Chapter 4

HIERARCHY AND STABILITY IN ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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In the long run it is Asia (and not Europe) that seems far more likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict. The half millennium during which Europe was the world's primary generator of war (and economic growth) is coming to a close. For better and for worse, Europe's past could be Asia's future.

-Aaron Friedberg1

THE PUZZLE

A general consensus is emerging among security experts that Asia is a potential source of instability. ² Whether realist or liberal, most analyses implicitly or explicitly assume that Asian nations conceive of their security in the same way that western nations do. From this perspective, given the wide disparities in economic and military power among nations in the region, the broad range of political systems that range from democracy to totalitarian, and the lack of international institutions, many western analysts see a region "ripe for rivalry." Despite these concerns, and even after the ignominious exit of the U.S. from Vietnam, after the fall of the Soviet Union, after the implementation of economic reforms China, Asia has yet to see any major conflict or instability.

Yet there is another strand of thinking about Asian international relations that is both more optimistic in its conclusions and also poses different challenges to U.S. foreign policy. In this view Asian international relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than that of the west.³ From this perspective, until the intrusion of the western powers in the nineteenth century, Asian international relations were remarkably stable, punctuated only occasionally by conflict between countries. The system was materially based and reinforced through centuries of cultural practice, and consisted of sovereign states defined over geographic areas that functioned under the organizing principle of anarchy. In this view Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations, while allowing considerable informal equality. Consisting of China as the central state, and the peripheral states as lesser states or "vassals," as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate war. This contrasts sharply with the western tradition of international relations that consisted of formal equality between nation-states, informal hierarchy, and almost constant interstate conflict (see the appendix to this article).

With the intrusion of the western powers in the nineteenth century, the old Asian order was demolished as both western and Asian powers scrambled to establish influence. After a century of tumult in Asia, in the late 1990s a strong and confident China emerged, while Vietnam became increasingly more stable. Soon, perhaps, Korea will be reunified. While realists and liberals have tended to view modern Asia as potentially unstable, if the system is reverting to a pattern of hierarchy, the result may be increased stability.

If this is the case, there are important implications for our understanding of the region. Most significantly, a hierarchic view of Asia leads to different implications for U.S. foreign policy. On the one hand, if the U.S. remains tightly engaged in Asia, and if Asian nations do not balance China as realists expect, an American attempt to construct balancing coalitions to contain China using East Asian states will be highly problematic. On the other hand, if the U.S. withdraws significantly from the region, Asia may not become as dangerous or unstable as the conventional wisdom expects.

This leads to the following questions: is the Asian region hierarchic? If so, what are the implications for stability in the future?

This article makes one overarching argument: there is more security and stability in Asia than is generally realized. Especially because the pessimistic realist predictions show little sign of being born out, at a minimum scholars should seriously consider the implications of this alternative explanation. However, scholars have rarely tested this image in any discriminating manner.⁴ In this essay I present the logic and implications of Asian international relations built on the hierarchic system. I define stability as the absence of major interstate war and generally calm relations between countries. I argue that hierarchy is more stable than realists have allowed, and often it is the absence of hierarchy that leads to conflict, while also providing evidence from the last fifteen years that presents us with at least a plausible argument that such a hierarchic system is reemerging in Asia.

In the first of the paper's three sections I introduce the logic of a hierarchic international or regional system, and show how this view is only a slight modification of realism. In the second section I examine six centuries of Asian international relations, and show how the system historically functioned from the end of the Yuan dynasty to the twentieth century. The final section shows how a hierarchic perspective explains three puzzles from the current era that realism has had difficulty explaining.

I. ANARCHY AND HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Kenneth Waltz led us down the wrong path by contrasting hierarchy and anarchy.⁵ His argument that anarchy leads to balancing and fear of preponderant power has become widely accepted in the study of international relations. Realists overwhelmingly expect that power is threatening and that nations balance each other whenever possible.⁶ The theoretical argument against the possibility of unipolarity has been best adduced by Christopher Layne. He writes that "in a unipolar world, systemic constraints—balancing, uneven growth rates, and the sameness effect—impel eligible states to become great powers."⁷ In realism, the principle of self-help forces nations to coalesce against the would-be dominant power. As Stuart Kaufman points out, the logic of self-help under anarchy "encourages strong powers to absorb weak ones when practical, promoting consolidation in the international system."⁸

The hierarchic model I derive here grows out of realism, and the contrasting form of organization I discuss here embodies many of the traits that realists will find familiar, and begins with the standard neorealist assumptions. Nation-states are the unit of analysis, and exist as sovereign entities defined over a geographic area. The system is one of anarchy, where the use of force is always a possibility.⁹ Preferences and position are determined by power and geography. Relative position matters in hierarchy—there is one central state and many lesser, peripheral states. Rhetoric, contracts, and laws and are also regarded as being unenforceable, and thus mistrust is high in the international system. Nations are primarily concerned with survival while threats and instability are accepted as a fact of life in international politics. As a result, nation-states are concerned about power and survival first, and economic issues second.

However, realism posits that only two types of organization can occur in the international system: anarchy, with its emphasis on poles and alliances, and hierarchy, consisting of either formal or informal empire.¹⁰ David Lake writes that "in anarchy, each party of the relationship possess full residual rights of control



FIGURE 4.1 A continuum of security relations.

... in hierarchy, one party, the dominant member—possess the right to make residual decisions."¹¹ Lake's conception of hierarchy is hegemony or empire. Yet hierarchy is not the opposite of anarchy; rather, equality is the opposite of hierarchy. Both equality and hierarchy can exist within the larger organizing principle of anarchy.¹² The only major change I make to the standard realist model is to explicitly recognize that nation-states are not equal when acting on the world stage.

Realists have underexplored a hypothetical middle path that involves a central power that still operates in anarchy, but does not cause other nations to balance against the largest power in the system, and does not fold them under its wing in empire. Hierarchy is not hegemony: hegemony is overarching and more intrusive. Hegemony also focuses the bulk of its attention to the largest power, while hierarchy is more concerned with the interaction of states up and down the hierarchy. Hierarchy also accords all states within the system a place and a means of interacting with each other. This middle path is hierarchic (figure 4.1). Hierarchy also allows for substantial autonomy and freedom among the lesser states.

