Building Stability in Weak States: The Western Balkans
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Predrag Jurekovi_

PREFACE

"Building Stability in Weak States" was the topic of a workshop of the Woking Group "Crisis Management in South East Europe" of the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes which was held from 10-11 November 2001 in Tirana. It is no coincidence, however, that the initiative to develop this important topic for the development of security policy in South East Europe originated at the Albanian Institute for International Studies. Albania is seen as typical "weak State" in South East Europe, even though it has recovered from the quasi-civil war of 1997. This publication has ten articles by conference participants ranging from theoretical discussions to case studies from the region.

Most papers talk at length about what are the typical attributes of "weak States". **Albert Rakipi** (Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana/Albania) distinguishes between the terms "weak State" and "weak power". According to Rakipi "weak or strong states" refer to the degree of socio-political cohesion, while "big and small powers" refer to the military and economic power in comparison to other States. Rakipi argues in his study that lack of legitimacy is the primary source of State weakness in a number of South East European States in general and in the Balkans in particular. The Director of the Albanian Institute for International Studies sees a close correlation between the problem of missing political legitimacy and the weak or non-existent statal tradition in most States of the Balkans. **Filip Tunji_** (Centre for Strategic Studies, Ljublijana/Slovenia) thinks that the special geopolitical situation of the western Balkans is the core of their "weakness".

This Slovene analyst describes the historical role of South East Europe as border area between different centres of power and between cultural zones. The weakness of small States in the western Balkans (which is caused by strong external influences) shows itself as limited ability to conduct an autonomous foreign policy. In his contribution **Spyros Damtsas** (Balkan Trust Network, Athens/Greece) presents the thesis that only those States are stable where the population shares a common value system. Such a consensus of the citizens is missing in the crisis areas of South East Europe (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina). These States would therefore not constitute a political unity. **Enver Hasani**'s (Prishtina University, Pristina/Kosovo) contribution is the fourth paper with a theoretical focus. This extensive analysis discusses the preconditions for stability in a system of States and allocates, referring to the stabilisation of South East Europe, a central role in establishing a democratic and peaceful society in crisis areas to the West.

The contributions of **Janusz Bugajski** (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C./USA), **Aldo Bumçi** (Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana/Albania) and **Todor Mirkovi_** (Institute for Geopolitical Studies, Belgrade/Serbia and Montenegro) discuss the problems of a few "weak States" in the western Balkans. Bugajski criticises the international community for postponing a decision on the final status of the Kosovo time and again. This would weaken Kosovo, he claims, because it would remain dependent on external powers, even though Serb hegemony has ended. The American scientist advocates a step-by-step reduction of the UN-administration in Kosovo (while retaining the international military presence), because this would halt the process of state creation. Full governmental control should be transferred to the population of Kosovo. The problem of the unclear and temporary status of areas in South East Europe as important factor of regional instability is

central to Aldo Bumçi's contribution. He analyses the security political development in Montenegro. Bumçi sees a connection between the difficulties of the Montenegrin government in their attempts to conduct institutional and economical reform and the unsolved question of the status of Montenegro. The EU-brokered treaty of mid-March (which proposes a loose Serb-Montenegrin union) does not bring clarity to future Serb-Montenegrin relations. This treaty is a temporary measure which would not end the *de facto* separation. Todor Mirkovi_ analyses the current internal and external problems facing the Serb-Montenegrin State after the end of the Milo_evi_ era from a wide perspective encompassing the whole Yugoslavia. The basic preconditions for stable development in Serbia and Montenegro are the solution of internal order-political conflict, a good relationship to neighbouring States and the integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.

Antonio Leitao (NATO Defence College, Rome/Italy) and **Predrag Jurekovi_** (Bureau for Security Policy, Vienna/Austria) analyse in their papers the role of relevant International Organisations in stabilising the western Balkans. While Leitao describes the general possibility that NATO has to act as crisis manager, Jurekovi_ analyses what the EU did with respect to the crisis in Macedonia.

A "special case" in this publication is the Romanian contribution of **Constantin Hlihor** (University of Bucharest, Bucharest/ Romania). Romania is in kind of a "geographical limbo" between the former Eastern Europe and the Balkans. this special position finds its expression in the area of politics as well. On the one hand Romania counts as one of the East European States which are concerned with reforming their structure and are conducting negotiations to join the EU, on the other hand this State is actively engaged in projects of the "Stability Pact for South East Europe".

Hlihor's paper gives us an interesting overview of the activities of Romania in the stabilisation process for South East Europe.

It remains to say that I think that this working group is a small, but important contribution science can make to the process of stabilisation in South East Europe. In its unique way it brings together scientists from different areas of studies from South East Europe and, indeed, from the whole PfP area to exchange ideas and to develop new ways of overcoming the problems we are faced with in this dynamic region of Europe. I sincerely hope that we can continue the good work for a long time to come!

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Albert Rakipi

WEAK STATES - A VIEW FROM WITHIN

What are Weak States?

Although the phenomenon of weak states has not been uncommon in the arena of international politics, there has been relatively little research on weak states. There has been an increasing concern for the weak states during the first decade of the aftermath of the Cold War. This concern came about mainly due to the negative impact that a number of weak or failed states had or could have not only on their national security but also on international security issues.
The impact of negative spill-over effects of weak states on the international arena has been increasing, primarily due to the end of the Cold War. Previously, the deep separation into two opposing blocs and into a third unallied one limited the impact that weak states could have on the international arena. Another factor that has deepened the negative impact of weak states on national and international security issues is the changing nature of conflict in today's world. Most of the conflicts or wars during the last decade have been intra- rather than inter-state ones. Such were the wars that took place in the Balkans, wars that took place within the Yugoslav Federation. Thus, the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and later on in Bosnia were wars within the Yugoslav Federation until when the international community decided to recognize these countries as independent states. The latest conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was an internal one, as it was the case also with the '97 disturbances in Albania. The Kosovo War is another example of intra-state conflict. It was a war that took place within the rump Yugoslav Federation composed of Serbia and Montenegro, despite the fact that the parties in the conflict

represented different nations and ethnicities. Moreover, the conflict in Kosovo is one of the best examples to demonstrate the fact that intra-state conflicts constitute a real threat to the international security and order and not only to that of the local actors involved.
It is fair to say that international peace, however, does not seem to be jeopardized by war or conflicts between states. The issue now is how to secure peace within states.

According to Kalevi Holsti (1996), "the assumption that the problem of war (conflict) is primarily a problem of relations between states has to be seriously questioned ... The security between states in the third world, among some of the former republics of the Soviet Union, and elsewhere has become increasingly dependent upon security within those states. The classical formulae were: International peace and security provide an environment in which domestic politics can unfold untroubled by external disturbances. The equation is now becoming reversed. The problem of contemporary and future politics, it turns out, is essentially a problem of domestic politics".[1]
A functional global response to the serious threat that terrorism poses to global security requires that special attention be paid to weak or failed states. To a great extent, the roots of international terrorism lie in aching societies of weak states.
But, what are weak or failed states? Weak or failed states are "incapable of sustaining themselves as members of the international community".[2]
The civil wars, violence between communities, ethnic conflicts, collapse of governments, poverty and on top of it organized crime

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[1] **Kalevi Holsti**, The State, War, and the State of War (1996), p. 15.

[2] c.f.: **Barry Buzan**, People, States and Fear, 2nd ed. ( ); **Lawrence Freedman**, Weak States and the West, 32 Society (1994), Number 1, p. 17; **Gerad B. Helman, Steven R. Ratner**, Collapsing into Anarchy, Current (1993), Number 353, p. 33; **Albert Rakipi**, Weak States - new dynamics of security, Romanian Journal of International Studies (1999).

turned a number of the new states, that were declared or are being declared independent, into ungovernable land. Although there is no clear definition of each of these two categories there is a very evident commonality. This commonality relates to the weakness of the institutions. In fact, the major difference between weak and failed states is the degree of weakness of the institutions. When state institutions are weak but still functional to a certain extent, the state classifies as weak. If the institutional weakness is such that it incapacitates their functionality the state is considered to be failed.

What is important here is the concept of weaknesses of these states. According to Barry Buzan "States ... vary in terms of their degree of socio-political cohesion which is the very essence of what qualifies them to stand as members of the category of states ... When the idea and institutions of a state are both weak, then that state is in a very real sense less of a state than one in which the idea and institutions are strong.[3]
In order to clarify the concept of weak states, Barry Buzan emphasizes the fundamental differences between weak and strong states and between big and small powers. Weak or strong states refer to the degree of socio-political cohesion, while big and small powers refer to the military and economic power in comparison to other states. According to Barry Buzan, being a strong state in terms of institutional functioning does not depend on military or economic power. Weak powers such as Austria, Holland, Norway, Singapore or Switzerland are simultaneously strong states, while such relative big powers as Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, even big powers like China or Russia used to be and in some cases continue to be weak.[4]

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[3] *ibidem.*
[4] *ibidem.*

Nonetheless, there is a connection between being a big or relatively big power and a strong state. For instance, while Slovenia already has or is on the way of consolidating a strong state, it can never gain the status of power, even in the regional context. Or although Switzerland has a state that operates perfectly, it does not aspire to become a European power, much less a world power.

The Search for Legitimacy

Lack of legitimacy is the primary source of state weakness in a number of Southeastern European states in general and in the Balkans in particular. Here it is important to note that legitimacy does not pertain to the respective governments within the state, but has to do with the relationship between the state and the citizens in its most general meaning. Thus, legitimacy pertains to the experience that the people have to get organized in a modern state and to the extent that the state is accepted by its citizens as necessary in order to fulfil their need to be politically and socially organized. In this respect the Balkan states do not enjoy a high degree of legitimacy. At the very least, the extent to which the state is accepted and respected by the societies of Bosnia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania is much less as compared to that of the Western European ones.

There is an ongoing debate among scholars as to why the state developed in Europe as this particular form of social organization.[5] The modern state emerged in Europe "along with the coming of industry and of complicated commercial arrangements… the modern industry and commerce needed something like the state."[6]

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[5] cf: **Charles Tilly** (ed.), The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (1975).

[6] cf: **Phillips Shvely**, Power and Choice, 4th ed. (1987), p.110.

If the Balkan states and a number of Southeastern European and other states in the region are weak, one should first look at the origins of these states and how they were created in order to understand why they are weak. It is important to ask the following: what necessities brought about the creation of these states? They emerged relatively later then their Western European counterparts. The national movements that anticipated and set the grounds for the creation of these independent states were, with few exceptions, motivated by nationalism or resulted from the opposition to imperial or colonial systems. In any case these movements were not set in motion by the immediate necessities of modern industries and commerce. The movement that led to the creation of the state in Western Europe was a massive one, and although it was led by the emerging elite of the time it had a substantial popular backing. In the Balkans, on the other hand, the concept of the state was conceived and encouraged by an elite that identified the state with power.

The idea and the need for a state in Western Europe is more deeply felt as compared to that in societies of Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or even in Romania and Bulgaria. "States in industrial societies after more than 500 years of development, have become "strong" in the sense that for the first time in history, they enjoy popular legitimacy."[7]
In the Balkans, and generally in Southeastern Europe as well as in all the third world countries, a state tradition was lacking and therefore could not be the source of the legitimacy for the state, i.e., the long experience of the coexistence of the state and the citizens which in time translates the former - in the eyes of the public - into a necessity.
The reason why there is low acceptance of the state in countries such as Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria and so on

[7] **Kalevi Holsti**, The State, Fear and the State of War (1996).

should be sought in the authoritarian regimes or the communist dictatorships that came to power in these countries at the end of the Second World War. During the period of dictatorship the state was used against certain segments of the population. For nearly half a century the citizens of Albania and those of the other countries in the communist bloc, at the very least did not conceive of the state as a necessity and at the very best, more than half of these societies thought of the state as an instrument of repression that ensured the survival of the communist regime. The societies in the communist countries were deeply divided into those who supported and those who opposed the communist system. For a relatively long period of time in the human conscience of the Balkan countries and other countries in the communist bloc, the authoritarian regimes, and in the worst scenario extreme dictatorships, were identified with the state. Therefore, for the citizens of these countries the state never enjoyed legitimacy and was even perceived to be an evil for at least half of the society. For certain segments of society, on the other hand, as was the case not only for Albania, the state was a source of income and an instrument that was used to subjugate the rest of society. However, the phenomena of a clientele state, such as nepotism and localism that are still very present ten years after the fall of communism do not originate from the totalitarian states in the Balkans. These are not solely Balkan phenomena. It is probably fair to argue that the deep backwardness, economic underdevelopment and the isolation of these states from each other nourished and still nourish, a hundred years later, perceptions of the state as the primary source of personal gains.

The weakness of the state in most of the Balkan countries cannot be explained by the heritage of the communist period. The economic and political stagnation, the slow paste of the reforms or even the scarcity of ideas on how to reform and modernize society has its roots in the period before that of the communist regimes. Even before the Second World War these countries were closed agrarian economies with a very limited industrial sector.

In the meantime Western Europe had begun, for at least two hundred years, to practice liberal ideas in both the social and the economic realm. These ideas would find fertile ground and develop in the Balkans much later. In most of the countries in Southeastern Europe the liberal ideas and practices would develop simultaneously with the democratic ones. Usually, Liberalism and Democracy tend to go hand in hand. However, "it is possible for a country to be liberal without being particularly democratic, as was eighteenth-century Britain."[8]

Greece is perhaps another example where economic development and the development of liberal practices in general increased and strengthened the legitimacy of the state, despite the fact that democratic processes in Greece were interrupted by episodes of autocratic rule. Spain could be another example of the coexistence of autocratic rule on the one hand and liberal economic practices on the other.

Some instances of liberal practices in the region began to develop in the twentieth century, but they were rare and far between the whirlpools of conflict and violence. In the case of Albania such were few years under the rule of King Zog I. during which the state enjoyed some sort of legitimacy. Yugoslavia under Tito is another example in the Balkans where in the absence of democratic procedures the government experimented with liberal economic policies that were not completely unsuccessful.

After WWII most of the countries in the region, and particularly Albania, would become the grounds of some of the wildest experiments of the communist regimes that were trying to develop the Marxist concept of the state. According to this concept, the state is simply an instrument of power.

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[8] **Francis Fukuyama**, The End of History and the Last Man (1992).

The Legitimacy of a State's Institutions

At the essence of the existence of the state ever since its inception and under all kinds of regimes is the need to gain legitimacy or the trust and approval of society. Legitimacy vests the government and its structures with the authority to act.

Thus, another source of state weakness or failure in the Balkans or elsewhere has to do with the legitimacy of governance. Countries such as Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and many former communist countries began liberal economic policies and at the same time democratic procedures in order to determine who would govern the country. So, two processes had to take place simultaneously: the economic development and the transformation of the economy, completely centralized in the case of Albania and partially liberalized in the case of Yugoslavia. Also, for the first time in the history of many former communist countries, the legitimacy of the state would be determined through the open competition for power among different political groupings and through the participation of a public that had the right to elect and to be elected.

Would this imply, though, that the governments that were in place in Albania and Yugoslavia as well as in other countries of the former communist bloc before the dawn of democracy lacked any kind of legitimacy? Any government in any regime needs some kind of legitimacy in order to stay in power and to take action on behalf of society. As Socrates explains in Plato's Republic, even among a band of robbers there must be some principle of justice that permits them to divide their spoils.[9]

The communist government that came to power in Albania in 1944 did enjoy certain popular support. It was a legitimate government in the eyes of the public since it came out of the movement that put up the major resistance against the fascist invaders. At the time the

[9] *ibidem.*

legitimacy and power of this government could have been hardly successfully contested by another political movement. This was true for most of the communist governments that came to power in other countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. They did enjoy some legitimacy as organizers of the anti-nazi-fascist resistance. The other political groupings in these countries appeared compromised in the public eye due to their alleged collaboration with the nazi-fascist invaders.

Thus, for a relatively long period of time the communist governments continued to enjoy popular support and a considerable amount of legitimacy. This was also due to the achievements of these governments in the first decades after WWII. In the case of Albania, for example, the communist government strengthened its legitimacy by conducting land reforms at a massive scale. In a country where conditions of extreme poverty prevailed at the time, any steps towards the betterment of the life of the peasants in an overwhelmingly rural society gave a real boost to the legitimacy of Hoxha's communist government. The reforms, especially those in the agricultural sector, brought relative improvements in the living conditions of the populace, at least within the first two decades immediately after WWII.

In a similar fashion, the popularity and legitimacy of the Soviet government increased due to the rapid economic development of the Soviet Union after WWII.

Hitler's Germany in the Thirties is another good example of how a government attains legitimacy through successful economic reforms and development. “What solidified Hitler's hold on Germany and gave him a degree of legitimacy by the end of the 1930s was the results of his early policies. He reduced unemployment … he built the autobahn system of superhighways; he even pioneered the Volkswagen ‘Käfer’ automobile."[10]

[10] cf: **Phillips Shvely**, *supra* fn 6.

Tito's Yugoslavia is another good example that shows how a government can enjoy legitimacy through economic achievements. While in a number of communist bloc countries the economies were entering periods of recession and deep economic crises, the citizens of Tito's Yugoslavia enjoyed living standards that did not set them very far apart from other citizens in the developed Western European countries.

What the examples above have in common is not simply the fact that they demonstrate that economic achievements bring about legitimacy for the government. Another commonality the previous examples share is the fact that all the above mentioned countries were fascist or communist dictatorships at the time. Thus, at this point one could ask: Was it due only to their economic successes that these governments and their legitimacy were not contested for a certain period of time? To answer this question it is important to emphasize that in these dictatorships, both of the left and of the right, alternative views and processes were either routed from the very beginning or simply forbidden by law. Both in the case of a left-wing dictatorship and in that of a right-wing one the so-called civil society was smothered or subjugated. There was no free speech and the media was completely in the hands of the government.

The communist Albanian Government as well as many others of the former communist bloc managed to stay in power for many consequent decades despite the fact that the economic development came to a halt. In fact, the economic situation worsened, the country remained undeveloped, unemployment was large and poverty was soaring.

Therefore, when the Eastern and Southeastern European countries broke away from the communist system, they could not claim legitimacy simply on the prospects of future economic growth, but also on the premises of open democratic procedures and free competition of different political groupings through the participation of the citizens and the public opinion at large.

Almost all of the post-communist governments that replaced the communist ones in this part of Europe enjoyed an almost popular legitimacy. The coming to power of these governments marked the end of the one-party rule that had exhausted the population, ruined the economy and had disappointed the hopes of many. The governments that came to power in the early nineties were identified with the change from a totalitarian to a democratic system and they opened a new epoch for the people of the countries that had suffered under communism. The Albanian government of the Democratic Party, the first Albanian opposition that precipitated the fall of communism in Albania in 1992 was most probably as popular as the Albanian communist government of 1945, probably enjoying substantial legitimacy in the populace at large.

The experience of Albania after 1992 and in fact the experience of every former communist country shows that in an open society where various alternatives compete freely it is of primary importance to first secure the legitimacy of the institutions through democratic elections, and only afterwards seek legitimacy through economic successes. Thus, if at present time a number of Balkan countries classify as weak states the reasons should be sought in the distortions of those democratic procedures that legitimise the institutions of governance.

In Rump Yugoslavia, Serbia has just started to draw from this source of legitimacy for her government and institutions. During the last parliamentary elections in Bosnia–Herzegovina and even in Croatia the standards needed for these elections to be considered free and fair were not met. Macedonia is another good example where distortions in the electoral processes added to the internal problems of the country that resulted into a security crisis not only for Macedonia but also for the entire region. The prevalent political conflict and unsustainable stability in Albania ever since 1996 can be attributed to the movement away from democratic procedures

and standards. Ever since 1996 there have been serious violations during the electoral processes and the results of the elections have been contested by the two major political spectrums. A precondition for self-sustainable stability in these countries is the consolidation of democratic procedures to regulate the transfer of power from one political party to another. In most Balkan countries power has not yet been transferred through free and fair elections.

But how does the absence of legitimacy emerge in the weak states of the region? Multiethnic states count for the bigger part of weak states. In such cases societies can not become communities because of their division over ethnic basis (Macedonia). But the phenomenon is endemic even to nation states (Albania). In this situation the institutions do not function or function with serious deformations. There is a striking level of politically motivated violence, questionable and even unconstitutional use of the police and secret services.

In both categories, multinational and national, the absence of institutional legitimacy is the main reason for generating instability and even anarchy. The legitimacy of institutions is connected to democracy. Following the end of the Cold War, democracy is considered "as the conditio sine qua non for validating governance".

Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, even Serbia can be classified as weak states. This is due to either the absence or violation of the legitimacy of the institutions. Of course, the degree of weakness varies from country to country. State control over the media is easily perceptible in each of the countries. Physical violence, loss of jobs on political motivations or on ethnical basis, political arrests etc.

