Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, by Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, Toby Dalton, and Gregory Koblentz

 

South Asia and East Asia: North Korea

North Korea, a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1985, is believed to have pursued an active nuclear weapons program, in violation of the Treaty, centered around a number of facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. North Korea blocked International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and threatened to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, forcing an unprecedented regime crisis. In October 1994, as part of a special agreement with the United States, North Korea pledged to freeze operations at most of these facilities, halting the production of new weapons-usable nuclear materials, and promised to eventually dismantle its gas-graphite moderated reactors and reprocessing facility. Under the agreement, the United States, South Korea, and Japan formed a multilateral consortium to build two light-water reactors in the North and to deliver 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the first nuclear reactor is completed. Some observers suspect, however, that—in the absence of effective IAEA inspections—North Korea is continuing secret work on nuclear weapons, such as designing a nuclear device or fabricating components from materials it already possesses.

 

Background

The key facilities at Yongbyon include an operational 5-MWe experimental nuclear power reactor, a partially completed large-scale reprocessing plant for plutonium extraction, a number of radiochemistry laboratories (or "hot cells") that can be used for plutonium extraction, a high-explosive testing facility, a fuel fabrication plant, and a partially completed 50-MWe power reactor. North Korea was also building a 200-MWe reactor at Taechon until it agreed to freeze construction of the facility under its October 1994 understanding with the United States.

Although North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, it did not permit the IAEA to conduct inspections, as required by the Treaty, until May 1992. In the early 1990s, U.S. intelligence agencies judged that North Korea had extracted plutonium at the Yongbyon reprocessing plant—and possibly at a number of hot cells—using irradiated fuel rods from the 5-MWe reactor, which is thought to have been partially or fully refueled in 1989. Technically, North Korea could have obtained as much as 12 kg of plutonium—enough to have manufactured one or two nuclear weapons. Most U.S. intelligence agencies at the time assessed that the amount of plutonium recovered by North Korea was more than that declared to the IAEA, and that the excess would have been enough for one or possibly two nuclear weapons.

The 5-MWe reactor’s inventory of spent fuel was again unloaded in May 1994. If reprocessed, this material could provide enough plutonium for four or five nuclear weapons. In addition, if completed, the 50-MWe reactor would have the potential to produce enough material for ten to twelve nuclear bombs a year.

Under the terms of the U.S.–North Korean "Agreed Framework" concluded on October 21, 1994, however, North Korea has pledged to:

1. Freeze operations at, or cease construction of, all of these reactors and cease operating the Yongbyon reprocessing plant, with the freeze to be verified by the IAEA;

2. Not separate plutonium from the spent fuel removed from the 5-MWe reactor in May 1994 (the status of the fuel to be monitored by the IAEA);

3. Ship the spent fuel out of North Korea; and

4. Thereafter dismantle all facilities of nuclear proliferation concern. In exchange, North Korea will be provided with two less proliferation-prone light-water reactors (LWRs) and a number of other energy-related inducements as well as security assurances.

The Inspection Controversy

North Korea’s acceptance of the Agreed Framework culminated a decade of ups and downs in the relationship between North Korea and the international non-proliferation regime. As noted above, although North Korea became a party to the NPT in 1985, it did not finalize a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as required by the Treaty, until April 9, 1992. Under the NPT, North Korea is required to declare all of its nuclear materials and related facilities for IAEA inspection. In May 1992, the IAEA initiated a series of inspections and "visits" to verify North Korea’s initial inventory of nuclear facilities and materials. During this process, in the summer and fall of 1992, the IAEA found discrepancies in North Korea’s declaration of levels of past plutonium production.

Specifically, the IAEA’s chemical analysis of samples of plutonium provided by Pyongyang contradicted the latter’s claim that it had previously separated only grams of plutonium in a one-time "experiment." Instead, the IAEA results indicated that the North had separated plutonium in four campaigns over three years, starting in 1989.

The findings raised further concern because they also appeared to contradict North Korea’s claim that it had not replaced the fuel core of the 5-MWe reactor since the unit began operating in 1986 but had separated plutonium only from a handful of defective fuel rods that it had removed from the facility. U.S. intelligence analysts believed, however, that the reactor’s core had been replaced during a 100-day period when the unit was shut down in 1989, providing the North with a stockpile of plutonium-bearing spent fuel from which it had subsequently extracted a significant amount of plutonium at the Yongbyon reprocessing plant—possibly enough for one or two nuclear devices. The IAEA finding that the North had engaged in multiple plutonium separation campaigns thus lent credence to the U.S. view that North Korea might have a significant quantity of weapons-usable plutonium.

