Ethnopolitics in the new Europe: Chapter 5

Ethnopolitics in the new Europe, by John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning

5. The Volksunie and the Vlaams Blok in Belgium

Within the Flemish movement, there have long been differences of opinion regarding its end goal and ideology. The experiences of Flemish-speaking troops serving under French-speaking officers in the trenches at the IJzer Front during World War I convinced many Flemish soldiers to support a movement that sought to enhance the rights and opportunities of their people but left unclear what the ultimate aim should be: Moderates desired greater autonomy, whereas radicals desired political independence. The first Flemish ethnopolitical party to gain seats in Parliament dates from the first election after that war. Earlier, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Flemish nationalists had endeavored to get their voices heard within existing parties and had close ties with the left. During the interwar years, the first independent Flemish ethnopolitical party began to associate itself with Nazi ideology.

This gave the Flemish movement a dual heritage that still divides the movement today: left-leaning ideological ties as well as extreme rightist views. These differences were contained within one party until the emergence of the Vlaams Blok in 1978. Although the Vlaams Blok initially remained a small party, it was able to gain representation in Parliament relatively easily, for Belgium’s proportional representation system allows such access to new parties.

The seeds of ethnopolitics were present at the inception of the Belgian state. It is one of the younger states of Western Europe, gaining its independence in 1830 after a revolt against Dutch rule, which had begun only about fifteen years earlier. At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, the Low Countries were united into one kingdom. The north had been a sovereign entity since 1648, whereas the south was known first as the Spanish Netherlands, then as the Austrian Netherlands. The adoption of French as the Belgian national language in 1830 may have been a logical reaction to years of Spanish, Austrian, and, most immediately, Dutch dominance, but as time passed, the Flemish segment of the population became more vocal in its demands for recognition of its language and cultural heritage.

French was spoken by the elites and the population of the southern part of the state, Wallonia. Dutch dialects were spoken by the population in the northern part of the state, Flanders. Yet the conflict between the Flemish- and French-speaking communities that came to define politics in Belgium was not necessarily inevitable. Flemish ethnopolitics arose in reaction to the efforts of the French-speaking elites to create a French-speaking Belgian state and initially remained a sociocultural movement among select Flemish elites.

The conflict can thus be said to reflect the failure of the dominant group to impose its language and culture on the entire country. Perhaps too many factors conspired against its success: As one of Europe’s younger states, it attained its independence through the intervention of the Concert of Europe and acquired a German prince as its king. ₁ This, coupled with Wallonia’s early industrialization while Flanders remained agricultural and, later, Flanders’ economic rise while Wallonia’s industry declined, did not make it easier to weld a unified nation out of such different parts.

Historical Background

The conflict can thus be said to reflect the failure of the dominant group to impose its language and culture on the entire country. Perhaps too many factors conspired against its success: As one of Europe’s younger states, it attained its independence through the intervention of the Concert of Europe and acquired a German prince as its king.1 This, coupled with Wallonia’s early industrialization while Flanders remained agricultural and, later, Flanders’ economic rise while Wallonia’s industry declined, did not make it easier to weld a unified nation out of such different parts.

Since its early days, Flemish ethnopolitics has focused on linguistic issues to express the unequal status of Flemish- or Dutch-speaking versus French-speaking Belgian citizens. ₂ Yet the issues that divide the two groups are not fundamentally about the right to use Flemish in official environments: Language became the metaphor that expressed the Flemish sense of exclusion within their own country. ₃

Using language to express political grievances was perhaps a logical choice for the Flemish movement. First, King William I used the Dutch language in his efforts to unify the Low Countries. According to Arthur Vermeersch, this king “estimated the value of the Dutch language as a unifying factor to be very high” and instituted a language policy that reflected this view. ₄ Dutch was declared to be the official language, although its use was not initially compulsory. However, Flemish elites had increasingly adopted French and often regarded Dutch with disdain. Furthermore, the declaration of Dutch as the official language created employment problems for those in the bureaucracy who had not mastered this language. Although other issues played a role as well, the perceived cultural affront and the loss of employment contributed to the grievances that eventually led to the revolution in the southern Netherlands and the subsequent creation of the Belgian state in 1830. ₅

Second, the leaders of the Belgian revolution stressed French and declared that Flemish was not a language, but a dialect. ₆ The right to use this dialect in education, the military, the courts, public administration, and so on, became the centerpiece of the Flemish movement’s efforts to gain equal status with French-speaking Belgium. More important than language, however, was the Flemish perception of second-class citizenship. This perception was rooted in the widespread poverty that plagued Flanders while Wallonia industrialized.

The Flemish movement began as a sociocultural movement of Flemish elites. It stressed the use of the Flemish language and fought against the perception of it as a collection of dialects spoken only by the uneducated masses. Flemish was promoted as a worthy instrument of literature and, by extension, culture.

There were some cautious attempts to move into the political arena after the founding of the Vlaamsch Verbond (Flemish Union) in 1861, but the Flemish movement was not yet associated with a particular party at this time. Instead, Flemish nationalists were activists within the existing parties. Notable among them was Camille Huysmans, a member of Belgian Workers Party, for whom the emancipation of workers and of the Flemish were closely intertwined: “As an internationalist and as a Belgian, Flemish separatism founded on the supposition of Flemish nationalism and a Flemish ‘race’ did not appeal to him. His ideal was cultural autonomy within the unitary state and the economic framework of the Belgian nation.” ₇

Despite these initial forays into politics, the movement remained largely elite based and sociocultural in focus until the introduction of universal suffrage in 1893, which brought a large number of exclusively Flemish-speaking men into the electorate. ₈ Developments since that time have given Flemish ethnopolitics a dual historical heritage: It was associated with the left early on, yet it also associated itself with Nazi ideology during World War II. In addition, Flemish ethnopolitics in its infancy developed moderate and radical strains. Both this dual heritage and these two strains can be recognized in the two Flemish ethnopolitical parties today.

The first attempt to found a Flemish party dates from the 1890s, but it found little support. A more durable Flemish political party emerged from the Front movement during World War I among the soldiers in the trenches at the IJzer Front, where mostly Flemish soldiers served under officers who were often not just French-speaking, but anti-Flemish as well. Under these conditions, the attraction of a movement that promised greater autonomy was quite understandable. Yet the movement also took advantage of the German occupation to advance its cause, and it became difficult to distinguish between collaborators and Flemish nationalists. Instead of being rewarded for their bravery with concessions to Flemish demands, those who had been involved in the movement found themselves in jail if they had not managed to flee abroad. ₉

Nevertheless, many veterans joined the Verbond der Vlaamse Oudstrijders (Union of Flemish Veterans). This organization played a major role in the creation of a new political party called the Vlaamsche Front (Flemish Front, or Frontpartij). It participated in the national elections of 1919 and won five seats. This was the first election to be contested using single, universal male suffrage and proportional representation. ₁₀ Prior to that time, the upper classes had been able to cast multiple votes, which affected the extent to which the “common man” could influence elections. Hence, it is no surprise that the Frontpartij entered the national Chamber of Representatives at that time. The upper classes tended to be more tied into the French-speaking elite structure, whereas the ordinary Flemish person more clearly felt the disadvantages of belonging to a language group whose rights were not recognized.

