Ethnopolitics in the New Europe: Conclusion

Ethnopolitics in the New Europe, by John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning

7. Conclusion

The previous chapters surveyed the development and behavior of the principal ethnopolitical parties in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium, and Great Britain in order to compile the necessary information to assess the six expectations that were presented in Chapter 1. The cases were selected on the basis of several reasons: All of them represent ethnically divided states where there are a few large ethnic groups in competition with one another, all of which are geographically concentrated (thus controlling for sociocultural structure); all represent parliamentary systems (thus controlling for the effects of presidentialism); and, finally, all have ethnic kin states across the border.

To assess the six expectations in Chapter 1, Table 7.1 outlines the results for the “dependent” variable of ethnopolitical party behavior, primarily conceptualized as the degree to which the party demanded the rearrangement of the existing political order. This behavior can range from demands for more equitable treatment without altering the basic features of the state to outright demands for a separate state altogether. For the purposes of comparison, each party surveyed in this study was coded using Joseph Rudolph and Robert Thompson’s criteria: zero (0) for output oriented parties; one (1) for antiauthority parties; two (2) for antiregime parties; and three (3) for anticommunity parties.

Table 7.1 Ethnopolitical Party Behavior


Country	Party/Coalition	Orientation Regarding Arrangement of State^a

Bulgaria	MRF	0
Slovakia	Coexistence HCDM HCP	2 1 1
Estonia	Russian Party of Estonia Russian People’s Party of Estonia	1 1
Latvia	Russian Citizens of Latvia Party	0
Belgium	Volksunie Vlaams Blok	2 3
United Kingdom	SNP Plaid Cymru	2 2

Note: a. 0 = output-oriented parties; 1 = antiauthority parties; 2 = antiregime parties; 3 = anticommunity parties.

As indicated in Table 7.1, the Eastern European ethnopolitical parties that are least inclined to demand a fundamental restructuring of the state are the MRF in Bulgaria and the Russian Citizens of Latvia Party. In both cases, the ethnopolitical parties have been satisfied with criticizing the existing political authorities for not doing enough for the community that they purport to represent, focusing largely on government outputs (such as guarantees for language and educational rights), as opposed to reordering the political structure. In addition, the HCDM and the HCP in Slovakia and the largest Russophone parties in Estonia have opposed the existing authorities, but these appeals have generally fallen short of demands for political autonomy. The most radical parties, at least in terms of their demands for political autonomy, are Coexistence in Slovakia and the more radical Russophone parties in Estonia, although the latter are relatively weak and unrepresented at the national level. For the West European cases of Belgium and Britain, the Volksunie represents a party that has demanded autonomy for the Flemish population, as have the SNP and Plaid Cymru, although Plaid Cymru has only recently abandoned the consideration of extraconstitutional means to gain political ends. These three parties are similar in their demands to the most radical parties in Slovakia and Estonia. Moreover, the single most radical party of all is the Vlaams Blok, which has demanded the outright independence of Flanders from Belgium.

At first glance, when comparing all of the cases, the most striking observation is that the Western European ethnopolitical parties are generally more radical in their political demands than their Eastern European counterparts. In other words, controlling for the presence of ethnic kin states across the border, parliamentary systems, and territorially concentrated ethnic communities, the ethnopolitical parties in the consolidated democracies are more likely to be radical than those in transitional systems (contrary to Expectation 1 in Chapter 1). This is a somewhat surprising finding, for we originally expected that, because of the frustrations accumulated under a previous authoritarian regime, the ethnopolitical parties in countries in transition would be more extremist than parties in consolidated democracies. However, this is not an entirely inexplicable finding. Indeed, as illustrated in the preceding chapters, many of the leaders of ethnopolitical parties in transitional systems, such as Ahmed Dogan of the MRF, are concerned that if the house catches fire, then the entire political system will burn down. This attitude has also been exemplified by the Hungarian parties in Slovakia (especially the HCDM and the HCP), which have been quite hesitant to press forward demands for political autonomy despite the anti-Hungarian measures adopted by the Meciar government, lest this provide fodder for Slovak nationalists. For the Russophone parties as well, especially in Estonia, where the perception that there is nowhere else to go is most apparent, there is a reluctance to pressure the government for further concessions, particularly on the part of the Russophone parties now represented in the Riigikogu.