In an effort to resolve the discrepancies that the IAEA found in North Korea’s declaration regarding plutonium production, the IAEA called in early 1993 for a "special inspection" of two undeclared sites near the Yongbyon nuclear complex that were thought to contain wastes from the plutonium separation process. North Korea refused to allow the inspection and announced it was withdrawing from the NPT, which permits such action on a 90-day notice if a party’s "supreme national interests" are jeopardized. After a round of negotiations with the United States in June 1993, North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal. North Korea asserted, however, that it was no longer a full party to the NPT and that the IAEA no longer had the right to conduct even normal routine and ad hoc inspections. Over the ensuing nine months, Pyongyang severely constrained IAEA inspection activities needed to preserve the "continuity of safeguards," leading IAEA Director General Hans Blix to declare in December 1993 that Agency safeguards in North Korea could no longer provide "any meaningful assurances" that nuclear materials were not being diverted to weapons uses.

In March 1994, as part of a complicated package deal with the United States, North Korea initially agreed to an IAEA inspection of its declared facilities, but then blocked the Agency from taking key radioactive samples at the plutonium extraction plant at Yongbyon when it believed that key elements of the deal had not been fulfilled. The crisis escalated further in mid-May 1994, when North Korea started to defuel the 5-MWe reactor while refusing to implement procedures demanded by the IAEA to segregate 300 carefully selected fuel rods from the 8,000-rod core. Analysis of the radioactive signature of the segregated rods would have indicated how long they had been in the reactor, permitting the IAEA to determine whether it had been refueled in 1989—and, thus, whether North Korea might have been able to obtain plutonium for one or two nuclear devices.

As Pyongyang accelerated and completed the defueling, Hans Blix declared in a letter to the U.N. Security Council, on June 2, 1994, that the "agency’s ability to ascertain, with sufficient confidence, whether nuclear material from the reactor has been diverted in the past, has been . . . lost." A special inspection of the two undeclared waste sites thus apparently remained the IAEA’ s principal option for determining past levels of plutonium production. However, North Korea continued to insist that it would never allow inspections at the two sites, which it claimed were military facilities and therefore off limits to the Agency. To penalize North Korea for refusing to comply with IAEA inspection requirements during the defueling of the Yongbyon reactor, the Agency in early June suspended all technical assistance to the North. This led Pyongyang to announce on June 13 that it was withdrawing from the IAEA (a step that did not, however, amount to a renunciation of its safeguards obligations under the NPT).

These developments prompted the United States to circulate, on June 15, a proposal to the U.N. Security Council calling for two phases of sanctions against North Korea. The first phase of the sanctions, which were to be activated after a grace period, consisted of a worldwide ban on arms imports from, and arms exports to, North Korea, along with a downgrading of diplomatic ties. In the second phase, to be triggered if the North continued to reject the IAEA’s demands, a worldwide ban on financial dealings with Pyongyang would be implemented.

The crisis eased after former President Jimmy Carter met with North Korean President Kim Il Sung on June 16-17. The North Korean leader agreed to freeze his country’s nuclear program if the United States resumed high-level talks. These negotiations—which took place in July but were then suspended until early August because of the sudden death of Kim Il Sung on July 9—proved successful in hammering out an "Agreed Statement" on August 12, 1994, under which, in broad terms, North Korea agreed to dismantle the elements of its nuclear program that appeared to be linked to the production of nuclear arms.

The "Agreed Framework"

The two sides proceeded with a series of expert-level discussions and another round of high-level talks to work out the modalities of an agreement. After a period of stalemate, they managed to conclude the "Agreed Framework," signed on October 21, 1994. The accord provides, among other things, for the establishment of a multinational consortium that will finance and supply North Korea with two LWRs by the target date of 2003. In return, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program immediately; pledged not to refuel the 5-MWe Yongbyon reactor; undertook to halt construction of the 50-MWe reactor at that site and of the 200-MWe reactor at Taechon; and agreed to seal the Yongbyon plutonium separation plant and the fabrication plant at the site, and to leave the spent fuel discharged from the 5-MWe reactor in June 1994 in storage, without plutonium separation. Pyongyang also agreed that the spent fuel would be removed from North Korea as nuclear components for the first LWR are supplied and that all of the facilities where activities were frozen would be dismantled by the time that the second LWR was completed.

