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Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, by Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, Toby Dalton, and Gregory Koblentz
Pakistan is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and was long regarded as a de facto nuclear power that "could assemble a limited number of nuclear weapons in a relatively short timeframe." India’s May 11 and 13, 1998, nuclear tests and nuclear-weapons declaration produced a matching reaction from Pakistan, which, after briefly hesitating, tested a series of nuclear devices of its own on May 28 and 30 and also declared itself a nuclear-weapon power.
Pakistan has been locked in a conflict relationship with India that has led to three wars since both became independent in 1947. As a result of Pakistan’s defeat by India in the last war of 1971, Pakistan was dismembered; its former eastern wing became the independent state of Bangladesh. Pakistan secretly commenced its nuclear weapons program shortly thereafter.
Since the late 1980s, the top military and civilian leadership of Pakistan has sought to project an ambiguous form of nuclear deterrence—non-weaponized deterrence—to check any major attack and related political and military pressure from its much larger and also nuclear-capable neighbor. Although Pakistan had not declared or demonstrated nuclear weapons before May 1998, it was believed to have a secret nuclear arsenal consisting of a small number of complete but unassembled nuclear weapons that could be quickly readied for use. By conservative estimates, Pakistan by 1995 would have been able to deploy about 10 nuclear weapons; by other estimates, the number could have been as high as 15-25.
Pakistan reportedly possesses about 30 nuclear-capable M-11 surface-to-surface missiles with a 280-300-km range, supplied by China, and is reported to be constructing a factory to build similar missiles. In July 1997, as a riposte to India’s semi-deployment of the Prithvi missile in Punjab, where it could strike Lahore, Pakistan reportedly tested the Hatf-3, a 600-km ballistic missile, and then in the spring of 1998 tested the Ghauri missile, which is claimed to have a range upwards of 1,500 km that could reach much more deeply into Indian territory. Pakistan halted further production of weapons-grade uranium in 1991, temporarily placing a ceiling on the size of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It has made efforts to expand other elements of its nuclear weapons program, however, including work on weapons design, on unsafeguarded facilities to produce plutonium and, possibly, on facilities to increase the production capacity for weapons-grade uranium.
Background
Nuclear Weapons Program
Pakistan secretly launched its nuclear weapons program in 1972, in the aftermath of the 1971 war. The program, which gained new impetus after India’ s nuclear test in May 1974, had made substantial progress in acquiring sensitive uranium-enrichment know-how and technology by the early 1980s. This was expedited by the return to Pakistan in 1975 of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a German-trained metallurgist, who was employed at the classified URENCO uranium-enrichment plant at Anselmo in the Netherlands in the early 1970s. Dr. Khan brought to Pakistan personal knowledge of gas-centrifuge equipment and industrial suppliers, especially in Europe, and was put in charge of building, equipping, and operating Pakistan’s Kahuta enrichment facility. In 1977 and again in 1979, the United States terminated economic and military aid to Pakistan in a sanctions-based effort to dissuade it from continuing the nuclear weapons program.
Glenn-Symington Amendment
The 1979 economic and military aid cutoff was made pursuant to the 1977 "Glenn-Symington Amendment." This amendment requires the termination of assistance to any state that imported uranium-enrichment equipment or technology after 1977 and refused to place it under IAEA inspection. Pakistan transgressed this law in 1979 because of its importation of equipment for its secret uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta.
In 1981, in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the United States for six years suspended the application of the uranium-enrichment sanctions provisions of the Glenn-Symington Amendment to Pakistan and provided greatly increased military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Washington’s fundamental goal was to create a bulwark against further Soviet expansionism and to establish Pakistan as a strategic partner supporting anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Reagan Administration officials also argued that the restoration of aid would advance U.S. non-proliferation objectives by enhancing Pakistan’s overall security, thereby reducing Islamabad’s motivation to acquire nuclear arms.
Pakistan continued its nuclear weapons program, however. A 1983 U.S. State Department analysis of the effort declared that there was "unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program." The report highlighted Pakistan’s progress in key areas of weapons manufacture, its critical dependence on clandestine efforts to procure nuclear equipment from private Western firms, and its receipt of nuclear assistance from China, including assistance "in the area of fissile material production and possibly also nuclear device design."