A common feature of all weak states is the identification of the state with the government. Security of government is mischievously interpreted as security of the state. So, if the government is endangered, the state and the nation are endangered. However, although the identification of the state with the

government is present in almost every weak state, it manifests itself in a variety of forms. For instance, in Albania, if the government collapses, the state collapses too; when a new government takes office, the new state starts to build.

Whereas in FYROM, the legitimacy of the institutions is questioned by the ethnic Albanians who account for no less than 40% of the country's population according to Albanian sources and no more than 22% according to official sources. The weak states combine "structural weaknesses with a regime, which is inherently divisive in representing only one part of the community"[11]. This is the case with Macedonia where the state has been established as the Macedonians' national state to represent their collective rights. The Macedonian experience but also the experience of other multiethnic states poses the critical question: is the institution of free and fair elections sufficient in order for the institutions of the state to be legitimate and the state to be strong? The parties of one ethnicity may win the majority in free and fair elections. Therefore, they will not find it necessary to involve political parties from other ethnic groups in government. Here the state is involved, not the government. By wining the majority in free elections, a certain ethnic group sets up its own state and deprives groups from other ethnicities from the right to state institutions. The Macedonians try to cover up the national state they are building ever since their UN-membership under the presence of a few Albanian ministers in the cabinet. In the meantime, the Albanian presence in the army, police, education, secret service, foreign service, etc is almost inhibited.

[11] **Steven R. Ratner**, *supra* fn 2.

Legitimacy through the Actions of the International Community

The international community is another source of legitimacy for the weak states. This legitimacy does not simply derive from recognition. Weak and even failed states have been recognized internationally and are members of the United Nations. However, there are other states that function quite efficiently, and stronger states that have not been recognized internationally. These states exist *de facto*, but they have not been recognized *de jure.* Such are Northern Cyprus and Taiwan.

If weak states are incapable to ensure their own normal survival, one would expect the international community to intervene. The engagement of the international community in order to support the weak states is necessary, as the weak states are not capable of maintaining themselves as members of the international community. This is not to say that the international community has always shown the same willingness and inclination to come to the aid of the weak states. In those instances when the presence of crisis-driven weak states has endangered or could potentially endanger the interests of the powers and institutions that constitute the so-called international community, the attention and the assistance given have been greater, swifter and more effective. This engagement of the international community has appeared quite early if we remember the forms of protectorate that the League of Nations and later on the United Nations proposed in order to come to the help of some new and weak states at the time.

How does the international community serve as a source of legitimacy for the governments of the weak states?

First of all, through economic aid, through programs for economic aid and reforms financed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund or other regional financial institutions. Most of the former communist countries, including the Balkans, had immediate

financial and economic needs when they began the reforms after the fall of the communist regime. Thus, the legitimacy that can be drawn is twofold. On the one hand, through the support received by these international institutions, and, on the other hand, through the higher chances of economic success that such a support brings about, which in turn means more legitimacy.

Thus, at least initially a lot of economic aid and later on many economic programs of the European Union, or from EU members, in countries like Albania, but also Romania and Bulgaria helped the first non-communist governments to reduce the social costs of the reforms that were necessary in order to move from a centrally planned to a market economy. At the same time a series of economic agreements or simply economic programs of the International Monetary Fund, European Union and so on, were viewed and propagated by the post-communist governments as achievements in the field of democratic transformation. Almost all the first post-communist governments viewed NATO and EU membership, or any steps towards such memberships as an indicator of their democratic rule, or as a passing grade for their legitimacy. Albania was the first country that signed the partnership for peace agreement and applied for NATO membership. This happened due to the determination of the political elite that put up a resistance against the communist regime to tie up the future of the country with the West and its institutions. It is fair to say, though, that the relations of the first post-communist Albanian government with NATO, EU or other Western countries were viewed as a source of legitimacy for the Albanian government by the international community itself. The same scenario took place with little variations in Romania and Bulgaria, the only major difference being that in Albania ever since the establishment of a multi-party system there was no major political force that would oppose, at least publicly, the western orientation of the country. When the Socialist Party (the former

Communist Party responsible for the total isolation of Albania and the fifty-year enmity towards the West) came to power in 1997, it maintained the orientation towards NATO, EU, USA and other Western institutions in its foreign policy.

Secondly, but not second, the international community serves as a source of legitimacy for the weak states through the special role that institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has taken upon itself. The legitimacy of the post-90 governments can not longer come from the barrel of the gun, since free and fair elections are not only perceived essential for legitimacy but also as an international norm. However, free and fair elections that have been accepted by all the actors still remain a challenge for a number of Balkan countries that still have to hold such elections in order to complete the peaceful transferring of power from one political party to another. OSCE and other institutions, such as ODIHR have not only observed but also conducted arbitration regarding various electoral processes in these countries. Although OSCE Missions have the status of the observer in electoral processes and write reports containing suggestions, it is fair to say that their conclusions are widely accepted as the final say regarding the validity of the elections. While in Kosovo, OSCE organized the elections, the conclusions of similar OSCE missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania as well as a number of former Soviet Union Republics were used as the criterion upon which the validity of the election process and the international standards were evaluated. This role of the international community seems to be not only necessary but also desirable especially for those weak states that manifest a conflictual political culture. However, in a number of cases double standards have been used by the international community in evaluating and legitimising election results.

"There has been a tendency especially in the Balkans to make a compromise with the international standards with regard to free

and fair elections, i.e. escaping from these standards, which starts with the elections of September 1996 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was followed by the elections of April 1997 in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia, and it reached its peak with the Parliamentarian elections in June 1997 in Albania."[13]

In the case of Macedonia, for example, the international community shunned away from major problems in the Macedonian–Albanian relationship within the newly created state of Macedonia. The internal Macedonian problems pertaining to the consolidation of the common institutions were either postponed or ignored by the international community. The attempt to preserve regional stability at the expense of domestic problems was the prevailing theme of the international community in the Balkans, Macedonia and Kosovo for a long time.

The outburst of armed violence in the spring of this year (2001) tore that deceiving veil of a multiethnic state, unveiling thus the undemocratic methods and procedures this state was functioning upon. The control of the state, the decision-making process and even the executive branch were in the hands of the Macedonian ethnicity; the army, the police force, as well as other security bodies were almost entirely composed of Macedonians.[14] The very decision to crush the armed uprising through the use of violence implies that the Albanian population, although it did have some representatives in government, was not consulted and left out of the decision-making process. The Media and the political elite also reflected the deep division between the two major ethnicities.

However, Macedonia had been viewed by the international community as a success story of ethnic co-existence.[15] When the

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[13] See Albania's parliamentary election of 1997 prepared by the staff of the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[14] cf: **Albert Rakipi**, Albanian in the Balkans, AIIS (2001), Albanian edition.

[15] **International Crisis Group**, Macedonia's Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf (2000).

Balkans became engulfed in a series of wars, preserving the territorial integrity of Macedonia was thought to be a decisive need. Through all its actions and initiatives the international community gave its unreserved support to the Macedonian government, making it immune to criticism. In this way the international community ignored or postponed those matters that were eating away the internal stability of the country. Legitimate concerns about the security of Macedonia quite often have been used as justifications in order to postpone difficult decisions about problematic internal matters.[16] The international community is thus at least partially responsible for creating a false or at least unreal image of harmonious ethnic co-existence in Macedonia. Thus, one of the issues that have been continuously contested by both Albanians and Macedonians is the percentage of the Albanian population in Macedonia. According to official sources, Albanians do not constitute more than 22% of the entire population of the country, whereas the Albanians claim 40% of the population if not more. The real number of the Albanians is certainly greater than that given by the official census.[17] However, the second census that was monitored by the international community under the auspices of the OSCE (1994) gave a number that is almost identical to that of the government statistics, 22.09%.

Another instance in which the international community turned a blind eye, was the reduction of the number of Albanian deputies in the Macedonian parliament, by reorganizing the electoral districts so as to favour the Macedonian electorate. Those electoral districts assigned to an Albanian electorate had on average 1.5 times more voters than those with a Macedonian electorate.

The parliamentary elections of 1996 in Albania were characterized by serious shortcomings. The opposition withdrew, undermining the electoral process. The international community through OSCE

[16] *ibidem.*

[17] *ibidem.*

reports did not accept the distorted victory of the Democratic Party undermining thus the legitimacy of the government and its institutions.

In the 1997 early parliamentary elections the international community backed a compromise that denied access to half of the country to one of the two major competing political parties. The international community recognized the results of the elections as acceptable given the circumstances of the 1997 crisis in Albania. This meant a movement away from those democratic standards that had been considered sacred and a legitimacy test up to then. Perhaps, given the circumstances, this was the lesser evil, however, basing a four-year term for the winning party on the results of such elections did not contribute to the stability of the country. The government that came to power was viewed as illegitimate by the opposition and its electorate. At the same time those who came to power through the armed rebellion felt obliged to include in important sectors of the administration, such as the security and the finances, individuals that were identified with the armed wing of the Socialist Party, for which there were allegations of connections with the organized crime and smuggling activities. This in turn undermined the legitimacy of the government and its institutions, delaying thus further the rule of law.

The last parliamentary elections in Albania were also characterized by serious violations, and neither the country, nor the institutions that came out of these elections were recognized as legitimate by the opposition. The international community which deeply influences the domestic policies of Albania, while recognizing the serious violations that occurred during the elections, seems to have been led by considerations other than democratic procedures, such as regional stability, when concluding that the elections were acceptable.[18] The parliamentary elections in Albania took place

[18] See Albanian Parliamentary election the report of OSCE.

while Macedonia was going through its worst internal crisis ever since it came into existence.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that weak states are not a new phenomenon in the international arena it is important to note their increasing importance in world politics due to irreversible Globalisation trends. In today's world the negative impact that a weak state has on national security and stability can quickly affect regional and international security and stability parameters. It is for this reason that deeper research and a deeper understanding of the weak state phenomena is needed. As the examples from the Southeastern European countries show, at the root of the weak state phenomena are the legitimacy crises, weak institutions and old trends and mentalities. The concept of legitimacy is very important here. It has to be understood both in the framework of the state and that of governance. In the state context it pertains to the shred traditions and experiences that the citizens have had in building and living under a common state. Legitimacy of governance, on the other hand, while it is related to the legitimacy of the state is also closely connected with efficiency and democratic procedures that are open and fair.

Here the international community has an important role to play, not only because the international community serves as a source of legitimacy, but also because it upholds democratic standards and procedures. In many weak states the international community has gained a status that allows it to arbitrate among different political groups. For this reason it is important that democratic principles and norms are applied uniformly across different countries and scenarios and be sacrificed due to short-term security and stability

concerns. Only in this way can sustainable, prosperous and democratic stability be achieved, and the weak states strengthened.

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WEAK STATES OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE IN BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS

1. Introduction

With this paper, I wish to offer an insight into some of the politico-geographical aspects of the stability of weak states in Southeastern Europe with respect to their position “in between”, regarding the powers outside this region.
Indisputably, Southeastern Europe has traditionally been saturated with internal sources of instability. But the question is whether they are always autochthonous, until we place them into wider regional, European, Eurasian and global geopolitical and geo-strategic frameworks.

2. Background

Allow me to say some words at the start about the determination of the term “weak state”.
My starting point for defining a “weak state” is the term “small state”. This implies a question if a small state is the same as weak state. This is not necessarily so but it is as a rule. Nor is a large state necessarily at the same time also a power state.
However, the term “weak state” may be defined considering various aspects. Without entering into the various theoretical approaches, I am in this case taking as starting point the fact that “weak states” have fewer possibilities of choice in the decision-making processes and are more occupied with survival. At the

same time they also have limited influence on their own and foreign policy.

Thus, my view on the weak state proceeds from the state's position in the wider distribution of power, and hence from the consideration that "the most obvious fact about small powers is that their foreign policy is governed by the policy of others". In addition to this, the size of a country in terms of its territory and population does not automatically reflect its power, but rather its force. Notwithstanding this fact, the term "weak state" can be applied usefully to describe those countries suffering from a lack of power and which are small in terms of territory. "From this point of view, a weak or small state is any state in the international system that does not belong to the category of the power…." (*quoted by Handel, 1990: 11*).

Thus, in this discussion I can proceed using the terms "small state" and weak state as synonyms.

Figure 1: Europe in Between



2.1 The Position of SEE in the Europe in Between

Presently, Southeastern Europe is only the southern arm of the "Europe in Between" and for many reasons should be treated as such. The "Europe in Between", often called "Central" and "South-Eastern Europe", is the European area in which the four European Empires were in touch, making out and paying their mutual accounts to the 1914.

The "Europe in Between" is a rough translation of the original expression in German "*Zwischeneuropa"*, which came into use during the first phase of the collapse of the European "Concert of

the Four Empires", recovering that by the super powers in the Eurasian and European territorial and security order and the security and geopolitical division of Europe into Western and Eastern Europe (*Kennedy, 1987*)[1]. Evidence to the region involving a group of small states whose status has always been disputable is provided by a long list of unclear designations such as: "Eastern Europe", "Central Europe", "*Mitteleuropa"* or "*Mittellage"*, "East-Central Europe", "the marching lands of Europe" or other more expressive terms such as: "borderlands of the West", "the soft core of Europe", "the grey area", "*cordon sanitaire*", "*barrière de l'est"*, or "*die Schützerzone*". The original term *"Zwischeneuropa"* was introduced by the Czech writer and philosopher Toma_ Masaryk[2]. He described the region as "*zwischen Westen und Osten, zwischen den Deutschen und Russen*", that is, "between West and East, between the Germans and Russians". This is a kind of "Middle Europe" which presently includes nineteen countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece.

Concerning stability and security the warning that the fragmentation of the region into small states (*Kleinestaaterei*)[3] would lead to "fatal instability" was given immediately after the creation of these states. The non-living (weak) nation-states, each in conflict with one another and internally disunited "could become chess figures in the game of the big powers". The transformation of the principle of national self-determination into a system of territorial states was described by Wilson's Secretary of State, Lansing, as a utopian idea that raises false hopes and inevitably leads to new conflicts. Immediately after the creation of the

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[1] According to Kennedy, the second phase of the collapse of European forces occurred after the Second World War.

[2] **T.G. Masaryk**, Das neue Europa. Der slawische Standpunkt (1922).

[3] Hungarian social democrat Jazi, for example.

"Europe in Between", the analysts of the new territorial system described the national territorial borders as fences (imaginary or physical), on which the questions concerning war and peace and the life and death of nations are temporarily hanged (*Bowman, 1928:31*).

After WWII, during period of the bipolar European security order, the "Europe in Between" was included in the bipolar world and served as a buffer between the two security systems.

However, it should be mentioned that all the states of SEE of that time were created before the whole "Europe in Between" was created. During about 100 years they appeared as vassal, semi-independent and independent states, building their own political, national and territorial identities and autochthonism, mainly inside Ottoman Empire, and served as buffer, peripheral or edge areas[4]. However, it happened first of all through a crossways of the interests of the powers around, and only after that political leaders and peoples in Southeastern Europe.

[4] Terms as are Ukrajine, Vojna krajina in Slavic languages mean edge, margin, as frontier provinces, frontispiece etc.

Figure 2: The weakness of South East European States

Category*	Largeness	The States in the SEE (km2)
Very large	> 2.5 mil. km2	[Russia, 4.858.000]
Large	350.000 to 2,5 mil. km2	*[Ukraine, 603.700; Germany, 357.021]*
Medium-size	150.000 to 350.000 km2	Romania (237.500) *[Italy, 301.230]*
Small	25.000 to 150.000 km2	Macedonia (25.713), Albania (28.748), BiH (51.129), Croatia (56.538), FR Yugoslavia (102.173), Bulgaria (110.912), Greece (131.944), Moldova (33.700).
Very small	under 25.000 km2	Slovenia (21.271).
*According to Glassner's classification		

Presently, the "Europe in Between", leaving aside the Ukraine, extends over 20.5% of the area of Europe and includes 50% of European countries.

In Southeastern Europe, 26.3% of the European countries occupy 8% of the surface area and are inhabited by 10% of the total population of Europe. Only Romania is medium-sized, the rest are small countries. Besides Romania, only three other countries considerably exceed 100.000 km^2 in area, while all the others range in size between 21.000 and 55.500 km^2. During the last decade, the number of countries in Southeastern Europe doubled. The collapse of former Yugoslavia led to the emergence of five entirely new weak states. For example, only the European part of Turkey (23.623 $km^{2)}$ is larger then Slovenia, and very near in size to Macedonia, Albania or Moldova.

2.2 Southeastern Europe in the "New Geopolitical Structure"

By the term "new geopolitical structure" I understand the territorial system created by the actual re-territorialisation[5] at the global, Eurasian, European and regional levels. This is marked by the dialectic of individualisation, diversification and localisation as well as (re)nationalisation, regionalisation, and re-imperialisation (*Newman, 1999; Wæver, 1997, 1997a; Foucher, 1993, 1998; Paasi, 1986, 1999; Mlinar, 1994; Kürti, Langman, 1997*). Although this is a dialectic process, I am, in this case, interested in regionalisation and re-imperialisation whose geopolitical dimensions mostly determine stability and security in Southeastern Europe, by pushing it to the edges of wider territorial systems and delegating it the function of a periphery or border area. It is the latter that I wish to continue this discussion with.

Southeastern Europe "In Between" in the "*new global geopolitical structure"*

"A 'new' geopolitics - offering fresh perspectives on the relationship between geography and politics - is important to the development of sound, balanced, and realistic paradigms for geopolitics offers the spatial conceptual basis for the new world map" (*Cohen, 1994: 15*). Cohen put the word "new" geopolitics in inverted commas because the hopes for the emergence of a new world order had been quickly dispelled. On the way, STRATFOR analysts, within the context of the NATO offensive on the FR of Yugoslavia in 1999, stated that "the post-cold war world quietly ended in 1998", which means that the battle for the spheres of interest and domination has effectively just started.

Cohen's analysis covers two types of the re-orientation and realignment of political territorial units at all levels of the geopolitical chart - territorial and political.

The first one may be considered in a classical geographical way.

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[5] Re-territorialisation is understood as the process opposite to deterritorialisation, which is founded on globalisation and is intended to lead to a non-territorial global society.

The "new" world will be divided into *two geostrategic or geopolitical realms* - the maritime and the Eurasian continental - "arenas of strategic place and movement". Second on the hierarchy list and within and out of the geostrategic realms are the geopolitical regions, shaped by contiguity and political, cultural, military and economic interaction, and influenced by historical movement.
The region that I described as the "Europe in Between" is, in this context, presented as the gateway region of Central and Eastern Europe, which as a *transitional zone can facilitate contact and interchange between the two realms*.

Figure 3: Southeastern Europe as the two-fold gateway: to the East and to the Middle East



(Source: Cohen, 1994)

What seems to be very important is that our Southeastern Europe is twofold gateway. It is between geostrategic realms and at the same time also gateway toward second outside geopolitical region named a Schatterbelt region covering Near and Middle East (Figure 3). Thus Southeastern Europe is truly specific fault line along which geopolitical divisions are emerging (again).
Only third on the hierarchy list are the nation-states which are ranked in hierarchy with regard to the position *of their power*

within the world system. The "*gateway territories*" which are currently components of the sub national, or *fourth level* of the hierarchy represent a special category. Gateways are embryonic states that can accelerate exchanges that will stimulate the evolution of larger states from which the gateways have spun off.

Politically, according to Cohen, the world is becoming multipolar with a *hierarchy of states within the system*. The position of a state on the system's hierarchy list will be determined *by its capability to project its own power*. The list will not remain static, and the positions of the states on it will be *changing constantly*.

However, on top of the list are five major forces or centres of the first order: the USA, a maritime and sole military and economic colossus; Russia and China[6], military strong but economically relatively weak land Eurasian forces; Japan and the European Union, economically dominant but without sufficient military capabilities.

The second place on the list is occupied by regional forces which have challenged and changed the bipolar and multipolar world, but have not displaced the major powers. Rather, they have become absorbed within an evolving system. They are located within individual regions that are already dominated by a major force and cannot represent any serious challenge. "Second-order states may have regional hegemonic aspirations, but such hopes are far from reality", says Cohen. "In general, then, the destiny of second-order powers is not to achieve hegemony over an entire geopolitical region. Rather, it is to exercise broad regional influence, with hegemony having practical significance only in relation to proximate states".

Third-order states influence regional events in special ways. They compete with neighbouring regional powers on ideological and political grounds or in having a specialised resource base, but

[6] In contrast to Mackinder, Spykman and R. Nixon, who considered China as a maritime force.

lacking the population, military, and general economic capacities of their second-order rivals. In the “Europe in Between”, only Poland has been rated as a third-order state among the countries (*Cohen, 1999*). Among the sates of the fourth-order, he mentions only the Sudan and Ecuador, and puts Nepal in the fifth group, stating that all these countries "have only marginal external involvement".

Let me also point out that Slovenia is described as a state which "can be a prototypical gateway state" providing markets for raw materials from Serbia, Croatia, and whatever other states emerge on the space of former Yugoslavia and facilitate industrial development and innovation that could be diffused to the new southern states.

