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Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, by Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, editors
8. Arab Nationalism in "Nasserism" and Egyptian State Policy, 1952-1958
James Jankowski
The 1950s were a tumultuous period for Egypt. A military coup in July 1952 overthrew the Egyptian monarchy and established a new republican order. After decades of effort, Egyptians finally realized the termination of the British occupation. Political and economic links with the West were eroded and/or severed; at the same time a new relationship with the Soviet Union was established. In the world arena Egypt became a leader of the nonaligned movement of Third World states. Closer to home, Egypt adopted a policy of involvement in and leadership of the Arab nationalist movement. The culminating event of the latter development was the integral union of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic in 1958.
At least in terms of state policy, Egyptian nationalism moved into new channels over the course of the 1950s. This essay examines that process. First, it discusses the nationalist outlook of the central figure in the new regime, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir (Gamal Abdul Nasser). Second, it investigates the revolutionary regime's involvement in Arab nationalism from its assumption of power in 1952 to the creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958. What considerations and calculations lay behind the Egyptian government's assumption of a leadership role in the Arab nationalist movement?
A central theme of recent research on nationalism has been to emphasize the contingent, fluid, and multivalent nature of national identity. This perspective is certainly borne out by the nationalist views and orientation manifested by Nasser in the 1950s. To focus on the two national allegiances most salient in his own case, Nasser himself repeatedly emphasized the coexistence as well as the compatibility of his Egyptian and Arab loyalties. "Arab Egypt" was used in his public rhetoric from an early date; 1 later addresses declared Egypt to be "a member of the greater Arab entity" 2 or maintained that "by our country I mean the whole Arab world." 3 The Egyptian National Charter of 1962, largely drafted by Nasser himself, provides the most authoritative Nasserist statement of this folding of Egypt into an Arab loaf, referring in its opening to "the Arab people of Egypt" and later explicitly asserting that "there is no conflict whatsoever between Egyptian patriotism and Arab nationalism."
Despite his assertion of both a narrower Egyptian and a broader Arab national allegiance, the two were not equal loyalties for Nasser. Nasser's identification with Egypt clearly developed earlier and, at least through the 1950s, took precedence over any Arab affiliation. Egypt lay at the center of Nasser's emotional universe. Once asked whether his sense of collective identity was more Egyptian or Arab, his response was an unreserved expression of his self-definition as an Egyptian coupled with a more contingent sense of Arab affiliation: "I am Egyptian. And I feel Arab because I am deeply affected by the fortunes and misfortunes of the Arabs, wherever they may occur." 5 The primary formative influences on Nasser's emerging political consciousness derived from the Egyptian nationalist context. The specific course of his politicization as a youth--membership in the Young Egypt movement and participation in student demonstrations in the mid-1930s--imbued him with a fierce Egyptian patriotism. The writings of Tawfiq al-Hakim, one of the more territorialist of Egyptian interwar intellectuals, were of particular importance in the development of the political outlook of the young Nasser. He himself attempted a novel modelled on Hakim's 'Awdat al-Ruh (Return of the Spirit) when in school, and years later acknowledged the importance of Hakim's writings to his intellectual formation.
Echoes of the exclusively Egyptian nationalist outlook that flourished in Egypt in the 1920s and 1930s are visible in some of Nasser's declarations and writings of the 1950s. His introduction to Husayn Mu'nis's Egypt and Its Mission (Misr wa Risalatuha) manifested much the same tone of pride in Egypt's national distinctiveness and world-historical role as had characterized the writings of an earlier generation of Egyptian territorial nationalists. Egypt was "the center from which civilization had radiated throughout the world," the source of human knowledge in areas as diverse as religion and literature, medicine and engineeering; later it had become the leader of Islamic civilization; it was "the genius nation (al-umma al-'abqariyya)." 7 However, Nasser did not go as far as as to assert Egypt's "Mediterranean" or Western character, the position that marked the extreme edge of Egyptian territorialist thought. In his view the Egypt=Mediterranean/Western equation was "a fundamentally mistaken theory;" Egypt's "spirit" was Arab rather than Western.
The systematic analysis of several of Nasser's major addresses undertaken by the Egyptian scholar Marlene Nasr has demonstrated the centrality of Egypt in Nasser's rhetoric. Phrases referring to Egypt were usually unqualified in Nasser's speeches (e.g., "al-watan" meant the land of Egypt; "al-umma" meant the Egyptian nation); phrases referring to the Arabs were qualified (e.g., "the Arab homeland/al-watan al-'arabi;" "the Arab nation/al-umma al-'arabiyya") and appeared later in time. 9 In moments of tension or crisis it was references to Egypt that predominated in Nasser's public addresses. Whereas his three-hour speech of 26 July 1956 in which he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal gave considerable attention to Arab nationalism and its benefits in its early passages, its emotional peroration defending the nationalization of the Canal and asserting Egypt's determination to control its own resources had Egypt and its people, rather than the Arabs, as its sole referents:
| Now, while I am speaking to you, Egyptian brothers of yours are taking over the administration and management of the Canal Company. At this moment they are taking over the Canal Company, the Egyptian Canal Company not the foreign Canal Company. They are taking over the Canal Company and its facilities and directing navigation in the canal, the Canal which is situated in the land of Egypt, which cuts through the land of Egypt, which is a part of Egypt and belongs to Egypt. 10 |
