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Ethnopolitics in the New Europe, by John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning
1. Ethnopolitics and Ethnic Parties
Recent developments in Europe have sparked both a renewed interest in ethnic political conflict and a reassessment of the literature on political integration. Once-successful examples of politically integrated states such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) have disintegrated. Plans for greater regional integration in Western Europe and the possible emergence of a United States of Europe remain on hold in the tangled aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty. Integration appears to be on the retreat; and disintegration, motivated by nationalist sentiment, seems the rule, rather than the exception, in the post–Cold War era.
While the earlier literature tended to be overly optimistic about the prospects for political integration, 1 the recent literature tends toward the pessimistic. 2 Some have concluded that ethnically plural societies are almost naturally and necessarily “defined by dissensus and pregnant with conflict.” 3 In particular, the tragedy of Yugoslavia has compelled many to mark the Yugoslav example as a “cautionary tale for all post-communist countries.” 4 As a result, the post–Cold War era has given rise to a new dogma, which holds that the “new world order” has unleashed primordial conflicts, thus making political integration and democracy nigh on impossible. From this perspective, “violence is assumed to follow ethnic tensions as night follows day.” 5 Thus, the old system of states is labeled “unnatural,” and the only real solution to this dilemma is to recognize these “natural” differences, divide up the real estate, and provide different peoples with their own homelands. 6 In a sense, this conjures up the “romantic notions of Urvölker whose unchanging nature asserts itself from time to time.” 7
Although there are truly formidable roadblocks to integration in states that are ethnically divided, it is misleading to assume that such states are predestined for disintegration and, worse yet, the miseries of civil war. To be sure, aspects of the environment make the emergence of powerful disintegrative forces more likely. Economic, social, political, and historical factors can lead to the rise of extreme national sentiment and intense feelings of anger over current political arrangements. 8 However, this sense of anger does not inevitably translate into violent political action. 9 To assume that environmental conditions are sufficient to explain ethnic conflict detracts from the important role played by political leaders and the organizations they lead in aggravating, deepening, or dampening ethnic political conflict. Whether or not such feelings are translated directly into activities that lead to disintegration depends upon the development of the organizational expression of the national sentiment—the ethnopolitical party. 10
The role played by ethnopolitical parties in fostering or retarding ethnic political conflict has been noted by Donald Horowitz, Cynthia Enloe, Paul Brass, and Anthony Smith. 11 Although political parties may reflect the environment from which they arose, they also nurture and affect that environment.
By appealing to electorates in ethnic terms, by making ethnic demands on government, and by bolstering the influence of ethnically chauvinistic elements within each group, parties that begin by merely mirroring ethnic divisions help to deepen and extend them. Hence the oft heard remark in such states that politicians have created ethnic conflict. 12 Moreover, the appearance of an ethnically based party can set off a chain reaction in the party system such that the appearance of organized ethnic parties forces others to adopt similar political strategies. 13 In the end, this dynamic often produces a system of political parties that is not only conflict ridden, but antithetical to the basic characteristics of political democracy. 14
Although the argument that the activities of political parties form an important set of intervening variables in explaining the incidence of conflict in divided societies is not new, this book builds on the previous literature in three ways. First, rather than focus on ethnic conflict and nationalism in general, attention is concentrated on the level of the individual party as the unit of analysis. Certainly, as noted above, the actions of individual parties can set off a chain reaction leading to an ethnic explosion; however, there are just as many instances where an ethnically based political movement does not lobby for an ethnically pure homeland or political separation, but seeks to behave according to constitutional norms and to accommodate the existing political structure. Thus, if conflict is explicable in terms of the behavior of ethnic parties, then more explicit attention to the factors that explain individual ethnic party behavior is warranted.
Second, unlike most previous works on ethnic conflict that employ case studies to inductively build theoretical propositions, this book proposes to systematically subject existing theoretical propositions to the litmus test of empiricism in order to assess which of these provide a sufficiently general explanation to account for the behavior of ethnopolitical parties throughout the “new Europe.”
Third, although most of the current and past literature on nationalism and ethnic politics in Europe focuses on differentiating between Eastern and Western or inclusive versus exclusive models of nationalism, 15 it is contended here that there are more shared commonalities among ethnopolitical parties in both Eastern and Western Europe than originally thought; thus, existing theoretical explanations can usefully be employed to shed light on the behavior of ethnopolitical parties in both Eastern and Western Europe.
To this end, the following sections of this chapter address conceptual issues, identify the behavioral patterns that can exist for ethnopolitical parties, and consider both the environmental (i.e., external) and internal factors that are often cited as affecting ethnopolitical party behavior. These comprise the basis for several theoretical expectations concerning ethnopolitical party behavior. Finally, the design of this book, justification for the selection of empirical cases, and an outline of the structure of each chapter are presented.
