Chapter 3

SOCIALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory

Alastair Iain Johnston

INTRODUCTION[1]

I think it is fair to say that for most IR theorists there are two main ways in which involvement in international institutions changes state behavior in more cooperative directions. The first is through material rewards and punishments: in pursuit of a (mostly) constant set of interests or preferences a state responds to positive and negative sanctions provided exogenously by the institution (rules, membership requirements, etc.) or by certain actors within the institution. The second is through changes in the domestic distributions of power among social groups pursuing (mostly) a constant set of interests or preferences such that different distributions lead to different aggregated state preferences.

Few would deny that these are plausible, observable and probably quite frequent ways in which policies change direction after a state enters an international institution. But are these the only or even primary ways in which this change occurs? The ASEAN Way discourse explicitly challenges the "hegemony" of these two processes in IR theory and practice. The discourse stresses that the way in which the social milieu is created inside formally weak institutions—the effects of familiarity, consensus building, consultation, non-coercive argumentation, the avoidance of legalistic solutions to distribution problems, etc.,—the process itself, is a critical variable in explaining cooperative outcomes

FIGURE 3.1 Comparative Regional Subsystem Contexts.

in institutions.[2] Thus, proponents of the ASEAN Way argue that, in contrast to the pessimism of realist theory and its variants, and to the "follow-me" hubris of European institutionalization and integration, the Asia-Pacific is developing patterns of institutional form and content that can lead to high levels of cooperation even with low levels of formality and intrusiveness. That is to say, the discourse suggests that there is a third way in which state behavior changes, namely, through socialization inside international institutions such that state behavior changes in the absence of these two conditions and, instead, in the presence of the endogenous "social" effects of institutions.

One of the most important of these effects is persuasion.[3] Indeed, the explicit purpose of the ASEAN Way as manifested in the only multilateral security institution in the region—the ARF—is to develop "habits" of cooperation.[4] A habit (according to Webster's) is, among other things, an "acquired mode of behavior that has become nearly or completely involuntary." Thus the ARF aims, in part, at socializing its participants in "modes of behavior" (in this case cooperation) that become taken-for-granted, pursued on the basis of appropriateness. The ASEAN Way, and the ARF, then, are explicitly trying to create what constructivists argue are central processes in IR, namely, processes of social interaction that lead to the internalization of normative understandings which, in turn, create new definitions of interest independent of exogenous material constraints (whether these be material power structures or institutional rules). Putting it crudely and visually (fig. 3.1), the ASEAN Way discourse might suggest that the Asia-Pacific is situated in or moving toward the northwest corner of the x and y axes (1), unlike Western Europe situated in the northeast corner, and unlike the

dire predictions of the neo-and traditional realists who would argue that the region is mired in the realpolitik southwest corner (2).[5]

It is one thing to claim this is what the ASEAN Way is doing in Asia-Pacific IR and altogether another to show that this is in fact happening. How would one know it if these social effects were indeed critical for understanding cooperation inside institutions? And why it is important for IR theory to find an answer to these questions? Interestingly enough, the claim that the ASEAN Way is, at least in part, responsible for this evolution in Asia-Pacific IR parallels the "sociological turn" in IR theory led by social constructivist work. Social constructivists in particular focus on the link between the presence of particular normative structures at the international level (mostly in international institutions) and the incorporation of these norms in behavior by the actor/agent at the unit-level. Indeed, socialization is *the* central "causal" process for constructivists that links structures to agents and back again. And a subset of socialization, a critical microprocess, is persuasion—their trump card.

But constructivists, as Jeff Checkel has pointed out, have not been very successful in explaining the microprocesses under which actors are exposed to, receive, process, and then act upon the normative arguments that predominate in particular social environments—particularly in the so-called hard case area of security.[6] Given the claims about socialization embedded in the ASEAN Way discourse, a focus on precisely how an institution allegedly modeled off this discourse does affect cooperation might be useful in testing the valued added of this sociological turn in IR.

So what I propose to do here is to ask, first, is there space for a socialization argument in IR theory? And if so, what might such an argument look like? That is, if one were to treat institutions as social environments rather than only as a set of exogenous rule-based constraints on actors, what might the implications be for thinking about institutional design and cooperation?[7] Finally I'll try to test for the effects of socialization—persuasion in particular—in explaining the evolution of Chinese approaches to the ARF, and to multilateral security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific in general.

SOCIALIZATION IN IR THEORY

Socialization is a fairly common analytical concept in a range of social sciences where social interaction and the impact of group processes on individual behavior is a critical research focus: linguistics and the acquisition of language; sociology and social psychology and theories of in-group identity formation and compliance with group norms; political science and the acquisition of basic political orientations among young people or explanations of social movements; international law and the role of shaming and social opprobrium in eliciting treaty compliance; anthropology and the diffusion of cultural practices, among

other fields and topics. It ought to be a vibrant area in IR as well since socialization would seem to be central to some of the major topics in IR theory today: preference formation and change;[8] national identity formation; the creation and diffusion of, and compliance with, international norms; the effects of international institutions, etc.[9]

But while most noncoercive diplomatic efforts have been aimed at persuasion—"changing the minds of others"—only recently has IR theory begun to engage the concept of socialization. The Clinton administration, as did many ASEAN states, for example, viewed the engagement of China as a way of "teaching" Beijing about allegedly predominant norms and rules of international relations (free trade; non-use of force in the resolution of disputes; nonproliferation; multilateralism, etc.). Clinton officials in particular spoke about bringing China into the international normative community, an enculturation discourse if ever there was one. Defense Secretary William Perry noted in a speech in Seattle in 1995 that engagement was a strategy for getting China to act like a "responsible world power."[10] In March 1997, in outlining national security policy for Clinton's second term National Security Advisor Sandy Berger referred to engagement as designed to pull China "in the direction of the international community."[11] Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, noted in a speech to the World Economic Forum in October 1997 that "We want China to take its place as an active and responsible member of the international community."[12] Secretary of State Madeline Albright wrote in an op ed in the Miami paper Diario *Las Americas* in July 1998: "The manner in which the United States engages China now and in the future will influence whether China *becomes* a constructive participant in the international arena. . . . We seek a China that embraces universally recognized human rights and global norms of conduct and one that works with us to build a secure international order."[13]

Even if, in the end, many attempts to use diplomacy to effect the internalization of new ways of thinking and behaving fail,[14] it still makes sense to try to explain why actors (state and non-state) engage in this kind of activity in the first place. But of course, we don't really know how many of these attempts do fail because we haven't really tried to define, isolate, and measure the effects of socialization processes in IR.

This is not to say that predominant IR theories ignore the term socialization completely. Neorealism uses the term to describe the homogenization of self-help balancing behavior among security-seeking states interacting under conditions of anarchy.[15] But in neorealism homogenization is not really socialization in common-sense usage. Rather it is imitation and selection leads to similarities in behavior of actors through interaction: states that do not emulate the self-help balancing behavior of the most successful actors in the system will be selected out of it, while those remaining (assuming there are no new entrants into the system—a problematic assumption that I will come to in a moment) will

tend to share behavioral traits. It is unclear as to whether the theory assumes states will also share epiphenomenal realpolitik foreign policy ideologies, because the theory is unclear as to whether states are conscious agents pursuing balancing outcomes or simply unconscious participants in the creation of unintended systemic balances.

In any event, it is simply not empirically obvious that this kind of selection even occurs. As Dan Reiter has argued, historical experience rather than some search for obvious transhistorical exemplars is often the criteria states have used when deciding when and what type of balancing is appropriate (Reiter 1996). Indeed, one could legitimately question whether material structure plus anarchy does any selecting out at all, given the empirical frequency and significance of failures to balance.[16] The death rates of states declined dramatically in the latter half of the twentieth century. Unsuccessful states—those that eschew self-help, that fail to balance internally or externally—simply do not disappear anymore.[17] New states emerged in the late twentieth century in an era when failed or unsuccessful states were not routinely eliminated, and thus, presumably, could retain heterogeneous traits and characteristics, supported in some respects by institutions and rules analogous to those that support socially weak, "deviant," and failed individuals in domestic societies. This being the case, the characteristics of the system structure must, by definition, be much more varied and complex than the simple tending-toward-balances anarchy of a neorealist world. Thus, the social environment in which these new states are socialized must be one that not only rewards or selects states that copy 'successful" self-help balancers, but one that may also reward or support "deviant," heterodox behavior. If so, then so much for the homogenizing effects of social interaction—socialization—in anarchy.[18]

Contractual institutionalism generally does not use the term socialization. For most contractual institutionalists, true to their micro-economic and game theoretic predelictions, the notion that social interaction can change preferences and interests is not a central concern (or they are divided as to its theoretical possibility and empirical frequency). Social interaction inside institutions is assumed to have no effect on the "identities" or "interests" of actors, or at least institutionalists are divided as to whether there are any effects.[19] That is, actors emerge from interaction inside institutions with the same attributes, traits, and characteristics with which they entered. These characteristics in turn have no effect on the attributes, traits or characteristics of the institution itself—an efficient institution reflects the nature of the cooperation problem, not the nature of the actors themselves—and these characteristics, in turn, have no impact on actor identities. Iteration, the intensity of interaction, or the provision of new information about the beliefs of other actors, etc., do not seem to have any effect on the basic preferences of actors. The quality or quantity of prior social interaction among players should be irrelevant to the calculus of whether or not to defect.[20]

Instead, prosocial or cooperative behavior in institutions is a function of such things as material side payments or sanctions provided by institution or other actors; the desire for a good reputation portable to other exchange relationships; and reassurance information. Contractual institutionalism generally does not treat institutions as agent-like entities, nor does it examine the affect relationships created through interaction inside institutions.

For contractual institutionalists, or those sympathetic to the approach, there are sound methodological reasons for downplaying socialization.[21] For one thing, socialization opens the door to unstable or rapidly changing preferences, depending on how interactive the agent-structure relationship is. This makes modeling hard because it makes it difficult to hold preferences fixed to determine the independent effects of strategic environment on behavior. For another, observing preferences is hard; it is particularly difficult to determine whether external manifestations (e.g. speech act or action) of what is "inside heads" are in fact strategic. This leads to a methodological tendency to deduce preferences from theoretically based characteristics of actors (e.g. militaries prefer large budgets because they prefer offensive doctrines because they prefer efficiency and minimal uncertainty).[22]

Institutionalists do not rule out changes in preferences or behavior that are not exogenously constrained: There is no *a priori* reason why information, say, might change not only beliefs about the strategic environment, but also the preferences of extant decisionmakers. But if preferences do change as a result of interaction in an institution, institutionalists usually look for a change in distribution of power among political elites/decisionmakers (elite replacement—due to some effect of an institution—e.g information about policy failure; sanctions; distribution of institutions benefits).[23]

This uninterest in socialization is somewhat surprising, though. Given the prominence of coordination games and focal points in institutionalist theorizing about social norms, habits, customs, and conventions that constrain rationally optimizing behavior one might expect more curiosity about the social-historical origins, and the stability, of focal points. Institutionalists admit that focal points can be products of shared culture and experience.[24] Martin notes that bargaining inside institutions may allow states to establish focal points in a coordination game. But the origins of these focal points in IR are not of central concern, and institutionalists do not explicate the microprocesses by which bargaining reveals or creates (or convinces actors to accept) a focal point.[25] This is acceptable if one assumes relative stability in focal points and conventions. But this is an assumption, not an empirical claim. It is an assumption challenged by constructivist or complex adaptive systems, agent-based ontologies that assume that continuous interaction between multiple agents over time can lead to rapidly changing social structural contexts (emergent properties) that, in turn, affect how agents define their interests. In macrohistorical terms, this means that

social conventions and focal points can evolve and change rather dramatically, non-linearly, and in path-dependent ways.

Needless to say, for social constructivists socialization is a central concept: The constructivists' focus on the "logics of appropriateness"—pro-norm behavior that is so deeply internalized as to be unquestioned, automatic, and taken-for-granted—naturally motivates questions about which norms are internalized by agents, how, and to what degree. The empirical work in this regard has tended to follow the sociological institutionalists' focus on macrohistorical diffusion of values and practices (e.g. rationalism, bureaucracy, market economics), measured by correlations between the presence of a global norm and the presence of corresponding local practices. Finnemore goes beyond correlation to causation by focusing on how international agents (e.g. international organizations, ideas entrepreneurs, etc.) have actually gone about "teaching" values and constructing domestic institutions and procedures that reflect emergent international norms and practices and that states pursue even if these seem inconsistent with its material welfare or security interests.

The problems with constructivist work so far, however, are fairly basic. First, inheriting much of the epistemology of sociological institutionalism, constructivists have tended to leave the microprocesses of socialization under-explained.[26] They tend to assume that agents at the systemic level have relatively unobstructed access to states and sub-state actors for diffusing new normative understandings. This leaves variation in the degree of socialization across units—the degree of contestation, normative "retardation," etc.—unexplained. And it leaves the causal processes unexplicated.[27] Even Finnemore's story of "teaching" stops essentially at the point where agents at the international level deliver norm-based lessons to rather passive students. There is less attention paid to the processes by which units or unit-level actors understand, process, interpret, and act upon these "lessons." It is unclear how exactly pro-normative behavior is elicited once the models of "appropriate behavior" are displayed or communicated to agents at the unit-level. This neglect is surprising, given constructivists' focus on reflective action by multiple agents: if this kind of agency exists in the diffusion of norms, what happens when "teaching" efforts run into reflective action by multiple agents at the receiving end?[28] The result is, however, that the "constitutive" effects of systemic normative structures are mostly assumed, rather than shown.