To offset the energy deficit that North Korea claimed it would face by the freezing of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, the United States was to arrange for the delivery to North Korea (within three months) of heavy oil for heating and electricity production "that will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually." This grant of heavy fuel oil would stop with the completion of the first LWR.

Under the Agreement Framework, North Korea would remain party to the NPT. However, it would not be required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement until a "significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components." This delay, estimated to last from four to six years, will result in postponement of IAEA verification of the accuracy and completeness of North Korea’s initial report on the nuclear materials in its possession. More specifically, it will postpone IAEA special inspections of the two waste sites noted above and thus a determination of whether the North possesses sufficient plutonium for one or more nuclear weapons.

The Agreed Framework also provided for steps toward the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States, U.S. assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the North, and a North Korean commitment to implement the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Proponents of the Agreed Framework have pointed to its inherent security benefits. They stress that it freezes, and then dismantles, nuclear facilities that would have given North Korea the capability to produce dozens of nuclear weapons per year, some of which might have been exported. Another advantage cited is that North Korea has effectively agreed, for the first time, to IAEA inspection of the two undeclared waste sites, which will help reveal the history of past plutonium production. Proponents of the agreement note, moreover, that it places restrictions on North Korea beyond those imposed by the NPT by banning reprocessing of existing spent fuel and requiring the dismantling of North Korea’s most sensitive nuclear facilities. As a by-product of the agreement, the construction of the LWRs would require thousands of South Korean engineers, technicians, and laborers to work, live, and socialize in the North for a decade, thereby improving the chances for more normal relations between Pyongyang and Seoul and lifting, at least partially, the veil of secrecy surrounding the North.

On the other hand, the Agreed Framework is controversial. Its critics contend that the agreement guarantees nothing and gives away too much. First, by postponing IAEA inspection of the two undeclared sites for an extended period (four to six years), the accord delays attaining full compliance with IAEA safeguards and creates an unprecedented "special" safeguards status for North Korea (i.e., it introduces a double standard and a troubling precedent). Postponing inspections, it is argued, compromises the integrity of IAEA safeguards, especially as they relate to the conduct of the Agency’s "special inspections." The accord also will not attempt to rule out, for four to six years, the possibility that North Korea possesses a pre-existing stock of plutonium or possibly one or two nuclear weapons. Moreover, the critics stress, the agreement preserves for a somewhat longer period North Korea’s ability to acquire additional nuclear weapons rapidly—since, if implementation of the pact breaks down, Pyongyang would have immediate access to the stored spent fuel from the 5-MWe reactor as well as to the Yongbyon reprocessing plant. A final criticism is that the agreement sets a precedent for others to "toy" with the NPT. Iran, for example, has already hinted it might withdraw from the Treaty because it is the object of a U.S.–led nuclear embargo.

On balance, it seems clear that the Agreement Framework, although an unorthodox adaptation to North Korea’s singular defiance, still provides a credible means of keeping North Korea in the regime and of blocking nuclear weapons manufacture while time is used to construct other incentives and build constructive working relationships with North Korean authorities.

 

Developments

Implementation of the Agreed Framework has proceeded slowly due to time-consuming negotiations with North Korea and periodic crises on the Korean peninsula. North Korea’s continuing freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing facility has been verified by the IAEA. John Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has stated, "In fact, I understand that the reactors are gathering rust and wouldn’t be useful without an enormous investment again." Progress on implementing the political, economic, and reactor-related aspects of the Agreed Framework has been slow, but overall the project to construct the reactors has made the most headway. North Korea has been receiving regular oil shipments since January 1995.

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

On March 9, 1995, the United States, Japan, and South Korea formed a multinational consortium, called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to supply North Korea with the two promised light-water reactors. Besides being the agency responsible for implementing the reactor deal, KEDO has also taken over responsibility for raising the funds to pay for the oil deliveries that the United States sponsored initially. One of the initial stumbling blocks in carrying out the reactor-related portion of the Agreed Framework was North Korea’s refusal to accept South Korean reactors. On June 13, North Korea and the United States issued a joint statement, which resolved some of the more contentious issues that had been stalling implementation of the Agreed Framework. Both sides agreed that KEDO would select a reactor model based on a U.S.–origin design and would also select the prime contractor for the project. The program coordinator would be an American firm chosen by KEDO. On the same day, KEDO announced that the 1,000-MWe Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP), based on the System 80 reactor design of the U.S. firm Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering, (ABB-CE), would be the model for the reactors to be supplied to North Korea.