The key issue is whether all nations understand that the central state had no territorial or overweening ambitions, and whether there exists a method for resolving conflicts. If this is the case, all nations in the system can find an equilibrium that involves acquiescence to the dominant state. Equilibrium results because other states know that opposing the central state is impossible, and thus defer to it precisely to the point where expected costs of conquering them slightly exceed the expected benefits. Because conquest has some costs, in hierarchy other states do not need to defer completely to the central state on all issues. They are independent precisely to the degree that they estimate that the central state's expected costs of enforcing deference will exceed benefits. All of this works better to the degree that material power relationships make the expected outcome of conflicts certain. The key insight is that bandwagoning occurs because secondary states have no choice. If they could balance at a bearable costs, they would.

A hierarchic system is also different from informal empire, which exists when a functionally dependent state remains nominally sovereign. Michael Doyle writes "informal imperialism achieves [control] through the collaboration of a legally independent (but actually subordinate) government in the periphery."¹³ Wendt and Friedheim distinguish between an informal empire and the mere concentration of power: "Material inequality is not a sufficient condition [for informal empire], however. . . . The vast majority of materially unequal dyads in the states system are not informal empires. Concentration of capabilities is not equivalent to centralization of control."¹⁴ The contrast with informal empire is important: in informal empire the puppet governments collaborate with the imperial power against the wishes of the populace.¹⁵ In hierarchy, independent sovereign nations accept the central position of the largest power in the system but are fully functional on their own terms.

BEHAVIORAL IMPLICATIONS

There are four major ways in which a hierarchic system differs in its behavioral implications from the Westphalian system of equal nation-states.

1. Bandwagoning by the lesser states is a central feature of hierarchy. In contrast to the realist predictions about state behavior that emphasize that lesser states will be fearful of and balance against the central state's capabilities, in hierarchy the lesser states flock to its side with a view toward gaining benefits.¹⁶ This behavior corresponds to Randall Schweller's distinction between balancing for security and bandwagoning for profit, or the "preponderance of power" school.¹⁷ Preponderance-of-power theory argues that a preponderant state will not need to fight, and a smaller state may not wish to fight.

The hierarchy as a system is stable and order is preserved through a combination of benefits and sanctions that the central power provides to the lesser powers. Good relations with the central state ensures survival and even prosperity by the lesser states, through a continual flow of goods trade, and technology. Rejection of the hierarchy brings conflict as the central power intervenes to reestablish the hierarchic order.

When the lesser states challenge the central state, the central state reserves the right to use force to restore order. This hierarchy develops over time and can become a formal or informal pattern of relations among nation-states. Thus order is restored and conflicts resolved through the central state's use of force to impose order on the rest of the lesser states. These states in turn realize that to challenge the hierarchy would be against their own interests. Additionally, internal trouble within the central state does not lead to the lesser states upsetting the existing order; it takes regime change of an enormous amount to disrupt the system from within. Weakness in the foreign relations of the central power invites extensive conflict among the lesser powers, because the organization that stabilized their foreign relations is gone.

2. A hierarchic system is more stable than a "Westphalian system" in good times, but more chaotic during bad times. A central state at the top of the hierarchy maintains order and minimizes conflicts between the lesser powers, and also provides a means by which to adjust to unforeseen circumstances. Thus in

"normal" times a hierarchy should see less interstate war and more stability. In the abstract, hierarchy may be more stable than equality. Everyone knows their place, and so there is little misinformation or fear of miscalculation. It is also understood which nations have more responsibility and rights to order the system, and thus they are not viewed with the same suspicion when they do so. However, when the central state experiences trouble and the hierarchy breaks down, order is more easily upset. Thus in times of weakness or major change in the system, we would expect less stability than in a western system.

3. Material power is at the base of the hierarchy, but other factors also matter. Nations in the system develop shared norms that allow for communication. Often, these shared cultural norms can serve to mitigate the security dilemma and increase the level of communication between states in the system. Such information is consistent with methods designed to mitigate the problems of asymmetric information that game theorists such as James Fearon have identified.¹⁸ If all states know the rules of the game, they can communicate threats, acceptance of the status quo, and other positions more clearly. Thus, although cultural norms derive from the underlying power structure, they are by no means inconsequential or epiphenomenal. As Organski writes: "Everyone comes to know what kind of behavior to expect from the others, habits and patterns are established, and certain rules as to how these relations ought to be carried on grow to be accepted. . . . Trade is conducted along recognized channels ... diplomatic relations also fall into recognized patterns. Certain nations are even expected to support other nations. . . . There are rules of diplomacy; there are even rules of war."19 Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner also write in this vein: "The status quo of the overall hierarchy is thus the rules, norms, and accepted procedures that govern international relations."20

4. There is little interference by the central power in the affairs of the lesser states in hierarchy. What makes hierarchy unique is that both the central and the lesser states explicitly recognize the central state's dominant position. And all the states recognize and legitimate the lesser states' positions. As long as the lesser states acknowledge the unrivaled position of the central state, the central state respects the autonomy and sovereignty of the lesser states. The lesser states retain full autonomy of domestic organization and foreign policy, and full autonity to order their relations with each other. Indeed, the dominant state in the system does not necessarily care about the lesser states' foreign policies, as long as relations with the dominant state itself are maintained.

CAVEATS

I have developed an inductive, generic model for how hierarchy might function in the international system. It contrasts in some fairly clear ways with the structural realist model developed by Waltz. However, it should be emphasized that the modifications I make to realism here are fairly minor. All I do in this section is add a little complexity to the standard realist view of the world: a pecking order known by all states. This is simple, and derives from a large body of recent literature on international relations. Hierarchy is path dependent, serves to lower transaction costs between actors, is ultimately based on material power but is reified through cultural practices, provides a means by which actors can signal accommodation, deference, and information, and provides an equilibrium focal point around which actor expectations and practices can converge.

II. ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1300–1900

Defined as both the absence of major interstate war and the continuity of fixed borders, Asia was more stable than Europe in the period 1300–1900. I define the domain of Asian international relations as ending in Manchuria in the north, the Pacific to the east, the mountains of Tibet to the west, and then running south to the coastal regions of the Mekong delta. In short, this study mainly focuses on the region comprising Japan, Korea, China, and Vietnam. These countries were the major actors in the hierarchic system. Although much more detailed research needs to be conducted, from the decline of the Mongol Yuan dynasty in the late 1300s to the intrusion of the west in the nineteenth century, it appears that the system was relatively stable.

