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Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, by Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, Toby Dalton, and Gregory Koblentz
Six years after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 Russia alone — instead of two or three nuclear powers — emerged as the nuclear-weapon-state successor to the Soviet Union. This shared Russian and U.S. objective was not a foregone conclusion in the circumstances of the Soviet breakup in 1997. By late 1996, however, it had materialized — as a result of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine cooperating in the de-nuclearization process. Russia also succeeded to all of the Soviet Union’s international legal obligations connected with nuclear-weapon state status. In addition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia thus succeeded to the Soviet Union’s nuclear-weapons-related obligations under other important security agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Russia also assumed — almost immediately, on December 24, 1991 — the Soviet permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.
Although some strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were dispersed in several other Soviet republics when the Soviet Union dissolved, the bulk of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and virtually all of its nuclear-weapons production infrastructure was concentrated on Russian territory. Russia essentially inherited the Soviet nuclear command structure, including key codes needed to target and launch the Soviet strategic nuclear systems, some of which were still deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as late as 1996. Russian military personnel preserved control over all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in the other new independent states. This prevented any of the other post-Soviet states from acquiring independent control or possession over nuclear weapons. Recognition of Russia as the sole nuclear-weapon-state successor to the Soviet Union prevented the creation of additional nuclear-weapon states, which would have generated severe instability in Central Europe and undermined the basic goal of the NPT.
Russia now is a partner in a wide range of new non-proliferation activities, including the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Wassenaar Arrangement for export controls over conventional military and dual-use technology. Close cooperation between Russia and the West continues in implementing arms control agreements and confidence-building measures; assuring the safety of stored nuclear weapons; achieving warhead dismantlement, and preventing the theft or diversion of fissile materials; as well as in finding civilian research alternatives for Russian weapons-related scientists (through the International Science and Technology Center, ISTC).
At the same time, Russia’s space, missile, arms-production, and atomic energy establishments have revived international marketing efforts to survive in a changed political and economic environment. This has led to sensitive Russian nuclear trading relationships and arms sales — particularly with Syria, Iraq, Iran, India, and China — that appear to be inconsistent with rigorous non-proliferation controls and therefore with the regional stability needs of the Middle East, Gulf, South Asia, and the Pacific Rim. These commercial activities appear to go hand in hand with a perceptible hardening, recently, of Russian foreign and defense policy that has slowed the progress of strategic and nuclear arms reductions and inhibited new initiatives to broaden the areas of partnership and to solidify a non-adversarial post–Cold War environment.
Background
De-Nuclearization Accords After Soviet Collapse
Russia took immediate steps in 1991 and 1992 to consolidate control over all of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear arms, transporting those deployed or stored in other former Soviet states to Russian soil for redeployment, storage, or dismantling. The legal basis for Russia’s sole custody of these weapons was agreed on December 21, 1991, at Alma-Ata (now Almaty), Kazakhstan, where leaders of eleven former Soviet republics signed a series of declarations establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In Article 6 of the Declaration on Nuclear Arms, a document signed only by the leaders of the four states with nuclear weapons on their territories, the four agreed that "[by] July 1, 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine will insure the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to central factory premises for dismantling under joint supervision." These three states also agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons on their territory to any state other than Russia — a proviso that anticipated the withdrawal of all Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia. At Alma-Ata, Belarus and Ukraine (but not Kazakhstan) committed themselves to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.
In a subsequent post-Soviet accord on nuclear command-and-control signed in Minsk on December 30, 1991, the leaders of the eleven CIS states agreed that a "decision on the need [to use nuclear weapons would be] made by the President of the Russian Federation in agreement with the heads of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and in consultation with the heads of the other member states of the Commonwealth." As a practical matter, however, control over the use of nuclear weapons remained under Russian authority. Arrangements for sharing authority in this area ended in June 1993, when Russia formally took full control over the use of all nuclear arms in post-Soviet states. In the Minsk agreement, Ukraine also pledged that nuclear weapons on its territory would be dismantled by the end of 1994, with tactical nuclear weapons to be dismantled by July 1, 1992.
START I and the Lisbon Protocol
The de-nuclearization framework was further elaborated in the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed on May 23, 1992, by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Through the Protocol, the four states agreed to participate jointly in START I as successors to the former Soviet Union and to "implement the Treaty’s limits and restrictions" (Article II of the Protocol). In addition, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to "adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" as non-nuclear-weapon state parties "in the shortest possible time" (Article V of the Protocol). In separate letters to President George Bush, each of the three presidents also agreed to the elimination of all strategic nuclear arms on their territories within the seven-year START I implementation period. By this time, all tactical nuclear weapons already had been withdrawn to Russia from the three states.
START I, the result of nine years of negotiations between the two superpowers, was signed in Moscow by the United States and the Soviet Union on July 31, 1991. It was the first strategic arms control treaty to actually cut levels of deployed strategic weapons as opposed to merely capping existing arsenals. Under START I (as modified by the Lisbon Protocol), the two sides must reduce their strategic nuclear forces to equal aggregate limits of 6,000 accountable warheads deployed on 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles — i.e., intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. Sublimits for warheads allow no more than 4,900 deployed on either side’s ICBMs and SLBMs, and of this subtotal, no more than 1,100 warheads may be deployed on mobile ICBMs and no more than 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBMs (missiles armed with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles [MIRVs]).
The entry into force of START I was considerably delayed by the need to secure ratification by each of the four successor states. In approving ratification on November 4, 1992, Russia’s Supreme Soviet attached a condition that Russia not exchange instruments of ratification until after the other three successor states had acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states and carried out their other obligations under the Lisbon Protocol. In Belarus and Kazakhstan, these NPT-related steps proved relatively uncontroversial. The Belarusian parliament ratified START I on February 4, 1993, and Belarus formally acceded to the NPT on July 22, 1993. The parliament of Kazakhstan ratified START I on July 2, 1992, and Kazakhstan formally acceded to the NPT on February 14, 1994. In Ukraine, however, where tensions with Russia intensified over a number of issues in 1993, acceptance of START I and the NPT proved more contentious.
Trilateral Accord with Ukraine
The Ukrainian parliament, or Rada, approved ratification of START I on November 18, 1993, but declared that a number of stiff conditions — which were unacceptable to Russia and the United States — would have to be met before ratification could be accomplished. Simultaneously, the Rada resolved that Ukraine was not bound by Article V of the Lisbon Protocol, calling for quick accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
After extensive negotiations, on January 14, 1994, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk — together with President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin — signed the Trilateral Statement, in which they agreed that all nuclear warheads would be withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine to Russia for the purpose of subsequent dismantling in the shortest possible time. Ukraine would in exchange receive a number of political, economic, and security benefits. As a result of this understanding, on February 3, 1994, the Rada approved a two-part resolution instructing President Kravchuk to exchange the instruments of ratification of START I and acknowledging that Article V of the Lisbon Protocol applied to Ukraine. The Rada also implicitly endorsed the Trilateral Statement but did not then approve accession to the NPT.
The Ukrainian parliament finally approved the Trilateral Statement on November 16, 1994, but once again imposed conditions, making Ukraine’s NPT accession contingent upon first receiving security assurances by the nuclear states. Security assurances, in the form of a multilateral memorandum signed by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia, were promised to Ukraine immediately prior to the November 16, 1994, parliamentary vote. At the Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in Budapest on December 5, 1994, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia provided this memorandum to Ukraine and initialed a document that also extended security assurances to Kazakhstan and Belarus. France also provided security assurances to Ukraine at the CSCE summit in a separate document. On the same occasion, Ukraine then presented its instruments of accession to the NPT.
This action, along with the earlier accessions by Belarus and Kazakhstan, satisfied Russia’s conditions for ratifying START I. Consequently, at the same meeting, the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine exchanged their START I instruments of ratification, and formally brought the treaty into force.
START II Landmark
Earlier, on January 3, 1993, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin had signed in Moscow the follow-on START II agreement, providing for even deeper strategic cuts than START I. START II provides for the elimination of all multiple-warhead ICBMs and for a two-phase reduction of nuclear warheads on deployed strategic delivery vehicles. At the end of the first phase — seven years after the entry into force of START I — the United States and Russia may not have more than 3,800 to 4,250 warheads on deployed delivery systems. In the second phase — by January 1, 2003 (or by December 31, 2000, if the United States is able to assist in financing the dismantlement and elimination of Russian nuclear weapons) — each of the two parties would reduce the overall total of deployed strategic warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500. This would represent a two-thirds reduction in strategic nuclear forces from peak Cold-War levels. Because START II relied on the definitions, declarations, and verification provisions of START I, neither the U.S. Senate nor the Russian parliament would vote on ratification of START II until START I entered into force. (START II ratification delays and START III issues are discussed in Developments below.)
Confidence-Building: De-Targeting
On January 14, 1994, Russia and the United States agreed that they would no longer target strategic missiles at one another. Great Britain joined this agreement on February 15, 1994. The agreement stipulated that strategic missiles under the command of the countries party to the agreement were to be de-targeted no later than May 30, 1994. On September 2, 1994, Russia and China signed a similar de-targeting agreement, pledging that they would no longer aim missiles at each other.
De-Activation of Systems Covered by START I
During the delay in START I entry into force, the United States and Russia took steps toward early de-activation of the strategic systems that were to be cut under the treaty. In early March 1995, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had "deactivated all of its forces to be eliminated under START I by removing over 3,900 warheads from ballistic missiles and retiring heavy bombers to elimination facilities." He also noted that the United States had "already eliminated about 290 missile launchers and over 230 heavy bombers, putting [the United States] below the first START I intermediate ceiling that will not come into effect until December 1997." Earlier, Perry reported that Russia had already removed 2,600 warheads from missiles and bomber bases, taken 750 missiles off their launchers, and destroyed almost 600 launchers and bombers.
Meanwhile, Russia concluded bilateral agreements with Belarus and Kazakhstan for the early de-activation and withdrawal of strategic systems to Russia. In the case of Belarus, 45 single-warhead SS-25 road-mobile ICBMs and their warheads were withdrawn to Russia by early December 1994. The plan then was that all SS-25s and their warheads in Belarus would be removed by the end of July 1995. In Kazakhstan, by December 1994, 810 warheads — 440 from 44 SS-18 ICBMs and 370 from air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) — had been removed from missiles. About 632 of these warheads had been returned to Russia by March 1995, including all 370 ALCM warheads and 260 SS-18 warheads. All 370 ALCMs and the associated strategic bombers were withdrawn to Russia, and reportedly twelve SS-18 missiles were moved to Russia as well.
Ukraine’s de-nuclearization process was guided by the Trilateral Statement noted earlier, which called for a phased de-activation and removal process. In the first phase, which was to be completed by mid-November 1994, all SS-24 ICBMs on Ukrainian territory were to be de-activated. In fact, by early December 1994, not only had Ukraine de-activated all its SS-24s, but it had also de-activated 40 of its 130 SS-19s. The Trilateral Statement also called for Ukraine to remove at least 200 warheads from its SS-19s and SS-24s to Russia by mid-November. By February 1995, a total of 420 warheads (removed from SS-24 and SS-19 missiles, and from ALCMs deployed on heavy bombers) had been withdrawn to Russia.
Disarmament Assistance
To ease the financial burden of dismantlement of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in Russia and the three other former Soviet states, the United States provided technical and financial assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program — also known as the Nunn-Lugar program (after its sponsors, Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar). By late February 1995, the United States had proposed $503 million for projects in Russia. Most of the Nunn-Lugar projects are dedicated to assisting with the elimination of strategic offensive arms. Others, such as the project on Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) were designed to curb the proliferation risks associated with stored fissile materials resulting from the drawdown of Russia’s arsenal. Of the funds authorized by Congress, $300 million had actually been obligated to projects in Russia by February 1995.
Other Initiatives
The United States agreed to purchase 500 metric tons of weapons-grade uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons that is to be blended down to low-enriched uranium (LEU) suitable for use as nuclear power plant fuel. The LEU will be sold to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) for eventual use in nuclear power reactors. American inspectors will be allowed to conduct limited inspections at two Russian material blending facilities in order to verify that the highly enriched uranium (HEU) actually comes from dismantled warheads.
Another initiative is the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), a Moscow-based multilateral organization that organizes peaceful employment opportunities for scientists and engineers in those new independent states that were previously involved in work on weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. The Center, which began operating in March 1994, was founded by the European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States. In addition to the initial parties, by early 1995 Finland, Sweden, and Georgia had joined as members; and Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Canada had taken steps to become members.
Weaknesses in Non-Proliferation Control Measures
By 1994, despite the unprecedented progress in strategic arms reductions and the de-nuclearization of the other successor states, Russia had for several reasons emerged as a serious nuclear proliferation concern in the West. There were fears that Russia’s severe political and economic difficulties, coupled with the collapse of the old Soviet personnel control system, could lead to a loss of central control over its large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons–grade materials. The problem seemed most severe for the nuclear materials. The Soviet Union’s regulatory mechanisms for the control of nuclear exports could prove inadequate for the changes that would occur with market-oriented economic reforms, and old border controls for the Soviet Union no longer fit the changes in the map of a down-sized Russia and its ties with the other former Soviet states. Russia’s laudatory commitments to nuclear weapons dismantling programs meant that its stockpiles of weapons-grade materials and secure storage needs would actually increase. Without effective controls, Russian nuclear materials could find their way into a global black market in sensitive nuclear goods. This in turn could greatly accelerate the rate of proliferation by other states desiring nuclear arms while simultaneously undermining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and supplier-country export controls that form the backbone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Nuclear Theft and Smuggling
Prior to 1995, several episodes involving transport and theft of weapons-grade materials had been traced to Russia, including the "disappearance of an undisclosed quantity of HEU from the ‘Luch’ nuclear research facility at Podolsk, near Moscow"; the "theft of three fuel rods containing HEU from a naval base in Murmansk"; and a case involving the possible theft of some 2 kg or more of HEU from St. Petersburg.
In 1994 there were at least five known instances involving the smuggling to Europe of weapons-usable materials that apparently originated in civilian research laboratories in Russia. German officials uncovered three distinct cases of the smuggling of weapons-grade plutonium: 6 grams of 99.75 percent Pu-39 were confiscated in Tengen, on May 10; 300 grams were seized on August 10 in a Munich airport on a flight from Moscow; and just under 2 grams were found in Bremen, on August 16. In addition, there were two different seizures of HEU. One incident took place in Germany in mid-June 1994, when police in Landshut confiscated 800 milligrams of HEU enriched to 87.8 percent. The other incident occurred in Prague in mid-December 1994, when Czech police seized approximately 3 kg of HEU, the largest finding of weapons-grade nuclear material to date.
In congressional testimony on June 27, 1994, former CIA Director R. James Woolsey said that Russian criminal organizations, which have established an extensive infrastructure consisting of front companies and international smuggling networks, may be facilitating the foreign transfer and sale of nuclear materials and possibly could acquire and sell nuclear weapons to foreign entities. He noted that the target of opportunity for these organized crime groups could be "hostile states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea [which] may try to accelerate or enhance their own weapons development programs" through the acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials, complete nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction.
Political instability within the Russian Federation could lead not only to weakened controls over key nuclear assets but, in an extreme case, also to the emergence of new splinter states with nuclear assets located on their territory. If the political factions comprising the leadership of new entities managed to obtain custody of deployed nuclear weapons, their ability to assume operational control would depend on their capability to bypass sensing devices and/or coded switches that control access to the arming and fusing circuitry of the weapons. As one panel of experts has noted, the existence of such devices "cannot provide reassurance that these weapons would be useless to mutinous custodians or political factions who had prolonged possession of the weapons, especially if they had technical expertise."
Developments
From early 1995 through 1997 Russia continued to experience considerable political turmoil and economic difficulties. Signs of economic stabilization emerged in late 1996 and 1997, feeding hopes that 1998 would finally show an upturn in economic growth (though economic crises in East Asia and Russia in the winter of 1997-98 postponed economic recovery). President Boris Yeltsin’s relations with the State Duma (the lower house of Parliament) went from bad to worse with the December 1995 elections, which returned the Communist Party and its allies as the largest faction, albeit slightly short of an absolute majority. Liberals and reformers retained about a quarter of the Duma seats. The balance was held by various nationalist factions — often aligned with the Communists against President Yeltsin and in opposition to economic liberalization, political reform, and deeper cooperation with the West. Yeltsin, despite serious health problems, overcame a steep decline in popularity to narrowly win reelection over Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist Party candidate, in the mid-1996 presidential elections. Yeltsin underwent a successful cardiac operation the following winter and, as his health improved, sought to reassert presidential leadership in the spring and summer of 1997.
During the same period, Yeltsin’s reform initiatives, foreign policy, and arms control efforts were increasingly buffeted by the resurgence of a more assertively nationalist outlook in Russia that constrained new opportunities for cooperation with the West. The nationalist mood, particularly among the foreign policy elite, was in part fueled by reactions to the gathering momentum of NATO enlargement but fundamentally driven by the dissatisfaction of the opposition factions in the Duma with Yeltsin’s economic reform policies, the demoralization of the armed forces with internal war in Chechnya and general budgetary retrenchment, and the severe hardships that large sectors of the society suffered from the contraction of the economy and the decline of services, especially outside Moscow and St. Petersburg. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Russian political groups demonstrated broad acceptance of constitutional and democratic electoral procedures, and the administration managed to persist, unevenly, in steps toward a market economy. Western efforts to address the problems of nuclear arms reduction, defense conversion, and controls over nuclear materials through Russian cooperation continued to move forward, although more slowly than in the 1991-94 period.
De-Nuclearization.
The final steps in de-nuclearization — the removal of all strategic warheads from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine — occurred in 1995 and 1996. All 1,410 strategic nuclear warheads attributable to strategic delivery systems located in Kazakhstan had left for Russia before the end of April 1995. With respect to Ukraine, the 1,825 strategic warheads attributable to strategic delivery systems deployed on its soil in 1990 had all been withdrawn to Russia by May 1996. The final batch of 81 road-mobile ICBMs and associated strategic warheads that had been deployed in Belarus was returned to Russia in late November 1996.
Strategic Arms Reductions
START I Implementation: Implementation of the reductions prescribed for the successor states of the Soviet Union by START I proceeded rapidly after the treaty’s entry into force on December 5, 1994. As of fall 1997, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine collectively had eliminated or de-activated about 1,300 operational strategic launchers equipped with approximately 4,100 warheads and were almost two years ahead of schedule in meeting the first phase of START I reductions. Although all strategic nuclear warheads had been removed from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine by November 1996, cooperation and coordination between Russia and these three states was required to schedule reductions in the delivery systems and to declare periodic data to comply with the treaty’s provisions. These provisions require the four countries collectively to meet the lower ceilings (stipulated in START I for the former Soviet Union as a whole) but allow Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to retain strategic launchers (silos and bombers) until the end of the seven-year reduction period. U.S. and Russian objectives nevertheless have been to facilitate acceleration in the dismantlement of missile silos and the removal to Russia of those missiles and bombers (that may not have to be physically eliminated under the ceilings) from the three other successor states.
As of December 1996, all 81 SS-25 road-mobile ICBMs deployed in Belarus before START I entry into force had been removed to Russia; the 104 SS-18 heavy ICBM silos deployed in Kazakhstan had been destroyed; all of the SS-18 missile airframes in Kazakhstan had been moved to Russia; and most of the 40 heavy bombers and approximately 370 associated air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) based in Kazakhstan had been moved to Russia (a few inoperable heavy bombers were still present in early 1997 at the Semipalatinsk air base in Kazakhstan, subject to an agreement to destroy them on site). Of the 130 SS-19 silos present in Ukraine in 1991, 107 had been destroyed by December 1997, with the remainder to be destroyed in 1998; 44 SS-24 ICBM silos deployed in Ukraine are scheduled to be destroyed in 1998 with U.S. dismantlement assistance; and 44 heavy bombers remain in Ukraine, subject to elimination (Russia could have exercised the option to purchase some bombers from Ukraine, but in 1997 decided not to buy them because the aircraft had deteriorated, were generally not in flying condition, and would have been very costly to overhaul).
By the end of 1997, the status of START I reductions of strategic offensive arms in Russia was as follows.
With the de-nuclearization of the other three successor states, Russia could, in the absence of START II, retain forces up to the START I ceiling — a level of 6,000 accountable warheads, with the actual number somewhat higher; it is generally understood, however, that Russia cannot afford the high cost of maintaining this level.
In March 1997, Russia and the United States agreed to amend START I in order to give it permanent duration. This will resolve a concern that delays in implementing START II and negotiating START III could decouple them from START I, which contains the basic procedures for reductions and most of the verification rules for all the START treaties. Amending START I also needs the agreement of the other three parties — Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine — and will be codified by the START-implementing Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
START II Ratification: START II had been signed in January 1993 by Russia and the United States as a bilateral, follow-on treaty (not involving Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), but its ratification and implementation have been held up — first, by the three-and-a-half-year delay in bringing START I into force; and second, by the opposition to START II approval in the Russian parliament, especially in the State Duma. In deference to Russia’s early difficulties in ratifying START II, the U.S. Senate delayed its own advice and consent to START II ratification for two years but proceeded to approve START II formally on January 26, 1996.
President Yeltsin submitted START II to the Duma on June 20, 1995, stating that ratification was in Russia’s interest but noting that "the START II treaty can be fulfilled only providing the United States preserves and strictly complies with the bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972." This caveat reflected continuing Russian anxiety that U.S. plans to deploy theater missile defense (TMD) and Congressional pressures to build a national missile defense (NMD) could undercut the ABM Treaty and generate instability in the strategic relationship. Originally, the ABM Treaty was the primary concern of Russia’s administration and defense establishment in hesitating to push for START II ratification. But by 1995, several other criticisms of START II had gained momentum among Russian defense experts and members of parliament.
Although START II called for equal warhead ceilings in the 3,000-3,500 range, and thus intended to achieve parity, it would in fact have distinct effects on the quite differently structured U.S. and Russian strategic forces. With respect to the treaty itself, one set of Russian criticisms focused on the high cost to Russia of implementing the treaty, and a second set alleged an unequal military result of the reductions for Russia, which would lose its most potent forces: MIRVed land-based missiles, the backbone of Russia’s strategic arsenal. As Russia’s economy worsened, a related consideration loomed ever larger — the high cost for Russia of replacing MIRVed land-based missiles with new single-warhead missiles, as envisaged by earlier plans. The bulk of this future procurement cost could be avoided only if further reductions — in a START III agreement — lowered the ceilings on both sides to levels that Russia could afford. Finally, START II ratification languished in Moscow as most of Russia’s political elite, irrespective of party affiliation, could not resist holding the treaty hostage to Western restraint in NATO expansion plans.
These issues forced a U.S. strategic arms control review in the winter of 1996-97, producing substantially revised U.S. positions on START II and an outline for START III that yielded agreements at the Helsinki Summit on March 20-21, 1997. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to:
Modify START II so as to postpone the deadline for START II reductions by five years — from January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2007 (easing the financial burden of reductions on Russia);
Begin negotiations on a START III immediately after START II enters into force, agreeing in advance that that the lower ceilings for START III would be 2,000-2,500 warheads, with these reductions to occur by the same deadline of December 31, 2007 (removing from Russia the economic burden of building up single-warhead ICBMs to START II levels); and
Remove the threat from missiles that would be eliminated under START II earlier, by de-activating them (either removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed de-activation steps) no later than December 31, 2003.
Also at Helsinki, the two presidents reaffirmed their commitments to the ABM Treaty and agreed on a formula that would allow their negotiators to finalize accords on the "demarcation" between strategic (ABM) and theater missile defenses (TMD) — clarifying the criteria that distinguish strategic and tactical missile defenses. ABM missile defenses are limited by the ABM Treaty, while theater (tactical) missile defenses are not. Agreement on demarcation had been under negotiation since 1993 and is viewed by the U.S. administration as a means of safeguarding the integrity of the ABM Treaty while modernizing it to deal with changes in technology, including those reflected in emerging missile proliferation threats. According to U.S. officials, the Russian side indicated at the Helsinki Summit that the prospects for ratification of START II by the Russian parliament would greatly improve after the signing of the forthcoming NATO-Russia Founding Act and the completion of the ABM/TMD Demarcation Agreement. Once those hurdles had been crossed, President Yeltsin indicated, he would begin a major drive to gain parliamentary approval for the START II pact.
Shortly after the Helsinki Summit, Russian concerns regarding the enlargement of NATO were partially addressed with the signing in Paris of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on May 27, 1997. Among other initiatives, the Founding Act established a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, giving Russia an additional channel for its voice on European security affairs.
As envisaged at Helsinki in March, Russia and the United States signed the START II extension protocol in New York on September 26, 1997. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov also exchanged letters in New York that codify the Helsinki commitment to "de-activate" those ICBMs that are to be eliminated under START II (Russian SS-18s and SS-24s, and the American MX) by December 31, 2003. De-activation will either entail removal of warheads or be carried out by other jointly agreed steps, which are yet to be negotiated. On Russia’s behalf, Primakov issued a unilateral statement indicating that, once START II has entered into force, experts from both sides should immediately begin work on methods of de-activation and an appropriate program of U.S. assistance to implement them, and that Russia will proceed on the understanding that the START III treaty will be negotiated and in force well before the de-activation deadline. Also in September, the Russian government began new steps to win Duma approval of START II. But the Duma did not act on the treaty in 1997, and Russian ratification was postponed at least until the fall of 1998.
Unveiling START III: As noted above, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton achieved an agreement in principle at the March 1997 Helsinki Summit on certain elements of START III, including lower ceilings on each side’s forces in a range between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads, to be fulfilled by the end of 2007. They also agreed that START III would break new ground with provisions for the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and for irreversibility (i.e., destruction rather than stockpiling of strategic nuclear warheads removed from delivery systems eliminated under the START treaties). In addition, the two presidents agreed to explore possible measures relating to long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems. These discussions are to take place separately from, but in the context of, the START III negotiations.
Formal START III negotiations have awaited Russia’s ratification of START II. Soon after the New York signature of the START II protocol in September 1997, however, U.S. and Russian experts began to meet informally to discuss issues that will need to be resolved in START III. These expert discussions continued through the winter of 1997-98, having been given impetus by October 1997 consultations between Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and the new U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, James Collins; Foreign Minister Primakov and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott; and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vice President Albert Gore.
Disarmament Assistance
Substantial progress has been made with dismantlement projects in Russia since early 1995 under the CTR program. This program initially focused on securing nuclear weapons being withdrawn from service, including those removed from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Under U.S. Department of Defense auspices, it continues to support activities related to the dismantlement or destruction of strategic delivery systems (e.g., ICBMs, SLBMs, missile launchers, and heavy bombers) and the dismantlement of nuclear warheads, as well as to help build secure storage facilities for fissile material derived from dismantled nuclear weapons. The program also has been expanded in scope to provide assistance with the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially chemical weapons. Related U.S. Department of Energy initiatives will enable support for Russian commitments to shut down reactor facilities that have been important in the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and to upgrade Russian methods of accounting for and securing or controlling fissile materials.
CTR program appropriations and expenditures for Russia, as well as for the other three successor states, have increased over time. By the end of 1997, aggregate totals of planned CTR assistance to the new independent states had reached over $1.8 billion. For Russia alone, U.S.–planned CTR assistance had reached a total of over $973 million. Russia has been receiving roughly half the value of all the CTR programs, and the lion’s share of that amount has been for eliminating strategic weapons and establishing more stringent fissile material controls. Other important expenditures include support for Russia’s centralization and secure storage of fissile material from dismantled weapons (at the Mayak facility), and for Russia’s destruction of chemical weapons at the Shchuchye facility.
A clear picture of warhead dismantlement in Russia has yet to emerge. Russia has occasionally stated that it had a capacity to dismantle about 2,000 nuclear weapons a year; it has at the same time reported that the rate of dismantlement was slowed down by the lack of suitable storage space for dismantled components. The U.S. Department of Defense believes that Russia’s large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons is not being drawn down through dismantlement at the rate it could have been, and a November 1997 report states:
If carried out, the Russian tactical warhead reduction initiatives, announced in 1991, could result in the elimination of a total of about 15,000 tactical warheads. Also, strategic arms agreements could result in the retirement and eventual disassembly of a total of more than 7,000 strategic warheads. The process of eliminating strategic warheads began in earnest in 1994. Russia is believed to be dismantling warheads, but Moscow has not divulged specific information on warhead reductions. The economic situation in the country probably has slowed the reduction effort; many retired warheads slated for elimination are awaiting dismantlement. However, the U.S. government assesses that strategic warheads constitute the majority of the warheads eliminated so far.
This huge overhang of tactical nuclear warheads in Russia has been a concern of the United States as strategic arms reduction proposals point to ever deeper reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Consequently, the U.S. position includes tactical nuclear weapon reductions among the issues that need to be addressed parallel to START III.
Defense Conversion and Domestic Nuclear Non-Proliferation Controls
In non-nuclear weapon states, the IAEA safeguards regime focuses on civilian nuclear facilities and nuclear material imports to detect or deter diversion of materials from civilian to military or weapons purposes. In Russia, which is a nuclear-weapon state and not obligated under the NPT to safeguard its nuclear facilities or materials, the basic fear of imminent proliferation risks is related to the breakdown of traditional physical security controls over nuclear weapons (especially those in storage), and over fissile materials, including those derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons. The quantities of fissile material in storage must have grown significantly — since large numbers of nuclear weapons have been removed from service due to both unilateral measures and nuclear arms reduction agreements since 1990, and since a significant number of these weapons are reportedly dismantled every year. A number of CTR projects and programs, especially those supervised by the U.S. Department of Energy, have been designed to help Russia alleviate the proliferation risks from nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage.
Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A): In this category, the MPC&A program is one of the more recent and successful programs designed to assist Russian facility managers to control fissile materials, i.e., prevent theft or diversion of nuclear materials. Projects subsumed under MPC&A have spent over $300 million in the new independent states as a group, and $288 million in Russia alone. These projects have been developed through cooperation between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and through consultations and joint projects between managers at individual U.S. National Laboratories and their Russian counterparts, including those in the secret cities that harbored the weapons production complex. These projects involve the provision of U.S. assistance to Russian facilities for improved MPC&A as well as reciprocal visits by U.S. and Russian specialists to nuclear facilities handling fissile materials.
According to the MPC&A strategic plan, DOE is providing assistance to 53 facilities in the former Soviet Union. By the end of 1997, physical security upgrades had been completed at 17 smaller sites, and DOE projects that upgrades will have been completed at 27 total sites by the end of 1998. In addition, DOE has helped establish training and education centers for Russian specialists at the Russian Methodological Training Center in Obninsk, the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, and the Tomsk Polytechnic University; by January 1998, more than 2,000 individuals had received training under these programs. Recent developments include: expansion of the list of facilities to be covered under the program; conclusion of a comprehensive agreement with the Russian Navy for MPC&A at all naval sites, formalized in a protocol signed in December 1997; initiation of work with the Russian Navy to improve the security of highly enriched uranium fuel for submarine propulsion reactors; and new initiatives to improve nuclear materials transportation security. By the end of 1997, DOE was engaged in cooperative MPC&A projects at all sites in the former Soviet Union known to contain fissile material.
The Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA):In May 1994, to support U.S. and Russian agreement on the goal of terminating the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, Russia agreed to cease operating two plutonium production reactors at Seversk (Tomsk-7) and one at Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26) by December 31, 2000. Russia’s condition was that U.S. assistance provide alternative sources of energy to these cities by that date to replace the district heating that the reactors provide. In addition, Russia agreed that, in the interim, no plutonium produced in these reactors would be used for nuclear arms and that the United States could verify this.
Russia later declared that it had, as of October 1, 1994, stopped using plutonium produced in the three production reactors for nuclear weapons. It refused to bring the 1994 agreement into force, however, claiming that the United States was reneging on a pledge to finance the alternative power installations. Russia also declined U.S. access to the reprocessing (plutonium separation) facilities in the two cities, on grounds that this would divulge classified information. In June 1995, Russia agreed to allow the United States to monitor the operation of the three reactors and to monitor the plutonium separated from the spent fuel produced in these units — without, however, inspecting the reprocessing plants where the plutonium is separated.
In exchange, the United States agreed to assist Russia in conducting feasibility studies to assess possible energy alternatives to the reactors, including:
In May 1996, the reactor core-conversion option was selected. Following a detailed engineering study, the United States agreed to pay $10 million for a joint U.S.–Russian feasibility study on converting the reactors. The United States also agreed, in principle, to seek up to an additional $70 million to pay for the conversion of the three reactor cores, assuming a favorable result of the feasibility study and Russia’s meeting certain agreed milestones.
In August 1996, negotiations began on a revised Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement for the conversion of the three reactors, and a new text was agreed upon in January 1997. Negotiations on a CTR Core Conversion Implementing Agreement began in June 1997 and concluded in September. Both agreements were signed on September 23, 1997, at the ninth meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in Moscow. The new text calls for the reactors to be modified by the year 2000 and provides for U.S. monitoring of all plutonium produced in the reactors and separated after January 1, 1995, to ensure that it is not used for weapons. (Russia will also be able to monitor former plutonium-producing reactors at Hanford and Savannah River to confirm that they are no longer operating.) The agreement specifies that the Russian reactors will be shut down at the end of their normal lifetimes, approximately in 2009-2010.
Reciprocal Fissile Material Inspections:A March 16, 1994, initiative of U.S. Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov was subsumed in the May 10, 1995, Moscow Summit commitment by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton to pursue "a cooperative arrangement for reciprocal monitoring at storage facilities of fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to national security requirements to help confirm the irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons. . . ." Development of reciprocal inspections has been stalled since late 1995, however, by Russian inability to exchange classified information. This reflects the difficult challenge of finding a way to avoid disclosing nuclear-weapon design information while verifying that fissile material subject to monitoring is in fact from dismantled nuclear weapons. This issue must also be resolved for the transparency arrangements at the Mayak storage facility and to enable START III negotiations on the objective of irreversible warhead destruction.
Uranium Purchase Agreement: An important measure to reduce the risks of weapons-grade uranium from dismantled former Soviet nuclear weapons leaking into the nuclear black market was the U.S. agreement with Russia to pay nearly $12 billion for 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) over a 20-year period. Procured through the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the HEU (over 90 percent U-235) is first blended in Russia with slightly enriched uranium to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) suitable for use as power reactor fuel. After some delays during 1995, USEC received shipments containing the equivalent of 6 tons of HEU in 1995 and 12 tons in 1996. The deliveries were originally expected to average 10 tons of HEU per year for five years, and then 30 tons per year for the remaining fifteen years of the contract. But in November 1996, USEC and Minatom signed a revised contract providing for an accelerated payments and delivery schedule for the subsequent five years; the equivalent of 7,500 nuclear warheads would be converted to nuclear fuel, with USEC paying $2 billion for the imported material. Transparency measures also have been developed and expanded to provide U.S. assurance that the material blended down actually comes from nuclear weapons, and reciprocal monitoring measures have been worked out for Russia to assure itself that the LEU is fabricated in American facilities as reactor fuel and does not reenter a weapons processing cycle.
Other Fissile Material Monitoring Arrangements: A three-way U.S.–Russia–IAEA initiative launched on September 19, 1996, builds on separate U.S. and Russian pledges to place fissile materials that are no longer needed for defense purposes under IAEA safeguards. A key objective of this initiative is to develop a new set of tools for international monitoring of excess fissile materials, especially those in sensitive forms, in the context of U.S. and Russian disarmament activities. To verify storage of nuclear weapon components (such as the plutonium "pits" that probably will be stored at Mayak) traditional IAEA safeguarding methods — which involve sampling, visual inspection, and various quantitative measurements — will have to be modified significantly to avoid the disclosure of sensitive nuclear-weapons design data. After a negotiating pause in September 1997, U.S. and Russian officials issued a progress report to the IAEA General Conference on discussions regarding the trilateral initiative. In December, U.S., Russian, and IAEA experts met in the United States to examine possible methods for conducting IAEA monitoring under the initiative.
Nuclear Export Controls
Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commitment to export controls. Ironically, while the centralized communist political system lent itself to stringent export controls over nuclear items, the changes following the Soviet breakup weakened Russia’s ability to enforce strict export control requirements. Russia’s geographical boundaries were smaller. Customs arrangements had to be set up at new political borders. Some of Russia’s laws and regulatory mechanisms had to be reconstructed for a new constitutional environment. Russia’s deep post-Soviet economic difficulties — coupled with natural incentives to establish the international export competitiveness of its cash-starved arms and high technology industries — have created tremendous internal pressures to sidestep the export control regulations of the nuclear and missile non-proliferation regime. These pressures surfaced in the 1990s in strategic and conventional military exports to China, black market leakage of missile components to Iraq, nuclear and missile export deals with India and Iran, and the promotion of advanced conventional arms sales to Indonesia and elsewhere.
Although Russia succeeded the Soviet Union as a key member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Russia and India reopened negotiations in the mid-1990s on a Soviet commitment to supply nuclear power reactors to India — despite the NSG’s adoption in 1992 of guidelines barring such sales to countries like India that are not NPT adherents and are not covered by full-scope IAEA safeguards on their nuclear programs. With regard to Iran, which is subject to a comprehensive embargo on nuclear trade by the United States and other NSG members, Russia opened a nuclear cooperation channel in January 1995, offering not only to construct a nuclear reactor for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant for $800 million but also to assist Iran in developing nuclear technical proficiency in several areas of civil nuclear training, research, and development. Reportedly, Russia even initially agreed to supply uranium enrichment (gas centrifuge) technology and heavy-water moderated reactors to Iran, although it dropped these militarily useful components of its offer after strong protest by the United States (XREF see chapter on Iran for details).
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
After earlier agreeing to abide by the MTCR guidelines, Russia announced in June 1995 that it would join the MTCR and issued an enabling decree in July. It was formally admitted into the regime in August, and participated in its first MTCR plenary meeting on October 10-12, 1995. The MTCR prohibits or restricts transfers of missiles, components, and related production technology with respect to missiles able to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads more than 300 km. Russia has adopted a detailed export control list of missile components and technologies. In 1995 and 1997, however, missile transactions originating in Russia have raised questions about its compliance with the aims if not the letter of the MTCR.
A shipment of Russian missile guidance components (from strategic missiles, then being dismantled under START I), en route to Iraq, was intercepted at the airport in Amman, Jordan, in November 1995, and U.N. inspectors fished out another shipment of Russian missile components from the Tigris River near Baghdad in Iraq in December. The Russian government denied knowledge of the shipments, indicating they had no official approval. Other sources in Russia indicated that the shipments had been exported by private businessmen who had circumvented the Russian customs by using false labeling.
Beginning in early 1997, reports surfaced that SS-4 ballistic missile technology had been transferred to Iran from Russian design institutes and companies and revealed the fact that Vice President Gore had notified Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, ensuring that Moscow officials could not plead further ignorance. The character of these transactions was unmistakably inconsistent with MTCR objectives. They encompassed missile-related equipment, special materials and technical information, as well as training of Iranian technicians at Russian institutes — all of which could assist Iran with developing and producing two planned ballistic missiles, the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4. Iran’s Shahab-3 reportedly is based on North Korea’s No Dong 1 missile and is expected to have a range of 1,300 km with a 700-kg payload — a range sufficient to reach Israel; by some estimates, it could be only a year from completion. The Shahab-4, according to Israeli sources, is based on the Russian SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) design, would have a range of 2,000 km when carrying a payload of 1,000 kg and might be just three years from completion.
U.S. officials at all levels have remonstrated Russian counterparts for this missile assistance to Iran. Russian officials have disclaimed that there is any official Russian assistance of this kind to Tehran, or that there is any significant missile-related technical assistance in private or educational channels. In July 1997, President Clinton assigned Ambassador Frank Wisner, a senior diplomat, to concentrate on this issue. President Yeltsin named Yuri Koptev, Russian Space Agency Director, as Wisner’s counterpart. As of November 1997, Wisner and Koptev had held three rounds of talks. Russian officials have acknowledged that there have been Iranian efforts to acquire technology but have claimed that the Russian internal security service has thwarted all such attempts, including an Iranian attempt to have NPO Trud manufacture parts for a liquid-propellant missile. In November, the security services caught and deported an Iranian diplomat who had been trying to buy missile design information from defense organizations.
As of the end of 1997, U.S. officials remained highly concerned about Russia’s propensity to trade in military goods with Iran but also believed at that time that Russia had not transferred any complete MRBMs to Iran. Iran apparently had not given priority to importing complete missiles of that kind, but rather had sought technical assistance and information that would enable it, eventually, to produce its own long range missiles indigenously. U.S. officials also believed that Russia urgently needed to improve its export controls but found Russia unreceptive to U.S. offers of help on export controls under the auspices of the Nunn-Lugar program. The Clinton Administration’s failure to get Russian cooperation in terminating missile-related activities with Iran has resulted in congressional pressure, including a Concurrent Resolution threatening sanctions on Russian entities and restrictions on aid to Russia in the FY1998 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act. The Act would withhold 50 percent of the aid to Russia unless the president certifies to Congress that the Russian government "has terminated implementation of arrangements to provide Iran with technical expertise, training, technology, or equipment necessary to develop a nuclear reactor, related nuclear research facilities or programs, or ballistic missile capability." The Act allows a presidential waiver of the restriction, subject to a notification to Congress that "making [the aid] available (A) is vital to the national security interest of the United States, and (B) that the Government of Russia is taking meaningful steps to limit major supply contracts and to curtail the transfer of . . . " nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran.
Other Arms Control Measures
Chemical and Biological Weapons: Russia inherited the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the world. It was therefore especially important that Russia’s parliament ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by a large majority on November 5, 1997 in the first successful action on an international arms control treaty by Russia’s State Duma and Federation Council. The CWC approval was conditioned on Western aid for chemical weapons destruction. The CTR program already is providing some assistance for this purpose, and a number of other Western nations have made commitments to help Russia eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile. Russia is a member of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
The U.S. Defense Department has stated in its annual report on proliferation that "Serious concerns remain about the status of Russian chemical and biological warfare programs, the accuracy of the information provided by Russia in its declarations, and the willingness of the Russian defense establishment to eliminate these capabilities." The same report states that Russia’s stockpile of chemical weapons agents measures about 40,000 metric tons and indicates that Russia may be developing new generations of chemical agents, has retained intact key components of the former Soviet Union’s biological warfare program, and may be continuing some research related to biological warfare. It also states that "the former Soviet offensive biological program was the world’s largest" and expresses concern that "work outside the scope of legitimate biological defense activity may be occurring now at selected facilities within Russia."
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT):Russia has adhered to a moratorium against the testing of nuclear weapons since 1991. Once negotiation of the CTBT had progressed to the point of widespread acceptance of a zero-yield nuclear explosive test ban, Russia consistently supported a strict regime to inhibit advanced nuclear weapons development by undeclared nuclear-weapon states. Russia has not ratified the CTBT and is expected to await U.S. ratification before acting.
Prospects
Arguably, no country’s full participation in the global non-proliferation regime is more important than Russia’s. Russia has been an effective partner in the peaceful de-nuclearization of the other Soviet-successor states and has continued to play a key leadership role in developing the nuclear non-proliferation regime — as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as a key supporter of the permanent extension of the NPT, and in voluntary cessation of nuclear weapons testing and strong support for the CTBT. As a U.N. Security Council Permanent Member, Russia was also an effective partner in devising the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection arrangements in Iraq after the Gulf War.
Russia has also enabled the implementation of START I, notwithstanding the unprecedented situation that had arisen with the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the complications Moscow faced with the Lisbon Protocol in coordinating its START I reduction and inspection obligations with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The continued implementation of START-related nuclear arms reductions has been an important underpinning of non-nuclear-weapon state confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Russia has also worked closely with U.S. counterparts in developing post-Soviet controls over nuclear facilities and materials as well as the nuclear weapons infrastructure. Among other things, this has included:
Russia has also joined the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement, and it has recently ratified the CWC — thereby boosting confidence that cooperation in establishing common assumptions and ground rules for national export control laws and regulations, and their actual implementation, will proceed in the areas of advanced conventional arms and dual-use technologies, missiles, and chemical weapons. Progress in these areas is needed to strengthen several recent non-proliferation agreements that are evolving along with, and sometimes overlap, the long-established nuclear non-proliferation regime. Almost invariably this calls for close consultation about particular cases and thus must be a continuing process.
In looking to the future, however, it should be noted that challenges to close cooperation on certain aspects of non-proliferation have arisen with Russia and that others may emerge. As this chapter and those on Iran, Iraq, and India indicate, Russia does not see eye to eye with the United States on the best nuclear and arms export control lines to draw for non-proliferation purposes with troubled states and regions. Some of Russia’s exports to China in the military and missile fields are also matters of concern. There have been politically costly delays in moving forward with strategic arms control as well: START II ratification and START III negotiations still hang in the balance, and discussions have yet to reach fruition in the difficult areas concerning the disposition of excess nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials and the destruction of tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, the 1997-98 financial crisis that held back Russia’s hoped-for economic recovery increased the obstacles to implementing costly arms reduction measures in Russia.
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998
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