In contrast to the primary place held by Egypt in Nasser's hierarchy of national loyalties, his identification with the Arab nation and Arab nationalism emerged later in time; it was also a more intellectual phenomenon lacking much of the emotional resonance that he expressed towards Egypt. According to the account in his autobiographical tract The Philosophy of the Revolution, "the first elements of [Nasser's] Arab consciousness" began to develop only in the later 1930s through participation in demonstrations in support of the Palestinian and Syrian nationalist movements. 11 At first no more than "the echoes of sentiment," 12 Nasser's Arabism began to acquire an intellectual rationale in the 1940s through his military studies when his analysis of World War I campaigns in the Middle East made him aware of the strategic importance of Palestine in the defense of Egypt. 13 By the time of the war for Palestine in 1948, he had come to realize that "the fighting in Palestine was not fighting on foreign territory. Nor was it inspired by sentiment. It was a duty imposed by self-defense." 14 His participation in the war solidified his conviction of the integral political link between Egypt and Arab Asia:
| After the siege and battles in Palestine I came home with the whole region in my mind one complete whole. . . . An event may happen in Cairo today; it is repeated in Damascus, Beirut, Amman or any other place tomorrow. This was naturally in conformity with the picture that experience has left within me: One region, the same factors and circumstances, even the same forces opposing them all. 15 |
Ideological influences were secondary in the development of Nasser's identification with Arab nationalism. He appears to have read the writings of several Arab nationalist or protonationalist writers--'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, Shakib Arslan--during the course of his education. But these formed only a minor component of his reading when in secondary and military school, the bulk of which concerned Egyptian, modern European, and military history. 16 He is reported not to have read the leading contemporary Arab nationalist ideologue Abu Khaldun Sati' al-Husri until after the Revolution of 1952. When he did, he was impressed enough with Husri's views to arrange a meeting with him. 17 According to his confidant Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Nasser paid little attention to Arab politics in the early years of the revolution; even from 1955 onward, when Arab issues assumed more importance for his regime, his reading on Arab affairs remained sporadic. 18
The key Arabist terms in the Nasserist lexicon were "the Arab nation/al-umma al-'arabiyya" (first referred to in 1954), "Arab nationalism/al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya" (1955), and "Arab unity/al-wahda al-'arabiyya" (1956). 19 Nasser's earliest usage of "Arab nationalism" referred to the Arab nationalist movement in Western Asia and did not include Egypt. 20 A benchmark in Nasser's rhetoric occurred in July 1954, when he asserted that "the goal of the government of the Revolution is that the Arabs become a united nation (umma muttahida), its sons cooperating for the common good." 21 His identification with Arab nationalism was much stronger by 1956. In the early passages of his speech of 26 July announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the referent "Arab nationalism" assumed the inclusion of Egypt in the movement. Now it was "our Arab nationalism" and "our Arabism" that was at stake in the imminent confrontation with the West, and resistance to the West was couched in the Arab terms of the need to "defend our freedom and our Arabism." 22
What were the reasons articulated by Nasser for his belief in the Arab nation, Arab nationalism, and Arab unity in the mid-1950s? When Nasser first declared that "the goal of the government of the revolution is that the Arabs become a united nation" in July 1954, his rationale was a blend of historical and contemporary considerations:
| It [the revolutionary regime] believes that the place occupied by the Arabs between the continents of the world, their great contribution to culture, their valuable economic resources, and their connection with the Islamic East and the East as a whole nominates them for a great place and destines them for influence in the affairs of the world. |
| The revolution also believes that the problems of the Arabs are the problems of Egyptians. If the problem of the [British] occupation has until now absorbed the greatest part of the effort of Egyptians, it has never distracted them from participating in every Arab effort expended for the sake of the liberation of the Arabs. 23 |
It was the common problems of Egyptians and Arabs and the practical utility of solidarity for both that Nasser emphasized as the motive force behind Arab nationalism over the next few years. A frequent theme in Nasser's understanding of history was that, from the Crusades through the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 (which had only limited success because its leaders "failed to extend their vision beyond Sinai") to the first Arab-Israeli war, Arab disunity guaranteed Arab defeat; concomitantly, Arab unity was the path to victory. 24 Both history and contemporary experience taught the same lesson: "it is not possible to assure their [the Arabs'] security save if united with all of their brothers in Arabism in a strong cohesive unity." 25 Arab cooperation was a necessity for self-defense: "if the Arabs cooperate, it will be possible for them to defend themselves; if they are divided, others will dominate them." 26
Arab nationalism meant Arab effectiveness: "our strength is in this Arab nationalism, the Arabs sticking together for the benefit of the Arabs." 27 Various phrases were used to illustrate the practical reasons for Arab nationalism and unity: Arab nationalism was "the protective armor" of each Arab state against both imperialism and Israel; 28 it was their "weapon," even their "principal weapon," in the struggle against foreign domination; 29 it was "strategic necessity" or more fully "a defensive necessity, a strategic necessity, and common interests" which impelled the Arabs towards unity. 30 Arab nationalism was thus justified in terms of its pragmatic utility in the achievement of the parallel nationalist aspirations of the different Arab lands. The conclusion of Nasser's speech of 26 July 1957 celebrating the nationalization of the Suez Canal a year earlier made the link between Arab nationalism and Egyptian national interest explicit:
| Our policy is based on Arab nationalism because Arab nationalism is a weapon for every Arab state. Arab nationalism is a weapon employed against aggression. It is necessary for the aggressor to know that, if he aggresses against any Arab country, he will endanger his interests. This is the way, oh brotherly compatriots, that we must advance for the sake of Egypt, glorious Egypt, independent Egypt. 31 |
If Nasser's nationalism consisted of an original Egyptian patriotism overlaid in time by a more contingent sense of the benefits of Arab solidarity, what was missing from his portfolio of politically meaningful identities? A striking feature of both Nasser and his regime in the 1950s is the rejection of religion as a political referent.