The traditional international order in Asia consisted of an outlook on international relations that yielded substantial stability. In Chinese eyes—and explicitly accepted by the surrounding nations—the world of the past millennium has consisted of civilization (China) and barbarians (all the other states.) In this view, as long as the barbarian states were willing to kowtow to the Chinese emperor, and so demonstrate formal obedience to their lower position in the hierarchy, the Chinese had neither the need to invade these countries nor the desire to so. The Chinese have always known that they are Chinese and not Korean, or Vietnamese. There was extensive knowledge of and interactions among the various countries. This system survived until western encroachment in the early nineteenth century.

The hierarchic world of ancient Asia appears to have incorporated many of the realist assumptions: the ancient Asian world was a self-help system, where anarchy is the organizing principle. Nation-states (broadly defined) are the actors, with position and preferences determined by national power and geographic location. Military power was of potential recourse in dealing with other nations. Yet the hierarchy diverges from the European order in that these fundamental attributes of the system yield hierarchy. The European order consisted of formal equality of sovereign states combined with informal hierarchy since the largest powers have disproportionate influence on the system. In Asia the hierarchy consisted of formal hierarchy and informal equal-

ity. As long as the smaller powers paid tribute to China, there was little incentive for China to intervene in local politics. Yet they did not behave the way theories of international relations would predict. The most obvious anomaly is that these nations bandwagoned with, as opposed to balanced against, the largest power in the system.

Asian international relations was distinct from Europe in two other major ways. First, centuries separated major conflict between countries; second, the countries remained essentially the same after the war-there was no shifting and malleable boundaries that were redefined, and nations did not rise and disappear. As seen in the appendix to this article, the major difference between Europe and Asia was that conflicts between the states in the hierarchy were centuries apart, and tended to occur as order within the central power was breaking down. As one Chinese dynasty began to decay internally, conflict along and among the peripheral states would flare up, as the central power's attention was turned inward. As dynasties rose and fell over the centuries movement within the hierarchy took place. Thus in 1274 and 1281, as the Sung and Chin dynasties were crumbling in China, the Mongols under Kublai Khan attempted unsuccessfully to conquer Korea and Japan.²¹ As the Ming dynasty weakened, the Japanese general Hideyoshi attempted to invade China through Korea in 1592 and 1598, although he failed to take Korea. But with the restoration of order within China, conflict between the peripheral powers would cease and relations between all powers would be relatively peaceful for centuries.

Borders also remained relatively fixed in Asia. This contrasts sharply with the western experience. In 1500 Europe had some five hundred independent units; by 1900 it had about twenty.²² In East Asia, the number of countries and boundaries composing the hierarchy have remained essentially the same since 1200 A.D.²³ However, once the hierarchy was upset, it broke apart immediately. In the late nineteenth century both China and Japan became "realist states" almost overnight. Between 1592 and 1895 Japan invaded no country. After that date, it engaged China in a war, annexed Taiwan, and moved into Korea.

The formally hierarchic relationship consisted of a few key acts that communicated information between actors. Most important was kowtow to the Chinese emperor by the sovereigns of the lesser states. Since there could only be one emperor under Heaven, all other sovereigns were known as kings, and on a regular basis would send tribute missions to Beijing to acknowledge the Emperor's central position in the world. In addition, when a new King would take the throne in the lesser states, it was customary to seek the Emperor's approval, a process known as "investiture." Although pro forma, investiture was a necessary component of maintaining stable relations between nations. Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Tibet, and other kingdoms peripheral to China (Jakarta, Malaysia) pursued formal investiture for their own rulers, sent tributary missions, and maintained formal obeisance to China. This may be opposite of what realists would predict. At a minimum we should see these countries bordering China to be attempting to retain as much independence as possible.

While it is often argued that Japan was outside the Chinese system, the Japanese viewed the world in much the same way as the Chinese: the Japanese described the world as *ka-I no sekai*, or the world of China and the barbarians. As Tashiro Kazui notes, "it was not long before both Japan and Korea had established sovereign-vassal relations (*sakuho kankei*) with China, joining other countries of Northeast Asia as dependent, tributary nations."²⁴ Kazui notes that "from the time of Queen Himiko's rule over the ancient state of Yamatai to that of the Ashikaga shoguns during the Muromachi period, it was essentially these same international rules that Japan followed."²⁵ It is true that during the Tokugawa shogunate Japan and China did not resume a tributary relationship. However, trade was still conducted through Nagasaki, although only by private merchants, and indirectly through Korea and the Ryukus. China under the Qing was much more willing to consider private trading relations in the stead of formal tribute relationships.

By the early Ming period (1368–1644), the new Yi dynasty (1392–1910) in Korea was regularly sending three tributary missions per year to China. Until the Tokugawa shogunate (1600–1868), even the Japanese had traditionally given tribute to the Chinese emperor. Key-hiuk Kim writes that:

In 1404—a year after the ruler of Yi Korea received formal Ming investiture for the first time—Yoshimitsu, the third Ashikaga shogun, received Ming investiture as "King of Japan." The identical status assigned to the rulers of Yi Korea and Ashikaga Japan under the Ming tribute system seems to have facilitated the establishment of formal relations between the two neighbors on the basis of "equality" within the "restored" Confucian world order in East Asia.²⁶

Kowtowing to China did not involve much loss of independence, as these states were largely free to run both their internal and foreign affairs independently from China. For example, while Vietnam kowtowed to China it also went on to expand its territory in Southeast Asia. Being a client state had benefits, as well: China helped the Vietnamese fight the French (the Chinese "black flags" troops). In 1592 the Chinese sent troops to Korea to attack Hideyoshi. In the 1800s China sent troops to Tibet to repel an invasion from Nepal. Thus being a client state brought economic, political, and military benefits at a cost lower than arms racing or alliances.

Indeed, after the Hideyoshi invasions of Korea in 1592–1598, the Tokugawa shogunate recognized Japanese-Korean relations as equal. "The Tokugawa rulers understood and accepted the Korean position. Japan after Hideyoshi had no ambition for continental conquest or expansion. They tacitly acknowledged

Chinese supremacy and cultural leadership in the East Asian world. ... Although Tokugawa Japan maintained no formal ties with China ... for all intents and purposes it was as much a part of the Chinese world as Ashikaga Japan had been."²⁷ Japan became known as *sakoku* (closed country). However, it is shown that this is not seen in any Japanese sources, public or private, until a translation of a Dutch paper.²⁸ These countries, even during Tokugawa and Qing, had extensive relations. During the Tokugawa period, the *bakufu* established formal and equal diplomatic relations with Korea, subordinate relation with the Qing, and superior relations with the Ryukus.