Two strands had developed early on within the Flemish movement, which are commonly referred to as “minimalist” and “maximalist.” ₁₁ Minimalists generally sought to advance the Flemish cause within existing political parties. However, such parties also focused on other issues, and the specific problems of the Flemish were not necessarily the highest priority. For the Frontpartij, the Flemish question did have priority, but whether it was truly maximalist is another matter. Maximalists did not merely make the Flemish cause a high priority; those classified into this category tended to question the very existence of Belgium. The Frontpartij stood for some form of self-government, but it was not yet clear what shape that would take. In 1917, the leaders at the front had demanded that Flanders be granted self-government after the war. This demand was translated in various ways: Some wanted a federal state, some favored disbanding Belgium, and others preferred incorporation into the Netherlands. ₁₂

The Frontpartij was clear on its left-wing and antimilitarist stances. The party consisted of individuals with a desire to change the world for the better, some of whom identified themselves as socialist or communist. The party received 2.6 percent of the vote and entered Parliament with five seats in 1919. In the election of 1929, it managed to obtain eleven seats, but it subsequently lost votes and three seats in the election of 1932. In this same time period, the rightists within the party gained more strength. ₁₃

In some cases, individual party supporters also changed their views. Joris van Severen, for example, had supported the Frontpartij, but during the 1920s became enamored of Mussolini. In 1931, he formed the Verbond van Dietsche Nationaal-Solidaristen, or Verdinaso (League of Dutch-Speaking National Solidarists). Although this group never gained many followers, it was one of the factors that influenced the reorganization of the Frontpartij after its electoral debacle of 1932. In 1933, the party renamed itself the Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond (VNV; Flemish National Union) and adopted a totally revised program: Once left-wing and democratic, it was now right-wing and authoritarian. A Catholic teacher and veteran of World War I, Staf de Clerq, became the leader of the new VNV. Although he was not himself an ideologue, he allowed himself to be influenced by fascist thinkers. ₁₄

The VNV was present in Parliament for the entire interwar period, gaining its highest level of representation in the elections of 1939 with seventeen seats. Largely as a result of its association with Nazi ideology and its collaboration with the Nazi occupation, there was a decline in support for Flemish nationalism in the immediate post-World War II period. ₁₅

The Volksunie and the Vlaams Blok

The Volksunie

The Flemish ethnopolitical movement in the period immediately following World War II included many individuals who had been collaborators or who had been accused of collaboration. It is therefore noteworthy that the executives of the newly created Volksunie were all individuals who did not have such a past. In fact, Hugo Gijsels argues that the group was carefully chosen to allow the new party to dissociate itself from the extreme right sympathies of some in the movement, although such individuals could be found among the members of the Volksunie. ₁₆ Some waited before joining the new party. Karel Dillen, for example, who had a long-standing association with the extreme right and later became the founder of the Vlaams Blok, joined the Volksunie three years after its creation, having initially remained outside it. ₁₇

At its founding in 1954, the Volksunie set two main goals: (1) It aimed to reform the Belgian state into a federal structure; and (2) it hoped to change the political structures and political culture more generally. The first goal relates directly to the ethnopolitical agenda: Through federalization, the party aimed to secure greater autonomy for Flanders. In concrete terms, this meant greater control over policymaking in all matters that affected Flanders, from language rights to unemployment benefits and the building of roads. The second goal was not so much to reform the formal institutional framework but, rather, to change how politics was conducted within that framework. The consensus-oriented political practices of the traditional parties were faulted because they created a system that was relatively impenetrable to outsiders. In addition, the traditional parties were able to maintain their power bases through patronage. Membership in political parties has long remained higher in Belgium than in the surrounding democracies, and one reason is that tangible benefits, such as jobs, often depended on such affiliations. ₁₈ Despite the criticism of the political practices of the traditional parties, the emphasis of the Volksunie was first and foremost on Flemish interests, that is, the federal goal.

The party significantly improved its performance in 1965 when it gained 6.7 percent of the vote, doubling its support from the previous election. It built on that success and polled around 10 percent of the vote in the next four elections (see Table 5.1). In that same time period, it participated in government coalitions, first in the period 1977-1978 and again in 1988-1991. ₁₉ In each case, the coalition was broad and inclusive. The first coalition included both Flemish and Walloon Christian Democrats (i.e., Catholieke Volkspartij [CVP], or Christian Peoples Party, and Parti Social Chrétien [PSC], or Christian Social Party) and Socialists (i.e., Parti Socialiste and Socialistische Partij); the Front Démocratique des Francophones Bruxellois (FDF), a party claiming to represent the interests of the French-speaking Brussels population; and the Volksunie. The second coalition consisted of the same parties, minus the FDF. In both cases, nationalist parties were perhaps natural coalition participants, because the issues concerned the transformation of the Belgian state from a unitary to a federal system in response to the communitarian problem. In both cases also, constitutional changes were on the agenda that required two-thirds majorities and, to secure these, larger than usual coalitions. ₂₀

Table 5.1 Flemish Nationalists in the Belgian Parliament


Election	Party	% Vote	No. Seats

November 16, 1919	VNV	2.6	5
November 22, 1921	VNV	3.0	4
April 5, 1925	VNV	3.9	6
May 26, 1929	VNV	6.3	11
November 27, 1932	VNV	5.9	8
May 24, 1936	VNV	7.1	16
April 1, 1939	VNV	8.3	17
February 17, 1946	-	-	-
June 19, 1949	Flemish Nationalists	2.1	0
June 4, 1950	-	-	-
April 11, 1954	Flemish Nationalists	2.2	1
June 1, 1958	Volksunie	2.0	1
March 26, 1961	Volksunie	3.5	5
May 23, 1965	Volksunie	6.7	4
March 31, 1968	Volksunie	9.8	20
November 7, 1971	Volksunie	11.1	21
March 10, 1974	Volksunie	10.2	22
April 17, 1977	Volksunie	10.0	20
December 17, 1978	Volksunie Vlaams Blok	7.0 1.4	14 1
November 8, 1981	Volksunie Vlaams Blok	9.9 1.1	20 1
October 13, 1985	Volksunie Vlaams Blok	7.9 1.3	16 1
December 13, 1987	Volksunie Vlaams Blok	8.1 1.9	16 2
November 24, 1991	Volksunie Vlaams Blok	5.9 6.6	10 12
May 21, 1995	Volksunie Vlaams Blok	4.7 8.0	5 11

Sources: de Winter, Elections et Gouvernements ; Inbel, Belgium; Belgium Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Parlementsverkiezingen.