Nationalism, Ethnopolitics, and Ethnopolitical Parties
A commonly used concept in the study of politics in ethnically divided states is “nationalism.” As a concept, nationalism is both complex and ambiguous, but at the heart of it is the notion of “the self-assertion of ethnic groups.” 16 While such self-assertion might involve the strengthening of a group’s identity, it can also be aggressive in relation to other groups. As Rasma Karklins notes, nationalism as a political doctrine has been linked not only to the emergence of modern democracy and anti-imperial struggles, but also to xenophobic dictatorship. 17 Nationalism has been at the root of the democratic value of national self-determination, but it has also been employed to justify the exclusion of cultural minorities and the destruction of the democratic state. 18
The ambiguity of nationalism as a concept has caused some scholars in recent years to question its theoretical utility. Many, such as Joseph Rothschild and Karklins, have preferred to use the term “ethnopolitics” to broadly describe politics among ethnic entities. 19 Whereas nationalism is a “state of mind in which supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state,” 20 and as such represents a “political doctrine to make culture and polity congruent,” 21 the more inclusive ethnopolitics encompasses aspirations short of the creation of a nation-state and the congruence of culture with polity. Further, the concept of ethnopolitics has the advantage of including politics that are not conflictual; although ethnopolitics can be conflictual, it can also be cooperative.
The organizational expression of ethnopolitics is the ethnopolitical party. Although in much of the literature on political parties, the party has been conceived as both an integrative and an electoral organization that represents the “buckle which binds one social force to another,” leading to the creation of a national identity that transcends “more parochial groupings,” 22 other conceptions view the political party as a group of individuals who organize to achieve some specific purpose—winning competitive elections—as indicated by Leon Epstein’s definition of “political party” as “any group of individuals, however loosely organized, whose avowed purpose is winning elections.” 23 Similarly, Anthony Downs defines the political party as “a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election.” 24 And Kenneth Janda defines the political party as “a set of organizations that pursue a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions.” 25
However, ethnopolitical parties do not fall easily into either of these two definitions. On the one hand, ethnopolitical parties do not begin as integrative organizations. They primarily represent the interest of an ethnic group, rather than primarily seek to broaden their appeal to other groups. On the other hand, ethnopolitical parties often do not begin as electoral organizations, but as pressure groups whose original purpose is the pursuit of goals such as cultural preservation or linguistic autonomy. Nonetheless, although ethnopolitical parties may begin as organizations that do not originally seek to place their avowed representatives in power, they inevitably attempt to do so over time. This is due to the shifting goal orientation of the ethnopolitical party, a shift that occurs because, although campaigning for election may not have been the original purpose of the organization, the temptation to pursue political power grows as it becomes more apparent that the most effective means to influence the power relations among ethnic groups is to hold office. This requires that the ethnopolitical party appeal beyond the limited confines of the group in order to obtain political power. However, the extent to which the party must expand its appeal beyond the group it purports to represent depends on other factors: the institutional rules of the game, the strength of the existing party system, and the structure of ethnic competition (the number of groups, the extent of ethnic fragmentation, etc.). For our purposes, then, an ethnopolitical party is defined as an organization that purports to represent a particular ethnic group and seeks political power to impinge on the “relative power or position of ethnic groups.” 26 Ethnopolitical parties, from this perspective, are not naturally nationalist parties (which purport to make congruent culture and polity). However, they can become nationalist, particularly if means short of political separation prove ineffective.
Dimensions in Categorizing Types of Ethnopolitical Party Behavior
What are the actions that an ethnopolitical party can adopt? There have been several attempts in the recent literature to conceptualize ethnopolitical party behavior and to classify different kinds of ethnopolitical parties. 27 One of the more interesting is that offered by Joseph Rudolph and Robert Thompson, 28 who have identified four types of “ethnoterritorial movements” in terms of the goals they pursue: (1) output-oriented parties, which are less concerned with achieving self-rule than with expanding their region’s share of government outputs; (2) antiauthority parties, which are primarily concerned with affecting who makes decisions—that is, with the nature of existing political authority; (3) antiregime parties, which focus on changing the constitutional principles and political structures regulating the manner in which decisions are made (parties of this type often press for a federal-like system in which their region has autonomous control over those economic and cultural decisions affecting it); and (4) anticommunity parties, which challenge the fundamental legitimacy of the multinational political community in which they find themselves and champion independence.
In a more recent article, Raphael Zariski offers a different set of criteria by which to classify ethnopolitical party behavior. Rather than categorize parties by their attitudes concerning the political system, Zariski focuses on three behavioral characteristics: the willingness to use violence, ethnic exclusiveness, and separatism. 29 Ethnic exclusiveness refers to the “outright rejection of other ethnic groups, not only as models to be emulated... but even as allies to be courted for votes and political support or as recruits to be assimilated.” Taken to its extreme, ethnic exclusiveness involves “racist contempt for lesser breeds.” 30 Separatism is defined as a “movement that has a clearly articulated ultimate goal of independence and sovereignty.” 31 Ethnic extremist parties, then, are those that rank high along these three dimensions. Presumably (although Zariski is not entirely clear on this point), nonextremist parties do not exhibit these characteristics.