In economic relations, while none of the northeast Asian states were trading states along the lines of the western European powers, China, Japan, and Korea engaged in extensive trade with each other for centuries. Indeed, even "tribute" was more a hypothetical goal than reality, for the tributary nations gained as much in trade and support as they gave to the Chinese emperor. Key-hiuk Kim writes that "Although the total value of Korean tribute exceeded that of Chinese gifts by some 80,000 taels every year, the figure did not represent a net gain for the Chinese government, for it spent at least an equal amount to support the visiting Korean embassy personnel."²⁹ Tribute in this sense seemed as much a means of trade and transmission of Chinese culture and technology as it was a formal political relationship.

China and its tributaries had far more interaction with each other than is commonly acknowledged. The popular impression of the histories of these countries is that they were virtually autarkic from one another. Recent scholarship, however, is showing that trade, both private and tributary, made up a significant portion of both government revenues and GNP. Under this systme, these countries were a thriving, complex, and vibrant regional order.

During the Tokugawa period, John Lee notes the "undiminished importance of a trade relationship with China and, to a lesser extent, with Korea and the Ryuku."³⁰ Some scholars estimate that at the height of Japanese trade in the early 1600s, Japanese silver constituted 30 to 40 percent of total world production.³¹ Regarding China, John Lee notes that "China since the sixteenth century was even more deeply involved than Japan in trade with the larger world. Few other places produced the commodities that were universally in demand in greater quantity or variety, and few others attracted foreign traders in the same number."³²

Gang Deng notes that "China is often portrayed as a country isolated from the outside world, self-sufficient and insulated from capitalism . . . with marginal, if not non-existent, foreign trade. In fact, China needed foreign trade, both by land and sea, as much as many other pre-modern societies in Eurasia."³³

Zheng Chenggong's Ming loyalist regime in Taiwan (1644–83) took part in triangular trade involving Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines; his fleet to Japan alone comprised fifty ships a year. . . . The total profit from overseas trade each year has been estimated at 2.3–2.7 million *liang* of silver. . . . The tributary system was a form of disguised staple trade. Trade is also shown because of the fighting over the ability by tributary states to pay tribute. Hideyoshi invaded Korea, a Ming vassal state, to force China to allow Japan to resume a tributary relationship, and threatened that a refusal would lead to invasion of China itself.³⁴

Culturally the Chinese influence was formative. Although neither the Japanese nor the Korean languages are sinic in origin (generally they are thought to be Ural-Altaic with more similarity to Turkish and Finnish), Vietnam, Korea, and Japan have used Chinese characters and vocabulary for more than 2,000 years. Although the indigenous languages were used for common everyday speech, all educated people, and all formal communications, were written in Chinese. Until the advent of Christian missionaries in Vietnam, the Vietnamese, too, based their writing system on Chinese characters. Family organization, education, cultural, arts and crafts—all were derived from a Chinese influence. Although each country retained its own sense of self, the Chinese influence was pervasive.

In contrast with feudal Europe—and with the intermittent exception of Japan—the nations of Asia have been centrally administered bureaucratic systems for far longer than the European nations. Feudal systems tend to be highly decentralized with government functions delegated to vassals. Centralized bureaucratic administration in China involved a complex system of administration and governance. The entire country was divided into administrative districts down to the province level, with appointments made from the capital for most tax, commercial, and judicial posts. In addition, since the Han dynasty, an examination system was used for selecting government bureaucrats. Passing the exam and going to the capital became the origins of Asia's focus on education—anyone who passed the exam assured both himself and his family a substantial jump in prestige and income.³⁵

The demolition of the old order came swiftly in the nineteenth century. The intrusion of western powers and the inherent weaknesses of the Asian nations created a century of chaos. When the hierarchic system broke apart Japan was able to seize the initiative and attempt to become the regional hegemon. Much of Southeast Asia became embroiled in guerrilla wars in an attempt to drive out the western colonizers, from Vietnam to the Philippines to Malaysia and Indonesia. The two world wars and the cold war all muted Asia's inherent dynamism. It was not until the late 1990s that the system began once again to resemble an Asian regional system that is both powered and steered by Asian nations themselves.

III. HIERARCHY IN THE MODERN ERA

More important than whether a hierarchic system existed historically is whether such a system might be reemerging today, and if so what might be the implications. Clearly no modern state will seek investiture from China regarding its chief executive, nor will any country pay tribute to China. Yet modern practices may convey the same shared cultural understanding, and an implicit hierarchy may be reemerging. China is large, growing, and centrally situated, and there is some suggestive evidence that points to the conclusion that Asia is more hierarchic than egalitarian.

In particular, a hierarchic view explains three puzzles that realism has trouble explaining, and presents us with one major contrasting hypothesis. First, hierarchy partially explains why Japan has had a limited reemergence as a great power. Second, why Asian nations have reacted differently to the Taiwan issue than the United States. Third, why Vietnam and Korea are not obviously balancing China. The divergent hypothesis is that the U.S. may face more difficulties creating a balancing coalition against China than is conventionally expected, and that if the U.S. withdraws there may not be the chaos that realism predicts. Each one of these issues is complex, and deserves greater treatment than I can provide here. I will merely sketch out how a hierarchic system explains these issues.

A. WHY JAPAN IS NOT YET A "NORMAL" POWER

If Asia—and Japan—were as realist as analysts think, then Japan would have rearmed at least a decade ago, while at the height of its economic growth. Although Japan is very powerful, it has not yet adopted the trappings of a complete great power. Scholars have debated why this has not yet happened. Previously, the debate has been between realists and those who argue "Japan's culture or domestic politics is different, and hence its foreign policy is different."³⁶ Different from critiques of realism that focus on Japan's domestic politics or culture, the explanation I offer is international in nature. After showing that the two main realist hypotheses for Japan's behavior are suspect, I offer a third hypothesis built on hierarchy. These two realist hypotheses are often conflated in the literature:

1. The Great Power Hypothesis: Japan is so rich and large that it will soon want to become a great power once again ("old" realist hypothesis).

2. *The Umbrella Hypothesis*: When the U.S. leaves Japan, it will rearm and become a normal power ("new" realist hypothesis)³⁷

These hypotheses have rarely been tested in any discriminating manner. Note as well that these two explanations are mutually incompatible: Japan cannot be a normal great power and yet sit under the U.S. security umbrella.




FIGURE 4.2. Defense Spending (% GDP), 1985–1999. Source: IISS, the Military Balance 2000–2001.