Figure 4: Southeastern Europe as the convergence area of the three Civilisations

(Source: Hupchick&Cox, 1996:Map 4)

The frontier's position of Southeastern Europe within the new global geopolitical structure is also determined by Huntington's concept of clashing civilisations (*1998*). Huntington looks for the co-ordinates of the new system in the return to cultural and religious values. Brill sees the essence of the concept in the fact that geoculture is becoming a new factor of world politics (*Brill, 1997*).

The strengthening of the conscience of nations over the whole world is no longer a national matter but has rather been raised to the level of belonging to particular cultural and civilisation circles. "The world will be organised on the basis of civilisations or will not be organised at all. The world in which the major states play the leading or dominant role is a world of spheres of influence. Where major states exist, they represent the central element for the new international system founded on civilisations". The result of

all this is that the areas of conflict in the world are increasingly emerging along the lines demarcating the civilisations. The differentiation between these civilisations is deep and is deepening further. The current task of the West is the "efficient exploitation of international institutions and the application of such military power and economic resources as will guarantee the maintenance of Western dominance, protect its interests and promote Western political and economic values" whereby America personifies the West.

Running from the Barents Sea, along the eastern edges of the “Europe in Between”, turning towards the West in Romania and joining up the former Austrian military frontier (Vojvodina and Croatia) Huntington’s line separates Western from Eastern Christianity whereby Bosnia and Herzegovina represents the area of the convergence of both the Christian and Islamic faiths. From here, it extends towards the East through Sand_ak and Kosovo separating, in one part, the Islamic and Orthodox religions, and separating the Montenegrin and Greek Orthodox faith from the Orthodox heartland, in another part. In the Southeast and along the Bulgarian coast of the Black Sea, it once again separates Islam from Orthodoxy.

Thus, Southeastern Europe represents a triple border area - that of Western Christianity towards Eastern Orthodoxy in the East and towards the Islamic world in the South and, at the same time, of both Christian faiths towards the Islamic world. This is the area of convergence of the three great religions where, according to Huntington, it is not easy to construct the dividing line between civilisations in clash. In his study entitled "The Clash of Civilizations" Huntington has used the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example through which he has elaborated his thesis on the ending of the ideological confrontation, which will be replaced by the confrontation between civilisations and three religions that have been taken as the best illustration of divisions,

which are also marking the zone of confrontation (*Vukadinovi_, 1997*).

2.3 Southeastern Europe "In Between" in the new European imperial system

This part is aimed to proceed to keep looking to position of Southeastern Europe regarding the new European geopolitical structure.

European integration and disintegration constitute part of the changes of the political space, in which the reterritorialisation means the creation of the new territorial functional systems. Such orientation of European Union dictates the extension of its security and defence perimeters towards the extreme territorial boundaries of the Union and beyond.

Figure 5: Southeastern Europe as the "grey zone" regarding the Balance-of-power in Europe

(Source: Wæver, 1997:66)

What is important in this context is that Europe is traditionally an area of balance of power in which we can see Southeastern Europe as the peripheral “grey zone”. However, due to known historical facts, analysts talk of the European Union as the "neo-medieval" Europe in the spirit of medieval Christianity, the time when the European political idea rises in opposition to the "pagans".

Analysts have observed that the process of European reterritorialisation is leading to the territorial reorganisation of the Eurasian space, especially at the touchlines of Europe where numerous nations served to hold off the "others". The "others" are still talking about the creation of a European identity in opposition to Russia and the wider East. Here, the tendencies to define a new border line between the East and West are what Kjellen has called the "Great Cultural Divide", i.e., the use of history and religion in order to define the "others" on the other side, in military and cultural terms (*Tunander, 1997: 19-20*).

They are talking, at least metaphorically, of an European empire centred in Brussels with the periphery towards other imperial centres, Ankara and Moscow. Analysts generally agree, in the case of the European Union, that it's a matter of a return to an imperial system structure consisting of the following:

Figure 6: Integrated Europe and the Structure of Imperial Organized Systems



(Wæver, 1997: 64&67)

- the central region (direct rule),
- a circle of dominions with peripheral or local autonomous authorities who undisputedly accept the supremacy of the centre,
- a circle of units with almost full internal independence, but with limitations in the field of their foreign policy, and certainly with a prohibition of mutual war (the hegemony circle),
- a circle of units as recognised independent countries, albeit unequal, whereby the loyalty of leaders to other systems is also recognised (independent countries).

The system of territorial concentric circles also exemplifies the hierarchy of the distribution of power and the interests of the

centre. More concretely, regarding the European Union, the hierarchical territorial system is represented by the structure from the "centre" around Brussels to the "periphery", and then followed by the "others". The system of territorial concentric circles also exemplifies the hierarchy of the distribution of power and the interests of the centre. The imperial ambitions in the European area which may, likewise, be felt or expected are harboured by Russia and Turkey, as can be seen by their policies in Southeastern Europe.

The imperialisation of the European space is characterised also with traditional rivalry of Germany, Russia and Turkey. The last two, due to their imperial legacy and geographical location, are even today wavering between the national and imperial vision of their identity (*Wæver, 1997; Hassner, 1997*)[7]. Therefore, it is a matter of the already familiar Europe of several imperial systems with centres and peripheries which may become a reality, especially in the event of the failure of the European Union project. As Wæver (*1997:79*) observes, "In the Yugoslav case, EU logic is to be involved too little rather than too much in peripheral European affairs. If the EU collapsed, the Great Powers that would emerge - Germany, France and Italy - would be much more inclined to intervene completely. In a European arena of rivalry,

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[7] Hassner argues that France and Great Britain were also European Imperial forces but outside European territory.

One of the major topics of the forecasts made by STRATFOR staff for the first decade of the 21st century was "Europe Comes in Crossroads", "Germany as a Foundation Stone" (or keystone, "The New European Strategic Environment" and "European Dis-synchronisation"). Although the analysts strongly reject the forecast that something serious will happen during the decade, they have nonetheless clearly analysed the obstacles to the building of the European Union and have hinted at security and defence dis-synchronisation with respect to the position of Germany (and Poland), which is emerging with the return of the Russian Armed Forces to the eastern Polish border and, as such, to the NATO border and with the possible integration of the Ukraine.

sub-regional gains would not be unimportant, gains in the Balkans would count. For the EU, the aim is to lift itself to the level of a global political-economic actor and thus to avoid being caught up in old-fashioned, local struggles".

Instead of a system of sovereign states, we shall have to deal with complex centralised cultural/political structures of semi-independent states, with a uniquely complicated dualistic or double-headed *suzerain state-system* (*Wight, 1977*). In such a system, the importance and status of the states will depend on their position in the imperial territorial hierarchy of concentric circles from the centres towards their peripheries. This is what Taylor described as the imperialist system characterised by the operation of two types of state: "the core" (centre) and the periphery, with two classes of citizens operating in each of the groups: the rulers and the ruled (*Taylor, 1997: 110-111*).

In this context, Southeastern Europe is undoubtedly shifting to the function of the border area and convergence space, in which there is a likelihood of sovereign states being hardly recognisable. Instead of this they will be entrenched into lumps or sheaf of the weak states forming the intermingling border or tampon areas, with the centres providing them some form of "soft security".[8] Only some of them will have relatively more freedom for manoeuvres inside peripheral areas (not only because of position in this sense).

[8] As was introduced by Olav F. Knudsen for the Baltic States during an international Partnership for Peace seminar "Security in the Northern European Region", Stockholm, December 1999.
There have been trends towards defining Europe without the Balkans, to define "The Balkans" as non-European.

Figure 7: SEE in the new global and European geopolitical structure



(Source: Wæver, 1997:77)

Is it then strange that the main ambition of the states in the area is to escape the tampon status (*glacis*) although it is not yet clear whether this is possible at all (*Foucher, 1998: 236*).

Figure 8:Borders, borders and borders, but what about the weak states in between?



2.4 Southeastern Europe with respect to the new borders of wider functional territorial systems

For decades now, it has been repeated at almost all public gatherings that territory is no longer important and that we are building a Europe without separating borders while, at the same time, new separation lines and divisions are being created. It is undisputable that boundaries are a part of economy, security and strategy. With the shifts and the creation of new economic, security, military and other territorial systems, a system of functional boundaries is being developed, which is in contrast to the requirements for stability and security in Southeast Europe and the small states of the region.

"The First Europe" (*Brzezinski, 1995*) or "The European Fortress" (*Mann, 1993*) was created with the adoption of the so-called Schengen Border, while the enlargement of the European Union and NATO is meant to guarantee Europe a security belt, i.e., a periphery and, in that way, a "soft" contact with the East. A look at the illustration of the movement and formation of territorial

boundaries clearly shows the border and convergence function of Southeastern Europe and its very complicated position. Are state territorial boundaries of the weak states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe keeping their autochthonous functions or do they abandon them in favour of the functions of borders of wider territorial systems? The concept of the enlargement of the European Union envisages the creation of peripheral states of the Union which are, today, already performing the frontal protection of the Schengen border. Russia shares no border with the Schengen Europe and very likely will not have any such border even after the European Union enlargement. In the sector of the Balkans or Southeastern Europe, we have now all three (SHE, EU and NATO) boundaries and borders corresponding to the same location, but with the NATO military operational bridgehead and forward lines of their own troops, observation posts, operational bases and forward positions in the Weak States of the Balkans.

It is clear that the role of Southeastern Europe as a border area is traditionally and presently also manifested in its peripheral position with respect to the Russian sphere of interest. Looking at the second picture of the Figure 8 this is evident also by the current security doctrine of the Russian Federation. As a Eurasian force, Russia inherited strategic interests that may be seen in the conceptualisation of its national security policy. The states of Southeastern Europe are located in the 3rd and 4th circles of Russian security interests about which the Russian Federation may bargain with the West whether these countries could be her allies in the formation of *ad hoc* political alliances against the West, especially the USA (*Grizold, Ferfila, 2000: 91).*

3. Instead of a conclusion

However, our Southeastern Europe is like the frontier area of everything. Given what has been said above, it is not difficult to conclude that the weaknesses and the smallness of the SEE countries is highly conditioned by the position of the region “In Between”, on the intermingling edges and peripheries of powers and empires, serving as a gateway between realms. None of the SEE states belongs to the first circle of any system, and all are vulnerable to the conflicting nature of the border area in which the empires meet or where, to a less or more extent, their peripheries overlap. These are areas in which the European Union, NATO and individual forces expand, through a combination of economic, diplomatic and security (military) mechanisms, their new functional borders. The transformation of the "*First Europe*" (*Brzezinski, 1995*) or the "*European Fortress*" (*Mann, 1993*) into the Schengen Europe and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO towards the East have, primarily, geopolitical, geostrategic and security intentions, i.e., to create new functional and security borders which will be dislocated from the official borders of these territorial security systems, and to create their own peripheries (*Foucher, 1998*).

The citizens of the states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe bordering with Schengen Europe are now "foreigners" who are subjected, upon entering Schengen Europe, to all the procedures of classical and thorough border control.

Foucher has posed a question: "Is the concept of 'frontierisation' adequate to understand better what the essence of the European Union is? (*Foucher, 1998:236*). In the same way, I am also posing the following question: Is the concept of the 'frontierisation' of Southeastern Europe (and the wider Eastern and Southeastern Europe) adequate to understand better what the essence of the stability and security of the weak states in the region is?

It is clear that Southeastern Europe consumes more history than it is capable of locally digesting. It also appears that its history is difficult to digest even for the UN, NATO, EU, Russia, and individual European forces. Has this region really been condemned to endemic instability and constant conflicts forever, and have the Balkans bred congenital barbarity which effectively obstructs peaceful co-existence? Have we, first of all, asked ourselves where and who we are? Although the region has been decomposed again, becoming periphery, and testing field for “democracy”, but also for military, weapons, power-relations… answers to all questions of their destiny must be found by peoples of this region. One thing is certain: nobody can do it but we ourselves.

Many times during our discussion today the question was how our weak states should become strong states. I think this is not the right question. The more important issue is actually how our weak states are to become “normal weak states”.

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POLITICAL UNITY AS A PREREQUISITE TO STATE SUSTAINABILITY

Political science is keen on definitions. How shall we define the state and on what political basis will we legitimise its existence, on what principle shall we delineate its borders, what is the changing nature of sovereignty, etc.
In the post-cold war period an array of new questions arose, pertaining to the fragmentation of the Soviet Empire and the Yugoslav Federation and the emergence of urgent national claims latent in the cold war period.

Thus, states emerged through civil war and secession and there appeared the necessity for defining or constructing a whole new environment referring to their internal organization (New Constitutions, power-sharing arrangements in the government) and also defining their relations with the new international environment. However, ethnic claims and ethnic rivalries albeit leading to the emergence of a new state proved a two-edged sword and undermined the existence of these states.

Trying to reverse contending principles into converging realities is not an easy task. In the former Yugoslavia, specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina, self-determination and the inviolability of state borders, both legally accepted principles of the international community, confronted each other. To cope with this complex reality the international community tried to forge concepts and patterns of ethnic co-existence, which sometimes reflected the great power interests while at other times exposing inadequacy between challenges and means to confront them. The Bosnia war and Dayton agreement best illustrate the above points. As H.

Kissinger points out in his recent book, “In this manner, the United States, at the Dayton negotiations in 1995, drifted toward insisting on a multiethnic, unified Bosnian state despite the fact that, until it was created in 1992, Bosnia had never been an independent state. For at least five hundred years, Bosnia had been a province at the frontier between the Austrian and Ottoman empires. NATO’s 1992 recognition of an independent sovereign state of Bosnia inevitably called into being a civil war, not a country. Given that past, insistence on a multiethnic state at the end of the civil war in effect committed NATO to a permanent occupation role to preserve the peace.”

Nevertheless, Dayton is the present reality and the future of Bosnia is at stake. What are the conditions of its survival? And who is going to be accountable for its collapse? Does Bosnia and Herzegovina. comprise the necessary elements for a viable state? And what are these elements?

Conditions for the formation of a state are twofold: one referring to the external international environment and one pertaining to the internal forces of the state and the juridical conditions for its existence. What this paper argues is that a part of the general, international or regional setting that can sustain a state, the most important condition of state viability, consists of the internal political dynamic on which the secret of its creation depends and provides the cultural basis, symbols, beliefs, customs and geography which hold this state together. Political unity is defined as the common belief of a community of people who occupy a certain geographical area and constitute a distinct entity determined by history, race, ethnicity or any other freely expressed, subjective- but nonetheless legitimate- political option. Political unity is the synonym of state allegiance and chosen citizenship. If citizenship is to mean a more active and participating concept rather than a status of ‘rights and obligations’, which is not inconsistent with inter-ethnicity, we conclude that political unity is an indispensable condition for the

sustainability of any state. The absence of such unity keeps denuding the state of its political bases, therefore rendering it a mere institutional structure, an empty framework sustained by external or simply non-viable internal forces.
The existence of 'weak states' in the Balkans presupposes the existence of a policy which implies that those states are or remain weak. The existence of small states does not necessarily mean that they are not viable. From Singapore to Cyprus there is evidence that a state, however small, can be viable.
There is always a comparative advantage to be exploited, given either by geography or geology, or constructed by the civil and human capital of the specific country. In the Information Age, where Science and Technology dominate the Economy (based on services and computer application) human capital is the major factor of the surplus – value. The absence of a large State Market is not a handicap in a globalised economy. Isolation is the problem, not the size.

Human capital takes years to build and needs stable institutions (education, economic structures etc.), but all these presuppose a necessary condition: political will. In the Balkans, however, we are even prior to that stage, we need to know on what basis the states will be formed . Moreover, if the state does not manage to hold together for a decade one should not start to call into question its politicians, its economic performance or its international pressures, but its state fundamentals. The later consists of a political unity based on colour, ethnic origin, religion, geography or any other criteria. In this context it is preferable to refer to the notions of phantom-states, artificial states, imposed states, convenient states, keen states rather than to weak states.

For example, if Montenegro were to be created as an independent state, would it owe its existence to its heroic past under Prince

Nicolas or rather to the anti-Milosevic campaign of the West? The same– more or less- applies to Kosovo's future status.
The new "Macedonian" State is the best example of neglecting the condition of political unity, on which I have insisted. In that particular country, everything seemed to be favourable. Its pivoting centre in the Balkans, in terms of trade, communication and population movements; its pro-Western attitude; its position as an oasis of peace in the area and its fame as a multi-ethnic success story. All collapsed, not just because of Kfor favouritism or other secret plotting, nor even west indifference but because the basis of the new Macedonian state was not what it was supposed to be, the multi-ethnic, citizen-based state serving the whole of its society. It seemed like a state that constitutionally imposed an identity even for Slavs. When Belgium and Quebec still struggle about ethnic or linguistic balances, why do we think that Skopje could be better off? Recent events in Albania, too, (Tropoja incidents) illustrate the flaws of the political unity due to specific social factors which we do not intend to discuss in the present paper.

I intend to comment on the failures of international organisations concerning institution building and legitimising state structures, specifically in Bosnia and Republika Srpska.
The international community is confronting a major dilemma: according to its mandate it is bound to secure the function of democratic institutions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it has to impose on those institutions the terms of their function. In other words its mandate can be described as 'imposing democracy' which, in my view, is a contradiction in terms. The role of the international community is best illustrated by the powers of the High Representative (OHR) to impose laws and dismiss public officials. It is considered that such legislative power is an important tool for building the state institutions. The experience of this political arrangement shows the limits of what the international community can achieve without the support of the leaders and

institutions of the two entities. Due to the failures of the implementation of the peace agreement, there is a tendency to believe either that ethnic conciliation in Bosnia is impossible and the international community should withdraw, or that the International Administration should take stricter measures and temporarily impose a real protectorate. Neither of these two is, of course, the best option.
The reconstruction programme has resulted in strengthening the local power structures and their capacity to resist the state 'building agenda'. Trying to impose ethnic co-existence, the international community ended up with weak or non-existent institutions, legitimising the opposite of what was intended, i.e. corruption and creation of dominant parallel structures.

A number of question is being raised:
Was Dayton a still-born agreement? Is political conditionality the political extension of a successful financial concept or one of a Soviet-inspired political blackmail? What are the side effects of the action of the Tribunal? Can countries be punished or re-educated like kids? What about people, do they want to live together? And finally, could in this case discuss the principle "Divide them up so that they reunite"
The implementation of the Dayton agreement leads to the dilemma between administration, management or assistance on the one hand and coercion on the other and this takes us to the discussion of a doubtful concept, namely political conditionality .
Conditionality was a concept forged by the international financial institutions to achieve the effectiveness of financial operations. Loans and general financial support were conditioned by taking specific measures related to the economic situation of the specific country and pertaining to the improvement of balance of payment or other structural adjustments. These measures are heavily criticised as to their long-term efficiency on the economic situation of a country because they drain the resources for public spending.

Measures proposed or rather imposed had a certain consistency. It was consistent that a country that had lost its solvency and asked for help would have to conclude a contract that had two parts: rights and obligations, an offer and a counter offer. Both terms of the contract were of economic nature so the deal was clear enough, the argument being that since you take the money I have to be in a certain way assured about the way I will be reimbursed or the way the project will be executed. The inefficiency of the IMF conditions can be discussed extensively but this doesn't mean that conditions are not necessary.
Transposing this into the political field, especially concerning the institutions-building of a transitional period, is a different task. Economic aid should have its own logic. Accordingly, its efficiency should be based on the scope and the way it is bound to be used. These are economic criteria which should be very strict and vigorous so that the undertaken projects can be realised. Now, does this imply that in order to obtain the funds for the reconstruction of the country you should comply with the political will and political and juridical obligations imposed by the international community? Given that you recognise a country and express the will to provide funds for its reconstruction, be consistent to that will and find measures of control to secure the appropriate use of the money. However, imposing political conditions results in an obvious inconsistency that when these are met, the money is going to be allocated without much scrutiny as to its specific impact on reconstruction.

A lot has been said about the action of the Criminal Tribunal. It is true that no reconciliation can be obtained if it is not based on a sentiment of justice. There are, nevertheless, political and economic priorities defying the tribunal procedures. Obstruction of the reconstruction process because of the action of the tribunal is inadmissible.

In relation to the political will to live together the peoples of Bosnia do not have to offer an encouraging picture. If in areas of direct international financing one can detect a will to function collectively in other areas like sports, the ethnic character is vividly preserved. Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be partitioned because this will lead to the formation of an Islamic state, an evolution not desired by the European Union leaders. A loose confederation seems to be the best option for the future so that every entity could take its responsibilities. Reconciliation will have to take place globally in the Balkans. The reconciliation process could only be undertaken by powerful politicians sprang out of a genuine political process not an imported strategy especially of a Central Power's Administrator. The Greco-Turkish paradigm of reconciliation after the war in Asia Minor in 1922 demonstrates that it takes politicians of the calibre of Venizelos or Kemal to succeed.