The program reached a key milestone in 1985, when, despite numerous pledges to the United States that it would not produce weapons-grade uranium, Pakistan crossed this threshold. By 1986, Pakistan had apparently produced enough material for its first nuclear device, thereby acquiring a de facto nuclear weapons capability, although it is believed to have refrained at this juncture from fabricating the key nuclear components for nuclear arms. Although the United States sought to discourage Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear program throughout this period, Washington restrained its pressure on Islamabad because of the need for continued Pakistani cooperation in the campaign to oust Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
The Pressler Amendment
The Afghanistan-related duality in U.S. policy toward Pakistan was reflected in the enactment of a 1985 law known as the Pressler Amendment, which specified that U.S. aid and government-to-government military sales to Pakistan would be cut off unless the president certified at the beginning of each U.S. fiscal year that Pakistan did "not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed U.S. assistance program will significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device." This formulation underscored U.S. concerns about the Pakistani nuclear program but did not trigger an immediate termination of U.S. aid, inasmuch as Pakistan was believed not to have an assembled device at the time. Despite further Pakistani advances toward nuclear weapons, through October 1989, Presidents Reagan and Bush made the certifications necessary to permit U.S. aid and arms sales. The 1989 certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device reportedly was made only after Pakistan’s Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto agreed to suspend the further production of weapons-grade uranium.
In late 1989 and early 1990, perhaps because of the threat of war with India, Pakistan apparently ended this freeze and fabricated cores for several nuclear weapons from pre-existing stocks of weapons-grade uranium. As a result, in October 1990, the Bush Administration declined to make the certification required by the Pressler Amendment and terminated all aid and government-to-government military sales to Pakistan. At the time, Pakistan had 28 additional F-16 aircraft and certain other military hardware on order, to be acquired on a government-to-government (rather than on a commercial) basis, and therefore unquestionably subject to the Pressler Amendment embargo. Islamabad continued making payments on these purchases after October 1990 so that it could receive the armaments at issue in the event that the prohibition against such U.S. military sales was rescinded.
In late 1991, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who succeeded Benazir Bhutto in November 1990, reinstated the freeze on the production of weapons-grade uranium. This freeze appears to have remained in effect. Pakistan continued to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU), however, thereby enlarging its overall nuclear weapons potential. Other aspects of the Pakistani nuclear program also continued to advance. These included work on nuclear weapon designs; construction of a 40-MWt nuclear reactor at Khushab that is not subject to IAEA inspection and is apparently intended for the production of plutonium; work on safeguards-free facilities for separating plutonium from the Khushab reactor’s spent fuel; and the enlargement of Pakistan’s capacity to enrich uranium, reportedly through the construction of a second enrichment plant at Golra.
Pakistan’s Ambiguous Nuclear Posture
Although evidence of Pakistan’s ability to deploy nuclear weapons had been clear at least since President Bush failed to certify in October 1990 that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device, rather than declare itself a nuclear-weapon state, Pakistan preferred merely to hint at this capacity in official statements. In August 1994, however, eleven months after he lost the prime ministership to Benazir Bhutto in the October 1993 elections, Nawaz Sharif openly stated: "I confirm that Pakistan possesses the atomic bomb." This did not, however, comprise an official statement of the Pakistani government. Prime Minister Bhutto thereafter invoked the more traditional, ambiguous official line, stating in April 1995, for example: "We have enough knowledge and capability to make and assemble a nuclear weapon. But we have voluntarily chosen not to either assemble a nuclear weapon, to detonate a nuclear weapon, or to export technology." In another pronouncement in a similar vein, she stated in April 1996 that Pakistan’s nuclear program would "remain peaceful so long as our national survival and territorial integrity is not threatened." After his return to power in the elections of February 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stayed within the official policy line, until his hand was forced by India’s May 1998 tests (see Developments section of this chapter).
Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear deterrent has been motivated principally by fears of domination by India, whose population, economy, and military resources dwarf those of its western neighbor. A desire for leadership in the Islamic world, popular nationalist sentiment, and bureaucratic pressure also contribute to Pakistan’s bid for nuclear arms. Since the 1971 India-Pakistan War, relations between Islamabad and New Delhi have alternated between periods of relative peace and periods of considerable tension, punctuated with crises that nearly erupted into war during the winter of 1986-87 and the spring of 1990. In the latter crisis, heated by Indian accusations that the insurgency by Muslim extremists in the Indian-held portion of Kashmir had been instigated and was fueled by Pakistan, there were fears that Pakistan might take steps to deploy its nascent nuclear arsenal. These concerns spurred intensive, and ultimately successful, U.S. diplomatic efforts to defuse the situation.
Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures
Over the years, Pakistan has proposed numerous bilateral nuclear arms control initiatives with India, declaring, for example, that it would be prepared to join the NPT or accept other non-proliferation measures if India did so. India has rejected these proposals, arguing that they do not address the nuclear threat India faces from China and that nuclear disarmament questions should be addressed as global rather than regional issues. Pakistan and India have, however, adopted a number of bilateral confidence-building measures, including a military-to-military hot line and an agreement, which entered into force in January 1991, prohibiting the two states from attacking each other’s nuclear installations. Lists of facilities covered by this agreement are now exchanged periodically.
In August 1992, the two states brought into force agreements on mutual advance notification of military exercises and on the avoidance of overflights of military aircraft. They also signed a bilateral accord banning the possession, manufacture, and use of chemical weapons. This accord, however, did not contain any verification measures. Both states also became original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in mid-January 1993. India ratified the CWC in September 1996, and Pakistan ratified it in October 1997. Both India and Pakistan have also ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
Ballistic Missile Program
Pakistan’s efforts to acquire ballistic missiles intensified in the mid-1980s, when, with Chinese assistance, it launched a program to develop two short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) systems: the 80-km-range Hatf-1 and the 300-km-range Hatf-2. A 1994 study indicated that the Hatf-2 was not expected to be available as a militarily deployable system for a number of years, but a 1997 Pentagon report observed that it may have been discontinued. In parallel with these programs, Pakistan also sought to acquire the 280-300-km-range, nuclear-capable M-11 ballistic missile system and associated equipment from China.
The precise nature of China’s support for Pakistan’s ballistic missile program is not known. The 1997 Pentagon proliferation report says, "Pakistan received SRBMs and associated equipment from China during the early 1990s." This latest official report makes clear publicly that the U.S. government believes actual short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) were transferred to Pakistan in the early 1990s but does not clarify whether these missiles were captured by the 300-km-range/500-kg-payload parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). On June 25, 1991, pursuant to the missile-transfer sanctions provisions of the 1990 Defense Authorization Act, the United States imposed Category II sanctions for two years on governmental or government-owned entities in China and Pakistan because of M-11 missile-related equipment transfers by China to Pakistan. Category II sanctions are those specified in the law for transfers of dual-use missile technology or equipment. Some U.S. government sources believed at the time that the transfer actually involved complete M-11 missiles, which would justify tougher, Category I sanctions.
The sanctions against China were waived in March 1992, after China had sent a written message to the Bush Administration in which Beijing agreed to abide by the "guidelines and parameters" of the MTCR. In August 1993, Washington imposed Category II sanctions against Chinese and Pakistani entities for a second time, however, because of China’s renewed transfers of M-11-related items to Pakistan; again, the sanctions were those the U.S. law specified for transfers of dual-use missile technology or equipment, although transfers of actual missiles may have been involved. The sanctions against China were lifted in October 1994, after it had reaffirmed its previous commitments to abide by the MTCR "guidelines and parameters" and agreed to ban the sale of "ground-to-ground" missiles inherently capable of carrying a 500-kg payload to a distance of at least 300 km (the primary threshold for missiles of concern under the MTCR)—a ban that China agreed prohibited further exports of the M-11 missiles.
Developments
The major strands of Pakistan’s nuclear development described above have continued to unfold since early 1995. During 1995-96, in one effort to regain influence over proliferation trends after the imposition of Pressler sanctions on Pakistan in 1990, the United States sought to promote a package of incentives to encourage proliferation restraint in Islamabad. New disclosures of Chinese and Pakistani transactions, however, prevented the full implementation of the initiative. Meanwhile—despite its apparent preparations for a nuclear test in anticipation of a new Indian test, and its matching of India’s refusal to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—Pakistan maintained the voluntary freeze on weapons-grade uranium enrichment even as it attempted to advance other aspects of its nuclear and missile programs.
Partial Release of Frozen Arms Package
By early 1995, the failure of the United States to deliver the 28 F-16s and other military equipment embargoed by the Pressler Amendment—or to return the nearly $1.3 billion that Pakistan had already paid for these arms—had become a source of increasing strain between Washington and Islamabad. Indeed, elements in the Pakistan military reportedly had threatened to end the freeze on the production of weapons-grade uranium if the matter were not satisfactorily resolved. In March, the Clinton Administration announced that it would address the issue by seeking a modification of the Pressler Amendment. The principal objective of a modification was to create incentives for Pakistan to continue the restraints that it had voluntarily imposed on its nuclear program. These included not only the weapons-grade uranium production freeze but also decisions not to conduct nuclear tests, not to deploy nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable missiles, and not to export sensitive nuclear items.
When Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Washington in April 1995, President Bill Clinton confirmed that he would address the issue, and by the summer, the Clinton Administration had introduced legislation to modify the Pressler Amendment to permit the release of $368 million in arms contracted for prior to 1990 and to provide an initial cash refund of $120 million. None of the F-16s Pakistan had purchased would be released to Pakistan, however, in part because of their potential as nuclear delivery systems. Rather, the United States would seek the resale of the F-16s elsewhere, with the proceeds being used to reimburse Pakistan. The change in the Pressler Amendment would also end its prohibition on U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan and on certain military assistance (for anti-narcotics, anti-terrorism, peacekeeping, and military-to-military contacts). In return, Pakistan would continue to implement the existing restraints on its nuclear weapons program, or, as phrased in a State Department letter to Senator Sam Nunn, "Pakistan knows that the decision to resolve the equipment problem is based on the assumption that there will be no significant change on nuclear and missile non-proliferation issues of concern to the United States."
The Brown Amendment
In November 1995, in a provision known as the Brown Amendment—named after its sponsor, Senator Hank Brown—Congress approved the Clinton Administration’s proposed modification of the Pressler Amendment. Because of an unrelated conflict with Congress over the federal budget, President Clinton did not sign the Brown Amendment into law until February 1996. As the Administration and Congress worked to enact the measure, Pakistan continued its freeze on the production of weapons-grade uranium, and it refrained from conducting nuclear tests, exporting nuclear materials or technology, and deploying M-II missiles. At the same time, however, Pakistan sought to advance its nuclear weapons capabilities along the plutonium track, as well as to upgrade its equipment on the uranium track.
Plutonium Track
According to U.S. officials, Pakistan continued work on its 40-MWt, heavy-water research reactor at Khushab, with Chinese assistance, although Washington was apparently unable to discern the precise nature of this assistance. Prime Minister Bhutto claimed that the project is "a small reactor for experimental purposes" and that the country has "no plans to produce plutonium." The Khushab reactor—which Pakistan claims is of indigenous origin, and therefore probably would not be placed under IAEA inspection—has the potential to contribute importantly to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Once operational, it could provide Pakistan with the country’s first source of plutonium-bearing spent fuel free from IAEA controls.
Weapons-grade plutonium from the Khushab reactor’s spent fuel could be extracted at the nearby Chasma reprocessing plant, if that facility becomes operational, or at the pilot-scale New Labs reprocessing facility at the Pakistani Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) in Rawalpindi—both facilities being outside IAEA purview. The Khushab reactor is estimated to be capable of generating enough plutonium for between one and two nuclear weapons annually. Not only would this increase Pakistan’s overall weapons production capabilities by perhaps 20-30 percent (assuming that the Kahuta enrichment plant can produce enough weapons-grade uranium for three to four weapons per year), but the availability of plutonium would permit Pakistan to develop smaller and lighter nuclear warheads. This in turn might facilitate Pakistan’s development of warheads for ballistic missiles. In addition, Pakistan might employ the Khushab reactor to irradiate lithium-6 to produce tritium, a material used to "boost" nuclear weapons so as to improve their yield-to-weight efficiency.
The Khushab reactor was reported to have been completed in 1996, although it had not been fueled, according to U.S. officials. As of late 1997, the Khushab reactor still was not operational, apparently because of Pakistan’s inability to procure (or produce) a sufficient supply of unsafeguarded heavy water.
China was also reported to be assisting Pakistan with completing a facility linked to the Khushab reactor and thought to be either a fuel fabrication plant or a plutonium separation (reprocessing) plant. Pakistan previously was not thought to have a fuel fabrication facility to manufacture fuel for the new reactor. There was, however, construction at an "auxiliary location" just south of the Khushab reactor. Whereas in mid-1996 officials worried this might represent work on a reprocessing plant to handle spent fuel discharged from the Khushab reactor, more recently they have said categorically that the auxiliary location is "not a reprocessing plant."
The status of Pakistan’s reprocessing capabilities at New Labs in Rawalpindi and at the Chasma site, however, has not been altogether clear from published sources. A classified U.S. State Department analysis prepared in 1983 said that the New Labs facility was "nearing completion" at that time; thus the facility could well be available for use today. Reports on the Chasma reprocessing facility in the early 1990s suggested that it was progressing, but probably still several years from completion. According to an analysis by the CIA quoted in the press, as of April 1996, China was providing technicians and equipment to help finish the facility. According to reports of August 1997, however, U.S. officials believe that, while some Chinese assistance and equipment may have trickled into the Chasma reprocessing project, the reprocessing complex at Chasma "is an empty shell." If this description is correct, Pakistan may have only the laboratory-scale reprocessing capability at New Labs and may be further from major plutonium reprocessing activities than once thought.