The first hypothesis, the "Great powers and rising expectations" is most easily falsified. There is no realist explanation for why the second-largest nation in the system does not balance or challenge the largest. Japan has the world's second-largest economy, is arguably the world's finest manufacturing nation, and is certainly one of the most technologically sophisticated countries in the world. Yet Japan lacks aircraft carriers, intercontinental missiles, nuclear weapons, and does not send troops abroad. In sum, Japan is hard to invade, but Japan also evinces almost no significant military or diplomatic strength. So although Japan is relatively strong, it clearly has not rearmed to the extent it could, nor has it rearmed to the extent a "great power" would (figure 4.2).

In support of the great power hypothesis, Michael Desch offers evidence of Japanese intentions: marginally increased defense spending, a virtual nuclear deterrent, and nationalistic rhetoric from selected politicians.³⁸ Yet this evidence is speculative at best. The key is not the offhand remark from a rightwing politician, but rather that Japan could easily triple its defense budget and still spend only what other powers such as France and Germany spend (figure 4.2). In addition, Japan could modify its constitution, develop nuclear missiles, deploy ICBMs, and build aircraft carriers. It could also forge a foreign policy independent from that of the U.S., and attempt to exert far more influence in diplomatic arenas. This would be convincing evidence that Japan is, or has pretensions to being, a great power. Any discussion of virtual, potential, or nascent power is all an admission that Japan does not yet function as a typical realist nation.

The second hypothesis, regarding the U.S. as keeping the genie in the bottle, is also suspect. First, why would the second-largest power in the system trust the largest power? Threats arise by the mere presence of capabilities—intentions can always change for the worse.³⁹ As Robert Jervis writes, "Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise."⁴⁰ Even if a nation was peaceful when it was weak, changes in power can bring changes in goals. Second, why has Japan not doubted the U.S. commitment many times before? Arguments about the umbrella implicitly assume that Japan is realist and would rearm if the U.S. leaves. If this is true, and if there is no other factor that keeps Japanese foreign policy from being more assertive, then we should have seen Japan rearm at least a decade ago. From a Japanese perspective, there are only two pieces of information necessary to doubt the trustworthiness of the U.S. commitment:

- 1. How we treat our allies in Asia
- 2. How we treat Japan

From a realist perspective, the only information Japan should need to rearm is evidence regarding those two conditions. Yet those two conditions were met in the mid-1980s. From the vantage point of 1985, a Japanese policymaker would have to conclude that it was unlikely that the U.S. would still be defending Japan in 2000. Why? Because Japan had just had 15 years of negative signals. As the Jervis quote above shows, "things change," and if anything, Japanese had every reason to doubt the U.S. commitment. In 1969 President Nixon had called for "Asia for Asians" and began a major drawdown of U.S. troops and commitments to the region. By 1985, Japan had seen the U.S. abandon both South Vietnam and Taiwan. By the mid-1980s, U.S. anger at Japanese trading and economic policies was reaching a crescendo, culminating in the 1985 Plaza Accords and the 1988 Structural Impediments Initiative. In addition, the U.S. had begun to pressure Japan over "burden sharing" and attempted to make the Japanese pay more for the U.S. troops already deployed. All the indicators pointed to the conclusion that the U.S. would not be a reliable ally of Japan in the future. In addition, Japanese economic growth was at its height, Japanese national sentiment about its future was increasingly optimistic, and in 1985 Japan was potentially a better technological and manufacturing country than the U.S.

From a realist perspective, only the most naïve and myopic of leaders would focus only on the present. Indeed, precisely because of the vagaries of international politics, realists see leaders of nations as constantly looking over the horizon and trying to anticipate future trends. Thus, Japan has already had ample reason to doubt the U.S. commitment to its defense.

Yet in 1976 Japan pledged to keep defense spending at 1 percent of GDP, and this has remained virtually unchanged to the present. There was also little

Japanese reaction to the Vietnam or Taiwanese pullout by the U.S. And in the mid-1980s there was not concomitant increase in procurement or personnel policies in the Self-Defense Forces. Japan did not rearm despite real tensions with the United States in the 1980s, and its foreign policy shows almost no behavioral response.

The alternative to the umbrella hypothesis is fairly simple: Japan has not rearmed to the level it could because it has no need to, and it has no intention of challenging China for the central position in Asian politics. Japan can survive right now—it has no need to arm any more. It also has a view that accepts China as big and central. The historic animosities and the lingering mistrust over Japan for its transgressions in the first half of the twentieth century are reasons sometimes cited for a fear of Japanese rearmament. However, the situation has changed dramatically after nearly sixty years. In the late nineteenth century Japan faced decaying and despotic Chinese and Korean monarchies, a significant power vacuum, and extra-regional pressures from the western nations. Today Japan faces the opposite: well-equipped Korean and Chinese militaries with significant economic growth and robust economies, and no significant European or Russian intrusions to its region. It is unlikely that Japan need or will seek to expand its diplomatic and military influence on the Asian landmass.

B. WHY ASIAN NATIONS REACT DIFFERENTLY TO THE TAIWAN ISSUE THAN THE U.S.

Regarding conflict over the status of Taiwan, there are two issues that a hierarchic view of Asia provides us purchase upon. First, why is China so upset? Second, why do the Asian nations seem unconcerned about China's anger? At first glance, the increased tension across the Taiwan Strait in the recent past might seem puzzling: why would China provoke a war over Taiwan that it cannot yet militarily win?⁴¹ Why would China jeopardize its entry into the WTO, risk frightening its neighbors, and severely threaten its economic growth if nations impose sanctions, just to retain Taiwan? The answer lies in China's view of Taiwan as an essential element of its national identity, and China's willingness to bear the real costs of such actions.

A systemic-level view of China and Taiwan would actually point to an increased defensive posture on the part of China. During the cold war China was able to play a middle position between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and with détente in the 1970s, to become even an ally of sorts with the U.S. against the Soviets. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the unquestioned dominant country in the world, and also increasingly turned its attention to a potentially dangerous China.⁴² Thus China has come into more directly conflict with the U.S. in the past decade than before, and from a weak position relative to the U.S. A structural view would expect to see China

not taking provocative actions against U.S. allies in the region. However, the opposite has occurred.