Concerning the future of this region as related to or influenced by its past, I would like to pass on to literature, in particular Ivo Andri_ and his novel "The Bridge over the Drina" referring to the annexation of Bosnia in the Habsburg empire:

"At first only the army was to be seen. Soldiers sprang up, like water from the earth, behind every corner and every bush. Then, officials began to arrive, civil servants with their families and it seemed that they were coming to prolong for a short time the occupation begun by the army.

But with every month that passed the number of the newcomers increased. However, what most astonished the people of the town and filled them with wonder and distrust was not so much their numbers as their immense and incomprehensible plans, their untiring industry and the perseverance with which they proceeded to the realization of those plans. …They were never at peace; and they allowed no one else to live in peace. It seemed that they were resolved with their impalpable yet ever more noticeable web of

laws, regulations and orders to embrace all forms of life, men, beasts and things, and to change and alter everything, both the outward appearance of the town and the customs and habits of men from the cradle to the grave… All this they did quietly without many words, without force or provocation, so that a man had nothing to protest about.

But in the homes, not only of the Turks but also of the Serbs, nothing was changed. They lived, worked and amused themselves in the old way. Old customs of slavas (personal feasts), holidays and weddings were kept up in every detail…In short, they lived and worked as they had always done and as in most of the houses they would continue to work and live for another fifteen or twenty years after the occupation.

But on the other hand the outward aspect of the town altered visibly and rapidly. Those same people, who in their own homes maintained the old order in every detail and did not even dream of changing anything, became for the most part easily reconciled to the changes in the town and after a longer or shorter period of wonder and grumbling accepted them.… Naturally here, as always and everywhere in similar circumstances, the new life meant in actual fact a mingling of the old and the new. Old ideas and old values clashed with the new ones, merged with them or existed side by side, as if wanting to see which would outlive which."

Bridge over the Drina, bridges over Balkan troubled waters, lets hope that the new Balkan bridges will not follow the custom to incorporate any other victims as in the old stone bridges so masterfully described by Ismail Kadare in his novels.

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REFLECTIONS ON WEAK STATES AND OTHER SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL (IN)STABILITY

The concept of international stability is probably one of the most widely used concepts in the self-determination discourse, especially after the end of the Cold War. The principle of territorial integrity of states, the restrictive interpretation of self-determination, and the extreme caution in recognizing new self-determination claims following Cold War's demise, have cumulatively been justified by an appeal to the values of international peace and the stability of international order. However, the concept under discussion is not related to self-determination issues only. It is wider in scope and far more complex in content than it appears at first sight. The concept of international stability should not only be seen as a result of the self-interest and power politics pursued by states in their mutual relationships. In the era of interdependence and globalisation that we live in, other principles and values, norms and institutions certainly influence the interstate relationships, no matter how confusing these principles, values, norms and institutions might be. At the same time, there are other sources of international (in)stability, in addition to those focusing on the state-as-actor component. These are the issues that we deal with in the following paragraphs. We start our elaboration in order to answer two general questions: 1) what is international stability and 2) what are the sources of international (in)stability?

In International Relations literature a clear cut definition of the concept of international stability per se is not given. Its definition is contrived from the analyses and observations made by scholars

as to the nature of the international system (bipolarity vs. multipolarity); the means or institutions designed for the management of power relations within the international system (balance of power, hegemony, collective security, world government, peacekeeping and peacemaking, war, international law and diplomacy); finally, the analyses and observations concerning the very nature of international actors, e.g. states (democracies vs. non-democracies).

When defined, though, the concept of international stability in its essence captures the main features of either the international system or of its components. In both cases, the definition of the concept focuses on the state-as-actor unit, rational in its actions, thus excluding other non-state entities from this conceptualisation. These non-state actors, such as national or religious groups, terrorist organizations, etc., may as well be incorporated into the definition of the concept.

Of the definitions focusing on a state-as-actor, those offered by Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, are singled out as the most important. Although probabilistic in its nature, this definition purports to take as a vantage point both the total system and the individual states comprising it. From the broader, or systemic, point of view, these authors define stability as “the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur”. And, according to these authors, from the more limited perspective of the individual actors, stability refers to the “probability of their continued political independence and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in a war for

survival".[1] This conceptualisation of international stability does not account for non-state entities, whose actions are not taken into account as a potential source of international instability. After the end of the Cold War, these non-state entities proved to be a huge source of instability not only in interstate relations but also in the relations and affairs that develop within sovereign states. These non-state factors were at the end one of the major causes of the collapse of former Communist federations (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). The ethnic claims for self-determination triggered by the rising nationalism in the post-Cold War era threatened and continue to threaten the regional and wider stability, this being admitted by liberal[2] and realist[3] scholars alike. The case of former Yugoslavia is a metaphor for the new international system, that is, a system which is more turbulent and anarchic at present than ever before during the recent history.[4] This is not to say that the international system of the Cold War period was not anarchic. It did not have an overreaching supranational authority entrusted with securing order and stability in the system. However, it did have some relative stability and the mechanism to maintain this state of affairs, which rested with the two superpowers who took on the role of disciplinarian within their own blocks (or spheres of influence). With the collapse of this system, new logic of anarchy ushered in focusing not only on interstate relations but also on the internal dynamics of the existing

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1 **Karl W. Deutsch**, **J. David Singer**, Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability, 16 World Politics (1964), Number 3, pp. 390-406 at pp. 390-391.

2 cf: **Stephen Van Evera**, Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War, 15 International Security(1999/91), Number 3, pp. 7-57.

3 cf: **John J. Mearsheimer**, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, 15 International Security(1990), Number 1, pp. 5-56.

4 A thorough analysis of the Yugoslav case in the above sense can be found in: **Richard H. Ullman**, The Wars in Yugoslavia and the International System after the Cold War, in: Richard H. Ullman (ed.), The World and Yugoslavia's Wars (1998), Chapter 2.

sovereign states. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, NATO's new role in relation to international security changed accordingly. This new role of NATO had to be formally accepted in the light of new changes in the structure of the international system. Thus, meeting in Rome in November 1991, the alliance's heads of state and government adopted what they called NATO's "new strategic concept". The danger the alliance faced was no longer "calculated aggression" from Moscow but "instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe".[5]

The initial debate regarding the international stability focused on the international system and its structure. Some scholars asserted that the multipolar world was less stable compared to that composed only of two powers (bipolarity).[6] In this debate, some other scholars denied the existence of bipolarity and multipolarity in international politics.[7] Some others saw the nuclear deterrent as

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[5] cf: See, **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**, NATO Handbook (1993), Appendix II, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th and 8th November 1991".

[6] For more on this debate, cf: **Karl Deutsch**, **J. David Singer**, *supra* fn 1; **Hans Morgenthau**, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (1966); **Richard Rosecrance**, Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future, 10 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1966), pp. 314-327; **Kenneth N. Waltz**, Theory of International Politics (1979) ; **John Lewis Gaddis**, The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar System, 10 International Security (1986) pp. 99-192.

[7] Thus, R. Harrison Wagner proposes distinction between the tight power distribution of the Cold War and the loose distribution following it. cf: **R. Harrison Wagner**, What Was Bipolarity, 47 International Organisation (1993), Number 1, pp. 77-106.

the main source of international stability, ignoring the role of the structure of the system itself.[8]
Empirical evidence relied upon by these scholars belongs mainly to the pre-World War II period. This evidence is put foreword both to support and oppose the distribution of capabilities (bipolarity and multipolarity) as the sources of international stability in K. Waltz's terms. The debate was heated in particular after the Cold War and was triggered by John Mearsheimer's famous article Back to the Future[9].

Scholarly works examine various means and institutions designed for power management in international politics. They are ranked and classified, according to their order of importance in different ways. They mostly relate to the following concepts: balance of power, hegemony, collective security, world government, peacekeeping and peacemaking, war, international law and diplomacy.[10] Among these means and institutions, the balance of

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[8] **James M. Goldgeier**, **Michael McFaul**, A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era, 46 International Organisation (1992), Number 2, pp. 467-491. For the opposite view, cf: **Kenneth N. Waltz**, *supra* fn 6, pp.180-182.

[9] The crux of the issue in this article is that bleak future of humanity following the Cold War. Mearsheimer believed that the new system of multipolarity created after the Cold War would be more war-prone. He also believed that the stability of the past 45 years shall not be seen again in the decades to follow. Among the reasons for this, Mearsheimer included the hyper-nationalism, especially in Eastern Europe. cf: **John Mearsheimer**, *supra* fn 3, pp. 5-56.

[10] See more on this in **E.H. Carr**, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (1946); **Hedley Bull**, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (1977); **Inis L. Claude**, Swords Into Ploughshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization (1984); **Robert Gilpin**, War and Change in World Politics (1981); **Charles W. Kegley**, The Long Postwar Peace (1991**)**; **Thomas J. Volgy**, **Lawrence E. Imwalle**, Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World Order, 39 American Journal of Political Science(1995), Number 4 pp. 819-834.

power takes the most prominent place in scholarly analysis as well as in interstate relations.[11] This is the reason why we devote our attention to the balance of power only, leaving aside the rest of the instruments and institutions.

The balance of power is a result of the activities of the state-as-unitary actor acting in an essentially anarchical environment. Although there are very few differences among the scholars as to the side effects of the balancing behaviour of states, such as that concerning the possibility of cooperation under the conditions of anarchy, most of the authors agree that the balances of power are formed systematically.[12]

As we saw, the second part of the definition of international stability focuses on the state, or the second level of analysis. From this perspective it is assumed that stability exists when states continue to preserve their political independence and territorial integrity without the need to pursue the struggle for survival. Is this definition, which we label a "classical" one, accurate enough to cover all forms of stability pertaining not only to the present but to

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[11] See more on the development and the history of the idea of balance of power, in: **Evan Luard**, The Balance of Power.The System of International Relations, 1648-1815 (1992), pp. 1-30.

[12] Hedley Bull, though, says that balances of power may come into being through conscious efforts and policies of one or all sides. **Hedley Bull**, *supra* fn 10, pp. 104-106. Among these types of the formed balances fall the Concert of Europe (1815-1919). This system of great power management of international affairs did achieve the greatest ever success in maintaining the stability in international affairs. There were wars among great powers during this time as well: Britain, France and Russia fought in the Crimea in 1854-1855 and Bismark went to war first with Austria and then with France to unify the German states in 1870-1871. Nevertheless, a certain amount of conflict may be accommodated and is accommodated by the international system without the system itself losing its overall stability. It is stability, at the end, mot conflict, that has been normal condition of the international system. cf: **Andreas Osiander**, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990. Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability (1994), pp. 3-4.

the Cold War era as well? In trying to give an answer to this, IR scholars have focused their attention on the internal dynamics of states and their social, political and economic fabric they are made of. This line of reasoning, by and large present during Cold War years, has produced a large amount of evidence and very useful theoretical insights, known as the "theory of democratic peace".

The main premise of this liberal view on international stability is that democracies are war-prone but that they do not go to war with each other.[13] In their mutual relationship, democratic states observe and externalise the democratic norms, rules and procedures as well as institutions which, in turn, prevent the recurrence of the logic of the balance of power and the security dilemma. The logic of anarchy and its consequences, say these authors, remain valid only among the undemocratic and authoritarian states that are, in some cases, named as the "outer concentric circles"[14], or the "periphery" of international society.[15] The "theory of democratic peace" is not confined to the interstate relations only.

Within this liberal view there has also emerged another stream of thought focusing on intra-state relations. The assumption, notes Kelvi Holsti, that the problem of war (conflict) is primarily a problem of relations between states has to be seriously questioned.[16] In essence this assumption was earlier questioned in scholarly work, in the studies regarding the phenomena of state-

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[13] More on this in: **Michael W. Doyle**, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 American Political Science Review (1986), pp. 1151-1169; **Joanne Gowa**, Democratic States and International Disputes, 49 International Organization (1995) Number 3, pp. 511-521; **John M. Owen**, How Liberalism Produces Peace, 19 International Security (1994), Number 2, pp. 87-125.

[14] **Barry Buzan**, From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School, 47 International Organization (1993), Number 3 pp. 327-352 at 349-352.

[15] **James M. Goldgeir**, **Michael McFaul**, *supra* fn 8.

[16] **Kalevi J. Holsti**, The State, War and the State of War (1996), p.15.

building of the nations that emerged from the process of decolonisation. As we shall see in the following chapter, these new states did not have to struggle for their survival in an anarchical society of states in order to secure and preserve their newly won independence and territorial integrity. Their political independence and territorial integrity were rather guaranteed and preserved by the same "anarchical" society. This was done through the norms on sovereign equality of states, fixed territorial borders and the so-called juridical statehood[17]. The international regime providing for these norms proved to be very stable in the long run and has favoured the political independence and territorial integrity of these states but to the detriment of political and economic development and the social cohesion of these countries.[18] The legitimacy of the ruling elite that took on the task of state-building following the end of decolonisation derived not from the will of those governed but from the norms on equality of states, fixed territorial borders and juridical statehood. These qualities, in essence, enshrined the collective will of the majority of the members of the international society.[19] However, as we shall argue later, any approach different from the one above mentioned, supporting former administrative (colonial) borders as a basis for international statehood, would have proved more destabilizing, especially had it been based on the ethnic principle.

The analysis of state building, both in theory and practice, in former colonies and its impact on international stability has further been extended to the new states that emerged after the collapse of Communist federations following the end of the Cold War. Long

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[17] cf the eloquent study by Robert H. Jackson: **Robert H. Jackson**, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and Third World (1990).

[18] **Jean François Bayart**, The State in Africa: The Politics of Belly (1993), pp. 41-118.

[19] **I. William Zartman**, Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (1995), pp.1-11, 207-273.

before these new states emerged, the Communist federations had descended into anarchy and violence, imperilling their own citizens and threatening their neighbours through refugee flows, political instability, and random warfare. This second wave of the failed (collapsed or weak) states, whose very existence rested with the presence of juridical statehood in the international realm, produced the instability in the system (in one case even causing a serious rift among the great powers of the present-day international system : Kosova during NATO air campaign of March – June 1999). These types of states are associated with the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and the violence it produces.[20]

Ethnic nationalism, as a divisive and destabilizing force in international relations, has been treated with equal care as the state system itself. In fact, those who studied ethnic conflicts as a source of international instability have made a parallel between the behaviour of ethnic groups and the states. Barry R. Posen is among them. He states that ethnic (and other religious and cultural) groups enter into competition with each other, amassing more power than needed for security, and thus begin to threat others. The crux of this argument is that ethnic (and other religious and cultural) groups behave, upon the collapse of the previous state structures, in the same manner as do the sovereign states under the conditions of anarchy.[21] Nevertheless, as opposed to the previous wave of the

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[20] They are called that because of the weaknesses of the state institutions and the lack of political and social cohesion within these states. cf: **Gerard B. Helman**, **Steven R. Ratner**, Collapsing Into Anarchy, Current (1993) Number 353; **Lawrence Freedman**, Weak States and the West, 32 Society (1994), Number 1, at: http://www.epnet.com.

[21] cf: **Barry R. Posen**, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, 35 Survival (1996), Number 1, pp. 27-45. An identical view is expressed also by Markus Fischer, but regarding medieval times. This author says that the behaviour of communes, duchies, principalities and other actors of this period was more or less like the behaviour of modern states acting under the conditions of anarchy. cf. **Markus Fischer**, Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal

failed states, this time the role and the commitment (military and non-military) on the part of the international community, in terms of preserving the political independence and territorial integrity of its newly accepted members, is by far greater and more effective than in the past. As a sign of this role and commitment, the international community has added new norms and procedures concerning democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human and minority rights (apart from old ones regarding the sovereign equality of states, fixed territorial borders and juridical statehood). A qualitatively new meaning was attached to the territorial integrity of states that emerged from former Communist federations. In some cases, as in the Balkans, this new interpretation was brought to the foreground by the use of force, huge military deployments as well as economic and other assistance on the part of the international community. This was done in order to render meaningful the new concept of territorial integrity that should be seen in close connection with the internal political and economic infrastructure of these new countries. For this purpose, new institutional mechanisms and programs, such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, were set up. This means that the assumption of the "democratic peace" that liberal and democratic states are producers of peace and stability in the system is gaining weight and proving to be correct, in Europe at least.

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KOSOVA: THE CORE OF THE BALKANS

Kosova is neither a weak state nor a failed state but an aspiring state heavily dependent on international actors. Two years after NATO's liberation of Kosova from Milosevic's Yugoslavia, it is important to evaluate conditions and prospects in the aspiring state and to offer some concrete recommendations for further evolution. Above all, it remains clear that Kosova occupies a central position in the Balkans both geographically and strategically and its development, whether positive or negative, will have reverberations throughout the region. In sum, four critical issues converge in the NATO-held territory: the struggle for national independence, the impact of outside intervention, the resolution of the Balkan-wide "Albanian question," and the ongoing process of Europeanization.

Independence on the Agenda

However much the "international community" studiously seeks to avoid the issue, it is obvious that the most important objective for all Albanian Kosovars is national independence. It is equally apparent that with Montenegro moving toward a referendum on independence in the spring of 2002, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may soon cease to exist. We have seen for the past decade that federal Yugoslavia was a failed state held together primarily through violence and now by international support. Two outstanding questions are therefore left to answer in the case of Kosova: how and when is statehood to be achieved? It is evident that any attempt to pressurize or entice Kosova into another

subordinate relationship with Belgrade, whether through federalism or autonomy, will restoke conflicts and could even spark a renewed insurgency movement among frustrated Albanians.

The possibility of any regressive moves by the internationals has persuaded some former KLA (Kosova Liberation Army) operatives to prepare contingency plans for a possible Serbian-Yugoslav military takeover. Indeed, it would be irresponsible for former Kosovar fighters to pursue complete demobilization and organizational disbanding given the prospect of international military withdrawal and Belgrade's political ambitions to "regain Kosovo" still hovering over the region. In sum, the lack of clarity on Kosova's "final status" and its unclear future security has inevitably encouraged contingencies and preparations for a renewed guerrilla war. There is little doubt that Belgrade has also developed contingency plans for a military takeover of the "province" once NATO departs.

The final status of Kosova cannot be postponed indefinitely and in reality the Bush White House simply cannot pass the decision on to the next U.S. administration. This is especially true given Washington's repeated commitment to scaling down American peace-keeping assignments. The only valid solution in these circumstances is a twin-track approach: steady moves toward institutionalising independence and Kosovar self-reliance and a determination to deter Belgrade from any threat of a military takeover through a long-term security guarantee.

The upcoming general elections in Kosova will therefore become an invaluable stage in legitimising Kosova's politicians and building authoritative indigenous institutions. Throughout the election and post-election process, international players must aim to empower the emerging central government in Prishtina, to create an effective legislature, to maximize local initiatives, and increase

support for the most civic-oriented political parties, media networks, and non-governmental organizations.

Elections can help to legitimise politicians who have felt largely excluded from the governing process or in a limbo-like position until the status question is permanently resolved. Legitimate elections will also contribute to undercutting political polarization and rival claims by political groups that only they represent Kosova's "national interests." The incoming administration in Prishtina will have to take substantial responsibility for building a sovereign democratic state. It must promote consensus and not division on the most vital reformist issues. It must ensure progress toward far-ranging restructuring with a cross-party commitment by the new legislature to institutional reform whatever differences may exist between specific political formations. Successful political stabilization requires the consolidation of accountable and authoritative democratic institutions based on constitutional principles.

It is therefore vital for Kosova to develop an indigenous constitution that can help concentrate political energy, give credence to legality, and provide a more solid basis for democratic development. All major political players must support such an approach, as it would help secure the foundations of statehood. The organs of government would then acquire the confidence of the public and the respect of the internationals. Meanwhile, any extremist parties advocating ultra-nationalist and authoritarian solutions will have to be exposed and marginalized so that they do not undermine the body politic of the aspiring state.

The internationals cannot sit on the sidelines but must contribute in the building of a secure law-abiding state. Among the many tasks facing both foreign and domestic actors are tangible improvements in efficiency, competence, and professionalism among government

officials and the civil service. A core civic administration needs to be developed that provides continuity and credibility regardless of changes in government. Equally importantly, Kosova must build a judicial system that will be both independent and competent, and in which equality before the law is guaranteed, regardless of ethnicity, gender, or creed. Both the majority and the minorities can thereby develop trust in the system and loyalty to the new state structures.

In the security arena, the police and intelligence forces require strict governmental control and supervision as well as the authority and capability to improve their effectiveness. Public trust in the police forces will grow as their success in fighting crime and restoring law and order increases, with substantial international assistance. The new government must focus on expanding professional police departments with Western help as this will build public confidence in these vital indigenous institutions. And of course the law enforcement agencies and the judicial system must become serious players in combating corruption and organized criminality in all their pernicious manifestations.