Such reluctance is not so apparent, though, in ethnopolitical parties in consolidated democracies, such as Belgium and Britain. Indeed, these parties can press their demands for autonomy and/or independence without fear of igniting a conflagration. Thus, for instance, for the Vlaams Blok, peaceful separation along the Czechoslovak model is held out for emulation. Unlike transitional systems where demands for autonomy are perceived as “extreme” and “threatening” by even the ethnopolitical parties, such demands in Western Europe are viewed as “democratic.” Hence it is more likely that Western European ethnopolitical parties are encouraged by the strength of the existing system to make even more extreme demands. Table 7.2 summarizes these findings for Expectation 1, as well as for the remaining expectations listed in Chapter 1.

Table 7.2 Were Expectations^a Supported?


Expectations	Bulgaria and Slovakia	Estonia and Latvia	Belgium and Britain

Expectation 1	No	No	No
Expectation 2a	No	No	Yes
Expectation 2b	No	No	Mixed
Expectation 3	No	No	No
Expectation 4a	Yes	Yes	No
Expectation 4b	Yes	Yes	Yes
Expectation 5	Yes	Yes	Yes
Expectation 6	Yes	n.a	Yes

Note: a. See Expectations 1-6 in Chapter 1, pp. 15-16, for a precise rendering of initial hypotheses.

Expectations 2a and 2b held that the larger the gap in the economic performance among ethnic groups and the greater the overall shrinkage in the economic pie, the more likely it would be that the ethnopolitical party representing the minority group would engage in extremist behavior. However, the evidence from the Eastern European cases does not generally support these contentions. For instance, although unemployment has been generally high for both the Turks in Bulgaria and the Hungarians in Slovakia in comparison to ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Slovaks, following the end of Communist rule, the Hungarian parties in Slovakia have been much more radical in their demands for autonomy than has the MRF in Bulgaria, which contradicts Expectation 2a. Moreover, the level of overall economic contraction in both countries is similarly high, caused in part by the shock of the demise of the CMEA and the disappearance of markets for tobacco and other consumer products in Bulgaria and arms in Slovakia (counter to both Expectations 2b and 3).

Where the Bulgarian and Slovakian cases differ is in the form of political representation and the structure of competition (Expectations 4a, 4b, and 5). In the Bulgarian case, the fact that the MRF was able not only to gain a significant amount of representation in Parliament in the initial parliamentary election, but also to play a pivotal role as the political broker between the Bulgarian socialists and the democratic opposition afforded the party’s leadership much greater influence on policy than the Hungarian parties have in Slovakia. Moreover, the MRF faced little competition for the allegiance of the Turkish population (largely due to the law that forbade the participation of ethnic parties, which the MRF had cleverly circumvented), and the anti-Turkish Bulgarian nationalists were only weakly represented in government (in support of Expectation 5). Taken together, this meant that the MRF leadership could afford to pursue a moderate, accommodationist approach to the BSP and the UDF (both of which needed the MRF in order to govern) from 1990 to 1994 and had little to fear from either anti-Turkish parties or potential competitors for Turkish votes.

For the Hungarian parties, there were different conditions. In the initial elections in Slovakia, although the Hungarian parties (i.e., Coexistence and the HCDM) had gained representation in the Slovak National Council, they played only a marginal role and did not have the political clout to block important legislation. Indeed, unlike in Bulgaria, where the MRF was actively courted as a coalition partner, the Hungarian parties in Slovakia were treated as pariahs with whom even the more moderate Slovak parties were reluctant to cooperate. Hence, although in Bulgaria there has existed a continual incentive for the MRF to rely on parliamentary means to advance its cause, in Slovakia, the strategy adopted by the Slovak Hungarian parties is similar to that adopted by outsider groups—namely, mass protest. Further, contrary to the situation in Bulgaria, Slovak Nationalists dominate the current political process. Coupled with the Hungarian socialist government’s seeming disinterest in promoting the interests of Hungarians outside of Hungary, the Slovak Hungarian parties are isolated and marginalized and face the threat of renewed intolerant Slovak nationalism alone. Thus, it is little wonder that the Slovak Hungarian parties, even the most moderate ones, have pressed their demands for some form of regional political autonomy.

