Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, by Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, Toby Dalton, and Gregory Koblentz

 

North Africa and the Middle East: Iran

Although Iran had been a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1970, it is believed to have pursued a secret nuclear weapons program since the mid-1980s. Iran’s motives for nuclear weapons stem from its rivalry with Iraq, from its quest for preeminence in the Persian Gulf, and, possibly, from the desire for a deterrent against major power intervention.

In 1996 congressional testimony, CIA Director John M. Deutch said: "We judge that Iran is actively pursuing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. . . . Specifically, Iran is attempting to develop the capability to produce both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In an attempt to shorten the timeline to a weapon, Iran has launched a parallel effort to purchase fissile material, mainly from sources in the former Soviet Union." Iran’s indigenous uranium-enrichment program appears to be focused on the development of gas centrifuges. U.S. intelligence testimony in 1996 indicated that Iran’s nuclear weapons program was still at a relatively rudimentary stage, at least eight to ten years away from producing nuclear arms—or less with foreign assistance.

Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear arms has gone hand in hand with Iran’s promotion of Islamic fundamentalism through violence and subversion. The Clinton Administration has branded Iran a "backlash state" because of its sponsorship of terrorism and assassination, subversion of the Middle East peace process, campaign to intimidate smaller countries in the Gulf region, and its human rights abuses. Washington has sought to contain Iran through an energetic campaign of diplomatic isolation and wide-ranging economic sanctions—some targeted on its weapons-of-mass-destruction and missile programs.

China and Russia have been Iran’s main suppliers of nuclear technology. In the U.S.–China summit of October 1997, however, China made a commitment to cancel almost all of its existing nuclear assistance to Iran and to provide Iran no new nuclear assistance. China at that time declined to give explicit assurances that it would stop assisting Iran’s acquisition of missiles. Russia has sought to expand civilian nuclear cooperation with Tehran and is building a nuclear power plant for Iran at Bushehr. In the course of consultation with the United States, however, Russia has dropped its previously contemplated uranium-enrichment assistance to Iran.

Iran is believed to have one of the world’s largest chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles and reportedly acquired stocks of biological weapons (BW) for the first time in 1996. Iran might soon be able to mate these weapons with ballistic missiles. Iran possesses the 300-km range Scud-B and the 500-km range Scud-C missiles and is able to strike targets in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region. Iran is also seeking to acquire the 1,000-km range Nodong missile from North Korea, which would enable it to target Israel for the first time. In addition, Iran is working on a missile with a 1,300-1,500 km range with assistance from Russian firms, and seeking to develop the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 ballistic missiles with ranges up to 2,000 km.

Thus, although Iran probably is at least eight to ten years away from acquiring nuclear weapons, it may be able to threaten its adversaries’ population centers with other mass destruction weapons far sooner. Iran appears to be following the model adopted by Iraq in the 1980s: obtaining "strategic" capabilities based, initially, on more easily developed chemical and biological weapons while working toward the acquisition of nuclear arms.

 

Background

The revolutionary Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini that came to power in Iran in 1979 inherited two partially completed, German-supplied nuclear power reactors at Bushehr. Under construction in the late 1970s, the structures were severely damaged by Iraqi bombing during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Germany later refused to repair and finish the plants because of Iran’s apparent interest in nuclear weapons. The Khomeini regime also inherited a nuclear research base and continued the nuclear research activities. The Tehran Research Center, for example, trained specialists and operated a small U.S.–supplied research reactor, which remained under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Specialists at the center presumably had access to the research done during the Shah’s reign, possibly including undeclared nuclear-weapons research. The Khomeini regime’s commitment to continued nuclear research was so strong that in 1984—in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War—it opened a new nuclear research center in Esfahan.

Iran’s great losses from the war with Iraq played a key part in Iran’s decisions to invest in modern conventional arms and in weapons of mass destruction (WMD). During the war, Iraq had used chemical weapons against poorly protected Iranian forces with devastating effect, and Iraq’s bombardment of Tehran with conventionally armed, extended-range Scud missiles during the spring 1988 "War of the Cities" was an important factor leading Iran to accept a cease-fire in October of that year. Shortly after the cease-fire, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, then the speaker of the Iranian parliament and commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces and later Iran’s president, declared:

With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed in the battle field.

We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task [emphasis added].

To produce nuclear weapons material, Iran sought the needed expertise by enlarging its nuclear research and energy program with assistance from China and Russia. Iran also conducted covert research on fissile material production, supported by smuggling activities, particularly in Western Europe. Because development of an indigenous capability to produce fissile material might take from eight to ten years, however, Iran added a second track to its nuclear weapons program, seeking to purchase nuclear weapons material illicitly in the former Soviet Union.