Nasser's only occasional public discussions of religion in the 1950s clearly indicate a personal preference for the separation of religion and politics into distinct spheres of human activity. Although The Philosophy of the Revolution makes the "Islamic circle" the last and largest of the three arenas in which Egypt had to find its proper role, it also speaks of Muslim "cooperation" in looser and less vital terms than those employed for the Arab and African circles. 32 In an interview with Jean Lacouture early in 1954, Nasser was careful to disavow religion as the basis for state policy: "after eighteen months in power, I still don't see how it would be possible to govern according to the Koran. . . . The Koran is a very general text, capable of interpretation, and that is why I don't think it is suitable as a source of policy or political doctrine." 33 This was not just a placebo tailored for foreign consumption; he offered a similar analysis of the desirability of separating religion from politics in a press conference of 1956 when asked whether Muslims had a particular aversion to foreign rule: "all peoples wish to live free, independent, and equal. This is not a religious question but a political question. . . . For the Muslim is a human being before he is a Muslim." 34
Marlene Nasr's analysis of several of Nasser's major addresses bears out the marginality of religion as a political referent for Nasser. It was language and culture, not religion, which were the primary criteria for membership in the Arab nation; in his view "membership in the Arab nation was independent of any religious affiliation." 35 Whereas he eventually came to speak the desirability of Arab "unity," his use of the word "cooperation" for Muslim interaction implied a weaker bond. 36 Nasser's speeches were not usually couched in terms of concepts such as "Islamic education" or "Islamic society"--at most, they used the vaguer phrase "the Islamic spirit." 37 Nasser used the word "nation/umma" first for Egypt, later for the Arabs, but not in its traditional meaning of the community of believers in Islam; similarly, "unity/wahda" was applied only infrequently to the Muslim community, and then only in combination with "Arab unity" and "Asian-African unity." 38
Much the same dismissal of religion as a bond of political affiliation is found in Nasser's policy positions. By the 1950s the concept of an Islamic Caliphate was a dead issue for Egyptian policy-makers. Nasser bluntly told the Iraqi Regent 'Abd Il-Ilah as much when the latter inquired about the possible revival of the office in 1954: "we believe that the Caliphate is an historical stage whose purposes have come and gone, and any discussion of it in current circumstances is a waste of time." 39 Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal reports Nasser telling Nuri al-Sa'id of Iraq that "the holy bond of Islam is one thing, unity of interest and security another, particularly if it is based, in addition to religion, on a unity of history, culture, language, and geography." 40
On the level of policy the revolutionary government largely ignored Muslim solidarity as a tool of state policy. The major "Islamic" initiative of the Nasserist regime in the 1950s was its sponsorship of the "Islamic Conference [al-mu'tamar al-Islami]" in 1954. First discussed with the Saudis by Salah Salim during a trip to Saudi Arabia in June and launched by Nasser when on Pilgrimage in August, the initiative for an international Islamic coordinating office centered in Cairo was at least partially inspired by the the regime's current political struggle with the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954. 41 Headed by Anwar al-Sadat advised by a board of 'ulama, its official aims were promoting international Muslim education and interaction, the propagation of the message of Islam, and the establishment of Islamic cultural centers. 42 It appears to have received little attention from the regime after the crushing of the Brotherhood late in 1954. By 1957 a British evaluation of Egyptian regional policies estimated that "Egyptian endeavors to obtain hegemony in the Moslem world have been relatively unsuccessful," and went on to observe that by that date (1957) Egypt had become "relatively inactive" in propaganda efforts in other Muslim lands. 43
The Nasserist regime's disavowal of religion as a political referent for Egyptian policy of course occurred in a particular context. In the initial years of the revolutionary regime in the early and mid-1950s, its most serious domestic challenge came from the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime's rejection of a religious basis for national politics was at least in part produced by the need to distinguish its programs and appeal from that of the Brotherhood. 44 Yet the consistent marginalization of religion in both the rhetoric and the policies of Nasserist regime in the 1950s seems to indicate that this dismissal of religion as a political bond was more than just a tactical maneuver. The disavowal of religion as a political referent had marked the dominant strain of Egyptian territorial nationalism prior to 1952. On the whole, Nasser and his colleagues seem to have absorbed and to have remained faithful to a secular and a reliious perspective on Egyptian national identity after they came to power. As Nasser himself put it in a speech at the end of the decade, using the same secularist terminology that had been employed by the previous generation of Egyptian nationalists, "religion belongs to God; the watan belongs to each individual living in it." 45
Arab Nationalism in Egyptian State Policy, 1952-1958
Two generalizations are often made about the initial policy orientation of the new regime that came to power in Egypt in July 1952. One is the pragmatic and nonideological outlook of its leaders. As a group, the army officers who made up the Free Officers movement and who dominated Egypt through the mechanism of the Revolutionary Command Council in 1952-1954 were military technocrats, not intellectuals. Other than a sense of frustration with the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions of Egypt, a commitment to rooting out political corruption, and a determination to achieve complete Egyptian independence--what an early speech of Nasser termed the "hateful trio" comprised of "social injustice, political despotism, and British occupation" 46 --they had no detailed plan for the development of Egyptian society. It is in part this lack of a blueprint that explains their extended arguments as to whether to restore parliamentary rule and their vacillating treatment of existing political forces in the early years of the revolution. 47
The second generalization is the Egyptian focus of the new regime. The original concerns of the Free Officers were primarily domestic rather than foreign. American diplomatic reports in 1952-1953 stressed that the regime was "concentrating . . . on domestic problems" and spoke in terms of its "preoccupation with domestic affairs." 48 In as far as the new government had an international agenda, it related primarily to Egypt: retrospective evaluations of the thrust of the new government by former members of the Free Officers emphasize British evacuation from Egypt as the central concern of the revolution in its initial phase. 49 Nasser's public statements through 1953 spoke in the same Egypt-oriented terms of the goal of the revolution being "the liberation of the watan from imperialism" (his first public address, November 1952), that the "chief goal" of the Free Officers movement was "seeing their country achieve full, complete independence" (January 1953), or that "this revolution was staged to liberate Egypt and drive out the occupation forces" (June 1953). 50 i>The Philosophy of the Revolution codified the Egypto-centric thrust of the revolution in its early days: "What is is we want to do? . . . There is no doubt that we all dream of Egypt free and strong." 51
In as far as the new government had foreign policy concerns in 1952-1953, they were Egyptian and Nile Valley issues such as the negotiations with the British over the status of the Sudan (concluded in February 1953), the on-and-off negotiations with the British over British evacuation from the Suez Canal zone (concluded in October 1954), and the convoluted and ultimately unsuccessful discussions with the United States concerning American military aid. According to General Muhammad Najib, even the issue of the status of the Sudan was a secondary concern for the new regime's leadership: reports on the Sudanese negotiations went unread by Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) members, and Nasser himself at one point is stated to have referred to the Sudan as being "a burden upon Egypt which it is better to abandon." 52 Through 1952-1953 issues related to Egypt took precedence over Egyptian relations with its neighbors.