A third approach has been offered by Janusz Bugajski, 32 who focuses on Eastern Europe. For Bugajski, the kinds of demands made are a function of the degree to which an ethnic group is territorially compact and whether an ethnic kin state exists upon which the ethnopolitical movement can draw external support. He identifies five major variants of ethnic politics: cultural revivalism, political autonomism, territorial self-determination, separatism, and irredentism. Cultural revivalism involves a focus on social, cultural, religious, and educational institutions and usually involves increasing participation by the ethnic group in regional or national politics, rather than a challenge to the existing state. Cultural revivalism is common among groups, such as the Romany (Gypsy) population in the Czech Republic, that are spread throughout the country and have no kin state to provide external support. Political autonomism involves demands for control over political resources, particularly those dealing with minority culture and education. These demands often emerge when minorities have constituted majorities in previously existing states, when they possess a history of organized political involvement in a multiethnic country, and/or when their ethnic compatriots currently constitute a majority nationality in a neighboring kin state.
The difference between political autonomism and Bugajski’s next two types of ethnopolitical behavior is a matter of degree. Territorial self-determinism is similar to political autonomism in every respect save for the focus on a formal territory that is identified with the ethnic group. Calls for territorial self-determination usually involve demands for restructuring the state into a federal or confederal structure in which specific regions are recognized as having “republican status.” The emergence of the demand for territorial self-determination is most likely when the group is territorially compact. Separatism is a more extreme variety of territorial self-determination and usually involves a situation wherein the ethnic group is territorially compact and refuses to be included in the existing state, be it federal, confederal, or otherwise. Finally, irredentism, or the combination of separatism of the minority group joined with the imperial ambitions of a neighboring kin state, is most likely when the ethnic minority population is territorially compact and when ethnic compatriots currently constitute a majority nationality in a neighboring state.
What all of these schema have in common in categorizing different types of ethnic parties is the ultimate goal or end regarding the configuration of the political system and their community’s role in that system. Thus, Zariski, Rudolph and Thompson, and Bugajski have distinguished between ethnic parties that seek a fundamental reorientation of the features of the existing system (separatism for Zariski and Bugajski, and anticommunity parties for Rudolph and Thompson). This distinction yields the primary component of ethnopolitical party behavior, which is here conceptualized as the activities of the ethnopolitical party regarding the arrangement of the state. Such activities can range from demands for more equitable treatment without altering the basic features of the state to outright demands for a separate state altogether. For the purposes of comparison, each party in this study will be coded using Rudolph and Thompson’s criteria: zero (0) for output-oriented parties; one (1) for antiauthority parties; two (2) for antiregime parties; and three (3) for anticommunity parties. The demands made by ethnopolitical parties are considered more “extreme” if they tend toward desires for a fundamental restructuring of the state in the direction of separatism.
Yet beyond simple concomitant comparison across parties, we are also interested in comparisons over time. Many scholars have noted that ethnic parties evolve and that the operational objectives of these parties are consequently subject to change. A party may adopt an approach that initially intends accommodation but can later evolve into extremism. Conversely, a party that initially emerged as an extremist organization may be coaxed, however reluctantly, into pursuing less extreme strategies. What are the commonly cited factors that affect the evolution of ethnic parties?
Several factors have been cited in the literature that seeks to answer this question. These can generally be divided into three types of explanations: (1) those that focus on the effects of regime change; (2) those that emphasize the features of existing systems; and (3) those that concentrate on the internal characteristics of the parties.
Regime Change and Ethnopolitical Party Behavior
An important factor in activating ethnopolitical extremism is the effect of regime change, particularly a transition away from authoritarian rule (as in post-Franco Spain). 33 In ethnically divided societies, the introduction of democratic competition and expanded political participation has often led to disintegrative ethnic conflict. 34 This is especially true when an abertura (political opening) appears following a period of extensive repression of a community’s aspirations, for pent-up frustrations often quickly flower into extremist ethnic politics. Thus, democratization in Eastern Europe has led to the greater appeal for all-encompassing nationalist slogans, especially in a world “accustomed to a monopoly of ideas and a permanent struggle with the enemy,” making it far more difficult to “substitute the process of slow integration for the logic of destruction and war.” 35
Nevertheless, even when the opportunities presented by such regime change push the ethnopolitical party into making extreme demands, these demands may be tempered over time, especially if democratic transition is successful and there is a period of democratic consolidation. Indeed, as Colin Williams has observed, there is a strong incentive to moderate demands in the face of democratic competition, and this moderation is based on the ethnic parties’ desire to expand their base of political support in order to gain access to political power. Although the “logical implication” of any desire for autonomy may be political independence, autonomists have generally “confined their demands to areas they perceive as being acceptable to the governing body.” The latter, in turn, has usually been willing to negotiate, since it, too, appreciates that the cost of pushing a demand for autonomy to its logical conclusion would be extremely high. “But to reach the point where central leaders are willing to negotiate, ethnoterritorialisms must appear to speak for a large regional audience, which usually requires that the movements moderate their separatist nature.” 36
This would suggest the expectation that the pressure to make extreme political demands (meaning separatism or political autonomy) is higher in preexisting parties within societies undergoing democratic transition than in parties that emerged after the consolidation of political democracy.
