

Dennis J.D. Sandole

THE BALKANS STABILITY PACT AS A REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION 'SPACE': AN EVALUATION

1 Introduction

My general goal in this presentation, as it is for all of us at this workshop, is to examine the *Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*: the "pearl of the German presidency of the European Union" adopted in Köln on 10 June 1999, the day that NATO's 78-day bombing campaign of Serbia ceased.

This juxtapositioning of events is important as it apparently took the Kosovo conflict (but not the Bosnian conflict alone!) to encourage European states and other members of the international community, to respond to events in the Balkans with something like the Stability Pact.

As we all know, the Stability Pact represents an ambitious attempt to deal with the Balkans on a *regional* basis, recognizing that all political units and conflicts in the region are components of a larger whole; such that to deal effectively with any one unit or conflict means that, ultimately, the others -- *and their interconnections* -- have to be dealt with as well, if not simultaneously, then certainly in sequence.

Dealing with the political units and their conflicts in the Balkans is an onerous task; hence, the Stability Pact is modelled in part on the Marshall Plan that facilitated the rebuilding of Western Europe following the end of World War 2, and the European Union, which civilized relations between all of the former European adversaries of that war, especially France and Germany. Indeed, one of the purposes of the Stability Pact is to prepare the countries of the region for eventual entry into the European Union.

My specific objective in this presentation is to assess to what extent the Stability Pact incorporates appropriate conflict-handling (e.g., prevention and management) mechanisms for the Balkans. As a means to that end, I want to first outline a framework, the "*3 pillar comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution*", that I developed (see Sandole, 1998; forthcoming) as part of my efforts over the years to manage and "order" the wide range of disparate bits and pieces comprising the multidisciplinary field of conflict and conflict resolution. The framework is also useful for analyzing any particular conflict situation in order to explore what if anything a potential third party can do about it.

For this presentation, the framework has the additional value of being useful as a basis for *evaluation*: assisting us to observe what *is* and, by contrast, what *is not*, in the Balkans "conflict space" -- e.g., appropriate conflict prevention and management mechanisms -- as well as to imagine what *could be* in that space.

2 The 3 Pillar Framework: "*Mapping*" Conflict and Conflict Resolution

As its title indicates, the 3 pillar framework is comprised of three parts, or "pillars," which are intimately interrelated in the initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, de-escalation and termination of dynamic conflict processes.

Pillar 1 deals with the elements of *conflict* in general or of any particular conflict, whether latent, nonviolent, or violent; i.e.,

(a) the *parties* involved in conflict (e.g., Serbs-Croats; Serbs-Kosovar Albanians; Serbs-Bosniaks; Croats-Bosniaks; Macedonians-Albanians).

(b) the *issues* about which the parties are in conflict (e.g., territory).

(c) the *objectives* that parties hope to achieve by being in conflict over certain issues (e.g., status quo-changing [=self-determination] vs. status quo-maintaining [=sovereignty] goals).

(d) the *means* that parties use to achieve their goals (e.g., confrontational vs. nonconfrontational, lethal vs. nonlethal means).

(e) the *conflict-handling orientations* of parties, despite the particular means they might be using at any point in time (e.g., conflict avoidance, accommodation, confrontational, compromise, collaborative problemsolving). And

(f) the *conflict "spaces"* within which conflict is taking place (e.g., cultural, religious, historical, political, social, economic, and/or institutional environments).

Pillar 2 deals with *conflict causes and conditions*, which can be operative at, e.g., the following levels of analysis:

(a) individual (*biological/physiological and psychological*) factors, e.g., "chosen traumas" (Volkan, 1997).

(b) societal (*political, social, and economic*) factors, e.g., organized crime, unemployment.

(c) international (*political and economic*) factors, e.g., the "War on Terror". And

(d) global/ecological (*population and environmental*) factors, e.g., regional environmental degradation; increase in the number of young, unemployed males in developing countries (see Kaplan, 2001).

Finally, **pillar 3** deals with *conflict intervention*:

(a) 3rd Party Objectives.

(1) [Violent] Conflict Prevention
= *Preventive diplomacy*.

(2) Conflict Management
= *Peacekeeping*.