The first effort at developing a new regional foreign policy stance for Egypt on the part of the revolutionary government came in early 1954, in the form of a new policy of Egyptian "neutrality." In December 1953 key Egyptian ambassadors were summoned home to discuss the formulation of a policy of neutrality. As summarized by a source close to Nasser, the thrust of the new approach was (1) a formal Egyptian declaration of neutrality; (2) efforts to persuade other Arab states to follow the same line; (3) an attempt to strengthen Egyptian ties with the Asian-African bloc of states. 53
By early 1954 these deliberations resulted in the articulation of a policy of declared Egyptian neutrality. That "neutrality," however, was clearly based on its utility for the achievement of Egyptian national goals, particularly the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement with Great Britain over the termination of the British base in the Suez Canal zone. As the government daily al-Jumhuriyya explained the policy in January 1954, "Egypt's new foreign policy position will not be one of 'neutrality' in the general sense but will be based on the principle that Egypt will not cooperate with anyone unless her rights and sovereignty are recognized." 54 Regime spokesman Salah Salim defined Egyptian neutrality in much the same terms a few days later: "Egypt's policy is hostility and non-cooperation toward any nation which infringes (on) Egypt's digni ty and freedom, but cooperation with all countries both east and west which extend the hand of friendship." 55 Nasser was more ambivalent about a neutralist policy: while asserting his personal conviction that "neutrality (is) of no avail, especially in wartime," he nonetheless declared that Egypt's policy henceforth would be one of "non-cooperation with those who encroach on her sovereignty." 56
Foreign observers also noted the instrumentalist thrust of this new policy. The British Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson termed Egyptian neutrality a "tactical move . . . to impress the Americans and ourselves." 57 US Ambassador Jefferson Caffery's evaluation of Egyptian neutrality was that "'(n)eutrality' as they see it is a policy of non-cooperation and not a commitment to any theory of foreign affairs. To them neutrality is the position of being able to play the field without commitments. . . . (T)he elite of the RCC conceive of 'neutrality' as an entirely controllable instrument of Egyptian foreign policy which can be turned on or off at will." 58
Egyptian neutrality blossomed into something meaningful only in 1955, when external stimuli such as the Bandung Conference provided new opportunities for Egyptian assertiveness in the international arena. In the interim a specifically Middle Eastern policy of greater importance took shape. This was the struggle against Western-aligned regional pacts and the concomitant effort to promote greater inter-Arab cooperation as an alternative to alliance with the West. In essence, it was opposition to a Western-linked system for Middle Eastern defense in 1954-1955, which sparked a policy of augmenting Arab solidarity under Egyptian initiative and in the process set the revolutionary regime on the path of Egyptian leadership of the Arab nationalist movement.
Through the intermittent discussions between Egypt and the Western powers in 1952-1954 concerning the creation of a regional defense organization, the Egyptian government's consistent position was that regional defense needed to be the collective prerogative of the Arabs themselves. 59 The issue acquired new urgency early in 1954, when it appeared that Iraq might break with formal Arab solidarity and join Turkey and Pakistan in a Western-oriented defense grouping. Such a prospect was repeatedly condemned by Egypt's leadership in 1954. Both government spokesmen and the Egyptian press repeatedly cautioned Iraq against being enticed into a Western-linked alliance that would weaken the Arab League and Arab solidarity. 60 The operative motive for this position as articulated by Egyptian spokesmen was primarily what such a Western-linked defense arrangement would mean for Egypt--its isolation in regional politics. Thus in April Nasser publicly warned that "any policy aimed at isolating some Arab states from the others would be strongly opposed" by Egypt. 61 Other Egyptian sources reiterated Nasser's belief that recent Western maneuvers were "designed [to] isolate Egypt." 62 In place of a Western-linked defense agreement, the Egyptian preference was for the strengthening of the Arab Collective Security Pact. 63 As Nasser put it to a Western journalist in August 1954, "the most effective way of defending this area is to leave it in the hands of the area's people." 64 Egyptian propaganda outlets emphasized this theme from mid-1954 onward:
| The "Voice of the Arabs" calls on the Arabs to stand in one rank in the face of imperialism, to expel the British, to cleanse the land of Arabdom from this plague, to obtain with their own money and to make for themselves arms which will repulse aggression, and and to maintain peace and justice. . . . This, O Arabs, is the policy of Egypt. 65 |
The demand for an independent Arab defense arrangement "based upon indigenous factors" rather than tied to the West was reiterated by Nasser and other spokesmen for the regime through the rest of 1954. 66
The crisis over the issue of independent versus Western-linked collective defense arrangements came in early 1955, when despite vehement Egyptian opposition Iraq formally aligned itself with pro-Western regional states and Great Britain in the Baghdad Pact. Egypt's reaction--propaganda attacks on Iraq and the Pact; hastily concluded defense agreements with Syria and Saudi Arabia; encouraging internal forces in other Arab countries, particularly Syria and Jordan, to resist efforts to bring these states into the Baghdad Pact system--marked the effective beginnings of the "Arabist" phase of Egyptian foreign policy during the Nasserist era. 67
Why this vehement opposition to the Baghdad Pact? The contemporary American interpretation of Nasser's and Egypt's motivation in opposing the Baghdad Pact upon its conclusion in early 1955 was that Egyptian opposition was prompted less by abstract devotion to the principle of Arab unity than by the practical concern that the Iraqi initiative was an attempt to isolate Egypt within Arab politics. As Ambassador Henry Byroade evaluated the Egyptian position in March 1955, "Nasser was not greatly upset by (the) fact that Iraq joined in (the) pact with Turkey;" what did upset him was the Iraqi attempt to draw other Arab countries into the arrangement, which Nasser viewed as both a step towards the longstanding goal of Iraqi-Syrian union and simultaneously an attempt to "isolate Egypt" in the Arab world. 68 He saw Egypt eventually isolated. . . . He admitted (the) man in the street had no feeling about all this but Egypt under his leadership would not be so isolated." 69
It was Nasser's perception of Egypt as "the victim of a Western policy designed to separate her from the Middle East" which Byroade credited with prompting Egypt's vehement opposition to the Baghdad Pact. 70
In a speech before a group of Army officers in March 1955, Nasser himself explained the new policy of regional assertiveness his government was developing in similar terms. The point of his remarks was that the realization of complete Egyptian independence was dependent on the achievement of a position of regional influence:
| All we want today is to create for ourselves an independent personality which will be strong and not dependent, which will be free to direct its domestic policy the way it wants and (to) direct its foreign policy in a way which serves its interests. . . . |
| If, God willing, we want to have an independent personality and develop it in the critical period we are in, we must steel ourselves. Our revolution calls for liberation and independence. This means liberation internally and externally, and that we must have an entity [sic] and an influence on what goes on around us. 71 |
Byroade's commentary on this speech found it "not surprising that Nasser as an Army officer places first and foremost in his foreign policy thinking the need for Egypt to develop its military and political 'personality' so that it can be truly 'independent'--i.e. can it achieve such a position of internal and external strength that it will never again be subject to big-power 'domination.' " 72
A parallel interpretation of the genesis of Egyptian regional activism in the mid-1950's has been voiced retrospectively by some of Nasser's associates who participated in the development of that policy. According to Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, it was during the negotiations with Great Britain over evacuation from the Suez Canal zone in 1952-1954 that Nasser came to the realization that genuine Egyptian independence depended not only on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Nile Valley; it also required preventing the perpetuation of foreign hegemony in the alternative form of a regional defense pact. 73 As Haykal phrased it, it was Nasser's concern for Egyptian independence which led him "to define the identity of Egypt in the environment in which it lived." 74 Egypt's Ambassador to Syria Mahmud Riyad has explained Nasser's regional thinking in much the same terms. Although Nasser had no definite Arab policy from the start, he became convinced in time that "the liberation of Egypt was connected with the liberation of the Arab states" and that Arab liberation would "aid Egypt" in its own struggle for national independence. 75 Thus to both Nasser and his closest associates involved in the formulation of Egyptian foreign policy in the mid-1950s, the adoption of an Arab nationalist orientation was a policy choice rooted in the utility of Arab solidarity for the achievement and maintenance of Egyptian independence.