Environmental Factors Affecting Party Behavior
Economic Factors
Economic factors are most commonly cited as being associated with increased ethnic tensions. Studies of nationalism, for instance, have linked nationalism with economic development and modernization. Karl Deutsch contends that nationalism plays an important role in social communication, or the transmission of the culture of a people across territory and through history; this is particularly important in societies undergoing modernization that uproots traditional systems of social solidarity, requiring new concepts of community. 37 Ernst Gellner argues that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, resulting from the “distinctive structural requirements of industrial society.” 38 Benedict Anderson, as well, contends that the rise of nationalism in the modern era is linked to the spread of a vernacular print culture that is linked to modernization and industrialization. 39
Although modernization may generally be linked to nationalism, specific aspects of the modernization process affect whether political movements that aspire to represent a particular community adopt more or less extreme demands. Among these aspects is the differential economic performance among groups that may increase resentments in a segmented society. Moreover, not only can differential growth rates create the basis for resentments upon which ethnic parties can capitalize, but the timing of economic growth also impacts such resentments. 40 Further, “de-development,” or periods of economic downturn, are especially related to the growth of resentments. Resource allocation issues are particularly divisive, especially as resources become increasingly scarce and there emerges a greater demand for the “equity” of such allocations. 41 Conflict, therefore, becomes more likely when the resource pie shrinks. 42
Sociocultural Factors
A great many scholars have also noted that certain sociostructural features of a country exacerbate the degree of resentment produced by political and economic factors. 43 In particular, the existence of fewer groups tends to heighten resentments generated by developmental inequalities and the creation or lack of political opportunities. For instance, as R. S. Milne notes, the fewer and more equally sized the groups, the more likely that they will constitute opposite and impermeable poles. Resentments under such conditions are often quite strong, and the quality of politics is usually highly conflictual and conducive to extremist politics because there are no balancing or arbitrating groups to mitigate conflict. 44
A second sociocultural factor that impacts the quality of resentments is what Horowitz has referred to as the “structure of group relations.” On the one hand, there are “ranked systems” where social class and ethnic origins coincide. Under such conditions, ethnic groups are ordered in a hierarchy, with one superordinate and one subordinate. On the other hand, there are “unranked systems” where parallel “ethnic groups coexist, each internally stratified.” 45 The latter is most common in bipolar societies where each ethnic group is territorially compact. The existence of ranked and unranked systems in turn affects the quality of resentments and the course of ethnic conflict. Often, resentments in ranked systems, when they emerge, are couched in terms of class conflict and demands for redistribution of resources, because the issues of ethnicity and class are intertwined. However, when unranked systems predominate, and unranked groups “constitute incipient whole societies,” resentments usually revolve around issues of autonomy, not social transformation. 46
International Factors
Extremist politics also results from changes in the international environment. Whether the political leadership of ethnic parties sees utility in pursuing accommodationist or separatist ends depends, to a large extent, on its perception of its community’s role in the region within which the state is located. Two aspects of that regional environment within which a multiethnic state is located shape the structure of opportunities presented by that environment. One is the presence of cross-border ties among groups—for example, when a linguistic group transcends the confines of political boundaries. Second, the tendencies within the region toward political integration or its inverse, disintegration, will affect the opportunities facing political leaders.
Two different types of cross-border ties are particularly relevant in this regard. The first we refer to as an environment of “external threat,” which is represented by the following hypothetical situation: Consider groups x and y in country A and adjacent country B; group y is culturally and linguistically related to the dominant portion of country B’s population. In such an international environment, tensions between the two groups are often very high, first because one group (x) considers itself the titular and “rightful” owner of the country and often perceives the other group as interlopers and, worse yet, a “fifth column.” Members of group y, on the other hand, may feel that they are the heir to a great civilization and that the presence of powerful potential support across the border may embolden their demands. 47
Second, in addition to cross-border ethnic ties, tendencies within the region toward political integration or disintegration will affect both the perceptions and the actions of the leaders of ethnic segments within states. Indeed, greater regional integration might well promote the emergence of what Ernst Haas has referred to as extreme “micro-nationalisms.” 48 The logic behind this expectation is that regional integration permits previously isolated ethnic groups to become more visible and, in certain cases, interact across national boundaries. 49
The reverse situation creates a different set of incentives. Given the above logic, it may be the case that in a disintegrating regional environment, leaders of the various ethnic groups face greater incentives to arrive at political accommodation within the existing state. There is no other set of institutions, and the alternative to political accommodation is chaos and war. In other words, the greater uncertainties presented by a disintegrating environment are likely to make accommodation a more attractive proposition than it would be under other circumstances.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that a disintegrating international environment inexorably leads to domestic political accommodation. It may well be that some leaders perceive violence to give them their best chance to gain the settlement they desire; that is, they may expect that in a disintegrating environment, their chances to achieve their goals through violence are better than under other circumstances. To a large extent, this depends on whether leaders view such circumstances as opportunities or as risks. This in turn depends on the biases and prejudices leaders hold.