Another explanation for the relatively moderate strategy adopted by the MRF as compared to the Hungarian parties in Slovakia is that it is more internally diverse, a product of the pretransition developments (which supports Expectation 6). Represented within the MRF leadership are not only ethnic Turks, but Pomaks and Bulgarians as well. Further, especially until 1994, the MRF represented a broad coalition of Bulgarian Turkish politicians, ranging from those who favored some form of national-cultural autonomy to those who wished to maintain the commitment to multiethnic principles. This has meant that the MRF leadership must chart a middle course, making relatively forceful demands on the cultural front (particularly over language issues) while categorically rejecting any demands for cultural or political autonomy. Conversely, in Slovakia, the various subethnic political cleavages are represented by separate parties. Hence, within the parties (particularly Coexistence), there is less in the way of internal diversity, as well as a weaker internal “brake” on the actions of party leaders.

Turning to the next pair of cases, Estonia and Latvia, there are a number of observable similarities. First, ethnopolitics in both is greatly affected by external relations with the Russian Federation, especially since that ethnic kin state has taken an active interest in the welfare of the Russophone population. Second, in both Estonia and Latvia, Russophones constitute a very large proportion of the population (a fact that has led Baltic nationalists to view them as a threat to the cultural integrity of the titular nationality) that consists of relatively recent arrivals in the Baltics. Indeed, whereas the multiethnic Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rulerships had ended in Bulgaria and Slovakia long before the democratic transition, the demise of the Soviet system coincided with democratic transition in the Baltic states. This has meant that, unlike the Turkish population in Bulgaria and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the Russophones in the Baltics lack a clear and fully developed identity as a community, beyond some lingering attachment to symbols of the Soviet past. Moreover, like other post-Communist states, both Estonia and Latvia have suffered economic difficulties associated with the transition (although the recovery has occurred sooner in Estonia than in Latvia), and Russophone populations in both states have suffered economic hardships following independence (although this is more pronounced in Estonia than in Latvia). Despite these general similarities, the development of the Russophone ethnopolitical parties of Estonia has been quite different from the experience in Latvia (counter to Expectations 2a, 2b, and 3).

In Estonia, the level of ethnopolitical party development has been far higher than in Latvia, despite similarly high levels of Russophone discontent with the activities of their respective governments regarding language and citizenship issues. To a large extent, this differential level of development was due to different experiences regarding the evolution of transitional politics prior to independence, marked by the emergence of a partially articulated party system prior to independence in Estonia, and the lack of one in Latvia.

Moreover, the Russophone political parties have generally been more aggressive in Estonia than in Latvia in terms of making demands for political autonomy for regions where Russophones comprise a majority of the population (particularly around Narva and Sillimae), the high point occurring with the local government-sponsored referendum on political autonomy in 1993. In Latvia, on the other hand, Russophones have thus far been content with focusing on the defense of language, educational, and cultural rights without seeking the fundamental restructuring of the postindependence political system.

However, the potential for more radical demands on the part of Russophones is probably far greater in Latvia than in Estonia. This is because Russophones in Estonia have not only gained representation in post-Soviet Estonian politics, especially after the local elections of 1993 and the parliamentary election of 1995, but the parties that represent the most moderate elements have emerged to become the political voice of the Russophone population. In Latvia, in contrast, Russophones remain essentially excluded from the political process: They have neither an independent voice nor moderate political parties that can channel demands into constructive directions (supporting Expectations 4a and 4b). Further, whereas the Estonian nationalists who had dominated the political process from 1991 to 1995 and had pushed for the most onerous legislation on language and citizenship (at least from the perspective of the Russophone population) suffered a political setback in the parliamentary election in 1995, the Latvian nationalists made significant gains just a year earlier. Thus the Russophone parties in Latvia have little recourse other than to continue to rely on other organizations to defend the interests of their community or, more ominously, to increasingly depend on the intervention of Moscow to promote their interests in postindependence Latvian politics (supporting Expectation 5). Although the current leadership of the Russophone population in Latvia does not appear to be inclined toward making demands for the fundamental restructuring of the Latvian state, this seems due to the fact that the Russophone population has yet to develop both a consciousness as a distinct group and the organizations necessary to articulate growing dissatisfaction with the present regime.