Civil Nuclear Assistance: First Track

China provided significant assistance to Iran’s civil nuclear program from the mid-1980s. China reportedly trained Iranian nuclear technicians and engineers in China under a ten-year agreement for cooperation signed in 1990. China supplied Iran with two "mini" research reactors installed at Esfahan. China also supplied Iran with a calutron—the type of equipment used in Iraq’s EMIS enrichment program for separation of weapons-grade uranium. The calutron is a smaller model which, according to the Iranians, is used only for stable isotope production. Both countries claim the aid has been exclusively for peaceful purposes, in line with Iran’s NPT obligations. The United States has objected to such assistance on the grounds that it could bolster Iran’s nuclear technology base and indirectly support its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

In 1992, Washington persuaded China to indefinitely postpone the sale to Iran of a plutonium-producing research reactor and convinced Argentina not to export supporting fuel-cycle and heavy-water production facilities. On the other hand, China in March 1992 agreed to supply two 300-MWe nuclear power reactors to Iran based on its Qinshan-1 design. The reactors were to be located at Esteghlal, a site adjacent to Bushehr.

On January 8, 1995, Russia signed an $800-million agreement with Iran under which Russia is to complete one of the two partially constructed nuclear power reactors at Bushehr. Under the contract, Russia is also to provide low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for a period of ten years starting in 2001 at an annual cost of $30 million, as well as technical training. If the project goes well, the deal may be extended to include Russia’s completion of the other partially constructed unit at the same site. During the discussions over the Bushehr agreement, Tehran expressed strong interest in purchasing two more power reactors, 440 MWe in this case, and a research reactor from Russia.

The Chinese and Russian agreements to supply Iran with nuclear power reactors aroused strong concern in Washington. While it acknowledged that the contracts are legal under international non-proliferation guidelines, the Clinton Administration strongly protested them as providing expertise and training that would contribute indirectly, but substantially, to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

By 1992, press reports of Western intelligence findings helped explain the basis for Washington’s concerns. They indicated that Iran had established experimental programs in fissile material production at Sharif University in Tehran, and possibly at other locations. These programs reportedly included research and development in both centrifuge uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Iran was said to be supporting these efforts by means of a clandestine procurement network; it was secretly approaching Western European companies to acquire nuclear-related, dual-use technologies and purchasing a number of small companies—particularly in Germany—to serve as export platforms for sensitive equipment to Iran.

Although there had been a number of allegations during the late 1980s that Pakistan might be contributing to the Iranian nuclear weapons effort, such reports were not substantiated and eventually died away in the early 1990s. Indeed, in March 1996, then-CIA Director John Deutch advised Congress, "We have no concrete evidence of WMD cooperation between Iran and Pakistan."

Part of Iran’s nuclear weapons program was believed to be under the authority of the civilian-run Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), while the procurement activities abroad were reportedly controlled by the Iranian Defense Ministry. According to American and German intelligence officials, the Defense Ministry uses front organizations like Sharif University to help buy nuclear-related equipment. The defense unit concerned has also been implicated in possible nuclear weapons research and development activities at military sites.

Direct Purchase: Second Track

Iran is also thought to be trying to accelerate nuclear weapons development by direct "purchase [of] fissile material, mainly from sources in the former Soviet Union," according to former CIA Director Deutch. In this context, Iranian agents are said to have contacted officials at nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan on several occasions. For example, in 1992, Iran approached the Ulba Metallurgical Plant at the production complex at Ust-Kamenogorsk to buy enriched uranium and beryllium metal, although they were unsuccessful. There are conflicting reports on whether the Iranians wanted to buy LEU as reactor fuel for future use or, instead, wanted to buy or smuggle some of the more than 500 kg of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) stored at the complex at the time.

Special IAEA "Visits"

In 1991, in an effort to dispel recurring suspicions about its nuclear program, Iran agreed that, in addition to permitting routine IAEA inspections on all nuclear activities as required by the NPT, it would also allow the IAEA to visit any location within the country to check for undeclared nuclear activities. The agency has made two such special "visits." A February 1992 visit observed several locations not on Iran’s list of declared nuclear sites but found no violations of the NPT. In a follow-on visit in November 1993, IAEA officials viewed facilities in Esfahan, Karaj, and Tehran, but again found no violations of the pact. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the visits have not allayed U.S. concerns.

Ballistic Missile Program

During the early 1990s, Iran sought to acquire ballistic missile capabilities that could be used for delivering nuclear weapons—turning to Libya, North Korea, and China for missile systems and related technologies. Iran possesses two versions of the nuclear-capable and North Korea–supplied Scud ballistic missile, the Mod. B (300-km range) and the Mod. C (500-km range). It also has in its inventory the Chinese-supplied CSS-8 missile with an estimated range of 150 km.

North Korea agreed in 1992 to sell Iran the Scud, Mod. D (Nodong 1) ballistic missile, then under development, with a range of 1,000 km (capable of reaching Israel). Some sources have reported that North Korea has postponed the Nodong-1 sale indefinitely, possibly at the request of Israel, or as a result of ongoing negotiations with the United States. Iran apparently has acquired much of its current ballistic missile capability in exchange for providing long-term financing for North Korea’s missile program. China reportedly had agreed in 1988 to provide Iran with "M-class" missile technology that would enable it to produce nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with ranges of 300 to 1,000 km, but later reports said that this offer had been withdrawn.