Second, when constructivists do begin to look at these microprocesses of socialization and the constitutive effects of social interaction, the focus is almost exclusively on persuasion. Yet here there are two issues. One is that persuasion and shaming or social opprobrium (often termed normative "pressure") are conflated.[29] These are, in fact, distinct microprocesses. Persuasion involves the non-coercive communication of normative understandings that is internalized by actors such that new courses of action are viewed as entirely reasonable and ap-

propriate. Social pressure, opprobrium—also termed social influence—is different. The actor desires to maximize social status and image as ends in themselves. This leads to a sensitivity to the accumulation of status markers that are bestowed only by a relevant audience with which the actor has at least a modicum of identification. The process of choosing to act in prosocial ways is an instrumental or "consequentialist" one, not one governed by appropriateness per se.[30]

A second issue is that when talking about persuasion constructivist-oriented research has tended to borrow in some form or another from Habermas' theory of communicative action. The argument is that social interaction is not all strategic bargaining. That is, bargaining is often not simply a process of manipulating exogenous incentives to elicit desired behavior from the other side. Rather it involves argument and deliberation all in an effort to change the minds of others. As Hasenclever et al., put it, "parties enter into a debate in which they try to agree on the relevant features of a social situation and then advance reasons why certain behaviors should be chosen. These reasons—in so far as they are *convincing*—internally motivate the parties to behave in accordance with the mutually arrived at interpretation."[31]

The main problem here is that it is not obvious, when actually doing empirical research, what the value added of using Habermas is to the neglect of a very rich research tradition on persuasion in communications theory, social psychology, and political socialization. It is not clear how the application of the communicative theory of action would go about showing whether persuasion or coercion explained behavior that was more pro-social over time, which is what makes communicative action in and of itself "convincing." How are actors convinced to agree on a "mutually arrived at interpretation" of social facts. Under what social or material conditions is "communicative action" more likely to be successful? How would one know? Constructivists seem to rely on an identity argument that hints at an infinite regress problem: that is persuasion is more likely to occur when two actors trust one another such that each accepts the "veracity of an enormous range of evidence, concepts and conclusions drawn by others."[32]

SOCIALIZATION: DEFINITION AND PROCESSES

Social scientists generally agree that socialization is a process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse "expected ways of thinking, feeling, and acting." For Stryker and Statham 'socialization is the generic term used to refer to the processes by which the newcomer—the infant, rookie, trainee for example—becomes incorporated into organized patterns of interaction."[33] Berger and Luckmann define the term as "the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or sector of it." Socialization, then, involves the development of shared identification such that peo-

ple become members in a society where the intersubjective understandings of the society become "objective facticities" that are taken for granted.[34] Political scientists generally agree with the sociologists: Ichilov refers to political socialization as "the universal processes of induction into any type of regime." These processes focus on "how citizenship orientations emerge."[35] Siegal refers to political socialization as the "process by which people learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system."[36] IR theorists have generally simplified socialization to processes "resulting in the internalization of norms so that they assume their 'taken for granted' nature."[37] Ikenberry and Kupchan evoke a Gramscian-like image when they define socialization as a process whereby states internalize "the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into the community formed by the hegemon and other nations accept its leadership position." This hegemonic order "comes to possess a 'quality of oughtness.' "[38]

There are a couple of common themes here: The first is that socialization is most evidently directed at, or experienced by, novices, newcomers, whether they be children, inductees into a military, immigrants, or "new" states. That is, "noviceness" is an important characteristic that affects the pace and outcome of socialization processes.[39]

The second theme is the internalization of the values, roles, and understandings held by a group that constitutes the society of which the actor becomes a member. Internalization implies, further, that these values, roles, and understandings take on a character of "taken-for-grantedness" so that not only are they hard to change, but also the benefits of behavior are calculated in very abstract social terms rather than concrete consequentialist terms. Why should one do X? "Because, . . . " or "because it is the right thing to do . . . " rather than "Why should one do X? Because it will lead to Y, and Y benefits me."[40] To date, however, constructivism has been vague on how persuasion leads to internalization and why.

Persuasion has to do with cognition and the active assessment of the content of a particular message. As a microprocess of socialization, it involves changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion. It can lead to common knowledge, or "epistemic conventions" (that may or may not be cooperative) or it can lead to a homogenization of interests. That is, actors can be persuaded that they are indeed in competition with each other, or that they share may cooperative interests. The point is, however, that the gap or distance between actors' basic causal understandings closes as a result of successful persuasion.

Persuasion is a common tool in social relationships. People tend to rank changing other's opinions very high in a list of influence strategies, regardless of whether the other is considered a friend or an enemy.[41] Communications theo-

rists have argued that all social interaction involves communications that alter people's "perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and motivations."[42] How persuasion works therefore is a focus of a great deal of research in communications theory, social psychology, and sociology, and there is no obvious way of summarizing a disparate and complex literature.[43] But let me try.

Essentially there are three ways in which an actor is persuaded. First, s/he can engage in a high intensity process of cognition, reflection, and argument about the content of new information (what Bar-Tal and Saxe call cognitive capacity).[44] Also known by some as the "central route" to persuasion, the actor weighs evidence, puzzles through "counterattitudinal" arguments, and comes to conclusions different from those h/she began with. That is the "merits" of the argument are persuasive, *given* internalized standards for evaluating truth claims. Arguments are more persuasive and more likely to affect behavior when they are considered systematically and, thus, linked to other attitudes and schema in a complex network of causal connections and cognitive cues.[45] This process of cognition, linking one set of attitudes to another, is more likely to occur when the environment cues and allows for the actor to consider these connections. That is, it is less likely to be spontaneous than it is promoted.

Thus the probability of some change in attitudes through cognition increases in an iterated, cognition-rich environment (where there is lots of new information that cues linkages to other attitudes and interests). As a general rule the probability goes down if the initial attitudes are already linked to a larger, internally consistent "network of supportive beliefs," particularly if these beliefs are about potential enemies and other high-threat outgroups. In small, but high affect in-groups, the content and volume of new information is likely to favor the existing dominant preferences of the group. Thus, even if the actorgives rational consideration to the available information, s/he is more likely to support the groups' conclusions if s/he is from outside the group.[46]

This relates to a second route to persuasion. An actor is persuaded because of her/his affect relationship to the persuader: Sometimes called the "peripheral" route to persuasion, here the persuadee looks for cues about the nature of this relationship to judge the legitimacy of counterattitudinal arguments. Thus information from in-groups is more convincing than that from outgroups. Information from culturally recognized authorities (e.g. scientists, doctors, religious leaders) is more convincing than that from less authoritative sources. This will be especially true for novices who have little information about an issue on which to rely for guidance.[47] Information from sources that are "liked" is more convincing than that from sources that are disliked. Liking will increase with more exposure, contact, and familiarity. The desire for social proofing means that information accepted through consensus or supermajority in a valued group will be more convincing than if the group were divided about how to interpret the message.[48]

Third the persuasiveness of a message may be a function of characteristics of the persuadee her/himself. This can refer to a range of variables from cognitive processing abilities, to the strength of existing attitudes (usually these are stronger if developed through personal experience than if based on hearsay or indirect experience, for example), to what appears to be an deeply internalized desire to avoid appearing inconsistent, to the degree of independence an agent might have in relation to a principal. Thus, for example, an attitude associated with an explicit behavioral commitment made earlier will be more resistant to change later because actors experience discomfort at being viewed as hypocritical and inconsistent. Conversely, a new set of attitudes will be more persuasive if associated with a new, high-profile behavioral commitment.[49] Thus a focus on the characteristics of the persuadee means looking at the individual features that can either retard or propel persuasion. All this means is that actors entering a social interaction bring with them particular prior traits that, interacting with the features of the social environment and other actors, leads to variation in the degree of attitudinal change.[50]

Obviously persuasion in the end is a combination of all three processes above and it is hard to run controls that might isolate the effects of any one process. People are more likely to think hard and favorably about a proposition, for instance, when it comes from a high affect source, in part because affect helps kick in cognitive processes that include resistances to information from other sources.[51] On the other hand, one can identify ideal combinations that could, in principle be tested. Given these processes, then, there are certain kinds of social environments that ought to be especially conducive to persuasion.

- when the actor is highly cognitively motivated to analyze counterattitudinal information (e.g. a very novel or potentially threatening environment);
- when the persuader is a highly authoritative member of a small, intimate, high affect in-group to which the also persuadee belongs or wants to belong
- when the actor has few prior, ingrained attitudes that are inconsistent with the counterattitudinal message,
- when the agent is relatively autonomous from principal (e.g. when issue is technical or issue is ignored by principal).[52]

TESTING FOR SOCIALIZATION EFFECTS: RESEARCH DESIGN ISSUES

For the most part, when IR specialists or sociological institutionalists look for the effects of socialization the unit of analysis has tended to be the state—or

state elites in a fairly aggregated way.[53] This presents obvious problems when examining particular institutions as social environments since states as unitary actors don't participate in institutions; rather, state agents do, e.g. diplomats, decisionmakers, analysts, policy specialists, as well as nongovernmental agents of state principals. Secondly, it presents problems when applying the most-developed literature on socialization typically found in social psychology, sociology, communications theory, and even political socialization theory. Most of this literature examines the effects of socialization on individuals or small groups. Thirdly, a constructivist ontology, in a sense, allows (even demands) that the unit of socialization be the individual or small group. As Cederman points out, constructivism's ontology can best be captured by the notion of complex adaptive systems whereby social structures and agent characteristics are mutually constitutive, or locked in tight feedback loops, where small perturbations in the characteristics of agents interacting with each other can have large, nonlinear effects on social structures.[54] Thus it matters how individual agents or small groups are socialized because their impacts on larger emergent properties of the social environment can be quite dramatic.[55] Finally, constructivists have to deal with the choice theoretic critique that what is observed as the normatively motivated behavior of a group at one level may be the aggregation of the strategic behavior of many subactors comprising that group at a lower level.[56] There are good reasons, then, for studies of socialization to "go micro" and focus on the socialization of individuals, small groups and, in turn, the effects of these agents on the foreign policy processes of states.[57]

But if these are appropriate units of analysis why choose international institutions as the "agentic environments" of socialization? After all, state actors experience a myriad of socializing environments from bilateral interactions at the state level, to intrabureaucratic environments at the policy level, to training and work environments inside bureaucratic organizations themselves. Let me try to make the case. One of the critical claims constructivists make is that "anarchy is what states make of it." In other words, material power structures do not determine state interests or practices, and thus the practice of realpolitik by unitary rational actors is not an immutable "fact" of international politics. In order to make this case, constructivists and their fellow-travelers have, for the most part, underscored the empirical "deviations" from realist or material power-interests theories (such as weapons taboos, "autistic" military doctrines, and cultural limits on the conduct of war, 1996), etc.[58] These have been important cases that have chipped away at the realist edifice. But the durability of constructivism depends, I believe, on going beyond so-called deviant cases to look at cases and phenomena that realist theories claim they can explain; that is, constructivists are going to have to make the argument that realpolitik practice is a reflection of ideology and realpolitik norms.

If this is done, then by definition one has the conditions for a critical test.[59] In a critical test one spins out additional alternative but *competitive* propositions, predictions, and expectations from the two sets of explanations to see which additional set of empirical observations is confirmed or disconfirmed. One such additional empirical implication that could provide an important test of constructivist versus material realist explanations of realpolitik is as follows: if constructivists are right, realpolitik discourse and practice ought to be changeable, independent of material power distributions and "anarchy," when actors are exposed to or socialized in counter-realpolitik ideology. If materialist realist theories are right, realpolitik discourse is epiphenomenal to realpolitik practice and neither should change in the presence of counter-realpolitik ideology because for rational security seeking actors no counterrealpolitik argument about how to achieve security should be convincing or persuasive.

This is where international institutions come in. Constructivists suggest that international institutions in particular are often agents of counter-realpolitik socialization. They posit a link between the presence of particular normative structures embodied in institutions and the incorporation of these norms in behavior by the actor/agent at the unit-level. It is in institutions where the interaction of activists, so-called norm entrepreneurs, is most likely, and where social conformity pressures are most concentrated. Institutions often have corporate identities, traits, missions, normative cores, and official discourses[60] at odds with realpolitik axioms. So, for example, some arms control institutions expose actors to an ideology where multilateral transparency is normatively better than unilateral nontransparency; where disarming is better than arming as basis of security; where common security is better than unilateral security; and where evidence of the potential for cooperative, joint gains in security in the international system is greater than evidence that the environment is a fixed, conflictual one. All of these axioms and assumptions challenge the core assumptions of realpolitik ideology. So, if there is any counterattitudinal socialization going on, it ought to be happening in particular kinds of security institutions.[61]

Precisely because counter-realpolitik institutions may be critical environments for counter-realpolitik socialization, an easy case can be made for studying the ASEAN Way and the ARF in particular. As I will discuss, in *content* the ASEAN Way and the ARF embody a non-realpolitik ideology centered on the notion of common security (though, admittedly, in uneasy tensions with sovereignty-centric axioms as well). In *form*, the ARF's loose and informal features best fit the kind of institutional ideal type environment most conducive to persuasion as a socialization process. Moreover, crucial for testing the constructivist case, the ARF is, in part, aimed explicitly at socializing a large, deeply realpolitik actor, but one that is nonetheless as much as a novice to international institutional life as one can find among major powers—the PRC. I treat the PRC as a novice in the sense that China has moved more rapidly into interna-

FIGURE 3.2 China's IGO memberships as % of US, Indian and average world memberships. *Source*: *Yearbook of International Organizations* (2000/2001), Appendix 3: Table 3.

tional institutional life starting from a lower baseline of participation than any other major power or even most minor powers in perhaps this century. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate both the China's "laggard" participation profile and its rapid move into institutions in the 1990s.

On the ARF specifically, one senior Chinese analyst involved in the inte ragency process told me that prior to participation in the ARF China didn't know what its interests were on many regional security issues, having never had to do the research on things such as transparency, military observer CBMs, and preventive diplomacy.[62]

Together, a "novice" and hard-realpolitik state(s) is ideal for testing for socialization since this is precisely the kind of state where the effects of socialization (if there are any) are easiest to observe. If constructivists are right, any prosocial or cooperative behavior that emerges from China's involvement in the ARF should be a function either of changes in a preference for multilateralist outcomes (in which case there should be a convergence in the security ideology that Chinese decisionmakers take to the ARF and that promoted by the institution itself). Those substate actors most directly exposed to this ideology should be the strongest proponents of it.[63] If materialist realist theories are right, there should be no socialization effects of a non-realpolitik kind on the PRC. Indeed, China's suspicions about entrapment in multilateral security commitments should not change. At best, all relevant actors in China should see the ARF as a tool for balancing against U.S. power. There should not be much internal debate on this score. If contractual institutionalist arguments are right, then prosocial or cooperative Chinese behavior should be either a product of exogenous incentives or disincentives constraining China from pursuing its prisoner's

FIGURE 3.3 China's Accessions to Multilateral Arms Control and Environmental Treaties as % of Eligible Accessions.

dilemma (or worse, deadlock) preferences, or perhaps new information that re-assures a PD or deadlock China that it cannot be exploited or entrapped in the ARF (e.g. that participation is essentially costless).

Note, however, that treating institutions as social environments means posit-ing that different social environments vary in terms of their persuasiveness. This means asking how institutions as social environments vary in ways conducive to socialization. We need, then, a typology of institutional forms or institutional so-cial environments. Unfortunately, we don't have one. One could imagine, though, at least several dimensions for coding institutions as social environ-ments. Here I am borrowing and expanding on the typology of domestic institu-tions developed by Rogowski:[64]

1. membership: e.g. small and exclusive or large and inclusive
2. franchise: e.g. where the authoritativeness of members is equally allo-cated, or unevenly (though legitimately) allocated
3. decision rules: e.g. unanimity, consensus, majority, supermajority
4. mandate: e.g. to provide information, to deliberate and resolve, to ne-gotiate and legislate
5. autonomy of agents from principals: low through high.

Different institutional designs (combinations of measures on these five di-mensions) would thus create different kinds of social environments, leading to differences in the likelihood and degree of persuasion. For instance, per-suasion is likely to be the most prevalent and powerful socialization process when membership is small (social liking, in-group identity effects on persua-siveness of counterattitudinal message); when franchise recognizes the spe-

cial authoritativeness of a couple of actors (authoritativeness of messenger); when decision rules are based on consensus (requires deliberation–cognition effects); when the institution's mandate is deliberative (requires cognition, agents may be more autonomous since there is no obvious distribution of benefits at stake so there is less pressure to represent principal); and when autonomy of agents is high, e.g. when the issue is a narrow technical one or when the principal just doesn't care much (when the principal is less attentive or relevant).[65]

But how would one know if persuasion had led to prosocial/pronormative behavior in international institutions? First, as I noted above, one would have to show that social environments in institutions are conducive to persuasion. Second, one would have to show that after exposure to or involvement in a new social environment, attitudes or arguments for participation have indeed changed, converging with the normative/causal arguments that predominate in a particular social environment. Third one would have to show that behavior had changed in ways consistent with prior attitudinal change. Finally, one would have to show that material side payment or threats were not present, nor were they part of the decision to conform to prosocial norms.