The evolution of a multi-faceted and multi-organizational civil society will limit the focus on exclusivist ethnic and national questions. Encouraging popular participation in a broad range of civic groups and voluntary organizations will in turn greatly enhance civic confidence in the reform process and in the legitimacy of the political system. Underpinning such developments, significant changes are needed in Kosova's political culture in which decades of anti-democratic ideology and nationalist defensiveness are effectively countered. Both public institutions and public perceptions will require transformation and in this endeavour a broad campaign of civic education is essential.

Given its recent history, the alternatives to independence remain bleak. The indefinite "non-status" stalemate or the proposed return of Kosova to Serbian or Yugoslav control may actually exacerbate the problems already faced by international actors in guaranteeing security and building credible local institutions. Any disconnections between indigenous self-determination and international goals for the territory will create rifts and contradictions. These can undermine the progress of institutional self-determination, which the upcoming elections are supposed to encourage and bolster. In this context, any agreements between UNMIK and Belgrade over the heads of the Albanian population and its elected representatives are illegitimate and undemocratic and must be rejected by Prishtina.

The Impact of the International Intervention

The United Nations mandate in Kosova was ultimately designed to return the territory to Belgrade's jurisdiction. Presumably, a large-scale international military and political presence will be necessary until conditions have been met for either a peaceful reintegration of the territory or the final acceptance of Kosova's statehood. In the meantime, a counter-productive dependency relationship has emerged between Kosovars and international institutions that may become increasingly difficult to overcome the longer the current "stalemate" continues. Such a relationship could seriously threaten the development of indigenous institutions and democratic procedures.

A major problem for all multi-national institutions and Western leaders is how to prevent Kosova from developing into a permanent international protectorate with externally appointed administrations largely bereft of domestic authority or legitimacy. At the other extreme, international agencies must seek to ensure

that any accelerated disengagement by foreign bodies does not unravel the results painstakingly achieved on the territory, particularly in the security arena, and even reignite armed confrontations.

While NATO has clearly ensured overall security in Kosova and deterred any likelihood of a Yugoslav reinvasion, the United Nations and its various offshoots have proved to be less successful. Indeed, UNMIK has been accused by various observers of counter-productive measures, including the creation of colonial-like bureaucracies, of favouring foreign over indigenous organizations, of duplicating efforts between different international agencies, and of wasting reconstruction and democratisation resources. Given these charges, it is important to more vigorously pursue constructive steps for promoting indigenous institutions that can give structure and content to democratic pluralism and Kosovar self-determination.

Urgently needed is consistent progress in the state-building process, the construction of legitimate and participatory institutions, and the assurance of inter-state security. This would help consolidate and expand positive regional developments that would contribute to eliminating impending crisis and conflict. Dependent states or denied states are ultimately weak states.

Inevitably, any strategy of “indigenisation” involves certain risks and unpredictabilities. Although the primary risk is of a rapid disengagement that provokes fresh hostilities, other variables must be considered.
Without the anchoring of democratic governance, Kosova may become susceptible to authoritarianism or to political elements interlinked with the criminal underworld. Alternatively, political fracturing and institutional paralysis may accompany a large-scale international withdrawal. In order to avoid such scenarios and to

guarantee that self-determination is effective, outside actors must focus on the preconditions for long-term security during a decreasing international presence.

Both the central and local Kosovar authorities will have to obtain the authority and resources to govern and not simply to consult with international agencies. There is still an overall lack of clarity as to the power of the proposed central government and its relationship with the UN authorities and eventually the Serbian and Yugoslav governments. Such confusion and uncertainty breeds local radicalism and irresponsibility, encourages nationalist revanchism in Belgrade, and actually prolongs the foreign presence, thus contradicting stated U.S. policy.

A vexing problem for the internationals has been the demands of local Serbian leaders for Kosova's canonisation. They have sought to establish Serb majority districts in parts of northern Kosova while gaining their own local administration and retaining special ties with Serbia. Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic has recently proposed a "special status" for the Serbian minority in self-governing territorial units. Such proposals have been rejected by international representatives as they could herald a formal partition of Kosova along ethnic lines. Albanian leaders adamantly oppose any such solutions and demand full territorial integrity under a single government.

Acceptance of future independence with a roadmap and timetable to achieve such a goal could undercut the threat of a new Serbian takeover by deligitimizing Belgrade's incessant claims that the territory will return to Serbia – a stance that simply encourages militancy and polarization. In contrast, definite criteria and timetables for a democratic independent state will give both the internationals and the locals a concrete goal toward which political, institutional, and economic reconstruction can be directed.

And last but not least, a package involving a permanent NATO security guarantee for the territory, the development of an effective

European-based rapid reaction force, and Serbia's involvement in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), together with other confidence-building measures, will significantly diminish any temptations for future military action by Belgrade.

A Regional Albanian Solution

The past year has witnessed the emergence of "Greater Albanianism" as a major preoccupation of the international community. With the break-up of Yugoslavia, the birth of several new Balkan states, and Albania's emergence from international isolation in the past decade, the position of the Albanian population came under increasing pressure from all sides. Conflicts have been visible between demands for centralism by Serbia and Macedonia, in particular, and Albanian aspirations for self-determination or outright independence. Moreover, instability in Albania itself has threatened to further unsettle the region by promoting lawlessness and cross-border conflicts.

However, it is misleading to assume that that there is an overarching "Greater Albania" conspiracy that seeks to create an "ethnic Albania" in the region encompassing states or parts of states with Albanian majorities. Instead, there is a pan-Albanian feeling of cross-border nationhood that has been exploited both by Albanian and anti-Albanian militants. Only marginal groups have campaigned for an expansion of Albanian territory while major parties in Albania, Kosova, Macedonia, and Montenegro have not favoured any border revisions at the expense of neighbours.

Outside of Albania itself, three kinds of movements have been visible among the Albanian populations: an outright independence movement in Kosova, an equal rights movement in Macedonia, and a communal revivalist movement in Montenegro. Certain tendencies within these movements have pan-Albanian aspirations, but it would be too simplistic to view them as part of some overarching "Greater Albania" program.

Albanian leaders across the region consistently repudiate the notion of a "Greater Albania" or a "Greater Kosova." Concurrently, they underscore that a durable peace and a secure region ultimately depends on the recognition of Kosova's independence. The current ambiguity and the potential fluidity of borders is exploited by militants and criminals, encourages anti-Albanian nationalism, and jeopardizes NATO's mission throughout the region. A durable inter-ethnic political settlement in Macedonia and Kosova's upcoming elections can help dispel the claim that an independent Kosova will lead to political instability. It is the lack of a credible political future that has contributed to embroiling both Kosova and Macedonia in spasms of instability. The prospect of democratic statehood can and must eradicate radicalism and chaos.

The Albanian population in the Balkans is overwhelmingly young and growing faster than that of any other ethnic group, even given the high rates of emigration. It is a dynamic population whose energies must be channelled toward constructive and productive causes such as economic development, entrepreneurship, education, political responsibility, and international integration. Otherwise, frustration and shrinking opportunities could encourage the growth of radical and armed groups or feed the scourge of organized criminality. In this respect, independence for Kosova and the political contract in Macedonia could help dispel these destructive tendencies and transform the younger generation into a vital pillar of development for the Balkan region.

All responsible Albanian leaders must declare their unequivocal recognition of Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Serbian independence and territorial integrity as Kosovar statehood becomes a reality. They must openly state that they harbour no designs or pretensions to these states and do not support any violent groups along Kosova's frontiers. The undermining of Macedonia's sovereignty will simply stiffen resistance to Kosova's

statehood, imperil inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia itself, and undercut international sympathy for the Albanian community. Macedonia cannot become a bargaining chip for either Belgrade or Prishtina, because its integrity remains vital for Balkan peace and security.

Stress must also be placed on the positive regional ramifications of an internationally recognized Kosovar state. For example, any potential threat from Belgrade will become ineffective and persistent Russian attempts to undermine the NATO mission or to forge some new anti-Western pacts with Serbia and Macedonia will be largely dissipated. Above all, a continuing NATO presence during the time that a national Kosova defence force is created will convince all military units in the surrounding region to desist from provocative actions.

Kosova's statehood could promote a solution to the wider "Albanian question" in the south Balkans. It would pacify the more radical Albanian demands for a larger state by setting permanent and unchangeable international borders while allowing the internationals to deal with Kosova as a country in its own right. During the next three years, corresponding with the term of the Bush administration, Kosova can establish all the elements and qualifications for statehood.

In many respects it can be argued that Kosova, as a more ethnically homogenous territory, is better prepared for single statehood than Bosnia-Herzegovina, another international protectorate. If the Serbian minority in Kosova receives appropriate physical and institutional protection, NATO ground troops will not have to patrol any "inter-entity" or "inter-community" lines, as the vast majority of Kosova's population is committed to the territorial integrity of Kosova.

Any further deterioration in Kosova, Macedonia, and Serbia will have a destabilizing effect throughout the west Balkans. While the worst-case-scenario is a spreading war, a more likely scenario is "insipid destabilization" characterized by deepening political instability, economic retardation, a freeze on foreign investment, and the further growth of illicit business and international criminal networks. This will estrange the Balkans from the European process and the trans-Atlantic structures. It will also guarantee a costly and permanent security headache for the Alliance that can become a bounty for Russian interests, international criminals, rogue states, fundamentalist extremists, and other anti-NATO and anti-European elements.

Institutional dependence on foreign factors may be crucial during various national emergencies such as the ones witnessed in Kosova in recent years, but this is not a viable substitute for "democratic security." Ultimately, the only legitimate and durable form of Balkan stability and reconstruction will have to be based on indigenous democratic development, the self-determination of new states, and voluntary international integration.

Europeanization or Americanization?

Although international institutional integration is the objective of most Balkan states and entities, the priorities and content of these processes differ between capitals. Two broad streams are now visible in the region: governments and political leaders who favour Europeanization and rapid attachment principally to existing European-based institutions, and those that are banking on a combined process of Europeanization and Americanization. The latter signifies, above all, membership of the NATO alliance, the maintenance of strong political and military ties with the United States, and a focus on American business investment.

The contrast between these two positions is most clearly on display in the differing approaches of Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Kosova toward their final political destination. The Serbian and Yugoslav authorities (particularly the latter) are more openly Euro-focused while Belgrade even seeks to achieve some equidistance or "balance" between Europe and Russia in its diplomatic, political, and security dimensions. Russia is still viewed in some high political circles as some kind of protector and counter-balance to unwelcome American influence.

In stark contrast, the Kosovar leadership of all political persuasions is basically Americanist in its political orientation. It focuses on developing close ties with Washington, largely as a counterweight to what are perceived to be unreliable European influences or as protection for the aspiring state against the threat of Serbian revanchism or further Russian interference in the Balkans. Central to this approach is a long-term Kosovar desire for NATO membership and a close partnership with the United States in all possible arenas.

Of course, the ultimate aim of European Union (EU) accession is considered to be important for guaranteeing economic prosperity and integration in the continental mainstream. But in the estimations of most Kosovars, security cannot currently be assured by Western Europe alone and it could even be endangered without intensive American involvement and leadership. Experiences over the past decade throughout the Balkans tend to confirm their scepticism.

In this context, an independent Kosova with a legitimate and authoritative government can make an important contribution to the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign. First, a sovereign Kosova government could combat links between organized crime and Middle Eastern terrorist penetration. Second, the Prishtina administration could directly participate in a range of regional anti-terrorism initiatives. In sum, the time is approaching for Kosova to become a subject and a participant in the international community

and not an object of dependency and a bone of contention between Belgrade and the United Nations.

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MONTENEGRO: THE TWOFOLD CHALLENGES OF INTERNAL REFORM AND UNSETTLED STATUS QUESTION

Introduction

These two factors combined – the unsettled status question and the challenge of internal reform – have contributed to Montenegro's weakness. The degree of progress made in the area of institutional and economic reform is directly linked to the capacity and efficiency of the state to provide basic services, collect taxes, devise and implement policies, in other words, the ability of the state to address peoples' needs. In this respect, all Southeast European states could be considered weak though at varying degrees. On the other hand, the unsettled status issue has a direct impact on the legitimacy of the state itself. It is important to clarify the peculiarity of Montenegro a bit further and comparing it with Kosova will help. In both cases the final status has not been defined. (Despite the recent agreement reached between Serbia and Montenegro the situation still remains uncertain). The magnitude of the issue is such that it overshadows other pending questions. As the Montenegrin experience has shown that it is extremely difficult for the government to undertake institutional and economic reform while the status question is unresolved.[1] However, in the case of Montenegro the unsettled status question involves bigger issues than this. Unlike Kosova, where over 90 percent of the population support independence and the question now evolves around the

[1] **European Stability Initiative**, Sovereignty, Europe and the Future of Serbian and Montenegro (2001), at: http://www.esiweb.org.

negotiations of Albanians with the *others* for the final status, in the case of Montenegro the idea of independence is opposed by a significant segment of the Montenegrin population. Thus it is not only a question of the Western pressure but also the opposition demands to remain in a federation with Serbia. This cleavage in Montenegrin politics is not new, although it resurfaced after several decades. The first Montenegrin Parliament of 1906 was divided along the same lines. Labels such as *Whites* and *Greens* have represented these two opposing groups. This conflict, whether old or new, is directly linked with the "basic legitimacy of the state rather than simply the orientation of policy within a structure the legitimacy of which is generally above the question."[2] This has been the defining cleavage in Montenegrin politics for the last 4 years.

Although as we mentioned earlier that the lack of consensus on the '*idea of the state*' and sluggish institutional reform have contributed to the state weakness, the latter is not a constant variable. So until the fall of Milosevic, despite its weakness, Montenegro's weight in regional politics was not commensurate to its size and strength. Montenegro played a crucial role in the Western efforts to overthrow Milosevic. During this period Podgorica received strong international backing both politically and financially. The role played by the West constitutes another important variable that has a bearing on setting the final status question and the pace of economic reform.

In the rest of the paper we will analyse the developments in Montenegro during the last decade – three main periods – from the angle of state legitimacy and capacity of state institutions to fulfil peoples' needs. We will be paying attention also to the role of the West in this process.

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[2] **John B. Allcock**, Explaining Yugoslavia (2000), p. 261.

1990-97: Political and Economic Stasis

During this period the political life of Montenegro could be described as falling into the *dominant-power politics* category. According to this, "one political grouping dominates the system in such a way that there appears to be little prospects of alternation of power in the foreseeable future. A key political problem in the dominant power politics countries is the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party. The state's main assets are gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party."[3] In Montenegro the Democratic Party of Socialist, the successor of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, continued to be in power unchallenged until 1997 (and remained in power after 1997 but in a different context that will be explained later). Thus Montenegro, similar to Serbia, did not experience any political transition. During this period the links between Serbia and Montenegro remained strong. In the referendum held in March 1992, 96 percent of the 66 percent participating voters supported the continuation of the Yugoslav federation between Serbia and Montenegro. As we can notice during this period there was consensus among the ruling elite and the Montenegrin public about the 'idea of the state' – the federation with Serbia enjoyed legitimacy and Montenegro remained an ally of Serbia despite the wars and international sanctions. (However, the 1997 split of the ruling party showed that discontent had been growing within the party as well as in the public).

The picture in the institutional and economic areas was similar to the one in the political sphere. The lack of political transition, the continuation of the phenomenon of one-party rule and the decision to remain in a federation with Serbia reflected itself in the economic and institutional fields. During 1990 to 1997, the

[3] **Thomas Carothers**, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 Journal of Democracy, Number 1 (2002), pp. 11-12.

Montenegrin economic system did not undergo any transformation either in terms of structure or management. The state remained the major player in the economy, and industry continued to be considered as the basic sector in economy.[4] The disintegration of Yugoslavia, the wars and the international sanctions reduced the capacity of the state to address peoples' needs, which was reflected in the negative economic growth that Montenegro has experienced since 1989. And the consequences of the delayed economic and institutional reform will continue to contribute to Montenegro's weakness for some time to come. Nevertheless, the weakness of Montenegro in this respect should not be assessed in absolute terms, but rather should be seen in a larger context taking in consideration the situation in the immediate neighbourhood and especially in Serbia. During the sanctions the Montenegrin government tried to develop semi-illegal ways to maintain some kind of economic activity and the economic situation was slightly better than in Serbia.[5] This fact becomes important if we consider it against the background that Montenegro had been one of the poorest regions in former Yugoslavia.

In a few words, during this period Montenegro could be considered a relatively stable and strong state, though a semi-authoritarian one. The Democratic Party of Socialist retained political and social control and there was consensus among the majority of the population regarding the future of Montenegro or what we could call identity politics, although there were groups that supported the independence of Montenegro. While in economic terms the capacity of the state had declined, in relative terms the situation was better than in neighbouring Serbia.

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[4] **Veselin Vukotic**, The Economic Situation and Economic Reforms in Montenegro, in: Nicholas Whyte (ed.), The Future of Montenegro (2001), p. 45.

[5] **European Stability Initiative**, Autonomy, Dependency, Security and the Montenegrin Dilemma (2000), at: http://www.esiweb.org

The Split with Milosevic and the Drive for Independence

The DPS division in 1997 created a radically different situation for Montenegro itself and for its relations with Serbia. By virtue of the dominant position in Montenegrin politics and its identification with the state the break up of DPS in two groups – anti-Milosevic and pro-Western led by Djukanovic and pro-Milosevic led by Bulatovic – created a deep cleavage in Montenegrin society. Although initially the creation of an independent state was not articulated as an objective, the intransigent position adopted by Belgrade regarding Podgorica's proposal to restructure the federation combined with measures taken by Milosevic, which undermined the parity of Montenegro with Serbia in federal institutions and attempts to weaken Djukanovic forced the authorities in Podgorica to take over federal functions and establish a de facto independent state.

The split in DPS also marks the beginning of transition in Montenegro. Although the DPS remained in power it was no longer the same party. The change in DPS was not only reflected in its new stance regarding relations with the West, Milosevic and reform, but also in its membership where the more modern, younger and educated party elite and members remained on the anti-Milosevic faction, which kept the party name – Democratic Party of Socialist. The other group that remained loyal to Bulatovic and Milosevic formed a new party called Socialist Peoples' Party (SNP). In addition to this, as a result of the division in the old DPS several other new elements were introduced to Montenegrin political scene. In the parliamentary elections of May 1998 DPS formed a coalition with Social Democratic Party (SDP), and Peoples Party (NS). Although DPS remained the major party in the coalition government, this power sharing was a novelty in the

Montenegrin politics.[6] The winning coalition attracted also the votes of the Albanian and Boshniak/Muslim minorities. Another new dimension that was introduced to domestic politics was the emergence of a real opposition represented by SNP led by Bulatovic. The close presidential race of October 1997, and the parliamentary results of May 1998 (SNP received 36.1 percent of the vote while Djukanovic led coalition 49.54 percent) showed that the pro-Milosevic faction had significant support among the population.

Thus, in other words, the split in DPS heralded the beginning of the Montenegrin exercise in democracy. However, the milieu in which this democratic experiment was taking place was fraught with danger. As we mentioned earlier the government and opposition endorsed diametrically different set of values concerning the very nature of the state and many other key issues. If we add the Milosevic/Belgrade factor into the equation we notice that the lack of a legitimate, above politics framework for the Montenegrin democracy emerged as very threatening. This threat was mainly embodied in the presence of the Yugoslav army and the different perceptions of the government and opposition about its role in Montenegro.

One indispensable element in a state is that there is only one authority claiming the legitimate right to use coercive means. In the case of Montenegro we witness a different situation. The Yugoslav Federal Army loyal to Belgrade claimed the constitutional obligation to protect and operate in the territory of rump Yugoslavia, while on the other hand there was also a 15000 strong Montenegrin police force that was loyal to Podgorica and was set up as a countermeasure to any action that Yugoslav Army troops could have taken. As Podgorica continued to take over functions from the federal level, the Yugoslav Army remained the

[6] **Centre for Democracy and Human Rights**, Country Report for Montenegro (2001).

only factor through which Milosevic could influence developments in Montenegro.[7] So in 2000, in addition to the internal trade blockade that Serbia had imposed on Montenegro, the Yugoslav army imposed a blockade on the international borders of Montenegro. While for the governing coalition and pro-independence forces the Yugoslav army constituted a serious threat as was indicated by the creation of the strong police force to counterbalance it, for the pro-Yugoslav opposition the army was a legitimate institution that was carrying out its functions. What is more, in 1999, federal authorities in cooperation with the pro-Yugoslav opposition in Montenegro formed the 7th Battalion of Military Police, a paramilitary organizations comprised of 1000 people.