Western Nuclear Embargo

China and Russia have been the only major nuclear supplier states willing to make nuclear transfers to Iran openly. The Western nuclear suppliers, in contrast, have adopted, from the regime’s earliest days, a U.S.–led embargo on nuclear sales to the Iranian Revolutionary Government. The United States has relied on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to coordinate the Western embargo and persuaded other like-minded states to withhold goods that were regulated under the NSG’s core export control guidelines. Controlled items include complete nuclear power plants, major components for them, and sensitive "nuclear-unique" items or equipment (relating to uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and heavy-water production). NSG rules permit the sale of such items, provided they are subject to IAEA inspection in the recipient state, but Washington has convinced its Western trading partners to adopt the stricter policy in the case of Iran. China is not an NSG member, and Russia, though a member, explicitly rejects the U.S.–initiated ban on major nuclear exports to Iran. Moscow argues that the United States has not presented persuasive evidence that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons and that the light-water type of reactor that Russia is supplying, which will be under IAEA inspection, is not a proliferation risk. As noted below, Iran has vehemently protested U.S. efforts to block its access to nuclear technology on the grounds that the U.S. action violates Article IV of the NPT.

U.S. efforts to curtail foreign nuclear sales to Iran intensified during the Bush Administration when, in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, it was learned that Iraq, despite its status as an NPT party, had pursued a massive nuclear weapons program that relied heavily on the procurement of goods from abroad. This experience led the NSG in April 1992 to extend its controls to nuclear "dual-use" items—i.e., items with both nuclear and non-nuclear end uses—prohibiting exports of items on the list "when there is unacceptable risk of diversion [to the production of nuclear explosives] or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons." Once the new NSG rules were adopted, Washington sought agreement from the leading Western members of the group to prohibit all transfers of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran but only Great Britain and Germany complied. An initially unsuccessful, parallel U.S. proposal, launched in 1992, was to curtail Western sales of (non-nuclear) strategic dual-use items to Iran; the initiative took four years to materialize in the form of the Wassenaar Agreement in 1996. Washington in early 1993 sought to persuade other Western industrialized states not to reschedule any credits they had issued to Iran, not to issue any new credits, and to oppose new loans for Iran from multilateral banks. Again, Washington achieved only partial success.

U.S. Sanctions

After the U.S.–Iran agreement for nuclear cooperation expired in April 1979, the essential preconditions for U.S. exports of nuclear equipment and materials to Iran were absent. Passage of the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act expressly prohibited such transfers as well as exports to Iran of all dual-use commodities and U.S. government and commercial arms sales. In addition, during the 1980s, the United States imposed a wide range of sanctions on Iran because of its support for international terrorism, its attacks in 1987 on U.S.–flagged Kuwaiti tankers, and other actions hostile to U.S. interests. These sanctions blocked economic and military assistance to Iran, prohibited the importation of Iranian-origin goods, and restricted U.S. contributions to multilateral organizations that assist Iran and U.S. Export-Import Bank credits for Iran.

On March 6, 1992, the United States imposed sanctions, under missile non-proliferation provisions of the Arms Export Control and Export Administration Acts, against the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and against two North Korean entities for engaging in "missile proliferation activities." The sanctioned activities involved North Korea’s transfer to Iran of Scud missiles and production technology for such missiles. Because the transferred items fell within Category I of the MTCR Annex (see the description of the MTCR in Appendix X on the Missile Technology Control Regime in this volume), the sanctions imposed on the three entities consisted of a two-year ban on U.S. export licenses for all dual-use and military goods and a ban on all U.S. government contracts. In addition, because the transfers were considered to make a "substantial" contribution to the Iranian missile program, the Bush Administration also invoked a provision of the law permitting the imposition of an additional sanction: a ban on all imports to the United States from the sanctioned entities. Since U.S. trade with North Korea was already prohibited under a U.S. embargo dating from the Korean War, and since Iran was prohibited by other statutes from receiving all but the least sensitive exports (and the Iranian Defense Ministry was unlikely to receive U.S. export licenses of any kind), the new sanctions did not impose significant new penalties on the targeted entities in either state. The imposition of sanctions did, however, serve to highlight and publicize the fact that important missile-related transfers were taking place between the two states involved and to underscore U.S. concerns about such transactions.

 

Developments

Since early 1995, Iranian efforts to advance its nuclear capabilities—and U.S.–led efforts to block such progress and to isolate Iran more generally—have continued. In recent years, the United States expanded non-proliferation and more generalized sanctions against Iran and succeeded in persuading Russia and China to curtail the most troubling of the planned nuclear transfers to Iran. This Russian and Chinese retrenchment, it appears, did slow the progress of the overall Iranian nuclear weapons effort. In October 1997, China agreed that it would terminate most previous nuclear assistance projects with Iran and provide no new nuclear assistance. Over the last three years, however, Iran has expanded its missile and chemical weapon capabilities and for the first time has acquired stocks of biological weapons.