Together, these design issues suggest a set of empirical referents. Assuming an actor enters the institution and its particular social environment with realpolitik preferences and causal and principled beliefs, and assuming the institution embodies causal and principled beliefs that are generally inconsistent with realpolitik ones, if persuasion is at work, one should expect to see (after exposure to this environment): arguments about participation should include declining concern about detrimental effects of participation on relative capabilities and security; heightened concern about beneficial effects for global, regional and national security; and conformist behavior later in the process that could not be expected earlier on. In short, you should get increasing "comfort" levels even as the process becomes more intrusive. Unfortunately, there simply is not enough variation in security institutions in the Asia-Pacific at the moment to systematically test for the socialization effects of variation in institutional social environments.[66] Thus, as a test for the "plausibility" of the persuasion, I will look at an institution that ought to be highly conducive to counter-realpolitik persuasion (ARF), and examine what socialization effects, if any, it has had on a relatively novice realpolitik state (China). This constitutes, interestingly enough, both a most likely AND a least likely test of socialization. It is a most likely test because conditions are ideal for determining and isolating the independent effects of socialization (in this case persuasion, the "purest" form of socialization). It is a least likely test as well because China's long-time hard realpolitik, unilateralist approach to regional security would seem to be least susceptible to change.

THE ARF AS A COUNTER-REALPOLITIK INSTITUTION

The first thing is to establish is that the ASEAN Way as embodied in the ARF does indeed constitute a counter-realpolitik ideology that is, in some sense, "diffusable." Acharya identifies at least four key elements of this ideology: open regionalism, soft-regionalism, flexible consensus, cooperative/common security. The first three refer to the "structure" and form of the ARF, a variable that matters when discussing whether the ARF creates conditions conducive to persuasion (and perhaps social influence). I will come back to these features in a moment. Cooperative and/or common security, however, is the normative core of the ARF.[67] First enunciated by the Palme Commission for Europe in the early 1980s, the concept embodies a number of principles: the nonlegitimacy of military force for resolving disputes, security through reassurance rather than unilateral military superiority, nonprovocative defense, transparency. Behavior that is reassuring rather than threatening should be the rule, such that the ARF can "develop a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia-Pacific region."[68]

The security philosophy here implicitly assumes states are essentially status quo (or can be socialized to accept the status quo) and as such it is both normatively and empirically "true" that reassurance behavior is a better route to security than traditional realpolitik strategies. Security is positive sum. As such, traditional axioms like "if you want peace, prepare for war" are outmoded or counterproductive.[69] To this end, the normatively appropriate and empirically effective means for achieving security involve the building of trust through confidence-building measures, and the diffusion of security problems through preventive diplomacy and conflict management. This is not to say that all members of the ARF, even the strongest backers of the institution, behave in ways perfectly consistent with the injunctive norms. The point is that these are the articulated, and formal, if sometimes implicit, "theories" of security that are supposed to serve as the basis of "habits of cooperation."

For a social environment to have a socializing effect, obviously an actor has to be a participant. The ARF is explicitly designed to be maximally attractive to states. The principles of open regionalism, soft-regionalism, and flexible consensus are critical in this regard. Together they reflect the nondiscriminatory goals of the ARF. While there are evolving rules for participation, the principle of open regionalism means the institution should be as inclusive as possible, combining multilateralist activists and skeptics such that there is no aggrieved actor left out to undermine the efficacy or legitimacy of the institution.[70]

Moreover, the institution should be as attractive to states as possible (in this case, China). Soft-regionalism, therefore, emphasizes the informality, nonintrusiveness of the institution, and explicitly endorses the codes of conduct in the

ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which emphasizes sovereignty-preserving principles such as the noninterference in the internal affairs of states, respect for territorial integrity, the right to chose domestic social systems, etc.[71]

At first glance this would appear to be inconsistent with counter-realpolitik socialization. I don't think there is any easy way of squaring this circle. What this principle does do, however, is send reassurance signals toreassure participants that the institution will not undermine basic interests, that it will not be used by powerful states to exploit or influence less powerful or influence ones. That is, it makes the institution attractive, or at least nonthreatening from the perspective of the most skeptical potential participant.[72]

Flexible consensus ensures not only that the institution doesn't move far ahead of the interests of the most skeptical state but also that the most skeptical state cannot veto its evolution. Consensus decisionmaking is a logical mechanism for reassuring member states that the institution will not threaten sovereignty or national unity. The rule was expressly written into the Chair's Statement summarizing the consensus at the Second ARF meeting in Brunei in 1995: "Decisions of the ARF shall be made through consensus after careful and extensive consultations among all participants."[73]

Consensus decisionmaking might appear to be a suboptimal decision making rule for a diverse group of actors: while it is more efficient than a unanimity rule, there is always the risk that individual actors can acquire informal veto power.[74] Studies of consensus decisionmaking among political parties in Swiss canton governments suggest, however, that consensus rules are likely to reduce intergroup conflicts in systems with "strong subcultural segmentation"—e.g. diverse subgroups as in the ARF.[75] In addition, as Chigas et al. argue in their analysis of consensus rules in the OSCE, consensus means all states have a greater stake in the implementation of decisions because they are collectively identified with a decision in ways that they would not be had they been defeated in an on-the-record vote over a particular course of action. Efforts to buck or shirk consensus decisions will generate more negative "peer pressure" than had clear opposition been registered through a vote.[76] Put differently, consensus rules make obstinacy costly in ways that up-and-down voting rules do not: obstinacy threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the entire institution because its effectiveness is premised on consensus. It portrays the obstinate actor as one whose behavior is fundamentally at odds with the purposes of the institution. "Principled stands" against efforts to declare consensus are viewed as less principled that had they been expressed in a losing vote. Moreover, a consensus decision reduces the risk of ending up on the losing side. Losing internationally can have domestic political costs. It could be harder to maintain a domestic consensus for an international institution if one appears to lose badly from time to time.[77]

The ARF's consensus decision rule was an attractive feature for China. Consensus ensures that China will not be on the losing side in any majoritarian voting system. This was probably important for those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handling ARF diplomacy: It would have been much harder to sell the benefits of the ARF in the policy process in Beijing if China's leaders had evidence that China was losing in recorded voting procedures.

A subcomponent of consensus decisionmaking rules in the ARF is a norm of avoiding particularly controversial issues that might end up preventing consensus. This is where Track II activities have been instrumental to the functioning of the ARF, both as a source of ideas and as a channel for defusing potentially volatile issues. These track II activities come in three forms: ARF-sponsored Track II meetings;[78] activities undertaken parallel to, or in support of, the ARF without the ARF's prior formal endorsement;[79] and the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, an umbrella organization created in 1993 of 13 national CSCAP committees. While it is not the only Track II process around, CSCAP is the largest and most organized, with national CSCAP committees collaborating in working groups on topics such as CBMs.[80]

Whether or not by design, the evolving relationship to Track II contributes to the ARF's stability and legitimacy as an institution for states in the region. Issues that are too controversial for Track I can be moved into Track II rather than being discarded entirely. This sustains the momentum behind issues that the ARF might otherwise be compelled to abandon at the Track I level. Given that many Track II participants are government officials who also participate in Track I activities,[81] an issue is never really not within Track I's sphere of attention. This means that states are more likely to get used to an issue being part of their interaction than if it were initially considered illegitimate. Track II can also "filter," or sanitize proposals that would otherwise be deemed more controversial by dint of who made them. *Who* makes a proposal can sometimes be more controversial than the *content* of the proposal itself.[82] But if proposals are "de-personalized" through the Track II consensus process, and then again through the ARF Chair's determination of consensus in the Track I level, much of the controversiality can be filtered out. Thus Track II can help define a Track I agenda that might not have otherwise appeared. As long as this myth of difference is not explicitly challenged, then the destabilizing effect of controversial issues is reduced. Chinese officials have stated openly that CSCAP's unofficial nature was a fiction because of the presence of so many government officials in their "personal capacities." Nonetheless the Chinese government has played along: In a statement of support for links to Track II, it noted, "Issues not discussed or needing further discussions because of disagreement" can be put into Track II fora.

The form of the ARF, then, exhibits some of the features of an institution that may be likely to create a social environment conducive to persuasion:

membership is relatively small (22 states) with some consistency over time in the participants at both the senior minister and functional specialists levels.[83] The decision rule is consensus; the mandate is deliberative and, partly as a result, this lowers the perception that highly threatening states can control the outcomes of the institution; and initially at least there was a certain amount of autonomy for China's representatives to the extent that the ARF was not central to Beijing's regional diplomacy, and the most likely repository of opponents, the PLA, was not fully involved in policymaking.[84]

We have, then, two key features of the ARF: a counter-realpolitik ideology and an institutional structure with features conducive, in part, to maximize opportunities to develop "habits of cooperation" in the absence of material threats and punishments. On top of this, the institution is seen explicitly by many of its participants as a tool for socializing China to accept the legitimacy of multilateralism, transparency and reassurance as a basis for security.[85]

Put differently, some participants in the regional security discourse see the ARF as a tool for increasing China's "comfort level" with multilateralism. Comfort level is another way of saying that an actor's utility level changes positively with changing levels of institutionalization. An actor has a particular distribution of utility associated with particular levels of institutionalization. Different actors may have different distributions of utility. Skeptics of multilateralism would have low values of utility at high levels of institutionalization. Committed multilateral activists would have high values of utility at high levels of institutionalization. Greater willingness to accept institutionalization would be indicated by an increase in an actor's utility whereby it comes to believe that the absence of an institution is a less valued than before and the presence of one becomes more valued than before.

The question is what might cause a shift in this comfort level, in this distribution of utility?

Mainstream institutionalist theory would probably focus on things such as reassurance (information underscores that fears of even small amounts of institutionalization are exaggerated) or the distributional effects of the institution (leading to change in domestic political balances of power). Socialization arguments would focus on persuasive arguments that more institutionalization is a "good" in and of itself, or on social backpatting and opprobrium effects that link the utility of involvement in the institution to the utility of social status and diffuse image.[86]

Here I want to focus on evidence for persuasion. Recall the required indicators of persuasion: that social environments in the institution are conducive to persuasion; that after exposure to or involvement in a new social environment, attitudes or arguments for participation converge with the normative/causal arguments that predominate in the social environment; that behavior had changed in ways consistent with prior attitudinal change; and that that material

side payment or threats were not present, nor were any part of the decision to conform to prosocial norms.

Having established that the institutional form of the ARF meets the criteria for an environment conducive for persuasion the question becomes whether attitudes or arguments in China have converged with the normative/causal arguments at the core of the ARF "ideology." Clearly, the public and internal discourse in China on multilateral security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific prior to China's entry into the ARF in 1994 was highly skeptical of their value. Indeed, in internal circulation (*neibu*) and open materials alike, the discourse stressed that bilateral relations, particularly among the great powers, were the basis of stability or instability in IR; that there was no urgent need to build multilateral security mechanisms, indeed that multilateralism was "largely irrelevant"; that such institutions would be dominated by the U.S. or Japan while China would be outnumbered, and sensitive bilateral disputes where China might have an advantage in bargaining power might be internationalized.[87] The skepticism of multilateralism was rooted in even deeper realpolitik assumptions about international relations where structurally (and sometimes ideologically) induced zero-sum competition among sovereign states necessitates unilateral security strategies.[88]

Since entering the ARF, however, there have been some noticeable changes in the discourse. Initial statements made to the ARF (e.g. Foreign Minister Ian Lichen's comments at the first ARF in 1994) stressed what can only be seen as traditional "rules of the road" for the management of relations among sovereign, autonomous states. These included the five principles of peaceful coexistence, economic ties on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, the peaceful settlement of disputes, adherence to the principle that military power should only be used for defensive purposes (Yuan 1996: 11). Terms, concepts, and phrases associated with common or cooperative security were absent.[89]

By late 1996, however, Chinese working level officials directly involved in ARF-related affairs began to articulate concepts that were, to a degree, in tension with traditional realpolitik arguments. Shu Chunlai (a former Ambassador to India, and a key figure in China's CSCAP committee) appears to have been China's first authoritative participant in ARF-related activities to have used the term "common security." In a paper originally presented at the ARF sponsored Paris workshop on preventive diplomacy (November 1996), Shi and a co-author Xu Jian noted that common security was central to the post-cold war need for a "renewal" of old security concepts. This renewal, they argued, entailed abandoning "old" concepts, "based on the dangerous game of balance of power." There was not much more on the subject, and paper went on to stress, somewhat in tension with common security, that preventive diplomacy should be handled strictly in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence.[90]

By early 1997, however, ARF-involved analysts and officials *unofficially* floated a better developed concept of "mutual security" at the first Canada-

China Multilateral Training Seminar (the seminar brought together a small number of key officials handling the ARF in the MOFA Asia Department, and a couple of analysts from China's intelligence institution (CICIR) who were also in the ARF "interagency" process. The term meant, according to one Chinese participant, that "for you to be secure, your neighbor had to be secure," a common security concept based on the notion of "win-win." It is possible the Chinese may have felt under pressure to develop an original Chinese contribution to the multilateral security discourse: "common security" was perhaps too closely identified the CSCE process, and thus might have been too provocative inside the Chinese policy process.

One of the participants in the seminar (a participant in interagency discussions on the ARF, and an analyst in CICIR) also submitted a paper in which he listed three types of security systems: hegemonic systems, alliance or military-bloc systems, and multilateral systems. The latter he called an "encouraging development," and noted that mutual security, like common security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security were traditionally unfamiliar concepts in China. But these were now "taking place in the minds of policymakers and scholars and in the actions of Chinese policies," though he didn't elaborate beyond this.[91]

Around the time of the seminar, another analyst involved in ARF-related work in a think tank attached to the State Council, Liu Xuecheng, wrote a paper on confidence building in the Asia-Pacific. The paper provided a sophisticated explanation of Western theories of CBMs, noting for example their military reassurance purposes. The author also elaborated a bit on "mutual security," noting that the concept was embodied in the April 1996 Five-Power (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) Treaty on CBMs.[92] (One of the Chinese participants at the Canada-China seminar in Toronto had also noted that mutual security had come from the Chinese discourse on the Five-Power Treaty.)