Political Factors
There has been a long-standing contention that political factors, and especially political structures, affect the opportunities ethnopolitical parties face. In the literature, there has been considerable debate over the effects of institutional factors on politics in ethnically divided societies, particularly the effects of representational mechanisms (such as the electoral law and federalism) and the structure of the constitutional order (or presidential versus parliamentary systems). 50
Historically, there has been considerable debate over which representational mechanisms are most apt to promote political stability in ethnically divided new democracies. Two dimensions are involved in the debate over representational mechanisms. The first dimension deals with the scope of representation, or the extent to which representation is commensurate with political divisions in society. The second deals with the quality of representation, or the primary units to be represented. 51
There has also been much debate in the literature on whether expanded representation is beneficial or detrimental in promoting ethnic peace in divided states. On the one hand, the “consociational” school contends that representing groups proportionally facilitates the integration of as many subcultures as possible into the political game, thus creating the conditions for interethnic cooperation. 52 Consociationalists therefore tend to favor political structures like proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and federalism, because they prevent the consistent denial of representation to important minorities. 53 Further, by securing representation for minority groups, PR serves to facilitate the integration of disaffected groups into the political system, which ultimately leads them to moderate their demands. On the other hand, “majoritarian” models of politics are inappropriate in ethnically divided societies because they “systematically exclude blocs,” which is “likely to result in violence and democratic collapse.” 54 Thus, by promoting “segmental political parties” and their representation “instead of creating conflict.... [they] now play a constructive role in conflict resolution.” 55 Moreover, in the long run, there is the possibility that such inclusive mechanisms might also serve to activate the cleavages within ethnic blocs and hence weaken ethnic-based politics as a whole. 56
However, critics have pointed out that the introduction of PR might lead to the representation of extremist or antisystem ethnic parties, intent on the destruction of an incipient political democracy, and there is no reason to believe that such parties will necessarily moderate their demands once they have attained access. 57 In addition, critics of federalism contend that when state borders coincide with those of the ethnic group, ethnic parties are availed representation that they often use as “springboards” for a bid at national power or, failing that, separation. 58
Some suggest that the solution to ethnic political conflict does not lie with the scope of representation, but with its quality. For instance, Brass criticizes the consociational remedy as leading to the “freezing” of ethnic conflicts by promoting measures that reify ethnic groups. 59 He suggests a different means to deal with ethnic conflict: Give free play to individual competition that will ensure that the system does not discriminate on a group basis. Promoting individual competition and an individually based system of representation would diffuse ethnic conflict by undermining “the segmental cleavages of plural societies and permit inter-segmental alliances on other bases than inter-elite agreement.” 60 The promotion of intraethnic divisions and crosscutting cleavages leaves open the possibility for integrating divided societies on a new basis other than ethnicity and promoting “individual rights and the future prospect of individual autonomy.” 61
Another point of contention concerns the impact of presidentialism versus parliamentary systems. Matthew Shugart and John Carey note that presidentialism tends to provide an incentive for politicians to broaden their appeal in the pursuit of office. 62 Thus, as Horowitz notes, the adoption of presidentialism coupled with election procedures designed to broaden support in, for example, Nigeria and Sri Lanka provide a moderating effect on ethnic politics. 63 Yet critics of presidential systems have linked more cases of political violence to these systems than to parliamentary systems. Juan Linz, for one, argues that in a presidential system, the political stakes of winning the presidency dwarf all other concerns, thus making it more likely that losers will not accept the outcome of an election. 64 Scott Mainwaring has also noted that political instability is likely to result from presidential systems because there is a greater likelihood for political deadlock when the different branches are dominated by polar opposites, which is often the case in ethnically divided societies. 65
An additional political dimension that affects the appearance and behavior of ethnic parties is the structure of competition, or the features of the party system that affect the opportunities presented to ethnic parties and, hence, provide incentives to behave in certain ways. For Gordon Smith and Peter Mair, a key variable in explaining the behavior of “small parties” such as ethnic parties is the size of the dominant parties in the party system. From this perspective, for party systems that are dominated by large parties, there is no need for coalition building. 66 Thus, through exclusion, there is a strong incentive for ethnic parties to adopt increasingly extremist positions, especially if there are no mechanisms present to guarantee representation. On the other hand, positive political theorists working on spatial models of electoral competition have noted that the presence of a large number of small parties may also promote extremist political behavior. In a multiparty system, the presence of several parties may exert a “squeezing out” effect on political parties, compelling individual parties to “jump out” from the “pack.” 67 This squeezing effect largely depends on the electoral law and the structures of the political system. When there are incentives present to broaden the party’s appeal (such as under a plurality electoral rule), there is often a “crowding” effect that squeezes out smaller or weaker competitors, compelling them to adopt extremist positions in order to differentiate themselves from other competitors. 68
Beyond the sheer number and size of the parties in a party system confronting the ethnic party, there is also the effect of the ideological features of the party system. In particular, the key variable is the strength of the parties that are in opposition to the ethnopolitical party. In other words, when nationalist parties that represent the politically dominant group are powerful, then the ethnopolitical party representing a political minority is more likely to adopt extremist political demands.