After months of further negotiation, North Korea and KEDO concluded a Supply Agreement on December 15, 1995, for the actual financing and supply of the reactors. The Supply Agreement has three main components: setting out the scope of supply for the two light-water reactors; outlining the terms of repayment by North Korea for the cost of the reactors; and outlining the general terms and conditions under which KEDO will operate at the project site. In addition, according to a senior White House official, the Supply Agreement is important because "it codifies in a legally binding instrument, those same non-proliferation commitments which were the core of the Agreed Framework of 1994." This means that delivery of fuel oil and construction work on the LWRs will stop immediately if North Korea violates its contractual commitments.

The terms and conditions of the Supply Agreement are detailed in subsequent protocols negotiated between KEDO and North Korea. On July 11, 1996, KEDO and North Korea signed three protocols on privileges and immunities, transportation, and communication. In March 1996, KEDO selected Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), South Korea’s electrical utility with nuclear power reactor experience, as the prime contractor for the reactor project. In July, KEDO selected the U.S. firm Duke Engineering & Services, Inc., as its program coordinator (later renamed as its technical support consultant). The same month, KEPCO submitted a rough cost estimate for the LWR project—reportedly, $5.5-$6 billion. (In November 1997, KEDO officially declared that the cost of the LWR construction project would be $5.1785 billion.) South Korea is prepared to assume a "central role" and pay up to 70 percent of the cost of the project, while Japan will play a "meaningful role," paying up to 20-25 percent. North Korea will repay the cost of the project over a 20-year, interest-free period, with a three-year grace period, following the completion of the LWRs.

In early September 1996, Stephen W. Bosworth, then head of KEDO, stated, "We have put in place nearly all of the basic political agreements with the North Koreans that will be required for us to launch work in North Korea at the designated site for the reactors." At the time, negotiations were under way on two additional protocols, but the implementation of the Agreed Framework was halted by the September 18 discovery of a North Korean reconnaissance submarine grounded on South Korea’s coast. South Korea allowed KEDO to complete the negotiations, but refused to allow it to initial the protocols on "site use" and "use of DPRK manpower, materials, and services" until North Korea apologized for the submarine incident.

On December 29, 1996, after a series of meetings with the United States, North Korea expressed "deep regret" for the submarine incident. On January 8, 1997, KEDO and North Korea signed the protocols on site use and use of manpower, materials, and services. In April, a KEDO delegation traveled to the LWR project site via a sea transportation route for the first time. On May 4, KEDO and North Korea initialed a protocol on "actions in the event of nonpayment." In July, KEDO and North Korea concluded negotiations on the final steps needed before physical work could begin at the LWR project site at Sinpo. In August 1997, KEDO formally broke ground on the LWR project.

Three months earlier, on May 15, KEDO and the European Union had initialed an agreement for EURATOM to become an executive board member, with contributions to KEDO to total $86 million over five years. As of mid-1997, KEDO had 11 members and had received international contributions from 23 countries.

Oil Deliveries

As part of the Agreed Framework, the United States committed itself to compensate North Korea with fuel oil for the energy it lost by shutting down its 5-MWe reactor and abandoning plans to finish the two larger power reactors. In January 1995, the United States delivered 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. KEDO then assumed responsibility for the delivery of the remaining 100,000 tons due by November 1995, and the 500,000 additional tons due every twelve months thereafter. These oil shipments will continue until the first LWR is completed. Reports emerged in mid-1995 that North Korea was diverting fuel oil to the military. In response, KEDO installed oil flow meters at the thermal power plants that were receiving the fuel oil. KEDO met its fuel oil commitments to North Korea in 1995, 1996, and 1997.