This acute security concern and the deep division in the society are also reflected in the process of state building in Montenegro. The police force established to protect Podgorica from Belgrade and pro-Yugoslav opposition in Montenegro, is feared and seen with suspicion by the supporters of the opposition. The opposition (SNP) has criticized the privatisation process as benefiting only certain section of the society that are close to the government and has also complained that its members cannot get civil service jobs.[8] The opposition is simply against the institutional building that has taken place since 1998. However, while the state building in Montenegro, by virtue of the deep cleavage in the society, could not bring together both 'ideological views' it does have elements that are inclusive both in terms of values and procedure. First, except for the presidential elections of 1997, in which Momir Bulatovic declared that it does not recognize the election results, which was followed by demonstrations and some acts of violence, the elections have been the mechanism through which "the real

[7] **International Crisis Group**, Current Legal Status of the Federal Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, at: http://www.intl-crisis-group.org.

[8] **International Crisis Group**, Montenegro: Socialist Peoples Party a Loyal Opposition, at: http://www.intl-crisis-group.org.

issues of power have been solved" creating a tradition in peaceful political change.[9] Second, unlike the 1990-97 period, the governing coalition has reached out to minorities. The anti-Milosevic and pro-Western platform pursued by Djukanovic and DPS led coalition secured them the vote of Albanian and Boshniak/Muslim minorities, which has proven important. Actually the minorities have voted more for DPS, SDP and Liberal Alliance (LSCG) than for their own ethnic parties.[10]

The split in DPS and the break up with Milosevic also heralded the initiation of economic and institutional reforms in Montenegro. The capacity of the government was enhanced both in terms of the new functions that were now administered at the republican level as well as due to significant western financial and technical support during this period. As we mentioned earlier, forced by Milosevic's actions that was trying to undermine the position of Djukanovic and in order to avoid the negative consequences of decisions over which it had no say – such as monetary policy – Podgorica took over several functions that were previously administered at the federal level. Thus in November 1999 the *Deutsche Mark* was introduced and in November 2000 it became the sole currency and Monetary Council of the National Bank of Montenegro was set up. As result of this reforms inflation dropped from 23.2 per cent in December 1999 to 1.5 per cent by May 2000. In August 1999, Montenegro began collecting customs duties at its external borders. The reforms tried to revive the process of privatisation by implementing a mass voucher privatisation scheme. The government liberalized foreign trade as it is indicated by the different custom tariffs implemented by Serbia 10 percent and Montenegro 3 percent. Price controls were also removed, except for certain commodities such as electric energy, water. Steps were taken in other areas, such as foreign relations, reflecting the desire

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[9] **European Stability Initiative**, *supra* fn 5.

[10] **International Crisis Group**, Montenegro in the Shadow of Volcano, at: http://www.intl-crisis-group.org.

of Montenegro to create its own international personality. In spring 1999, Montenegro adopted a liberalized visa regime no longer demanding visas to foreigners who entered its territory.[11]

Despite the continuation of the military threat and the 'sanctions' taken by Belgrade such as stopping the budgetary exchanges between the federal and the Montenegrin budgets by the end of 1998 and the imposition of the trade embargo the position of Djukanovic strengthened. The ability of Podgorica to withstand pressure from Belgrade and its allies in Montenegro bolstered the image of Djukanovic as a capable leader who had the situation under control. Two factors accounted for this. As it was indicated by several polls, but also by the parliamentary elections of April 2001, the pro-independence electorate had grown in numbers thus increasing the legitimacy of the government. Secondly, the western political and financial support strengthened the position of Djukanovic. Montenegro occupied an important position in the Western efforts to weaken and overthrow Milosevic. While the West remained ambiguous and refrained from making a clear commitment to support Montenegro in case of a military attack from Belgrade, it left open the option that it could get involved trying in this way to prevent both a potential attack from Milosevic as well as Podgorica's declaration of independence. The financial support given to Montenegro by the West was one of the highest per capita received in Central and Eastern Europe. In the period 1998-2001 Montenegro received about 800 million DM of international help, which made possible for the government to continue functioning, but also resulted in the dependence of the Montenegrin economy on the international aid. Since the main aim of the aid was to strengthen the position of the pro-western forces, it was not conditioned to the progress made in the implementation of the reforms. In addition to this, there are two other factors that had a negative impact on the resolve of the government to pursue

[11] **Centre for Democracy and Human Rights**, *supra* fn 6.

the reform agenda. First, as we pointed out at the beginning of this paper the unresolved status question and the continuous need to focus on the danger emanating from Milosevic diverted the energies of the government away from pending domestic issues. Lastly, "the economy was/is run by a tight web of political patronage and cross-ownership, which generates strong vested interests in the status quo. The government depended on this stratum for its political support and did not have the authority to push for the reform."[12] These inherent weaknesses reappeared once the West changed its attitude toward Montenegro.

Montenegro after the fall of Milosevic

As we showed above, until the fall of Milosevic Djukanovic and Montenegro enjoyed a very strong support from the West. However, the fall of Milosevic changed all this. The West lost interest in the anti-Belgrade policy line pursuit by Djukanovic, which was reflected in a significant drop in political and financial support. The prevailing Western perception is that the independence of Montenegro would have a negative domino effect not only on the unresolved status of Kosova but even beyond in the region. Paradoxically as it could sound, the fall of Milosevic left Montenegro in a very precarious and actually weaker position, at a time when Podgorica should have felt stronger than ever – the military threat from Belgrade had ceased to exists and those favouring independence formed a majority in Montenegro, though a thin one. However, this slight majority, as it was indicated by the parliamentary elections of April 2001, could not form the ground for launching the referendum on independence. On the other hand, since the independence card was the motto of the election campaign, which gave the government the winning majority made

[12] **European Stability Initiative**, *supra* fn 5.

the retreat very difficult and costly for Djukanovic. In order to fully comprehend the tough challenges facing Djukanovic and pro-independence forces, we should consider all this against the background of an ailing economy and its dependence on Western financial aid.

Since 1989 peoples' living standards have fallen steadily as is indicated by the 50 percent decline of GNP. Due to reasons that we pointed earlier, the progress made in reforming the economy was limited leaving the basic structure of the former economic system still in place. The state provides subsidies for the heavy industry, which is a large component of the present economic activity that cannot be sustained. These industries have little prospects to survive privatisation. Furthermore, over the past few years the Montenegrin the number of the people employed by the government has increased to more than 34 000 people. In total the Republic employs 75 000 individuals in the public administration and in publicly controlled companies. This is some 60% of active official work force (the data conflict regarding the total number of employed however, the number of those employed by the state is very large). Montenegro has a negative trade balance in 2000 of $193 million or 26 percent of GDP and a budget deficit of 17 percent. While the state does not have the ability to deal with the problem created by the large share of informal economic activity. As we can notice the foreign financial assistance has been crucial for the running of the economy.[13] This provided to the West a strong leverage that could use against Djukanovic in case he continued its independence drive. However, this policy, which was labelled as short sighted by many observers, carries several negative repercussions. Instead of focusing on the functional ties that would exists between Montenegro and Serbia, whatever the final outcome thus stimulating a constructive dialogue, the EU is

[13] For details on Montenegrin Economy see: European Stability Initiative, *Montenegro: Rhetoric and Reform*, 28 June 2001, at http://www.esiweb.org and *MONET Montenegro Economic Trends.*

pursuing the policy of conditionality which does not facilitate the parties defining the interests involved in the process.[14] Actually it seems that the EU is even more interested than Federal and Serbian authorities for the existence of the federation. In addition, the EU is isolating the pro-western forces in Montenegro while indirectly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposition, whose pro-European credentials are suspect.[15]

On 15 March it seems that the EU was able to bring the parties into an agreement. The name of the new state is the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The agreement provides for: a unicameral parliament; a president; a council of ministers composed of five ministries; and the court. In the economic sphere the two republics will keep their separate economic systems: both in monetary as well as trade and custom policies. The agreement should be ratified by the republican and federal parliaments. However, nothing seems very certain. As a report indicates that the union of Serbia with Montenegro it's losing appeal.[16] Beyond the status issue the Montenegrin authorities and the international community should focus on domestic challenges that have a direct impact on people's lives.

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[14] **European Stability Initiative**, *supra* fn 1.

[15] **Mabel Wisse Smit**, Squabbling Yugoslav Republics Set for Divorce, Balkan Crisis Report (2002), Number 322, at: http://www.iwpr.net.

[16] **Daniel Sunter**, Serbia: Union with Montenegro Losses Appeal, Balkan Crisis Report (2002), Number 325, at: http://www.iwpr.net.

Todor Mirkovi_

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: MAIN SECURITY CHALLENGES –THE WAY TO OVERCOME THEM

General Remarks

The organizers of this Conference have chosen proper and very real topics for the discussions. Building stability in the South East European states is simply a conditio sine qua non. It is well know that almost all ex-communist countries in this region are "weak states" regarding their internal security and international standing. However, it is quite obvious that one conference is not able to build stability in a single country, even less in a group of countries. What a conference can do is to identify crucial problems and to show the paths leading toward resolving them. And that is just - according to my opinion - what is expected from this Conference.

Crisis Management is another demanding topic when South East European countries are at stake. In the absence of stability armed conflicts usually arise. In between, there is a period of crisis, and the crisis should be appeased through crisis management.

In politico-military literature crisis management is often - as a concept - mixed with peace-keeping and peace-making/enforcing concepts. However, crisis management should be considered as a conflict-prevention, rather than conflict-control or peace-building activity. The main task of crisis management should be to obviate the escalation of a crisis out of an armed conflict. It could be achieved by political, economic and other non-military means. Military assets, as a last resort, could be used, eventually, when crisis management fails.

It has been so thoughtful to organize such a conference in Tirana, the capital of Albania. I have a feeling that Albania has somehow been neglected in the matters of building peace and stability in the Southeastern European region. It is obvious, however, that no serious security problem in the Balkans, at least in its South-Western part, can be properly solved without full Albanian participation.

Security Challenges in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is facing, in essence, the same security problems as the other transitional South East European countries, with some additional, specific issues arisen from the differences resulted from her specific development during the last ten or so years.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal, multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state. None of these qualities, unfortunately, gets along in harmony. Misunderstandings between the Federal Government and the Government of the Republic of Montenegro and tensions among ethnic and religious groups characterize current the situation in FRY.

Almost for a full decade, at the very end of the last century, Yugoslavia was directly or indirectly involved in wars, including the 78 days it was subjugated to Nato's air campaign. For the same period of time, the people of Yugoslavia and her economy were subjected to international sanctions. Due to such occurrences, Yugoslavia's infrastructure has been seriously damaged and her economy devastated. Today's GNP per capita in Yugoslavia, for example, is less than half of her GNP per capita twelve years ago.

The sanctions and Nato's air campaign had serious consequences on the development of the South Eastern European region in general. They caused serious implications on the relations not only between the FRY and the so-called International Community, but also between Yugoslavia and her neighbouring countries.

International sanctions and the wars waged in her neighbourhood as well as within Yugoslavia worked strongly in favour of the black market, corruption and crimes. These evil phenomena have struck deeply the roots of Yugoslav society and also overflew across the borders in the neighbouring countries.

As a consequence of the war (Kosovo case), the FRY lost - for the time being - control over a part of her territory. Now ruled by the International Community, Kosovo remains one of the most sensitive spots in Europe.

Most of the South East European countries started to build their political and social-economic system in accordance with the Western European standards more than ten years ago. In that respect, Yugoslavia was too late. She got rid of the government which hampered economic transition and political-social transformation much later - less than a year ago. The new democratic government is now passing through so called l'enfant disease.

The ruling coalition is made up of too many parties and their leaders express their views in public with different approaches towards the current problems. Clearer differentiations and regroupings of the Yugoslav, or rather Serbian, political milieu are rather slow. The process of the economic and social reforms is still not giving satisfactory results. Foreign support, financial assistance and direct foreign investment are far below the level previously expected. Industrial production continues to decrease, and living

standards are in stagnation. The opposition of the left or right tries to exploit the ruling elite's weaknesses for the promotion of its own views.

Yugoslavia has seven neighbours plus one across the Adriatic sea. Relations with all of them are still not built upon a good neighbourhood basis. Besides, some of Yugoslavia's neighbours are facing serious security problems. Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, is imposed and kept under foreign/international control. It is more or less the same with Macedonia. Albania is still in the process of recovering from 1997, with numerous internal problems. In case some disturbances would occur in the surroundings, the country's own security would be in peril.

Yugoslavia has been for more than ten years in some kind of isolation. Apart from (or a part of) the international sanctions, the country was excluded from almost all international organizations, including financial and monetary institutions, and so deprived of the possibility to express her views on current internal and/or regional issues or on the demands for a particular kind of support or economic and financial assistance. Such positions had grave consequences upon Yugoslavia's development as well as security. These obstacles have finally been lifted and the doors for new opportunity are now widely opened.

Searching for Solutions

Internal security, sustainable development, a strong international position and good relations with neighbouring countries are preconditions for peace and stability of any country, including Yugoslavia.

The FRY has many internal problems, and her international position is still unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, at the present level of development and international standing, there is no real threat to the country's national security from outside, nor is there any kind of internal disturbance. However, if the issues are not met in a proper way and at the right time, then some kind of threat might appear. Therefore, additional efforts made in searching for the paths that lead to solutions concerning the most crucial issues as soon as possible and to create conditions favourable for building enduring peace and stability are a necessity.

The uncertain status of the Federation and long-lasting discussions on its future are simply are no longer tenable. They hamper development and slow down the country's integration in the International Community.

Excluding the current setting, one could see three possible solutions:

1. A federation with significantly reduced responsibility of the Federal Government;
2. A union of the two semi-independent countries, and
3. Two independent countries with a friendly and good neighbourhood relationship.

Each of these settings has advantages and disadvantages. The first one would offer more stability and faster development, provided the relations between the federal authority and the authorities of the two republics would work properly and efficiently. The third one, I am convinced, would carry with itself more uncertainty and challenges.

As far as the future of the Federation is concerned, the forthcoming referendum and/or the elections in Montenegro seem to become

decisive. The possibilities of the development in the aftermath remain in the sphere of hypotheses and estimates, without any solid foundation.

Along with the solution of the Federation issue, misunderstandings stemming from that issue should disappear. The rivalries among Serbian leaders might be considered as normal - as a part of the new democratic development. They could slow down that development but should not threaten it. In any case, further and faster democratisation of society is of crucial importance for building peace and stability in Yugoslavia and in the region.

In Kosovo, for decades (not to say centuries), inter-ethnic animosity and misanthropy have been fostered. The most recent war and its aftermath strengthened the results of that fostering. Given the deepness of that seeded hatred and the current situation in Kosovo in general, it seems that it might be necessary to wait for some years (if not decades) before the leaving of the UNMIK and KFOR institutions from that province would be recommendable. In the meantime, additional efforts should be made in promoting inter-ethnic confidence, tolerance and mutual understanding. The main tasks and objectives of all influential factors, directly or indirectly involved in the Kosovo matters, should be to build multi-ethnic, multi-confessional and truly democratic surroundings.

After becoming a member of the United Nations and the OSCE, the FRY is now looking forward to join other international and regional organizations. The country’s first goal is the Council of Europe. The Nato program "Partnership for Peace" is becoming more and more attractive for the highest Yugoslav polity and military. Nato full membership and the European Union are her next, long-term goals. Attaining those goals, however, depends very much on Yugoslavia’s internal development, that is, on her economic development and socio-political integrity, as well as

upon her regional and international standings. Therefore, for full integration into the International Community, Yugoslavia will have to work very hard at building her integrity and strong international standing.

Peace and Stability through Development

Peace and stability are in a very close correlative linkage, together with development. "Without peace it is impossible to achieve sustainable development and without development there is no chance for a real peace" (Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "Agenda for Peace, 1992"). The validity of B.B. Ghali's statement can be proved in reality. Small and medium-size highly developed countries enjoy higher internal stability and they are less imposed to the foreign political pressures and military interventions. They are also lesser prone to war and violence than underdeveloped countries. Starting from that point of view, it is not hard to state that the main goal of underdeveloped countries should be to enter the club of high-developed countries. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, it seems that this will not be easily attainable.

Recent estimates show that between 1989 and 1999, Yugoslavia - due to the troubles she was facing, lost more than 500 billion USD in non-realized GNP. To that amount an additional sum of 100 billion USD of the losses directly or indirectly inflicted by the Nato bombardment should be added. Today, Yugoslavia is at the very bottom of the European scale in terms of GNP per capita.

For faster development and at the same time stronger prevention of internal unrest and regional perils Yugoslavia needs and deserves corresponding foreign aid. The current Yugoslav leaders work very hard to obtain such aid, but with moderate results. In doing so, they are somehow neglecting possibilities of better and more profitable

use of domestic resources which are contained, first of all, in natural wealth and in human capacities.

For better usage of the domestic resources, the introduction of modern management – a measure which is deficient not only in Yugoslavia but also in other South East European countries - could be of enormous help. Faster development can be achieved also by an improvement of the public governance, where modern management is badly needed.

Considering development to be a major determinant of peace and stability in a country, it should be emphasized that not only economic development is meant. Rather, it is also social (democratic, cultural, etc), technological and other. Only regarded as multi-dimensional, with an synergetic approach to the problems, development can mitigate the perils and lead to peace and stability.

Education for Peace and Stability

The famous Irish author, George Bernard Shaw, said: "Peace is not only better than war, but infinitely more arduous". It would be hard not to agree with the respected author. Peace, certainly, is better than war because war is destructive, while peace is constructive. Unreasonable leaders easily start and wage war, while wise thinkers endlessly fought for peace without too much success.

It would be hard to oppose another genius, Albert Einstein, who, speaking on the advantages of peace, said: "Peace cannot be presented by force. It can be achieved by understanding". It is true, peace can be achieved by understanding, but how can understanding be achieved? How can understanding be achieved among peoples of different heritage, among states whose leaders

have different aims and objectives, among rich and pour peoples or countries?

One of the ways to achieve peace by understanding might be through education. Not education per se, but education deliberately planned and programmed for the promotion of peace and stability. Today, in the world there are so many schools in which the young ones are taught how to wage war, how to kill someone or to destroy something, either for offensive or defensive purposes. One can hardly encounter a place or institution where teaching is designed particularly to the promotion of peace, how peace is obtained and sustained. Building a culture of peace, tolerance and togetherness in life is not part of CURRICULA of schools and universities - at least this is not the case in Yugoslavia.

Education for peace and stability can be performed by organizing and carrying out the following forms and levels of education:

1. Specialist courses and seminars for selected participants,
2. Specialist and post-graduate studies, including the elaboration of master's and doctor's theses, and
3. Incorporation of Irenology (The Science of peace), as a separate subject, into the regular teaching programs of particular schools and/or colleges.

Education for peace does not anticipate the promotion of idealized pacifism or the negation of a need for defence, but, rather, the promotion of the spirit of understanding, tolerance and peaceful coexistence; the promotion of cooperation among nations and states; acting towards the elimination of real and/or potential dangers to peace and stability etc. Education for peace should also include activities relating to the strengthening of knowledge and understanding of the nature and causes of war and violence and advantages of peace, development of new humane values of

patriotism (in contrast to nationalism), a culture of peace and joint life; cherishing and improvement of cultural and civilizational heritage based on the principle "live and let others live".

Education for peace is most important for elementary school teachers, who are in a position to transfer their knowledge to the younger generations. Studies in Irenology could be useful for the students of international relations and the ones who work or intend to work in that field.

The program of education for peace and stability, in case it would be developed and accepted, should be implemented in all Balkan or South East European countries. Only in that way it would, in the long run, produce favourable results.

Concluding Remarks

All South East European, transitional countries have more or less the same problems and the same longings. All of them belong to the Balkans, which are as a region often designated as the "European powder barrel".

Besides being the least developed countries of Europe, they are wrestling with problems arising from economic transition and socio-political transformation. Multi-ethnic and multi-confessional tensions and inter-state rivalries remain to be remarkable characteristics of the Balkan region. In such circumstances, crisis management should be raised to the level of the art or science of conflict prevention and of creating conditions for peace and stability in each of the South East European countries and in the region in general.

Today, all South East European countries in transition demonstrate their willingness to join NATO and the European Union. To be eligible for the accession, however, they have to fulfil numerous conditions. A good relationship with the neighbouring countries and, as a result of that, regional stability, stay among that conditions. Therefore, each of the South East European countries should coordinate the efforts with the others in their striving to become full members of the International Community. A major contribution to that aim would be to develop a credible pre-accession strategy for South East European countries in transition to join Nato and the European Union.

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SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITHIN NATO

At the Washington Summit in 1999, the Alliance adopted the new strategic concept which took a more comprehensive view of Euro-Atlantic security and placed greater emphasis on NATO capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management. All these were related to lessons learned in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, acquired by exercising, and no doubt to other lessons learned from recent events in the USA. Some lessons even may have to be learned yet.

Crisis management is an old phrase in the NATO. No one used the term then, but the preamble and the first six articles of the Washington Treaty are the basis of NATO. As we use the phrase today, it represents a new approach to security in the Alliance.

The Alliance's crisis management process is founded on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty which emphasises the need for Alliance consultation. The article states the following: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

This article established one of the most important mechanisms, the consultation procedure, which is implemented whenever any ally considers the territorial integrity or political independence of any of the allies to be threatened. The new strategic concept highlights the importance of consultations (2nd of “fundamental security tasks”). The language of Article 4 on consultation is mirrored in the PfP invitation.

