Chapter 6

IDENTITY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA

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Two theories of contemporary international relations compete to explain state behavior at the system level. Realist theories explain state behavior primarily in terms of a country's relative position in the international distribution of power. The internal attributes of the country, such as political ideology, economic system, or governmental institutions, are secondary. "State behavior" according to Kenneth Waltz, the preeminent realist theorist, "varies more with differences of power than differences of ideology, internal structure of property relations, or in governmental form."[1] Constructivist theories explain state behavior at the system level in terms of a country's identity or relative position in "the intersubjective understandings and expectations that constitute [states'] conception of self and other."[2] State identities determine whether countries see each other as friends or foes and thus whether relative power differences between countries are threatening or not.

These theories inform current analysis of international relations in Asia. Henry Kissinger, a foremost practitioner of realist theory, interprets Asia's future largely in terms of the position and balancing of rival powers. "The relations of the principal Asian nations to each other," he writes, "bear most of the attributes of the European balance-of-power system of the nineteenth century." "China is on the road to superpower status." "The other Asian nations are likely to seek counterweights to an increasingly powerful China." And "the

American role is the key to helping Japan and China coexist despite their suspicions of each other."[3] Iain Johnston, on the other hand, interprets Chinese foreign policy behavior primarily in terms of its realpolitik strategic culture (identity). This culture, "which generally places offensive strategies before static defense and accommodations strategies," drives Chinese foreign policy whatever the external distribution of power may be. It "reflects a set of characteristics of the external environment as dangerous, adversaries as threatening, and conflict as zero-sum, in which the application of violence is ultimately required to deal with threats."[4] If this interpretation holds, balancing Chinese power is not likely to facilitate coexistence, as Kissinger expects, but may actually intensify conflict as China maneuvers persistently to shift the balance of power in its favor.

Realist theories, which argue that power positioning overrides cultural self-identification, do not deal effectively with revisionist states (such as China, if Johnston is correct) whose self-image rejects the status quo and seeks to maximize, not balance, power.[5] On the other hand, constructivist theories, which argue that national self-images drive foreign policy irrespective of external power positions, do not deal adequately with performance or outcomes. Some self-images work better in the "real world" than others. If self-images interpret power, they may also misinterpret it.[6] In the end, the Soviet Union's self-image as a communist state failed because it did not cope adequately with the exploding power realities of the information age. China, as the last great communist state, may fail for the same reason. Self-images motivate power, but they are also subject to it. To evaluate outcomes, relative power remains a necessary exogenous factor, not a wholly endogenous product of interpretation, as some constructivist approaches maintain.[7]

How might one compensate for the shortcomings of realist and constructivist theories? This essay suggests combining the realist and constructivist variables of power and identity (self-image) to explain present and potential patterns of Asian politics at the systemic (or sub-systemic) level. Each variable becomes an independent influence on outcomes at the system level.[8] The distribution captures relative power differences (from equal/decentralized to unequal/centralized). The distribution of identity maps out threat perceptions based on differences among self-images (friendly vs. unfriendly). Juxtaposed, the two variables define a scatter diagram of four basic models of international systems (or subsystems, if one is looking only at the Asia-Pacific region). I call these models *anarchic* (decentralized/relatively equal power and unfriendly self-images), *security communities* (decentralized/relatively equal power and friendly self-images), *imperial* (unequal power and unfriendly self-images), and *hierarchical* (centralized power and integrated self-images).

The anarchic model captures realist terrain in international politics. But security communities, imperial models, and hierarchical situations illustrate cir-

cumstances that realism cannot account for (or, in the case of hierarchy, consigns to domestic politics alone). And, while constructivism claims to account for all of these situations (whatever states make of the situation), it ignores the constraints on collective dialogue imposed by power structures. As I note below, the dialogue in a situation of imperial or unipolar power is likely to be differently constrained than a dialogue in an anarchic situation or within security communities.

A particular international system (or subsystem) may exist anywhere on the scatter diagram (see figure 6.1, below). The axes are continuous, not dichotomous. At each point on the scatter diagram, the structural constraints of power and identity vary, setting various limits on military, economic, and political behavior among actors within that system (or subsystem).[9]

The four models obtained by juxtaposing power and identity variables help to solve a number of puzzles about contemporary and future Asian relations that realism and constructivism alone cannot explain. Two such puzzles are the relative stability of great power politics in Asia and the low level of institutionalization in the region compared to Europe.

Realism predicts only situations of anarchy. Because states balance not maximize power, they do not bandwagon and create imperial or unipolar situations.[10] Similarly, they do not form security communities, even if they share friendly self-images, because internal similarities cannot override external differences in power positions.

Thus, in Asia, realism predicts that great powers will compete and balance against one another. There should be considerable instability. In the near term, Japan and the United States are the two principal and therefore competing powers, and in the longer-term China will join the competition against both Japan and the United States. In fact, however, Japan and the United States are allied with one another and are strengthening their alliance to deal with threats in Asia beyond the borders of Japan (the new defense guidelines). They exist in a security community in which intense economic competition does not escalate readily into international military threats or rivalries. In addition, the United States and Japan dwarf China in military and economic power. They exercise imperial or unipolar power in the region. These two factors—the security community between Japan and the United States, and the unipolar power position of the United States and Japan vis-à-vis China—contribute to greater stability in the region. Thus, an approach combining identity and power predicts existing realities in Asia better than realism can do by itself.

Constructivism tends to predict high levels of institutionalization among states if state identities are cooperative and not competitive. Realism predicts high levels of institutionalization (and hence specialization) if the distribution of power is hierarchical. As all of the papers in this volume confirm, the level of

institutionalization and multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region is low compared to that in Europe. Constructivism would have to account for this outcome by arguing that identities in Asia are more competitive than those in Europe. Asia does include nondemocratic as well as democratic states and multiple world religions, rather than the predominant Judeo-Christian religion of Europe. Yet, historically, as Dave Kang suggests in this volume, Asia has experienced less competition and fewer wars than Europe (at least until Western intrusion in the nineteenth century). Kang attributes this outcome to Chinese imperialism (or the Chinese system) which emphasized formal hierarchy but informal equality (as opposed to the emphasis in Europe on formal equality and informal hierarchy). But Chinese imperialism in Asia does not equate with higher levels of institutionalization.

Considering power and identity simultaneously helps to solve this puzzle. Constructivism ignores the possibility that the distribution of power may exert an independent influence on the construction of social identities.[11] Yet social identities in Asia have been constructed for the most part under an imperial or unipolar distribution of power, with China having been the dominant power for much of the past thousand years. This configuration of power did not lead to higher levels of institutionalization, however, because China's identity emphasized a soft institutional system of tribute and deference, rather than a hard institutional system of international organizations and specialization. China's domestic institutions sufficed to order the realm. In Europe, by contrast, the distribution of power was continuously anarchic, with only very brief moments of imperial conquest. Under the circumstances, no one state was able to impose its domestic institutions on the international realm and higher levels of international institutionalization were required to coordinate interstate affairs.