Disclosure of Iran’s Secret Enrichment Program

In the spring of 1995, details emerged on Iran’s nuclear procurement activities, publicly substantiating its suspected efforts to establish a secret gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment program. Specifically, Western intelligence sources were quoted as stating that, since 1990, Iran had approached German and Swiss firms to purchase balancing machines, as well as diagnostic and monitoring equipment—all dual-use items potentially valuable for laboratory-scale centrifuge development. In addition, Iranian agents were said to have contacted a British company to obtain samarium-cobalt magnetic equipment, potentially useful in the development of centrifuge top bearings.

Also during early 1995, Russia proceeded with its contract to help Iran build a nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Tensions rose with Russia when the Clinton Administration learned in March-April 1995 that, as part of a secret protocol to the reactor sale contract, Russia had agreed to provide Iran with a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility. Such a facility, though itself under IAEA inspection and dedicated to the production of low-enriched (non-weapons grade) uranium, could enable Iran to build and operate a similar plant clandestinely to produce weapons-grade uranium. Other disturbing elements of the protocol were an agreement in principle for Russia to supply a 30-50-MWt light-water research reactor, 2,000 metric tons of natural uranium, and training of Iranian graduates in the nuclear field in Russia.

Just as these facts emerged, the Clinton Administration was completing the review of U.S. policy toward Iran that led it to impose additional trade sanctions on Iran on April 30, 1995. Concerned that continued purchases of Iranian oil by U.S. companies overseas gave the impression that Washington was not serious about isolating Iran, and under congressional pressure to impose tougher measures, the Clinton Administration extended a number of trade prohibitions to cover the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies. The new sanctions included a ban on all imports of Iranian origin-goods (including those transshipped largely unchanged through third countries), a ban on U.S. exports to Iran of all dual-use goods regulated under the Export Administration Act (including those transshipped largely unchanged through third countries), a ban on investment in Iran by U.S. persons and their subsidiaries, and a ban on trading by U.S. persons and their subsidiaries in Iranian oil. In explaining these new measures, President Clinton made clear that one purpose of the broadened U.S. trade sanctions was to curtail Iran’s ability to pursue the development of nuclear arms:

I am formally announcing my intention to cut off all trade and investment with Iran and to suspend nearly all other economic activity between our nations. This is not a step I take lightly, but I am convinced that instituting a trade embargo with Iran is the most effective way our nation can help to curb that nation’s drive to acquire devastating weapons and its continued support for terrorism.

This demonstration of U.S. resolve may have influenced Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s decision to cancel the transfer of an enrichment facility to Iran, the most dangerous element of the Russian nuclear deal. At their May 10 summit in Moscow, Yeltsin advised Clinton that Russia would not supply militarily useful nuclear technology to Iran and that, as part of this undertaking, would remove the centrifuge plant provisions from the protocol with Tehran, acknowledging that certain elements of the protocol had "the potential for creating weapons-grade fuel." Yeltsin refused to abandon other aspects of the protocol, however.

Iran has regularly objected to U.S. efforts to impose the nuclear embargo. Indeed, at the third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in September 1994, Iran threatened to withdraw from the NPT on the grounds that the Western embargo violated Article IV of the Treaty. This article guarantees "the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," as well as full access to "equipment, materials and scientific and technological information" for such uses. Iranian officials later toned down their threat of withdrawal and did not renew it at the fourth PrepCom in January 1995. But at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, which concluded on May 11, 1995, Iran revisited the "peaceful uses" issue by threatening until the last minute to block consensus on indefinite extension of the treaty. Ultimately, Iran backed down, reportedly after Russia warned that blocking consensus might jeopardize Moscow’s sale of nuclear reactors to Tehran.

Chinese Reactor Cooperation Suspended

In the fall of 1995 China’s reactor sale to Iran was suspended, ostensibly because of difficulties over site selection, although the underlying cause may have been Iran’s difficulties in raising financing. Other factors may also have been involved. Some reports indicated that China suspended or even terminated the deal because of strong U.S. pressure. Also, France, Germany, and Japan apparently had declined to supply China with essential components that it might have needed for the reactors it had offered Iran. It is also possible that Iran lost interest in the arrangement once it was confident that Russia would complete the Bushehr project.

New U.S. Sanctions Laws

In February 1996, President Clinton signed two additional pieces of legislation aimed at constraining Iranian WMD programs. The first amended the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act to impose sanctions on any person or foreign government that "transfers or retransfers goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons." The sanctions to be imposed against persons—including corporate entities—were a two-year ban on U.S. government procurement contracts and a two-year ban on the issuance of export licenses to the person. The sanctions to be imposed against governments—all for one year—were a ban on U.S. assistance, opposition to multilateral loans, suspension of co-development or co-production agreements, and suspension of military and dual-use technical exchange agreements. In addition, the president was given the discretion to halt all dual-use exports to the country in question. Previously the law had imposed sanctions only when aid to Iran or Iraq was intended to assist either to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons. The original Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act had allowed the president to waive these sanctions upon a finding that doing so was "essential to the national interests of the United States." In many respects, the triggers for sanctions and the sanctions to be imposed under the 1996 amendment to the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act overlap with other anti-proliferation sanctions laws, such as the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. However, the new provision, with its specific targeting of assistance provided to Iran and Iraq, served to underscore U.S. concerns about the WMD programs of these states.