The invocation of the Five Power Treaty in this common-security influenced discourse on mutual security is important. The Treaty comes as close to a CSCE-type CBM agreement as anything in the Asia-Pacific region, with provisions for limits on the size and type of military maneuvers allowed within certain distances of borders, provisions for military observers and military exercises, etc.[93] In internal Chinese debates over multilateralism, whether or not one believed the principles of the treaty had broader applicability to the region was an indicator of sorts about one's skepticism toward multilateralism in general.[94] The initial idea for the treaty grew out of bilateral PRC-Soviet negotiations over the border in the early 1990s. The Soviets had introduced the idea of a formal CBM agreement, using the various conventional weapons CBMs that it had negotiated with Western Europe as a template. Initially, Chinese negotiators were unsure of the meaning of the terms the Soviets were bringing over from the European experience. The terminology had to be translated into Chinese with ex-

planation so that MoFA officials understood the implications of certain CBM terminology. Thus the Five Power Treaty emerged fairly directly from European CBM experiences tabled by the Soviets.[95]That those articulating the concept of mutual security would do so by invoking the Five-Power treaty as an example/precedent/exemplar suggests that the term signified an acceptance of more intrusive and formal security institutions. Indeed, the earliest analyses of the ARF tended to explicitly reject the CSCE as a model for the Asia-Pacific.[96]

Interestingly enough, in June of 1997 at the first CSCAP General Meeting, where China's national committee participated for the first time, China's representative, Chen Jian (Assistant Foreign Minister, and formally in charge of multilateral security issues at the MOFA), explicitly extolled the Five Power CBM treaty as contributing to confidence and security in the region. He did not mention "mutual security," however—nor indeed the term "new security concept."[97] This suggested that there was still probably some internal debate about the legitimacy of the concept and whether China should be formally and publicly associated with it. The term had not yet made it into the official policy discourse.

This changed by November 1997. The Chinese paper presented to the ARF Intersessional Support Group on CBMs in Brunei explicitly noted that the Five-Power Treaty embodied the notion of "mutual security" and could be used as a source of ideas for the rest of the Asia-Pacific. Mutual security was defined as an environment where the "security interests of one side should not undermine those of the other side . . . . This kind of security is a win-win rather than zero-sum game."[98] We shouldn't underestimate the significance of the incorporation of this loosely game-theoretic terminology in the Chinese discourse (and another "positive sum"—*zheng he*—used more recently by multilateralists in China)—terms borrowed, one assumes, from interactions with multilateralists in ARF-related activities. The origins are hard to pinpoint, but it doesn't seem to have been used prior to 1997: one of its earliest appearances was in comments that some Chinese participants made in the Canada-China seminar in January 1997. The term "win-win," of course, stands in distinct tension with traditional realpolitik notions of security and reflects core assumptions of common security.

Then in December 1997 at the Third CSCAP North Pacific Meeting, the Chinese delegate, Ambassador Shi Chunlai, developed the "new security concept" further, linking it to "mutual security" and, by implication, to common security: The concept, he argued, was "one that is not based on the cold war mentality featuring zero-sum game, but on mutual and equal security." Rather it meant "not creating winners and losers."[99] Both "the new security concept" and its component "mutual security" received the highest level endorsement when they were included in remarks by China's Foreign Minister Ian Qichen at the Private Sector's Salute to ASEAN's 30th Anniversary in December 1997.

Since then official Chinese commentary has pushed the discourse further to include rather bald attacks on realpolitik: An analysis broadcast by China Radio In-

ternational in late December argued, for instance, that the Five Power CBM treaty was a good example for the rest of the Asia-Pacific. It had authenticated "a new security concept completely different from the cold war cold war mentality and the traditional security concept, [']If you desire peace, you must prepare for war.['] This saying is a vivid description of the traditional security concept." The traditional realpolitik concepts included such ideas as maximizing military force so as to become stronger than one's opponent, a narrow focus on the security of the nation above all else and the resort to military means in the pursuit of security.[100]

This does not mean that by 1998 mutual security had becomebecame a fully developed concept, nor that it wholly replicated cooperative or common security concepts, nor that the Chinese leadership had converted and rejected realpolitik axioms. Far from it. But it does mean that regional security issues (outside of the Taiwan question) were discussed increasingly within the framework of multilateralism.

Nonetheless, there was still some concern about the underdeveloped nature of these new themes in discourse about regional security. Thus in 1998 MOFA's Asia Department, realizing that it required more sophisticated "theoretical" arguments to bolster and justify the mutual security discourse and policy, began to ask some prominent international relations specialists in government-run think tanks for new ideas about regional security. A number of these thinkers are people one might consider multilateralists and integrationists.[101]

Specifically, through the MoFA's Policy Research Office, the Department commissioned a study by a respected specialist in regional multilateralism from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.[102] The report, entitled "The Concept of Comprehensive Security and some theoretical thoughts about China and Asia-Pacific Security," and submitted to MOFA in December 1998, explicitly argued that military power and traditional territorial-based concepts of national security were no longer the most important issues in China's future security in the region. Rather, China faced an increasing array of nontraditional security problems that could not be solved through the augmentation of national military power alone, and thus should focus more energy on developing multilateral cooperative solutions to security problems, including greater activism in the ARF. The report noted—in recognition of security dilemma dynamics—that China's behavior on the ground was one reason for other states' worrying about China's rising power. To deal with this, the report argued, China had to signal that it basically accepted extant rules of international and regional order while trying to moderate these rules and norms through existing international institutions and procedures. In other words, China's rise was a potentially destabilizing element in international relations not only because of perceptions of Chinese power in the past, but also because China had to credibly signal that it was in essence a status quo power. The report explicitly borrowed arguments and concepts from Western, including Canadian, multilateralists and included an

appendix that introduced some of the multilateralist lexicon to its audience (e.g. integration theory, interdependence theory, democratic peace theory).[103] The arguments in the report were designed in part to assist the Asia Department and other multilateralists to make more sophisticated internal arguments in favor of greater participation in the ARF, e.g. to persuade others in the policy process, particularly in the PLA, of the value of multilateral diplomacy.[104]

The Chinese discourse on regional security multilateralism, then, has moved quite some distance from public skepticism to informal articulations of mutual security and common security to public affirmation of the concepts. Moreover, the concepts have been explicitly linked to a "real world" institutional exemplar of these principles, the five power CBM treaty, a document that is consistent with, indeed modeled in some ways off of, CSCE-style institutions.

The obvious question is: Is this all cheap talk? A realpolitik actor would have incentives to be deceptive: if one believed one operated in what could be called a prisoners" dilemma (PD) environment, then cooperative cheap talk could encourage others to cooperate, thus creating opportunities to acquire the "temptation" (C, D) payoff. This would, in principle, be especially attractive to an actor in an institution, such as the ARF, with little or no monitoring capacity (except for voluntary and nonstandardized "defense white papers") and no ability to punish defection. Many in the U.S. government view the mutual security discourse precisely as that: a deceptive effort to redirect attention from inconsistencies between Chinese security behavior (sharp increases in military expenditures, provocative military exercises, etc.) and the ideology of the institution, while trying to underscore the inconsistencies between U.S. bilateral alliance strategies in the region and the ideology of the institution.[105]

I am not convinced of the pure deceptiveness of this discourse, however. In principle there is a relatively easy test of this hypothesis. If it is right, then the strongest *proponents* of the mutual security discourse and the Five-Power Treaty as an exemplar agreement for the region should be the strongest *opponents* of U.S. bilateral alliances in the region. In addition, variations in Chinese efforts to undermine support for U.S. alliances (particularly with Japan), should track directly with variations in the strength and prominence of the mutual security discourse. On both these tests the instrumental or deception hypothesis comes up short. A careful tracking of the discourse, as I have tried to do above, suggests that the strongest proponents are precisely those who in private interactions with diplomats and scholars indicate a deeper commitment to multilateralism—multilateral functional specialists in the MOFA and somewhat more "pro-American" voices in the strategic analysis community. While these people are generally opposed to the expansion of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, and would like to use multilateral diplomacy to pressure the U.S. to limit the scope of its military cooperation with Japan, they also recognize the alliance is a reality and may indeed constrain Japanese remilitarization.[106]

My sense is that those who are less enamored with the mutual security discourse are be found mostly in the military: It is in the PLA where some of the strongest skeptics of the U.S.-Japan alliance are found. One could also imagine that the PLA should be troubled by the anti-realpolitik content of "mutual security" and its use of a potentially militarily intrusive CBM treaty as a model for the region. Moreover the Chinese CBM proposals that were clearly biased against U.S. military power in the region (e.g. observers at joint military exercises, reductions in military reconnaissance activities aimed at ARF members, etc.) appeared first in 1995–1996, well before the "mutual security" concept emerged, and were promoted by the PLA, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[107]

My argument here rests, obviously, on the critical question of whether the mutual security discourse has, in some sense, been internalized among those working most closely in the ARF environment. The evidence that this may be the case is indirect at the moment.[108] But China's involvement in the ARF and related processes seems to have led to the emergence of a small group of policymakers with an emerging, if tension-ridden, normative commitment to multilateralism because it is "good" for Chinese and regional security. ARF policy in China was put in the hands of the Comprehensive Division of the Asia Department of the Foreign Ministry. The Division had perhaps as few as eight or ten overworked officers. A couple of these officers did the preparatory work for ARF meetings and Track II activities. Initially, in ARF activities the Chinese representatives were unaccustomed to the give and take of corridor debate and negotiation. They also came to the discussions with a watchful eye for developments that might impinge on sensitive security or domestic political issues. Over time, however, with experience in informal discussion, familiarity with the ARF norms of interaction, these officers have become much more engaged, relaxed, and flexible. Even Chinese ARF specialists have noted that the institutional culture of the ARF requires them to adjust the tone and tenor of their discourse. While in the UN where vigorous and legalistic defenses of specific positions in negotiations that are often viewed as close to zero-sum are often required, in the ARF there is more give and take, more spontaneous intervention to explain positions, and with some exceptions, an atmosphere that downplays "in your face" defenses of national positions.[109]

Most interesting has been their apparent endorsement, within limits, of multilateralism as being compatible with Chinese security interests. More than one foreign diplomat in Beijing, who has had interactions with these MFA officers extensively, havehas suggested that their agenda is to tie China gradually and innocuously into regional security institutions so that some day China's leaders will be bound by the institutions. They see ARF involvement as a process of educating their own government. The main conduit for the infusion of these sorts of ideas, into this group at least, has tended to be experience in Track I and II, not so much the absorption of academic literature on multilateralism.[110] It

seems this group's influence over Chinese ARF policy may be helped by further institutional change in China. In January 1998, the Asia Department set up a separate division just to handle ARF and Track II diplomacy.

There is some intriguing concrete evidence of the commitment these individuals have in protecting the policy from domestic political critics—hence an indication of their growing normative stake in the ARF. A senior Canadian official involved in ARF diplomacy reported that the Chinese delegates to ARF discussions apparently did not report back to Beijing any reference by other delegations to the CSCE as a possible model for the ARF. The CSCE is not just a symbol of a more intrusive, constraining regime; it is also a regime that deals with human rights.[111] Downplaying this information, then, was important to preserve support or acquiescence for further institutionalization of the ARF. Other Canadian diplomats have reported that sometimes the multilateralists in the MFA will help other states frame proposals for ARF-related activities in ways that will make these more acceptable in Beijing. While only anecdotal, this evidence suggests that over time the character of Chinese obstruction or resistance in its ARF diplomacy "on the ground" has shifted from protecting given Chinese "interests" only to protecting, in part, Chinese multilateral diplomacy from potential domestic opposition. When the ARF diplomats are under closer scrutiny from Beijing they have tended to be less conciliatory publicly. During the 1997 ISG on CBMs in Beijing, for instance, Canadian and American diplomats observed that the MOFA diplomats stuck to the proposal for observers at joint military exercises due, possibly, to the large presence of PLA observers in the meetings. The MOFA ARF diplomats had earlier suggested they might drop the position before the Beijing ISG because of the opposition of many ARF states, but apparently had decided against this in the face of the PLA first-hand scrutiny of China's ARF diplomacy in Beijing.[112]

Tentatively speaking, then, one could plausibly see a shift in China's ARF diplomacy to a diplomacy more empathetic with the institution and less empathetic with other PRC constituencies that may have different views of the value of multilateralism. Indeed, as one might expect, the creation of a specialist regional security institution inside the MoFA has also led to an emergent organizational interest in ARF diplomacy. As one MoFA interviewee implied, as the ARF agenda moves toward considering more formal arms-control like CBMs, the Asia Department has had to defend its prerogatives against the Arms Control and Disarmament Department, which handles most other multilateral security diplomacy for the MoFA.[113]

Even if the new "mutual security" discourse is not entirely cheap talk, is it irrelevant talk in the sense that it has little constraining effect on behavior? This question is central, of course, for showing whether or how socialization matters. But it is not central in showing that socialization occurs. Policy outcomes, like international social structures, should also be seen as products of the interaction

of multiple actors in bureaucratic social environments where persuasion, social influence, and mimicking, not to mention strategic behavior, may be at work. Indeed one needs to know far more about the highly secretive Chinese foreign policy process than I do now. But a couple of points are worth mentioning.

First, even though I am black boxing part of the policy process (the part where the newly socialized proto-multilateralists then interact with other constituencies and communities and their normative and causal arguments) suppose they have an influence substantially greater than zero, and that the concept of mutual security has enough normative substance such that policy behavior ought to reflect some of its elements. There ought, then, to be some observable empirical implications. First and foremost, one ought to see a greater degree of Chinese "comfort" with the ARF's more institutionalized features and intrusive agenda over time. That is, there ought to be things about the ARF that Chinese decisionmakers accept now that they either opposed, or one could plausibly "counterfactualize" should have opposed in 1993.

Concretely, China's changing comfort level has allowed the following changes in the ARF institution and agenda:

Institutional Structure: The major innovation occurred at the Second ARF in 1995. The ARF agreed to set up two kinds of working groups to undertake intersessional discussions that could not be handled in the annual day-long Foreign Minister's meeting. Canada and Australia had floated proposals at the First ARF in 1994 for Track I intersessional work, but these had been rejected at the time, primarily because of Chinese objections.[114] In 1995 the proposal was put on the ARF agenda again. This time, despite some Chinese grumbling over the terminology and temporal mandate (China objected to the term "working groups" and to an indefinite timeframe because both smacked of thicker institutionalization) the ARF created two intersessional meetings (ISM)—peacekeeping operations; and search and rescue—and one intersessional support group (ISG) on CBMs. Their initial mandate was only to meet once in 1996, and the Third ARF would then decide whether or not to extend their lives, but they have been renewed regularly since then.[115] In 1998, the ARF ISG on CBMs recommended that the ARF convene two meetings of the ISG in 1999, further "regularizing" what is supposed to be an ad hoc process.[116] The ISG and ISMs finally provided the ARF with a process for much more detailed investigation of solutions to security problems in the region. This allowed states with particular expertise and or interest to influence intersessional work (e.g. Canada and PKO) Most surprising to ARF participants, but consistent with the argument about China's increasing comfort levels, China offered at the 1996 ARF to co-chair an ISG on CBMs with the Philippines in March 1997. China is now part of the intersessional process in a way no one imagined possible in 1993.

Agenda: Here there have been a number of innovations that were either rejected in 1993 and 1994, or were viewed as too controversial. All of these reflect

some give by the Chinese. On nuclear testing, for example, despite its sensitivity to criticism on this score, the Chinese did not disrupt consensus when the 1995 and 1996 Chair's statements indirectly criticized both China (and France) for their nuclear testing programs.[117]

On preventive diplomacy (e.g. using the Chair's good offices to investigate or mediate disputes, sending ARF special representatives on fact finding missions, moral suasion, and third-party mediation) the PRC has traditionally been very uneasy with a more active ARF role because of the potential for "internationalization" of core security issues.[118] Nonetheless, the ARF formally took up the issue at its Track II working group on preventive diplomacy in November 1996 in Paris. Indeed, the explicit mandate of the Paris working group was to propose a list of relevant preventive diplomacy CBMs for the agenda of the ISG co-hosted by China March 1997. At the time, the main concrete recommendation to come out of the meeting was a proposal to expand the told of the ARF Chair's "good offices."[119] In April 1998 at another ARF Track II working group on PD the group agreed to recommend to the ARF SOM an "enhanced role for the ARF chair or other third parties in providing good offices in certain circumstances," a slight expansion of whose good offices might be called upon in PD activity. Interestingly enough, China's own experience with border CBMs with the Indians and Russians was suggested as possibly relevant for PD in the rest of the region.[120] These CBMs were, on paper at least, "contractual," CSCE-like agreements placing specific limits on the size and movement of military forces along borders.