The touchstone of the practical Egyptian position on Arab nationalism in the 1950s was the stance taken by the Egyptian government in regard to various proposals for Arab federation or unity. Egypt's leaders viewed proposals for Arab federation or unity with considerable skepticism in their early years in power. Muhammad Najib records that he regarded Iraqi suggestions concerning Arab federation in 1953 as "a fairy-tale" and that he told the Iraqis that "it is necessary [first] for us to unify our thoughts and our interests--then we can unify our countries." 76 In an interview of late 1953 Nasser similarly stated that he did not believe that current projects for Arab federation were realizable in view of Hashimite-Saudi historical enmities as well as the current foreign domination existing in many Arab countries. 77 When the Iraqis floated the idea of a formal Iraqi-Jordanian union before the Egyptians early in 1954, Nasser's view was that this was "premature"--foreign policy and defense coordination had to come before efforts at closer federation would be successful. 78 Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi similarly expressed skepticism when asked about the prospects for Arab federation early in 1954. 79 A few months later Nasser publicly spoke against the idea of Fertile Crescent unity on the grounds that it would isolate Egypt within the Arab world and thus "render the Arabs asunder." 80
It is in the regime's response to periodic Syrian efforts to establish closer links with Egypt in the mid-1950s that the practical Egyptian reserve about Arab unity can be seen most clearly. Fuelled primarily by the competitive dynamics of Syrian politics at the time, various Syrian leaders and parties put forth proposals for closer Syrian-Egyptian political integration in 1955-1956. The Egyptian response to these proposals was consistently negative. The first Syrian approach for Egyptian-Syrian union apparently came from Syrian Prime Minister Khalid al-'Azm early in 1955, in the context of Egyptian-Syrian collaboration in opposition to the Baghdad Pact. According to Mahmud Riyad, "there was absolutely no thought in my mind, or in Abdul Nasser's, in attempting constitutional union between Egypt and Syria at that time in the manner which 'Azm was calling for." 81 When later in 1955 the Syrian Parliament requested a secret commitment that Egypt would automatically come to the aid of Syria in case of attack by Israel as the price for the creation of a joint Syrian-Egyptian military command, Egypt refused to accede to the Syrian demand. 82 In August 1956 the Egyptian government declined to receive a Syrian delegation that wished to visit Egypt to discuss Egyptian-Syrian union. As relayed from a Syrian source, the reason given to the Syrians was the impeccably Egyptianist one that "Egypt has too many other pressing problems now." 83
Late 1956 was indeed a time of other pressing problems for Egypt. The momentous events of that year--Western refusal to support construction of a new dam at Aswan; the consequent Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal; the international crisis that ensued; and the combined British-French-Israeli military operation against Egypt of late 1956--fall outside the scope of this essay. But these events were not without major consequences for Egypt's relationship to Arab nationalism. By consolidating Nasser's personal prestige and position as unrivalled leader of the Arab world, the Suez crisis of 1956 moved Arab nationalist aspirations to a new level and led to the more intense efforts to attain meaningful Arab unity that marked the later 1950s.
Yet in retrospect Suez did not bring an immediate change in the regional stance and policies of the Egyptian government. Two detailed reports on private conversations with Nasser in the months after Suez had catapulted him to a position as hero of Arab nationalism show little change in the emphases of the Egyptian government from what they had been prior to the events of 1956. In December 1956 Nasser held a three-hour meeting with US Ambassador Raymond Hare. 84 According to Hare's record of this conversation (in which Nasser had been "just about as frank as we could expect"), Nasser told the ambassador that his first priority was to "build up (the) domestic economy" of Egypt; in Nasser's view "preoccupation with foreign affairs" only detracted from the demands of "essential domestic reform." Nasser understandably denied any aspiration for "empire over the Arab states" and asserted Egyptian involvement in the affairs of other Arab states to be reactive in character and aimed solely at the "avoidance [of] outside domination" of the Arab world.
Nasser's protestations of regional innocence made to a foreign diplomat cannot alone be taken as sufficient evidence of his position. But this conversation receives considerable corroboration in a memo of April 1957 by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal summarizing his own conversations with Nasser. 85 Like Hare, Haykal recalls Nasser according the internal struggle for economic progress the highest priority in his plans in 1957. In regard to Egyptian policy in the Arab world Nasser articulated a policy of regional caution and reserve: while he did wish to extend Egyptian contact with "progressive Arab forces," nonetheless he was leery of undertaking initiatives that would involve Egypt in unwanted crises. Despite the fact that Nasser anticipated that the crucial arena for Egypt in the immediate future was the Arab one ("as for the battle which will soon impose itself on us, it is the battle for the heart of the Arab world"), he expected regional turmoil to emerge as a result of Western efforts to counter Egyptian prestige and influence rather than because of Egyptian initiatives.