Uranium-Enrichment Track
In the mid-1990s, Pakistani specialists also pursued efforts to improve the Kahuta enrichment plant and, possibly, to expand the country’s capacity to enrich uranium. The best-publicized episode was Pakistan’s purchase from China of 5,000 custom-made ring magnets, a key component of the bearings that support high-speed rotation of centrifuges. Shipments of the magnets, which were sized to fit the specific type of centrifuge used at the Kahuta plant, were apparently made between December 1994 and mid-1995 and became known to the Clinton Administration by August 1995. It was not clear whether the ring magnets were intended for Kahuta as a "future reserve supply," or whether they were intended to permit Pakistan to increase the number of uranium-enrichment centrifuges, either at Kahuta or at another location.
As discussed in the chapter on China, the ring magnet transaction, valued at $70,000, raised the possibility that China had violated a provision of the Export-Import Bank Act, added in 1994, requiring a cutoff of all U.S. Export-Import Bank financing to any country that "has willfully aided or abetted any non-nuclear-weapon state" in acquiring enriched uranium or plutonium not subject to IAEA monitoring. In this instance, however, the principal impact of sanctions would have been on U.S. firms doing business in China, as the sanctions would have jeopardized as much as $1 billion annually in unrelated U.S. exports to China.
After the ring magnet story became public, the Clinton Administration entered into active negotiations with China over the sale, temporarily suspending new Export-Import Bank credits, without formally declaring that China had violated the statutory sanctions provision. It also postponed the release of military hardware to Pakistan, notwithstanding the intent of the Brown Amendment. In mid-April, however, the Administration eased both restrictions, apparently in anticipation of the resolution of the controversy that would be announced on May 10, 1996.
On that date, the Clinton Administration announced that it would not impose sanctions against China under the Export-Import Bank Act. The Administration accepted the Chinese government’s statement that it had not been aware of the ring magnet sale, and, because it was not made "willfully," the transaction did not transgress the statutory standards requiring the termination of Export-Import Bank financing. As part of the resolution, the Administration stated that China would a) make a public commitment not to provide assistance to any nuclear facility not subject to IAEA monitoring—a commitment U.S. officials stated would prevent future ring magnet sales, and b) engage in a dialogue with the United States on strengthening export controls. The following day, China issued a statement declaring, "China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities."
If this undertaking is strictly implemented, it would appear to rule out Chinese assistance to activities at unsafeguarded Pakistani facilities that could support the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Still, the phraseology of the May 1996 pledge is quite vague, leaving unclear, for example, whether China’s pledge will ban transfers of dual-use items, technology (such as blueprints), and expert advice. Many specialists consider it likely that China will, as in the past, interpret its obligations narrowly. On the basis of the history of China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, some observers, especially in India, have come to believe that China perceives Pakistan to be a strategic ally and partner with which it is working to keep India in check. If China does have such an objective, it is doubtful that it will stop all assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs—notwithstanding any pledges Beijing may have given the United States. However, this may overestimate the closeness of the China-Pakistan tie, and other observers—even a few in India—have not jumped to this conclusion. Moreover, the recent upgrading of Chinese nuclear export control policies (see China chapter in this volume) is likely to constrain Chinese assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear activities in Pakistan.
While the May 1996 understanding averted the imposition of sanctions against China, the ring magnet episode undercut the Clinton Administration’s efforts to restore a measure of non-proliferation influence in the relationship with Pakistan and curtailed the intended benefits of the Brown Amendment. After the Brown Admendment’s enactment in February 1996—which was followed by the brief suspension of arms transfers noted above—Pakistan received $124 million in cash as a first tranche of the reimbursement of funds it had paid to the United States and, through September 1996, received some $150 million in military equipment contracted and paid for prior to 1990. However, the ring magnet case prevented Pakistan from receiving any economic or targeted military aid—benefits that the Clinton Administration and many legislators earlier had anticipated would be extended to Pakistan after passage of the Brown Amendment.