Internal Factors Affecting Party Behavior
The discussion so far has focused primarily on the forces that shape the structure of opportunities facing political parties. Yet there are several scholars who contend that the internal characteristics of the party are the primary determinants in explaining party behavior. In particular, who leads the party is as important as the situation in which the party finds itself.
Some argue that who leads is a function of the stage of development a party has reached. For instance, Miroslav Hroch proposes that nationalist groups in the course of their development pass through distinct stages, defined in terms of the different social groups from which they draw their support. In the first, or the cultural, phase, some members of the middle and upper classes develop an interest in national history, language, and culture, and support organizations that endorse cultural demands. No clear political aims are articulated. The second phase involves the politicization of the movement. However, this is usually expressed in the form of pressure groups or civic action groups, rather than through a single party organization. The third stage sees the establishment of nationalist organizations as a mass movement, with the extreme nationalists satisfied with nothing less than total political independence. 69
Although useful, Hroch’s examination focuses primarily on historical cases. Indeed, in the modern era, the phases of development are less clearly separated. The instruments of mass communication have collapsed the first two stages such that cultural demands are now addressed to a mass audience and often take on immediate political significance. Further, Hroch’s analysis is limited to explaining the evolution of ethnic parties prior to entering into electoral competition. As M. N. Pederson has noted, this is an important factor in that the behavior of the party is greatly affected by entrance into electoral competition. 70 For Pederson, the party’s behavior is affected by four thresholds that differentiate the stages of party development: (1) the threshold of declaration, or the point at which a group of people declares it will participate in an election; (2) the threshold of authorization, or the legal regulations that have to be fulfilled by the party in order to participate in the election; (3) the threshold of representation, or when the party has gained enough support to gain representation in Parliament; and (4) the threshold of relevance, or when the party has entered as members in a coalition government. However, unlike Hroch, Pederson does not argue that the organization necessarily follows a linear process of development from one stage to the next. Rather, it is possible for a party to move back and forth along this dimension.
Yet, as James Kellas notes, the fact that behavior of the party may be different at different stages of its development is due less to some natural process of evolution and more to the fact that, at different times and under different conditions, different kinds of elites dominate the nationalist movement. For Kellas, there are three types of elites that comprise any nationalist movement: a political elite “comprising politicians, civil servants and military”; the cultural elite, “especially teachers, writers and clergy”; and the economic elite “comprising businessmen and trade union leaders. Each reacts differently towards nationalism and towards the central state.” 71 The cultural elite is most likely to be inclined toward the extreme because, being so involved in education and the creative arts (especially writing and broadcasting), they have a “vested interest” in promoting an idealized national identity upon which their careers depend. Teaching, writing, and broadcasting a national language bring such people economic gains and a reason to favor more extreme (nationalist) political demands. 72 The economic elite is least likely to be nationalist since it is usually the case that it has links with wider markets and does not wish to have those market ties severed. The role of the political elite is crucial in the balance of power in the nationalist organization. 73 However, since those in the political elite are likely to be primarily motivated by the pursuit of political power, they often “blow” in the direction of the prevailing political winds.
Clearly, some characteristics of the political environment are apt to make more likely the emergence of certain types of leaders over others. As Angelo Panebianco contends, the perspective of leaders is affected by the environment in which they are situated. Although political parties often evolve from “systems of solidarity” (in which individuals who affiliate with the party are motivated by some sense of common ideals) to “systems of interests” (in which individuals develop a growing need for self-preservation, even at the expense of compromising ideals), evolutionary trajectories can be altered by environmental factors. 74 Generally speaking, the initial period of a party’s evolution is characterized by an emphasis on dominating the party’s environment (i.e., viewing other parties as enemies to be conquered) and the later periods by an emphasis on coming to terms with that environment (in order to promote political survival). However, certain environmental conditions will push the party toward the maintenance of ideals and the continued pursuit of strategies of domination. Other conditions will push the party toward adapting to its environment. Thus it follows that ethnic parties are likely to be more extreme when environmental conditions promote those who view politics as a “zero-sum” game versus those who view politics in shades of gray.