From the outset of the state system at Westphalia, European states depended upon contractual and eventually legal institutions to guarantee and protect their separate and independent identities. Although the anarchic distribution of power produced much instability, the competitive construction of identities produced a corresponding codification of legal and organizational devices, which ensured the survival of separate and independent states, despite repeated wars. Thus, levels of institutionalization in Asia and Europe are functions of the configuration of both power and identity, not of either one alone.

The rest of the essay divides into two parts. In the first part, I explore the rationale and empirical considerations involved in developing a structural model of international politics that tracks simultaneously both identity and power. In part two, I use the model to explain aspects of contemporary and future interstate relations in Asia that realism and constructivism cannot or do not explain as well.

A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF POWER AND IDENTITY

SOCIAL CONSENSUS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

The history of the modern state system suggests that both material (realist) and social (constructivist) factors have always combined at the structural level to determine the character of state behavior. The balance of power system that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe involved not just a physical separation of territories and decentralization of power. It also involved the social structure of sovereignty. The critical parameter of that system, as John Ruggie points out, "was not who had how much power, but who could be designated *as* a power."[12] That designation came about through a shared understanding that, although states projected diverging cultural and religious self-images, they would not seek to impose their own culture (at the time, specifically their religion) within the territory of another state. This reciprocal recognition of state sovereignty constrained the use of power. It did not eliminate war, but it did make war illegitimate for the purpose of eradicating another state. In this sense, the European system that emerged after 1500 was not imperial but anarchic.[13]

While the power structure of the European system has remained anarchic to the present day, the social structure has gone through several changes.[14] At the end of the Napoleonic wars, the victorious powers—Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria—reinstituted the system of state sovereignty. Rather than eliminate the defeated power, they restored the French monarchy. The great powers also agreed to abstain from intervention in internal affairs and to accept a defensive posture—to balance, not maximize, power—in external affairs. From this point on, however, the social consensus unraveled. First, through the Holy Alliance, Prussia, Russia, and Austria sought to legitimate intervention in the affairs of another sovereign (e.g., Spain, Italy, Greece) to prevent the overthrow of the monarchy (that is, to prevent a repetition of the French revolution that led to the Napoleonic wars). This was too much for Great Britain whose domestic politics was moving toward representative institutions. After Britain left the Congress of Vienna system, Prince Metternich of Austria managed to moderate the anti-revolutionary zeal of the Holy Alliance, especially that of the Russian Czar. After Metternich's death, Prussia, under Bismarck, posed a new challenge to the conservative consensus. Bismarck believed it was legitimate to use force offensively to unite independent states under the banner of their common German culture. The great powers now splintered on the critical question of when and for what purposes it was legitimate to use force in interstate affairs. The empires (Russia and Austria-Hungary) sought to use force to conserve the monarchy, Germany to unite and protect a new autocratic nation, and Great Britain and France to defend emerging liberal institutions.[15]

Two world wars and then a cold war followed. Each of these contests was as much about the social basis for managing the balance of power as about the balance of power itself. Was mutual respect of sovereignty compatible with Bismarck's and then the Kaiser's militant nationalism? Did mutual respect of sovereignty extend to Hitler's criminal regime engaged in genocide? Did peaceful coexistence imply the moral equivalence of totalitarian communist states and liberal democracies? The cold war was not only about the social structure that would govern the balance of power in Europe; it was also the first major world conflict that was settled largely by a contest between competing values or self-images rather than an actual test of military arms.[16]

In the wake of the cold war, a new social consensus has emerged among the major industrial countries for managing the balance of power. As mature democracies, these countries subject the legitimate use of force at home to strict constitutional guarantees and appear to reciprocate the expectation that they are not likely to use force in their external relations with one another. The so-called democratic peace, while it is not fully understood by political scientists, is nevertheless a powerful expression of contemporary reality.[17] The Atlantic democracies and Japan do not threaten one another with military force and do not have any strategic plans to do so. Their behavior reflects a pervasive consensus among democratic nations as to when and for what purposes it is legitimate to use force within their individual societies as well as in their relations with one another. In the limited area of human rights, this consensus appears to go beyond democratic countries. Increasingly, all countries accept the notion that it is illegitimate to use force domestically to torture or otherwise abuse the person of each individual citizen. They also appear to accept the idea that international intervention is justified to protect these basic human rights.[18]

DEFINING IDENTITY

How could we model the role of identity without slighting that of power? Identity is a very broad concept. It might refer to ethnicity, culture, religion, politics or any number of other variables. The aspect of identity that appears to be most crucial to international affairs, however, is the orientation countries take toward the use of force. As Robert Powell demonstrates, the issue of the use of force essentially separates realist and neoliberal theories of international relations. "When . . . the use of force actually is at issue," Powell writes, "cooperative outcomes . . . cannot be supported," and "this inability to cooperate is in accord with the expectations of structural realism." On the other hand, "if the use of force is not at issue, . . . the results are more in accord with neoliberal institutionalism."[19] Powell identifies the use of force as a constraint in the system arising from the nature of military technology and the cost of fighting. This con-

straint also reflects a common evaluation among the states of the costs and benefits of fighting and therefore a shared understanding among them affecting the management of the balance of power.

We can break such a shared understanding or consensus down into the orientation (or identity) of individual states toward the use of force. This orientation has both an internal and an external component. The internal aspect deals with the conditions under which the state considers it legitimate to use force against its own citizens. As Waltz tells us, a state or hierarchical actor is not defined primarily by a monopoly on the use of force but by "a monopoly on the *legitimate* use of force."[20] Internally, each state has an agreed set of rules that legitimates or delegitimates the use of force within that society. These rules have a substantive and a procedural dimension. The substantive dimension concerns the rationale or grounds on which the use of force is legitimate—political ideology (e.g., liberalism, communism, etc.), tradition (e.g., culture, religion, ethnicity, etc.), or charisma (heroic myths, cult of the leader, etc.).[21] The procedural dimension deals with the question of who makes the decision to use legitimate force—a single ruler, an elite or oligarchy, or the people directly or through representative institutions. One measure of internal identity, therefore, may be a typology of regime types, graded in terms of the substantive and procedural mechanisms by which these regimes legitimate the use of force internally against their own citizens. Several data bases exist that provide such a typology of regime types. They make it possible to code the internal dimension of a country's identity and associate an empirical measure of legitimacy with each empirical aggregate or pole of military (and economic) power in the international system (or subsystem).[22]

The external aspect of a state's orientation toward the use of force deals with the conditions under which a state considers it legitimate to use force against another state in the international system. Some states may consider it legitimate to use force only for defensive purposes. These states are called status quo powers or "defensive positionalists."[23] They do not seek offensive gain; they seek only safety. They try to minimize the difference between their gains and the gains of others, not to maximize this difference. Other states may consider it legitimate to use force to achieve offensive gains. These states are called revisionist powers. They seek to maximize the difference between their gains and that of others and to shift the relative distribution of power in their favor. By deposing sovereigns in other states, Bismarck, as Kissinger details, signaled that he no longer accepted the European status quo based on legitimate monarchical states. Bismarck sought to revise the system to accommodate the unification of smaller German states based on more aggressive nationalist principles.[24] What was not clear until World War I was whether other states could or would accommodate the new Germany. Accommodating states fall somewhere between offensive maximizers and defensive positionalists. They consider it legitimate to

use offensive force for certain purposes but not ultimately to challenge a multipolar equilibrium.[25]