The issue moved from Track II to Track I at the Sixth Senior Official Meeting in May 1999 where it was agreed that at the CBM ISGs in 2000 the question of the ARF Chair's good offices should be discussed in more detail. A draft paper on PD, prepared by Singapore, was circulated in November 1999 prior to the ISG on CBMs in Singapore in April 2000. The paper on PD outlined the principles and scope of the concept (see ARF 1999). The Singapore meeting authorized more explicit focus on an enhanced role for the Chair and for "Experts/Eminent Persons" (EEP). Papers on these two topics, presented by Japan and Korea respectively, were placed on the table later in 2000.[121] This finally initiated a detailed, Track I debate in the ARF over PD.

The Chinese position has evolved from opposition to PD to a more active, though wary diplomacy. The Chinese delegation officially contributed a working paper on PD in February 2000, prior to the Singapore ISG, in which it staked out key principles. These stressed that the ARF was a forum, not a mechanism "for dissolving specific conflicts."[122] Preventive diplomacy should use peaceful diplomatic means (by implication eschewing military operations such as PKO) to prevent armed conflict and only with the consent of all the parties directly involved. Any PD should also be based on mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, and extant inter-

national law. On the basis of this paper, the Chinese suggested changes to the Singapore PD paper that would have, by and large, incorporated substantial portions directly from the Chinese working paper.

Some of these suggestions made their way into a revised Singapore paper in April 2000. Some of these changes were minor deletions of language. One however enshrined the principles of the UN Charter, the FFPC, and the ASEAN TAC in one of the eight principles of PD, giving the PD paper a stronger emphasis on upholding sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. China (and other states) also beat back a Canadian effort to dilute this principle with language on respecting human rights and the rule of law. Not all of the Chinese suggestions were incorporated, in particular a proposal to delete language that, in its view, might allow PD in cases of bilateral disputes that had the potential of spreading to other states.[123]

The PD issue is, as of this writing, at a stage where states are agreeing to disagree about some of the principles and modalities of PD. The revised Singapore paper was accepted at an ISG in Kuala Lumpur in April 2001, though as a 'snap shot' of the state of discussions on PD and with acknowledgment that substantial differences remained on virtually all of its components. The fact remains, however, the ARF appears still to be committed to developing a mechanism for more proactive dispute prevention. Chinese diplomacy on PD is no longer aimed at preventing this kind of evolution in the role of the ARF. Rather it has acquiesced to the notion of PD and instead has been essentially aimed at shielding the Taiwan issue and any of its own bilateral territorial disputes from ARF-based PD, and at strengthening language on sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs.[124] The fact that the ARF took up these issues and is moving the discussion slowly forward, despite Chinese concerns suggests, again, a changing degree of Chinese comfort with the evolving agenda.[125]

On the South China Sea question, China's leaders' long-time preference has been for bilateral discussions with other claimants. They have worried that in multilateral settings China would be out-voted, its bargaining power diluted, leading to the dilution of China's sovereignty claims or, worse, the carving up of China's claims. They have tried assiduously in the past to prevent what they call the "internationalization" of the issue. It was considered a major conceptual breakthrough, then, when the SCS was put on the Second ARF agenda in 1995. Even though internal reports indicated continuing fears of multilateral approaches to resolving the issue, the Chinese delegation did not object to the Chair's declaration of consensus.[126] Nor was China willing (or able) to prevent the Statement from pointedly encouraging all claimants to reaffirm their commitment to ASEAN's 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea, this after China's construction of as small naval post on the disputed Mischief Reef in February 1995. The Third ARF Chair's Statement again touched on the SCS issue—this time welcoming China for its commitment in 1995 to resolve SCS

disputes according to international law, but also pointedly commending the Indonesian workshop on the South China Sea for its work on conflict management issues.[127] The workshop was set up in 1992 and is funded by Canada. The Chinese had been unhappy with this and had tried to pressure the Canadians to stop funding. By the Third ARF, apparently, China didn't believe it was necessary to oppose consensus on this issue.

Over time, Chinese civilian analysts have apparently concluded that any hope of establishing control over all the South China Sea islands and surrounding water is for the foreseeable future fairly dim. Even internal analyses suggest that the exclusive use of military power to assert China's claims will probably be counterproductive and that negotiations are the only realistic solution.[128] But they also recognize that the absence of a viable military option has put China in a very difficult spot since it is unlikely that diplomacy alone will convince other states to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty. In the face of this dilemma, China has quietly scaled down its claims, recognizing that any diplomatic formula will probably require the sacrifice of some portion of extant claims. The issue is, according to which principle should territorial claims be pushed and along which part of the periphery. A continental shelf claim that advantages China in one area may not be as advantageous as a mid-line claim in another. In 1995 at the ARF meeting the PRC announced it would settle disputes on the basis of the rules in the UNCLOS. Internally, Chinese decisionmakers realized that in the face of ASEAN opposition, it did China little diplomatic good to refuse to stick to expansive historical claims as the sole basis for negotiation even though under UNCLOS provisions China would probably have to concede territorial claims to the Vietnamese.[129] China also dropped the claim to Indonesia's Natuna Islands.[130]

I am not suggesting that persuasion inside regional security institutions is the sole explanations for these changes in Chinese diplomacy. Indeed, the basic diplomacy of image in the eyes of ASEAN countries played a critical role. But some of the proto-multilateralists involved in regional security policy have supported these arguments. Some have even remarked that involvement in the ARF has reduced the likelihood of China's resort to force over disputes in the South China Sea because there are now more diplomatic, read multilateral, tools at China's disposal.[131]

Finally, on CBMs, China was traditionally skeptical about their value to the extent these are deemed asymmetrically intrusive. Weak states, like China, it claimed, should rightfully be less transparent than strong states like the U.S. In addition, China has criticized the notion that one can transplant CSCE-type CBMs to the Asia-Pacific. The First ARF was relatively silent on CBMs. However, by the Second ARF, under Brunei's leadership, the ARF had endorsed the ARF Concept Paper that laid out a timetable for implementing a wide variety of CBMs. These, all voluntary, would be taken from the Annex A list. Among

them were: statements on security perceptions and defense policies; enhanced military-to-military exchanges; observers at military exercises; promotion of the principles of the ASEAN TAC and the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea; exchanges of information on PKO activities. At the ISG on CBMs in January 1996, states presented Defense White Papers and statements about security perceptions. But no comments on or criticisms of the content were permitted. There were complaints outside the ARF that the Chinese presentation—a White Paper on Arms Control—was not especially detailed or credible. China followed up in 1998 with a more detailed and sophisticated White Paper on Defense, modeled more or less on the Japanese and British White Papers.[132]

By the Third ARF, with the results in from the ISG on CBMs, the list of CBMs recommended in the Chair's Statement lengthened and deepened. While Defense White Papers and statements on security policies were still voluntary there were hints of an emerging template.[133] "Such papers could also cover defense contacts and exchange programs undertaken by participants." The Statement also hinted that, unlike in the ISG, the content of these papers would also no longer be off-limits to discussion. "Exchanges of views on the information provided in such statements and papers should be encouraged in future ARF dialogues." On military observers at exercises and prior notification of military exercises, the Statement noted that states were encouraged to exchange information about their ongoing observer and prior notification activities "with a view to discussing the possibilities of such measures in selected exercises."[134] The March 1997 ISG on CBMs co-chaired by China and the Philippines pushed this further. The agenda for the meeting called for reaching consensus on the invitation of observers to joint military exercises and the prior notification of joint military exercises.[135] Interestingly, while ASEAN and China tend to decry the validity of a CSCE template for the Asia-Pacific, the CBMs that are now either on the table in the ARF ISG or endorsed in the ARF Concept Paper Annex B (or embodied in the 5 Power Treaty), are not much different in kind from the first generation of CBMs under the CSCE.[136]

By the end of the decade China had proposed or hosted a number of CBMs ranging from the fourth meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges, to a seminar on Defense Conversion Cooperation, to exchanges on military law, to military exchanges on environmental protection.[137] The character of these proposals still reflected an impulse toward unilateralism—that is they were all proposed by China without coordination with other states or without asking other states to co-chair or co-organize. Moreover, some proposals have been frustratingly vague. For instance, in 1997 China proposed that a maritime information center be set up in Tianjin to provide the region with information about climate, ocean conditions, etc. Other delegates had a hard time trying to elicit more specific details about how such a center might be run, how the information might be disseminated (smaller states might be reluctant to rely on information con-

trolled or provided by a great power in the region).[138] In addition, some of the CBM proposals are transparently self-serving, such as the previously discussed CBM on joint military exercises or a proposal for states to cease surveillance operations against each other. But the fact remains that this activity, as constrained as it is, is not viewed as especially duplicitous by most ARF states, and is considered a welcome indication of a growing Chinese sophistication and nuanced commitment to multilateral measures.

Thus change over time in the ARF is a result, in part, of the social effects of its initial form and function on one of the key actors in the institution. The mutual evolution between social environment and actor interests, understandings, and behavior is precisely what, according to constructivism, we should expect to see.

None of this means that China doesn't ever get its way. Clearly, despite the changes, the institutionalization, and agenda of the ARF, it is not moving as fast as some countries would like. But often the recalcitrant parties are not just the Chinese. Moreover, often the limits to Chinese comfort levels tend to show up in the language adopted, rather than in the concrete content of discussions. While preventive diplomacy is on the agenda, the Chinese have been reluctant to support conflict resolution roles for the ARF. The 1995 ARF Concept Paper had divided the timeline for ARF development into three phases: CBM phase, development of preventive diplomacy phase, and a phase for the development of conflict resolution mechanisms. When the Second ARF Chair's Statement endorsed the Concept Paper, however, "conflict resolution" was changed to "the elaboration of approaches to conflict." The Chinese had objected to "conflict resolution mechanisms" because the term implied giving the ARF a mandate to intervene in conflicts that the Chinese might want to keep bilateral.[139] The slow pace of discussion on preventive diplomacy is, in part, a function of China's worries about its application to bilateral disputes, or conflicts it considers to be internal (e.g. Taiwan, ethnic separatism), though it has to be said that China is not alone in stressing the importance of the principle of sovereignty and independence in the application of PD mechanisms.[140]

The second general point is that the "mutual security" discourse developed through involvement in the ARF and related activities may become even more constraining over time. Borrowing and modifying normative concepts are not cost-free. Alternative normative discourses can affect actors' behavior in at least three ways. First they can underscore a widening gap between discourse and practice.[141] Subjective pressure due to a perceived gap between one's new identity, as embodied in the new discourse on the one hand and identity violating practices on the other, can lead to practices that are more consistent with the new identity (as consistency theory would suggest). Intersubjective pressure due to opprobrium generated when the new pro-group, pro-social discourse is obviously in tension with behavior can also lead to pro-group practices. In the Chi-

nese case, for China's proto-multilateralists, mutual security (at least its common security elements), the rejection of realpolitik *parabellum*, and holding the Five-Power Treaty up as an exemplar of these principals, puts China's behavioral violation of these principles in starker relief. This can have reputational costs in the contractual institutionalist sense, or legitimacy costs in domestic political processes, or social psychological costs in terms of self-legitimation, identity consistency, and status.

Second, new normative discourses can positively sanction behavior that otherwise is unallowed or not seriously considered. For example, before China could enter international economic institutions like the IMF and the World Bank in the early 1980s, it had to revise its long-standing Leninist thesis on the inevitability of war. Early attempts in the late 1970s to do so ran into resistance.[142] Why? Because revisions would mobilize resistance from "true believers," opponents of engagement with global capitalist institutions who could invoke Mao as legitimating their arguments. The "inevitability of war" discourse didn't mean China was actually preparing for an inevitable global war between socialism and capitalism or within capitalism, nor that Chinese leaders necessarily believed it was imminent. But one couldn't be a Maoist and not profess this view. Thus one couldn't reject Maoism in foreign policy without rejecting the discourse. To no longer be a Maoist, to delegitimate Maoism as an obstacle to moving into institutions, required adjustment of the discourse. Revision of the discourse didn't determine China's entry into IMF and World Bank, but it permitted it, allowed action, and delegitimized opposition on Maoist grounds. Similarly, mutual security and its Five-Power power treaty exemplar legitimates common security arguments internally, and permits proponents to operate, argue, and defend their policies in ways that were illegitimate prior to China's entry into the ARF. That is, new discourses can legitimize or empower those who have genuinely internalized these norms to act politically, thus changing interagency balances of power and foreign policy outcomes.

Third the logics and normative values embodied in discourse can constrain even those who use them instrumentally. They do so by narrowing the range of behavioral options that can be proposed or followed. It becomes harder for pro-realpolitik actors to advocate unilateralist noncooperative security strategies if these fall outside of the range of behaviors acceptable in a cooperative security discourse.[143]

This doesn't guarantee the discourse will win out over realpolitik, and it doesn't mean there aren't other considerations that go into the ARF policy process—diffuse image, rivalry with the U.S., the mimicking of unfamiliar but "standard" diplomatic practices, etc. Nor does it mean there aren't realpolitik actions designed to advantage China's relative security in some way while disadvantaging others. But it does suggest there is now one more, legitimate, rival set of arguments—normatively based on elements of common security and committing

China, perhaps unintended, to support more intrusive multilateral security that it would have opposed, indeed did oppose, prior to its entry into the ARF.

Common knowledge (or intersubjective social facts) comes from common language (or intersubjective social discourses).[144] Cooperative or common security are not value-free imports into the Chinese lexicon, to be used entirely instrumentally for purposes wholly different than those for which the terms were originally designed. Even the Sinified form of cooperative security—mutual security, with its residual elements of Westphalian rules for regulating interaction among autonomous sovereigns states—constrains how some Chinese decision-makers can now talk, and thus think, about multilateralism.

OBJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

There are at least four objections to these tentative findings about the socialization of some of those Chinese officials exposed to the ARF and its related processes. The first is that exogenous material side payments or threats may be responsible for China's more constructive, "comfortable" approach to the ARF. This objection is fairly easy to handle: the ARF has no capacity to put any such exogenous sanctions in place. Nor, as far as I am aware, have any other states unilaterally linked any such sanctions to China's participation. Indeed, the most likely sources of these side payments and sanctions—US foreign-policy makers—have themselves been ambivalent about the value of the ARF.