To rely solely on the characteristics of leaders to explain the behavior of the party, however, is to ignore other internal constraints on what leaders can do, particularly those imposed by the collective units they lead. Indeed, it is one thing to have the existence of mass resentments; it is entirely another to mobilize and focus these into collective action. 75 Leaders do not lead completely homogeneous political organizations, nor are organizations merely a reflection of the aspirations of leaders. Rather, they are collective entities that often consist of individuals with widely variant views, opinions, and aspirations. 76 At times, especially when the organization is a heterogeneous entity, this constrains leaders since they must exert much energy on building internal consensus to maintain unity in the face of external challenges. Ceteris paribus, this often promotes a degree of moderation on the party of leadership, since they are required by the heterogeneity of the organization to act as consensus builders. In turn, this emphasis on consensus can spill over into the ways in which the party deals with others. In contrast, homogeneous organizations tend to lessen such constraints since leaders are less likely to expend political energy on building consensus within their organizations, which makes them less likely to seek consensus outside of the party. 77
Theoretical Expectations and the Design of This Book
The factors outlined above lead to six general expectations, which are the basic themes guiding our inquiry into the individual national cases.
| Expectation 1. | Because of pent-up frustrations harbored under a previous authoritarian regime, ethnopolitical parties in countries in transition are likely to make more extremist political demands regarding the arrangement of the state than are parties in consolidated democracies. |
| Expectation 2. | (a) The greater the gap in economic performance among ethnic groups, the more likely it is that the ethnopolitical party representing the political minority group will make extremist demands; and (b) the greater the degree of economic downturn, the more likely it is that the ethnopolitical party will engage in extremist demands. |
| Expectation 3. | The more regionally integrated the state, the less likely it is that the ethnopolitical party will make extremist demands. |
| Expectation 4. | (a) The broader the scope of political representation, the less likely it is that the ethnopolitical party will make extremist demands; and (b) the more the quality of representation is based on individual competition and not on group competition, the less likely it is that the ethnopolitical party will make extremist demands. |
| Expectation 5. | The more the current government is dominated by nationalists of another group, the more likely it is that the ethnopolitical party representing the political minority will make extremist demands. |
| Expectation 6. | The more diverse the composition of the ethnopolitical party, the less likely it is that it will make extremist demands. |
To assess these expectations, we studied Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (particularly developments in Scotland and Wales). All of these cases represent divided states where there are at least two large, geographically concentrated ethnic groups in competition with each other. Further, all of the national cases represent parliamentary systems (thus controlling for the effects of presidentialism), and all have ethnic kin states across their borders.
Although comparing West and East European cases runs the risk of comparing proverbial apples and oranges, we attempt to minimize this potential problem by dividing the comparative analysis into three sets of paired comparisons that generally represent the various types of ethnically bipolar countries in Europe. In the first set (Chapters 2 and 3), we compare the East European cases of Bulgaria and Slovakia. In both countries, the principal ethnic minority groups (Turks in Bulgaria and Hungarians in Slovakia) represent long-standing communities that suffered repression under Communist rule and that currently constitute territorially concentrated populations amounting to about 10 percent of the total population. In the second set (Chapter 4), we compare two Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, both of which were part of the former Soviet Union. The Russophone populations of each are of only recent origin, but they comprise more than one-third of the population of each state. Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6, we compare the West European cases of Belgium and the United Kingdom. Both represent ethnopolitics in consolidated democracies, with long-standing ethnic communities that have developed relatively strong ethnopolitical parties.
In each chapter, we focus on the behavior of the ethnopolitical parties that represent the political minority population: the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria, the Hungarian parties in Slovakia, the Russophone parties of Estonia and Latvia, the Volksunie and the Vlaams Blok in Belgium (representing the Flemish population), and the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru in the United Kingdom. Specifically, we provide historical and socioeconomic backgrounds to the development of the ethnopolitical parties and discuss international dimensions, institutional features of the systems, the structure of competition, and the evolution of the ethnopolitical parties in recent years. At the end of each chapter, we assess our six expectations as they pertain to the individual national cases.
In the concluding chapter, we assess each expectation comparatively, highlighting those factors that appear to have the greatest general explanatory power in accounting for the development and behavior of the ethnopolitical parties.
Endnotes
Note 1: Haas, Beyond the Nation-State; Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Lindberg, The Political Dynamics. For a critique of this literature, see Jalali and Lipset, “Racial and Ethnic Conflicts,” 585–587. Back.
Note 2: Druckman, “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty,” 44–45; Jackson and James, “The Character of Independent Statehood”; A. Smith, The Ethnic Revival. Fred Parkinson’s assertion that “constructing nations out of separate ethnic groups is not only a difficult but also an unnatural process” states this pessimistic view most explicitly (“Ethnicity and Independent Statehood,” 339). Back.
Note 3: M. G. Smith, The Plural Society, xiii. Back.
Note 4: Michnik, “Dignity and Fear,” 15. Back.
Note 5: Fearon and Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” 716. Back.
Note 6: See Rabie, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, 177–194. Back.
Note 7: Haas, “What Is Nationalism?” 725. See also Rustow, A World of Nations, and Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. Back.
Note 8: Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 11. See also Zariski, “Ethnic Extremism,” 253–273. Back.