External and internal orientations toward the legitimate use of force may be related. It would be unusual to expect a government that used force arbitrarily at home against its own citizens to refrain in a principled way from the use of force against citizens of other countries abroad.[26] Conversely, democratic states appear to externalize the reluctance to use force at home in their relations with other countries abroad, at least with other democracies. Not only are states influenced in their external behavior by internal self-images and practices, but they also read the internal self-images of other states to give them a clue about the external behavior of those states. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, "threat perceptions do not emerge from a quasi-objective international power structure, but actors infer external behavior from the values and norms governing the domestic political practices that shape the identities of their partners in the international system."[27]

Nevertheless, internal and external orientations of states toward the use of force may also be independent of one another. Democratic states may not be more peaceful in general than other states,[28] and nondemocratic states have formed peaceful alliances throughout history (such as the Holy Alliance from 1815–1850).

COMBINING IDENTITY AND POWER

Identity as defined above is obviously influenced by power. In the crudest cases, power determines identity. Stalin remarked once to an associate, "whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system."[29] On the other hand, identity sometimes defies power and has significant consequences even when power wins. A Lithuanian parliament guard commented when Soviet troops threatened to storm that country's parliament: "the intention is not to win, because we all know that is impossible. The intention is to die, but by doing so to make sure Moscow can't tell any lies as they did in 1940."[30] Power and identity can and do act independently of one another. As Joe Nye writes, "politics is not merely a struggle for physical power, but also a contest over legitimacy."[31] Something important about international relations is lost particularly in a setting in which notions about the legitimate use of force differ (as they do among the states of the Asian-Pacific region perhaps more so than among European states).

Figure 6.1 juxtaposes identity and power as two independent variables.[32] The distribution of power measures relative *military* capabilities along the y-axis. The distribution of identity measures the differences among states toward the *legitimate* use of military force along the x-axis. The x-axis in figure 6.1 is actually a summation of differences along the two dimensions of a state's orientation toward the use of force—internal and external. It gives us a measure of the polar-



FIGURE 6.1 Distribution of Identity and Power.

ity among states in terms of the degree to which they threaten one another by the rules they apply to legitimate the use of force (as distinguished from the capabilities they possess, which is measured by the y-axis). If these rules diverge (right side of the figure), states manage power capabilities competitively; the prospect of physical violence (anarchy) or political oppression (empire) is always present. If the rules converge (left side of the figure), hierarchies and security communities emerge which regulate the use of force on the basis of common rules.

Because legitimacy has two dimensions (internal and external), convergence can lead to more than one type of hierarchy or security community. Figure 6.2 illustrates various types of security communities. Security communities in area A that involve only mature democratic, defensive-oriented republics severely limit the legitimate use of force. For all practical purposes, this type of community eliminates the competition for military power among members. The democratic peace prevails. Security communities in area C include some democracies that are immature or oligarchic and offensive-minded. Relations in this type of security community involve more instability and suspicion. Disputes



FIGURE 6.2 Convergence of Identity in Security Communities.

may escalate more easily to the level of military threat. One example is the tension that prevails between mature democratic states and younger, democratizing states.[33] Security communities in area B involve nondemocratic and defensive-minded states. This type of security community legitimates the use of force more often than does a democratic security community. Force is used domestically to repress the rights of a majority of the citizens and externally to assist other members in suppressing internal revolts. The Holy Alliance among Russia, Prussia, and Austria was such a community. Finally, security communities in area D include member states that are nondemocratic and offensive-minded. Such states are mobilized authoritarian or totalitarian governments. They sanction the most invasive and aggressive use of force. Although these states still agree on the internal and external circumstances when it is legitimate to use force (otherwise their relations would not constitute a security community but a traditional alliance under anarchy), the use of force is so arbitrary and unconstrained that such a community is hard to sustain. The troubled alliances between fascist states before World War II (e.g., Germany and Italy) and communist states after World War II (e.g., Sino-Soviet alliance) may be examples.

EXPECTED BEHAVIOR

Combining realist and constructivist variables at the structural level predicts a different range of expected behavior than either realism or constructivism alone.

In sector 1 of figure 6.1, realism predicts hierarchy and specialized behavior. Actors perform different functions and depend upon one another through interdependent or integrated institutions.[34] If identity is included in the analysis, however, behavior may not be specialized. A totalitarian hierarchy, which rules by fear of the use of force, elicits redundant (parallel) and segmented (compartmentalized), not specialized and integrated, behavior.[35] A liberal hierarchy, on the other hand, encourages specialized behavior through exchange-based political and economic institutions.[36] NATO and the former Warsaw Pact do not strictly qualify as hierarchies. They do reflect similar structures of centralized power in the areas of military command and control. Despite these similar material structures, however, they display very different internal and external behavior patterns because the terms on which their hierarchical power is legitimated are very different.[37]

Sector 2 of figure 6.1 predicts different behavior than we expect from realism. As Michael Doyle points out, "imperialism's foundation is not anarchy but order, albeit an order imposed and strained."[38] There is a single center of power, as in the case of hierarchy, but there is no single community or consensus on the legitimate use of force.[39] This imperial or unipolar structure predicts muted military and economic competition because no state or combination of states is capable of challenging the imperial power. Political competition replaces military competition. Asian nations, for example, challenge U.S. and Western values, even while they rely on U.S. military forces for security against each other. Economic relations center bilaterally on the imperial power. They are specialized but not integrated. The form of institutionalization depends upon the content of the rules by which the imperial state legitimates its power. A nondemocratic imperial state may marginalize and exploit smaller states. A democratic one may seek to develop and assimilate them. Examples in the case of U.S. imperial power are the international economic institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization) which project America's soft power to promote liberal markets and transparent governments among developing states.

Thus, in a situation of empire, the extent to which the imperial state threatens other states is a function of identity not power. Threat depends, as Michael Mastanduno shows, on whether the challenging states are status-quo, revisionist, or accommodating states and whether the imperial state can successively reassure, confront, and engage these states to perpetuate its dominance. As Mastanduno concludes, U.S. security practices in the unipolar, post–cold war world can be better explained by balance of threat theory, which pays attention to countries' self-images, intentions and soft power, than by balance of power theory, which focuses only on the distribution of capabilities.[40]

Security communities (sector 3 of figure 6.1) predict coordinated, not specialized or ordered, behavior.[41] States apply the same rules to the use of force. If

those rules severely restrict the use of force, as they do among mature democratic countries, liberal institutions and trade replace military competition. Institutions such as the European Union and Group-of-Seven (G-7) elevate economic relations and promote absolute economic gains as opposed to relative military power. An apparent firewall separates economic from military competition.[42] If the rules sanction the frequent use of force, state institutions penetrate the society and dominate economic markets as well as nongovernmental relations (i.e. limit civil society). Economic rivalry escalates more easily to military rivalries. This reasoning explains why security communities among nondemocratic states, which sanction the more frequent use of force, tend to be less stable.