Egypt had neither the aspiration nor the expectation of achieving Arab unity after Suez. When Prime Minister Sabri al-'Asali of Syria raised the subject of unity with Nasser early in 1957, Nasser's response was that the Egyptian public had yet to be prepared for such a drastic step; in his view the realization of unity would take "at least five years." 86 Well into 1957 Nasser was publicly disavowing any Egyptian intention to establish an Arab "empire," 87 stating that "I am not thinking of in terms of [Arab] federation or confederation for the present," 88 and predicting that, due to current inter-Arab political rivalries, "Arab unity will take a long time to accomplish." 89 Even in early January 1958 only a few days before the inauguration of the negotiations that were to lead to Egyptian-Syrian unity later that month, Nasser told a Lebanese newspaper that Arab unification was unlikely to be realized in the immediate future. 90
Nasser's predictions were wrong. On January 12 1958, a delegation of Syrian Army officers reflecting the views of a recently-formed Military Council (but not the position of the civilian government of Syria) went to Egypt to plead for immediate Syrian-Egyptian unity as the only way to avoid political chaos in Syria.
Few Egyptian leaders were enthused about the idea of Egyptian unity with Syria in late 1957-early 1958. In Syria Ambassador Riyad had attempted to dissuade the Syrian military delegation from travelling to Egypt to seek unity. 91 When the delegation arrived, the Egyptian Mukhabarat cautioned about the practical obstacles of uniting two different Arab countries. 92 With the possible exception of 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amr, most of Nasser's associates appear to have either opposed or had strong reservations about union with Syria in January 1958. 93 Fathi Radwan's comment to Nasser on the eve of union captures the obvious and major problem that unity with Syria posed for Nasser and Egypt: "tomorrow you will become President of the Syrian state. Yet you have never set foot in it [Syria], and you don't know much about it." 94
Ultimately Nasser's position was the one that mattered. His initial reluctance about integral Egyptian-Syrian union is well-documented. He told Sayyid Mar'i at the time that "unity would be a large financial burden on the Egyptian budget" and simultaneously would draw Egypt into conflict with the Great Powers. 95 According to 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, Nasser's preference was still for a federal union for five years, after which the possibility of integral unity could be reconsidered. 96
When Nasser met with the Syrian delegation on January 15, he countered Syrian arguments in favor of unity with stating his own view that unity would be a burden for Egypt; eventually he stalled for time by telling the Syrians that he would respond only to an official request for unity made by the Syrian government rather than by a self-appointed military group. 97 Only when Foreign Minister Salah al-Din Bitar came to Egypt and belatedly endorsed the officers' call for unity on behalf of the Syrian government did Nasser make the decision to accede to the Syrian request for union.
Why did Nasser accept Egyptian-Syrian union in January 1958? Over the course of 1957, as Syria stumbled from one political crisis to another, Nasser appears to have become genuinely worried over the possibility of political disorder, civil strife, and possibly eventual Communist ascendancy within Syria. 98 The Syrian initiative itself created a new situation that Nasser could not evade: in view of the position of Arab leadership he had assumed over the past few years, Nasser realized that "circumstances compelled him to accept some sort of union." 99 Ali Sabri summarized the situation neatly; "they've placed us in a bind." 100 When both the Syrian military and Syrian politicians agreed to Nasser's stringent conditions for unity (the withdrawal of the Syrian Army from politics; the abolition of political parties in Syria; and a popular plebescite to ratify union) Nasser overcame his reservations and agreed to the integral union of Syria and Egypt. 101 Even then apprehension persisted: Nasser told Fathi Radwan that Syrian pressure had forced him to to accede to union even though he shared Radwan's own skepticism, 102 and he explained the union to his Cabinet as something forced upon him by circumstances. 103 He was equally apprehensive with US Ambassador Raymond Hare, telling him that "it's going to be a big headache, because we're not set for it. We have to do it but it'll be a big headache." 104 Such were the expectations with which the most important effort to realize the integral Arab unity of different Arab states, the United Arab Republic, was created.
In their early years in power, the leadership of the Egyptian revolutionary regime viewed Egyptian involvement in Arab nationalism through an Egyptian prism. The perceived needs of Egypt were the primary reasons offered as the basis for the effort to assert Egyptian leadership of the Arab nationalist movement. At least until 1958 the form of Arab nationalism manifested by Nasser and his colleagues retained a sharp sense of Egyptian separateness within the body of the Arab nation and perceived Egyptian involvement in Arab politics largely in terms of the furtherance of Egyptian purposes.
This policy of instrumental Arabism did not represent a radical departure from the positions taken by Egyptian governments on regional politics before the Revolution of 1952. When Egyptian policy-makers began to involve Egypt in regional issues such as the Palestine issue in the later 1930s, or when in the 1940s they took the lead in the creation of the League of Arab States and later went as far as to involve Egypt in war in the (unsuccessful) defense of Arab Palestine, the main considerations impelling Egyptian politicians toward regional involvement had been a similar concern for the defense of what were perceived to be Egyptian national interests and the assertion of Egyptian hegemony within an emerging regional state system. 105
To be sure, the revolutionary regime pursued a policy of Egyptian leadership of Arab nationalism with greater vigor and persistence than its predecessors. It also had greater success in asserting Egyptian leadership of Arab nationalism than prerevolutionary regimes. But the thrust of the preceding analysis is that, at least until the creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, the major difference between the new military regime and its civilian forerunners lay in the circumstances that permitted it to assume a position of Arab leadership (the recession of imperial control over regional politics after World War II; the Cold War and the leverage it offered smaller states; Nasser's own personal prestige acquired in his anti-imperialist successes of 1955-1956) than in the nationalist outlook of its leaders. It was calculations of opportunity and options that differed from earlier Egyptian regimes; motivating drives by and large did not.