In contrast to the predominant threat of the past, the risks for Allied security that remain, are multifaceted in nature and

multidirectional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. Uncertainty about where and how they could develop into crises or military threats will prevail, and NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved.
In this context it would be stimulating to give an idea of the meaning of the term “crisis”. It may surprise you to know that there is no NATO, Allied or internationally agreed definition of the term “crisis”. The strategic concept quite deliberately avoided giving a clear-cut definition of the term, and that allows the North Atlantic Council (NAC) maximum flexibility in deciding when a situation becomes a crisis.
On the other hand, here is what could be considered a definition, a non-approved definition, more of a common understanding of what a situation of crisis is (as used in the NATO environment) that could be useful to start this framework. According to this, a crisis can be understood as “a national or international situation where there is a threat to priority values, interests or goals”, that means that priority values, interest or goals of the Alliance are in danger.

These risks can arise in various ways, and it states “to stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus”. A second point in the Strategic Concept and Summit Communiqué is that this “new alliance” will be larger, more capable, and more flexible and able to undertake new missions, including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management, including CROs.
This text is meant to provide an understanding of crisis management, briefly describing the organisation, procedures and measures, and then highlighting some of the key changes that have been put in place in recent years or that are under way.
It is clear that in order to begin planning for non-Article 5, CROs will require a Council settlement, and such a decision is a political one which must be taken in accordance with the relevant

provisions of the Washington Treaty and the 1999 Strategic Concept.

But for a better understanding of this situation let us now turn to the objectives of NATO crisis management and the organisation:

- The agreement on objectives must be achieved by the Military Committee;
- To contribute to effective conflict prevention, including reducing tensions so as to prevent them from becoming crises, also through CROs, if necessary:
- To manage effectively crises which have arisen to prevent them from becoming conflicts;
- To ensure timely civil and military preparedness adapted to suit different degrees of crises;
- In the very unlikely case that hostilities were to break out, to control the response, prevent further escalation and persuade any aggressor to cease his attack and withdraw from allied territory;
- And, when further escalation or hostilities have been stopped or are under control, to de-escalate in order to re-establish the normal order.

As you see, these objectives in the past were designed for the Cold War period, and it was a response to an enemy preparation to attack, but now there is a different approach.

The new approach was first set out in 1991 in Rome, as part of the Alliance's new strategic concept. It encompassed a new, broader approach to security, and greater opportunities to achieve long-standing objectives by using political means.
Today, the likely conflicts are generated by the crises between the political actors resulting from tensions and antagonisms caused by ethnic conflicts, extreme nationalism, intra-state political strife,

failed or inadequate political change, and severe economic problems. In relation to this, there are some key aspects which include:

1. More active use of political and diplomatic means
2. Close interaction and cooperation with other international organisations
3. Significant changes in our force and command structures, and
4. NATO support for UN- and OSCE-mandated peace-keeping operations, including, of course, NATO and NATO-led peace support operations /CROs.

First of all the specified principles required to rule the crisis management process must be considered:

- The Alliance being composed of nineteen sovereign member countries, consensus is needed to achieve an Alliance decision;
- The highest authority of the Alliance is NAC. In defence policy matters that involve the integrated force structure, the highest authority is the Defence Planning Committee (DPC);
- The Council/DPC, in carrying out their main tasks of collective decision-making in a crisis, act as the forum for consultation, wherein member governments can express and compare their views, leading to the harmonisation of these views in the form of collective decisions on measures to be implemented;
- All decisions taken in the Council/DPC (and all other NATO bodies) are expressions of national sovereignty and are therefore taken by consensus. The nations have delegated to their Ambassadors the responsibility of

representing all elements of their Governments (political, economic, defence, and civil emergency);

- The Council/DPC is supported by the Military Committee, the Political Committee, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the Crisis Response Committee, and, when required, other relevant Committees which provide advice and recommendations on aspects and measures within their respective fields of competence;
- Major NATO Commanders are responsible for conducting operations, in conformity with political guidance by the Council/DPC;
- NATO has no sources of intelligence of its own in peacetime. It is therefore imperative that member countries share nationally-gathered intelligence and their assessments with their Allies, and make them speedily and comprehensively available to NATO Headquarters and major NATO commanders;
- Finally, at every step in the Crisis Management there is political control of the military; no decision regarding planning for deployment, or actual employment of military forces, can be taken without political authorisation.

The arrangements and procedures have been developed but they nevertheless raise some key policy questions which were debated fully in the Alliance. These include the issue of mandates and political legitimacy of NATO-led CROs and the legal framework within which such operations would be conducted. Among these, the use of political legitimacy and mandates will be a key question that must be considered on a case-by-case basis by the Council. Some significant factors in this framework are:

- The identification and monitoring of crisis situations, including related analysis procedures;
- The exchange of intelligence and information;

- Production and circulation of assessments to support consultation and collective decision-making;
- Circulation of press and public media.

The forum for consultation and co-ordination of crisis management is the Council Operations and Exercises Committee (COEC) at the level of political military representatives from national delegates, concerned with crisis management and exercises. Its role is to provide arrangements, procedures and facilities, including communications issues, questions relating to the NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN), and the preparation and conduct of crisis management exercises, and its sustainability in the management of crisis for this proposal.

The Crisis Management and Operations Directorate includes the Crisis Management Section, the Council Operations Section, and the Peacekeeping Staff. The Director of Crisis Management and Operations is also responsible on behalf of the Secretary General for the development and control of the NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN).
The Crisis Management Section provides staff support to the Secretary General, the Council and Defence Planning Committee, and relevant subordinate groups on major politico-military crisis management policy issues. It is responsible for implementing, monitoring and reporting on Council decisions associated with crisis management and the preparation and conduct of NATO operations.
It also has a liaison and co-ordination function between NATO and non-NATO nations, and appropriate international organisations such as: the United Nations; the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe; the European Union; the Western European Union; the Office of the High Representative of the UN; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Council Operations Section supports NATO crisis management by the development and improvement of procedures, organisation and facilities to support the needs of the Council and Defence Planning Committee, and to facilitate consultation in periods of tension and crisis.

The Peacekeeping Section supports the crisis management process by providing conceptual and technical strategic planning and advice on peace-support operations. The Peacekeeping Staff also support other aspects of NATO's work in the field of crisis response operations, including the development of Alliance peacekeeping policy, the development of CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) policy, and support for the PJC and PMSC Ad Hoc Groups on Peacekeeping. This section also maintains close relations with other international organisations including the OSCE, UN, UNHCR and the OHR.

The Situation Centre, known as the SITCEN, has three specific roles: to assist the North Atlantic Council, the Defence Planning Committee, and the Military Committee in fulfilling their respective functions in the field of consultation; to serve as a focal point within the Alliance for the receipt, exchange, and dissemination of political, military, and economic intelligence and information; and to act as a link with similar facilities of member nations and of the Major NATO Commands. A Communication Centre or “COMCEN” supports the Situation Centre.

At the earliest opportunity, the Partners and then non-Partner nations are invited and consulted to offer forces. These contributions are often in important areas of Allied shortfall such as medical, engineering and technical specialists.

The intention behind participation by Non-NATO Troops Contributing Nations (NNTCN) is to create a truly multinational framework and to better demonstrate international support and legitimacy.

The NNTCN are also given the opportunity to comment on operations planes, and their views are taken into account. This

allows partner and non-partner nations to contribute to the provision of political guidance and oversight of operations, and contributes to what is termed as ‘Decision Shaping’. In addition, NNTCN’s for SFOR and KFOR take part in a weekly meeting at NATO with diplomats and military representatives to review and discuss matters of mutual interest in the conduct of operations.
Non-NATO Nations close to the conflict area can also offer Host Nation Support in the form of basing, transit and over-flight rights. Support of this kind is crucial.

In response to a potential or developing crisis, for timely action it is essential to have a variety of different measures or possible responses in place, so that they do not have to be developed on an ad-hoc basis for each new situation. In deciding what to do about a given situation, the Council/DPC has a wide range of measures, and Allies have agreed from which to choose. These include:

- Diplomatic, economic and military preventive measures,
- A variety of military response options and
- A complete spectrum of precautionary measures.

The range of crises operations envisioned encompasses “the Alliance’s conduct of, and participation in, the full spectrum of operations, to include those in support of peace, which could range from the most demanding types of peace enforcement to military preventive activities, and others as directed by the North Atlantic Council”.
A further definition is given in relation to the spectrum of such activities which are described as “multifunctional operations, which encompass those political, military and civil activities, initiated and executed in accordance with international law, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution, and crisis management in pursuit of Alliance objectives. The Alliance’s

operations range from support operations primarily associated with civil agencies, through to operations in support of peace."

In defining the new strategic environment in which these operations are conducted, it is clear that the Armed Forces have to deal with a complex and diverse spectrum of actors, risks, situations and demands. The following factors must be taken into account:

- Response can involve international, political, diplomatic, military and civilian humanitarian authorities
- Environment can range from permissive to hostile and be influenced by the perception of the local population and local organisations
- Institutions of law and order could be fragile or non-existent.
- They will be politically sensitive and subject to considerable media and public debate.

In the new strategic environment, the distinction between Article 5 – *collective defence* - and non-Article 5 missions has been increasingly blurred. The key differences include participation by non-NATO Nations and the civil nature of operations.

- May have a specific mission, such as extraction operations or military support to disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation, or search and rescue.
- May be of a humanitarian nature not connected with any potential conflict.
- May be enforcement operations, to contain and prevent conflicts by early engagement or to terminate conflicts before escalation into war.
- May be as demanding as Article 5 missions, involving the complete array of NATO assets and capabilities.

Additionally, NATO CROs may be limited in objectives, means, area and time – or any combination of the four depending on the desired end-state, which:

To summarise, Non-Article Operations have proved to be even more demanding that those that were supposed to be conducted under the application of Article 5, with a new approach to the selection of objectives (no collateral damage, “0” casualties in own forces), and move lasting operations, with the need to think of forces rotation on the ground.

Clearly, with such a broad spectrum of operations, not all principles will be applicable in each case, and therefore judgement is required to temper the weight and application of this guidance. It must also be appreciated that this capstone document is not intended to hold all the answers. The lower level doctrinal publications, which stem from this policy, such as Allied Joint Publications will be of more relevance to those in the field.

However, I would like to highlight some aspects of these principles which are relevant to the troops on the ground. Assumptions for the selection of the principles for CROs could be: objectivity; perseverance; unity of command; unity of effort; use of force; flexibility; security; transparency of operations; legitimacy; impartiality; credibility; mutual respect; freedom of military movement; promotion of co-operation; consent. For a better discernment of the purpose of their application, some of them are outline below.

The use of force is one area where incorrect application can bring mission failure, and which therefore requires careful judgement. In all cases, the use of force must be in accordance with International Law, and politically approved guidance attached to the Rules of Engagement. While the abiding principle is that only the minimum necessary force should be used, any force should be precise, timely, appropriate and proportionate. Force should be used to

resolve a situation, not to escalate it. All these judgements are often left to the local commander on the spot.
Where the nature of the mission allows, operations should be conducted impartially, without favour or prejudice to any party. It is important that impartiality is maintained in all situations. Experience shows that once you have lost your impartial status, it is very difficult to re-establish it. The selection of the nation participating in the CROs must be among those that have no interests in the area.

In synthesis, it will be clear that the conduct of NATO in CROs requires military commanders at all levels to be fully aware of the diverse and numerous factors that can have an impact on these operations. They can be highly demanding and bring to the fore a significant multinational and civil dimension to military operations. There are clear challenges in planning and controlling operations, which involve the participation of non-NATO nations, taking into account the political and legal implications, while co-operating with civil agencies and international organisations.
NATO has learnt a great deal of lessons from recent operations in the Balkans and will continue to define and adapt its policy and procedures to ensure that future NATO-led CROs operations are conducted efficiently and effectively.

Reference

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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN MACEDONIA

1. Questions posed

Three aspects of the crisis in Macedonia shall be the theme of this paper:

- What kind of significance for the region and Europe as a whole does the conflict in Macedonia have?
- How successful was the crisis management by the EU and NATO up to November 2001? Did they succeed in limiting the conflict and developing possible solutions?
- What factors limit crisis management?

2. The dual challenge of security policy for international crisis management

The stabilising of Macedonia by the peaceful solution of the inter-ethnic conflict between the Slav Macedonians and the Albanian population sets a dual security political challenge for the EU and NATO as central actors of international conflict management in South-Eastern Europe:

Firstly, the success or the failure of Western conflict management in Macedonia has repercussions for stability in the whole south-eastern area of Europe. If the inter-ethnic conflict were to worsen to a civil war à la Bosnia the realisation of the goals of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe would be endangered. Especially the

goal of initiating an economic integration process in the western Balkans, which is closely lined to the Stability Pact, can only be achieved if the Macedonian state is stable.

A destabilising of Macedonia would not only hinder the attainment of the goals of the Stability Pact, but could also cause antagonisms between Macedonia and its neighbours to arise or be renewed. One must remember that the existence of an independent Slav-Macedonian identity was hardly beyond dispute amongst Macedonia's neighbours in the first years of its independence. Except for Albania all neighbours questioned the validity of the Macedonian state and/or the Macedonian nation after Macedonia had left the Yugoslavian federation. Serbia recognised the Macedonian nation, but not the state, Bulgaria proceeded to do the exact opposite and Greece did not recognise either. The relationship of Macedonia to its neighbours (especially to Greece) has certainly normalised since the middle of the Nineties and could certainly be called amicable. Notwithstanding this, the ghost of the so-called "Macedonian question" could be resurrected if Macedonia were to destabilise.

Secondly, the success or failure of international crisis management in Macedonia has repercussions for the course of the European integration process as well as the emerging security political structure of the EU. The representatives of the EU themselves state that the peace-making and stabilising of South-Eastern Europe is the most important test for the European Security and Defence Policy to date. A failure of European politicians in Macedonia would therefore be a step back in the efforts to formulate a common EU-security policy.

3. Prevention, the missed opportunity, but improved crisis management

The Western crisis management in the interethnic conflict in Macedonia up to date can be characterised as follows: An opportunity to prevent was missed again, but the crisis management has improved (in comparison with other, earlier, conflicts in the Balkans).

Concerning the missed opportunity of prevention one has to state that the international community had underestimated the inter-ethnic conflict potential in this country. They thought that the situation in Macedonia was stable compared to the situation in Kosovo and southern Serbia. The impression amongst the EU member states was that if one supported reform measures within Macedonia one did not have to care about an interethnic balancing act between Slav Macedonians and Albanians very much. Both the largest Slav-Macedonian party VMRO and the largest Albanian party PDSh contributed to the forming of this erroneous impression. After they had built a common government in the autumn of 1998 both parties gave the impression to the international community and to their own population that, with the forming of this government, the inter-ethnic balance was safe.

In the months before the crisis erupted quite a few acute early warning-signs were overlooked as well. An important example are the massive smuggling operations of arms in the geographic triangle of Kosovo – southern Serbia – northern Macedonia. KFOR was partially responsible for it occurring, because it failed to patrol the border area adequately. From the summer of 2000 at the latest there were reports of Albanians being armed in Macedonian border villages. Even EU-internal warnings of a widening of Albanian guerrilla activities to Macedonia at the start of February 2001 did not lead to a resolute response by the EU member states. Those

necessary political measures which were instated after the fights had broken out in spring amongst signs of difficulty should have been instated earlier. This is especially true of the Macedonian all-party-talks about a reform of the state. Whether an early start of these political measures would have prevented the armed conflict is questionable, but the danger of destabilising Macedonia would have been reduced.

The crisis management of the EU and NATO emissaries after the armed conflict had erupted can be said to have been a positive one (which, in turn, cannot be said of the conflict prevention measures). The West had reacted to the outbreak of the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with “a great perplexity”, but clear goals were formulated in the case of Macedonia soon after the fighting had erupted:

- To prevent the spreading of the fights from the rural areas to the multi-ethnic cities and thereby to prevent a civil war.
- To prevent a declaration of a state of war by the Macedonian government.
- To achieve a stable cease-fire.
- By using political and economical pressure the parties to the conflict should have been convinced of agreeing to a peace settlement plan, which would have restored the inter-ethnic balance. It was agreed not to appease the concepts of the radical forces on either side by concessions to them. The Albanian concept is to demand a federalisation of Macedonia along ethnic criteria. The Macedonian concept, on the other hand, is to demand the sustaining of a centralist state in which the Albanian people (about 30% of the total population) would keep its status as a mere minority. The peace plan of the international mediators pays attention to the multi-ethnic structure of Macedonia (in contrast to the above mentioned ethno-nationalist concepts) by

strengthening the competence of local government as well as assuring the proportional representation of Albanians in national administration and the Police while simultaneously stressing the civic principle in Macedonia's Constitution and preserving the territorial integrity of the state.

The above mentioned goals of international conflict management were reached to a large degree by using political and economic pressure on the parties to the conflict: A civil war involving the population of the cities was avoided up to now; the number of deaths is rather small (roughly 100 at the end of September) if compared to the 10.000 to 15.000 deaths in Croatia and the 200.000 deaths resulting from the conflict in Bosnia; larger "massacres" have not occurred yet, even though both the Macedonian security forces and the Albanian UÇK stand accused of grave violations of human rights; the Albanian guerrilla force agreed to its disarmament after the most important Slav-Macedonian and Albanian political parties had signed a peace plan in mid-August, and it decided to disband itself (at least formally).

Three factors cause the international conflict management to be more effective in Macedonia than in earlier crises in South-Eastern Europe:

- Firstly, there is now a regional stabilisation concept in place in the region (the Stability Pact) which contributes to the defusing of the conflict. The EU used the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement by Macedonia in April 2001 also as a foundation for the initiation of all-party-talks. The Slav-Macedonian politicians could justify their readiness to discuss reforms benefiting the Albanians via their own population by pointing out the interest of Macedonia in the European integration process.

- Secondly, the EU has got (contrary to the situation during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the Kosovo-conflict) the beginnings of a common security political structure and adequate instruments of crisis management. Apart from the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, there is the Standing Political and Security Committee where all the member states are represented and which prepares and executes the decisions of the foreign ministers in security matters. The analytical work should mostly be taken up by the Joint Situation Centre which was set up in early 2000, which is staffed both by military and civilian personnel. Mr. Solana himself has his own staff, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.
- Thirdly, the conditions for successful international conflict management by the community of States in Macedonia were better than in the other conflicts in the Balkans. Contrary to the conflict in Kosovo, Macedonia had a long tradition of a culture of co-existence between Albanians and the Slav population. The parties of the respective ethnic groups were engaged in permanent dialogue.

4. Limits of international crisis management

Even though a regional stabilising concept and common policies by both the EU and NATO succeeded in checking the conflict in Macedonia, the limits of international crisis management are clear:

International conflict management can try to initiate confidence-building measures amongst the parties to a conflict, but if the parties do not want to execute a peaceful solution supported by political compromise there can be no sustainable stabilisation. In the case of Macedonia this is demonstrated by the fact that the

peace plan of Ohrid, which provides for an improvement of the status of the Albanians in the areas of education and language as well as their proportional representation in national administration, was signed reluctantly by the Slav-Macedonian parties and is perceived as “Diktat”-peace of the West.

Furthermore (and also demonstrated by the Macedonian case), it is clear that it is difficult for international mediators to be accepted as “honest” and “impartial” broker in South-Eastern European society which is dominated by the categories of “friend” and “foe”. The Slav-Macedonian side accuses the EU of evoking anti-Macedonian and pro-Albanian policy thinking along the lines of “If you do not offer unambiguous support, you are my enemy!”. The NATO troops, stationed in Macedonia to protect EU and OSCE observers after they had collected UÇK weapons, are perceived by many Slav Macedonians as occupying force. Contrary to the overshooting negative perceptions of the Slav Macedonians the Albanian side, according to the classificatory scheme of either “friend” or “foe”, tends to think that the NATO troops are stationed in Macedonia exclusively to promote Albanian interests.

As in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the link between stable surroundings and a successful conflict management is discernible in the development of the inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia. If the neighbouring state is politically unstable or puts measures into place which favour one of the parties to the conflict, the chances for successful conflict management are reduced. In Bosnia-Herzegovina after the end of the war it was most of all the influence of Croatia led by Franjo Tudjman and Serbia under Slobodan Milo_evi_ which had a very negative effect on the peace process. The fragile inter-ethnic balance in Macedonia is influenced to a large degree by the political vacuum in Kosovo. A negative factor influencing the stability of Macedonia is the unclear status of this UN-protectorate, which, according to

International Law, is still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but which de facto has hardly any connection to Serbia. The longer the question of the status of Kosovo is unsolved and the greater the unhappiness of the Albanians in Kosovo, the larger the recruiting potential for extremist groups (which see the unification of all Albanians of the former Yugoslavia as the only solution to the “Albanian question”) will be.