Sector 4 of figure 6.1 predicts highly competitive behavior in all areas—political (because rules of legitimacy diverge), military (because power is decentralized), and economic (because competition is zero-sum). No state in this situation can afford to specialize or coordinate, let alone subordinate, its behavior to that of other states. Temporary alliances, entered into warily and exited easily, are the dominant form of behavior observed in this context.[43] This box captures the realist situation of anarchy, but because states compete for advantage as well as security, anarchy may be far more chaotic and dangerous than realists predicted.[44] Stability depends on state identities. If states are revisionist, anarchy is highly unstable; if they are defensive, anarchy might be quite peaceful.

THE MODEL APPLIED TO ASIA

THE ASIA-PACIFIC SUBSYSTEM

What are the structural features of contemporary international relations in Asia and how might they change in the future? Do structural features of identity and power predict great-power relations in this region, principally relations among China, Japan, and the United States, better than alternative models? For this purpose, the Asia-Pacific region will be considered as an insulated or closed subsystem. If necessary, this assumption can be amended to take into account the behavior of the European Union and Russia, the other two major powers of the global system.

Table 6.1 provides some basic indicators of the distribution of power and identity in the Asia-Pacific sub-region and the global system overall. A look at the three major Asian powers suggests several points. First, on the basis of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP (columns 9 and 10), the United States and China devote more of their annual resources to the use of force than Japan. China and the United States are also the only declared nuclear powers in the region (column 11). Given its larger GDP, of course, the United States dwarfs China in absolute military expenditures, as does Japan, even with its lower share

of GDP devoted to defense. This is true even though China has sharply increased its absolute military expenditures in recent years, as its GDP rose, while the U.S. and Japan reduced their military spending. In absolute expenditures the United States also dwarfs Japan (spending more than four times as much). The distribution of military power, therefore, is skewed sharply in favor of the United States. From a military power perspective, the United States is imperial, with its principal rival—in terms of nuclear weapons and relative attention paid to military matters—being China.

Second, the distribution of identity indicated in table 6.1 (columns 3 to 5) magnifies the power rivalry between the United States and China. Indicators of regime type provided by Freedom House and Polity III databases offer an empirical measure of the latitude of countries to use force legitimately in internal affairs. These indicators show the United States and China separated from one another as far as the scales measure—1 being most free, 7 least free on the Freedom House scale; and 0 being least free, 10 most free on the Polity III scale. In addition, Japan now lines up very closely with the United States, measuring the same as the United States on the Polity III scale (number of 10) and only slightly below the United States on the Freedom House scale (1 and 2 on political rights and civil liberties respectively compared to 1 and 1). Japan's numbers may overstate the quality of democracy in Japan. As column 6 shows, Japan is a highly homogeneous society with a strong propensity toward consensus and bureaucratic, as opposed to parliamentary, authority. Nevertheless, the distribution of power and identity taken together suggests a very wide gap in the region between the United States and Japan, on the one hand, and China, on the other. If we now consider the external aspects of identity—attitude toward the use of force in external affairs—the gap widens still further. Japan is by constitution a purely defensive-minded country. China maintains the right to use force offensively if necessary to prevent the alienation of Taiwan.[45] China's neighbor and communist friend, North Korea, also asserts the right to use force offensively to attack South Korea. The United States maintains a security alliance with Japan and a large military presence in the region. This presence is too far away from U.S. territory to claim purely defensive purposes, as in the case of Japan's forces. Unlike the forces of China potentially arrayed against Taiwan or those of North Korea aligned against South Korea, U.S. forces have no specific offensive intentions. The U.S. attitude might be considered accommodating, intended to deter the use of force for offensive purposes and to bring about a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the region.[46]

A third feature of the Asian subsystem that emerges from Table 1 is the relatively equal economic capabilities of the United States and Japan. In terms of GDP (column 2), the two countries dwarf China and roughly approximate one another.[47] Compared to China, the two countries also have economic freedom and social development ratings (columns 7 and 8) that are roughly comparable.

TABLE 6.1 Identity and Power Indicators

	Population (millions) 1995[1]	GDP (billion dollars) 1995[1]	Political Freedom Rating[2]		Polity III Ranking[3]	Minorities (%)	Econ. Freedom 1988[5]	Social Dev't[6]	Military Budget % GDP)[7]		ABC Weaps[8]
			PR	*CL*					*1985*	*1996*	
China	1,200	698	7	7	0	8	3.75	.626	7.9	5.7	ABC
Japan	125	5,109	1	2	10	1	2.05	.940	1.0	1.0	C
United States	263	6,952	1	1	10	12–9–8	1.90	.942	6.5	3.6	AC
S. Korea	45	455	2	2	10	0	2.30	.890	5.1	3.3	C
Taiwan	22	260	2	2	6	14 from Mainland	1.95		7.0	4.9	C
Hong Kong	6	28			5	1.25	.914				
ASEAN	477	633	2-7	3-7	0-8	multiple	1.30–5.00	.900–.348	1.4-19.4	2.0-–7.6	C

European Union	372	8,331	1	1–3	8–10	Less than 10	1.95–2.90	.946–.890	3.0	2.1	AC
Russia	148	345	3	4	8		3.45	.792	7.4		ABC

1. *World Development Report 1997*, (Washington: The World Bank 1997), pp. 214–215, 236–237, 248.
2. *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1997–98* (New York: Freedom House, 1998), pp. 600–601.
3. Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, *Polity III: Regime Type and Political Authority 1800–1994* (Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, September 1996). The numbers in this column are for the democracy variable in year 1994.
4. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book 1996*, World Wide Web: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/peo.htm. Single minority groups, defined by ethnic origin, that represent at least 5% of the population are listed separately.
5. Bryan T. Johnson, Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick, *The 1998 Index of Economic Freedom* (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1998), pp. xxix–xxxii
6. United Nations, *Human Development Report 1997*, Worldwide Web: http://www.undp.org/undp/hdro/hdil.htm
7. *The Military Balance 1997–98* (Oxford: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 293–398.

Countries proven or suspected to have Atomic, Biological and Chemical weapons as cited in following sources and from interviews with government officials. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *1996 Annual Report*, World Wide Web: http//www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp.htm; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Wide Web: http://www.sipri.se/cbw/cbw-mainpage.html.; U.S. Department of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, November 1997, World Wide Web: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/toc.html.

What this suggests is that the principal economic rivalry in the region is between the United States and Japan. These countries have comparable capabilities and freer access to one another's markets. China is a definite outlier in this configuration.

The picture that emerges from the table is an Asian-Pacific system that sits in the lower left-hand corner of sector 2 in figure 6.1. The structure of identity and power is imperial. The United States dominates the region militarily. What is more, the United States and Japan form a security community subsystem in the region that dominates politically and economically. This security community (a democratic one situated in area A of figure 6.2) mutes the use of force in domestic affairs of both countries; eliminates active military competition in their relations with one another; and underpins a security alliance that defends Japan and possibly other areas of common interest in the region (the subject of current defense guideline talks under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty). The United States and Japan compete economically, but a firewall prevents their economic competition from escalating to military rivalry. Nevertheless, the level of economic integration between the United States and Japan is lower (more bilateral and sectoral) than U.S. ties in Europe. Trade tensions are also higher, reflecting perhaps a wider gap in political culture (parliamentary versus bureaucratic) between the two countries.