(3) Conflict Settlement
= *Peacemaking [coercive]*.

(4) Conflict Resolution
= *Peacemaking [noncoercive]*.

(5) Conflict Transformation
= *Peacebuilding* (see Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

(b) 3rd Party Means for Achieving Objectives.

(1) Competitive and/or Cooperative Processes
(see Deutsch, 1973).

(2) "Negative" and/or "Positive Peace" Orientations
(see Galtung, 1969).

(3) "Track-1" and/or "Track-2" (*Multi-Track*) Actors
and Processes (see Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

The basic underlying assumption of the 3 pillar framework is that to deal effectively with any latent, nonviolent or violent conflict situation, analysts and potential intervenors must:

- (a) identify the elements of the conflict (pillar 1);
- (b) understand the factors driving the conflict (pillar 2); and then

(c) explore what their goals are as potential third parties in that particular conflict situation and how they might fulfill them (pillar 3).

Having gone through these three interrelated steps, potential third parties would be in a position to [a] design and [b] implement an effective intervention. Alternatively, in our case, an analyst would be able to *evaluate* an existing intervention; e.g., the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with regard to its violent conflict prevention and management capabilities.

3 Assessing the Stability Pact: An Effective Violent Conflict Prevention/Management Regime?

In summer 1999, European states and other concerned members of the international community (e.g., the United States) intervened (pillar 3) into the "conflict environment" of the Balkans (pillar 1) via the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to, among other things, address the causes and conditions of violent conflict in the region (pillar 2). So, how good a job has the Stability Pact been doing, either in terms of the appropriateness of its mechanisms or the effectiveness of its actions?

Prior to responding to that question, there are at least two preliminary issues that have to be addressed. First, to assess the Stability Pact in terms of its conflict-prevention and conflict-handling capabilities means to assess it *in general*, because all aspects of the reconstruction of the Balkans -- political, social, economic -- and the eventual entry of Balkan states into the European Union are relevant to addressing the causes and conditions of conflict. So, even though other presentations at this workshop deal with other aspects of the Stability Pact, some mention will have to be made of those aspects here as well.

Secondly, given that the Stability Pact is a mere three years old, having just barely emerged from its initial status as a framework *only* into more of a corresponding reality, it would be unfair to try, and in any case, difficult to demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship between it and conflicts that have continued to exist, have occurred, or might have

occurred during the past three years. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, we will conduct an "exploratory evaluation."

Apropos conflicts that have continued during the Stability Pact's brief existence, one year or so after it was inaugurated, a five-year assessment was made of the progress achieved in the reconstruction of Bosnia following the end of hostilities there in late 1995 (Smith, 2000, p. A1):

Five years into a multibillion-dollar effort to construct a viable, peaceful country from the ruins of Bosnia's civil war, Western governments are tiring of the job, citing rampant corruption, persistent ethnic hatred and a seemingly open-ended need for NATO peacekeeping troops.

Many large aid donors, including the United States, the World Bank and the United Nations, say they will cut their assistance to Bosnia in the next year, in some cases by as much as a third. Members of NATO are weighing new cuts in its 20,000-member force after reducing strength from 32,000 at the outset.

Bosnians worry that major reductions in aid and troops could reignite the 1992-95 war that shocked the world with neighbor-against-neighbor bloodletting and shelling of cities. As U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Michael L. Dodson, the top NATO commander in Bosnia, notes, the troops are "the glue that holds this all together."

According to a more recent report by the U.S. Institute of peace, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center and Pentagon (USIP, 2002, p. 2):

U.S. rumblings about leaving the Balkans are neither credible nor in the U.S. interest. They are even counterproductive, since they put Bosnians, Serbs, Albanians, and West Europeans on high alert, creating resistance to even modest proposals for reconfiguring the U.S. presence. Talk of U.S. withdrawal also boosts the influence of hardliners opposed to rule of law peace processes in all ethnic communities. Whatever the U.S. troop levels, occasional high-level U.S. attention is crucial, both to

the peace process in the Balkans and to protecting vital U.S. interests. Islamic extremism in Bosnia and Kosovo would be much worse but for the U.S. efforts, which have all but eliminated the vestiges of Iranian and other efforts to gain a foothold in Europe in the 1990s. The recent transfer from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Guantanamo Bay of Algerian members of al Qaeda with the cooperation of the federation police, despite local protests, demonstrates how important it is to U.S. national interests to maintain influence in the Balkans and to build effective state structures.