Finally, in both cases, coalition participation entailed significant consequences for the Volksunie. At the end of its first coalition participation, Dillen and a number of others left the party to form the Vlaams Blok. They considered the Volksunie to have added too much water to its ideological wine in making compromises regarding constitutional changes. Thus, starting with the 1978 elections, the Volksunie had to compete with a second Flemish ethnopolitical party that occupied space to the former’s ideological right. The latter did not gain strong voter support initially, but it meant a split in the Flemish movement nonetheless. Whereas the Volksunie had been the single representative of Flemish ethnopolitics within Parliament since 1954, there were two such voices after 1978.

The second coalition participation of the Volksunie had equally important consequences. For one, the party experienced heavy losses in the 1991 elections. It polled only 5.9 percent of the vote, down from 8.1 percent in 1987. In the aftermath of this electoral disaster, a number of the Volksunie’s MPs defected to the liberal party, the Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang (PVV), or the Party for Freedom and Progress. Among them was Jaak Gabriels, former chairperson of the Volksunie. The liberal party itself was in some turmoil, as it had once again failed to gain voters or to become part of the government coalition. The liberals soon reinvented themselves to become Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (VLD), or the

Flemish Liberals and Democrats, co-opting the Flemish ethnopolitical agenda in an effort to appeal to a wider range of voters. ₂₁ The fact that it has chosen to do so may constitute evidence of the importance of ethnopolitics in Belgium; it may constitute a “contagion of ethnic politics.” ₂₂

After participating in two coalitions, the Volksunie had lost both party members and voters, and it had gained competition for the nationalist vote from both the radical Vlaams Blok and the liberal VLD. So in 1993, the Volksunie attempted to give itself a clearer profile with a renewed and progressive program. Flemish ethnopolitics is still an important focus of the party, and it is still defined in terms of a federal goal. However, this federal goal is now set against the backdrop of the European Union (EU) and a “Europe of peoples and regions” that is to supersede the current states. Domestic goals include the quest for federalization of social welfare policy and a guaranteed minimum existence for every Belgian citizen over eighteen years of age. The party wants to integrate immigrants into the society and views them as an enriching element. In addition, the Volksunie pleads for an independent Ministry of Development Cooperation, one with a bigger budget and separated from Belgian commercial interests. ₂₃ Together, these program points indicate a left-leaning brand of ethnopolitics that incorporates solidarity with outgroups, be they immigrants within Belgian borders or citizens of Third World states.

Although the Volksunie started out as the sole political voice of Flemish ethnopolitics and incorporated different viewpoints, across time, the more moderate and left-leaning nationalists became central. The departure of Karel Dillen and others who formed the Vlaams Blok also meant that the Volksunie was less compelled to cater to all aspects of its complex heritage: It was no longer necessary to cater to those with extreme right views, who also tended to be those who took an all-or-nothing view toward Flemish autonomy. The departure of Gabriels and the more liberal-oriented members of the Volksunie allowed the party to strengthen the socialist-leaning aspects of its program.

The party’s governance structure consists of a congress, a party council, and a party executive. The congress is officially the highest decisionmaking organ and decides all important questions, including whether or not to participate in government coalitions. The party council is more important than the councils of Belgium’s other political parties: It meets once a month and determines the strategy of the party; it also elects the party executive and the chairperson. The executive group is responsible for the day-to-day governance of the party and meets weekly. Another important feature of the Volksunie is that it was created as a nonprofit organization, a legal construction that has, so far, been mirrored only by the Greens. ₂₄

The Vlaams Blok

The Vlaams Blok represents both a reaction to the Volksunie’s willingness to compromise with the mainstream political parties and the extreme right-wing component of Flemish nationalism. It tends to take a maximalist view regarding the movement’s goals; its official program calls the Belgian state a “historical error” and demands it be abolished. ₂₅

The party was founded in 1978 in protest to what was regarded as too much flexibility on the part of the Volksunie. For instance, during its coalition participation in 1977-1978, the Volksunie had accepted the Egmont Pact, which concluded a compromise regarding the adaptation of the constitution to which the Vlaams Blok objected. Starting in the 1980s, the Vlaams Blok also strongly objected to immigrants, who they perceived as culturally and economically detrimental to Flanders. ₂₆ The party’s slogan, “Eigen volk eerst” (own people first), was pasted on large billboards along the roads in Flanders. Given the long-standing sympathies with the radical right by the party’s main leader, Dillen, this attitude toward nonindigenous populations is not surprising. Although some authors classify the party as exclusively on the extreme right, it is a nationalist party: It arose from the Flemish movement and represents an intolerant form of nationalism. ₂₇

The Vlaams Blok captured only about one or two seats each election prior to the 1991 election, when it suddenly jumped to a twelve-seat win. Put differently, it had won less than 1.5 percent of the vote in earlier elections, but increased its share to 6.6 percent in 1991. In 1995, the party improved slightly, and it now holds 7.3 percent of the seats versus the 5.7 percent of the total number of parliamentary seats it held after the 1991 elections.

The party’s program states that it aims to transform Flanders into an independent state. Its pro-Flemish stand is coupled with an exclusivist stance regarding all others, as reflected in such program points as the desire to have taxes collected in Flanders benefit only the Flemish, to have unemployment benefits and other social services operate on the “own people first” principle, and to ensure that jobs, as well, go to the Flemish first. ₂₈

Like the Volksunie, the Vlaams Blok positions itself as a party that protests traditional political parties and the “politics as usual” approach. However, whereas the former has been willing to reform the system through participation in it, the latter takes a hard-line stance vis-à-vis the traditional political parties. In other words, the Vlaams Blok would categorize the Volksunie as such a traditional party and would present itself as an alternative. It attempts to appeal to “common sense” and, in that manner, fits comfortably among the recent wave of extreme nationalist parties. ₂₉

The party’s governance structure consists of a congress, a council, and an executive. All members of the party have access to the party congress, which functions primarily as a forum for discussion. ₃₀ The council is more important in decisionmaking and is the highest organ of the party. It meets monthly and makes all decisions regarding policy and strategy. In addition, the executive determines the daily governance of the party. The statutes dictate that the current party chairperson himself appoints his successor. After much speculation, the seventy-year-old Dillen finally made his choice known at the party’s congress in June 1996: He selected Frank Vanhecke, a thirty-seven-year-old with convictions similar to Dillen’s. ₃₁

In short, the current Vlaams Blok leadership is seeking to preserve the “purity” of its ideology. It is unlikely to change into a more moderate and tolerant ethnopolitical party anytime soon.