Thus, the United States, alone or with Japan, has an imperial advantage over China in both military and economic terms. Moreover, China, unlike Japan, contests U.S. political identity. China rejects U.S. values of individual human rights and the rule of law. Together with smaller Asian states, it touts Asian values—collective over individual rights, efficient over democratic government, and personal over legal relations. China trades with the United States and Japan, but this relationship is not well balanced or integrated. (The United States and Japan have much less access to China's market than China has to the U.S. or Japanese market.)[48] The firewall between economic and governmental or military disputes is more porous as state-directed agencies play a larger role in the Chinese economy. Political authoritarianism obscures the relationship between economic activities and military intentions.

ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS

This portrait of contemporary Asian-Pacific relations from a perspective that combines identity and power emphasizes different constraints on state behavior than realism or constructivism. Realism expects the two preeminent, not opposing, powers in the region to balance against one another. Hence, Japan and the United States should be competing against one another, not either one of them or both against China. They should be competing both through internal political and economic differentiation, and through external alignment with lesser

powers in the region, such as China and the ASEAN grouping of Southeast Asian nations.[49] Constructivism highlights the social and cultural diversity of the region and anticipates informal, pluralist institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) to foster higher levels of consensus and cooperation.[50] By contrast, the present analysis highlights neither the balance of power (anarchy) nor the emerging arms control dialogue (security communities). It emphasizes instead imperial structures of U.S. political and military dominance and U.S.-Japan economic dominance.

Which portrait is more accurate? If realism holds, there should be clear signs of growing military conflict between the United States and Japan. There are growing political tensions, to be sure (see later discussion under the section on Scenarios for Change). To date these tensions have not translated into military differences. Quite the contrary, the U.S.-Japan security treaty, although neglected after the fall of the Soviet Union, has if anything been strengthened recently in the wake of Chinese threats in the Taiwan Straits and North Korea's missile firings and clandestine underground nuclear weapons activities.[51] If constructivism holds, regional economic and security dialogues should be progressing more rapidly than regional arms races or territorial disputes. While precise empirical comparisons are beyond the scope of this essay, the rapid increase in arms expenditures in Asia since the 1980s, matched against the snail-like pace and lowest-common-denominator approach of both ARF and APEC, seems to argue against constructivist expectations.[52]

Realist and constructivist perspectives tap real developments in Asia. That much is not disputed in this essay. But because these perspectives track only one structural variable, they pull these developments out of context. Constructivist perspectives that focus on arms control dialogues, for example, fail to link up these dialogues with parallel dialogues that may be intensifying arms races. For every moderating influence on armaments that Chinese negotiations in ARF exert on top Beijing leadership, for example, there may be counter-influences from Chinese defense officials pushing for higher arms expenditures and concerned about relative military balances.[53] Realism risks the opposite distortion. It focuses primarily on arms races and discounts security dialogues that might lead to greater trust.[54] A more complete perspective would track both variables simultaneously.

Imperial structures highlighted by the combined identity and power approach explain several outcomes that realist and constructivist perspectives do not explain. First, imperial structures explain why military conflict in the Asia-Pacific region is currently muted. Under the constraints of an imperial structure, the balance of military power is essentially uncontested. China's military moves in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea do not challenge American military preeminence directly, as would such moves against South Korea, Japan

or the Philippines.[55] The competition takes place primarily in political arenas. In these arenas, China attacks U.S. hegemony ideologically, rejecting U.S. views on human rights and challenging Western values more generally by championing Asian values.

Second, imperial structures predict "ordered" economic relations centered on the imperial power, as opposed to "coordinated" behavior through multilateral institutions. Such structures explain stability in Asia despite low levels of institutionalization. Japan and the United States do not coordinate their trade policies with China or ASEAN countries. Both give priority to bilateral contacts. APEC seeks to change this pattern. But APEC operates on the convoy principle, going only as fast as the slowest member does. Compared to the EU, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or ASEAN, APEC is an extremely weak organization.

Third, as suggested earlier, a security community subsystem in Asia mutes military conflicts between the United States and Japan (conflict which realism expects). It is significant that, despite escalating trade and political tensions, the firewall between economic and military threats in U.S.-Japan relations has not been breached. Some studies trace this phenomenon to fundamental cultural changes in Japan centered around "beliefs and values that make [the Japanese] peculiarly reluctant to resort to the use of military force."[56] If this is so, it highlights the importance of tracking identity indicators as well as power rivalries.

Thus, the power and identity approach explains better recent stability in the Asia-Pacific subsystem. It does so without the complacent expectations of constructivist perspectives (equating dialogue with cooperation) or the powder kegs predictions of realist perspectives (expecting imminent military rivalry between preeminent powers). Moreover, because it tracks both political convergence and military conflict, the power and identity approach is better able to anticipate future changes in Asia-Pacific international relations.

SCENARIOS FOR CHANGE

The structural model developed in this paper does not predict sources of change. but given various scenarios for change, it can predict ranges of expected outcomes. Some scenarios for change could build on and reinforce contemporary stability in Asia. China could continue to liberalize internally, particularly in economic areas. While the government would remain authoritarian, the economy and society as a whole would become less vulnerable to arbitrary government intervention and more subject to the rule of law. This modest convergence of China's internal identity toward the United States and Japan might facilitate a marginal reduction of bilateral priorities and greater coordination of policies through multilateral institutions in the region—trade and economic ties in the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) and World Trade Orga-

nization (WTO), and confidence-building military talks under the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Similarly, on the positive side, the United States and Japan might continue to converge toward more compatible economic and trade regimes. Trade imbalances may persist and competition intensifies, but the possibility that this competition would spill over into greater political tensions would be diminished, not increased as in recent years. In short, the present imperial structure of power and identity would evolve toward a nascent security community with features characteristic of the upper right hand corner of sector 3 in figure 6.1.[57]

However, the theoretical perspective provided by a combination of identity and power would not lead one to expect that security community relations in Asia will take the form of institutional specialization and integration found in Europe. Because some important Asian countries remain nondemocratic, convergence of identities will not be sufficient to support a liberal consensus facilitating specialization and integration. The countries in Europe that are moving toward monetary and economic union sit on the far left hand side of the x-axis in sector 3 of figure 6.1. They are all solidly democratic and endorse global economic institutions and integration. If they succeed in federalizing, they may move progressively up the y-axis toward a hierarchical structure of international affairs in Europe (perhaps entering sector 1 at some point). The countries in Asia, even under the optimistic scenario of convergence toward a security community, are not likely to move in the same direction. They will remain further to the right of the x-axis and toward the top of the y-axis in sector 3, as identities remain more diverse and power more asymmetric in Asia than in Europe.