Spent Fuel Canning

The Agreed Framework also specifies that North Korea would store, without reprocessing, the spent fuel discharged in June 1994 from its 5 MWe reactor, and complete the removal of the spent fuel from its territory when the major nuclear components had been completely shipped to the North for the first reactor. Since North Korea has claimed in the past that it has engaged in reprocessing because it is unable to store spent fuel safely for long periods of time, the United States began a project to place the spent fuel in corrosion-resistant canisters that would allow for long-term storage. The U.S. Department of Energy awarded a contract to NAC International to stabilize and can the approximately 8,000 spent fuel rods. The first stage of canning the spent fuel rods was to install a water-purification device in the holding pool; this was accomplished by the end of September 1995. North Korea began removing the spent fuel rods from the pool and placing them in dry storage in January 1996. The actual canning, conducted by North Korea, began April 27, 1996, and was expected to be completed by April 1, 1998. The cost of canning, which will be borne by the United States, is estimated at $26.5 million. Although IAEA inspectors supervised the canning, they were not allowed to sample the fuel rods for radiation measurements. The ultimate fate of the spent fuel has not yet been determined.

IAEA

The IAEA has continuously monitored the freeze on North Korea’s indigenous nuclear activities since November 1994. The Agency has been allowed to conduct routine and ad hoc inspections of "unfrozen" nuclear facilities but not of the reprocessing plant, and it has been allowed to measure but not analyze the spent fuel. A North Korean representative to the IAEA has stated that North Korea will not provide any additional information on its inventory of nuclear material until the LWRs are operational. This stance would be inconsistent with the Agreed Framework, which states that North Korea must be in full compliance with IAEA safeguards before it can receive key nuclear components of the LWRs. During 1997, the IAEA and North Korea continued to hold talks about uncovering the North’s nuclear history, but no progress was reported.

Steps Toward Normalized Relations

Normalized diplomatic, political, and economic relations between the United States and North Korea have not yet been realized. In early January 1995, President Clinton signed an executive order reducing some sanctions on North Korea. However, the Trading with the Enemy Act, which has applied to North Korea since the Korean War and prevents virtually any trade with North Korea, remains in effect, although some exceptions have been made. On December 30, 1996, the United States approved a license sought by Cargill, Inc., a U.S. firm, to negotiate a commercial deal to sell North Korea up to 500,000 tons of grain. Cargill and North Korea reportedly reached an agreement on a shipment of an unknown size. In April 1997, the United States approved a joint venture signed in September 1996 between another U.S. firm, the Stanton Group, and North Korea’s Sungri petrochemical company to refurbish an oil refinery in the Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone.

In addition to this limited reduction of economic barriers, over the past two years, the United States has provided $33 million for medical supplies and food, including $10 million pledged in February 1997 and $15 million pledged in April 1997, in response to emergency appeals by the U.N. World Food Programme. The humanitarian aid offered to North Korea was both a sign of good will and an attempt to forestall disaster in the famine-stricken country. According to one report, U.S. government sources predicted in April 1997 that as many as 100,000 North Koreans could die from starvation and disease over the next four months. However, U.S., South Korean, and Japanese officials refused to assist with large-scale humanitarian aid until North Korea agreed to the proposed four-party peace talks (see below).

The Agreed Framework calls for the United States and North Korea to establish liaison offices in each other’s capitals as a prelude to full diplomatic recognition and the opening of embassies. In early 1997, a State Department official with responsibility for Korea declared that "conditions appear to be improving for the realization of the establishment of liaison offices" in Washington and Pyongyang. It is likely that the pace of opening liaison offices will be tied to the pace of the four-party talks.

The United States and North Korea will need to sign a bilateral nuclear cooperation accord to allow U.S. firms to supply nuclear equipment to the LWR project. A U.S. firm, Combustion Engineering, Inc., supplies some of the key nuclear components for South Korea’s reactors and is expected to receive an order for these same components for the LWRs that KEDO will provide to the North. If Congress finds the cooperation agreement meets U.S. law, it will become effective 90 days after being submitted by the president. For Congress to kill the accord, it would have to pass a joint resolution of disapproval. If the agreement does not meet all of the statutory requirements, Congress would have to pass a joint resolution of approval for the agreement to enter into force.

Korean Peace Talks

Following a series of incursions into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea, North Korea announced on April 4, 1996, that it was renouncing the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War. Later that month, Presidents Bill Clinton and Kim Young-Sam offered peace talks, also involving China, to North Korea. In July, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said that China would play a constructive role in the four-party talks. On December 30, after expressing "deep regret" for the submarine intrusion in September, North Korea agreed to receive a joint briefing from the United States and South Korea on the four-party talks. In January 1997, South Korea and the United States decided not to stage their joint military exercise ‘Team Spirit,’ which had been held for the previous three years.