There are clearly many other factors in addition to hierarchy that affect relations across the Strait. The more Taiwan's identity becomes a mature democracy, the more it exacerbates tension with the mainland. The Taiwan issue is also very much a case of competing identities. The traditional political powers of the KMT and CCP had similar goals and values: both parties want to rule all of China. Taiwan is a case where both sides could potentially coexist: both calling for a unified China, neither one willing to upset the status-quo, and the stalemate undergirded by the physical separation of water and the needs of the two political entities.⁴³ To that extent the issue is muted, and ironically, these two political entities have been comfortable dealing with each other precisely because they agreed on so many of the basic assumptions regarding what "China" is. But the conflict exists because of issues of identity, and Taiwan's consistently ambiguous historical relationship with China.

Taiwan has always existed uneasily within the shadow of China. Although nominally independent, Taiwan has also traditionally served as a refuge for the losers of mainland strife. Taiwan historically was not a formal province of China, but it was also not a recognized independent state in the manner of Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. In 1644 the Ming loyalists retreated to Taiwan to harass the triumphant Qing.44 Led by Admiral Koxingga, the Ming loyalists would sally forth from Taiwan. Although the Qing eventually subdued the Ming loyalists, Taiwan was not made a formal province of China until 1886. Before that time Taiwan was considered a part of Fukien province, administered by Manchu officials assigned from Beijing. However, official Chinese records in the eighteenth century also refer to Taiwan as a "frontier area."45 Although clearly a "part" of China, Taiwan was also not considered a part of Han China, and yet it was also not a separate political entity as were Korea and Vietnam. Thus the issue of China and Taiwan poses an interesting dilemma for realists. Are China and Taiwan nation-states? If not, how do we make sense of them and the conflict?

While the western answer to the question of whether or not Taiwan is a nation-state is obvious, the Chinese answer is exactly the opposite.⁴⁶ China may truly view Taiwan as an internal problem. Xu Dunxin, former Chinese ambassador to Japan, expresses a common Chinese refrain: "The Taiwan issue is China's business. It is China's internal affair. No country, including the U.S., has a right to concern itself with this issue."⁴⁷ Although such announcements tend to be dismissed in the West, the Chinese have had a consistent policy toward Taiwan, and pretending that China is not sincere in expressing this attitude is perhaps premature.⁴⁸ This Chinese perception has two implications for this eassay.

First, imposing a western conception of international relations on China may be missing the point. The nations of Asia have made an implicit pact with Taiwan: exist as a quasi-nation and enjoy the benefits of the international system. It should be emphasized that this has been the traditional solution to the Taiwan issue.⁴⁹ As long as Taiwan was willing to abide by these rules and be a quasi-nation, the benefits of being a nation-state were available to it. Taiwan's leaders could travel the world and play golf and perform quasi-diplomatic functions, Taiwan's firms could trade and invest overseas, and its status was not threatened, even by China. But while Taiwan could act like a nation-state, it could not officially become one.⁵⁰

The furor over the 1996 and 2000 Taiwanese elections, and Lee Teng-hui's 1996 statements in particular, revealed the consequences of breaking the rules. As various Taiwanese leaders became more assertive in their claims to full, sovereign, nation-state status, the rest of the world became increasingly cautious. And the reaction to the Chinese military maneuvers was especially telling.⁵¹ In good realist fashion, United States fury was directly almost exclusively at China for being provocative. However, the rest of the Asian states were muted in their responses to Chinese military intervention, and informally extremely upset at Taiwan for provoking China. The informal feeling among other Asian states has been that "Taiwan broke the pact."⁵²

Second, it was only as Taiwan began the transition to a genuine and modern nation-state with democracy that the issues became intractable with China. That is, China has been content to allow Taiwan to act like a normal nation-state and to conduct its affairs with little interference from Beijing.⁵³ However, a formal declaration of independence would cause China to respond, most likely with a punitive expedition. This should not be considered an idle threat on the Chinese part. The conflict also reveals China's belief that it has the right to order its relations in its surrounding areas.⁵⁴

Indeed, the conflict itself has been exacerbated as Taiwan has consolidated its democratic institutions. While Taiwan was under the control of the KMT and authoritarian governments during the cold war, there was little disagreement between China and Taiwan over the rules of the game and the ultimate place that Taiwan occupied in relation to China: Taiwan was clearly part of mainland China, and the only dispute was who—the KMT or the CCP—were the legitimate rulers of all China.

However, events of the past 15 years have seen Taiwan's identity increasingly shift to that of a modern nation-state. This shift is most notable in the gradual shift to democracy. Taiwan has become a strong, vibrant democracy, where people have the right to voice their opinions, and to elect leaders in contested elections.⁵⁵ As such, Taiwan, although not recognized formally as a nation-state by the United States, has become in the eyes of much of the world a legitimate political entity.

And therein lies the heart of the issue. While China's conception of itself remains roughly the same, Taiwan's is changing. And thus there is the clash be-

tween a democratic, capitalist, wealthy, and industrialized Taiwan deciding its own fate, and an authoritarian, quasi-capitalist, semi-traditional China attempting to control the fate of Taiwan.⁵⁶ Realism has much to say about how the conflict was managed during the cold war, but without understanding these competing visions of the world, it is not possible to understand why the conflict has endured, nor why it has become much more acute in the last decade.

Yet China's view of international relations is considerably more subtle. Although realist in its practices, this view also incorporates many non-Westphalian elements. For its part, China is comfortable with a loose definition of "nation." China has already agreed to a "one nation, two systems" approach with respect to Hong Kong. Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions, China has so far respected in large part the two-systems principle, allowing Hong Kong its own currency, legal system, and even military forces. In addition, the border dispute between India and China has never been formally resolved, both countries agreeing to leave the border undefined, and China's relations with Tibet and its western regions show an acceptance of looser relations than we might expect. The Chinese attempt to derive an identity that allows for the "one-country, twosystems" principle with Hong Kong is one example of how identities can be reconfigured that allow for accommodation. As long as Taiwan would also exist in a traditional, poorly defined, and partial relationship with China, both sides were content. But Taiwan's increasingly democratic domestic political institutions are causing conflict with China.

In a hierarchy, the other Asian nations recognize China's right to order its borders. In addition, other nations see China-Taiwan relations as an internal affair. By this logic, any actions—military or otherwise—that China takes against Taiwan are not indicative of how China would conduct its foreign policy. So we are seeing a China that is flexible in its worldview.