The second possibility is that changes in the nature of China's participation in the ARF reflect a deceptive effort to exploit cooperation from other states. One would expect this from a realpolitik actor with PD preferences. If this were all only deception, however, we would expect that as the ARF handles increasingly intrusive and sensitive issues that may impinge on core interests or relative power issues the PRC should dig in its heels in the face of any further change in the institution and agenda. In other words, the comfort level on the one hand, and the level of institutionalization and intrusiveness of the agenda on the other, should be negatively related. Yet, change in the ARF and change in comfort levels (at least of those participating in the ARF) are, to this point, positively related. That the ARF is already discussing the South China Sea in multilateral terms, intrusive CBMs, and moving, albeit slowly, toward preventive diplomacy mechanisms is evidence of this. Moreover, that there are Chinese (proto)multi-lateralists who are now holding up the Five Power CBM treaty as a potential model for East Asia suggests that PD preferences are no longer uniform across the agents in the Chinese policy process.

The third objection is that the Chinese multilateralism discourse in the ARF is deceptive because it is linked to an effort to constrain U.S. military power in the region. As I noted earlier, the problem with this argument is that there doesn't seem to be much of a relationship between the advocates of the multi-

lateralism discourse and the more hardline opponents of U.S. military power in the region. That hardliners are *now* using this discourse to challenge the legitimacy of U.S. bilateral alliances is evident. But the genesis of this discourse does not lie with them.

The fourth objection is that China's changing comfort level is, in fact, a function of new information about the benign nature of the ARF. Beliefs about, and hence strategies toward, the ARF have changed; but preferences have not. There are a number of related components to this argument: the ARF has proven to be largely irrelevant to core security interests; most of the other participants have used the ARF to send assurance signals that it will not become an institution that constraints Chinese relative power; thus, the Chinese have discovered over time that it is relatively costless to participate in the ARF. There has been no real change in China's realpolitik, PD preferences. At most, therefore, more cooperative behavior inside the ARF might serve short-term reputational purposes.

This last objection is the most serious and credible one. But I think it, too, has its problems. First, it is unlikely that a short-term concern for reputational benefits applicable to other specific opportunities for exchange was the driving force behind China's *continued* (as opposed to initial) participation in the ARF: No other states, particularly those who could provide the most concrete costs or benefits to China—the U.S. and Japan, for example—were linking ARF participation to other areas of cooperation such as trade. Indeed, the U.S. administration and Congress have been somewhat ambivalent about the value of the ARF. If the argument is that some more diffuse notion of reputation mattered—that some material cost may be incurred, or some material benefit may be acquired somewhere in the indeterminate future from some other player(s)—then the reputational argument becomes virtually unfalsifiable.

Second, the "new information" explanation is problematic because it underestimates the uncertain status of "new information." Information is interpreted, and the same information can be interpreted differently in the context of similar institutional rules and structures. Empirically we know that the same information will be interpreted differently depending on whether it comes from "people like us" (the information is more authoritative and persuasive) or comes from a devalued "other."[145] Economic transactions, for instance bargaining over price where people exchange information relating to their preferences and their "bottom line," vary dramatically depending on whether or not the parties are friends—friends offer higher payments and lower prices than strangers.[146] Social context is an important variable in how well information reduces uncertainty in a transaction, and in which direction this uncertainty is reduced (e.g. clarifying the other as a friend or adversary).

Thus, if all of China's ARF decisionmakers were realpolitik opportunists (that is, if they believed they were playing a prisoners dilemma game in some

form in East Asia) and if this basic worldview were fixed, then new information would be interpreted through these lenses. As I noted earlier, there is solid evidence from China's pronouncements and the interpretations of these by other states in the region that China initially looked upon multilateral institutions with a great deal of skepticism, and that its basic preferences were PD ones. It is probably true that the initial signals provided by a underinstitutionalized and nonintrusive ARF in 1994 could have been interpreted as nonthreatening by realpoliticians.[147] But as the ARF agenda and institution evolved, the signals should have been interpreted with increasing alarm by realpoliticians, since the trend lines were toward issues and procedures that could place some limits on relative military power. Yet, for a small group of China's ARF policymakers these signals were reinterpreted in less, not more, threatening ways. The fact that this group of policymakers eventually believed this information *was* reassuring while still expressing concern that others in the policy process (with more realpolitik views of multilateralism) might see this information as less reassuring, suggests that the information provided by the ARF has often not been unproblematically reassuring. Proto-multilateralists did not enter the ARF with this more sanguine interpretation of this "new information." Rather, this interpretation of the information came from socialization inside the ARF.

A focus on institutions as social environments raises interesting implications for institutional design. In general, contractual institutionalists argue that efficient institutional designs depend on the type of cooperation problem, e.g. a PD-type problem requires information (monitoring) and sanctions; an assurance problem primarily requires reassurance information (Martin 1993). The flip side is that one can identify inefficient institutional designs for a particular cooperation problems as well (e.g. an institution that is designed only to provide assurance information but has no monitoring or sanctioning capacity would be inefficient for resolving for PD-type problems). Additionally, Downs et al., argue that so-called transformational institutions (inclusive institutions that bring genuine cooperators and potential defectors together in an effort to instill norms and obligations in the latter) are less likely to provide efficient solutions than a strategic construction approach. This latter approach to institutional design stresses exclusive memberships of true believers where decisions are made on the basis of supermajority rules. The gradual inclusion of potential defectors under these conditions ensures that the preferences of the true believers predominate as the institution evolves. Their critique of the transformational approach rests explicitly on skepticism that the preferences of potential defectors can change through social interaction.[148]

It is not clear whether their skepticism derives from empirical evidence about the absence of state-level socialization, or simply on the methodological difficulties of assuming and then trying to observe preference change.[149] In any event, if one relaxes this assumption then one is compelled to revisit the con-

tractual institutionalists' notions of efficient institutional design. An institution that appears inefficient to contractual institutionalists (e.g. an assurance institution for a PD problem), may actually be efficient for the cooperation problem at hand. If, say, a player (or subactors in a policy process) with PD preferences can internalize stag hunt preferences through interaction in a social environment with no material sanctioning or side payments, then "assurance" institutions may work in PD-like cooperation problems. An efficient institution might then be reconceived as the *design* and *process* most likely to produce the most efficient environments for socializing actors in alternative definitions of interest. In the ARF case it is hard to imagine that the conclusions which China's proto-multilateralists came to about the role of multilateralism in improving China's security would have come from outside the institution or from experience in realpolitik environments.

ENDNOTES

1. Some of the ideas and evidence developed in this paper were first explored in a preliminary fashion in Alastair Iain Johnston, "The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum" in Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane and Celeste Wallander eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions in Time and Space* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999). Portions of the discussion about persuasion theory are reprinted from Johnston "Treating Institutions as Social Environments," in *International Studies Quarterly* 45(3) (December 2001) with permission of Blackwell Publishers.

2. Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: From the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way" *Pacific Review* 10 (1997): 3; Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (Oxford: Routledge Press, 2001).

3. Countless studies of cooperation in institutions refer to nonmaterial "international pressure" to explain why some recalcitrant states eventually cooperate, but it is remarkable how under-theorized this notion of "pressure" is in IR.

4. ARF "The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper" (1995).

5. Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia." in *International Security* 18(3) (Winter 1993/4); Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War." *International Security* 18 (4) (Winter 1993/4).

6. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in Interational Relations Theory" *World Politics* 50 (January 1998): 324–348; Checkel, "Forum Section: A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?" *European Union Politics* 2(2) (2001): 219–249

7. I am not treating institutions as agents of socialization *per se* the way that Finnemore does, for example. While the line between institutions as agents and as environments will often blur, it is important to keep the distinction clear conceptually so as to ensure that one can at least treat institutions as products of social *structures* produced by the interaction of agents. Otherwise, one ends up studying the interaction of agents with agents, rather than agents with agents inside structures. To the extent that

the social environment inside an institution embodies particular sets of norms that are to be diffused to agents, especially new members, one could talk about institutions having agentic properties.

8. This is particularly relevant when trying to explain how new states, "novices," decide on the policy content and institutional structure of their foreign policies, not an unimportant topic when looking at the effects of decolonization or the collapse of the Soviet empire.

9. See on socialization and its various aspects: Bambi B. Schieffelin and Elinor Ochs eds., *Language Socialization Across Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); John C. Turner, *Rediscovering the Social Group* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Rodney W. Napier and Matti K. Gershenfeld, *Groups: Theory and Experience* (4th ed.) (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987); Robert Cialdini, "Compliance Principles of Compliance Professionals: Psychologists of Necessity," in Mark P. Zanna et al, eds., *Social Influence: The Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology* (Lawrence, KS: Erlbaum Associates); Paul Allen Beck and M. Kent Jennings "Family Traditions, Political Periods, and the Development of Partisan Orientations" *Journal of Politics* 53(2) (August 1991): 742–763; Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Treaties* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Oran Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables" in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds, *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 160–194.

10. William Perry, "U.S. Strategy: Engage China, Not Contain," *Defense Issues* 10, no. 109 at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/s19951030-kaminski.html.

11. Samuel Berger, "A Foreign Policy Agenda for the Second Term," Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington, D.C. (March 27, 1997) at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/032797speech.html.

12. Stanley O. Roth, "U.S.-China Relations on the Eve of the Summit," World Economic Forum, Hong Kong, October 14, 1997 at http://www.state.gov/www /policy_remarks/971014_roth_china.html.

13. "The U.S. and China" *Diario Las Americas* Miami, Florida, July 5, 1998 at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980705.html. Emphasis mine.

14. As the hawkish critics of Clinton administration engagement claim. See for example Kagan (2000) and Kaplan (2001).

15. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 127–128. Classical realism seems torn between its impulse to essentialize the drive for power in a self-help world on the one hand and its sensitivity to historical contingency on the other. Morgenthau, for example, laments the disappearance of a time in European interstate relations when individual kings and absolute rulers with virtual automaticity heeded norms of behavior for fear of the social punishments from violation—e.g. shame, shunning, loss of prestige and status (Hans W. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1978), pp. 251–252). He even leaves open the possibility that definitions of power and interest are culturally contingent, implying at least that there is variation in how actors are socialized to conceptualize legitimate ways of pursuing legitimate interests (p. 9).

16. Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," in *International Security* 19(1) (Summer 1994): 72–107; Paul W. Schroeder (1994) "Historial Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in *International Security* 19(1): 108–148; Alistair Iain Johnston, "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy After the Cold War," in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 261–318.

17. See, for instance, the data in Tanisha M. Fazal "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm" (Paper prepared for the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, September, 2001).

18. As Wendt puts it, Waltz's use of socialization is surprising, given there is no social content to neorealism's concept of structure—it is the product of material power factors, *not* the product of the nonmaterial traits and characteristics (identities and preferences) of the interacting units. Thus socialization becomes convergence of behavior around balancing and relative gains concerns, not the convergence of actor attributes—e.g. identities, preferences and interests. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), ch. 3.

19. I am grateful to Celeste Wallander for pointing out to me some of the divisions over institutions and preferences in the contractualist camp.

20. Robert Frank, *Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions* (New York: Norton, 1988).

21. Jeffry Frieden, "Actors and Preferences in International Relations" in David Lake and Robert Powell eds., *Strategic Choice in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) pp. 39–76.

22. This seems to be a reasonable, cautionary argument for a sound methodological choice. It does reveal, however, an implicit disciplining move that constrains efforts to think about how preferences might change through new information acquired from social interaction inside an institution. There are a number of possible responses. First, theoretically deduced or assumed preferences are not so easily juxtaposed with "observed" preferences. Theories do not appear *deus ex machina*. They are almost invariably based on some initial inductive observation about a phenomenon. It is often not logically obvious what the preferences of actors ought to be from observing their position in society, their organizational constitution as actors—as both Kier and Legro point out about military culture. See Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military doctrine Between the Wars.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Jeffrey Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War Two* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). Theorizing about preferences, therefore, comes from a process of backing and forthing between initial empirical observations and theoretical hunches, and is itself subject to the same risks and measurement problems that the proponents of fixed preference analysis argue characterize attempts to observe preferences. Thus deducing preferences should not be a priori privileged as a "better" way of figuring out what actor preferences are. Second, the bias against observing preferences seems to exaggerate the difficulty of observing them. To be sure, validity and reliability of measures for "getting inside heads" of actors is problematic

since the only way to observe is to look at some phenomenon external to what's "inside heads," e.g. a speech act, a gesture, a decision. There is always the possibility that these external manifestations are in some sense strategic, not direct representations of preferences. But given the theoretical importance of the question—whether preferences change through social interaction, how stable the preferences are—it seems premature to give up trying to observe. The response should be, how do we reduce the measurement error to the lowest possible level and maximize the internal validity and reliability of indicators of preferences?

23. Robert O. Keohane "The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research Programme" in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 35. Abbott and Snidal try to meld rationalist and constructivist perspectives on the role and effect of formal international organizations, and touch on the possibility that IOs can help states "change their mutually constituted environment and, thus, themselves." Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1998): 3–32, at p. 25. But the bulk of the article focuses on the uses of IOs by states or on the roles IOs play in mediation, enforcement, and the provision of information. Despite the promising claim at the start to look at IOs as agents which "influence the interests, intersubjective understandings, and environments of states" (p. 9), but in the end the issue is essentially dropped.

24. The "conspicuousness" or "prominence" of some equilibrium outcome in a coordination game that turns it into a focal point can be a function of socialization in a shared "culture." James D. Morrow, *Game Theory for Political Scientists* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

25. Lisa L. Martin, "The Rational Choice State of Multilateralism" in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 91–121, see esp. p. 101. In more sociological terms, bargaining can entail a process of empathetic discovery of shared notions of prominence and conspicuousness about particular outcomes.

26. For a similar critique see Checkel "The Constructivist Turn," p. 335, and Thomas Risse, "Let's Talk" (Paper presented to American Political Science Associate Annual Conference, Washington DC, August 1997), p. 2.

27. Earlier examples of constructivist-influenced work tended to skip over the micro-conditions under which some norms were more persuasive than others. See John W. Meyer et al. "The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870–1990," *International Organization* 51(4) (Autumn 1997): 623–651 and Peter Haas "Constructing Multilateral Environmental Governance: the Evolution of Multilateral Environmental Governance since 1972" (Paper presented at Center For International Affairs, Harvard University, April 16, 1998), p. 26.. Haas posits that "interpersonal persuasion, communication, exchange and reflection"—socialization—occurs in thick institutional environments where epistemic communities are active, but there is no discussion of microprocesses of persuasion nor conditions under which variation in the effectiveness of persuasion—hence the completeness of socialization—might be observed. Keck and Sikkink go a long way in looking at the microprocesses by which

transnational activist networks "persuade," but international institutions as social environments per se is not the focus of their research. (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998]).Most recently, these lacunae are being filled by some very rich micro-focused research on socialization of new entrants into European institutions. See the work produced from the IDNET project, such as Jeffery Lewis, "Diplomacy in Europe's Polity: Socialization and the EU Permanent Representatives"; Alexandra Gheciu, "NATO, International Socialization and the Politics of State Crafting in Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe"; Jan Beyers and Caroline Steensels, "An exploration of some social mechanism affecting domestic political actors: Europeanisation: the Belgian case"; Jarle Trondal, "Why Europeanization Happens: The Transformative Power of EU Committees." (Papers Prepared for the IDNET second project workshop, "International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe," European University Institute, Florence, May 18–19, 2001.)