At that time it was recognized that, even if the Pressler Amendment were modified as the Brown Amendment contemplated, all economic and military aid to Pakistan would still be barred because Pakistan’s importation of uranium-enrichment equipment in the 1970s and 1980s violated provisions of the 1977 Glenn-Symington Amendment. As noted above, however, under special legislation, U.S. presidents had been given the authority to waive these sanctions upon a finding that this was in the national interest. Most recently, the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) had given the president authority to waive Glenn-Symington uranium-enrichment sanctions on this national interest ground with respect to all Pakistani violations prior to June 29, 1994. Thus, in the fall of 1995, before the ring magnet case emerged, it was assumed that the prohibitions against economic aid and certain military aid in the Pressler Amendment would be rescinded by means of the Brown Amendment, and that the prohibitions on such aid in the Glenn-Symington Amendment would be neutralized by waiver—ending all legal hurdles to U.S. assistance to Pakistan in these specified categories.
But Pakistan’s importation of the ring magnets for the Kahuta enrichment plant took place after June 29, 1994. For such actions, the NPPA offered no relief from the uranium-enrichment sanctions of the Glenn-Symington Amendment. This meant that while the Brown Amendment would eliminate the barriers to economic and certain military aid in the Pressler Amendment, the only way for the president to waive the prohibitions in the Glenn-Symington Amendment was to employ the original waiver provision in that statute. This necessitated a certification that he had "received reliable assurances" that Pakistan "will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons"—a certification no president has been able to make since the law was adopted in 1977.
Thus the ring magnets case, though it involved only subcomponents for a nuclear installation, had major consequences. It led China to accept important new undertakings regarding assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and it deprived Pakistan of the opportunity to the obtain U.S. economic assistance and certain military aid.
The Harkin Amendment
As a result of the cumulative statutory impediments to the Executive Branch having even limited opportunities to provide assistance to Pakistan, and thereby to maintain influence with the government of Pakistan, efforts have continued (beyond the Brown Amendment) to acquire some diplomatic flexibility through legislative modifications and interpretation. One of these was the Harkin Amendment of July 1997: a series of proposed modifications of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, supported by the Clinton Administration and sponsored by the Senate, to provide avenues for modest initiatives to improve communication and retain influence with Pakistan. The proposed modifications were a) to restore the option of U.S. education and training of Pakistani officers under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, b) to provide authority for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to support commercial ventures in Pakistan, c) to permit the Trade and Development Agency (TDA) to facilitate exports to Pakistan, and d) to offer financial support for democracy-building activities.
The original Harkin Amendment would not have authorized resumption of direct military aid to Pakistan, nor would it have specifically countered the Glenn-Symington sanctions. Some believed, however, that its IMET provision would be inconsistent with the spirit of Glen-Symington. In the course of Senate conference with the House of Representatives, the IMET and democracy-building provisions were struck from the Harkin Amendment. The version sent to the president for signature in late 1997 retained only the OPIC and TDA provisions.
Civilian Nuclear Power Program
In a somewhat less politically charged area, China is also assisting Pakistan in the construction of a civilian nuclear facility that will be placed under IAEA safeguards, a 300-MWe nuclear power plant at Chasma. This unit is not expected to contribute directly to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. However, China’s sale of the facility is inconsistent with the practices of the other major nuclear supplier states, which have banned such sales to countries that refuse full-scope safeguards (i.e., that refuse to place all of their nuclear installations under IAEA inspection). Although civil work at the facility was completed in early 1996 with the placement of the reactor’s containment dome, there is some question as to whether China will be able to supply the machinery and equipment to complete this facility.
Missile Program
In parallel with the consideration of the Brown Amendment and the controversy over the ring magnets, U.S. concern continued about China’s transfers of M-11 surface-to-surface missiles to Pakistan. In spring 1995, for example, press reports indicated that Washington believed that China had recently transferred components that could be used with the M-11, and, by the summer of 1995, the U.S. intelligence community had apparently concluded that Pakistan had more than 30 complete M-11 missiles on hand. The weapons, which some believed were received as early as November 1992, were said to be sitting in storage crates at the Sargodha Air Force Base, west of Lahore. The Clinton Administration declined to impose sanctions on the two countries, however, arguing that it lacked sufficiently firm evidence to support such action.
The M-11 issue resurfaced in the summer of 1996, when press reports disclosed the conclusion of a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that, as previously estimated, Pakistan had roughly three dozen M-11 missiles. The NIE reportedly stated that these were stored in canisters at the Sargodha Air Force Base, along with maintenance facilities and missile launchers; that the missiles could be launched in as little as 48 hours, even though the missiles had not been used in actual training exercises; and that two teams of Chinese technicians had been sent to Pakistan to provide training and to help unpack and assemble the missiles.