The defection of Hwang Jang Yop, founder of North Korea’s juche philosophy, to the South Korean embassy in China in early February 1997 heightened tension on the peninsula; unease was exacerbated by the shooting shortly thereafter of a North Korean defector living in South Korea (North Korean agents were suspected in the incident). After North Korea dropped its threats of retaliation for the defection of Hwang, the crisis eased, and the United States and South Korea announced that they were resuming food aid to North Korea. Following a March 5 joint briefing by the United States and South Korea on the proposed four-party talks, and a March 7 bilateral meeting with the United States, North Korea announced it was seeking U.S. diplomatic recognition, increased food aid, an end to U.S. economic sanctions, and trilateral talks with the United States and South Korea before it would attend the four-party talks. With the refusal of the United States and South Korea to accept North Korea’s preconditions, movement toward a replacement of the 1953 armistice agreement with a peace treaty stalled. Nonetheless, after a number of preliminary meetings throughout the year, the four parties were finally able to meet in Geneva on December 9-10, 1997. At this meeting, the parties agreed to reconvene in Geneva in March 1998.

Taiwan’s Nuclear Waste

In January 1997, Taiwan Power Co. announced that it would ship 200,000 barrels of low-level waste (LLW) to North Korea for burial at Pyongsan, the same site where North Korea has disposed of its own LLW and the same site that KEDO plans to use for disposal of LLW from the LWR project. North Korea would receive $270 million. The IAEA would not supervise the waste shipment or inspect the storage site. After strenuous objections from the international community, especially from South Korea and the United States, Taiwan announced in September 1997 that it had agreed with North Korea to postpone the shipments.

Missile Programs

North Korea has an expanding ballistic missile program, based on the reverse engineering of Soviet Scud-B missiles reportedly supplied by Egypt. With substantial Iranian financing, North Korea has developed and deployed the Scud Mod. B (320- to 340-km range and 1,000-kg payload) and Scud Mod. C (500-km range and 700-kg payload). The Department of Defense estimates that North Korea’s arsenal includes "several hundred" of these missiles. A South Korean press report indicates that North Korea can produce 150 surface-to-surface missiles a year. A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report estimates that North Korea can produce about 50 to 100 Scud missiles a year.

In return for its financial assistance, Iran has received from North Korea 100 Scud Mod. B and 100 Scud Mod. C missiles as well as the infrastructure to assemble, and in the future to produce, the missiles. In addition, Syria has received Scud Mod. C missiles and assembly facilities, and Egypt has reportedly received Scud missiles and production equipment from North Korea. Official government statements disagree as to whether or not Libya has obtained Scud missiles from North Korea.

North Korea is also in the "late stages" of developing the Nodong, a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers. When deployed, this missile will give North Korea the capability to hit targets throughout South Korea; Niigata and Osaka in Japan; Khabarovsk in Russia; and Beijing and Shanghai in China. The Nodong’s first and only flight test was in May 1993. Particularly worrisome is North Korea’s interest in selling the Nodong to a number of countries, including Iran, Libya, and Syria. If deployed in Iran or Syria, the missile could reach Israel; if deployed in Libya, it could reach U.S. bases and allied capitals in the Mediterranean region.

According to some sources, North Korea is also developing more advanced, two-stage missiles, including the Taepo Dong 1 (more than 1,500-km range) and the Taepo Dong 2 (more than 4,000-km range). Currently, both systems are in the design stage. In February 1996, John Deutch, then head of the CIA, stated that the Taepo Dong 1 missile "could be operational after the turn of the century." The intelligence community believes that the Taepo Dong 2 "could conceivably have sufficient range to strike portions of Alaska or the far western Hawaiian islands."

In April 1996, the United States and North Korea held two days of talks on North Korea’s ballistic missile program. The United States wants North Korea to abandon its development of longer-range missiles and stop its missile exports. In return, the United States would be willing to lift some of the trade restrictions currently in place. The United States and North Korea agreed to a second round of talks that was tentatively scheduled for August. However, the United States imposed sanctions on North Korea in May for the supply of missile-related technology to Iran, and when the sanctions became public in July, North Korea refused to attend the second round of talks. In November 1996, North Korea, under pressure from the United States, canceled a planned launch of the Nodong. New reports of North Korea readying the Nodong for testing or deployment emerged in mid-April 1997, around the same time that the United States and North Korea were discussing having a second round of missile talks. These talks were initially scheduled to be held on May 12-13 but were postponed at North Korea’s request to June 11-13, 1997.