C. WHY VIETNAM AND KOREA ACCEPT CHINA'S CENTRAL POSITION

From a realist perspective, the two countries that should be most fearful of China are Vietnam and Korea, because China can actually invade those countries. Yet both countries, while wary of China, are not behaving in explicitly balancing behavior. Vietnam and Korea must adjust to China,—that has always been the case and will always be the case. One implication of hierarchy is that balancing by equals is impossible. Both Vietnam and Korea have spent centuries adjusting to and resisting China's influence. Indeed, both Vietnam and Korea are known for their stubborn nationalism, gritty pride, and proud history as countries independent from China.⁵⁷ Yet at the same time, both Vietnam and Korea must deal with a China that looms large over their countries. From this perspective, it is probably more surprising if these two countries try to bal-

ance China by relying on a tenuous U.S. commitment. More reasonable is to adjust, get what you can from China, and not provoke China too much. China for its part realizes invading and holding either Vietnam or Korea would be extremely difficult, and thus hierarchy emerges.

In *Theory of International Politics*, Kenneth Waltz's key escape clause was to argue that "secondary states, *if they are free to choose*, flock to the weaker side."⁵⁸ Yet Waltz's implicit argument about alternative forms of organization does not provide us with any understanding of how or when such a situation might occur. In the case of Asia, Korea and Vietnam appear to face much higher costs in balancing China than other nations situated more geographically distant, and they appear to be preparing for a strong China on their borders.

While currently South and North Korea are locked in a zero-sum battle for dominance on the peninsula, there is an increasing possibility that unification could occur.⁵⁹ The alliances that a united Korea chooses could tilt the regional balance in any number of ways. A realist view would predict that China would pose the greatest threat to a unified Korea, and that a unified Korea would remain a staunch U.S. and Japanese ally to balance China's power. In contrast, the implication of hierarchy would be that unified Korea will accommodate and coexist with China, and that the U.S. might be the odd man out.

Japan and Korea seem to be natural allies. Both countries are capitalist economies, democracies, allied with the U.S., and they both share rapid economic growth and similar cultural characteristics. Korea and Japan countries would seem ideal as allies, especially put in opposition to a possibly dangerous China. But, as Victor Cha writes, "Throughout the cold war, the two states (Japan and Korea) have been staunch allies of the United States, and hosted the mainstay of the American military presence in East Asia. For most of the period concerned, the two states faced hostile adversaries in China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. Given this commonalty in allies and enemies, basic balanceof-power dynamics suggest that cooperative relations should ensue. This has been far from the case."⁶⁰ Yet a Japan-U.S.-Korea alliance may be more tense, and more difficult to sustain, than we expect.

A unified Korea in a hierarchic world would not necessarily fear a strong China along its border. Instead it would find a way to accommodate and adjust to China. Japan and Korea, being more equal, would have a more difficult time adjusting to each other. There are clearly other factors at work, such as historical animosities between Japan and Korea, but these are also in part endogenous to the collapse of the hierarchic system 150 years ago.

As yet there is little direct evidence that would allow us to discern a hierarchic system on the peninsula, because the division of the peninsula still dominates both North and South Korean strategic considerations. However, there is some suggestive evidence that both Koreas understand China's central position in Asia. First, North Korea has consistently had better relations with China than

with any of its other communist patrons. And even after China normalized ties with South Korea in 1991, North Korea and China have managed to have a close relationship. Second, South Korea gleefully rushed to normalize ties with China and the Soviet Union in 1991, and the South has not yet shown any indication that it has fears about the relationship with China. Third, South Korea has shown considerable deference to China, especially in its reluctance to fully support U.S. plans for theater missile defense.⁶¹ Finally, South Korean military planning—even the distant planning for post-unification defense—has been focused on water-borne threats, not the potential threat of a Chinese land invasion.⁶² South Korea has not begun to envision China as a potential threat or competitor to national security. This is surprising, given that China can actually invade Korea.

Like the Koreas, Vietnam is not showing any direct signs of being worried about a rising China. Vietnam, like the Koreas, has historically sat in the shadow of China. Although Vietnam and China have a long history of conflict, Vietnam is not currently arming, nor actively defending its border, against China.⁶³ The past three decades have seen conflict between the two nations: Vietnam fought a brief but sharp war with China in 1979, and then the two countries had a brief naval clash over the Spratley Islands in 1988. However, relations have since then steadily improved. By 1987, border incidents between Vietnam and China had mostly disappeared, and unofficial border trade began to develop.⁶⁴

Full normalization of ties occurred in November 1991. Since then, trade and economic cooperation have developed steadily. By 1997, mutual trade totaled \$1.44 billion, and China had invested an estimated total of \$102 million in Vietnam.⁶⁵ Vietnam and China signed a tourism cooperation plan in April 1999, which allowed Chinese to enter Vietnam without a visa.⁶⁶ China also signed an economic-technical agreement with Vietnam in June 2000, which allowed for \$55.254 million in upgrading the Thai Nguyen Steel Company and other industrial plants in Vietnam.⁶⁷ The indications are that Vietnam and China are developing a stable modus vivendi with each other.

Neither Vietnam nor Korea is obviously balancing China, nor does either country reveal particular concern at China's foreign policies. In fact, they both appear to be adjusting to the reality of a large and relatively rich China. While it is true these countries may have little choice in the matter, it is also true that both countries have options for alliances and defense planning that would be much more focused on deterring or balancing China.

CONCLUSION: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TO ASIA

A hierarchic view of Asia leads to different predictions about the influence and impact of the U.S. in the region. A hierarchic view would predict that the Aisan states see China's central place in the regional system as inevitable, and have strategies for adjusting to China without provoking it. In addition, China will act within bounds that are acceptable to the other Asian nations. If this is the case, U.S. attempts to form a balancing coalition against China may be counterproductive to the U.S. If forced to choose between the U.S. and China, Asian nations may not make the choice westerners assume that they will. Indeed, recent indications show that South Korea is hesitant about embracing theater missile defense for fears of provoking China and in an attempt to resolve its own peninsular issues.

At the same time, the importance of the U.S. as the lid on the boiling mess of Asian arms-racing and competition may be overstated. If the U.S. pulls out, a hierarchic view would predict that China would take a greater role in organizing the system, and Vietnam, Japan, and Korea adjust, with order preserved. U.S. withdrawal is not nearly so destabilizing for Japan in a hierarchic system as in a realist world. Under this scenario the US might withdraw and Japan will not rearm, because it feels no threat from China. In this case China and Japan know each other's place in the system and respect it. Japanese restraint does not imply that Japan does not fear China. Although there is plenty of concern about China in Japan, hierarchy does not imply warm friendly relations between the powers.⁶⁸ Japan can be wary of China and still conduct its foreign policy in a manner that implicitly recognizes China's central position in Asia.

Historically, Chinese weakness has led to chaos in Asia. When China is strong and stable, order has been preserved. The picture of Asia that emerges is one in which China, by virtue of geography and power, is the central player in Asia. And as China's economy continues to develop, it is increasingly a major economic and financial power, as well. In response, Asian nations will adjust to China.

I have attempted in this essay to introduce a focus on hierarchy into the discussion of international relations. I am not arguing that the Asian order may reassert itself, nor am I arguing that an "oriental" way of thinking about the world is simply different from our western ways. My point is rather more cautious: even a slight hierarchic pattern to modern Asian international relations will have different implications for the region than many western scholars predict. There seems to be no *a priori* reason to think that merely because old multipolar Europe was conflictual, modern multipolar Asia must also be conflictual. Rather, since pre-modern Asia was relatively peaceful, perhaps modern Asia can evolve into a similarly peaceful pattern of international relations.

The hierarchic system in Asia is not unique, and is not necessarily cultural in nature. The hierarchy has, of course, Asian forms. But the general pattern of organization is structural, and there are a number of examples that show that this system is neither unique nor completely dated. U.S.-Latin American relations are hierarchic. In fact, many of the same rituals used in Asia appear in a modern

1.	Modify the constitution	No
2.	nuclear weapons	No
3.	aircraft carriers	No
4.	power projection capabilities	No
5.	intercontinental missiles	No
6.	defense spending equivalent to other great powers	No
7.	procurement strategies	No
8.	attempts to influence the great game	No
	(seat on the UN security council, etc.)	
9.	GDP	Yes
10.	Population	Yes
11.	Per capita GDP	Yes

TABLE 4.1. Japan and Evidence of Great Power Status

context in the western hemisphere. The U.S. has generally left the Latin American countries on their own in terms of foreign relations, while explicitly reserving the right to interfere in the foreign relations of Latin American countries if it mattered to us (the Monroe doctrine). As long as foreign leaders come to Washington D.C. (kowtow) and utter the proper phrases (democracy and capitalism), they would reap great rewards from the U.S., and receive investiture (U.S. aid and protection.) However, failure to do so, or uttering certain wrong words meant extensive U.S. pressure, or even punitive expeditions (Haiti, Panama). The U.S. has no territorial goals with these countries, but it does reserve the right to maintain order in its sphere of influence and to punish those that do not explicitly and implicitly follow U.S. cultural guidelines.

More broadly, this essay has argued that hierarchy is compatible with anarchy; the actual contrast for hierarchy is equality. While the Westphalian system that emerged in Europe three centuries ago has spread over the globe, it is neither the only nor a permanent form of organization in international relations.

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ENDNOTES

1. Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 7. For other arguments that overstate the differences between Europe and Asia, see James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A tale of two worlds: core and periphery in the post-cold war era," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 467–491. Goldgeier and McFaul include Japan in the "core" and China in the "periphery." They note that territorial ambition is beyond the core but prevalent in the periphery. It seems that a "regional focus" rather than "core and periphery" would capture these dynamics equally well, with territorial ambition muted in Europe and northeast Asia, yet still potentially useful in other regions.

2. See, for example, Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry"; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 60; Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," Survival 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 3-21; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A tale of two worlds"; and Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18 (Fall 1993): 56, 65. On the China threat, see Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the Constraintment of China," International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 107–135; Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 149-168, at 164; and Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (November/December 1993). On Japan see Gerald Segal, "The Coming Confrontation Between China and Japan," World Policy Journal 10, no. 2 (Summer 1993); Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Chalmers Johnson, "Their Behavior, Our Policy," The National Interest 17 (Fall 1989); and Clyde Prestowitz, Trading Places (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Some of the more frantic concerns over Japan can be found in George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). For counterarguments, see Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," International Security 17 (Spring 1993); and Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: structures, norms, and policies," International Security 17 (Spring 1993).

3. The classic statement is John Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

4. The best work is by Ian Johnston, *Cultural Realism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), although he concentrates exclusively on China and examines neither the Asian region nor the present. See also Victor Cha's discussion in "Defining Security in East Asia: History, Hotspots, and Horizon-gazing," in Eunmee Kim ed., *The Four Asian Tigers: Economic Development and the Global Political Economy* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998).

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Comparative Historical Analysis (London : Routledge, 1992); and Barry Buzan, "The Idea of 'International System': Theory Meets History," *International Political Science Review* 15 (July 1994): 231–255.

6. See Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: why new great powers will arise," *International Security* 17 (Spring 1993); Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (Winter 1990/1991): 23–33; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 44–98.

7. Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," p. 7.

8. Stuart Kaufman, "The Fragmentation and Consolidation of International Systems," *International Organization* 51 (Spring 1997): 179.

9. In addition to Waltz, also see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," *International Security* (Spring 1990); and Stephen Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987)

10. See David Lake, "Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations," *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996):1–34, Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic politics and international ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the search for security," *International Organization* 47 (1993):207–33; and Michael Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).

11. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," p. 7.

12. For arguments compatible with this, see William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5–41; and Katja Weber, "Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Costs Approach To International Security Cooperation," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (June 1997): 321–40.

13. Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 38.

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15. Wendt and Friedheim write that "As objects of control, foreign and security policy are almost always regulated from the center . . . another institutional expression [of informal empire] is found in interorganizational linkages." "Hierarchy under anarchy," p. 697.

16. On balancing, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Redding, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Eric Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" *Security Studies* 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 409.

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18. See, for example, James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (February 1997): 68–90.

19. A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958): 315-361.

20. Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner, "Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War," *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (1996): 235–260.

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22. Stuart Kaufman, "The Fragmentation and Consolidation of International Systems," International Organization 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 176.

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25. Kazui, "Foreign Relations During the Edo Period," p. 286.

27. Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, p. 21, 23.

28. Kazui, "Foreign Relations During the Edo Period," pp. 283-306.

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30. John Lee, "Trade and Economy in Preindustrial East Asia, c. 1500–1800: East Asia in the Age of Global Integration," *Journal of Asian Studies* 58, no. 1 (February 1999): 7.

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36. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," *International Security* 17 (Spring 1993); Eric Heginbotham, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998) p. 171–203.

37. On great powers, see for example, Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18 (Fall 1993): 56, 65; Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," p. 55; and Michael Desch, "Correspondence," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 176. On the U.S. security umbrella, see Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," p. 56; and Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," p. 25.

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