In addition, the document reportedly surmised that Pakistan probably had designed a nuclear warhead for the system, based on evidence that Pakistan had been working on such an effort for a number of years. As noted earlier, however, Pakistan had not conducted a full-scale test of any nuclear explosive device, nor had it flight-tested a prototype nuclear warhead with the M-11. These factors led some in the U.S. intelligence community to doubt that any warhead Pakistan may have developed could be deemed ready for use.
In late August, another U.S. intelligence finding was leaked to the press: Using blueprints and equipment supplied by China, Pakistan reportedly had in late 1995 begun construction of a factory to produce short-range missiles based on the Chinese-designed M-11. The factory, located near Rawalpindi, was expected to be operational in one or two years. It was not clear whether the facility would be able to build complete missiles, or whether it would manufacture some components and use imported parts to produce complete systems.
None of these China-Pakistan missile-transfer events in 1996 triggered the imposition of U.S. missile-transfer sanctions on China or Pakistan, however. Indeed, throughout this period, modest shipments of U.S. military hardware continued under the Brown Amendment.
India-Pakistan Nuclear and Missile Arms Race
Although in March 1994 India had, after a relatively successful launch test, shelved the Agni medium-range ballistic missile program (the decision was reaffirmed by the United Front government in December 1996), India’s missile activities intensified in 1996 and 1997, producing the earmarks of a regional nuclear-missile arms race. Rejecting foreign overtures and advice, India began test-firing the Prithvi II, the Air Force version capable of targeting nearly all of Pakistan, in early 1996. Then, in June 1997, India took the provocative step of moving Prithvi I mobile missile systems from factories in the south into Punjab, bringing Pakistan’s most heavily inhabited region and cities within direct range of the missiles. In July 1997, moreover, India’s defense ministry announced revival of the Agni medium-range missile program. The Prithvi relocation in Punjab created direct pressure on Pakistan to deploy the Chinese-origin M-11 missiles reportedly stored at Sargodha, which would have triggered U.S. MTCR-related sanctions, probably on both Pakistan and China as well as on entities in China.
Pakistan chose instead to respond rhetorically, pointing out the threatening and destabilizing features of Indian missile actions, and also announced the first test of a new ballistic missile, called Hatf-3. The announced 600-km-range/500-kg-payload capability of Hatf-3 implies that it would be both nuclear-capable and capable of reaching New Delhi and other targets deeper in India’s interior. Subsequently, Pakistani sources claimed that development of an even more powerful and versatile missile, the Ghauri, was under way, with sufficient range to reach south India—indeed, any city in India—and then announced on April 6, 1997 that the Ghauri had been tested. Indian publicists highlighted these presumed capabilities in what appeared to be a media campaign in India to win defense budgetary support for a major procurement program for both offensive and defensive missile systems.
Equally disturbing is the recent worsening of the air-combat military imbalance between India and Pakistan, which could exacerbate nuclear and missile arms race instability by increasing the propensity toward "hair-trigger" nuclear weapon deployments on the Subcontinent. This is particularly the case for Pakistan, which has no depth of defense and therefore no airfields out of range of Indian air attack. The low-key U.S. transfer to India of smart-bomb technology, which is ideally suited for disabling aircraft at air bases, sharply increases Pakistan’s incentive to put its nuclear deterrent on high alert (adopting a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack posture), because it must now fear the possibility of successful Indian preemptive air attacks.
Nuclear Test Scare in 1995
Islamabad also faced an intensification of the nuclear challenge from India in late 1995, when U.S. agencies detected indications that India was preparing to conduct a nuclear explosive test at the Pokaran site in Rajasthan. India’s only previous nuclear detonation, described as a "peaceful nuclear experiment," had been in 1974. Indian nuclear program custodians may have pushed for a new test (or test series) due to their concern that the expected opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) during 1996 would soon make it extremely difficult for any state, whether or not a party to the treaty, to conduct nuclear tests for fear of incurring severe international condemnation.
The disclosure of the test preparations triggered a major diplomatic effort by the United States and a number of other industrialized countries to dissuade Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao from proceeding, and, by early 1996, the threat of a test appeared to have subsided. Nonetheless, testifying before the U.S. Senate in late February, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John Deutch stated, "We are concerned India is considering the possibility of a nuclear test. We have judged that if India should test, Pakistan would follow."