North Korea also has an indigenous cruise missile program based on Soviet and Chinese technology. North Korea has been manufacturing the Chinese-designed Silkworm anti-shipping missile for many years and has produced two variants with ranges of about 100 km. It is also developing an anti-shipping missile with a range of 160 km that was tested in July 1994. North Korea has also acquired European-built unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and has a program to develop its own UAVs that could be used for reconnaissance or delivering chemical or biological agents.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

North Korea is believed to have an active chemical weapons program and the ability to produce biological weapons. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, North Korea can produce "large quantities" of nerve, blister, and blood agents and "limited quantities" of biological warfare agents. Possible delivery systems include ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, and agricultural sprayers. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry has stated that North Korea maintains a chemical weapons stockpile estimated at 5,000 tons, consisting mainly of mustard, phosgene, and nerve agents. According to a Pentagon official, large amounts of chemical weapons have been stockpiled close to the DMZ. North Korea is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), but not the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

 

Prospects

As of early 1998, the basic bargain of the Agreed Framework has held together. The nuclear freeze on the North’s nuclear program remains in place. KEDO is scheduled to start construction work on the two LWRs by the fall of 1998, and it is anticipated that hundreds, and eventually thousands, of Koreans from both sides of the DMZ will work together to build the two plants. This direct interaction between North and South Koreans at the project site, as well as in KEDO–North Korea negotiations to agree on the detailed implementation of the Supply Agreement, although little-advertised, has been a significant accomplishment.

It is all the more worrisome, then, that financial difficulties may imperil KEDO’s continued success. KEDO faces an annual bill of approximately $60-$65 million to finance the supply of HFO to the North, and it has had to borrow funds through long-term suppliers’ credits to meet this commitment. In addition, although the KEDO member countries have pegged the cost of the LWR construction project at $5.1785 billion, none of this money has yet been appropriated by South Korea’s National Assembly or the Japanese Diet. However, KEDO has weathered a number of political storms in the past few years and now appears to be widely recognized as a functioning part of security agreements in Northeast Asia.

Other aspects of the North’s behavior remain troublesome. High on this list are its ballistic missile program and its continued chemical and biological weapons activities. It is expected that these issues will be addressed, if not resolved, in the four-party talks.

Finally, the uncertain political situation on the Korean Peninsula complicates charting the future for all of the actors involved. In the South, it could be expected that the financial crisis that swept the country in late 1997 will cause Seoul to turn inward and pay less attention to the North. On the other hand, the personality of long-time opposition leader Kim Dae-jung, who was elected president in December 1997 and assumed office in February 1998, may dictate otherwise. Kim has spoken often in the past of placing North-South relations on a better footing. He may understand that dealing with Pyongyang in a more positive fashion than his predecessor may build mutual confidence, lower the military threat from the North, and provide the South with a much-needed "peace dividend."

By comparison, the situation in the North is much more grave; the economy has all but collapsed. The North will again need to rely on foreign benefactors to feed its people in 1998, and despite some modest attempts at agricultural reform (although never labeled as such), the food situation is likely to remain a chronic problem. Questions over who, if anyone, was really running North Korea have largely receded as it has become clearer over time that Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim Jong Il, has solidified his grip on power. Yet, given the oblique nature of the regime, the most accurate characterization may be that there is no sign that the son is not in control in the North.

Since mid-1996, senior U.S. officials have increasingly questioned North Korea’s ability to survive in its current form. The three options usually discussed are implosion (collapse of the state), explosion (war with South Korea), or absorption (reform and reunification). In May 1997, the acting head of the CIA, George Tenet, referring to the possible outcomes of North Korea’s increasing difficulties, stated, "One of the things that worries us most is an implosion internally." The consequences of regime collapse could mean millions of North Korean refugees flooding into South Korea or westward to northern China. Signs of imminent collapse may cause Seoul to take the agonizing decision to bar refugees, perhaps forcibly, from entering the South. It is not far-fetched to think that China may take preemptive measures in its border area with North Korea that would result in its forces occupying North Korean territory. For these and other reasons, none of the major actors in the region are likely to favor reunification of the peninsula anytime soon.

 

Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998