Structure of Incentives

The Flemish and Walloon communities inhabit geographically distinguishable portions of the Belgian state. The exact boundaries of the Flemish- and French-speaking regions have shifted across time, which has contributed to the definition of socioeconomic and political issues in linguistic terms. In fact, research on Belgium’s political divisions has placed undue emphasis on linguistic aspects and ignored many others factors that have shaped the political importance of segmentation within this state. ₃₂ The conflict never was about language alone. There were and are distinct economic differences between the two regions. Although the social barriers that once motivated Flemish ethnopolitics have been substantially removed, perceptions of inequality linger. Moreover, modifications to the constitution have acknowledged and institutionalized the communitarian differences. ₃₃

One issue of contention remains the allocation of governmental resources. A strict focus on the equity of such allocations has led to a profusion of useless and wasteful public works, which have been chronicled in several books. ₃₄ This equity has not diminished Flemish/Walloon antagonism because the Flemish object to evenly divided allocations while contributing more than one-half of the tax base. In a sense, the meticulous pursuit of equity has provided the fodder for further demands for regional autonomy.

Social and Economic Pressures

Economic prosperity has never visited Flanders and Wallonia simultaneously. The differential growth patterns of the two regions have been cited as a factor that has contributed to the emergence of communitarian conflict. ₃₅

Prior to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, over two centuries before the establishment of the Belgian state, Flanders was urbanized and prosperous. ₃₆ The heritage of this early time still graces the architecture of many Flemish cities. However, this early economic success was not carried over into the industrial era. Wallonia industrialized as Flanders stagnated.

Belgium was the first state on the European continent to industrialize, but this affected mainly the Walloon provinces of Liège and Hainaut. The coal deposits of this region facilitated the creation of a steel and metalworking industry. In addition, textiles were an important facet of the industry in this region. As a historically very open economy, Belgium has been strongly affected by changes in the world economy, and in the post- World War II era, Wallonia’s industry was hit especially hard. Although Flanders had begun its rapid industrialization in the earlier part of the twentieth century, its economy emerged as the more prosperous one only in the period after World War II. ₃₇

The differential economic experiences of the two regions are reflected in the fact that the employment structures of the Flemish and Walloon regions are still different. As Table 5.2 shows, industrial employment tends to be higher in the Flemish provinces, whereas employment in services tends to be higher in Wallonia: The former employs 33 percent in industry and 64 percent in services, whereas the comparable figures for the latter region are 26 and 71 percent. Moreover, unemployment tends to be higher in the Walloon provinces than in the Flemish region. Although unemployment in the Flemish provinces of Antwerp and Limburg approximates that of some Walloon provinces, on average, Flanders is much better off: 5.5 percent versus 10.8 percent unemployment in Wallonia. Interestingly, the two Flemish provinces with relatively high unemployment rates have also tended to support nationalist politics more strongly. Note that election results reported in Table 5.3 show that in the elections just before (1987) and after (1991) the year for which unemployment figures were observed in Table 5.2 (1990), the two provinces of Antwerp and Limburg reveal stronger support for nationalist parties than any of the other Flemish provinces. Thus there appears to be at least some relation between high unemployment rates and nationalist votes.

Table 5.2 Structure of Employment in Belgium


	Employment (1989)
Region				% Unemployment (1990)
	% Agriculture	% Industry	% Services

Flanders	3	33	64	5.5
Antwerp	2	33	65	6.5
Flemish Brabant	3	25	73	4.2
Limburg	3	37	60	8.8
East Flanders	4	35	62	5.3
West Flanders	5	34	61	3.7
Wallonia	3	26	71	10.8
Walloon Brabant	3	24	73	6.1
Hainaut	3	27	70	13.1
Liège	3	28	70	11.0
Luxembourg	9	18	73	5.9
Namur	4	21	75	9.9

Belgium	3	27	70	7.6

Source: Eurostat, Portrait of the Regions, vol. 1.

Table 5.3 The Flemish Ethnopolitical Vote by Province, 1978-1995^a


Province	1978	1981	1985	1987	1991	1995	Province: Mean St. D.

Antwerp	13.0	18.1	16.3	18.3	24.6	25.2	19.3 4.8
Flemish Brabant	10.5	14.0	11.6	12.5	15.0	15.6	13.2 2.0
Limburg	14.5	18.1	16.9	19.6	21.7	17.7	18.1 2.4
East Flanders	13.8	18.0	14.0	14.3	17.9	19.0	16.2 2.4
West Flanders	13.8	17.8	13.5	13.4	14.9	15.1	14.8 1.7
Year:
Mean	13.1	17.2	14.5	15.6	18.8	18.5	16.3
St.D.	1.6	1.8	2.2	3.1	4.3	4.1	3.4

Source: Belgium, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Parlementsverkiezingen.
Note: a. Figures represent votes for the Volksunie plus the Vlaams Blok divided by the total valid poll for the Flemish provinces.

Antwerp and Limburg also have higher percentages of foreign residents than the remaining Flemish provinces—excluding Brabant, the province in which the capital region of Brussels is located. ₃₈ Belgium has seen an influx of foreign residents since 1950 that has doubled the percentage of the Belgian population. ₃₉ However, these residents are concentrated in the capital region and Wallonia, where they make up 28.5 and 11.4 percent of the population; in Flanders, they constitute just 4.5 percent of the population. ₄₀ Moreover, a sizable proportion of their presence relates to Belgium’s central position within the EU: A large proportion of foreign residents are citizens of other EU countries. ₄₁ The Vlaams Blok militates not so much against the presence of these foreigners as against those from beyond the borders of Europe. The xenophobia of this party should therefore be considered as part and parcel of its extreme right rhetoric and as only tangentially related to the objective presence of foreign residents within Belgium.

Economically, Belgium is very open and has a high dependence on trade with the European Union and Europe more generally. Table 5.4 shows that about three-quarters of Belgian exports are destined for EU countries and over 80 percent have European destinations. Belgian imports exhibit a similar pattern of interconnectedness with the EU and Europe at large. The Volksunie’s rhetoric recognizes this fact, whereas the Vlaams Blok ignores it. The former clearly positions Flanders within the European Union; the latter is much more skeptical. ₄₂

Table 5.4 Belgian Trade with Europe, 1991


Trade	% of Total

Exports to the EU	75.2
Imports from the EU	72.8
Exports to all of Western Europe (including the EU)	82.8
Imports from all of Western Europe (including the EU)	81.3

Source: The International Yearbook and Statesman’s Who’s Who.

The economic growth of Flanders in the post-World War II era gave the Flemish a degree of clout they had not experienced before. As the standard of living increased, so did the demands Flemish nationalists made on the political system. Initially, these demands centered on linguistic parity. French had been the official language in Belgium, which meant that Flemish citizens needed to master French if they aspired to a university education or government job.