The Western European cases of Belgium and Great Britain exhibit both similarities to and notable differences from the Eastern European and Baltic cases. Importantly, gaps in economic performance between the Flemish and Walloon regions appear to have fueled ethnopolitical demands. However, rather than economic downturn prompting greater extremism, the Volksunie emerged as Flanders was in the process of catching up with, and eventually surpassing, Wallonia. The Vlaams Blok emerged in the late 1970s, when Western European economies were experiencing difficulties, but its emergence is less associated with economic dynamics than with the fact that the Belgian electoral system provides easy access for new parties. In short, there was little to no incentive for the Flemish nationalists to settle their differences and stick together as one party. In Britain, the economic differential between Scotland and Wales, on the one hand, and the rest of United Kingdom, on the other, has always been mediated by investment and subsidies. Despite remaining differences between Scotland and Wales and the rest of Britain, such efforts have lessened the possibilities of utilizing economic differentials for ethnopolitical ends (supporting Expectation 2a, but not Expectation 2b).

Regional integration has not led the Western European states to more moderate ethnopolitics: Belgium was a founding member of the EU, while Britain joined only in 1973. The former is more economically tied into the EU and Europe as a whole. Yet it is in Belgium where we find the more extremist ethnopolitical party (thus contradicting Expectation 3).

In addition, the scope of representation appears to have radicalized Flemish ethnopolitics as compared to its Scottish and Welsh counterparts. The Belgian political system makes it relatively easy for new political parties to gain representation in Parliament, thus providing little incentive for disgruntled members of any party, say the Volksunie, to remain within that party, as opposed to breaking another away to form another group, such as the more radical Vlaams Blok. The SNP and Plaid Cymru, on the other hand, have struggled to gain representation in Britain’s single-member district system. Differences have at times led to difficulties within the party, but the SNP’s main competitor today is not an ethnopolitical party, but the Scottish Constitutional Convention, a coalition of a wide array of organizations. The parliamentary seats the SNP has been able to hold have often been the result of by-elections and have generally been quickly lost in subsequent elections. It has only occasionally been able to hold on to seats across multiple general elections. The British electoral system is based on individual competition, rather than on party program; and an ethnic party, almost by definition, campaigns on a program—specifically, its ethnopolitical demands.

Similarly, the moderation of the Welsh nationalist movement is also the product of electoral competition. Although Welsh romantic nationalists in the twentieth century have often showed a willingness to employ extraconstitutional tactics to attain political ends, the incentives presented by the well-entrenched nature of the political institutions in Britain contributed over time to the recent moderation of Plaid Cymru. In order to appeal successfully to a larger constituency, the party must play by the rules of the democratic game. The party cannot give in to frustration and extremist rhetoric if it wants to position itself as a credible alternative.

Belgium’s proportional representation, in contrast, promotes group competition through its party list system (contradicting Expectation 4a and supporting Expectations 4b and 6). Lastly, the Flemish perception that the government is dominated by Walloon interests endures, despite real changes that have taken place within the Belgian political system. The British political system appears more moderate and pragmatic in comparison: From the early days of the union, there was Scottish political representation and attention for Scottish economic interests. Although Scots have not always been convinced that the London government reacted promptly to the problems their regions faced, it would be difficult for them to argue that the government ignored their interests in favor of those of the English (supporting Expectation 5).

In searching for the common denominator that appears to explain the development and behavior of the ethnopolitical parties in both the Eastern and Western European cases, the most compelling set of factors relates to the form of representation. In particular, both the scope and the quality of representation appear to have played important roles in affecting the development and behavior of the ethnopolitical parties and, hence, the tenor of ethnopolitics. However, in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, the crucial variable appears to be the scope of representation. Thus, the primary difference between the MRF and the Hungarian parties in Slovakia is that the former was not only able to gain entrance into the political system, but that it was able to play a politically effective role as the balancer between two diametrically opposed poles. In Slovakia, on the other hand, although the Hungarian parties were able to gain representation, they were not afforded a pivotal role in post-Communist and postindependence politics. In sum, effective inclusion has served to provide the MRF with some stake in preserving the existing political system, hence leading to relatively moderate behavior; whereas in Slovakia, inclusion without influence has led to demands for the ethnic restructuring of the post-Communist political order.

In the Baltic states, the fact that the Russophone parties in Estonia gained representation in the political system and that in Latvia they did not appears to explain, at least in part, the differential paths followed by the Russophone parties. In the former, inclusion in the local elections of 1993 set the stage for the victory of moderate Russophone parties grouped in the Our Home Is Estonia coalition in 1995. In the latter case, exclusion in 1994 led to the greater potential for more extreme demands to be made by Latvian Russophones.