Building "effective state structures" is a major part of what the Stability pact is all about. It is hindered in this regard, however, not just by ethnonationalism and ethnic conflicts still dominating events in Bosnia (Jurekovic, 2002; Busek, 2002), but by the situation in Kosovo where, although the international effort there led by the United Nations (UNMIK) is better organized, "the peace is less firmly established" (USIP, 2002, p. 3).

In addition, the "most immediate threat to peace in the Balkans may come ... in Macedonia [where tense relations between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians descended into violence during February-August 2001], where violence could resume..." (ibid.).

Given the fragile situations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, plus the problem of "countering organized crime which has already established its own regional networks that are unhindered by ethnic differences" (USIP, 2002, p. 4), the three-year-old Stability Pact could wind up continuing to be more promise than reality, exacerbating already existing frustrations of those affected in the region.

Apropos those frustrations, a number of commentators have acknowledged that "the real chances of the Southeastern European countries to be integrated with the rest of the continent do not seem, for the foreseeable future, encouraging" (Varwick, 2002); or, "The only long-range, big picture idea which has been advanced for the region [i.e., the Stability Pact] is ultimate absorption into the European Union, but

this prospect is too far off to offer hope or enough incentive to bring peace now" (Lewis, 2001). Still, although

Membership in the European Union (EU) for Balkans states is still far off, ... the European Stabilization and Association Process [SAP], which is designed to pave the way for integration into EU structures through political and economic reforms as well as regional cooperation, provides a clear sense of direction and a means of pushing Balkans states to meet high standards and complete their democratic transitions (USIP, 2002, p. 2).

This is the basic idea of the Stability Pact, that it is a *process* (Busek, 2002) of sustained movement over time from chaos to stability. Many actors are involved in that process, with interconnecting roles and tasks, the greatest challenge being the *coordination* of all their efforts over time and space. This is the challenge facing the current Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact, Dr. Erhard Busek.

Part of that challenge -- as was made clear earlier in Mostar -- is that we do not know how to achieve coordination between multiple efforts to enhance *reconciliation* between erstwhile enemies (see Fitchett, 1996; Ryan, 1997; Sandole, 1999, p. 169; Busek, 2002).

Perhaps part of the problem is that, despite the best of intentions and availability of intellectual and physical resources, we -- the concerned international community -- lack an appropriate framework for moving beyond a cessation of hostilities (*negative peace*) achieved by conflict settlement (*coercive peacemaking*) and maintained by conflict management (*peacekeeping*), to conflict resolution (*noncoercive peacemaking*) and conflict transformation (*peacebuilding*), where the underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions of the conflict are effectively addressed (*positive peace*). This, in turn, is *my* challenge!

Accordingly, on the pillar 3 side of the 3 pillar framework, under the conflict resolution (*noncoercive peacemaking*) and conflict transformation (*peacebuilding*) categories of third party objectives, and the "track-2" (*multitrack*) category of third party means for achieving

those objectives, the "*Multi-Track Diplomacy Framework*" of Dr. Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald (1996, <www.imtd.org>) has much to commend it. In that multi-actor/multi-task framework:

-- track 1 remains the realm of official, governmental activity, *peacemaking through diplomacy*, with track 2 (*writ large*) subdivided into the following tracks:

-- track 2 (*writ small*) (nongovernment/professional): *peacemaking through professional conflict resolution*.

-- track 3 (business): *peacemaking through commerce*.

-- track 4 (private citizen): *peacemaking through personal involvement*.

-- track 5 (research, training, and education): *peacemaking through learning*.

-- track 6 (activism): *peacemaking through advocacy*.

-- track 7 (religion): *peacemaking through faith in action*.

-- track 8 (funding): *peacemaking through providing resources*. And

-- track 9 (communications and the media): *peacemaking through information*.