Congress directed the second new sanctions law against Russia’s sale of nuclear equipment and technology to Iran. Adopted in February 1996, the legislation conditioned U.S. economic assistance to Russia on a presidential determination, to be made every six months, that Russia had terminated "arrangements to provide Iran with technical expertise, training, technology, or equipment necessary to develop a nuclear reactor or related nuclear research facilities or programs." The legislation permitted the president to waive this restriction at six month intervals, however, upon a determination that making U.S. funds available to Russia "is important to the national security interests of the United States." Such waivers were exercised in May 1996, November 1996, May 1997, and November 1997 (see below).

Having obtained President Yeltsin’s commitment in May 1995 to drop uranium enrichment from Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, U.S. officials believed that Iran’s program to develop and bench-test gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment would still be at the experimental stage in early 1996. Strictly speaking, Iran would be obligated to declare a uranium-enrichment program to the IAEA under the country’s NPT safeguards agreement, but only at the stage that it was acquiring and installing the equipment. There had been some fear that Pakistan would help Iran acquire enrichment technology. In early 1995, for example, reports indicated that some U.S. officials suspected that Iran had obtained gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment technology, including European-origin design information, from Pakistan. CIA Director John Deutch testified in March 1996, however, that the United States had no "concrete evidence of WMD cooperation between Iran and Pakistan." Thus, U.S. efforts to dissuade nuclear suppliers from openly assisting Iran with sensitive uranium-enrichment technology seemed to have had success.

The March 1996 parliamentary elections in Iran held open the possibility that moderates might make significant gains within the Majlis (Iranian parliament), possibly leading to a gradual opening to the West. These hopes were disappointed, however. While the centrist bloc, the so called Servants of Iranian Reconstruction, achieved some gains, and the conservative bloc, the Society of the Combatant Clergy, lost its majority, the results did not lead to a decisive realignment, and Iranian activities of concern to the United States continued unabated. In subsequent months, therefore, Washington intensified its efforts to constrain nuclear transfers to Iran.

U.S. Pressure on China and Russia

Although China had halted its planned reactor sales to Iran, in April 1996 the U.S. Department of Defense still regarded China to be Iran’s "main" source of nuclear assistance. China apparently was still assisting Iran with the construction of a proliferation-sensitive uranium conversion plant near Esfahan. The facility was to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), the feedstock in the gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment process. If built, the facility could enable Iran to produce the fissile materials for nuclear weapons under the guise of mastering a link in the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the plant would be subject to IAEA inspection, Iran would be able to use the engineering knowledge to construct a similar, undeclared conversion plant.

In May, however, after the U.S.–China negotiations over China’s sale of ring magnets to Pakistan’s uranium-enrichment facility, Beijing restated its non-proliferation commitments and pledged to cease all assistance to foreign nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA inspection. Although no alleged Chinese assistance to Iran fell into this category because all known Iranian nuclear facilities are under IAEA monitoring, the commitment suggested that China was becoming more responsive to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation concerns. Indeed, in November 1996, the Chinese government reportedly indicated to the Clinton Administration that it might be willing to cancel the uranium conversion plant deal with Iran to help gain U.S. certification that China was in compliance with U.S. non-proliferation laws (see China chapter in this volume). Although this understanding nearly unraveled, a Chinese official confirmed in March 1997 that the Iranian uranium conversion plant sale had, indeed, been suspended.

Meanwhile, Washington stepped up pressure on Russia to halt its work on the Bushehr nuclear reactor, but without success. Among other initiatives, President Clinton pressed the issue with President Yeltsin at their April 1996 summit and in May invoked the sanctions provisions of the FY 1996 Foreign Appropriations Act, calling for the termination of U.S. foreign assistance for Russia. Because of the overriding U.S. commitment to support economic and political reforms in Russia, however, the president simultaneously exercised the waiver provision in the law, permitting continued U.S. aid to Russia.

As Washington sought to constrain Chinese and Russian nuclear exports to Iran, Iran’s clandestine effort to develop a uranium-enrichment capability apparently continued. In August 1996, British customs officials intercepted a shipment of 110 pounds of "maraging steel" at the London port of Barking. The material, which had been ordered by the Iranian military, can be used in the manufacture of uranium-enrichment centrifuges. It had been shipped by a U.S. manufacturer to a British defense company but was actually destined for Iran.