It should be noted that representation alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for ethnopolitical party behavior. The degree to which a relatively more inclusive scope of representation mitigates more extreme ethnopolitical demands depends on other variables, most notably, whether a single party or multiple parties that purport to represent the ethnic group exist and whether nationalists from the titular nationality hold a considerable degree of political influence. When the scope of representation is inclusive, when only one party represents the ethnic group, and when nationalists from the other side are weak (as in Bulgaria), it is likely that the ethnopolitical party will make only very moderate demands. When the scope of representation is inclusive, when several parties represent the ethnic group, and when nationalists from the other side are strong (as in Slovakia), the ethnopolitical party will likely demand some form of political and cultural autonomy (as in Slovakia and Estonia). Finally, when the scope of representation is exclusive, when numerous weak parties represent the ethnic group, and when titular nationalists are strong (as in Latvia), the ethnopolitical parties will likely demand something more than autonomy and are apt to turn to external support to push forward their agenda.

In the Western European cases, the form of representation affected the evolution and behavior of the ethnopolitical parties as well. In Belgium, the existence of a list proportional representation law, based as it is on a broad scope of representation and an emphasis on representing groups rather than individuals, has had two effects: First, the inclusive scope of representation has led to the effective split in the Flemish ethnopolitical movement into two distinctive parties, the Volksunie and the Vlaams Blok, each of which appeals to different segments of the Flemish population. Indeed, although the Scottish, Welsh, and Flemish movements have historically had their share of romantic nationalists and pragmatic politicians, in Belgium the romantic nationalists have fared much better politically than their counterparts in Scotland and Wales. In Scotland, the existence of a single-member district system also means that to compete, the SNP and Plaid Cymru have had to moderate their demands in order to secure representation. Second, the single-member district system has meant an emphasis on personality and the individual appeal of candidates, rather than on a program of independence for Scotland or Wales.

Overall, then, the political institutions and, more specifically, the electoral laws, have had a significant impact on the course taken by the ethnopolitical parties in all of the cases surveyed. Interestingly, in the Eastern European and Baltic cases, a broader scope of representation has been helpful in moderating the ethnopolitical demands, whereas in Western Europe, it has served to embolden the Flemish ethnopolitical parties. This suggests that the impact of the scope of representation may be different in transitional versus consolidated democracies. In other words, neither a proportional representation nor a single-member district system is a panacea for plural societies in general. Whereas a broader scope of representation appears important in containing ethnopolitical demands in transitional democracies, it does not appear to function in a similar fashion in the consolidated democracies of Western Europe. There, the greater hurdles presented by Britain’s single-member district system, coupled with the relatively accommodative policies the London government has pursued across time, appear to have resulted in a persistent but moderate Scottish ethnopolitics. Had the London government been less accommodative, however, the appeal of the SNP to the Scottish voter might have been stronger, but the incentive for the party to maintain a united front would not have increased. Put differently, the stronger economic grievances of the Flemish as compared to the Scots cannot fully explain why the former’s ethnopolitical demands radicalized while the latter’s did not. Rather, the opportunities provided by their respective electoral systems provide the more compelling explanation. Thus, the absence in consolidated democracies of the fear that the entire system might collapse if ethnopolitical demands are presented in too radical terms explains why the Flemish see no reason to moderate their demands. Conversely, for the ethnopolitical parties in the transitional democracies of Eastern Europe, political representation is a hard-won good that must be approached with care. In addition to the interests of the ethnic group, another interest is paramount: the survival of the political system itself.

Ethnically plural states present those governing them with challenges that more homogeneous societies do not face. However, like other parties, ethnopolitical parties respond to incentives. The ethnopolitical parties surveyed herein, therefore, appear to navigate their respective political landscapes with an acute awareness of the circumstances they face. Although the specific subset of cases that have been the subject of this work—ethnically bipolar countries in Europe—limits the generalizability of the conclusions, it is readily apparent that in both consolidated and transitional democracies, ethnopolitical parties are, in the first instance, committed to the legislative dance. The challenge for the future will be to keep them on the dance floor, because they are likely to be impatient wallflowers.

Ethnopolitics in the New Europe