Examining available documentation on the Stability Pact, including from the Office of the Special Co-ordinator (Dr. Busek), in terms of these multiple "tracks," it seems clear that:

(a) In addition to many governments, there are many international governmental organizations (IGOs) involved in the Stability Pact; e.g., the United Nations (UNMIK), World Bank, International Labour Organization (ILO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE), EU's Executive Commission, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Council of Europe, NATO (*track 1*).

One of these IGOs, the OSCE (<www.osce.org>), the most comprehensive trans-Atlantic, pan-European security organization with 55 participating states, launched a framework at its Istanbul Summit in November 1999, the *Platform for Co-operative Security* -- a component of the *Charter for European Security* -- which provides a continent-wide basis for "enhanc[ed] co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations and institutions" (*OSCE Handbook*, 2000, p. 23).

Since the three "pillars" of the OSCE -- [1] political and military dimensions of security; [2] economic and environmental dimensions of security; and [3] human rights and humanitarian dimensions of security - - correspond to the three "working tables" of the Stability Pact, it is likely that the relationships between the *macro* ["top-down"] Platform for Co-operative Security and the *micro* ["bottom-up"] Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe will reflect dynamic complementarity and synergy, further enhancing prospects for the successful operation of both.

(b) Although Search for Common Ground (SFCG <www.sfcg.org>) has been active in Macedonia working with the Macedonian and ethnic Albanian communities (see SFCG, 1997), and the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP <www.conflict-prevention.net>) has examined "lessons learned in conflict interventions and peacebuilding" in the region (see van Tongeren, et al., 2002), it is not clear to what extent these conflict resolution nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have worked in conjunction with the Stability Pact. In any case, I, myself, have lectured at the University of Bihac, on "Conflict Resolution in the Balkans," in April 2001, as part of my University's affiliation arranged by me and Prof. Dr. Nedžad Basic of the Human Rights Conflict Prevention Centre at the University of Bihac (<nbasic_hrcpc@yahoo.com>) (*track 2*).

(c) Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact Dr. Busek has called for finalization of free-trade agreements by the end of 2002 and for stimulation of foreign investment in the region, creating a market of 55 million consumers (O'Rourke, 2002; *Stability Pact Fact Sheet*, 2002, pp. 2-3) (*track 3*). Nevertheless, according to a joint World Bank/International Monetary Fund assessment (Demekas, et. al., 2002, p. 25):

Significant political risks persist. The crisis in FYR Macedonia is a reminder of continuing ethnic tensions in the region and the havoc they wreak in the economy. The [Ohrid] peace agreement [reached on 13 August 2001 with U.S. and EU assistance] will require full support at home and by the international community. Until clarity on the final constitutional arrangements in FR Yugoslavia is reached, investment is likely to be impeded. In Kosovo, ethnic wounds continue to challenge stability and recovery. State institutions still function poorly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and inter-entity cooperation is a shadow of what it ought to be. In all countries, entrenched interest groups that oppose reform continue to survive in state enterprises, in political groups linked with agriculture or banks, or in privileged companies with political links.

(d) There is no mention of *reconciliation* as such in the Stability Pact documents I have consulted, with the one possible exception suggested by the meeting on the "Link Diversity" initiative in Brussels, 20 March 2002, instigated by the Council of Europe and the Stability Pact, "to raise political and financial support for the 'Link Diversity' initiative, conceived by the civil societies in the countries of the region with the aim of creating civil links and *promoting inter-ethnic relations* as well as democratic citizenship" (emphasis added) (see *Stability Pact Newsletter*, 2002, p. 5) (*track 4*).

(e) Colonel Bernd Papenkort, of the German *Bundeswehr*, has put forward a proposal to various IGOs, to create and implement an "Academy for Politics" in Bosnia, working in conjunction with

Ambassador (Dr.) Bisera Turkovic's Center for Security Studies (CSS)
(see Turkovic, 1996),

to inform, to educate and to train BiH citizens and officials in all concepts of democratic politics, to provide insight into the challenges and mechanics of democratic institutions, to inform and educate on human rights issues, and to provide for government officials high quality training in modern and effective government management (see Papenkort, 2002 <papenkort@hotmail.com>). (*track 5*).