28. Similar questions are raised by Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn," p. 332 and Andrew Moravcsik "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51(4) (Autumn 1997): 539. There is a tendency to exaggerate the homogeneity of normative structures at the system level. Reus-Smit, for example, argues that "hegemonic beliefs about the moral purposes of the state" help explain the way in which sovereign states justify their behavior—the hegemony of these beliefs being a result of "communicative action" in action. While constructivsts will willingly argue that the beliefs which are hegemonic may change over time, there seems to be less analysis of cross-unit differences at any given point in time. There seems to be a slighting of the reality of contestation and reinterpretation of allegedly hegemonic norms, hence a lack of interest in variation in the degree of socialization at the unit level. See Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutive Structure of International Society and the Nation of Fundamental Institutions," *International Organization* 51(4) (Autumn 1997): 555–589. This is also a problem with the exclusively systemic focus on Alex Wendt's *Social Theory of International Relations.* For a recent effort to look at how precisely states resist normative "teaching" see Carlson's work on China's sovereignty discourse in the face of challenges from sovereignty perforating discourses in human rights, arms control verification, and humanitarian intervention Allen Carlson, "The Lock on China's Door: P.R.C. Foreign Policy and the Norm of State Sovereignty in the Reform Period" (Yale University, Department of Political Science, draft PhD dissertation, 1999).

29. Cites to Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*; Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practices: Introduction." In Risse and Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 1–38, and to Richard Price, "Reversing the Gunsights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines," *International Organization* 52(3) (Summer 1998): 613–644. (1998). See Johnston, "Treating Institutions as Social Environments" for an explication of the difference between persuasion and social influence.

30. In addition to social influence, another common microprocess is mimicking whereby actors copy pro-normative behavior as an efficient means ("best practice") of

adapting to an uncertain environment prior to any detailed ends-means calculation of the benefits of doing so. Mimicking is only loosely related to socialization since it is not an effect that is generated by the nature of the social environment. Rather it is a survival strategy for a particular social environment. It could come prior to or be seen as an outcome of persuasion and social influence. However, choosing which groups to mimic involves a degree of prior identification. Moreover, mimicking prosocial behavior can lead to internalization through repetition, or by establishing behavioral precedents that actors sensitive to status and image may be loathe to undermine. See Robert Frank, *Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 18; Bruce J. Biddle, "Social Influence, Self-Reference Identity Labels and Behavior," in *The Sociological Quarterly* 26 (2) (1985): 162; Elinor Ochs, "Introduction" in Bambi B. Schieffelin and Elinor Ochs eds. *Language Socialization Across Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986), pp. 2–3; R. B. Cialdini et al., "A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct" in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 24 (1991): 203–204.

31. Andreas Hasenclever, et al., "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," *Mershon International Studies Review* 40 Supplement 2 (October 1996): 213, emphasis mine; see also David Knocke, *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 3. For an excellent exegesis of Habermas' theory of communicative action see Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue: Communicative Action in World Politics. *International Organization*, 54 (2000): 1–39.

32. Michael C. Williams, "The Institutions of Security," *Conflict and Cooperation* 32(3) (1997): 287–307.

33. Sheldon Styker and Anne Statham, "Symbolic Interaction and Role Theory" in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., *Handbook of Social Psychology* Vol. 1 "Theory and Method" (New York, Random House, 1985) pp. 311–378 at p. 325. See also Ochs, "Introduction" to *Language Socialization*, p. 2.

34. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treaties in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 44.

35. Orit Ichilov, "Introduction" in Orit Ichilov ed., *Political Socialization, Citizenship Education and Democracy* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1990), pp. 1–8, at p. 1.

36. Cited in P. E. Freedman and A. Freedman "Political Learning" in S. Long, ed., *The Handbook of Political Behavior* (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), 1:255–303, at p. 258. See also Beck and Jennings, "Family Traditions," p. 743.

37. Risse, "Let's Talk," p. 16.

38. G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," in *International Organization* 44(3) (Summer 1990): 283–315, at pp. 289–290.

39. This raises a general research design question, namely, if socialization is to have a profound impact on state or substate actors, it should be most obvious in novices. Who are novices in IR? The obvious candidates are newly liberated or created states, or recently isolated states. This suggest where to look for "most likely cases" for the purposes of theory testing: e.g. China from 1980s on; newly decolonized states from 1950s on; newly independent states that emerged in wake of Soviet Union's collapse. These are states that quite literally have to set up foreign policy institutions, determine

what their foreign policy interests are on a range of novel issue areas, decide in which of a myriad social environments in IR they should participate (e.g. which institutions, which communities of states (middle power, major power, developed, developing) and which competitive and cooperative relations to foster etc. I will come back to this question of research design in a moment.

40. One should assume, however, that there should be degrees of internalization, given that not all actors are always exposed to exactly the same configuration of social pressures nor do they enter into a social interaction with exactly the same prior identifications. Thus, while pro-social behavior because of its "appropriateness" may be the ideal, at the opposite end of the spectrum should be pro-social behavior because of its material consequences (positive and negative). In between is pro-social behavior produced by positive and negative social sanctions (e.g. status rewards, self-esteem based identity-consistent behavior etc.). This latter process could be called second-order socialization process since status rewards can only be bestowed by a group with which an actor identifies as a relevant reference group or audience.

41. Brendon Gail Rule and Gay L. Bisanz, "Goals and Strategies of Persuasion: A Cognitive Schema for Understanding Social Events," in Mark P. Zanna, James M. Olson and C. Peter Herman, eds., *Social Influence: The Ontario Symposium* vol. 5 (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1987) pp. 185–206, at 192.

42. Berger, "Inscrutable Goals," p. 1.

43. See Philip G. Zimbardo and Michael R Leippe, *The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991), pp. 127–167. Despite the volume of this literature, "To date there is precious little evidence specifying who can be talked out of what beliefs, and under what conditions" (Berger "Inscrutable Goals," p. 8).

44. Daniel Bar-Tal and Leonard Saxe (1990) "Acquisition of Political Knowledge: A Social-Psychological Analysis," in Orit Ichilov, *Political Socialization, Citizenship Education and Democracy* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1990), p. 122.

45. Chenhuan Wu and David R. Shaffer, "Susceptibility to Persuasive Appeals as a Function of Source Credibility and Prior Experience with Attitudinal Object," in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52 (4) (1987): 687; Richard E. Petty et al., "Attitudes and Attitude Change," in *Annual Review of Psychology* 48 (1997): 609–647, at 616; Zimbardo and Leippe, *Psychology of Attitude Change*, pp. 192–197.

46. Rupert Brown *Group Processes: Dynamics Within and Between Groups* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 203.

47. Zimbardo and Leippe, *Psychology of Attitude Change*, p. 70.

48. Petty et al., "Attitudes and Attitude Change," pp. 612–629; James H. Kuklinski and Norman L. Hurley, "Its a Matter of Interpretation" in Diana C. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard Brody eds., *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966) pp. 125–144, at 129–131; Napien and Gershenfeld, *Groups, Thoery and Experience*, p. 159; Alice M. Isen, "Affect, Cognition and Social Behavior," *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 20 (1987): 203–253, esp. 206–211; Danny Axsom et al., "Audience Response Cues as a Heuristic Cue in Persuasion," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 53(1) (1987): 30–40, esp. 30–31. Using different language, Habermasian constructivists make a similar point: "trust in

the authenticity of a speaker is a precondition for the persuasiveness of a moral argument" (Risse, "Let's Talk," p. 16; see also Williams, "Institutions of Security, pp. 291–292).

49. Robert Cialdini, *Influence: The New Psychology of Modern Persuasion* (New York: Quill Books, 1984); Wu and Shaffer, "Susceptibility to Persuasive Appeals," p. 677.

50. Lupia and McCubbins argue that all of these conditions and characteristics are simply indicators of more basic conditions for persuasion, namely, that the persuadee believes the persuader to be knowledgeable about an issue and that his or her intentions are trustworthy (Arthur Lupia and Matthew D. McCubbins *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need To Know?* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998]). The more certain the persuadee is about these beliefs, the more likely the persuader will be persuasive. Both these characteristics can be a function either of familiarity and extensive interaction that, over time, reveals them, *or* of "external forces" that make it difficult or costly for the persuader to hide knowledge (or lack thereof) and trustworthiness (e.g. mechanisms for revealing knowledge, penalties for lying, costly actions that reveal the position of the persuader). Any other factors, such as ideology, identity, culture etc., are only predictors of persuasion to the extent that they reveal information to the persuadee about the persuader's knowledge and trustworthiness. Yet this misses the more interesting question about the empirical frequency with which social variables such as perceived ideology, identity, and/or cultural values are in fact the primary cues that people use to determine the degree of knowledge and trustworthiness of a persuader. That is, on average is perceived shared identity between persuadee and persuader more likely to be used by the persuadee as an authoritative measure of a persuader's knowledge and trustworthiness than other kinds of cues? The answer has important implications for how social interactions lead to socialization and how different institutional designs might lead to different socialization paths. Lupia and McCubbins tend to focus, as befits their interest in signaling games, on the role of external forces in clarifying beliefs about knowledge and trustworthiness of persuaders. Since, they argue, social and political environments are rarely ones where persuader and persuadee interact face to face over long periods of time, the familiarity/personal interaction route to beliefs about the persuader's knowledge and trustworthiness tends to be less common. This may be true at the national level of persuasion (e.g. political messages from politicians aimed at masses of voters), but it is not necessarily true at the level of social interaction in international institutions among diplomats, specialists, and analysts. Here the first route—familiarity, iterated face-to-face social interaction—may be more common, hence affect based on identity, culture, and ideology may be more critical for persuasion than external forces and costly signals. Institutions, therefore, that are "lite" in terms of these external forces, nonetheless may create conditions conducive to persuasion—and convergence around group norms—even though there are few material costs for the persuader to deceive and few material costs for the persuadee to defect from the group.

51. Jorgensen et al. found in a study of televised political debates in Denmark, for example, that the most persuasive debaters were those who used a small number of extended, weighty discussions of specific qualitative examples. The use of these specific, straightforward, and logical examples seemed to accentuate the authoritativeness of

the debater and were easier for viewers to assess and adjudicate. See Charlotte Jorgensen et al., "Rhetoric that Shifts Votes: An Exploratory Study of Persuasion in Issue-Oriented Public Debates." *Political Communication* 15 (1998): 283–299.

52. For a similar list see Checkel "Forum Section."

53. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 79–113; Meyer et al., "Structuring of a World Environmental Regime; Waltz, *Thoery of International Politics.*

54. Lars-Eric Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); see also Robert Axelrod, "Promoting Norms: An Evolutionary Approach to Norms" in Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 44–68.

55. This is, after all, the point of much of the work on how transnational networks affect state behavior (Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*; Mattjew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* [Ithaca: Cornell Univcrsity Press,1999]; Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," in *International Organization* 46[1] [Winter 1992]); "teaching" and the diffusion of norms and the creation of national interests (Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996]).

56. David A. Lake, and Robert Powell, "International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach" in Lake and Powell eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) pp. 3–38, at 33.

57. For the most part when I use "China" in this paper it is short-hand for the policy behavior taken officially in the name of the state. I am not, *repeat not*, claiming that the state called China is persuaded or socialized, or that all individuals in the policy process are persuaded by or socialized in the norms of the ARF.

58. Richard Price and Nina Tannewald, "Norms and Deterrrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos" in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 114–152; Kier, *Imagining War*; Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*; Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society.*

59. Parsimony as the tie-breaker is an illegitimate method for adjudicating between two competing explanations for the same phenomenon prior to a critical test.

60. For a discussion of organizations and their "goals" see Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin, "Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations," in *International Organization* 42(2) (Spring 1988): 245–273, esp. 247, 263–266.

61. Risse makes a similar point, suggesting that communicative action should be more frequent inside institutions than outside of them. Risse, "Let's Talk, p. 17. For one analysis of the ideology of a security institution that identifies causal and principled believes in the institution that are at odds with power maximization realpolitik see Muller 1993.

62. Interview with senior Chinese intelligence analyst involved in ARF policy process, Beijing July 1996.

63. Alternatively, cooperation should be result of concerns about diffuse reputation, or status as a responsible major player in a security environment increasingly characterized by multilateral security institutions.

64. Ronald Rogowski, "Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice," in David A. Lake and Robert Powell eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) pp. 115–136.

65. Here Risse and I are, I think, moving along parallel tracks. He notes, for instance, that nonhierarchical and network-like international institutions, "characterized by a height density of mostly informal interactions should allow for discursive and argumentative processes," Risse, "Let's Talk," p. 17. For a similar list of empirical expectations see Checkel, "Forum Section." Moravscik implies that because one can imagine "rationalist" arguments that make similar predictions these kinds of "mid-range" theory hypotheses developed by constructivism are somehow subsumed by rationalist approaches, or are at the very least theoretically undistinguishable from so-called rationalist predictions about persuasion. Andrew Moravcsik, "Forum Section: A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?" *European Union Politics* 2(2) (2001): 219–249. This is debatable on a number of grounds. First, even Lupia and McCubbins, the authors of the only systematic contractualist argument about persuasion, acknowledge that there may be different, more affective bases for persuasion in face-to-face interactions that are not captured by contractualist or "rationalist" microprocesses. Second, since the microprocesses in social psychological-derived hypotheses are different, the practical implications for the kinds of institutional designs most conducive to persuasion are meaningfully different. Finally, Moravscik misses the point of critical tests—namely they are set up precisely because two different sets of theoretical arguments make, in a specific instance, similar predications about behavior. The fact that two theories make similar predictions prior to a critical test means nothing about which theory is distinctively superior.

66. There are only two formal multilateral security institutions in East-Asia at the moment—the ASEAN Regional Forum (1994) and the 5-power CBM agreement (1996) The Korean Energy Development Organization might count as a third, since it is designed to eliminate the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

67. Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building"; *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia.* Some analysts differentiate between the two, but the differences are relatively minor and have to do with the issues that are considered security threatening (cooperative security uses a looser definition of security issues to embrace so-called nontraditional security—environment, social unrest etc). See Dewitt 1994).

68. Most of these principles are embodied in the ARF Concept Paper for 1995. See also the comments by the Malaysian defense minister Hajib Tun Rajak cited in David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in Asia-Pacific" *CAN-CAPS Papiers* No. 3 (March 1994): 12–13, and Lee Kwan-yew's comments about the ARF as a channel for China's reassuring Southeast Asia about its status quo intentions, cited in Leah Makabenta, "ASEAN: China Looms Large at Security Meet," Interpress Service, July 22, 1994.

69. Si pacem, parabellum" in the Latin. "Ju an si wei, you bei wu huan" in the Chinese. These are the security principles of the OSCE as well. The primary difference between OSCE and ARF definitions of common and cooperative security is that the former includes human rights and liberal domestic governance as a component of interstate security. The ARF, sensitive to the post-colonial sovereign-centric ideologies in ASEAN and China, has excluded this element.

70. In this respect the ARF reflects what Downs et al. call a transformational regime, precisely the type of design that, they argue, is least conducive to effective multilateral constraints on behavior because it seeks out a lowest common deno minator and dilutes the influence of "activists." Their argument holds IF one assumes that preferences are fixed, that socialization does not occur, and that the ideology of the institution is also diluted as the membership includes more "sceptics." It is not clear why this should be so, however, if the ideology is relatively stable and legitimate. See George W. Downs et al., "Designing Multilaterals: The Architecture and Evolution of Environmental Agreements." (Paper presented to American Political Science Associate Annual Conference, Washington DC, August 1997); "Managing the Evolution of Multlateralism," in *International Organization* 52 (1998): 397–419.