The manner in which the new revolutionary regime in Egypt adopted an Arab nationalist position raises some interesting questions about interpreting nationalist politics. The "modernist" view of nationalism as the inexorable consequence of the massive transformations wrought by industrialism and print capitalism is of unquestioned value in understanding the social and intellectual aspects of nationalism. But it is of limited relevance when we seek to analyze the involved and shifting political positions taken by nationalist leaders. In terms of politics, the insights of John Breuilly, Sami Zubaida, and Roger Owen are more useful. For Breuilly nationalism is "best understood as an especially appropriate form of political behavior in the context of the modern state and the modern state system;" 106 nationalist behavior can thus best be understood within the context of the control of the state, the needs of the state, and the competition among states operating in the same environment. Zubaida has emphasized the central importance of the "modern political field," that "complex of political models, vocabularies, organiza tions and techniques [that comprise] a political field of organization, mobilization, agitation, and struggle" for understanding Middle Eastern politics. 107 It is this political field that sets the parameters within which political behavior unfolds, and in which "the conception of the nation becomes the field and the model in terms of which to think of . . . other commitments and loyalties." 108 For his part Roger Owen has emphasized the importance of the colonial state in establishing new territorial units that, whatever their original historical reality or artificiality, once created provide the framework for subsequent political activity: "methods of political organization and styles of political rhetoric are largely defined by the context. . . . From the colonial period on, this context was created by the territorial state." 109
I would suggest that it was a combination of the political field defined largely by the existence of an Egyptian territorial state, as well as the realities and imperatives of Egyptian state power, which were most important in determining the nationalist policies of the Egyptian government in the 1950s. It seems to have been the constraints imposed by the modern state--maintaining both domestic control versus serious rivals and relative position versus external rivals for regional influence--that bulked largest in shaping the "Arabist" policies of the Nasserist regime. Similarly, the regime's pursuit of Arab leadership as the best possible sphere for Egyptian national assertion and the enhancement of Egypt's international stature (what Nasser in 1955 phrased as the need for "an independent personality" and "an influence on what goes on around us") is inconceivable without the particular regional political field found in the Middle East in the postwar era, when several newly independent Arab states shared the common concerns of how to deal with the old problem of European imperialism as well as the new issues of the Cold War and Israel.
These considerations of state power, both domestic and international, were the primary factors generating the Arab nationalist policies pursued by the Egyptian regime in the 1950s. The assertion that "Pan-Arabism is little more than an ideology of interstate manouevre" 110 may be too strong for the Fertile Crescent, where the beginnings of a sense of Arab nationalism antedate the modern state system and where the foundations of individual states were shallow. But it comes closer to the mark for Egypt, where the option of involvement in the Arab nationalist movement developed well after the formation of the Egyptian state and where the existing territorial state was the dominant element in the political field."
Notes:
Note 1: Egypt, Ministry of National Guidance, Majmu'at Khutub wa Tasrihat wa Bayanat al-Ra'is Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir (multivol; Cairo, n.d.), 1:155. Back.
Note 3: Speech of 22 July 1955, as quoted in Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt (New York, 1960), 225. Back.
Note 4: United Arab Republic, State Information Service, The Charter (Cairo, n.d.), 9-10, 22. Back.
Note 5: Quoted in Jean Lacouture, Nasser (New York, 1973), 190. Back.
Note 6: See Georges Vaucher, Gamal Abdel Nasser et son Equipe (Paris, 1959), 56-67; Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York, 1958), 460; Vatikiotis, Nasser, 28-29. Back.
Note 7: Husayn Mu'nis, Misr wa Risalatuha (Cairo, 1956 or 1957), 3-6. Back.
Note 8: Majmu'at Khutub, 1:277-278. Back.
Note 92: Marlene Nasr, al-Tasawwur al-Qawmi al-'Arabi fi Fikr Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, 1952-1970 (Beirut, 1982), 104-113. Back.
Note 10: Majmu'at Khutub, 1:564. Back.
Note 11: Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo, 1959), 62; Majmu'at Khutub, 1:650-654. Back.
Note 12: Nasser, Philosophy, 63. Back.
Note 13: Nasr, Tasawwur, 91-92; Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Milaffat al-Suwis (Cairo, 1986), 196-197. Back.
Note 14: Nasser, Philosophy, 63. Back.
Note 16: See Vaucher, Nasser, 50-67, 96-104; Nasr, Tasawwur, 93-98. Back.
Note17: Haykal, Milaffat, 284-285. Back.
Note 18: As cited in Fu'ad Matar, Bi-Saraha 'an 'Abd al-Nasir: Hiwar ma'a Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal (Beirut, 1975), 137. Back.
Note 19: For their frequency of usage, see Nasr, Tasawwur, 128, 214, 280. Back.
Note 20: Ibid., 209-212. Back.
Note 21: Majmu'at Khutub, 1:177. Back.
Note 24: See Haykal, Milaffat, 197; Mahmud Riyad, Mudhakkirat Mahmud Riyad, 1948-1978 (3 vols.: Cairo, 1985-1986), 2:67; Majmu'at Khutub, 1:55-59, 444-445, 641-645, 650-654. Back.
Note 27: Ibid., 501; also 548. Back.
Note 28: Ibid., 641-643, 643-645, 645-646. Back.
Note 29: Ibid., 645-646, 699-700. Back.
Note 30: Ibid., 654, 742. Back.
Note 32: Nasser, Philosophy, 59-60, 76-78. Back.
Note 33: . Lacouture, Egypt, 458-459. Back.
Note 34: Majmu'at Khutub, 1:579 (italics mine). Back.
Note 35: Nasr, Tasawwur, 344-348. Back.
Note 36: Ibid., 349-350. Back.
Note 37: Marlene Nasr, "Tatawwur al-Qawmi al-'Arabi," in Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim (ed.), Misr wa al-Qawmiyya wa Thawrat Yulyu (2d. ed., Cairo, 1983), 53-81, especially 77-79. Back.
Note 38: Marlene Nasr, "al-Qawmiyya wa al-Din fi Fikr 'Abd al-Nasir," in ibid., 93-101. Back.
Note 39: Haykal, Milaffat, 314-315. Back.
Note 40: . Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Li-Misr La Li-'Abd al-Nasir (Cairo, 1987), 104-106; see also Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo Documents (New York, 1973), 20-21. Back.
Note 41: Despatch of 12 June 1954, US/State 674.86A, 6-1254; military weekly report, 20 August 1954, US/State, 774.00(W), 8-2054. Back.
Note 42: Discussed in P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington, 1961), 191-193. Back.
Note 43: "A General Survey of Nasser's Foreign Policy," African Department, 30 August 1957; Great Britain, Public Records Office, FO 371/125427, JE1023/24. Back.
Note 44: See Ghada Hashem Talhami, Palestine and Egyptian National Identity (New York, 1992), 70, 77, 161. Back.
Note 45: Speech in Aleppo, 15 October 1960; Majmu'at Khutub, 2:266. Back.
Note 47: Discussed in depth in Joel Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution (New York, 1992). Back.