Political Incentives

Political Structures. The fortunes of the Volksunie, the Vlaams Blok, and the traditional Belgian political parties have been played out against the background of a series of constitutional changes that have gradually transformed Belgium from a unitary state into a complex, quasi-federal structure. Currently, the division is twofold: The country is divided into three regions and three communities that overlap. First, there are the Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels capital regions, each having its own legislative council. Second, the Flemish-, French-, and (small) German-speaking communities, each with its own council as well. The Flemish Parliament fuses the regional and community councils into one body, but it denies voting rights to the representatives from the Brussels region for matters concerning the Flemish region. In other words, when discussing legislation that concerns the Flemish region, only those representatives elected from constituencies in that region have voting rights; but when legislation concerns the Flemish community as a whole, the representatives from both the Flemish and Brussels regions vote. This complicated structure allows for representation on the basis of geographic and economic regions, as well as linguistic and cultural communities.

The division of competencies between the regions and the federal government is complex. Some policy areas have been delegated to the regions, but certain components of it remain in the federal government’s hands. For example, the regions may set economic policy, but labor law is made by the federal government. ₄₃ In some cases, the retention of such powers by the federal government must be seen in the context of the European integration. In sum, however, the federal government is in charge of foreign and defense policy, the judiciary, and monetary policy.

The federal structure as it currently stands is the result of the fourth constitutional revision of 1993. The four constitutional revisions of 1970, 1980, 1988, and 1993 all addressed issues surrounding the communitarian conflict, with the latter three progressively changing Belgium from a unitary to a federal state. ₄₄

An additional feature of the political structure is the electoral system. The Belgian system is a proportional representation system that provides relatively easy entry for new parties, especially given the low threshold. The country is divided into twenty voting districts for the 150 seats of the Chamber of Representatives, allocated on the basis of the relative population size of the districts. This yields districts that vary in size from two to twenty-two seats. Seats are allocated at two levels: first in the voting district, and second at the provincial level. Parties cannot automatically participate in the provincial division of seats; they must have reached the threshold in at least one voting district within the province. This threshold is set at one-third of the quota, which is calculated using the d’Hondt method. ₄₅

The Structure of Competition. Although a PR system does not necessarily lead to a proliferation of political parties, Belgium has experienced a fractionalization of the party system as a result of the mobilization of the Flemish community. ₄₆ Not only did ethnopolitical parties such as the Volksunie and the Vlaams Blok obtain parliamentary representation, the traditional political parties fragmented along communitarian lines as well. The Christian Democrats split in 1968 into the CVP and the PSC. The Liberals broke in 1971 into the PVV and the Parti Réformateur Libéral (PRL), or the Liberal Reform Party. The PVV became the VLD after the 1991 elections. The Socialists were the last to fragment: In 1978, they split into the Socialistische Partij and Parti Socialiste. This essentially leaves Belgium without any truly national political party organizations, ₄₇ although the ideological “sister” parties of the Flemish and Walloon communities have thus far chosen to join or leave coalitions in tandem.

Without considering the entry of new parties into Parliament, the split of the three main parties led to a doubling of the number of parties to six. In addition to the above-mentioned parties, the Belgian Communist Party was represented until it lost its last seats in the 1985 election. The Volksunie has been represented in Parliament since 1954, whereas the joint list of the FDF and the Rassemblement Wallon (RW) first obtained seats in 1968. After the Vlaams Blok and an antitaxes, anti-immigrant party called Respect voor Arbeid en Democratie/ Union pour la Démocratie et la Respect du Travail (RAD/UDRT) entered Parliament with one seat each in 1978, the number of parties had increased to eleven. In the subsequent election of 1981, a Flemish and a Walloon Green Party entered Parliament, bringing the total number of parties to thirteen. Since that time, the number and identity of the parties in Parliament have fluctuated with each election. Some of the new parties disappear after only one election; others hang on a little longer. The RAD/UDRT disappeared from Parliament in 1987 after having obtained one or more seats in the previous three elections. A party called Rossem entered Parliament in 1991 but disappeared again in 1995. The Front National entered Parliament in the same year and doubled its presence to two seats in 1995. After losing ground, the FDF affiliated itself with the PRL in 1995, reducing the number of parties to eleven in 1995. In addition to the parties that manage to gain representation in Parliament, many others have run for election at least once. In 1991, forty-one different parties ran, and in 1995, there were sixty different lists on the ballot. ₄₈ The majority of these aspirants have not gained representation, but their presence suggests that the Belgian party system remains in flux. This flux has contributed to openings for more radical ethnopolitics.

The rise of ethnopolitical parties in Belgium has been described both as a cause and as a symptom of the breakdown of the consociational party system. ₄₉ The rigidity of the consociational system may have contributed to the rise of new parties to represent these emerging nationalist interests. Yet the rise of these new parties also contributed to the fragmentation of the traditional mass parties into Flemish and Walloon counterparts. Only the Communist Party maintained a single national party structure until its demise in 1985. The breakup of the Socialist Party essentially completed the communitarization of the political parties in Belgium.

The Flemish ethnopolitical parties have had two aims—one substantive and the other process oriented. The former entails a demand for greater autonomy for the region and linguistic community. The latter entails a challenge to consociationalism that, the new parties claim, did not respond adequately to certain political problems faced by the society—specifically, the socioeconomic differences between Flanders and Wallonia. ₅₀ As such, the ethnopolitical parties can be seen as mobilizing parties that seek to attract voters on the basis of a “program that stresses new issues and looks at old issues from a new ideological vantage point.” ₅₁ The consequence of Flemish ethnopolitical representation in Parliament has been a restructuring of the entire party system along communitarian lines and the demise of national parties.

Evolution of the Volksunie and the Vlaams Blok

As stated earlier, the emergence of the Flemish movement was not only about linguistic issues, yet language structured Flemish ethnopolitics in important ways. Although the Flemish are not in numbers a minority population—they constituted just over 55 percent of the population in 1965, and their share of the population then grew to almost 58 percent by 1993 (see Table 5.5)—they have historically constituted a political minority. The French-speaking or Walloon population has shrunk slightly, but it remains at around 32 percent of the population. The German-speaking minority has remained stable as well. In the past, the Flemish were the most likely of these three groups to become fully bilingual: French acted as a ticket to university education, a desirable career, and membership in the elite. The Francophone population may have been exposed to Flemish in school, but it often cared little to become truly conversant in it. ₅₂ As the Flemish movement gained ground and effected constitutional changes, identifying oneself as Flemish became more attractive than a bilingual identification. Indeed, Table 5.5 shows a drop in the percentage of the population identifying itself as bilingual.