Also in August, Washington further intensified economic pressure on Iran by imposing "secondary" sanctions on it and Libya, through the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Signed by President Clinton on August 5 at a time when Iran was seeking international bids on eleven major energy projects, the law imposes sanctions on foreign enterprises that invest $40 million or more in the energy sector of Iran or Libya. Section 3 of the law, entitled "Policy with Respect to Iran," states: "it is the policy of the United States to deny Iran the ability to support acts of international terrorism and to fund the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them by limiting the development of Iran’s ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources of Iran." By the fall of 1997, this legislation was facing a serious challenge from Russian, French, and Malaysian oil companies that signed a deal with Iran to help recover and market oil and natural gas. The Clinton Administration backed away from imposing these sanctions because of the economic crisis in East Asia and in Russia in the fall of 1997 and spring of 1998, which placed larger U.S. foreign policy interests at stake.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

On September 24, 1996, Iran signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Iran had supported India’s objections to the treaty until immediately before the treaty was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on September 10. Iran had also objected to the inclusion of Israel in representing the Middle East and South Asian region in the treaty’s Executive Council. Iran also criticized the use of "national technical means" of intelligence for monitoring the treaty because they could be used as a cover for big-power intelligence gathering. As of May 1998, Iran had taken no visible steps to ratify the CTBT.

Iranian Nuclear Program Setbacks

In November 1996, U.S. aid to Russia was again called into question under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act because of Moscow’s continuing participation in the Bushehr reactor project. Once again, President Clinton waived the aid cutoff as permitted by the legislation. A memorandum explaining this decision highlighted the nature of U.S. concerns about the deal and the efforts that had been made to persuade Russia to terminate it:

The Administration shares the deep concern of the Congress over Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran. Such cooperation, which could contribute over time to a nuclear-armed Iran, continues to be a threat not only to U.S. security interests, the Middle East Peace Process, and global stability, but also to Russian security interests as well. In dealing with this pressing issue, the Administration has repeatedly and strenuously objected to any form of nuclear cooperation with Iran.

The president then explained that the urgent need to sustain the process of reform in Russia necessitated the exercise of the waiver so that U.S. aid to Moscow might continue.

Ironically, for reasons completely apart from U.S. pressure, it is possible that Russia may have second thoughts about finishing the Bushehr project. Initially, Russian officials had estimated that, once construction commenced by early 1996, it would take about 55 to 60 months to build the reactor and load it with fuel. However, by the fall of 1996, the project clearly faced complex engineering problems. Specifically, Russian experts were grappling with the incompatibility of metallurgical specifications of equipment supplied by Siemens during the 1970s with those of components to be fitted in the reactor under the Russia-Iran deal. In addition, Russia’s promised sale to Iran of a sizable research reactor, encompassed in the original Bushehr deal, also faltered. At U.S. urging, Russia refused to provide a heavy-water system—an efficient plutonium producer—as requested by the Iranians. The original agreement had called for a light-water research reactor.

By the fall of 1996, China had suspended its assistance to Iran on the uranium conversion facility. Coupled with the seizure of the maraging steel in Great Britain in August and Russian retrenchment on sensitive assistance, Iran’s plan to expand its nuclear program was running into growing obstacles. Continued IAEA monitoring in Iran—and pressure from the agency to expand its inspection activities there—provided another major constraint on the country’s clandestine nuclear activities for the remainder of 1996 and 1997.

In connection with Russia’s reactor sale agreement, the United States was particularly troubled by the arrangements for the disposition of the plutonium-bearing spent fuel from Bushehr. Take-back of spent fuel had been a standard feature of Soviet nuclear export agreements. In practice, this meant that plutonium in spent fuel was returned to the fuel supplier. In Iran’s case, spent-fuel return to Russia could prevent Iranian diversion of plutonium for weapons. Throughout the protracted U.S.–Russian dialogue over Russia’s contracts with Iran, the United States had urged Russia to agree to take back and keep the spent fuel from the Bushehr reactors. Washington feared that, even though spent fuel stored in Iran would be under IAEA inspection, if Iran chose to violate its obligations to the IAEA, it could, with adequate pre-planning, rapidly recover the plutonium and transform it into nuclear weapons. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), however, fearful of jeopardizing the commercial terms already agreed to with Iran, was reluctant to insist upon the permanent return of the spent fuel to Russia. Minatom’s position was that imposing such a condition on Iran would go "far beyond" the safeguards requirements of the NPT.

Ultimately, the United States convinced Russia to stipulate to Iran that spent fuel from the reactor would be returned to Russia. This did not resolve the related issue, however, as to whether there would be sufficient safeguards in place for the ongoing monitoring of significant quantities of irradiated fuel in cooling ponds at the reactor site, awaiting transport to Russia (see below).

Iran’s Presidential Elections of May 1997

In a stunning upset, moderate Islamic cleric Mohammed Khatami was elected president of Iran on May 24, 1997, winning approximately 70 percent of the vote. This raised expectations of an easing of tension between Iran and the United States, possibly beginning a bilateral dialogue. The elections came against the backdrop of a debate in Western circles on whether the U.S. policy of "dual containment" had run its course.