(f) There are many advocates *within* the Stability Pact *for* the Stability Pact, especially the Office of the Special Co-ordinator and those affected in the region (see various newsletters produced by the Office of the Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact and its webpage: <www.stabilitypact.org>) (*track 6*).

(g) Dr. David Little, formerly of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP <www.usip.org>), worked with members of the various religious communities in Bosnia, although his activities pre-date the inauguration of the Stability Pact (*track 7*).

(h) "Although not a fundraising mechanism" as such, the Stability Pact has succeeded in raising EURO 5.4 billion for various projects in the region (see *Stability Pact Fact Sheet*, 2002, pp. 2-3) (*track 8*). And

(i) There is much information *within* the Stability Pact *about* the Stability Pact, but not too much media coverage for it to become a "household word" in, e.g., the United States. One exception is the TV documentary, "Help! We Are Neighbours," financed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has been shown on television and in cinemas in Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, and Serbia, with plans to show it in Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia:

The film takes the audience on a journey through Southeastern Europe, highlighting problems and challenges the countries face,

from illegal immigration to demining and *establishing an interethnic dialogue*. The movie illustrates Pact activities and achievements, but equally highlights the aspect of *unfulfilled expectations and the slow pace of producing visible results* (emphasis added) (see *Stability Pact Newsletter*, 2002, p. 3).

In addition, the published proceedings from this workshop will likely be very helpful in raising the profile of the Stability Pact: a major goal of Special Co-ordinator Dr. Busek (O'Rourke, 2002) (*track 9*).

The positive effect of examining the Stability Pact in terms of Diamond's and McDonald's 9-track framework is that it reveals what seems to have been done and to what extent, and what still remains to be done. In these terms, therefore, we seem to have had a lot of track 1 (governmental and IGO), track 6 (advocacy), and track 8 (funding) activity, but not too much from the remaining tracks, which deal especially with reconciliation: track 2 (professional conflict resolution), track 3 (business), track 4 (citizen-to-citizen interaction), track 5 (research, training, and education), track 7 (religion), and track 9 (communications and the media).

4 The 3 Pillar Framework Revisited

Anatol Rapoport (1974, p. 175) tells us that there are basically two kinds of "conflict spaces" (pillar 1): those where there are no mechanisms for controlling or resolving conflicts (*exogenous* conflict environments) and those where there are such mechanisms (*endogenous* conflict environments).

For many "realists," i.e., those for whom *Realpolitik* is the primary (and preferred) way to negotiate and maintain "peace" (*negative peace*), the overall environment of the international system is basically "exogenous": there is not too much in the Hobbesian "black hole" of international anarchy to *effectively* control or resolve conflicts. Hence, according to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (cited in Waltz, p. 232).

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe represents an ambitious effort by the European Union, the United States, and other states and international organizations (pillar 3) to fill that relative "Hobbesian void" with conflict controlling and resolving mechanisms, to increase the "exogenous" content in the Balkans, in order to do more than merely maintain the "negative peace" (absence of hostilities) achieved thus far in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia (pillar 1).

Although negative peace is a necessary condition for establishing and maintaining "positive peace," it does not, on its own, deal with the underlying causes and conditions of the observable processes and symptoms of violent conflict (pillar 2).

Hence, again, the challenge for Dr. Busek and his colleagues involved with the implementation of the Stability Pact, is to solicit more investments in *all* tracks, but especially those concerned with *reconciliation*, and to *coordinate* them in the direction of conflict resolution (*noncoercive peacemaking*), conflict transformation (*peacebuilding*), and sustainable positive peace. Diamond and McDonald's "Multi-Track Diplomacy Framework," located within the context of pillar 3 of the 3 pillar framework, would likely be useful in this regard (also see Lederach, 1997).

To facilitate that effort, our colleague hosts from the Bureau for Security Policy, National Defense Academy, and Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management of the Austrian Ministry of Defense, might want to consider, as a theme for a future Reichenau conference, "mapping" the multiplicity of actors and tasks (and the timing/sequence of their involvement) that should be involved in the successful implementation of the Stability Pact!