Even this limited security community scenario may be entirely too optimistic for Asia, however. There are also important instabilities in the present situation. Two factors potentially pull the participants toward anarchy and the more dangerous structural features of sector 4 in figure 6.1. The most important is the military rivalry between the United States and China. If China continues to expand its military capabilities and exhibits greater political tenacity in the region because it cares more about the issues (which are closer to home), and if the United States gradually reduces its imperial military position in the region (either physically, politically or both), the situation will drift toward an anarchic structure of power and identity (sector 4 of figure 6.1). Japan will have to expand its independent military capability, and a triangular balance of power may emerge (which Henry Kissinger believes already exists or is soon inevitable—see earlier text and note 3).[58]

A second source of instability in the region lies in economic and political relations between the United States and Japan. Both Freedom House and Polity III indicate that Japan falls well within the range of peaceful democracies that appear to eschew the use of force or military threats in their relations with one another.[59] Nevertheless, there is persistent debate about how deep

and mature Japanese democracy may be.[60] If Japan fails to move forward toward greater political pluralism, transparency, and accountability; it is conceivable that current economic distrust between the two countries may grow.[61] Trade issues will continue to become bitter political issues resolved through contentious governmental negotiations rather than courts or multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms. Inevitably, political friction will generate doubt about security, and Japan may maneuver to attain a technological independence that could at some point support an independent military policy.[62] This estrangement between the United States and Japan could change the character of the security community between the two countries, creating fears that one side might use its material advantages for offensive purposes (moving the security community from area A to area C of figure 6.2). If political identities diverged further, the structure of relations might revert back to anarchy (sector 4 of figure 6.1). Assuming Japan and the United States remained significantly more powerful than China, the Asia-Pacific subsystem would become bipolar. China, even with its lesser power, might play a crucial role as a "swing state," courted vigorously by both the United States and Japan. If the United States withdrew, Japan might occupy an imperial position, at least for a while. Over the longer-run, if China's power grew, Japan and China might become the principal bipolar rivals.

There is a prospect, assuming the United States withdraws and Japan reverts back to non-democratic policies at home, that Japan and China might draw closer together, sharing certain Asian values and common authoritarian ideas about the use of force at home and adopting defensive-minded attitudes toward the use of force abroad. That would place Japan and China in area B of figure 6.2, suggesting a kind of security community among nondemocratic powers, analogous perhaps to the original Congress of Vienna in Europe. This scenario captures the notion of the Asianization of regional politics—a community of authoritarian governments content to accommodate one another, particularly in rivalries against the United States or other outside powers.[63] If Iain Johnston is right about China's strategic culture, however, China is unlikely to forego opportunities to use force offensively.[64] Japan's history offers little optimism that it would be able to do so either.[65] As we noted earlier, unless states are status-quo-oriented, a balance of power is difficult to sustain without early and usually system-wide (or at least subsystem-wide) military rivalries and conflicts.

An equally plausible prospect, therefore, is that China and Japan would compete for imperial dominance. Driven by the internal need to establish social hierarchies (consistent with their nondemocratic identities) and the external opportunity to exploit advantages, the two countries would clash with one another, rather than accommodate differences. Anarchy would replace a nondemocratic security community.

CONCLUSION

The theoretical framework in this paper based on the distribution of power and identity—rather than on power or strategic culture alone—broadens our analytical tools for understanding the Asia-Pacific region. The cold war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union effectively froze the distribution of identity in world affairs and conflated it with the distribution of power. In these circumstances, two models—hierarchy and anarchy—sufficed and indeed offered considerable insight into world affairs.

In Asia, for example, the bipolar Soviet–American confrontation created alliances that had everything to do with power and little to do with political identity among the countries involved. To combat the Soviet Union, the United States established a standing military alliance with Japan, an industrial county that had no significant democratic tradition (compared even with Germany, for example, whose people experienced the revolution of 1848 and the Weimar Republic). Subsequently, the United States allied with China against the Soviet Union. At the time China was a totalitarian and violent communist country convulsed in the Cultural Revolution. Balance of power considerations dictated such relationships irrespective of political identities. On the other hand, within the U.S.-Japan (and U.S-European) alliance, the hierarchical model enlightened thinking and practice. A division of labor was established. The United States assumed primary responsibility for security, while Japan committed itself to democratic reforms and economic reconstruction.[66] Similar understandings, but with an emphasis primarily on economic reconstruction, drove U.S. alliance relationships with South Korea, the Philippines and, less formally, Taiwan.

With the end of the cold war, thinking remained locked in these realist manacles. The United States, it was argued, had two choices—to confront and contain China in a new balance of power struggle between democratic and communist states, or to engage China and try to integrate it into hierarchical alliance institutions modeled after the integrated military and economic institutions of NATO and the European Union. To contain China, the United States would strengthen and integrate security alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other Asian states. To engage China the United States would promote free trade and potentially common-market-type arrangements within APEC and the WTO, as well as Helsinki-like arms control and human rights discussions in ARF.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, unfroze the identity variable in international affairs. The distribution of identity in the system between communism and democracy, which gave bipolarity its peculiar intensity and danger, no longer coincided with the distribution of power.[67] Although American power declined, the United States became part of a wider association of democratic

states. And although the Soviet Union retained its military, especially nuclear, capabilities, it disintegrated into fifteen separate political identities.

Identity factors open up two additional models for thinking about international and particularly Asian-Pacific politics. Because the United States, Japan, and other countries in the region (South Korea, Philippines, the other Chinese political system in Hong Kong, and possibly Taiwan) have converging political identities, they compete in ways that mitigate, if not eliminate, military rivalries among them. They live in a democratic security community, rather than a multipolar balance of power, and resolve competitive issues largely through economic and legal means. Simultaneously, however, these countries face significant internal and external differences vis-à-vis China. Because their military power is preeminent, however, these differences play out more in political and diplomatic terms—human rights, skirmishing over the Taiwan issue, diplomatic maneuvering to deal with North Korea, etc.—than head-on military crises. This imperial system, supplemented by a security community subsystem, is much more stable than a traditional anarchic balance of power. It could achieve even greater stability if the United States remains engaged in the region, China continues to liberalize economically, and the United States and its partners do not expect the levels of specialization and integration that characterize Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, the imperial system may also pull apart. The current relatively stable system might give way to a more fluid, triangular traditional-style balance of power politics among the United States, China, and Japan, or, if the United States withdraws, a competition for imperial power between China and Japan.

ENDNOTES

1. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 329. Under realist theories, I include classical and neorealist versions. Both give priority to the struggle for power. Classical realism recognized the relevance of goals, aims, values and domestic politics (identity). It conceptualized these constructivist factors only at the level of relationships, not the level of structure (as this article does). Hans Morgenthau, the preeminent classical realist, made very clear that "whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim." See Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. (New York: Knopf, 6th Edition, 1985), p. 31.

2. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 397. Constructivism focuses on identity formation and includes notions of corporate (autonomy), type (rational), and social (interrelational) identity. Social identity dominates, whereas in other traditions, such as liberalism, type identity (i.e. domestic politics) may stand alone and determine social interactions. For a contrast between constructivist and liberal perspectives, see Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); and Andrew Moravcsik,"Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Individual Politics," *International Organization*, 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 513–555.

3. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), Quotes from pp. 826–828.

4. Alastair Iain Johnston,"Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 219. See also Johnston's book, *Cultural Realism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

5. See Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security*, 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–108.

6. Native Indians in sixteenth-century Mexico, for example, interpreted invading Spanish conquistadors as gods. They obviously misinterpreted the power realities and were subsequently enslaved.

7. As Jeffrey T. Checked points out, "constructivists rely upon the insights of sociological institutionalism, . . . a particular branch of organization theory that systematically excludes questions of agency, interest, and power." See "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics*, 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 341.

8. By contrast, realism and constructivism attempt to subsume the other variable and make it epiphenomenal. As Waltz explains, "the placement of states affects their behavior and even colors their characters." *Theory of International Politics*, p. 127. Conversely, Iain Johnston contends that "structural realpolitik can be subsumed within the cultural realpolitik model." See "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," p. 264. Not all constructivist arguments make this strong claim. They seek only to supplement or compete on equal terms with realist perspectives. See Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein,"Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,"in Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security*, pp. 68–70.

9. The logic of structures is not causal but constraining. The distribution of power and identity defines the structures of any particular system or subsystem. Structures, in turn, define ranges of specific preferences, strategies, behaviors and outcomes. See John D. Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure," *World Politics*, 41, no. 1 (October 1988): 75–97.

10. Classical realists assumed that states did maximize power but still expected balance to prevail over bandwagoning or imperialism. Prudence restrained state objectives. Neorealists substituted the restraint of structure for prudence. As R. Harrison Wagner notes, "Waltz recognized only two types of systems: bipolar and multipolar." See "What was bipolarity?" *International Organization*, 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 88. Although Waltz and other neorealists argued belatedly that unipolar situations elicit balancing behavior against the imperial power, other realists point out that "if the hegemon adopts a benevolent strategy and creates a negotiated order based on legitimate influences and management, lesser states will bandwagon with, rather than balance against, it." See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 44–80; and Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security*, 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5–52. For the argument that bandwagoning, not balancing, may

characterize behavior in unipolar situations, see Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realism: Expanding the Institutions Debate," *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41, no. 1 (May 1997): 24.

11. Constructivists do talk about discursive power to influence intersubjective understanding. But they relatively ignore coercive power to *impose* intersubjective understanding. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998), especially pp. 177–180. As John Mearsheimer asks, isn't it possible that a fascist discourse would be more violent than a liberal or realist one? See "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 43–44.

12. John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," *International Organization*, 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 162.

13. According to Paul Kennedy, this was the principal difference between Europe and the empires that persisted in other parts of the world—China, Islam, etc. See *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), Chapter 1.

14. See J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The state and the nation: changing norms and the rules of sovereignty in international relations," *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 107–130.

15. For an insightful treatment of this eighteenth and nineteenth century history in terms of the interplay between shared values and power, see Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, chapters 3 and 4.

16. There are many and conflicting interpretations of the end of the cold war. For interpretations attentive to the role of domestic political ideas and self-images as well as that of power, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," *International Security*, 16, no. 3 (Winter 1991–1992), 74–119; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, pp. 357–400.

17. For summaries and critiques of the democratic peace, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles of a Post Cold-War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); the three articles by Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro and John M. Owen in the section, "Give Democratic Peace a Chance?" *International Security*, 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 5–126; and Joanne Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes," *International Organization*, 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 511–523.

18. See Martha Finnemore's discussion of the expanding practice of humanitarian intervention, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security*, pp. 153–186.

19. See Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," in Robert A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993): 211.

20. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 103–104.

21. Max Weber discussed these three sources of substantive legitimacy. See *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 78–79.

22. This internal aspect of a state's identity corresponds to what constructivists call type (as opposed to social) identity. It acknowledges that identity is in part intrinsic if actors are to have the capacity to change extrinsic or social identities. To get at this internal dimension of identity, this study uses two data sets of regime type. The Polity III data set, available through the Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan, contains two indicators of regime type (autocracy and democracy) and eight indicators of political authority. All of these indicators measure procedural aspects of government—the competitiveness, openness, and checks and balances (constraints) of electoral and institutional processes. There is no indicator of substantive political ideology or measure of civil liberties. A second data set, the index of political rights and civil liberties, available through Freedom House in New York, ranks countries in terms of both substantive and procedural dimensions. Although the measures focus primarily on procedural dimensions of government, by including the protection of civil liberties, the Freedom House data set incorporates a measure of substantive political ideology—liberalism vs. illiberalism.

23. See Joseph M. Greico, *Cooperation Among Nations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); and "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., *New Directions In international Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

24. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 117. Kissinger recounts a fascinating dialogue between Bismarck and his Prussian mentor, Leopold von Gerlach, in which Bismarck demarcates his policy of expedience in the service of his country from that of the Holy Alliance to preserve the status quo. See pp. 120–127.

25. This external dimension of identity corresponds to what constructivists call social identity. I am relating this dimension to a state's willingness to use force against other states, a willingness that depends on designations of friend and foe and hence the social construction of identities. There are well-known difficulties in making distinctions among offensive, accommodationist and defensive attitudes toward the use of force. Nevertheless, thee distinctions are made and form the basis of a substantial school of theorizing about the causes of war. For a recent discussion, see, the two articles by Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War" and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann,"What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It," in *International Security*, 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 5–44 and 44–83 respectively.

26. Ronald Reagan put the point succinctly: "A government which does not respect its citizens rights and its international commitments to protect those rights is not likely to respect its other international undertakings." Quoted in Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 271.

27. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," p. 22.

28. The evidence that democratic states are more peaceful in general is not as strong as the evidence that they are peaceful with one another. See David L. Rousseau, et al., "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–88," *American Political Science Review*, 90, no. 3 (September 1996): 512–534. See also John R. O'Neal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985," *International Studies Quarterly*, 41, no. 2 (June 1997): 267–294.

29. Quoted in Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michaels B. Petrovich (San Diego: Harcourt Bruce Javanovich, 1962), p. 114.

30. See Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 253. See also Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, *After the Fall: The Pursuit of Democracy in Central Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 1991), who comments about the dissidents who defied Soviet power during the cold war: "Remember, totalitarian power was brought down by so-called impractical idealists who proved to be the genuine realists; people who were willing to act as if they lived in a free society and often suffered the consequences because in fact they didn't." p. 249.

31. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 142.

32. For a related attempt to apply both regime types and external power shifts to a discussion of war, see Randall Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies more Pacific?" *World Politics*, 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 235–269. Schweller finds that the relationship of regime types defined as challenging or declining powers produces different behavior under similar relative power conditions.

33. In the democratic transition process, elites in democratizing states, some of whom are left over from previous nondemocratic regimes, compete to mobilize mass allies and in the process may unleash aggressive, warlike sentiments against other countries, including democracies. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security*, 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 5–38. Spencer R. Weart also finds this tendency among ancient republics. Oligarchic republics, which enfranchised about one-third of their population to participate in politics, did not fight against one another. Neither did democratic republics, which enfranchised about two-thirds of their population. However, oligarchic and democratic republics did fight against one another, reflecting the tendency of differences in degree or stage of democracy to produce offensive-minded behavior leading to war. See "Peace among Democratic and Oligarchic Republics," *Journal of Peace Research*, 31, no. 3 (August 1994): 299–316.

34. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 104–105.

35. Fascist and communist societies, for example, construct parallel systems of party and secret police institutions to monitor all aspects of government and private life. Citizen behavior in these circumstances is not specialized and exchange-based but withdrawn (private revolt) or, at the extreme, revolutionary (public revolt). See Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics*, 44, no. 1 (October 1991): 7–49. See also Jeffrey Berejikian, "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem," *American Political Science Review*, 86, no. 3 (September 1992): 647–658.

36. See Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization*, 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 513–555.

37. For studies that illustrate the different behaviors (nonhierarchical consultation versus informal empire) induced by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. See, respectively, Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, "Hierarchy Under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State," *International Organization*, 49, no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 689–723.

38. Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 11. See also Charles A. Kupahan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

39. As Doyle puts it, "the imperial government is a sovereignty that lacks a community," *Empires*, p. 36. On the different behaviors one might expect in an imperial as opposed to anarchic system, see also Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," pp. 260–262.

40. See "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security*, 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 49–89.

41. Karl W. Deutsch developed the concept of security community although he was thinking primarily about relations among democracies. See *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

42. For example, Mastanduno finds that balance of power theory explains U.S. post-Cold War economic relations with other countries better than balance of threat theory. This balance of power behavior in economic areas does not translate into balance of power behavior in security relations. The latter are better explained by more muted balance of threat theory. See "Preserving the Unipolar Moment."

43. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita showed why allies remain wary of one another and even fight if one takes policy goals (an identity measure) as well as power capabilities into account. However, Bueno de Mesquita uses an expected utility, not a structural, model. See *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

44. For Waltz and other realists, the fact that states pursue security and not maximum power is crucial and the main reason that anarchy is not as dangerous as it might otherwise be. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory" in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), p. 37.

45. Although China claims that the use of force against Taiwan is not external but internal, that claim is not a consensus view in the region. Hence China's reservation to use force against Taiwan may be coded as offensive.

46. In fairness to China, its intention to use force offensively against Taiwan might also be coded if China intends to use such force only if this can be done without disrupting the general equilibrium or balance of power in Asia. (See earlier definition of accommodationist behavior in text.) It is doubtful, however, that China could use force against Taiwan and presumably (assuming such force is unprovoked) against the United States as well without challenging the general balance of power in Asia.

47. The Table shows GDP at nominal exchange rates in 1995. It appears that Japan has a significantly higher per capita GDP then the United States. This relationship

changes when GDP is measured in terms of purchasing power parity. On that basis in 1990, Japan had a GDP per capita about 80 percent that of the United States. See McKinsey and Company, Inc., McKinsey Global Institute, *Manufacturing Productivity*, Washington, DC, October 1993.

48. China is the one of the few countries in Asia with which Japan runs a trade deficit. In 1996, Japan exported $22b. of goods and services to China and imported $40b. from China. See *Direction of Trade Statistics 1997* (Washington: IMF, 1997) p. 271.

49. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels find evidence of such competitive alignments. They argue that mercantile realism, which emphasizes techno-economic rather than military power, explains patterns of Japanese economic alignment with China and other Asian countries, as well as Japanese military commitments to multilateral peacekeeping operations. These patterns, they contend, are designed to counter long-run dependency on U.S. security guarantees. See "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," *International Security*, 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 171–203.

50. For an analysis along these lines, see Alastair Johnston's contribution to this volume.

51. Realists acknowledge the absence of U.S.-Japan military conflict but then argue, contrary to realist logic, that military power no longer matters because "the efficacy of appeals to arms has . . . declined dramatically during the course of the twentieth century." See Heginbotham and Samuels, "Mercantile Realism," p. 190.

52. What is more, as Thomas Christensen suggests in his contribution to this volume, the multilateral security cooperation that exists in ARF may actually be driven in part by arms competition. China, normally unfriendly to multilateralism, participates in ARF as a way to dilute U.S.-Japan bilateral defense moves, which may restrict China's military options in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea.

53. See the contribution in this volume by Alastair Iain Johnston.

54. Heginbotham and Samuels, for example, discount existing U.S.-Japan security ties by arguing that "Japan is doing little substantively . . . to make the alliance more appealing to its American ally." They focus primarily on growing technoeconomic conflicts, assuming rather than demonstrating that these conflicts trump already substantial security cooperation. See "Mercantile Realism," p. 185.

55. The United States has no explicit commitments to defend Taiwan or islands in the South China Sea, as it does, for example, to defend South Korea, Japan or the Philippines.

56. See the contribution in this volume by Thomas U. Berger and his article, "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan," in *Katzenstein* (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*. p. 318.

57. This scenario is equivalent to Joe Nye's strategy for the United States in Asia of "deep engagement." See "East Asian Security: The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, 74, no. 4 (July/August 1995): 90–103.

58. Revisionist scholars of Japan envision this scenario. See Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehm, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, 74, no. 4 (July/August 1995): 103–116.

59. On the Freedom House scale, Japan ranks no worst than five European countries—Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom—and better than

Greece. On the Polity III scale (which does not include measures of civil liberties), it ranks the same as other Western countries and better than Spain and France (which rank 9 and 8 respectively on the democracy scale).

60. For the two sides of this debate, see Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power* (New York: Knopf, 1989); and Kent E. Calder, *Strategic Capitalism Private Business and Public Purpose in Japanese Industrial Finance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Karel van Wolferen states bluntly "Japan democracy has not been realized. It exists only in potential." *The New York Times*, June 4, 1995, p. E5.

61. This distrust may already be breaching the firewall between economic and military competition, causing the United States and Japan to worry that relative economic gains may translate into the capacity to do each other political and ultimately military harm. See Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," *International Security* 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 73–113. For a broader discussion of the relationship between economic and military issues, see my essay, *Trade and Security: U.S. Policies at Cross-Purposes* (Washington: America Enterprise Institute Press, 1995).

62. For one analyst who sees clear signs of this development already, see Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

63. See Yoichi Funabashi, *Asia-Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, October 1995).

64. See Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China."

65. See Akira Iriye, *China and Japan in the Global Setting* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

66. See J. W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, no. 1878–1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

67. We now know that the cold war was a struggle between two political systems as well as two preeminent powers. As John Lewis Gaddis suggests, "if the Soviet Union had been the superpower that it actually was but with a system of checks and balances that could have constrained Stalin's authoritarian tendencies, a Cold War might have happened, but it could hardly have been as dangerous or as protracted a conflict." See "The Tragedy of Cold War History: Reflections on Revisionism," *Foreign Affairs*, 73, no. 1 (January/February 1994): 145. This view, is not uncontested by strong realists, of course. The noted historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. believes that the Cold War "would have been quite as acute if the United States had been like the Soviet Union, a Marxist-Leninist state"—in short, irrespective of political identities. See *The Cycles of American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), p. 202.