Barely two weeks after Deutch’s statement, preparations for a Pakistani nuclear test were disclosed. Reportedly, U.S. satellite photos revealed evidence of Pakistani nuclear test preparations at a site in the Chagai Hills—seemingly a direct response to India’s earlier preparations. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry described the story as "speculation" based on "deliberate leaks of faulty intelligence reports," but Foreign Minister Asif Ahmad Ali lent substance to the allegation when he said soon afterward: "If India wants to prove its manhood by conducting a nuclear test, then we have the capability to prove our manhood."
International Arms Control
On September 24, 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature at the United Nations in New York. Earlier that summer, India had denounced the treaty and declared that it would not sign it. Given the intense domestic opposition in Pakistan to accepting any nuclear restraints that India is not bound by, Pakistan indicated that it would become a party to the CTBT only if India joined too.
In the fall of 1997, Pakistan ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Like India, it was already a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
Political Leadership Changes
On November 5, 1996, Pakistan’s President Farooq Leghari dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on charges of corruption and economic mismanagement. Leghari also dismissed the National Assembly (Pakistan’s directly elected lower house of Parliament) and set new National Assembly elections for February 1997. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was returned to power by a landslide. His Pakistan Muslim League (PML) won a clear majority of National Assembly seats, enabling it to form a strong elected government in Islamabad.
The most important implication of this election result for Pakistan’s relations with India and for Pakistan’s nuclear policy was that Pakistan now had a civilian government with sufficient voting strength to conduct serious negotiations with India, and if India acted in a reciprocal spirit, to make and defend the politically sensitive agreements that would be necessary to begin resolving long-standing disputes, to initiate steps that could genuinely reduce military tension in the Subcontinent, and to join in confidence-building measures that could cap, if not reverse, the nuclear proliferation in the region.
Regrettably, elected Indian governments in the mid-1990s were becoming progressively weaker and were unable to get traction for substantive negotiations with Pakistan. The BJP, campaigning on a pro-nuclear weapons platform, was the rising power. Since it was able to form a government majority after the 1998 elections only after winning the support of several small parties, many assumed that it could not precipitously change India’s policy of nuclear ambiguity. But it did so within weeks of assuming office, conducting nuclear weapon tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, declaring India a nuclear weapons power, and plunging the Subcontinent into an open nuclear arms race. Despite the looming U.S. sanctions which would hit Pakistan far harder than India, Nawaz Sharif reluctantly gave the go-ahead for Pakistan to respond in kind less than two weeks later.
Prospects
The May 1998 India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests and open declarations on the possession of nuclear weapons programs have almost uncertainly unleashed a continuing nuclear arms and missile arms race on the Subcontinent. The constraints so tenuously maintained on Pakistan’s nuclear and missile acquisitions for the last decade may now give way to a determined effort in Pakistan to build a formidable nuclear arsenal, with assembled bombs for aircraft delivery, warheads for its ballistic missiles, and the fielding and training of deployed nuclear forces.
With U.S. NPPA sanctions applied automatically under law, and almost certain to have a profoundly debilitating effect on Pakistan’s externally indebted economy (unless superseded by new measures), Nawaz Sharif’s declaration of a national emergency (invoking martial law regulations) represents both a desperate effort to shelter Pakistan from the coming economic shock and the first step in a domestic regimentation that may be seen as needed to extract resources to compete effectively with India on the military plane. The tension over Kashmir has already risen since the first tests and could easily ignite an escalating war.
The immediate reaction of the United States, members of the Group of Eight, and the U.N. Security Council has been to deplore the nuclear breakout in South Asia and to begin a process of cooperation that would aim, in the short run, to tamp down tension, stabilize the India-Pakistan relationship, and urge a slowdown in the steps that India and Pakistan are both already taking to reallocate resources to their military programs. The search for a strategy to head off nuclear confrontation and the risks of war in South Asia will be given a much higher priority, with new attention to the Kashmir stalemate and the other root issues of conflict between India and Pakistan. This strategy will not be able to ignore the deeper security problems of both countries. It will have an important immediate focus on developing crisis-management measures, and firebreaks, such as easily monitored commitments not to actually deploy weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles that could compress nuclear-use decision time to minutes and seconds.
Finally, the response will also involve measures to repair and bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime—hopefully with, but if necessary without, the direct participation of the two self-declared nuclear powers on the Subcontinent. In the new situation that has arisen, and given the failure of automatic U.S. sanctions to deter this outcome, a new, more robust combination of incentives and disincentives will have to be designed—and developed through negotiations—to explore ways in which India and Pakistan may yet be able to join non-proliferation undertakings and step back from the nuclear and missile arms race that their actions have greatly accelerated.
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998
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