Table 5.5 Composition of the Belgian Population, 1965-1993


	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1991	1993

Flemish (%)	55.4	56.1	56.5	57.0	57.5	57.8	57.9
French (%)	32.7	32.3	32.2	32.1	31.9	32.0	32.0
Bilingual (%)	11.3	11.0	10.7	10.2	9.9	9.6	9.4
German (%)	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Total population^a	9,499,234	9,650,944	9,788,248	9,863,374	9,858,895	9,986,975	10,068,319

Source: Statesman’s Yearbook.
Note: a. Population figures are estimates, except for the 1970 figure, which is based on a census.

There have been other issues that have demanded attention, but the communitarian conflict is the thread that consistently runs through the history of the Belgian state. In the early post-World War II years, the “Royal Question” divided citizens; and in the 1950s, the so-called School Conflict did likewise. The former revolved around the acceptability of Leopold III as the king of Belgium. The king had spent the war years in the custody of the Germans and was for many associated with collaboration. A referendum did not settle the question. A majority nationally wished the king to return, but the vote was divided unevenly between the two regions: The Flemish tended to favor the king’s return, and the Walloons did not. ₅₃ In August 1950, the king proposed to abdicate in favor of his son Boudewijn, and the issue was thus settled.

Soon after, Belgium was embroiled in another debate. This time, the issue was secondary education. At issue was the fact that the cost of Catholic secondary schools often precluded parents from choosing freely whether they preferred an “official” (or public) or a “free” (private or Catholic) education for their children. The problem was complicated by the fact that the Catholic schools were more plentiful than public ones in Flanders. The School Pact of 1959 settled the issue by making secondary education free, with the state paying the salaries of teachers in both public and private schools and increasing the number of public secondary schools, especially in Flanders. ₅₄

Additional consequences of the School Pact were a qualitative improvement in education and a coherent educational policy. A by-product of greater access to education has been that the composition of the Belgian elite has changed to include more Belgians of Flemish heritage. ₅₅ Increased inclusion of Flemish Belgians into elite ranks was indeed the result of the changed circumstances, but it also strengthened Flemish ethnopolitics. Thus, although Flemish and French Belgians have achieved parity in educational levels, the French still have an advantage that derives from (family) connections with the elite. ₅₆ In other words, while the pool of candidates for elite positions is now equivalent across the two communities, the Flemish still perceive French Belgians to have an advantage. A sense of cultural inferiority has been difficult to overcome, despite real and significant change in the region.

An improved economic base and enhanced educational opportunities have nevertheless allowed more Flemish to join the ranks of the elite. Simultaneously, the Flemish movement gained a firm foothold in Belgian politics; although it had obtained five seats in 1961, its electoral support strengthened significantly in 1965, when it lost one seat but received a much larger share of the vote than it had in the previous election (see Table 5.1 above).

Gaining representation in Parliament may have served to strengthen the ethnopolitical cause, because it evidenced voter support for the movement and encouraged others who were sympathetic to express that sympathy electorally. Strengthening voter support beyond the initial base, however, often meant appealing to a broader audience. The Volksunie chose to do so and is now represented about equally in the Flemish provinces. The Volkunie’s first electoral success came in Antwerp; but as the party gained more seats, the distribution of its support diffused among the provinces.

Participation in a government coalition, the next step taken by the Volksunie, proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, participation allowed the party to play a role in the conduct of government and to influence decisions. On the other hand, it necessitated compromise, which became difficult for the party’s membership and voters to accept. Thus, in keeping with Kris Deschouwer’s contention that “new parties begin to lose as soon as they are perceived as being part of the ‘traditional game,’ which certainly happens when they accept an offer to join the government,” ₅₇ the give-and-take of coalition politics readily led to the perception that the Volksunie failed to protect the interests of the group. The resulting loss of support from the group the party represented was very difficult to recoup. ₅₈

The Volksunie lost seats in the elections immediately following its coalition participation in two coalition governments. In 1978, at the end of its first taste of coalition government, it lost six seats, which it was able to regain in the subsequent election of 1981. The aftermath of its second coalition participation turned out quite differently. In 1991, the party again lost six seats, but instead of regaining these in the subsequent election, the party continued to slide to five seats in 1995. This loss of seats looks more dramatic than it actually was: The Parliament used to consist of 212 seats but was reduced to 150 seats in the 1995 election. Ten seats in 1991 translated to 4.7 percent of the total, whereas five seats in 1995 translated to 3.3 percent of the total number of seats.

Despite the Volksunie’s voting losses, the total ethnopolitical vote fluctuated little. Since the Volksunie’s rise to almost 10 percent of the vote in the 1968 election, the ethnopolitical vote has been around 10 percent of the national total. It reached a low in 1978, with 8.4 percent, and a high in 1995, with 12.7 percent. Across the ten elections between 1968 and 1995, the ethnopolitical vote averaged 10.5 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.369. By this measure, all but the 1978, 1991, and 1995 elections fell within 1 standard deviation of the average.

The greatest benefactor from the Volksunie’s decline has been the Vlaams Blok. Since 1978, the latter received enough votes to obtain one or two seats and initially was of secondary importance compared to the Volksunie. However, in the 1991 elections, the Vlaams Blok gained significantly in support, polling 53 percent of the ethnopolitical vote and leaving the Volksunie just 47 percent. Despite this increased electoral strength, the Vlaams Blok has remained a party that is thoroughly entrenched in the province of Antwerp. As Table 5.6 shows, in both the 1991 and 1995 elections, about half of the Vlaams Blok’s support came from that province. Put another way, the party has done less to broaden its appeal than the Volksunie did at a comparable stage in its evolution. In concrete terms, this means that the Vlaams Blok has moderated its message only slightly, which is also evident from a comparison of the party’s 1991 and 1995 programs. The Vlaams Blok has continued to favor an independent Flemish nation-state and maintains a virulently anti-immigrant stance. ₅₉

Table 5.6 Distribution of Volksunie and Vlaams Blok Parliamentary Representation in Flemish Provinces


	Province

Year	Antwerp	Vlaams Brabant^a	Limburg	East Flanders	West Flanders	Total

Volksunie
1954	1	-	-	-	-	1
1958	1	-	-	-	-	1
1961	2	1	-	2	-	5
1965	4	1	-	4	3	12
1968	6	3	2	5	4	20
1971	7	3	2	5	4	21
1974	7	4	2	5	4	22
1977	6	4	2	5	3	20
1977	6	4	2	5	3	20
1978	3	3	2	3	3	14
1981	5	4	2	5	4	20
1985	4	3	3	3	3	16
1987	4	3	3	3	3	16
1991	3	2	3	2	-	10
1995	1	1	1	1	1	5
Vlaams Blok
1978	1	-	-	-	-	1
1981	1	-	-	-	-	1
1985	1	-	-	-	-	1
1987	2	-	-	-	-	2
1991	6	2	1	3	-	12
1995	5	2	1	2	1	11

Sources: Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique, 1991; Belgium, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Parlementsverkiezingen.
Note: a. Includes seats won in the voting district of Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde.