Note 48: Caffery to State, 5 September 1952, US/State, 774.00, 9-552; Caffery to State, 24 July 1953, US/State, 774.00, 7-2453. Back.
Note 49: For examples see 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi (2 vols.; Cairo, 1977), 1:195-196; Ahmad Hamrush, Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu (2d ed., 5 vols.; Cairo, 1983), 2:26; Khalid Muhyi al-Din, Wa Al-An Atakallimu (Cairo, 1992), 192. Back.
Note 50: . Majmu'at Khutub, 1, 3, 30. Back.
Note 51: Nasser, Philosophy, 43. Back.
Note 52: Muhammad Najib, Mudhakkirat Muhammad Najib: Kuntu Ra'isan Li-Misr (Cairo, 1984), 278-290. Back.
Note 53: Military weekly report, 17 December 1953, US/State, 774.00(W), 12-1853. Back.
Note 54: Despatch of 27 January 1954, US/State, 674.00, 1-2754. Back.
Note 55: Military weekly report, 12 February 1954, US/State, 774.00(W), 2-1254. Back.
Note 56: Military weekly report, 23 April 1954, US/State, 774.00(W), 4-2354. Back.
Note 57: Despatch from Stevenson, 12 January 1954; FO 371/108349, JE1022/3. Back.
Note 5: Caffery to State, 9 January 1954, US/State, 674.0021, 1-954. Back.
Note 59: Haykal, Milaffat, 185-187; Najib, Mudhakkirat, 316-322. Back.
Note 60: US/State, 674.00, 2-2054; US/State, 5-2454; FO 371/108349, JE1022/4. Back.
Note 61: Despatch of 20 April 1954, US/State, 674.00, 4-2054. Back.
Note 62: Government sources as cited in US/State, 774.5, 5-2854. Back.
Note 63: al-Jumhuriyya, 23 May 1954, quoted in US/State, 774.00, 5-2454. Back.
Note 64: Interview with John Law, 5 August 1954, in despatch of 13 August 1954, US/State, 774.00, 8-1354. Back.
Note 65: As quoted in Seale, Struggle for Syria, 194. Back.
Note 66: US/State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 (hereafter FRUS) (2 vols.; Washington, 1982, 1986), 2319-2322; US/State 674.00, 9-354; 774.00, 12-1754. Back.
Note 67: For a detailed account, see Riyad, Mudhakkirat, 2:101-112. Back.
Note 68: Byroade to State, 11 March 1955, US/State, 774.00, 3-1155. Back.
Note 70: Byroade to State, 4 April 1955, US/State, 774.00, 4-1455. Back.
Note 71: Translated in US/State, Despatch of 29 March 1955, US/State, 674.00, 4-455. Back.
Note 72: Despatch of 4 April 1955, US/State, 674.00, 4/1455. Back.
Note 73: Haykal, Milaffat, 185-187. Back.
Note 74: Ibid., 282-283. Back.
Note 75: Riyad, Mudhakkirat, 2:41-42. Back.
Note 76: Najib, Mudhakkirat, 340-341. Back.
Note 77: Lacouture, Nasser, 185-186. Back.
Note 78: Riyad, Mudhakkirat, 2:51. Back.
Note 79: Caffery to State, 23 February 1954, US/State, 674.00, 2-2354. Back.
Note 80: Despatch of 12 June 1954, US/State, 674.83, 5-2454. Back.
Note 81: Riyad, Mudhakkirat, 2:108. Back.
Note 82: Ibid., 121-123. Back.
Note 83: Moose to State, 9 August 1956, US/State, 674.83, 8-956. Back.
Note 84: Despatch from Hare, 16 December 1956; US/State, 674.00, 12-1656. Back.
Note 85: Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Sanawat al-Ghalayan (Cairo, 1988), 199-204. Back.
Note 86: Riyad, Mudhakkirat, 2:202. Back.
Note 87: Majmu'at Khutub, 1:619. Back.
Note 88: Interview of March 1957 as quoted in Robert Stephens, Nasser: A Political Biography (New York, 1971), 272. Back.
Note 89: Speech of July 1957 as quoted in US/State, 674.00, 7-2757. Back.
Note 90: Majmu'at Khutub, 1:771. Back.
Note 91: Yost to State, 14 January 1958, US/State, 674.83, 1-1458; same to same, 15 January 1958, US/State, 674.83, 1-1558. Back.
Note 92: Hamrush, Qissat, 3:49, and 4:87-88. Back.
Note 93: See Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat, 2:34-38; Sayyid Mar'i, Awraq Siyasiyya (3 vols.; Cairo, 1979), 2:397-399; Fathi Radwan, 72 Shahran ma'a 'Abd al-Nasir (Cairo, 1985), 99; Riyad, Mudhakkirat, 2:199-201; also Mahmud Fawzi, Thuwwar Yulyu Yatahaddathun (Cairo, 1988), 38, 55-56; Sami Jawhar, al-Samitun Yatakalllimu (Cairo, 1975), 50. Back.
Note 94: Radwan, 72 Shahran, 104. Back.
Note 95: Mar'i, Awraq, 2:397. Back.
Note 96: Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat, 2:36. Back.
Note 97: Haykal, Sanawat, 271-277; Riyad, Mudhakkirat, 2:215-217. Back.
Note 98: For material to this effect, see US/State, 674.83, 9-657; FO 371/131328, JE1022/10; Haykal as cited in Matar, Bi-Saraha, 138-139; Haykal, Sanawat, 266-269. Back.
Note 100: Quoted in Radwan, 72 Shahran, 99. Back.
Note 101: Yost to State, 30 January 1958, US/State, 674.83, 1-3058; Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat, 2:36; Hamrush, Qissat, 3:49-50. Back.
Note 102: Radwan, 72 Shahran, 103. Back.
Note 103: Mar'i, Awraq, 2:399. Back.
Note 104: Eisenhower Library, Raymond Hare Oral History. Back.
Note 105: For a discussion of Egyptian regional policies from 1936 to 1945, see Gershoni and Jankowski, Egyptian Nation; for the later 1940s, see Thomas Mayer, "Egypt's 1948 Invasion of Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies, 22 (1986): 20-36. Back.
Note 106: Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 1. Back.
Note 107: Zubaida, Islam, 145-146. Back.
Note 109: Owen, State, Power, and Politics, 20. Back.
Note 110: Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics (Austin, 1994), 177. Back.
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