President Clinton called the election of Khatami "interesting" and "hopeful" but made clear that "a reconciliation" with Iran would have to overcome "three big hurdles." Iran’s new leadership would have to demonstrate that Iran (1) has ceased to believe that terrorism is a legitimate extension of political policies, (2) will not use violence to wreck a peace process in the Middle East, and (3) will not develop weapons of mass destruction. Since the Khatami election, Iranians have hinted they would favor a dialogue with the United States, provided that the United States demonstrates its sincerity and good faith (e.g., lifting sanctions and dropping terrorism charges). Some saw the Clinton Administration’s late 1997 decision to defer sanctions against foreign companies involved in huge energy deals with Iran as a sign of flexibility toward the new Iranian leadership.

In a surprise move in August 1997, President Khatami appointed Gholam Reza Aghazadeh both as his vice president and as president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Replacing Reza Amrollahi with Aghazadeh as head of AEOI stirred new speculation about the future course of the Iranian nuclear program. Some argue that the change of the AEOI leadership reflects growing opposition within the Iranian parliament to the Bushehr project. According to one report, parliamentary opponents to the deal have questioned the $800-million figure cited by the AEOI and Minatom as the cost for completing the reactor and have charged that "Russian documentation for the project is inadequate," and that "there are no commercial contracts under Iranian law for completing" the reactor. Some parliamentarians have raised safety issues and urged the new Iranian leadership "to shore up relations with Western countries so as to be able to import Western reactor equipment or simply to scuttle the effort to complete the 20-year old Bushehr reactors and build a new nuclear power station instead." On the other hand, some observers believe that Amrollahi was replaced by Aghazadeh because of management ineffectiveness that allegedly had caused delays in the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Bushehr Stalled and Chinese Nuclear Assistance Ends

The issue of safeguards for the interim storage of spent fuel at the Bushehr site resurfaced in September 1997 during talks between Vice President Albert Gore and Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin. Reports indicated that, during the meeting, Russia had accepted the U.S. assessment of the proliferation risks posed by the Bushehr project and had agreed to a program of "mutual inspections." However, within days, a senior Russian official dismissed Gore’s renewed allegations of an Iranian nuclear weapons program and stated that there "[would] be no mutual inspections." He asserted: "Iran is sovereign. The reactors (for Bushehr) will be provided under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Iran is a member in good standing of the [NPT]. So there will be no additional [inspection] arrangements."

On the other hand, another Russian official described Bushehr as "on hold for right now" because of lack of finance and inconclusive commercial arrangements with the AEOI. Reportedly, as of early October 1997, some 200 to 300 Russian experts were still in Iran completing an engineering evaluation at the Bushehr installation, but no components for the reactor’s nuclear steam system had been delivered yet. Because of the delays, the projected date for completing Bushehr 1 had been moved further ahead to 2003.

In addition to the delays of the Bushehr project, the Iranian nuclear program has had to grapple in 1997 with the official termination of Chinese nuclear assistance. To achieve U.S. certification that it was in compliance with U.S. non-proliferation laws and gain access to advanced U.S. nuclear technology under the 1985 U.S.–China agreement for nuclear cooperation, President Jiang Zemin agreed at the October 29, 1997, summit with President Clinton that China would provide no further nuclear assistance to Iran (i.e., no fuel-cycle equipment or materials, and no power reactors). Jiang’s assurances that China would end the sale of cruise missiles and missile-related technology to Iran and avoid transfer of chemical weapons capabilities to Iran were less clear cut.

Missile Program

According to a November 1997 U.S. Defense Department report, Iran is making significant progress on becoming self-sufficient in the production of both liquid-fueled and solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Iran is already assembling missiles utilizing foreign-made parts and may be able at some point in the future to produce such components domestically. Iran was known to be in the market for missile-related technology and know-how for the production of a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).

In June 1995, the press cited U.S. intelligence reports as evidence that "strongly implicates" China in the transfer to Iran of equipment, materials, and scientific know-how that could be used in the manufacture of short-range ballistic missiles such as the Chinese M-9 or M-11. China was believed to have transferred "dozens, perhaps hundreds, of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools" to Iran, as well as rocket propellant ingredients that could be used on its current stockpile of short-range Scud Mod. Bs and Cs, as well as on Scud variants that Iran might produce in the future. In the final analysis, however, the United States did not find that China’s missile transactions with Iran violated China’s MTCR-related pledges and declined to impose MTCR-related sanctions against China or Iran.

In 1996, it became clear that North Korea was exporting missile capabilities to Iran. As a result, the United States did impose sanctions on May 26, 1996, on the Iranian Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics, the Iranian State Purchasing Office, and the Korea Mining Development Trading Bureau. The precise nature of the offending transactions remains classified, but U.S. officials indicated that North Korea had sold missile components, equipment, and materials to Iran, although not complete missiles, production technology, or major subsystems. The sanctions amounted to a political statement because U.S. dealings with the entities concerned were already banned by other legislation.