Thus, while the face of Flemish ethnopolitics is changing, much remains the same: The socialist and extreme right traditions continue to be found in Flemish nationalism. The first is associated with the Volksunie and the latter with the Vlaams Blok. In addition, the former represents a moderate and the latter a radical ethnopolitics. The Volksunie stresses autonomy within the now-federal Belgian state and eventually in a “Europe of nations and regions,” whereas the Vlaams Blok argues for an independent Flanders. ₆₀

What has changed is that Flemish ethnopolitics now affects all Flemish political parties. All have been forced to pay attention to ethnopolitical issues. The Liberals have perhaps gone the furthest in adopting aspects of the ethnopolitical agenda, indicated by their name change to Flemish Liberals and Democrats after the 1991 election. This name change also indicated an adoption of a moderate Flemish ethnopolitical agenda. The current fraction leader of the VLD in the Flemish Parliament, André Denys, has argued for greater autonomy for Flanders, although he also clearly states that he is not a separatist and does not want to do away with the Belgian state. ₆₁

As the VLD has moved to adopt some of the Flemish ethnopolitical agenda, some former members of the Volksunie have joined its ranks. André Geens, who was minister of development cooperation during the 1988-1991 coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, and the Volksunie, has since exchanged his Volksunie membership for membership in the VLD’s party executive. Another former Volksunie member, Jaak Gabriels, has similary joined the VLD. ₆₂

As the political representation of the Flemish movement was split between the Volksunie and the Vlaams Blok, the former adopted a more left-oriented platform, while the latter built on the far-right tradition of the movement. Moderate Flemish nationalists who were not comfortable with the radical and far-right aspects of Flemish ethnopolitics, but also did not feel at home with the increasingly socialist orientation of the Volksunie, found a home in the VLD.

The Vlaams Blok has continued to gain in strength, but its future may be in question as it has recently resorted to what was described in the press as a “coup attempt” and likened to tactics used by Nazi storm troopers. ₆₃ In response to the riot created by a group associated with the Vlaams Blok at the annual commemoration of the Flemish war experience at the IJzer Front during the last weekend of August 1996, a split occurred within the party: Jan Caubergs and several other Vlaams Blok politicians quit the party in protest. Caubergs will remain a member of Parliament, but he will now be an independent, rather than the representative of a party. The others held office at the provincial and local levels. ₆₄

This split brings home the message that there are limits to how radical the Vlaams Blok can become. Extralegal or antisystem activities may be tolerated by some in the movement, but they will also create tensions within the party and hamper its effectiveness. The actions of the Vlaams Blok at the IJzer commemoration also highlight the party’s quest to become the sole voice of the Flemish movement. Ironically, the message that its riot drowned out was a speech that stressed dialogue and cooperation among the politicians of Flanders and an injunction to develop a common vision regarding the meaning and the priorities for the autonomy that has been achieved thus far. ₆₅

Discussion and Conclusion

A series of constitutional changes reformed Belgium from a unitary state to a complicated federal one. Despite substantial grants of autonomy to the Flemish and Walloon regions, the debate continues. The Flemish ethnopolitical parties continue to receive support, together polling a more or less steady proportion of the national vote since about 1968.

That does not mean that the phenomenon of Flemish ethnopolitics has remained unchanged across time. Economic disparity between the two regions has existed throughout Belgium’s history and has provided the seeds of discontent. However, the rise of the Flemish economy coincides with the increasing strength of the Flemish ethnopolitical parties (Expectation 2a in Chapter 1). The gap between Flanders and Wallonia initially narrowed, as the former’s economy started catching up with the latter’s, and then widened in Flanders’ favor. It must be noted that while the Volksunie maintained a moderate stance, the Vlaams Blok emerged as the mouthpiece of a more extreme ethnopolitics. If the two parties are considered jointly, it may be concluded that Flemish ethnopolitical demands did indeed radicalize as Flanders emerged economically.

Furthermore, in those areas in Flanders that have experienced higher unemployment, support for the ethnopolitical parties tends to be stronger. This gives some credence to the notion that economic downturn creates an environment that is responsive to more extreme ethnopolitical demands (Expectation 2b).

The Flemish ethnopolitical parties emerged in a country in which consociational traditions favored cross-party agreement. The elites of both communities were represented in the traditional political parties. However, these elites, whether of Walloon or Flemish descent, also tended to speak French and to be highly interconnected with each other. Thus, the perception that the French-speaking community dominated Belgian politics was not difficult to substantiate (Expectation 5). Flemish ethnopolitical demands were geared to breaking open this relatively closed system of elite interconnectedness, thus providing greater opportunities for upward mobility for an emerging Flemish middle class. In short, Flemish ethnopolitical demands reacted not only to the overrepresentation of the French-speaking community in government, but also to a relatively closed elite structure.

Endnotes

Note 1: Kossmann, The Low Countries, 164; Fishman, Diplomacy and Revolution, 85. Back.

Note 2: The distinctions between modern Dutch and Flemish are comparable to those between British and American English. References to either are used interchangeably, except for those to historical situations: King William I meant to create a unity of language; the French-speaking leaders of the newly independent Belgium meant to be derogatory about the Flemish language. Back.

Note 3: Wils, “Introduction,” 1-39. Back.

Note 4: Vermeersch, Vereniging en Revolutie, 32. Back.

Note 5: Witte, Craeybeckx, and Meynen, Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 58; Luykx and Platel, Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 44; Wils, “Introduction,” 5; Kossmann, The Low Countries, 123; Fishman, Diplomacy and Revolution, 23; Vermeersch, Vereniging en Revolutie, 52, 88-92; Geyl, Noord en Zuid, 195. Back.

Note 6: Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 58. Back.

Note 7: Kossmann, The Low Countries, 469. See also Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 101, 142-143, and Luykx and Platel, Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 126-127. Back.

Note 8: Kossmann, The Low Countries, 465; Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 122. Back.

Note 9: Kossmann, The Low Countries, 470, 542-544; Luykx and Platel, Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 265; Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 149-150. Back.

Note 10: Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 181; Kossmann, The Low Countries, 607, 638; Deschouwer, “Small Parties,” 137; de Winter, Elections et Gouvernements, 77; Dewachter, De Wetgevende Verkiezingen, 22. Back.

Note 11: Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 182-185; Luykx and Platel, Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 271-274; Kossmann, The Low Countries, 637. Back.

Note 12: Kossmann, The Low Countries, 542-543, 638; Clough, A History of the Flemish Movement; Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 184. Back.