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THE POST COLD WAR ERA: ROMANIA AND THE STABILITY IN THE BALKANS

After the end of the Cold War, the most severe threats to the peace and security in Europe and also in the Balkans were instability and a lack of security generated by the new risks and challenges. Religious intolerance and nationalism – extremism, inter-ethnic conflicts, especially terrorist attacks as the ones on September 11, 2001, caused international community to become extremely fluid with imprevisible evolutions. The former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), James Wollsey, characterised this reality in a suggestive way, saying that "we killed a giant dragon (communism), but now we live in a jungle full of poisonous snakes".[1]

Therefore, in the last ten years Europe witnessed lots of crises and conflicts that have burst in the area, such as those from Transnistria and Slovenia in 1991; Croatia between 1991 and 1995; Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995; Kosovo between 1998 and 1999 and the Macedonian conflict in 2001.[2]

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1 **Stanley Hoffman**, Le monde nouveau et ses problems, Commentaire, Number 53 (1991).

2 **Lyubica Jelusic**, **Vladimir Prebilic**, Between old ties and new challenges: Slovenian policy towards crises situations in South-Eastern Europe, in: **PfP Consortium, National Defence Academy, Vienna,**Ten years after: Democratisation and security challenges in South-East Europe (2001), p 69; **Wolfgang Biermann**, **Martin Vadset** (ed.), UN Peace-keeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia (1999).

3 **Jaffrey Simon**, Sources of Balkan Insecurity: The Meed for a Comprehensive Strategy, Strategic Forum, Number 150 (1998), at: http://www.rdn.edu/inss/s.

It is easy to see that the centre of instability of South-Eastern Europe was Yugoslavia. The (in)stability ratio in the 20th century in the Balkans alternated in time, security being in a precarious state. Trying to hide these facts, communism deepened and actuated the causes that generated insecurity in the area.[3] The efforts made by both the countries from the region and the international community in the last ten years, have not solved the Balkan problem.

In this study I want to make a few suggestions that could generate some further arguments and possible directions in order to support the region to become a stable area for the European continent. This study has two objectives: on the one hand, it tries to demonstrate that for applying effective programmes and strategies in the Balkans a sustained effort in security level projection is necessary. This projection should take into consideration the necessity to have knowledge of the peculiarities of this area which is characterised by an ethnic, cultural and religious mosaic; numerous conflicts made this region the "powder barrel of Europe"; a lot of demarcation lines which cross over the Balkans (Catholicism/ Orthodoxy/ Islam; Western/Eastern civilisations; instable borders, etc[4]). Referring to this, Macedonia's President, Boris Trajkovski, at the opening of the "Crises Management in South–East Europe from PfP Consortium" working group, declared that the "history of our region, which today is called South–East Europe, was marked

[4] **Gheorghe Ciascai**, The consequences of NATO enlargement for South–Eastern Europe regional security, X Romanian Military Thinking, new series, Number 1 (1999), p. 51.

by many particularities that cannot be found to any other region of the world"[5].

The discussion of an adequate security model for the Balkan states is situated not only in the searching process for better solutions for the efficient construction of a stable security environment, but it also subscribes to the scholars' efforts to find a new paradigm to overpass the actual models of security. Because the specialists, analysts and decision-makers neither had any profound research nor a projection basis to put effort on interdisciplinary studies (from the international relations theory to mentalities study and ethno-religious sociology/psychology phenomena, they could not always offer viable solutions for the problems of the area.

Unfortunately, many times inadequate strategies were adopted. These strategies did not take into consideration the particularities of the area. This could be a possible explanation for the pessimistic or disastrous visions launched by some analysts in theoretical disputes. For some analysts, Kosovo meant "the relope of Cold War in Europe"[6] for others Kosovo could become the hitch for a bigger conflict that could involve neighbouring countries like Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia.[7] The American analyst Sean Kay from Wesleyan University, Ohio, highlighted that "yet in site of both the increased theoretical and policy attention to Europe's security institutions, the track record to date

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5 **Boris Trajkovski**, Address to Ohrid Conference, in: PfP Consortium, National Defence Academy, Vienna, *supra* fn 2, p. 6.

6 **Lawrence Freedman**, The future of international polities in the wake of Kosovo, Jane's Defence Weekly Feature, at: /http/defence.james.com. wyswyg/home45.

7 **Narcis Zarnescu**, Quo Vadis, Kosovo, V Rumanian National Defence College Journal, Number 2, (1999), p. 63-64.

does not support the basic assumption that institutions necessarily increase security"[8].

To build up a durable stability in the Balkans implies, first of all, models and strategies to be applied in order to conduct to the elimination of the security dilemma[9] and to a new paradigm for regional security. Security dilemmas are not exclusively a characteristic of the Balkans; they also characterised the international relations during the Cold War period[10], when national security was based on military defence, the use of force and threats being enrooted in the international relations system. As Robert Osgood observed, there is a fundamental contradiction, in the sense that the main instrument for getting security (military force) became, automatically, the first threat to another state or region's security.[11]

After the end of the Cold War and after the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation, the Balkan states fell into a similar dilemma when they used force instead of diplomacy as a solution to problems to be solved. The result was a bloody war and not peace in the Balkans.[12] There are some scholars who affirm that the Balkan states will not get rid of this security dilemma as long as there are forces in this area that are capable of offensive or defensive operations. I am of the opinion that if we build trust among the neighbouring countries through a control of the military expenditures, through the civilian control of the army and the

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[8] **Sean Kay**, Security Regionalisation in the new Europe. International Institution and Balkan Crises, in: Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations, 4th General Assembly, Olso, 11-12 August, 2000 (2000), p. 209.

[9] **Barry Buzan**, People, states and fear (trans. by Vivia Sandulescu) (2000), pp. 274-297; **Panayottis Tskonas**, Creating Conditions of Stability in the Balkans, II Romanian Journal of International Affairs (1996), p. 113.

[10] **Barry Buzan**, *supra* fn 9, pp. 286-287.

[11] **Robert Osgood**, **Robert W. Tucker**, Force, Order and Justice (1967).

[12] *ibidem.*

struggle against terrorism that generates insecurity, we will be able to increase security and stability in the region.

Stability in the Balkans can be established also through modification or even replacement of military doctrines or security strategies based on exclusive force, using a modern paradigm such as the cooperative security one.[13] In 1994, writing on Foreign Policy, the former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described Cooperative Security as tending "(…) to consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism"[14]. Michael Mihalka believes that through adopting a cooperative security model, states will not be any longer the prisoners of the security dilemma. "States in a pluralistic security community expect other states in the community not to use or threaten to use military force as means of resolving disputes. Such a community develops through extensive transactions and communication that aid and abet the consolidation of shared norms and values. This continued interaction is reinforced by cooperation, which further develops shared norms, which then create more interaction, in a positive feedback loop"[15].

The application of this security model in the Balkans presupposes first of all to create the proper conditions for the new elements that compose its substance. In the first place it should guarantee individual security by ensuring respect for human rights by the state[16]. "The essential basic value upon which a Cooperative

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[13] *ibidem.*

[14] **Gareth Evans**, Cooperative Security and Intra-States Conflict, 96 Foreign Policy (1994); **Richard Cohen**, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order (2001), p. 4.

[15] **Richard Cohen**, **Michael Mihalca**, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, in: Cooperative Security: from Theory to Practice (2001), p. 37.

[16] *ibidem.*

Security system rests in unquestioned conviction by its members to uphold and maintain the Individual Security of its own citizens and those of their fellow members. This is the inner ring of the Cooperative Security system, which will ultimately hold it together over time under inevitable pressures and stresses, internal and external. Only the ideal and values of liberal democracy can keep this vital nucleus together"[17].

Barry Buzan discerns a major contradiction between individual and collective security assurance. Although states assure a certain security for their citizens, they do this using a high level of threats. This direct or indirect threats, having deliberate or involuntary co-lateral effects, are often severe enough to dominate the fragile universe of the individual security [18].

The American analyst is right, if we deal with states in which the fundamental liberties of the citizens are limited, and if the individual perceives the state and its institutions as constraint elements or strange to his aspirations. The Balkans events, from the last 10 years, are full of such examples in which individuals or national and religious communities did not trust the state, and which are actually fighting against the state. That is the reason for which I believe that NATO's intervention was necessary and that NATO's humanitarian presence in Kosovo represents an enforcement action of cooperative security. "NATO acted without a UN mandate. This occurred in part because the norm for action did not exist at the UN Security Council, while it did exist among NATO members"[19].

A second objective of the present study is to present the political and the diplomatic actions taken by Romania in the framework of the diverse and sometimes contradictory actions taken by the

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[17] *ibidem.*

[18] **Barry Buzan**, *supra* fn 9, p. 61.

[19] **Richard Cohen**, **Michael Mihalca**, *supra* fn 15, p. 55.

political actors of South East Europe. Romanian diplomacy understood clearly ever since the collapse of communism that there is no East-European country that can stay aside while in the region conflicts, crises and other acts of terrorism take place.

After the collapse of communism in Romania, the Romanian government decided to join the efforts of the international community in the fields of security and peace. In this sense, Romania joined a lot of the UN and OSCE peace operations in the last years, 2001 representing a decade of full Romanian participation in these kinds of operations. Romania also contributed to missions of civilian police and it is determined to diversify its contribution in this field.

The creation of the Romanian military structures for peace-keeping missions and their participation in the neighbouring countries are both a direct consequence of the reforms that took place in the army and a proof for Romania's determination to continue with its contribution to peace keeping operations. The active participation of Romania in such operations underlines Romania's will to be integrated in Euro-Atlantic structures. The idea of joining the international community in such missions was strongly supported by the Romanian political class. Starting with 1991, more than 6000 members of the Romanian military have participated in diverse UN and NATO operations, or in the operations of the international community such as "Desert Storm", UNIKOM, UNAMIR II, UNSOM II, UNAVEM, MONUC, UNMEE, UNTAET, UNMIK, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, and the "Alba"-operation. In the recent years, the Romanian participation in the international peace-keeping and conflict-preventing initiative concentrated on the region of South East Europe. Units of the Romanian army took part in IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (March -Dec. 1996) with a battalion of engineers formed of 200 people.[20]

[20] cf: Romanian Armed Forces in Peacekeeping Missions (1998).

The Romanian military participated in the 1996 engineer "Josef Kruzel". It was constituted and took action based on the decisions no. 23 and 45 from 1995 of the Romanian Parliament, on the decision no. 63 from February 7, 1996 of the Romanian Government and based on the decision of the Romanian Major State from December 27, 1995. The battalion was placed in Zenica and took action within the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), under the direct command of the British General Sir Michael Walker. It participated in actions of mine clearing, and in the building of bridges and roads. For example, the first bridge built with the participation of the battalion was opened on April 21st, 1996.

The Romanian engineers placed in Zenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, were involved in several humanitarian projects. All the projects materialised in the Federation of Croats and Muslims and in the Serbian Republic, in all three areas of responsibility of the multi-national divisions: the North division (American), the South-west division (British) and the South-east one (French). Roads to isolated villages from mountainous regions such as Gladovic and Plahovic were built; the stadium of Sarajevo was renovated for the Athletic Games of Solidarity and books and other humanitarian aids were distributed in Zenica and in the neighbouring area. The Romanian engineers also contributed to the repairing of 150 km of the railway that connects Zenica with Doboj and Lukavac (in the centre of Bosnia-Herzegovina). In October 28, 1996 the Petrovo Selo railway bridge was opened.

By the Decision no. 25 from 1996 of the Romanian Parliament and by the Decision no. 73 of the Romanian Government from March 14 , 1996 Romania was part of the new military structure SFOR for a period of 18 months (from Jan. 1997 – June 1998). The structure of the unity was changed, the number of soldiers decreasing to 180. For the first time, a connecting structure between the battalion and LANDCENT (NATO's land force that replaced the ARRC) was created.

From the beginning of the Romanian military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the 1996 “Joseph Kruzel” Engineers Battalion 691 members of the military (84 officers, 250 military foremen, and 357 sub-officers) participated and more than 200 missions took place. The battalion’s activities took place on more than 600 km square, in a risky mountain area with forests. Some of these missions were not accepted by the other participants of the mission. On average, in the two years of activity, the Romanian battalion served on 30, 000 working days, within 1, 800 million km with more than 30, 000 hours of functioning of engineers’ machines. The participation of the Romanian Missions to IFOR and SFOR cost Romania as much as an expenditure for an Army Corps.

As a consequence of the appreciation of the Romanian soldiers for their participation in diverse missions, Romania obtained all the credit in the participation of other important peace-keeping missions and stabilisation in the Balkans. Since November 14, 1999 the Romanian army is present in NATO’s mission in Kosovo. Starting with August 20, 2000, Romanian observers are part of the “UNMIK Mission” in Kosovo. Since the 1st of July, as a consequence of the Decision no. 22 from June 27, 2000 of the Romanian Parliament, the detachment “Bosnia” formed of 68 soldiers takes action in the mission of the SFOR II.

In the framework of these operations for the support of peace, the Romanian military collaborated with military belonging to other armies. Presently, Romania collaborates with the Netherlands within SFOR (The Netherlands Detachment) and with Greece within the KFOR mission. The Netherlands Detachment (formed of 49 soldiers) acts under a NATO mandate and as a consequence of the Decision no. 22 from June 27, 2000 of the Romanian parliament and the Decision no. 188 from October 19, 2000 of the Romanian Government. The Romanian collaboration with Greece is part of the MOVCON mission (one platoon of road traffic control).

On September 26, 1998 on the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the Southeast European Countries in Skopje an agreement - a "memorandum for the Creation of Multinational peace Forces in Southeast Europe" (MPFSEE) - was signed. This agreement provided the ground for the establishment of a multi-national brigade, which should be used for humanitarian assistance, conflict-prevention, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement under UN or OSCE mandate and under the leadership of NATO or WEU. The headquarters of the MPFSEE is in the Bulgarian town of Plovdiv and a Turkish General is chief of the brigade. Each participant's share in the common budget is proportional to the participating military units, i.e.: Albania 11, 76%, Bulgaria 23, 53%, Greece 17, 5%, Italy 2, 94% Macedonia 8, 82%, Romania 11, 76%, and Turkey 23, 53%.[21]

The peace-keeping and the humanitarian missions in which the Romanian Army participates highlighted the unanimous appreciation of all the NATO member states regarding Romania's constant effort to contribute to solving the major crises in different parts of the world. It also demonstrated that Romania has a lot of potential to participate in these missions. Those directly involved in such missions proved that they are able to apply the standard UN and NATO procedures.

In the last year of the last century, a wave of potential risks and dangers from the Balkans got to be identified and controlled. During the Kosovo crisis, through the joined efforts of the international community, a conflict that could endanger peace in Southeast Europe was limited and stopped. Although it was considered a great success, the international community went further, elaborating a policy based on realistic measures of integration of the region in the Euro-Atlantic structures. In the

[21] **Jordan Baev**, Bulgaria's Experience in Peace Support Operations, in:**PfP Consortium, National Defence Academy, Vienna**, *supra* fn 2, p. 88.

course of the European Union (EU) initiative, on June 10, 1999 in Köln, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was accepted.
In the founding document, more than 40 partner states and organisations decided to support the Southeast European states in their efforts to maintain "peace, democracy, the respect for human rights and the economic prosperity aiming to gain stability in the region"[22]. In this sense, Jack Seymour and Rick Rust are of the opinion that "the Stability Pact is a tremendous victory for advocates of peace-keeping and conflict-prevention. It represents a movement away from the traditional military-centric approach of reacting to crisis situations. The United States and the European Union have finally realized that allowing crisis to explode in the Balkans is much more costly - both in terms of life and money - than taking initiatives for the construction of long-term peace"[23]. In its turn, Bodo Hombach, the co-ordinator for the Stability Pact, underlined that "in so far the approaches on Balkans were directed to the resolution of crisis. The Stability Pact is the first attempt to eliminate the structural, political and the economical insufficiency of the countries from the region by a preventive diplomacy"[24].
In the first days after the Stability Pact was launched, on the initiative of the Romanian minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Andrei Plesu, the Romanian Government decided to create an inter-parliamentary group for collaboration on the national level in the course of the Romanian projects and priorities for the participation in the reconstruction and the economic development in the Balkans. This group established a national plan for rebuilding and regional economic reconstruction in South East Europe that was

[22] Köln Document, 10 June 1999.
[23] **Jack Semour**, **Rick Rust**, Stabilizing Southeast Europe: When Action must follow Words, Basic Publications (2000), at: http://wwwbasicint.org/ Notesjuly12.htm.
[24] Mondorama, Number 102, (2000).

approved by the Romanian Government. In this way Romania participated actively in all three Working Tables[25].

In the realisation of the document, Romania started from the premises that "the Stability Pact is a prior exam of European integration that has as basis not only the accomplishment of political, economical and social criteria but also a prior for elementary behaviour before being accepted into European Union or NATO"[26]. A country can be a member of a Euro-Atlantic structure if it proves to have strong cooperation ties with its neighbours and to be able to harmonise its national interests with the international ones. The fact that a Romanian, Mihai Razvan Ungureanu, is the Special Emissary of the Coordinator for the Stability Pact may be considered as a proof of gratitude for Romania's role in this "Marshall Plan". In this way Romania has an important role in the mechanism which connects Brussels (where the Secretariat of the Stability Pact is located) to national co-ordinators of the Pact.

Holding the co-presidency of the Working Table 1 for democratisation and human rights in this period, Romania is determined to contribute wholly using its profound knowledge of the region, its experience in the area and its entire conception with regard to the cooperation in this region. Similar experiences have already been made within the activity of the regional cooperation mechanisms of which our country is part, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Southeast European Cooperation Process and the South East European Cooperation Initiative.

Romania also thinks that the specific aims the three Working Tables through which the Stability Pact functions want to achieve are equally important and intermingled. At the same time, I have to admit that the fulfilling of tasks of the other two working tables depends, in a crucial way, on the putting into practice of the

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[25] See the appendix at the end of the paper.

[26] **Mihai Razvan Ungureanu**, O cheie pentru enigma balcanica, Bacalnii, Number 15 (2001), pp. 7-10.

objectives of the Economic Working Table and, hence, on the establishment of stability, cooperation, and security in South East Europe. The economic component of the Pact has registered an important progress during this year. This progress corresponds with Romania's goals and efforts which my country and the other Balkan states invested in this new structure meant to settle the regional cooperation. For example, at a meeting in Skopje (10-11 February, 2000), the European Investment Bank considered feasible and worth to finance 23 out of 40 infrastructure projects included in the Romanian National Action Plan. At the same time, the First Regional Conference of the Donors, held in Brussels by the end of March, approved 9 Romanian infrastructure projects amounting to 1,042 million Euro. Participating in the Economic Working Table, Romania - also an active member of the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation[27] - stressed again the necessity of immediate and concrete measures for the de-blocking of the Danube. In order to underline the necessity of political, diplomatic and economic measures aiming at free navigation on this important European waterway, I will make use of the words of Bodo Hombach who said that "we have institutions which can decide within two days which bridges over the Danube we should bomb, but we need two years to start repairing the damage and make the river navigable again, even though every day the blockage is costing Bulgaria and Romania more than the international help can provide. The politicians must grasp these terrible contradictions, not just for the sake of Southeast Europe but for the common European good"[28].

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[27] The Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation (MoU) was signed on 27 June 2001 in Brussels. The major goal of the MoU is to complete the network of free trade agreements in the region by the end of 2002, creating a market of up to 55 million consumers. The agreements will be fully in line with the WTO rules and with relevant obligations of each signatory country vis-a-vis the EU.

[28] Mondorama, *supra* fn 24.

Coming back to the Working Groups, at the Third Working Table that approached lots of current issues, Romania presented three projects: the financing of the Centre for Fighting Organized Crime (SECI) and the supplementing of its prerogatives concerning the problems with small weapons, the establishing of a Regional Centre for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, the drawing-up of a joined document concerning the security risks for South Eastern Europe. The support of the Defence Reform and mitigating the human consequences of defence rightsizing is an example of the synergy created by the Stability Pact between specialized institutions such as NATO, the World Bank and the regional countries, in this case, Romania and Bulgaria. Romania and Bulgaria (with NATO's expertise) set up retraining programmes for officers whose jobs had been cut, to help reintegrate them into civilian activities. So far, around 2000 military personnel underwent such a training and the programme is now expanded to the other countries of Southeast Europe.

In conclusion, I want to underline in the first place the necessity to have scholarly research of the environment concerning security in order to have the possibility of drawing some security scenarios. I also wish to highlight the role of Romania within the framework of common efforts to establish an environment of stability and security in this part of Europe. For these reasons we consider the Stability Pact a solution for the speeding-up of the peace reconstruction process. At the same time, it is a way of building up partnerships which are mutually profitable among the member states of the European Union and among the states of this region.

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