During 1997, U.S. press reports quoted U.S. and Israeli intelligence findings that Russian enterprises, including cash-strapped Russian technical institutes, research facilities, and defense-production companies were transferring to Iran Russian SS-4 MRBM technologies. According to these assessments, Iran hoped to employ these SS-4 MRBM technologies to develop two Iranian derivatives of the 1,000-km range North Korean Nodong missile. The first indigenous missile, the Shahab-3, is projected to have a range between 1,300 and 1,500 km. The second, the Shahab-4, which would have an improved guidance system, is expected to have a range up to 2,000 km. The Shahab-4 could hit targets as far as Germany and western China.

At first, Russia repeatedly denied that it was supplying missile technology to Iran. Vice President Gore raised the issue in Moscow with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in September 1997. While the Russian government continued to deny official involvement in missile technology transfers to Iran, an official of the Russian Federal Security Service acknowledged on October 2 that his organization had "thwarted" an attempt by Iran, earlier this year, to custom order "joints and parts for a liquid-fuel missile engine" manufactured by a Russian factory. He also said that there were "separate occasions of cooperation with Iran as result of which Russian deliveries may have contradicted requirements of the Missile Technology Control Regime," but they all had been detected and stopped at an early stage. The Russian official also said that Iranian missile technicians were being trained at two Russian universities, but claimed that the information they have access to is disseminated widely.

In spite of these Russian assurances, during the fall of 1997, Israel put increasing pressure on a reluctant Clinton Administration to impose economic sanctions on Russian entities reported to be supplying ballistic missile technology to Iran. At the same time, the House Foreign Relations Committee marked up legislation to that effect. On November 4, 1997, the committee referred the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 to the full House. According to the committee report:

The bill requires the President to submit a report to Congress 30 days after the date of enactment, and periodically thereafter, identifying those entities where there is credible evidence they have transferred key missile components or technology to Iran. Thirty days after this report is required to be submitted, three sanctions (denying munitions licenses, dual use licenses and U.S. foreign assistance to these entities) would be imposed for a period of at least two years on these entities identified in the report.

Clinton Administration officials have complained that this law unfairly targets Russia, and, if implemented, would not only interfere with U.S. attempts to secure Russian cooperation on many important non-proliferation goals but could also sour U.S.–Russia relations, jeopardizing reform efforts in Russia. The bill (HR 2709) passed both houses of Congress by wide margins, though, and Clinton officials indicated in June 1998 that a veto was likely, but with such broad support in Congress a veto probably would be overturned. In fact, in late June 1998, the Clinton Administration announced a veto of this legislation

Chemical and Biological Weapons

The U.S. CIA stated in February 1996 that Iran was continuing to expand and diversify its chemical weapons program, already among the largest in the Third World. The agency estimated that Tehran currently controls a CW stockpile of several thousand tons of sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents, and has the potential of producing 1,000 tons of these agents each year. The delivery means for these agents include "artillery, mortars, rockets, aerial bombs, and, possibly, even Scud warheads." Importantly, the chemical agents that Iran possesses are World War I era weapons; it has yet to produce more advanced nerve agents, such as Soman, Tabun, Sarin, or VX.

In addition, the CIA stated in a May 1996 document that: "Iran has had a biological warfare program since the early 1980s. Currently, the program is mostly in the research and development stages, but we believe Iran holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons." The agency estimated that Iran’s stockpile of biological weapons then was limited, but that it could deploy biological weapons using the delivery systems it already had. The CIA is concerned that Iran has the potential to develop a biological warhead for its ballistic missiles, but does not expect this to occur before the end of the century. China has been implicated in supporting aspects of Iran’s CW and BW activities.

 

Prospects

John Holum, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, testified before Congress in March 1997 that Iran remained eight to ten years away from acquiring nuclear weapons—virtually the same assessment that U.S. officials had given two years earlier. Queried whether this meant that Iran’s nuclear program was making little progress, Holum replied: "I think they have slipped rather than gained on the timetable. That is my current recollection. I may also want to give you a classified response." During the course of 1997, press accounts and congressional testimony by U.S. officials also indicated that U.S. economic sanctions against Iran were beginning to affect its energy sector, possibly contributing to these setbacks.

At the same time, there have been no reports that Iran succeeded in acquiring whole weapons or nuclear materials on the black market from Russian or other sources. Indeed, there have been no new reported cases involving the smuggling of weapons-usable materials from the former Soviet Union by any party since 1994. On the other hand, hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials remain poorly secured in Russia and are likely to remain so for many years, despite important U.S.–Russian collaborative efforts to enhance controls over such materials. Thus the potential danger that Iran may be able to obtain such materials will continue.

The May 1997 election of President Khatami raises the possibility of moderation in Iran’s behavior. This could eventually alter the overall orientation of Iranian foreign policy or lead Iran to suspend its WMD and missile programs. However, until the Khatami regime takes steps to meet U.S. conditions for U.S.–Iranian "reconciliation," the United States is likely to continue its policy of containing Iran through diplomatic isolation and sanctions.

This may enable the United States and its allies to retard Iran’s bid for nuclear arms, but the overall threat posed by Iran’s other weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities appears destined to grow stronger in coming years.

 

Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998