Note 13: Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 184; Kossmann, The Low Countries, 639; de Winter, Elections et Gouvernements, 88, 93. Back.

Note 14: Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 210, 215; Kossman, The Low Countries, 639-640. Back.

Note 15: de Winter, Elections et Gouvernements, 108; Urwin, “Social Cleavages,” 320-340; Deschouwer, “Small Parties,” 138. In the meantime, Dutch historian Pieter Geyl helped draft a 1931 bill proposing to reorganize Belgium as a federal state (Kossmann, The Low Countries, 643). Despite his actions, Geyl did not think this plan was realistic, and neither did the minimalist Flemish nationalists within the Catholic and socialist parties. They favored linguistic parity and a bilingual central administration instead. However, the proposal is of interest because more than sixty years later, Belgium has, after four constitutional revisions, indeed become a federal state. Back.

Note 16: Gijsels, Het Vlaams Blok, 49-50. Back.

Note 17: Ibid., 50. Back.

Note 18: Deschouwer, “The Decline of Consociationalism,” 102-103. Back.

Note 19: de Winter, Elections et Gouvernements, 176, 204-205. Back.

Note 20: Deschouwer, “Small Parties,” 146-148. Back.

Note 21: Ibid., 90. Back.

Note 22: Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Back.

Note 23: Volksunie, Met Hart en Ziel voor Vlaanderen. Back.

Note 24: Deschouwer, “De Politieke Partijen,” 127; Deschouwer, “The Decline of Consociationalism,” 91. Back.

Note 25: Vlaams Blok, Nu Afrekenen!; Vlaams Blok, Uit Zelfverdediging. Back.

Note 26: Deschouwer, “De Politieke Partijen,” 130. See also Deschouwer, “Small Parties,” 138. Back.

Note 27: Gijsels, Het Vlaams Blok, 46-49; Desolre, “The Far Right in Belgium,” 245-257. Back.

Note 28: Vlaams Blok, Nu Afrekenen!; Vlaams Blok, Uit Zelfverdediging. Back.

Note 29: Deschouwer, “De Politieke Partijen,” 130. Back.

Note 30: Ibid., 131. Back.

Note 31: Derk Jan Eppink, “Bijtklare Vanhecke Houdt Blok Ultra-rechts,” De Standaard, June 10, 1996. Back.

Note 32: Huyse, “Politiek-Wetenschappelijke Publikaties over België,” 193-206; Frognier, Quevit, and Stenbock, “Regional Imbalances,” 251. Back.

Note 33: Dunn, “The Revision of the Constitution,” 143-163. Back.

Note 34: Folkert Jensma, “De Belg, Hij Lééft,” NRC Handelsblad, February 5, 1994, sec. Boeken. Back.

Note 35: Frognier et al., “Regional Imbalances,” 274; Wils, “Introduction,” 1; Dewachter, “Elite Circulatie,” 199-258. Back.

Note 36: Wils, “Introduction,” 2; Frognier et al., “Regional Imbalances,” 253. Back.

Note 37: Wils, “Introduction,” 1, 12-13; Frognier et al., “Regional Imbalances,” 252, 254; Kossmann, The Low Countries, 635; Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 139; Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. Back.

Note 38: Inbel, Belgium, 14. Back.

Note 39: Statesman’s Yearbook, various years. Back.

Note 40: Matthijs, “Bevolking,” 50-58. Back.

Note 41: Eurostat, Portrait of the Regions, vol. 1, 156. Back.

Note 42: Volksunie, Met Hart en Ziel voor Vlaanderen; Volksunie, Iemand Moet z’n Nek Uitsteken; Vlaams Blok, Nu Afrekenen!; Vlaams Blok, Uit Zelfverdediging. Back.

Note 43: Van Nieuwenhove, “De Bevoegdheidsverdeling,” 200. Back.

Note 44: Lamberts, “Staatsvorming via Conflictbeheersing,” 43. Back.

Note 45: Dewachter, De Wetgevende Verkiezingen, 353; Deweerdt, “Verkiezingen,” 274-277. Back.

Note 46: Powell, Contemporary Democracies, 101. See also Deschouwer, “The Decline of Consociationalism,” 84. The nationalist movement was primarily a Flemish one, but it did draw a response from the Walloon community in the form of the FDF and the RW (Deschouwer, “Small Parties,” 135-151). Although the two together polled around 10 percent of the national vote in the early 1970s, they have not been able to sustain that electoral success in the subsequent decades. Back.

Note 47: Deschouwer, “Small Parties,” 144. Back.

Note 48: Belgium, Ministerie an Binnenlandse Zaken, Parlementsverkiezingen. Back.

Note 49: Urwin, “Social Cleavages,” 340; Deschouwer, “The Decline of Consociationalism,” 82-83. Deschouwer includes the FDF and the RW in his analysis, as well as the Flemish and Walloon Green Parties. Back.

Note 50: Deschouwer, “The Decline of Consociationalism.” Back.

Note 51: Rochon, “Mobilizers and Challengers,” 421. The concept of a mobilizing party is similar to G. Bingham Powell’s extremist contender, in the sense that such parties “promise radical changes” (Contemporary Democracies, 93). Back.

Note 52: Recently, De Standaard reported that more Francophone Belgians are now learning Dutch or Flemish; they are beginning to view it as an economic necessity (June 24, 1996). Back.

Note 53: Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 246-252; Luykx and Platel, Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 449. Back.

Note 54: Luykx and Platel, Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 488-489. Back.

Note 55: Witte et al., Politieke Geschiedenis van België;, 264; Dewachter, “Elite Circulatie,” 224. Back.

Note 56: Dewachter, De Wetgevende Verkiezingen, 233-234. Back.

Note 57: Deschouwer, “The Decline of Consociationalism,” 106. Back.

Note 58: Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 344. Back.

Note 59: Breuning and Ishiyama, “The Rhetoric of Nationalism.” Back.

Note 60: Volksunie, Met Hart en Ziel voor Vlaanderen; Volksunie, Iemand Moet z’n Nek Uitsteken; Vlaams Blok, Nu Afrekenen!; Vlaams Blok, Uit Zelfverdediging. Back.

Note 61: Boudewijn Vanpeteghem, “Meer Autonomy of België ontploft,” De Standaard, September 13, 1996. Back.

Note 62: Janssens, Fiers, and Vos, “Vlaamse Politieke Partijen,” 503-559. Back.

Note 63: Derk Jan Eppink, “Vlaams Blok doet couppoging op IJzerweide,” De Standaard, August 26, 1996. Back.

Note 64: “Ruzie over IJzerbedevaart,” NRC Handelsblad, September 3, 1996. Back.

Note 65: Guy Tegenbos, “‘Soevereiniteit’ moest Vlamingen herenigen,” De Standaard, August 29, 1996. Back.

Ethnopolitics in the new Europe