References

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992). *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the

Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992).
New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information.

Busek, Erhard (2002). Keynote Speech. 3rd Reichenau Workshop of the PfP Consortium Study Group on Crisis Management in South East Europe. "The Stability Pact for South East Europe -- Dawn of an Era of Regional Co-operation?" Reichenau, Austria, 10-13 May.

Demekas, Dimitri G., Johannes Herderschee, James McHugh, and Saumya Mitra (2002). "Building Peace in South East Europe: Macroeconomic Policies and Structural Reforms Since the Kosovo Conflict." A Joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund Paper for the Second Regional Conference for South East Europe, Bucharest, 25-26 October 2001. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Deutsch, Morton (1973). *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*. New Haven (Connecticut): Yale University Press.

Diamond, Louise and John W. McDonald, Jr. (1996). *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. Third Edition. Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), Washington, DC. West Hartford (Connecticut): Kumarian Press.

Fitchett, Joseph (1996). "Hurdle for Leaders at Balkans Summit: Healing the Split in Mostar." *International Herald Tribune*, 17-18 February, p. 4.

Galtung, Johan (1969). "Violence, Peace and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 167-191.

Jurekovic, Predrag (2002). "Introduction." 3rd Reichenau Workshop of the PfP Consortium Study Group on Crisis Management in South East Europe. "The Stability Pact for South East Europe -- Dawn of an Era of Regional Co-operation?" Reichenau, Austria, 10-13 May.

Kaplan, Robert D. (2001). "A Sense of the Tragic: Developmental Dangers in the Twenty-first Century." *Jerome E. Levy Occasional Papers No. 2*. Newport (Rhode island): U.S. Naval War College.

Lederach, John P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

Lewis, Flora (2001). "Macedonia's Crisis Makes a Balkan Plan Even More Urgent." *International Herald Tribune*, 10 August, p. 4.

O'Rourke, Breffni (2002). "Balkans: New Coordinator Plans Boost For Stability Pact." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 January (<www.rferl.org>).

OSCE Handbook (2000). 3rd Edition/2nd Impression. Vienna, Austria: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Papenkort, Bernd (2002). "BiH Academy for Politics." May.

Rapoport, Anatol (1974). *Conflict in Man-Made Environment*.

Harmondsworth, Middlesex (England): Penguin.

Ryan, Randolph (1997). "The Long Haul. Exit, the Exit Strategy: Why Preventing War in Bosnia Remains America's Job." *The Washington Post*, 28 December, pp. C1 and C2.

Sandole, Dennis J.D. (1998). "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach." *Peace and Conflict Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2, December, pp. 1-30.

Sandole, Dennis J.D. (1999). *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era*. London and New York: Pinter/Cassell [Continuum International].

Sandole, Dennis J.D. (forthcoming). "Types of Conflict." In *Human Conflict: From Analysis to Action*, Sandra Cheldelin, Daniel Druckman, and Larissa Fast (eds.). London and New York: Continuum International.

SFCG (1997). *Search for Common Ground and European Centre for Common Ground: Report*. Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground.

Smith, R. Jeffrey (2000). "West Is Tiring Of Struggle to Rebuild Bosnia: Five Years After War's End, Efforts Have Largely Failed." *The Washington Post*, 25 November, pp. A1 and A14.

Stability Pact Fact Sheet (2002). Brussels: Office of the Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

Stability Pact Newsletter (2002). Issue 13, 4 April. Brussels: Office of the Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

Turkovic, Bisera (1996). *Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing*

World Order. Sarajevo: Saraj Invest.

USIP (2002). "Taking Stock and Looking Forward: Intervention in the Balkans and Beyond." *USIP Special Report*, 22 February.

van Tongeren, Paul, Hans van de Veen, and Juliette Verhoeven (eds.) (2002). *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*. Boulder (Colorado): Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Varwick, Johannes (2002). "The Kosovo Crisis and the European Union: The Stability Pact and its Consequences for EU Enlargement." *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, 7 May (<www.dgap.org/texte/kosovo.htm>).

Volkan, Vamik (1997). *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*. Boulder (Colorado): Westview Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959). *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dennis J.D. Sandole
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia