VI

RESOLVING 'THE SOCIAL PROBLEM'

For Paine and Condorcet in the 1790s, the elimination of poverty had been part of a pitched battle between advancing enlightenment and the receding defences of 'force and fraud'. These powers were personified by the aristocracy and the established church. In this battle, the works of Adam Smith had been a crucial asset. In the eyes of his progressive followers of the 1780s and 1790s, Smith's great achievement had not only been to spell out the historical and political importance of the progress of exchange, but also to distinguish the peaceful and reciprocally beneficial facets of exchange from the self-interested pleading of merchants, feudal magnates, closed corporations, mercantilist politicians and religious establishments. Commerce – the unhampered transactions between individuals desirous of bettering their condition – would no longer be weighed down and misshapen by the burdens imposed upon it by vested interests and the residues of a feudal past. Having been made accountable to the deliberations of representative and democratic bodies, assisted by the free circulation

of knowledge, and nurtured by peaceful and non-predatory government, its benign potential would freely unfold.

Commerce, in its eighteenth-century sense, also conveyed a certain mode of sociability. In the usage of Hume and Montesquieu, commerce implied peaceableness and the 'polishing' of manners. The French and American Revolutions added a further dimension. This sociability would now be practised by citizens sufficiently equal in legal and material status to possess moral and intellectual independence in their transactions with each other. In other words, viewed by Condorcet and Paine, the commerce of the future assumed dimensions which were at the same time both liberal and republican.

In the long nineteenth century which followed the Revolution of 1789, it was to be expected that such an approach would be more likely to find a home in a republic, such as that established and consolidated in France in the decades after 1870. In Britain, not only was the power of the crown, in a symbolic if not a constitutional sense, enormously boosted by the upsurge of loyalism after 1789, but the political privileges and wealth of the aristocracy remained undiminished until the end of the 1870s.

The intermittently stormy post-revolutionary history of France in the decades between the 1830s and the 1880s – and beyond – meant that, even in the Third Republic, ideas about the social underpinnings of a republic rarely had the chance to become established. Either they were overshadowed by more pressing political concerns or they were surrounded

by a legacy of fear and suspicion which the revolutions and uprisings of 1830, 1848 and 1871 could only reinforce. For this reason, legislative enactments to give reality to a social republican vision came only several decades into the history of the Third Republic and were relatively limited in their practical effects.

In the first months of the 1848 revolution, for instance, the dreams of 'association' emanating from 'the parliament of labour' at the Luxembourg Palace in Paris were lumped together by legitimists, conservatives and liberals alike as symptoms of anarchy and disorder. The bad reputation of the national workshops for the unemployed of Paris in bourgeois and provincial France and its culmination in the June uprising of 1848 quickly killed off any temptation to further social experiment. Thiers expressed the sentiments of the majority of the National Assembly when he stated on 13 September 1848:

> All that has been found to replace the old principles of the former society, of society in every age, in every country – property, liberty (of labour), emulation or competition, all that has been found, is communism, that is to say the lazy and slavish society; association, that is to say, anarchy in industry, and monopoly, the suppression of the currency and the right to work. [1]

The anti-interventionist individualism of Orleanist liberals like Thiers expressed the viewpoint of the propertied classes

across France. Or, as Frederick Bastiat put it, 'What political economy asks of governments is as simple as the retort of Diogenes to Alexander: get out of my sunlight'.

Liberal notables were scarcely less hostile to Bonaparte's promises of a social progamme. In 1844, the future Napoleon III had written a pamphlet on *The Extinction of Pauperism*. Its argument was that it was necessary to turn the propertyless working class into proprietors and that through 'association' in the form of 'agricultural colonies', 'poverty will no longer be seditious'. Tocqueville characterised his approach as 'a sort of abstract adoration of the people' unaccompanied by 'any taste for liberty'. During the Second Empire, Napoleon took a spasmodic interest in the mobilisation and support of mutual benefit societies, but never without the heavy hand of administrative and political surveillance. Not surprisingly, these plans got nowhere in practice.

In effect, whatever the nature of the political regime at the centre, social services remained almost entirely a local responsibility. The day-to-day functioning of offices of public assistance, hospitals, *dépôts de mendicité*, orphanages, mental asylums, the regulation of apprenticeship and child labour, the monitoring of benefit societies and sanitary regulation were divided between communes and *départements*. The Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Commerce and various specialised governmental agencies, oversaw developments in these areas, but at least until the 1890s did not directly intervene or offer material support. There was nothing comparable to the proactive ambitions

of direction and control by central government such as those pursued by the Poor Law Commissioners and Local Government Board in Victorian England.[2]

In the first two decades of the Third Republic there was little discernible change in these arrangements. On social and economic questions, the so-called 'Opportunists' who governed the Republic from the end of the 1870s differed little from their Orleanist predecessors. Unlike the religious and the legitimists, they were not shaken by the Commune, which they regarded as an aberration. Like their moderate republican predecessors from Thermidor onwards, they preached a somewhat short-winded moralism, stressing hygiene, sobriety, saving and economy; and still followed the precepts of Benjamin Franklin's *Le Bonhomme Richard* (*Poor Richard's Almanack*), which Jean-Baptiste Say had recommended in *Olbie*.

There was, however, one major area in which the approach of even the most moderate republicans differed from that of the monarchists and the Catholics, and in which the legacy of Condorcet remained very much alive. Almost all republicans were agreed about the central role to be played by education in the new republic. Education was important because, as Ferdinand Buisson wrote of Ferry's educational reforms in 1882: 'When the whole of French youth has developed, grown up under this triple aegis of free, compulsory, secular education we shall have nothing more to fear from returns to the past, for we shall have the means of defending ourselves.' Education was central not

simply because it would mould the people into the ethos of the Republic, but also because all except a small minority of republicans believed that it would be the means of creating equality and bringing to an end the social hierarchies of the past.

A more decisive shift in attitudes, at least among radical republicans, occurred in the 1890s with the emergence in the political arena of the doctrine of 'solidarism'. This concept was put forward by Leon Bourgeois, briefly prime minister in 1895–6, in his book *La Solidarité*, which appeared in 1896 and was adopted by the Radical Party as the basis of its party programme in 1908.

Solidarism owed something to the socialist thought of the 1830s but much more to a positivist optimism about the role of scientific progress, in particular the hopes invested in a science of society. Most immediately, Bourgeois built upon the theories of Émile Durkheim, especially the arguments put forward in his book *The Division of Labour* (1893) and developed in *Suicide* (1897). Durkheim believed it possible to build a science of morality and, in *The Division of Labour* he laid out some of its foundations. He distinguished between the 'mechanical' solidarity characteristic of primitive societies and the 'organic' solidarity characteristic of an evolved society based upon the division of labour.

The apparent paradox of the division of labour, in Durkheim's view, was that while the individual became more autonomous in an evolved society, at the same time s\he also became more narrowly dependent upon that society. Unlike

the automatic 'mechanical' solidarity of primitive society, in which the idea of the autonomous individual did not exist, there was nothing automatic about the 'organic' solidarity needed in societies based upon the division of labour. In evolved societies, such 'solidarity' had to be constructed through the elaboration of a body of rules which bound the component parts of such societies together. Like Condorcet, Durkheim built upon an anti-Rousseauean position, emphasising that modern society could not maintain itself without a series of intermediate bodies, especially professional associations capable of integrating individuals. Such a society would nurture the idea that social existence was a moral whole and that it depended for its development upon mutual sacrifice.[3]

Bourgeois's aim was to turn Durkheim's arguments to practical political use. Opposing the idea of a state of nature, Bourgeois argued that man was born 'in debt' to human association. From birth, he benefited from the past inheritance of a society and was in turn a link in the chain of solidarity which bound society together. Just as society created ties of dependence, this social debt created a moral obligation. He conceived of this unspoken obligation as a quasi-contract. Had the individual been consulted at the moment of entry into the world, he or she would surely have recognised that debt. The state as the guardian of law should encourage, or even, by means of taxation, constrain individuals to recognise these social obligations towards the collectivity. Practically, the state should discharge the debt

owed to society by taking care of children, the sick and the old and pay for this care by means of a progressive income tax. Both Durkheim and Bourgeois were careful, however, to argue that solidarism did not entail the activity of an overbearing interventionist state. The ties of obligation were generated by free associations acting within civil society. The role of the state was to protect them and support them by means of material assistance.

In his brief term as prime minister in 1895, Bourgeois tried, unsuccessfully, to introduce income tax to support what he called 'sensible practical socialism', and in the following decade a series of social measures were enacted. These included industrial accident insurance in 1898, the regulation of working hours in 1900, death duties in 1901, a weekly rest day in 1906 and old age pensions in 1910. But, as Madeleine Rebérioux and J. M. Mayeur have argued, 'the system was extremely sluggish; it had taken twenty years to pass the law on pensions, and twenty years, too, for the tax on income, "the Sleeping Beauty tax"'.[4]

Support for these measures by their intended beneficiaries was tepid. Organised labour led by the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs (General Confederation of Workers) campaigned against the law on pensions, not only because of its derisory character, but also because the workers did not trust 'the robber state'. Both pensions and income tax were blocked for a considerable time by the Senate. The Contributory Pensions Act, which was supposed to apply to workers and peasants, was considered

a 'fiasco'. Traditional republicans had great misgivings about the introduction of compulsion, since it implied the acceptance of a society permanently divided into classes and the abandonment of the idea that the worker could aspire to independence. Even among the radicals at their Nancy Conference of 1907, the social programme designed to attract the support of workers was coupled to a vision of 'the end of the wage system' and the ability to 'obtain access to individual property, which is the true condition of its [the proletariat's] liberty and dignity'.[5]

In Britain, as well, there was a shift in attitudes towards poverty during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. But the positions adopted in the resultant political debate could not have been predicted from the struggles of the 1790s. For the heirs to Painite republicanism and secularism combined these positions with an intransigent defence of Malthus and individualism. By contrast, the Church of England, or at least the leading reforming current within it, attacked political economy for its individualism and hostility to trade unions.

Some developments, however, might have been foreseen. By the 1870s, steamships and the telegraph had transformed the pace of commercial transactions, while railways had opened up the interiors of vast and hitherto inaccessible continents. The pessimistic prophecies of protectionists at the time of the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 were finally

beginning to come true, as the fall in world prices hit agriculture and began to undermine the wealth and power of the aristocracy. Cobden and the Anti-Corn Law League had won a belated victory, since the strength of Free Trade sentiment meant that, in Britain at least, the dramatic decline of cereal prices after 1870 was not accompanied by the return of protection.

At the beginning of the 1880s, great landowners, particularly those with urban property, also found their wealth and power under attack from a new form of popular radicalism. Once more, as in the case of Paine nearly a century before, it was a radical inspired by a vision of America who had transformed the terms of political debate: 'If we had to assign to any one event the starting of the new current of thought', wrote Sidney Webb in 1890, 'we should name the wide circulation in Great Britain of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* during the years 1880–1882.'[6] On the basis of his experiences in California, Henry George attacked Malthus, holding that the unearned increment of the landlord was responsible for the poverty of the masses. As soon as practicable, he argued, the land must be made common property, while in the interim a single tax should be imposed upon land values. Not only did his book sell over 100,000 copies but, in several tours of Britain in the early 1880s, his powerful oratory left a lasting impact.

In some important ways, Henry George's arguments appeared like a return to the pre-Malthusian perspectives of the late Enlightenment reformers. 'Social development,'

he argued in *Progress and Poverty*, 'is governed neither by a Special Providence nor by a merciless fate, but by a law at once unchangeable and beneficent; when we see that human will is the great factor, and that taking men in the aggregate, their condition is as they make it; when we see that economic and moral law are essentially one, and that the truth which the intellect grasps after toilsome effort is but that which the moral sense reaches by a quick intuition, a flood of life breaks in upon the problem of individual life.'[7] George's assault upon 'the unearned increment' and his proposal of a single tax on land helped to make possible Sir William Harcourt's 1894 budget, which introduced death duties. This measure, as Moncure Conway remarked in his pioneer biography of Paine, had been anticipated by the proposals in *Agrarian Justice* a hundred years earlier.

But such continuities are also deceptive. Although Henry George defined 'the law of progress' as 'association in equality', his starting point was closer to Ricardo and the early works of Herbert Spencer than to the arguments of the 1790s. *Progress and Poverty* made no mention of Paine or Condorcet and showed no interest in 'the calculus of probabilities'. Its radicalism was based upon a simple reading of Ricardo's theory of rent, in which the gains from the progress of society went exclusively to the rentier at the expense of both worker and employer. George's starting point was 'the squalid misery of a great city', which he and his followers linked to the undiminished power and wealth of the aristocracy as ground landlords in the towns.[8]

The best-known guardians of the tradition of Painite radicalism in British politics in the 1870s and 1880s were the activists of the Secularist movement, in particular, their leader, the editor of the *National Reformer*, Charles Bradlaugh. For Secularists, Paine's most revered text was *The Age of Reason*, a deist attack on Christianity. But Bradlaugh, like Paine and Richard Carlile, combined the campaign for Free Thought with that of republican radicalism. He believed, like Paine, that 'for free and rational men the only right form of Government is a Republic' and his aim, like that of his predecessors, according to his daughter, Hypatia Bonner, was 'the bringing of reason to bear at once on the things of Church and of State'.

But on questions of social welfare, Bradlaugh was a dedicated follower of Malthus; so much so that in 1861 he had become secretary of the Malthusian League. For Bradlaugh, Malthus had correctly identified the fundamental cause of poverty. His only defect was his adherence to a Christian ethic. 'Neo-Malthusianism', as it was called, meant combining Malthus's 'principle of population' with the 'rationalist' conviction that 'the prudential check need not mean prolonged celibacy'. In other words, Bradlaugh advocated birth control. After challenging the law by republishing a 40-year-old birth control pamphlet entitled *Fruits of Philosophy: An Essay on the Population Question*, Bradlaugh and Annie Besant were arrested and prosecuted in a celebrated trial in 1877–8.

Bradlaugh had first laid out his position in 1861 in a

pamphlet entitled *Jesus, Shelley and Malthus*, in which he had sketched out three successive attitudes towards poverty: the spirit of religious submission; the spirit of humanitarian revolt; and the spirit of science. Like Mill, Bradlaugh considered that there could be no escape from poverty until the poor had been educated on the necessity of family limitation. He accordingly condemned Paine's social proposals. 'The plan of allowancing poor families at so much per head would have quickened immensely the progress towards national bankruptcy which was carried so far under the old Poor Law. It would have bred paupers by the thousand.' Nor was it surprising that in the 1880s he should have stepped forward as the chief oratorical opponent of socialism and of Henry George. 'In a Socialistic State,' Bradlaugh argued in 1884, 'there would be no inducement to thrift, no individual savings, no accumulation, no check upon waste.'[9]

The welfare legislation of the Liberal governments of 1906–14 owed nothing to the ideas of Paine or Condorcet. The informing vision was no longer cosmopolitan, but national and imperial. The primary concern within government appears to have been the military and industrial efficiency of a working population now threatened by the competition of foreign powers.[10] Not surprisingly, at a time when Queen Victoria had become Empress of India and the scramble for Africa had reached its height, there was little place for a discussion whose prime aim in the ending of poverty was to create a republic of educated and independent citizens.

The case for 'national insurance' had first been proposed by the Reverend W. E. Blackley in 1878. He made no reference to the 1790s or the French Revolution. His aim was not to further equality, but to improve upon the New Poor Law of 1834 which, despite the improvements of the 1860s, had failed to reduce pauperism beyond a certain point. Blackley's proposal involved a scheme to 'abolish the improvidence, which is the curse, and, unchecked, must become the ruin, of our nation'. He argued that 'to make a reasonable provision against occasional sickness and the inevitable feebleness and infirmity of old age' was 'the duty of every man gifted with health and strength, and in a position to earn, by his daily labour, a wage from which such provision' could 'be made'. But this 'universally admitted duty' remained 'grossly neglected by our working classes'.

Blackley claimed that many friendly societies were insolvent, that withdrawals from benefit societies amounted to at least half the number of entries made in any particular year, and that a substantial proportion of these withdrawals – particularly those from people in middle life – were permanent. The final and most telling point was that 'the rates of payment which can really assure the benefits generally offered by friendly societies are far higher than any ordinary labourer in middle life can find it possible to pay'. The net result was that,'if every friendly society in England were perfectly solvent, and if all that the law contemplated and all that philanthropy suggested had been completely realised there would still remain 75% of the labouring classes

entirely dependent, in emergencies upon the poor rate, and therefore to be classed as improvident paupers'.

His solution was to make thrift compulsory. Every working man between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one should contribute £10 to an annuity fund, a 'national club', and payments should be made through employers or through the Post Office. The labouring classes should be shown how to contribute, and if they would not, they should be 'compelled' to do so. His response to those who objected to a compulsory state scheme was to point out how extensive state intervention in everyday life already was: 'A man who trembles so at the thought of any interference with his liberty, knows, if he will reflect a moment, that it is interfered with terribly when he is compelled to make his cottages fit for habitation; is compelled to disinfect his clothes if he has had the small-pox; is compelled to have his baby vaccinated; is compelled to keep it off the streets; is compelled, mayhap, to send it to a board school, and is even compelled, if need unhappily be, to pay for its support in a reformatory.'[11]

Blackley's argument was exaggerated. He made no attempt to understand the position of the friendly societies, and his estimate of £10 seriously underestimated the sum needed to yield an old age pension. Nevertheless, in the mid-twentieth century, the sequence of events which ran from Blackley's proposal to the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act and the National Insurance Act of 1911 was depicted as a progression from a coercive, moralistic and discretionary

Poor Law relief system towards a liberal welfare state, universal in coverage, morally neutral in application, democratic in administration and based on legally enforceable social rights.[12]

It is true that pressure for state-supported *non*-contributory pension schemes did build up among the trade unions and the Lib–Lab MPs elected in 1906. Their arguments were also reinforced by the influential advocacy of Charles Booth, who had argued for a non-contributory scheme at the beginning of the 1890s. But the legislation of the Liberal governments between 1908 and 1911 was far less of a break with Poor Law tradition than the mid-twentieth century historians implied. Except in the case of old age pensions, the spirit of this legislation was anything but universalistic. Women, except in a few designated employments, were excluded from health and unemployment insurance, and so were the bulk of male wage-earners in casual employment. Nor did the legislation make any pretence of aspiring to moral neutrality or a democratic inclusiveness. Pressure in shaping the legislation came primarily from the friendly societies, the Charity Organisation Society and the commercial insurance companies.

The whole principle of social insurance was regarded with great suspicion by the Charity Organisation Society and its sympathisers in the ministry responsible for the Poor Law, the Local Government Board. Their view was that it was impossible to 'legislate thrift' and that there should be no retreat from the strict deterrent principles of

the 1834 Poor Law. As a result, except in the case of old age pensions, the Liberal welfare reforms brought into being a set of institutions which did not replace the Poor Law, but ran alongside it. The unexpectedly non-contributory form of the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act was the result not so much of parliamentary or trade union pressure, but of the opposition of the friendly societies to any state-enforced contributory proposal.

The power of the friendly societies was greater than that of either the Charity Organisation Society or the Local Government Board. Their membership was twice as large as that of the trade unions and their political influence was such that no politician, either in Westminster or in the country, dared to oppose them. Their objection to both Blackley's contributory scheme and a similar proposal put forward by Joseph Chamberlain in 1891, was that they would be competing in the same limited market for working-class savings as the friendly societies themselves. With ageing memberships living longer, but drawing ever more heavily upon society sickness benefits as surrogate pensions, many of these societies, especially the smaller ones, appeared to be headed for insolvency. By contrast, the 1908 Act, which paid old age pensions out of general taxation, helped the societies by removing some of the pressure on their sickness benefits and muted their anxieties about the involvement of the state.

While the Liberal government overcame its misgivings about financing an old age pensions scheme of unknown

cost, it was not prepared to extend such a non-contributory approach to sickness or unemployment. Once again, it seems that the thinking behind the National Insurance Act of 1911 did not draw in any way upon the forgotten social insurance proposals of the French Revolutionary era. The chief influence upon Lloyd George, the minister responsible for the scheme, appears to have been the social legislation of Bismarckian Germany between 1883 and 1889. These measures included accident insurance, sickness benefit and old age pensions, each to be financed in different proportions by contributions from employees, employers and government.

In Germany itself, the legislation had largely been a development of the practice of employer welfare schemes in big industrial enterprises such as the Krupp works in Essen and the Stumm-Halberg works in the Saar. In Britain, however, the emphasis was rather different. Domestically, the main aim was to ensure that workers should not fall involuntarily into a pauper non-citizen category for reasons over which they had no personal control. For this reason, unlike in Germany, benefits were not graduated, but set at a flat rate high enough to make it unnecessary for workers to resort to the Poor Law.[13]

Great care was also taken to incorporate friendly societies within the scheme, an approach which produced many kinds of anomalies and a form of coverage which was neither universal nor free from moralism. Friendly societies retained their rules, which generally included a range

of highly censorious provisions against malingerers. They were also able to refuse applicants, potentially perpetuating the same kind of problems which had left the bottom third of the working classes outside the insured population during the Victorian period. The problem was partly solved by the entry of industrial and life insurance companies into the sickness insurance business, but their inclusion was at the cost of the tradition of local and democratic self-government originally intended to be the hallmark of the 1911 Act.

The most coherent and historically informed of the new conceptions of social security which emerged in the late nineteenth century was that adopted by liberal reformers within the Church of England. It both helped to inspire the late Victorian settlement movement and made a major contribution to the new liberalism of the turn of the century. One of its most important activists was Samuel Barnett, the vicar of St Jude's, Whitechapel, and first warden of Toynbee Hall. He recalled that he had arrived in his parish in 1873, convinced by the arguments of the newly founded Charity Organisation Society that 'doles' given in the shape either of charity or outrelief 'did not make the poor any richer, but served rather to perpetuate poverty'. This victory was won, outrelief to the able-bodied in Whitechapel was abolished and charity only given in conjunction with the careful investigation of individual circumstances.[14] But by 1883 he declared himself not happy with the results. The labourer in middle life on 20*s*. per week, he wrote, 'hardly dares to think',

for, given the insecurity of employment in east London, 'in the labourer's future there are only the workhouse and the grave'. But even with a skill and 40*s*. per week, there was no margin 'out of which to provide for pleasure, for old age or even for the best medical skill'. England, he went on, 'is the land of sad monuments. The saddest monument is, perhaps, "the respectable working man", who has been erected in honour of Thrift. His brains, which might have shown the world how to save men, have been spent in saving pennies.'

Because of their lack of an adequate standard of living, the lives of the majority of the English population were poor, materially, and even more important, spiritually. They were excluded from the world of culture and beauty:

> To live the life of Christ is to make manifest the truth and to enjoy the beauty of God. The labourer who knows nothing of the law of life which has been revealed by the discoveries of science, who knows nothing which by admiration can lift him out of himself, cannot live the highest life of his day, as Christ lived the highest life of his day. The social reformer must go alongside the Christian missionary.

He, therefore, proposed a programme of social reform which included old age pensions, schools of industry, medical relief, adult education, libraries, gardens and a more sensitive approach to the problem of slum clearance.[15]

Such an approach had already been pioneered by the young Balliol tutor and Christian activist Arnold Toynbee.

Toynbee remains famous not only for the new charitable settlement which bears his name but also as the historian who first introduced the idea of 'the industrial revolution' into English discussion. His *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England*, together with some addresses on political economy and contemporary politics, were edited by his friend, the future South African pro-consul Alfred Milner, and introduced by the Master of Balliol, Benjamin Jowett. In the *Lectures*, Toynbee refers to Marx's *Capital* (which he probably read in French translation), Henry George, Sismondi and Lassalle, as well as more familiar British sources, especially Thomas Carlyle. 'The essence of the Industrial Revolution,' according to Toynbee, who dated its beginnings to the 1760s, 'was the substitution of competition for medieval regulations, which had previously controlled the production and distribution of wealth.' Its ethos, 'freedom' as 'the first and last word of the political and industrial philosophy of the age', had been proclaimed on the 'eve of the Industrial Revolution' by Adam Smith. 'When Adam Smith talked with James Watt in his workshop at Glasgow, he little thought that by the steam engine Watt would make possible the realisation of that freedom which Adam Smith looked upon as a dream, a utopia.'

Toynbee was struck by Smith's 'cosmopolitanism', which had provoked his attack on the mercantile system, but especially by Smith's 'primary axiom' that 'men follow their pecuniary interest'. 'Equally prominent', however, was Smith's 'individualism', 'his complete and unhesitating trust

in individual self-interest'. This axiom had been developed to its furthest extent in the political economy of Ricardo:

> That world of gold-seeking animals, stripped of every human affection, for ever digging, weaving, spinning, watching with keen undeceived eyes each other's movements, passing incessantly and easily from place to place in search of gain, all alert, crafty, mobile – that world less real than the island of Lilliput which has never had and never can have any existence.

It had been Smith's conviction that 'the individual in pursuing his own interest is promoting the welfare of all'. Smith was 'interested in the production of wealth, not the welfare of man'. He did not recognise that the principle of *laisser faire* 'breaks down in certain points'. Not only could there be conflicts of interest between consumers and producers, but also 'a permanent antagonism of interests in the distribution of wealth … where the harmony of the individual and the public interest is a figment'. These antagonisms emerged more strongly after Smith's time in 'a darker period … as disastrous and terrible as any through which a nation ever passed … because side by side with a great increase of wealth was seen an enormous increase of pauperism'. Furthermore, 'production on a vast scale, the result of free competition, led to a rapid alienation of classes and to the degradation of a large body of producers'. Toynbee went on to support this claim with an account of the decline of the

yeoman, the factory system in conjunction with 'the all-corroding force of foreign trade, the growth of the farmers as a class distinct from their labourers who were henceforth "expelled and degraded", and in the manufacturing world, the separation of masters and men in which a "cash nexus" was substituted for the human tie'.[16]

In politics, according to Jowett, Toynbee was 'not a party politician at all'. 'He was not a socialist or a democrat, though he had some tendencies in both directions.' He followed Marx's *Capital* in thinking of the 'free exchange of labour' as the crucial component in the emergence of modern industry, but described Adam Smith's enunciation of this doctrine in the language of Carlyle's denunciation of 'the cash nexus'. He also followed Coleridge in arguing that the tendency of political economy was to 'denationalise'. Mill's distinction between production and distribution and his late abandonment of the wage–fund theory enabled him to express 'his strong natural sympathy with the life of the labouring classes' and argue for the virtues and necessity of trade unions.

Yet in other respects, like Barnett, Toynbee remained true to his Charity Organisation Society formation, especially in his treatment of pauperism. The New Poor Law of 1834 was 'perhaps the most beneficial Act of Parliament which has been passed since the Reform Bill'. He blamed the landowners for an 'unthinking and ignorant benevolence' and, like Malthus, considered that there had been 'the growth of a sentiment which admitted an unconditional

right on the part of the poor to an indefinite share in the national wealth'. This 'right' was granted in such a way as to 'keep them in dependence and diminish their self-respect'. He rejected this 'Tory socialism' and agreed with Burke's denunciation of the term 'labouring poor'. The Speenhamland system was an intimidatory use of its supposed 'rights' by the poor. 'The whole character of the people was lowered by the admission that they had a right to relief independent of work.'

Toynbee agreed with the socialists about the need for a more equitable distribution of wealth. 'Competition, heralded by Adam Smith, and taken for granted by Ricardo and Mill,' Toynbee wrote, 'is still the dominant idea of our time; though since the publication of the *Origin of Species*, we hear more of it under the name of "struggle for existence".' Henry George, he continued, was right to object to this analogy between men and animals and plants. To the idea that 'this struggle for existence' is a law of nature, and that therefore 'all human interference with it is wrong', Toynbee objected that 'the whole meaning of civilisation' was 'interference with this brute struggle'. Competition in production needed to be distinguished from competition in distribution which could be improved by political intervention.

Most noticeable in the writings of Toynbee and Barnett about poverty and the working classes was the disappearance of the Malthusian threat. Its dangers were diminished by a combination of free trade, informal empire and social

reform. Toynbee noted that, despite Mill's insistence upon restriction of population as a precondition of improvement, the rate of increase had not slackened. But the burden this placed upon the supply of labour had been lightened by 'the enormous emigration' of three and a half million people since 1846. The outlook for the labourer was hopeful because 'there is no reason to suppose that there will be any check on this relief of the labourer for the next fifty years at least'.

At home, on the other hand, a programme of social reform was required. 'For the labouring masses, with whom prudential motives have no weight, the only true remedy is to carry out such great measures of social reform as the improvement of their dwellings, better education and better amusements, and thus lift them into the position now held by the artisan, where moral restraints are operative.' But a 'more equitable distribution of wealth' could only be attained coincidentally with moral progress. 'The old economists thought competition good in itself. The socialist thinks it an evil in itself … we accept competition as one means, a force to be used, not to be blindly worshipped; but assert religion and morality to be the necessary condition of attaining human welfare.' As Jowett wrote, 'The Church of the future which Toynbee had before his mind was the union of the whole nation, or at least of the intelligent classes, in one body for a common purpose; mastering their own circumstances, and fellow workers towards a common end.'[17]

CONCLUSION

The argument put forward in *An End to Poverty?* is that the first practicable proposals to eliminate poverty through the creation of a universal framework for social security date back to the 1790s, and were a direct product of the American and French Revolutions. These were not proposals to resolve the 'social problem', as that problem came to be understood in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The purpose of the schemes discussed by Condorcet and Paine was not to remove the hostility of the working classes towards private property or to overcome the antagonism between labour and capital, since these were not yet perceived as intractable problems. Social and political proposals went together, since the aim was not solely to alleviate the lot of the poor but to reproduce on European soil the conditions of existence of a viable commercial republic akin to United States. All would be citizens since an ignorant and dependent poor left outside the political system would be vulnerable to faction or demagogy, and a danger to the republic.

These proposals were products of a revolution which not

only overthrew the monarchy in France but toppled its aristocracy and unsettled their peers across Europe. Similarly, the new social programmes associated with the Revolution not only posed a direct challenge to the institutional role of the Catholic church in the provision of poor relief in France, but also directly threatened traditional Christian assumptions about poverty and charity in Britain as well. As the Revolution developed, it also became clear that the threat of the Revolution was not simply to the power, privileges and abuses of the Catholic church, but to the whole Christian cosmology throughout Europe and the wider world.

The fall of Robespierre, the famine of 1795 and the practical bankruptcy of the Jacobin state led to the wholesale abandonment of schemes to abolish mendicity. The administrative practices of Thermidor fell back once more upon pre-revolutionary forms of relief. After Napoleon's Concordat, the church also hastened to retrieve as much as it could of the charitable and educational sphere, which had traditionally belonged to it. Even among republicans, large-scale experiments in the abolition of mendicity were hastily forgotten. In their place there was once again a recycling of the homilies of Benjamin Franklin on questions of industry and thrift. This approach persisted among moderate republican leaders and their rural and small town supporters well into the twentieth century. Towards the end of the nineteenth century there were impressive attempts to rethink a republican notion of interdependence and social obligation, most notably in the work of Durkheim. But the practical

results of the attempts by Leon Bourgeois and the Radical party to develop from this work a 'solidarist' political philosophy and legislative programme were relatively feeble.

In Britain, Paine's proposals reached and fired the enthusiasm of unparalleled numbers of people in a country still recovering from its American defeat, already in the middle of a religious revival and about to enter a counter-revolutionary war. Paine's mockery of his country's political institutions from the monarchy downwards was regarded with horror by the increasingly fearful and incensed loyalists and defenders of the existing state. But it was his undeniable popularity which caused most alarm. This was why the reaction was so intense.

The effort to thwart this revolutionary subversion of beliefs demanded the mobilisation of unprecedented numbers of the population and engaged the energies of every organ of church and state in every locality. More lastingly, this period of fear and uncertainty stamped upon the still protean features of political economy or Smith's 'science of the legislator' a deeply anti-utopian cast of mind, transforming future enquiry in the area into a gloomy and tirelessly repeated catechism, all too appropriate to what was becoming known as 'the dismal science'. The frisson of Smith's mild mockery of the manners of the great was gone. Instead, the ambition to combat poverty was henceforward conceived as a bleakly individual battle against the temptations of the flesh. Among the poor, even the procreation of children *within* marriage – though it could hardly be made

punishable by eternal damnation – became the occasion of official and ecclesiastical eyebrow-raising when such activity was not attended by the due amount of prudence and foresight. This combination of evangelical prurience and Malthusian alarm provided much of the underpinnings of the Victorian attitude to sex.

So deep was the repression of this brief republican moment in modern British history that memory of it – or at least discussion of it among the governing classes – all but disappeared. By the Victorian era and certainly from the withering away of Chartism after 1848, it appeared as if there never had been a time – at least, not since Cromwell – when Britain's monarchy and its mixed constitution had come under serious threat. Paine was remembered for his attack on taxation and paper money, not for his republican social proposals. Republicanism in Victorian and Edwardian Britain was the concern of a shrill sect led by men like Bradlaugh, preaching atheism and sexual profligacy on the streets of London and Northampton, but also less open to Paine's social proposals than their Anglican counterparts. The dark period in British history around the years of Trafalgar and Waterloo was never entirely forgotten. But ultimately, an alternative story of Britain's ordeal was devised. It was a story powerful enough to provide the starting point of the social history of modern Britain, imparting to national, religious and economic concerns a historical form which was to endure through most of the twentieth century.

This was the significance of Arnold Toynbee's *Industrial*

Revolution, an eclectic masterpiece drawing its inspiration in equal measure from Thomas Carlyle, Karl Marx and the Charity Organisation Society, yet at the same time truly a prototype of G. M. Trevelyan's later definition of social history as 'history with the politics left out'. It is striking that in *The Industrial Revolution* the French Revolution is barely mentioned. Toynbee is too honest a historian to suppress historical material altogether. He cites the Marquis of Lansdowne's statement on 1 February 1793 in which Adam Smith was accused of being 'the real originator' of 'the French principles' against which a crusade was contemplated. He calls it 'a curious statement'. He makes no mention of Paine and maintains that it was not Godwin but the growth of pauperism which was 'the real cause' of Malthus's *Essay on Population*.

The republican challenge to the English constitution and the church was ignored. Instead, there was the 'industrial revolution', not only 'one of the most important facts of English history', but Europe owed to it 'the growth of two great systems of thought, economic science and its antithesis, socialism'. 'Economic science' meant Smith's 'gospel of industrial freedom' supplemented by Malthus on pauperism, Ricardo on rent and John Stuart Mill on distribution. If the radicalisation of British politics in the 1790s and the intensity of the conservative reaction did not concern Toynbee, it was because the die had already been cast. The sequence which led to the substitution of the 'cash nexus' for 'the human tie' and to the end of 'the old relations

between masters and men' had already been set in motion by Smith.

Far from conceding that there might be more than one way of reading Smith, his 'gospel of industrial freedom', Ricardo's 'gold-seeking animals' and Charles Darwin's 'survival of the fittest' were treated as all of one piece. It was Smith's 'doctrine of freedom of labour' which became 'the principal weapon against the methods by which labourers have sought to improve their condition'. This doctrine, formalised by Ricardo and supplemented by Malthus's 'wage–fund theory' had produced the emergence of socialism in the work of two of Ricardo's disciples, Henry George and Karl Marx. Framing the antitheses in this way prepared the ground for Toynbee's solution, one of the first, but also one of the most influential of many proposals of 'a third way'.

Toynbee had established the outlines of a narrative which continued to dominate conceptions of the history of modern Britain throughout much of the twentieth century. It was qualified, but not fundamentally altered by debates between 'optimists' and 'pessimists' about the effect of the industrial revolution upon the standard of living of the working classes. On the left, historians were happy to endorse such an agenda, in part because it allowed Marx to intrude upon respectable historical debate, in part because of the conviction that the politics of the period concealed more basic and underlying social tensions. Typical of this approach was the belief of Mark Hovell, the first professional historian of Chartism, that Chartists could not have

thought that their aims would be realised by 'mere improvements of political machinery', that Chartism was therefore 'a protest against what existed … a passionate negation'. Edward Thompson challenged this assumption by placing the politics of English Jacobinism centre stage in his *Making of the English Working Class*, but returned to the Toynbee tradition with his distinction between 'moral' and 'political' economy, and in his refusal to draw significant distinctions between the positions of Smith and Burke on the treatment of scarcity.

On the centre left of British politics, Toynbee was even more successful. Toynbee's approach captured perfectly twentieth-century Labour's singular ability to combine within one credo a commitment to socialise all means of production, distribution and exchange, with an almost Burkean respect for monarchical and aristocratic institutions. Socialism in England, it seemed, was not a form of republicanism, but an alternative to it. Indeed, the only groups left outside this broad consensus stretching from church, landed classes and professionals to trade unionists, co-operators and communists, were businessmen, the much-lampooned entrepreneurs and the sort of people the early Mrs Thatcher respected – people of modest means who saved, did not call upon the help of their neighbours and kept themselves to themselves. It was not until the 1970s that historians drew attention to this imbalance and began to attribute to it some responsibility for the decline of Britain's 'industrial spirit'. But this insight was not pushed

far enough. Historical enquiry was largely confined to the Victorian period, and the question restricted to the impact of anti-industrialism upon economic performance. The creation of this anti-industrial mythology was not tracked back to its originating source.

This book has been an argument for the relevance of history to the present, an attempt to demonstrate – especially in the history of ideas – that the long term matters. From the general argument, a number of more specific conclusions may be drawn.

One might concern the familiar claim that the ancestry of a radically individualist and libertarian position in economic affairs dates back to Adam Smith. This claim has already been subjected to extensive criticism elsewhere. What has been added here is a stronger emphasis upon what distinguished Smith from his successors in the 1790s, Burke and Malthus as much as Condorcet and Paine. Recent research has highlighted Smith's fear of the doctrinaire approach of 'men of system': he had in mind in particular the French Physiocratic *economistes*. He placed considerable weight upon deference to the great and admiration of the rich, precisely because he considered that private property possessed such a shallow basis of legitimacy. But this form of timidity, or caution, had nothing in common with the Burkean relegation of the poor to an unquestioning acceptance of the views of the superior ranks in the social hierarchy or with the Malthusian

equation of the mentality of the poor with the immediacy of the animal passions of fear or concupiscence.

Furthermore, by following the story beyond the 1790s, it becomes clearer how the notion of political economy as a simple and total gospel of economic or industrial freedom came into being. Although it is true that, even in 1800, contemporaries had ceased to make a distinction between Smith's views on scarcity and those of Burke or even Malthus, it was the writings of the Romantics – particularly Coleridge, Southey, Hazlitt and Carlyle – which seized upon this fleeting and largely mistaken assumption of identity and perpetuated it for posterity. Coleridge also made an attack on political economy's cosmopolitanism and its supposed apology for the labour of factory children; Southey on its association with the harshness of early Malthusian doctrine and the ugliness of the manufacturing town; Hazlitt and Peacock on the abstraction and pedantry of its language. Finally, distilling all these disparate forms of assault into one riveting image, Carlyle identified political economy with the reduction of all the qualitative richness and diversity of life to the emptiness of the 'cash nexus'.

When Toynbee sought to characterise the 'industrial revolution', he started out, not from the writings of Smith, but from this single and commanding image of Carlyle, whose paternity he then sought to transfer back to Smith. In the case of Smith, Toynbee's portrait is in large part caricature. But neo-conservatism has been happier with the caricature than a true likeness.

Another conclusion which might be drawn concerns the discursive character of the creation of 'class' in the early nineteenth century. The 1832 Reform Bill legislated the disfranchisement of existing working-class voters in scot and lot boroughs and the acquisition by the working classes of a specific political identity – that of *not* being represented in a new property-based representative political system. The process which led to this enactment dated back to the counter-revolutionary alarms of the 1790s. The so-called 'social interpretation' of the genesis of 'class' was not only false for the reasons to which I have alluded in a previous book, *Languages of Class*, in origin it was also part of the process by which the republican and democratic challenge to British politics in the 1790s was pushed into the background and replaced by another story, drawing upon the Romantics, Carlyle, a bit of Marx and Toynbee. Toynbee's account of the 'industrial revolution' insisted that it was the gospel of industrial freedom, not the French Revolution and its repression, which was responsible for the separation and alienation of classes. By diverting attention from the political reaction to the Revolution and resituating a period of trauma in a purely industrial or agrarian setting, the peculiarities of the British monarchical and constitutional system came to belong to the natural and the taken-for-granted.

The last and most important conclusion concerns the dating and nature of the beginnings of social democracy. Historians generally date its emergence to Bernstein's 'revisionist' critique of Marx in the 1890s, or the Fabians'

substitution of Edgeworth's theory of rent in place of Marx's theory of capital. Others date social democracy to 1848 and Louis Blanc's proposals of a state socialism based upon partnership between producer associations and a Jacobin state authority. Others yet again point to the 1860s and the alleged deal struck up between Bismarck and Lassalle, the first leader of German social democracy, whose aim was to establish a form of state socialism.

But what the story told here suggests is that all these historical approaches put the cart before the horse. Social democracy *preceded* the genesis of nineteenth- or twentieth-century socialism, whether in its 'utopian' or 'scientific' form. The first thinkers and activists to build upon the works of Smith were libertarians of the left rather than of the right. However circumspect and politically cautious Adam Smith's own approach, readings of his work by the progressives of the 1780s and 1790s provided much of the foundation of a radical critique of aristocratic monopoly and the bellicose and inegalitarian state which protected it.

It was not Smith but the conservative reaction of the 1790s which produced the divorce between political economy and progressive politics. Indeed, it was precisely the ferocious reaction to what might be described as the first social democratic programme for the elimination of poverty and inequality that prompted the appearance of what came to be called 'socialism'. Socialism in the writings of Saint Simon, Fourier and Owen assumed a non-political and anti-republican form, not least to avoid the hostility encountered by

Condorcet, Paine and Godwin. Their 'utopian' or quasi-religious appearance helped to circumvent the formidable discursive and institutional obstacles, whether religious or political, erected by the enraged or demoralised regimes of the 1790s and 1800s.

The proposals of Condorcet and Paine derived from a unique juncture between the rationalist optimism of the Enlightenment, the impact of democratic revolutions and an exhilarating sense of the possibility of marrying Smith's conception of the potential of commercial society with a modern republican form. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this new language of citizenship was increasingly pushed aside by opposing extremes: on the one side, *laisser faire* individualism and a language of producer and consumer; on the other side, socialism and the language of worker and capitalist. Contemporary social democracy has too long attempted to navigate between these two extremes, both elaborated in the chilly and anti-political aftermath of the French Revolution. It should instead revisit its original birthplace and resume the ambition of the late and democratic Enlightenment to combine the benefits of individual freedom and commercial society with a republican ideal of greater equality, inclusive citizenship and the public good.

NOTES

Introduction

1 A. Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 12th edn (London, 1809), pt IV, ch. 1, pp. 248–9, 250.

2 See B. Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments 1815–1830* (Oxford, 1977); on the conservative reception and recasting of Smith, see E. Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), ch. 2 & *passim*; on the broader religious and political framing of these changes, see B. Hilton, *The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1795–1865* (Oxford, 1988); for its continuing impact upon government and charitable thinking in late Victorian England, see G. Stedman Jones, *Outcast London: A Study of the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society* (Oxford, 1971).

3 On Hegel's conception of political economy and 'civil society', see G. Stedman Jones, 'Hegel and the Economics of Civil Society', in S. Kaviraj & S. Khilnani (eds.), *Civil Society: History and Possibilities* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 105–31; on the combination of evangelical Christianity and possessive individualism in Vormärz Prussia and the part it played in the development of Young Hegelianism, see especially W.

Breckman, *Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory* (Cambridge, 1999).

4 Marx to Engels, 18 June 1862, Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 41 (London, 1985), p. 381.

5 See, for instance, F. A. Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order* (Chicago, 1948); F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (Illinois, 1952); G. Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age* (London, 1984).

6 See J. De Vries, 'The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution', *Journal of Economic History* 54 (June 1994), no. 2, pp. 249–271.

7 J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, P. Laslett (ed.), 14th edn (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 296–7; A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), E. Cannan (ed.) (Chicago, 1976), bk 1, ch. 1, p. 16. See the discussion of the significance in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century arguments about commercial society, in I. Hont, *Jealousy of Trade* (Cambridge, Mass., forthcoming), introduction.

8 T. Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two* (1792), M. Conway (ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, 4 vols. (London, 1906), vol. 2, pp. 487–8.

9 A.-N. de Condorcet, *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1795), J. Barraclough (trans.), S. Hampshire (ed.) (London, 1955), p. 180.

Chapter I

1 T. Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two* (1792), M. Conway (ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, 4 vols. (London, 1906), vol. 2, p. 461.

2 A.-N. de Condorcet, *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1795), J. Barraclough (trans.), S. Hampshire (ed.) (London, 1955), pp. 12, 169.

3 Condorcet, *Sketch*, pp. 173–4.

4 Condorcet, *Sketch*, pp. 176–7.

5 See R. Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776–1848* (London, 1988), p. 170.
6 Condorcet, *Sketch*, pp. 180–1.
7 Condorcet, *Sketch*, p. 181.
8 Condorcet, *Sketch*, p. 182; A.-N. de Condorcet, 'The Nature and Purpose of Public Instruction' (1791), K. M. Baker (ed.), *Condorcet: Selected Writings* (Indianapolis, 1976), p. 106.
9 As above, p. 126.
10 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 456.
11 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part One*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, pp. 316, 387; *Rights of Man: Part Two*, pp. 403, 438, 456, 485.
12 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, pp. 476, 482–92; on the importance of Sinclair, see I. Hacking, *The Taming of Chance* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 26–8.
13 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, pp. 501–2.
14 As above, pp. 501–2.
15 See A. O. Aldridge, 'Condorcet et Paine: leurs rapports intellectuels', *Revue de Littérature Comparée* 32 (1958), no. 1, pp. 457–65; G. Kates, 'Tom Paine's *Rights of Man*', *Journal of the History of Ideas* (1958), pp. 569–87; W. Doyle, 'Tom Paine and the Girondins', in W. Doyle, *Officers, Nobles and Revolutionaries* (London, 1995), pp. 209–19; B. Vincent, 'Thomas Paine républicain de l'univers', in F. Furet & M. Ozouf (eds.), *Le Siècle de l'avènement republicain* (Paris, 1993), pp. 101–26; J. P. Lagrave, 'Thomas Paine et les Condorcet', in B. Vincent (ed.), *Thomas Paine ou la République sans frontières* (Nancy, 1993), pp. 57–65; G. Claeys, *Thomas Paine: Social and Political Thought* (London, 1989), ch. 4; see also A. O. Aldridge,

Man of Reason: The Life of Thomas Paine (London, 1959); J. Keane, *Tom Paine: A Political Life* (London, 1995).

16 Condorcet, 'Reception Speech at the French Academy' (1782), in Baker, *Condorcet: Selected Writings*, p. 6; the best account of what Condorcet meant by 'the calculus of probabilities' is to be found in K. M. Baker, *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics* (Chicago, 1975); see also L. Daston, *Classical Probability in the Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1988), esp. pp. 210–25; Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, ch. 5.

17 Condorcet, *Sketch*, p. 162.

18 As above, pp. 162, 181.

19 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, pp. 488–9.

20 T. Paine, *Agrarian Justice* (1797), M. Conway (ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, 4 vols. (London, 1906), vol. 3, pp. 333, 337.

21 See Daston, *Classical Probability in the Enlightenment*, pp. 27–30, 127–9.

22 On Leibniz's memoir, see Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, pp. 18–20.

23 On the significance of changes in eighteenth-century attitudes towards insurance and the importance of The Society for Equitable Insurance, see L. Daston, 'The Domestication of Risk: Mathematical Probability and Insurance, 1650–1830', in L. Kruger, L. J. Daston & M. Heidelberger (eds.) *The Probabilistic Revolution*, vol. 1, *Ideas in History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 237–61. But see also G. Clark, *Betting on Lives, The Culture of Life Insurance in England, 1695–1775* (Manchester, 1999), esp. pp. 117–18, where resistance to a statistical approach to death is ascribed, not to the absence of a prudential attitude towards insurance before 1750, but to the persistence of popular and often credible beliefs about mortality patterns.

24 Cited in Daston, 'The Domestication of Risk', p. 250.

25 See Baker, *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics*, pp. 279–82; Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, pp. 44–6.

26 See J.-A.-N. Caritat Marquis de Condorcet, *Vie de Monsieur Turgot* (1783) (Paris, 1997), p. 187; A. R. J. Turgot, 'A Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind', in R. L. Meek (ed.), *Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics* (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 41–59; Baker, *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics*, p. 207.

27 Cited in D. Winch, *Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain 1750–1834* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 90. Winch's book is an invaluable source on the contrary uses made of Smith's work in the two generations following his death.

28 A. Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 12th edn (London, 1809), pt IV, ch. 1, p. 10.

29 R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael & P. G. Stein (eds.), A. Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1976), p. 208; on Smith's fears of the systematic plans of reform associated with the *economistes*, see I. Hont, 'The Political Economy of the "Unnatural and Retrograde" Order: Adam Smith and Natural Liberty', in *Französische Revolution und politische ökonomie*, Karl-Marx-Haus Trier (1989), pp. 122–49.

30 Paine, *Agrarian Justice*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 3, p. 341.

31 Condorcet, *Vie de Monsieur Turgot*, p. 164; Condorcet, *Sketch*, pp. 127, 163.

32 In this context, the link between between Turgot, Condorcet and Smith derives as much from Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* as from *The Wealth of Nations*. In each there is a new emphasis upon the reflective character of human beings and an aversion to mechanical and determinist theories. These linkages are powerfully brought to the fore in E.

Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), esp. ch. 8 & *passim*. Particularly important was a shared idea of 'economic enlightenment' linked to a dynamic view of history and cultural/mental development, as against static and ahistorical conceptions of self-interest. See, for example, the distaste for Helvetius manifested in the correspondence between Turgot and Condorcet. Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*, pp. 199–201.

33 Dugald Stewart, 'Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith', I. S. Ross (ed.), in W. P. D. Wightman & J. C. Bryce, *Adam Smith: Essays on Philosophical Subjects* (Oxford, 1980), p. 304.

34 Condorcet, *Sketch*, p. 180; he had already addressed this theme more explicitly in his *Essai sur les assemblées provinciales* of 1788, where he argued that the first cause of poverty was the unequal distribution of wealth due to bad laws and that the second was low wages due to the obstruction of free competition caused by guild and apprenticeship regulation, A.Condorcet O'Connor & M. F. Arago (eds.), *Oeuvres de Condorcet*, 12 vols. (Paris 1847–9), vol. 8, pp. 453–9; and see Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*, pp. 171–2; see also L. Cahen, *Condorcet et la révolution française* (Paris, 1904), pp. 83–7.

35 Baker, *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics*, p. 208.

36 Condorcet, 'The Nature and Purpose of Public Instruction', in Baker, *Condorcet: Selected Writings*, p. 106.

37 As above, p. 119.

38 See Condorcet, *Vie de Monsieur Turgot*, p. 171.

39 Baker, *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics*, pp. 292–3.

40 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part One*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 314; *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 413.

41 E. Canaan (ed.), Adam Smith, *An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) (Chicago, 1976), bk 3, ch. 2, p. 409.

42 Paine, *Agrarian Justice*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 3, pp. 328, 330. The different inferences writers around the time of the French Revolution drew from the so-called 'agrarian law' was of central importance in determining divergent paths of radicalism in the nineteenth century. See G. Stedman Jones, 'Introduction', in G. Stedman Jones (ed.), *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: The Communist Manifesto* (London, 2002), pp. 149–55.

43 Condorcet, *Sketch*, p. 32.

44 Condorcet, 'The Nature and Purpose of Public Instruction', Baker, *Condorcet: Selected Writings*, p. 109; *Sketch*, pp. 180, 192.

45 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, pp. 409, 456; *Agrarian Justice*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 3, p. 337; *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 496.

46 See I. Hont, 'Commerce and Luxury', in M. Goldie & R. Wokler (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-century Political Thought* (forthcoming), ch. 14; see also E. J. Hundert, *The Enlightenment's Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society* (Cambridge, 1994); P. Riley (ed.), F. de Fénelon, *Telemachus, Son of Ulysses* (Cambridge, 1994).

47 I. Kramnick (ed.), William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1798) (Harmondsworth, 1976), p. 171.

48 See Winch, *Riches and Poverty*, ch. 3; Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*, pp. 68–71.

49 See Winch, *Riches and Poverty*, pp. 76–80.

50 See D. O. Thomas, *The Honest Mind: The Thought and Work of Richard Price* (Oxford, 1977), p. 230.

51 Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, pt. iv, ch. 1, p. 10.

52 R. Price, 'A Future Period of Improvement' (1787) in D. O. Thomas (ed.), Richard Price, *Political Writings* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 164, 165; on the relationship between the American Revolution and British radical dissent, see P. N. Miller, *Defining the Common Good: Empire, Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-century Britain* (Cambridge, 1994); on the character of British radicalism in the 1780s and its reaction to the first years of the French Revolution, see R. Whatmore, 'A Gigantic Manliness: Paine's Republicanism in the 1790s', in S. Collini, R. Whatmore & B. Young (eds.), *Economy, Polity, and Society: British Intellectual History 1750–1950* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 141–6. On the salience of calls for moral reform in the 1780s, see J. Innes, 'Politics and Morals: The Reformation of Manners Movement in Later Eighteenth-century England', in E. Hellmuth (ed.), *The Transformation of Political Culture: England and Germany in the Later Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 57–119.

53 See F. Acomb, *Anglophobia in France (1763–89)* (Durham, NC, 1950) and Whatmore, 'A Gigantic Manliness' in Collini *et al.*, *Economy, Polity, and Society*, pp. 148–9.

54 A.-N. Condorcet, 'On the Influence of the American Revolution in Europe' (1786), Baker, *Condorcet: Selected Writings*, p. 81.

55 For Paine's American experience and its impact upon his thought, see E. Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America* (New York, 1976), chs. 3, 4, 6 & *passim*.

56 Whatmore, 'A Gigantic Manliness' in Collini *et al. Economy, Polity, and Society*, pp. 135–58; see also A. O. Aldridge, *Franklin and His French Contemporaries* (New York, 1957).

57 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part One*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 383; *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 437.

58 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, pp. 403–4, 471; *Rights of Man: Part One*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 321.

59 T. Paine, *Common Sense*, (1776), Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 1, p. 83.

60 Condorcet, *Vie de Monsieur Turgot*, pp. 173–5; 'On the Influence of the American Revolution on Europe', Baker, *Condorcet: Selected Writings*, p. 74.

61 'The Explanatory Note of M. Sieyès in Answer to the Letter of Mr Paine, and to Several Other Provocations of the Same Sort', in M. Sonenscher (ed.), Sieyès, *Political Writings* (Indianapolis, 2003), pp. 169–73; and on the basis of Sieyès' position, see the introduction and notes, pp. vii–lxiv, 163–4.

62 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 422.

63 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, pp. 406, 414.

64 Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, bk. 1, ch. 1, p. 16; Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 454.

65 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, pp. 415–16, 422–4.

66 As above, p. 498.

67 Paine, *Agrarian Justice*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 3, p. 325; *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 495.

68 Cited in I. Woloch, *The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820s* (New York, 1994), p. 244.

69 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, pp. 456, 512.

70 Although she has an interesting interpretation of Paine, I cannot agree with Gertrude Himmelfarb that Paine's position was just another proposal for Poor Law reform.

Himmelfarb makes no reference to the fact that Paine was primarily attempting to intervene in a debate in France. See G. Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age* (London, 1984), pp. 86–99.

Chapter II

1 Cited in E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963), p. 112.

2 See N. Rogers, *Crowds, Culture and Politics in Georgian Britain* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 197, 203 & ch. 6 *passim*.

3 R. A. & S. Wilberforce, *The Life of William Wilberforce*, 5 vols. (London, 1838), vol. 2, pp. 3–5.

4 R. Price, 'A Discourse on the Love of Our Country', *Political Writings* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 190, 195.

5 E. Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in London Relative to That Event* (1790) (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp. 157–9. Price in the same passage had referred to 'their king led in triumph, and an arbitrary monarch surrendering himself to his subjects'. Burke took this as a reference to the events of October 5–6 1789, when the people of Paris forced the Royal Family to return from Versailles to the Tuileries. Price called this a 'horrid misrepresentation' and said that his remarks referred to the fall of the Bastille on 14 July and the king's showing himself to his people as the restorer of their liberty. See Price, *Political Writings*, pp. 176–7.

6 Cited in Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, p. 110.

7 Cited in Rogers, *Crowds, Culture and Politics*, p. 207; see also J. Barrell, *Imagining the King's Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide 1793–1796* (Oxford, 2000).

8 See especially E. Rothschild, 'Adam Smith and Conservative Economics', *Economic History Review* 45 (Feb. 1992), pp. 74–96.

9 (T. R. Malthus), *First Essay on Population 1798* (London, 1966), pp. 303–4.

10 D. Stewart, 'Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, LLD', in I. Ross (ed.), *Adam Smith Essays on Philosophical Subjects* (Oxford, 1980), p. 311.

11 According to McCulloch, Dugald Stewart omitted to mention that when Smith was a student at Oxford he was reprimanded by the university authorities for possessing and reading Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*. J. R. McCulloch (ed.), *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith LLD; with a Life of the Author* (1838), 4th edn (Edinburgh, 1850), p. ii.

12 E. Burke, 'Preface to the Address of M. Brissot to His Constituents', *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, 8 vols. (London, 1803), vol. 7, p. 299. Burke was incensed that the education of the Dauphin had been passed to Condorcet, and that he had therefore been handed over 'to this fanatick atheist, and furious democratic republican'. E. Burke, 'Thoughts on French Affairs', *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, vol. 7, p. 58.

13 See E. Rothschild, 'Adam Smith and Conservative Economics', p. 80. The effort to blot out the ideas of Condorcet appears to have been very successful. A single edition of an English translation of Condorcet's *Sketch* appeared in 1795, but was not republished until a new translation appeared in 1955.

14 G. Claeys, 'The French Revolution Debate and British Political Thought', *History of Political Thought* 11, 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 59–80; see also I. Hampsher-Monk, 'John Thelwell and the eighteenth century radical response to political economy', *Historical Journal*, 34, 1 (1991), pp. 1–20.

15 For Smith's argument, see Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, bk 3, ch. 2, pp. 407–9.

16 For background, see J. R. Poynter, *Society and Pauperism, English Ideas on Poor Relief, 1795–1834* (London, 1969), chs. 1, 2 & *passim*; J. Innes, 'The Distinctiveness of the English Poor Laws, 1750–1850', in D. Winch & P. K. O'Brien(eds.), *The Political Economy of British Historical Experience 1688–1914* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 381–409; T. Horne, *Property Rights and Poverty: Political Argument in Britain 1605–1834* (Exeter, 1986).

17 T. Ruggles, *The History of the Poor, Their Rights, Duties and the Laws Respecting Them*, 2 vols. (London, 1793), vol. 1, pp. xv, 10. See also P. Slack, *Poverty and Policy in Tudor and Stuart England* (London, 1988).

18 See Innes, 'The Distinctiveness of the English Poor Laws', pp. 385–91.

19 N. Scarfe (ed.), *A Frenchman's Year in Suffolk: French Impressions of Suffolk Life in 1784* (Woodbridge, 1988), p. 215; see also F. Dreyfus, *La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt 1747–1827, un Philanthrope d'autrefois* (Paris, 1903), pp. 14–15.

20 F. M. Eden, *The State of the Poor*, 3 vols. (London, 1797), vol. 3, p. cccxi.

21 See Eden, *The State of the Poor*, appendix xi & see also G. Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age* (London, 1984), pp. 73–8.

22 T. Paine, *Agrarian Justice (1797)*, M. Conway (ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, 4 vols. (London, 1906), vol. 3, pp. 338–9.

23 Burke, *Reflections*, pp. 256, 262.

24 See R. Hole, *Pulpits, Politics and Public Order in England, 1760–1832* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 102, and for an excellent overview part II *passim*.

25 Paine, *Rights of Man: Part Two*, Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 2, p. 514.

26 M. Wollstonecraft, *An Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution* (London, 1794), vol. 1, pp. 21–2; for Wollstonecraft's own religious views, see B. Taylor, *Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination* (Cambridge, 2003), ch. 3.

27 H. More, 'The History of Mr Fantom, the New-fashioned Philosopher', *The Works of Hannah More*, 11 vols. (London, 1830), vol. 3, p. 12.

28 Wollstonecraft, *An Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution*, pp. 234–5.

29 On the centrality of the presence of the poor as an object of compassion and contemplation in the world of early Christianity in contrast to its insignificance in the outlook of pagan antiquity, see P. Brown, 'Late Antiquity', in P. Veyne, *A History of Private Life*, vol. 1, *From Pagan Rome to Byzantium* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 235–97.

30 W. Wilberforce, *A Practical View of the Prevailing Religious System of Professed Christians in the Higher and Middle Classes in This Country Contrasted with Real Christianity* (London, 1797), pp. 404–5.

31 H. More, 'Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education; with a View of the Principles and Conduct Prevalent among Women of Rank and Fortune', *The Works of Hannah More*, vol. 5, p. 25.

32 Wilberforce, *A Practical View of the Prevailing Religious System*, p. 405.

33 More, 'The History of Mr Fantom', *The Works of Hannah More*, vol. 3, pp. 28–9.

34 Burke, *Reflections*, pp. 211, 265; 'Thoughts on French Affairs' (1791), *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, vol. 7, pp. 13, 49, 57, 58; 'Three Letters Addressed to a Member of the Present Parliament, on Proposals for Peace with the

Regicide Directory of France' (1796), *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund* Burke, vol. 8, pp. 98, 169, 236, 259.

35 J. Mackintosh, *Vindiciae Gallicae, Defence of the French Revolution and Its English Admirers against the Accusations of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, 3rd edn (London, 1791), pp. 140–1. The detachment of radicals from Christianity, in Britain at least, appears to have been more an effect than a cause of support for the Revolution. See M. Butler, *Romantics, Rebels & Reactionaries: English Literature and Background 1760–1830* (Oxford, 1981), esp. ch. 3.

36 J. Robison, *Proofs of a Conspiracy against All the Religions and Governments of Europe*, 2nd edn (London, 1797), pp. 374–5; see also A. de Barruel, *Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism: A Translation* (London, 1797).

37 T. Paine, *The Age of Reason*, ch. 1 'The Author's Profession of Faith', Conway, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 4, p. 21.

38 E. Burke, 'Letters on a Regicide Peace', *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, vol. 7, pp. 368–9.

39 E. Burke, 'Thoughts and Details on Scarcity', *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, vol. 7, pp. 376, 377, 386, 391, 404.

40 See Rothschild, 'Smith and Conservative Economics', p. 87; and see also D. Winch, *Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750–1834* (Cambridge, 1996), ch. 8. For an account of how the problem of scarcities and famines was approached by Turgot and Smith, see Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*, ch. 3; and see also S. L. Kaplan, *Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV* (The Hague, 1976).

41 (T. R. Malthus), *An Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers* (London, 1798), p. 17.

42 In March 1793, in an appendix to a pamphlet, *Peace and Union Recommended*, Frend contrasted the wartime plight of poor country women near the Cambridgeshire village of St Ives whose earnings were 'to be scotched three pence in the shilling' with that of rich war profiteers whose incomes alone should have been 'scotched' by a quarter to pay for the war and relieve the plight of its poverty-stricken victims. For this, he was expelled from his college fellowship at Queen's College and ejected from the university. Frend had also been Coleridge's tutor while at Cambridge. See A. Goodwin, *The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution* (London, 1979), pp. 268–9. On the connections between socinianism (the denial of the Trinity) and political radicalism before the French Revolution, see J. C. D. Clark, *English Society, 1688–1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice during the Ancien Régime* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 330–46.

43 On Malthus's politics, see especially Winch, *Riches and Poverty*, pt III; and see also P. James, *Population Malthus* (London, 1979). After 1815, although he was still in principle a Whig, his politics became increasingly conservative. His semi-Physiocratic views on agriculture led him to defend landlords and support the Corn Laws, while his distrust of manufacturing and towns made him increasingly fearful of crowds and popular disturbance.

44 For an account of the theology and theological context of Malthus's *Essay*, see especially A. M. C. Waterman, *Revolution, Economics and Religion: Christian Political Economy, 1798–1833* (Cambridge, 1991), chs. 3 & 4; see also D. L. Le Mahieu, 'Malthus and the Theology of Scarcity', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40, pp. 467–74.

45 D. Stewart, 'Critical Examination of a Late *Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future Improvement of*

Society', 'Plan of Lectures on Political Economy for the Winter 1800–1', *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, Esq. FRSS*, W. Hamilton (ed.), 11 vols. (Edinburgh, 1855), vol. 8, p. 203; and discussed in Waterman, *Revolution, Economics and Religion*, pp. 113–14. On the impact of Stewart on the positions adopted by the *Edinburgh Review*, see B. Fontana, *Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society* (Cambridge, 1983).

46 For an account of the development of natural theology in eighteenth-century Cambridge, see Waterman, *Revolution, Economics and Religion*, ch. 3.

47 I. Kramnick (ed.), William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1798) (Harmondsworth, 1976), pp. 751–2, 759, 763.

48 (Malthus), *An Essay*, pp. 286–7, 351, 358.

49 (Malthus), *An Essay*, pp. 353, 354, 357, 363.

50 (Malthus), *An Essay*, pp. 11, 353, 364, 365, 369, 395.

51 (Malthus), *An Essay*, pp. 176–7.

52 (Malthus), *An Essay*, pp. 148–50.

53 Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, bk 1, pp. 81–2, 91; bk 5, p. 321.

54 On this topic, see E. Rothschild, 'Social Security and Laissez Faire in Eighteenth-century Political Economy', *Population and Economic Development* 21, (Dec. 1995), pp. 711–44.

55 Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, bk 1, pp. 19–20; *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 12th edn (Glasgow, 1809), pt I, sect 3, ch. 2, p. 86.

56 (Malthus), *An Essay*, pp. 86–7, 88, 254.

57 Malthus's theological deficiencies are discussed in Waterman, *Revolution, Economics and Religion*, pp. 106–12.

58 Waterman, *Revolution, Economics and Religion*, pp. 142–4.

59 Although it should not be forgotten that Malthus has never lacked influential advocates. See especially the admiring study by Keynes in 'Essay in Biography', in E. Johnson and D.

Moggridge, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 29 vols. (London, 1971–82), vol. 10.

60 (Malthus), *An Essay*, pp. 32–3.

61 E. A. Wrigley, 'Malthus on the Labouring Poor', in E. A. Wrigley (ed.), *Poverty, Progress and Population* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 243, 244–5.

62 See P. H. Marshall, *William Godwin* (Yale, 1984), ch. 10; Winch, *Riches and Poverty*, p. 305.

63 Condorcet, *Sketch*, pp. 188–9; for Condorcet's unpublished larger manuscript on the subject, see I. Cahen, 'Condorcet inédit. Notes pour le tableau des progrès de l'esprit humain', *La Revolution française* 75 (1922), pp. 193–212; (Malthus), *An Essay*, pp. 153–4; Godwin, *Enquiry*, pp. 767–70; Winch, *Riches and Poverty*, pp. 305–6. On the idea of 'promiscuous concubinage' as a cause of sterility, see J. Spengler, *French Predecessors of Malthus* (Durham, NC, 1942); T. Laquer in M. Feher (ed.), *Fragments for a History of the Human Body* (New York, 1989), pt III, p. 339; B. Wilson, 'Charles Fourier (1772–1837) and Questions of Women', PhD thesis, Cambridge, 2002.

64 Winch, *Riches and Poverty*, p. 314; for an argument contrary to Malthus that the enhanced sense of security afforded by Poor Laws assisted the mobility of labour in early modern England, see R. M. Smith, 'Transfer Incomes, Risk and Security: The Roles of the Family and the Collectivity in Recent Theories of Fertility Change', in D. Coleman & R. Schofield (eds.), *The State of Population Theory: Forward from Malthus* (Oxford, 1986).

65 T. R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population or a View of Its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness* (1803), 2 vols., P. James (ed.) (Cambridge, 1989), vol. 2, pp. 122, 123, 126.

66 Malthus, *An Essay*, 1803 edn, p. 127.

67 Malthus, *An Essay*, 1803 edn, p. 127.

68 M. Philp, 'English Republicanism in the 1790s', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 6, 3 (1998), pp. 235–62.

69 See L. Colley, 'The Apotheosis of George III: Loyalty, Royalty and the British Nation 1760–1820', *Past and Present* 102 (1984), pp. 94–129; P. Spence, *The Birth of Romantic Radicalism* (Aldershot, 1996).

70 Malthus, *An Essay*, 1803 edn, pp. 123–4.

71 G. Claeys, 'The French Revolution Debate and British Political Thought', *History of Political Thought* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 59–80; on the ultra radicals, see I. McCalman, *Radical Underworld: Prophets, Revolutionaries and Pornographers in London, 1795–1840* (Oxford, 1993).

72 (Malthus), *An Essay*, p. 85.

73 In 1817, Malthus wrote in support of savings banks which, 'as far as they go, appear to me much the best, and the most likely, if they should become general, to effect a permanent improvement in the condition of the lower classes of society'. But he stressed that this could only be a partial remedy and strongly opposed any parish assistance in the establishment and administration of such funds. See Malthus, *An Essay*, 1817 edn, vol. 3, 275; see also pp. 277–8.

74 J. S. Mill, 'The Claims of Labour', cited in Winch, *Riches and Poverty*, p. 405.

75 (Malthus), *An Essay*, p. 287.

76 J. B. Sumner, *A Treatise on the Records of Creation; with Particular Reference to the Jewish History, and the Consistency of the Principle of Population with the Wisdom and Goodness of the Deity*, 2 vols. (London, 1816), vol. 2, pp. 7, 8, 14, 25; and see the discussion of Sumner in Waterman, *Revolution, Economics and Religion*, pp. 160–3. Sumner was also a member of the royal commission whose report led to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. There is unfortunately no space to discuss here how the campaign to abolish the Poor Law concluded by

amending the act. Malthus himself thought that the abolition of the Poor Law ought to be a gradual process. There has been a long discussion among historians about the intellectual and political authorship of the act. For a general account, see J. R. Poynter, *Society and Pauperism: English Ideas on Poor Relief, 1795–1834* (London, 1969).

Chapter III

1 J. B. Say, 'Discours préliminaire', *Traité d'économie politique ou simple exposition de la manière dont se forment, se distribuent et se consomment les richesses*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1803), vol. 1, pp. i–iv, xx–xxi. On Smith, Say wrote, 'but between his doctrine and that of the economists, there is the same distance which separates the system of *Ticho-Brahe* from the physics of Newton; before Smith, some true principles had been put forward several times; but he is the first to show the true connection between them, and how they arise as necessary consequences of the nature of things.' As above, pp. xx–xxi, and see p. xliv.

2 See G.Lefèbvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution* (New York, 1947); C. Bloch, *L'Assistance et l'état en France à la veille de la Revolution* (Paris, 1908), bk 3, pp. 361–550; F. Dreyfus, *Un philanthrope d'autrefois, La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt 1747–1827* (Paris, 1903), pp. 138–200.

3 See O. Hufton, *The Poor of Eighteenth-century France 1750–1789* (Oxford, 1974), pt II & *passim*; A. Forrest, *The French Revolution and the Poor* (Oxford, 1981), ch. 1.

4 Forrest, *The French Revolution and the Poor*, pp. 27–8; I. Woloch, *The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820s* (New York, 1994), pp. 244–5 & chs. 8 & 9.

5 Bloch, *L'Assistance et l'état*, p. 443.

6 See Hufton, *The Poor of Eighteenth-century France*, chs. 2 & 12; Woloch, *The New Regime*, pp. 244–8; Bloch, *L'Assistance et l'état*, pp. 436–42.
7 Cited in C. Jones, *The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to Napoleon 1715–99* (London, 2002), p. 494.
8 Forrest, *The French Revolution and the Poor*, p. 172.
9 Woloch, *The New Regime*, pp. 254–8.
10 J. B. Say, *Olbie ou essai sur les moyens de reformer les moeurs d'une nation* (Paris, yr 8 (1800)), p. 3.
11 On Say's early career and his relationship with Clavière, see R. Whatmore, *Republicanism and the French Revolution: An Intellectual History of Jean-Baptiste Say's Political Economy* (Oxford, 2000), chs. 3–6.
12 R. Price, 'Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution and the Means of Making it a Benefit to the World', in D. O. Thomas (ed.), R. Price, *Political Writings* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 119.
13 As above, pp. 145–6.
14 Asked what he did during the Terror, the Abbé Sieyès answered, 'J'ai vécu' ('I lived').
15 B. Franklin, *Poor Richard: The Almanacks for the Years 1733–1758 by Richard Saunders* (Philadelphia, 1976), p.278.
16 Cited in Whatmore, *Republicanism and the French Revolution*, p. 117.
17 Say, *Olbie*, pp. 23–5.
18 Say, *Olbie*, pp. 23, 29, 33–4, 42–3.
19 Say, *Olbie*, pp. 12–15, 19.
20 Say, *Olbie*, pp. 3–5, 85–6, 91–4, 102; for Fourier's mockery of the Christian heaven, see G. Stedman Jones (ed.), C. Fourier, *The Theory of the Four Movements* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 200–1.
21 Say, *Olbie*, pp. 1, 8.
22 Say, *Olbie*, pp. 5, 27, 48–9, 71, 75.
23 Say, *Olbie*, pp. 29–31, 106.

24 Say, 'Discours préliminaire', *Traité d'économie politique* (1803), vol. 1, p. xliii; he expanded these remarks in the second edition of 1814, see 'Discours préliminaire', *Traité d'économie politique*, vol. 1, p. xcii; vol. 3, pp. 52, 56, 61, 174.

25 The Physiocratic political economist Dupont de Nemours attacked him for deferring to English ideas. He begged him to 'leave the counting house' and return to the French language of liberty. Cited in Whatmore, *Republicanism and the French Revolution*, p. 38.

26 Say, 'Discours préliminaire', *Traité d'économie politique* (1814), vol. 1, p. xcv.

27 Say, *Traité d'économie politique*, vol. 2, p. 288.

28 I develop this argument in *Before God Died: The Rise and Fall of the Socialist Utopia* (forthcoming).

Chapter IV

1 See M. Berg, *The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy, 1815–1848* (Cambridge, 1980); for a general survey see M. I. Thomis, *Responses to Industrialisation* (Newton Abbot, 1976); G. Claeys, *Machinery, Money and the Millennium* (Cambridge, 1987).

2 The relevant discussion in Smith is found in *The Wealth of Nations*, vol. 1, bk 2, ch. 5, pp. 384–5.

3 H. Gouhier, *La Jeunesse d'Auguste Comte et la formation de positivisme* (Paris, 1970), pt III, ch. 2; E. Alix, 'J. B. Say et les origines de l'industrialisme?', *Revue d'économie politique* (1910). P. Steiner, 'Politique et l'économie politique chez Jean-Baptiste Say', *Revue française d'histoire des idées politiques* 5 (1997), pp. 23–58. See S. M. Gruner, 'Political historiography in Restoration France', *History and Theory* (1972), pp. 346–65; M. James, 'Pierre-Louis Roederer, Jean Baptiste Say and the Concept of *industrie*', *History of Political Economy* 9 (1977), pp. 455–75; T. Kaiser, 'Politics and Political Economy in the Thought of the

Idéologues', *History of Political Economy* 12 (1980), pp. 142–59; C. B. Welch, *Liberty and Utility. The French Idéologues and the Transformation of Liberalism* (New York, 1984), ch. 3.

4 E. J. Sièyes, 'What is the Third Estate?', M. Sonenscher (ed.), Sieyès, *Political Writings* (Indianapolis, 2003), pp. 92–163.

5 J. B. Say, *Traité d'économie politique, ou simple exposition de la manière dont se forment, se distribuent et se consomment les richesses* (Paris, 1814), vol. 1, pp. 40–52. See P. Steiner, 'La Théorie de la Production de Jean-Baptiste Say', in J. P. Potier and A. Tiran, *Jean-Baptiste Say: Nouveaux regards sur son oeuvre* (Paris, 2002), pp. 325–59. See also R. Whatmore, *Republicanism and the French Revolution: An Intellectual History of Jean Baptiste Say's Political Economy* (Oxford, 2000); R. R. Palmer, *An Economist in Troubled Times* (Princeton, 1997).

6 On the eighteenth-century discussion of '*doux commerce*' see A. Hirschmann, *The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton, 1977).

7 B. Constant, 'The Liberty of the Ancients Compared to that of the Moderns?' [1819], in B. Constant, *Political Writings*, B. Fontana (ed.) (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 308–29.

8 Say, *Traité d'économie politique*, vol. 2, ch. 7, sect. 5, pp. 92–4.

9 But Say does emphasise the role of machinery in the division of labour and the importance of advances in the use made of the powers of nature. It was for this reason also that Say criticised the term 'commercial society' and preferred to refer to 'industrial society'. Eventually, he imagined, in 'a perfectly industrial society', 'men without being less numerous, would all be employed which categorically demanded a certain amount of intelligence, and where all action which was purely mechanical would be performed by animals or machines'. See Steiner, 'Le Théorie de la production', p. 334.

In the 1814 edition of the *Traité*, there is a brief chapter arguing the merits of machines both for '*la classe ouvrière*' and,

even more, for consumers. It was stated that many more hands were employed in cotton manufacture in England, France and Germany since their introduction, just as in printing. See vol. 1, ch. 7, pp. 52–61. Say was to elaborate these arguments in the *Cours complet*, as the argument about machinery grew more intense (see below).

10 J. B. Say, *England and the English People*, 2nd edn, J. Richter (trans.) (London, 1816).

11 As above, p. 14.

12 As above, p. 21.

13 As above, pp. 26, 29–30, 30–2.

14 As above, pp. 35, 36, 37–8.

15 As above, p. 38.

16 As above, p. 39.

17 As above, p. 43.

18 As above, pp. 65–6.

19 As above, pp. 63–5.

20 As above, p. 62.

21 See G. Stedman Jones, 'National Bankruptcy and Social Revolution: European Observers on Britain, 1813–1844', in D. Winch & P. O'Brien (eds.), *The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688–1914* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 61–93.

22 M. de Montvéran, *Histoire critique et raisonée de la situation de l'Angleterre au 1e Janvier 1816*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1819), vol. 1, p. 324.

23 M. le Comte Chaptal, *De l'Industrie française*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1819), vol. 2, p. 29.

24 As above, vol. 2, p. 31.

25 As above, vol. 2, pp. 38–40. Chaptal was a chemist as well as a factory owner. He became professor of chemistry at the École Polytechnique. Under the First Empire he acquired a large estate where he pioneered chemical experiments, especially in the cultivation of sugar beet. In 1823 he published *La Chimie appliquée à l'agriculture*. This contrast between France and

England was taken up by N. de Briavoinne in *De l'Industrie en Belgique, causes de décadence et de prosperité* (Brussels, 1839): 'C'est par une sorte d'aveu universel que la France est reconnue le siège de la révolution dans les arts chimiques, l'Angleterre celui de la révolution en mécanique' (p. 192).

26 *Edinburgh Review* 64 (October 1819), p. 367.

27 J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi, *Nouveaux principes d'économie politique ou de la richesse dans ses rapports avec la population*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1819).

28 As above, vol. 1, p. vi. Sismondi claimed that, pushed beyond a certain point, the division of labour could benefit the entrepreneur, without it producing a comparable advantage to society. 'We have demonstrated that if it is not accompanied by a [comparably] growing demand, the competition which enriches a few individuals produces a certain loss for all the others', as above, vol. 1, pp. 370, 374.

29 J. B. Say, 'Sur la Balance des consommations avec les productions', *Revue Encyclopédique* 23 (1824), pp. 20–1; *Traité d'économie politique*, 2 vols., 1803, vol. 1, p. 80; vol. 2, p. 244; J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi, 'De la balance des consommations et des productions', *Revue encyclopédique* 22 (1824), p. 281. Cited in P. Steiner, 'Say, les ideologues et le groupe de coppet', *Revue française d'histoire des idées politiques*, no. 18, 2nd. sem. (2003), pp. 331–53.

30 As above, p. 339.

31 As above, p. 341.

32 As above, p. 337.

33 As above, p. 322.

34 As above, p. 323.

35 J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi, 'Political Economy', Brewster's *Edinburgh Encyclopaedia*, 1815 (New York, 1966), pp. 117–18, 119–20.

36 Sismondi, *Nouveaux principes*, vol. 2, p. 262.

37 As above, vol. 1, p. 146.

38 As above, vol. 2, p. 262.

39 As above, vol. 2, p. 305. In a later work, *Études sur les sciences sociales* (1836, 1838), Sismondi provided the following definition of 'pauperism' – the word which dominated French and German discussion of the condition of the 'proletarian' in the 1820s–50s: '*Pauperism* is a calamity which began by making itself felt in England, and which has at present no other name but what the English have given it, though it begins to visit also other industrial countries. Pauperism is the state to which proletaries [*sic*] are necessarily reduced when work fails. It is the condition of men who must live by their labour, who can only work when capitalists employ them and who, when they are idle, must become a burden on the community' (*Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government; a Series of Essays Selected from the Works of M. de Sismondi*) (London, 1847), p. 149).

40 As above, vol. 2, p. 350.

41 As above, vol. 1, p. 368. Here is the probable origin of the notion, found in the *Communist Manifesto*, that proletarians have no country.

42 *Agriculture toscane*, cited in Sismondi, *Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government*, p. 31.

43 J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi, *Histoire des républiques italiennes du moyen âge*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1807–24).

44 See above, p. 32.

45 From the introduction to *Études* in Sismondi, *Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government*, p. 139.

46 Sismondi, *Nouveaux principes*, vol. 2, p. 401.

47 This complaint about the disappearance of intermediate social strata and the increasingly stark polarisation of rich and poor was endlessly repeated in the literature of social criticism between 1820 and 1848. See, for instance, the treatment of this

theme in the *Communist Manifesto*, G. Stedman Jones (ed.), Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (London, 2002), p. 231.

48 Sismondi, *Nouveaux principes*, vol. 2, p. 359.

49 As above, vol. 1, p. 362.

50 As above, p. 45.

51 As above, vol. 2, p. 366.

52 Sismondi, *Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government*. The only other complete text by Sismondi available in English, his article of 1815 on political economy for Brewster's *Edinburgh Encyclopaedia*, provided no more than hints of the critical position he would adopt in *Nouveaux principes*.

53 In France, see for example the *Éloge* of Sismondi by Mignet, translated in *Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government*, pp. 1–25, and Michelet's tribute: 'His glory is to have pointed out the evils; courage was necessary for that! – to have foretold new crises. But the remedy? That is not an affair of the same man, or the same age. Five hundred years have been required to set us free from political feudalism; will a few years be sufficient to set us free from industrial feudalism?' (as above, p. 42). For German discussion of the notion of the 'proletariat' in the 1830s and 1840s see W. Conze, 'Von "Pöbel" zum "Proletariat"', in H. U. Wehler (ed.), *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte* (Cologne, 1973), pp. 111–37. For Sismondi's impact upon legitimist social criticism, see A. de Villeneuve-Bargemont, *Économie politique chrétienne*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1834).

54 J. B. Say, *Letters to T. R. Malthus on Political Economy and Stagnation of Commerce*, H. Laski (ed.) (London, 1936), p. 8; see also D. Winch, *Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain 1750–1834* (Cambridge, 1996), pt III.

55 Say, *Letters to T. R. Malthus*, p. 9.

56 As above.

57 J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi, *Nouveaux principes d'économie politique ou de la richesse dans ses rapports avec la population* (Paris, 1827). In a new preface Sismondi considered his position vindicated by the course of the 1825–6 depression, which included riots against the power loom in Lancashire: '[S]even years have passed by and the facts seem to me to have vindicated me. They have proved much more than I could have done, that the savants, from whom I separated myself, were in pursuit of a false prosperity' (p. ii). According to Sismondi's journal, in the later 1820s Say was coming round to the Sismondi position: '5th September 1828 – I have had a letter from M. Say, who announces to me a second volume of his book with some concessions to my principles on the limit of production', *Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government*, p. 449.

58 J. B. Say, *Cours complet d'économie politique pratique*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1828), vol. 1, p. 364.

59 As above, pp. 390–1.

60 As above, pp. 393–4.

61 As above, p. 395.

62 As above, pp. 396–7.

63 As above, p. 398.

64 As above, p. 399.

65 As above, p. 400.

66 As above, p. 401.

67 As above.

68 As above, p. 412.

69 As above, p. 416.

70 As above, pp. 418–19.

71 As above, pp. 420–1.

72 See D. C. Coleman, *Myth, History and the Industrial Revolution* (London, 1992), pp. 1–43.

Chapter V

1 J. Blanqui, *Histoire de l'économie politique* (Brussels, 1842), ch. 38.
2 See L. Say (ed.), *Nouveaux dictionnaire d'économie politique*, (Paris, 1891), p. 197; *Dictionnaire de biographie française* (Paris, 1954), p. 643.
3 Blanqui, *Histoire de l'économie politique*, p. 167.
4 As above, p. 173.
5 As above, p. 173.
6 As above, p. 173.
7 As above, p. 180.
8 As above, p. 180. The new 'social school' of French economists was defined by the fact it 'related all progress to the general perfection of society' (see above, p. 297). Blanqui included in his 'social school' not only those mainly inspired by Sismondi, like Villeneuve-Bargemont and Droz, but also those such as Charles Dunoyer and Charles Comte who followed Say (see above, ch. 41).
9 As above, p. 181.
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13 As above, p. 203.
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16 Blanqui, *Histoire de l'économie politique*, pp. 204–5.
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26 Nassau W. Senior, *An Outline of the Science of Political Economy* (London, 1836), p. 72.
27 For an account, see M. Berg, *The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy 1815–1848* (London, 1980), pt II.
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31 E. A. Wrigley, *Continuity, Chance and Change: The Character of the Industrial Revolution in England* (Cambridge, 1988); N. von Tunzelmann, *Steam Power and British Industrialisation to 1860* (Oxford, 1978).
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33 B. Hilton, *The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought 1785–1865* (Oxford, 1988), p. 69.
34 W. Huskisson, *The Speeches of the Right Honourable William Huskisson with a Biographical Memoir*, 3 vols. (London, 1831), vol. 3, pp. 670–1.
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46 As above, pp. 474–5.
47 As above, p. 468.
48 As above, p. 468.
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53 J. Stillinger (ed.), John Stuart Mill, *Autobiography* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 39, 64–5, 69, 117–18.
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(1974), 'Legislation and Virtue: An Essay on Working Class Self-Help and the State in the Early Nineteenth Century'. In Neil McKendrick, ed., *Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society* (London: Europa, 1974), pp. 211–254.

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Chapter VI

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2 See F. Burdeau, *Histoire de l'administration française: du 18e au 20e siècle*, 2nd edn (Paris, 1994), pp. 145–9.

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6 S. Webb, *Socialism in England* (London, 1890); *The History of Trade Unionism* (London, 1894), p. 361; and see also J. Saville, 'Henry George and the British Labour Movement', *Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History* 5 (Autumn 1962), pp. 18–26.

7 H. George, *Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with the Increase of Wealth … The Remedy* (1879) (New York, 1987), p. 560; the impact of Henry George on late nineteenth-century radicalism was worldwide from Tolstoy to John Dewey. It is generally forgotten how important a part his ideas played on the prehistory of the Labour Party and of New Liberalism in Britain. See, for example, the testimony of Keir Hardie, who wrote in 1906 that his reading of *Progress and Poverty*

and George's visit to Scotland in 1884–5 'unlocked many of the industrial and economic difficulties which then beset the worker trying to take an intelligent interest in his own affairs' ('Character Sketches. 1. The Labour Party and the Books that Have Helped to Make It', *The Review of Reviews* (June 1906), p. 571). Or Bernard Shaw, who later wrote to George's daughter, 'Your father found me a literary dilettante and militant rationalist in religion, and a barren rascal at that. By turning my mind to economics he made a man of me' (cited in Agnes George de Mille, 'Preface', *Progress and Poverty*, p. xiii).

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Page references in brackets indicate where a concept has been crucially implied but not named as such.

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