Note 9: Fearon and Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” 716. Back.
Note 10: Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism. Back.
Note 11: This point is made by Giovanni Sartori when he notes that political parties both “pre-suppose” and “produce” political cleavages in society (“Political Development and Political Engineering,” 261–298). Back.
Note 12: Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 291. Back.
Note 13: Sartori, “Political Development and Political Engineering,” 293–298. Back.
Note 14: Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 298. Back.
Note 15: Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 576; Snyder, The New Nationalism. Back.
Note 16: Ra’anan, “The Nation-State Fallacy,” 9. Back.
Note 17: Karklins, Ethnopolitics, 3. Back.
Note 18: A. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 171. Back.
Note 19: Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, 84; Karklins, Ethnopolitics, 4. Back.
Note 20: Kohn, Nationalism, 9. Back.
Note 21: Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 43. Back.
Note 22: Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 405; Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments,” 4. Back.
Note 23: Epstein, Political Parties. Back.
Note 24: Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 25. Back.
Note 25: Janda, Political Parties, 5. Back.
Note 26: Karklins, Ethnopolitics, 4. Back.
Note 27: See, for instance, Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. Back.
Note 28: Rudolph and Thompson, “Ethnoterritorial Movements and the Policy Process,” 291–311. Back.
Note 29: Zariski, “Ethnic Extremism,” 261. Back.
Note 31: Ibid., 256. See also A. Smith, “Nationalism, Ethnic Separatism, and the Intelligentsia,” 17. Back.
Note 32: Bugajski, “The Fate of Minorities,” 102–116. Back.
Note 34: See Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” 493–514; Horowitz, “Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics,” 232–236; Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development. Back.
Note 35: Michnik, ed., “Dignity and Fear,” 18 Back.
Note 36: C. Williams, ed., National Separatism, 294. Back.
Note 37: Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 96–104. Back.
Note 38: Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 35. Back.
Note 39: Anderson, Imagined Communities, 66–79. Back.
Note 40: Tiryakian and Rogowski, eds., New Nationalisms of the Developed West, 101; Frognier, Quevit, and Stenbock, “Regional Imbalances,” 274. Back.
Note 41: Scott, “The Politics of New States,” 29–30. Back.
Note 42: Landis and Boucher, “Themes and Models of Conflict,” 21–22. See also Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Back.
Note 43: Daalder, “The Consociational Democracy Theme,” 604–621. Back.
Note 44: Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bi-polar States; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 22–30. Back.
Note 45: Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 22–23. Back.
Note 47: Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bi-polar States; Rothschild, Ethnopolitics. Back.
Note 48: Haas, “What Is Nationalism?” Back.
Note 49: Said and Simmons, eds., Ethnicity in an International Context, 18. Back.
Note 50: For a summary of this debate, see Lijphart, “Democracies,” 1–4. Back.
Note 51: For a discussion of this debate, see Nordlinger, “Representation, Governmental Stability, and Decisional Effectiveness,” 108–127; and Covell, “Ethnic Conflict, Representation, and the State in Belgium,” 230–235. Back.
Note 52: Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies; Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies; McRae, Consociational Democracy; Daalder, “The Consociational Democracy Theme,” 604–621; Lorwin, “Segmented Pluralism,” 141–175. Back.
Note 53: Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 106–107; Lijphart, “Proportionality by Non-PR Methods,” 113–123; Lakeman, How Democracies Vote. Back.
Note 54: Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 86; Duchacek, “Antagonistic Cooperation,” 3–29. Back.
Note 55: Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 106–107. Back.
Note 56: Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 649. Back.
Note 57: Barry, “Review Article,” 57–67; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 303–304. Back.
Note 58: Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition; D. Olson “Political Parties and the 1992 Election,” 301–314. See also Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, and Wightman, “Czechoslovakia,” 319–326. Back.
Note 59: Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 339. Back.
Note 61: Ibid., 346 n. 11. Back.
Note 62: Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, chap. 10. Back.
Note 63: Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Back.
Note 64: Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” 51–69. Back.
Note 65: Mainwaring, “Presidentialism, Multi-partyism, and Democracy,” 198–228; Stepan and Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks,” 1–22. Back.
Note 66: G. Smith, “In Search of Small Parties,” 23–40; Mair, “The Electoral Universe of Small Parties,” 41–70. Back.
Note 67: Cox, “Electoral Equilibrium,” 82–108. Back.
Note 69: Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. Back.
Note 70: Pederson, “Towards a New Typology,” 1–16. Back.
Note 71: Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 81. Back.
Note 72: Tiryakian and Rogowski, New Nationalisms of the Developed West. Back.
Note 73: Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 81. Back.
Note 74: Panebianco, Political Parties, 8–9. Back.
Note 75: M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, Modern Political Economy. Back.
Note 76: See Schlesinger, “On the Theory of Party Organization,” 369–400. Horowitz holds that the actions of leaders are often constrained by general attitudes among the membership of the ethnic segment they lead (Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 564). Back.
Note 77: Panebianco, Political Parties, 14–15. Back.
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