71. On the TAC, see Michael Leifer "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security" *Adelphi Papers* No. 30 (1996): 12–15. As I noted, these stand in contrast to the OSCE definition of common security. It is unclear how long the ASEAN Way discourse about security can resist a turn to the domestic sources of regional insecurity, however. The notion of nontraditional security issues—drugs, crime, refugees, transboundary pollution, etc.—has begun to enter the vocabulary of security specialists there. It is not a huge leap from discussions about how to prevent these kinds of problems to a focus on, e.g., domestic governance, social welfare, negotiated limits, and constraints on pollution emission.

72. These were norms that the Chinese regime, faced in particular with perceived American threats to unity (support for Taiwan) and domestic political order (human rights), wholly endorsed. As one Canadian diplomat noted, the ASEAN Way is a catch phrase for a pace that the PRC is comfortable with. The promise of a slow pace in the ARF is the only reason China came to the table interview with Canadian embassy officials, Beijing China, April 1996).

73. ARF, "Chairman's Statement of the Secondd ASEAN Regional Forum" (Brunei, August 1). This statement, in turn, reflected the ARF Concept Paper, a blueprint for the ARF's institutional and agenda evolution. "The rules of procedure of ARF papers shall be based on prevailing ASEAN norms and practices: Decisions should be made by consensus after careful and extensive consulations. No voting will take place" (ARF Concept Paper, 1995, p. 6).

74. The application of consensus rules in international organization varies quite a great deal from norms where, in practice, consensus is a unanimity rule in which there is informal vote-taking and where one state can veto, to norms where the chair has such legitimacy and latitude that individual opponents to a declaration of consensus are reluctant to challenge. The ARF tends to operate more closely to the latter than the former.

75. Jurg Steiner, *Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland* (University of North Carolina Press, 1974).

76. Diana Chigas, et al. "Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation" in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organization* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996).

77. Steiner, *Amicable Agreement*, pp. 269–271.

78. For example, a Paris workshop in November 1996 on preventive diplomacy the Chair's statement recommended that the ARF consider taking a more proactive role in preventive diplomacy through the provision of ARF Chair's "good offices."

79. For example, Australia convened a workshop on CBMs in November 1994; Canada and Malaysia co-hosted a workshop on PKO activities in March 1995; and South Korea hosted a workshop on preventive diplomacy in May 1995. The results of the workshops were acknowledged and commended in the Chair's statement at the 1995 ARF, p. 5. See also Gary Smith, "Multilateralism and Regional Security in Asia: The ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC's Geopolitical Value," *Working Paper* no. 97–2 (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, February, 1996).

80. The relationship between CSCAP and the ARF has been rather ambiguous. Neither the 1995 nor 1996 ARF Chair's statement specifically names CSCAP as the primary forum for ARF Track II activities, although the 1995 Concept Paper does identify it, along with ASEAN ISIS, as two potential brain trusts for the ARF. Its absence from the Chair's statements reflected, most likely, Chinese objections at that time to handing Track II responsibilities to an organization in which China was not a member. China's membership had been held up as the rest of CSCAP debated how to handle Taiwan's application for membership. The PRC refused to set up a national committee until it was satisfied Taiwan could not participate formally. This decision was made in late 1996; the PRC subsequently put together its national committee and formally applied to join CSCAP. CSCAP now appears to be emerging as a potential ideas factory for the ARF, somewhat analogous to the nongovernmental Pacific Economic Cooperation Council's relationship to APEC (Interview with prominent Canadian academic involved in Track II activities, January 1997 and e-mail correspondence with an Australian government official involved in ARF policy making, February 1997).

81. For example, in the late 1990s about 50 percent of the board of directors of the U.S. national committee of CSCAP had worked in government. The U.S. CSCAP also has a category called observers who are current government officials (U.S. CSCAP 1997). The Chinese CSCAP national committee initially consisted almost entirely of government officials. It included an Assistant Foreign Minister, the senior specialist on American, European, and arms control affairs in the PLA General Staff Department, as well as the Foreign Ministry's senior functional level officer handling ARF affairs (PRC CSCAP, "Preliminary List of Members of CSCAP China Committee. 1997). Very recently the Chinese CSCAP was expanded to include academics working on regional security issues.

82. "Filter" is Paul Evans' term. I am indebted to him for his insights into Track II. For an insightful discussion of the social-psychological "theory" behind Track II effec-

tiveness, with application to the Middle East see Dalia Dassa Kaye "Norm-Creation in the Middle East: Arguing in Track Two Security Dialogues" (unpublished manuscript, 2001). For a discussion of the role of Track II in ASEAN politics see Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*, pp. 66–67. For controversy over who makes the proposal see Marie-France Desjardin, "Rethinking Confidence Building Measures: Obstacles to Agreement and the Risk of Overselling the Process" *Adelpi Paper* No. 307.

83. E.g. Qian Qichen, Chen Jian, Fu Ying, Tong Xiaoling.

84. The franchise characteristics of the ARF are hard to code. On the one hand there is no formal recognition of particularly authoritative voices, e.g. there are no scientists working groups, advisory panels etc., that often define the scientific boundaries of policy discourse in, say, environmental institutions. On the other hand, ASEAN states are clearly authorized to take leadership roles in all ARF activities. All ARF intersessionals, for example, must be co-hosted by an ASEAN state. The ASEAN way, therefore, is enshrined as the guiding ideology of the institution. One complicating factor, however, is that often ASEAN states can be quite passive in the promotion of the common security elements of the ASEAN Way, particularly when these conflict with its sovereign-centric elements. Thus on transparency issues or intrusive confidence-building measures, China is not always the only state pushing for a lowest common denominator solution. On certain multilateral issues non-ASEAN activist states take the lead in defining the discourse. Given its experience, in interssessionals on peacekeeping operations, e.g., Canada can speak with a more authoritative voice.

85. I do not want to leave the impression that everyone in ASEAN intended to try to alter Chinese interests. Some were more skeptical about this possibility than others. Even these people, however, do not necessarily have an interest in openly defining the security problem as a suasion game. The concern is that by focusing on a China threat ARF will lose its focal point status and ASEAN will lose its leadership status in regional security affairs.

86. I would call this shift in utility distribution a change in "preference." I realize some contractual institutionalists would debate this, and consider this a change in "strategy." The difference between the two concepts is artificial and depends on the level of ends and means one is examining. For game theorists, the outcome of strategic interaction between two players is the product of a particular strategy pair. States are said to have preferences over outcomes. Yet if an institution is itself a product of a particular strategy pair (or the confluence of more than two strategies in a multilateral institution), then the form and function of the institution itself is a preference. Of course, multilateralism can also be a strategy at a higher level of interaction where the "goal" is some more abstract good, such as security. But since security is a grand preference of most states, to limit preferences to things as abstract as security, welfare, peace etc., means that no outcome below this level can be called a preference. Everything becomes strategy. I think this is reduces the utility of the term preference, and ignores the fact that actors can come to internalize multilateralism, unilateralism and bilateralism as legitimate, taken-for-granted ends in themselves.

87. Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing," in *Contemporary*

Southeast Asia 16(1) (June (1994).; Jing-dong Yuan,"Conditional Multilateralism: Chinese Views on Order and Regional Security" *CANCAPS Papiers* No. 9 (March 1996); Xu Weidi, "Ya-Tai diqu anquan huanjing fenxi" [Analysis of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region] *Neibu canyue* [Internal reference readings] (Beijing: Central Committee Documents Publishing House, 1996), pp. 251–254. See also, interview with senior Chinese intelligence analyst involved in ARF policy process, Beijing July 1996.

88. On Chinese realpolitik see Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik" *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1996); Johnston, "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy."

89. On military power for defensive purposes see Yuan,"Conditional Multilateralism."

90. Shi Chunlai, Xu Jian, "Preventive Diplomacy Pertinent to the Asia-Pacific," in *International Review* (China Center for International Studies) No. 4 (July 1997).

91. Chu Shulong "Concepts, Structures and Strategies of Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific" (unpublished manuscript, January 1997).

92. Liu Xuecheng, "Confidence Building Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region" *International Review* (China Center of International Studies, 1997).

93. For a systematic comparison of the five-power CBM agreement and the CSCE Vienna Document of 1994 see Acharya, "Ideas, Idenity and Instituion-building, pp. 16–23.

94. This was the distinct impression I received when interviewing military and civilian specialists on the ARF in 1996.

95. Interview with Chinese arms control specialist (January 1999).

96. Liu, "Confidence Building Diplomacy," p. 18.

97. Jian Chen, "Challenges and Responses in East Asia" (Speech to the First CSCAP General Meeting, Singapore, June 4, 1996).

98. "Chinese Paper at the ARF-ISG-CBMs in Brunei" (ms. November 3–5, 1997), p. 3.

99. Shi Chunlai, Xu Jian, "Preventive Diplomacy Pertinent to the Asia-Pacific" *International Review* (China Center for International Studies) no. 4 (July 1997).

100. China Radio International (1997) "The Taking Shape of a New Securitiy Concept and its Practice in China" (December 29, 1997), BBC-SWB (January 7, 1998). See also interview with senior Chinese think tank analysts close to the Asia-Pacific policy process in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, October 1998; interview with Chinese academic specialist on Asia-Pacific multilateralism, October 1998); interview with senior Chinese think tank analyst specializing in Asia-Pacific regional affairs, Beijing, October 1998; conversation with MOFA official, October 1998.

101. Interiew with senior MoFA official engaged in ARF work, January 1999. These individuals included Yan Xuetong, Wang Yizhou, Zhang Yunling, among other well-respected IR specialists. Yan is considered somewhat more realpolitik in his views of multilateralism than Wang or Zhang. Zhang, an economist, views regional security through the lens of economic integration. Wang is one of China's foremost IR theorists, with a research interest in the process of China's integration into global institutions. His work is influenced by his exposure to liberal institutionalism and social con-

structivism. The effort to develop more sophisticated thinking about multilateralism was given a boost in 2001 with China's first conference on the topic, hosted by the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Admitting that the topic was still very sensitive in China, one of the organizers, Wang Yizhou, wrote that multilateralist theory requires China to rethink its opposition to participation in everything from the G-8 to formal relations to NATO, to participation in ASEAN-US multilateral military exercises. See Wang Yizhou "Xin shijie de zhongguo yu duobian waijiao" [The new century China and multilateral diplomacy] (Paper presented to a research conference on "Theory of Multilateralism and Multilateral Diplomacy" in 2001).

102. Technically the study was commissioned by the MOFA Policy Research Office, but the primary consumer was the Asia Department.

103. Zhang Yunling, "Zonghe Anquan guan ji dui wo guo anquan de sikao" [The concept of comprehensive security and reflections on China's security] *Dangai Ya Tai* [Contemporary Asia-Pacific studies] No 1. (2000) pp. 1–16.

104. Interview with Chinese academic specialist on Asia-Pacific multilateralism, January 1999). The report was published about a year later in *Dangdai Ya Tai* [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies]. See Zhang, ibid. Interestingly, even in the post-Kosovo atmosphere in China where more "liberal" voices had to tread with somewhat more cautious when discussing international relations, there were essentially no significant changes in the wording or argumentation in the published version of the study.

105. The argument is outlined in Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Does China Want the US Out of Asia" *PacNet Newsletter* #22 (May 30, 1997). My own conversations with Pentagon officials involved in Asia policy confirm this particular interpretation. What lent this argument credence was that the mutual security discourse emerged around the same time that the Chinese hosted a rather uncharacteristically contentious (for the ARF) intersessional support group meeting on CBMs in March 1997. The Chinese chair (actually co-chairing with the Philippines, though the Philippines played a passive role in the meeting) refused to drop a Chinese agenda item that called for study of CBMs (military observers, prior notification, etc.) at joint military exercises in the region. Since the U.S. and its allies conduct joint exercises while the Chinese do not, the proposal was rightly criticized as being aimed at the U.S. military interests. The agenda item, however, was drafted by the PLA. The chief MOFA ARF policy functionary had privately indicated a willingness to drop the issue in discussions with the Canadians a couple of months before the meeting. But it is plausible that with the meeting in Beijing, and with a large PLA contingent observing the discussions, the MOFA did not feel free to drop the issue. In any event, the Chinese insistence on maintaining the agenda item in the face of opposition from a range of states prevented consensus on this issue and led to a great deal of concern in the U.S. about a Chinese offensive against US military alliances in the region. Conversations with Canadian diplomats (May 1997), and a PLA officer involved in ARF policy process (December 1997).

106. This argument was made by some of the civilian analysts and military officials involved in ARF policymaking I interviewed in 1998 and 1999. Indeed, the MOFA-commissioned report on comprehensive security is explicit in stating that China

should not and need not replace U.S. military superiority in the region, that China needs to balance militarily against U.S. power, in part especially if effective, practical multilateral security institutions can be set up in the region. See Zhang, "Concept of comprehensive security."

107. These proposals came from the Comprehensive Department of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the General Staff Department, the Department that coordinates PLA positions on the ARF.

108. The following comes from an interview with Canadian embassy officials, Beijing China, April 1996, interview with Singaporean embassy official, Beijing, China, April 1996; interview with senior Chinese intelligence analyst involved in ARF policy process, Beijing July 1996; interview with prominent Canadian academic involved in Track II activities, January 1997; interview with Canadian embassy official, Beijing, October 1998; and Smith, "Multilateralism and Regional Security in Asia."

109. Interview with senior MoFA official involved in ARF diplomacy, January 1999; Interview with Canadian diplomats involved in ARF work, July 2001.

110. Interview with Canadian embassy officials, Beijing China, April 1996; interview with senior Chinese intelligence analyst involved in ARF policy process, Beijing July 1996.

111. Smith, "Multilateralism and Regional Security in Asia," p. 22.

112. Interview with Canadian diplomat involved in ARF policy, May 1997.

113. The interviewee, in response to a question about the ACD Department's interest in Asia-Pacific multilateral security institutions, remarked that the Department "had a big appetite" (January 1999).

114. Leifer "ASEAN Regional Forum," p. 32

115. Much of the above paragraph came from interview with former senior US administration figure involved in Asia Policy, Beijing, June 1996; and Smith 1997; and e-mail with Australian government official involved in ARF policy, January 1997.

116. ARF Regional Forum Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy (ASEAN Draft, November 6, 1999), p. 8.

117. ARF Chairman's Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum (Brunei, August 1, 1995), p. 7; ibid., Concept Paper, p. 3.

118. China is not alone. South Korea apparently is leery of giving the ARF a preventive diplomacy role if this means ASEAN might try to involve itself in Northeast Asian issues. Interview with prominent Canadian academic involved in Track II activities, January 1997.

119. ARF Concept Paper of Co-Chairs: ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (Jakarta, July 22, 1996), p. 2

120. ARF 1999 Regional Forum Concept, p. 5.

121. ARF draft paper, "Enhanced Role of ARF Chair"; "Co-chair's Draft Paper on the Terms of Reference for the ARF Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs)" (October 2000).

122. "China's Position Paper on Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region (unpublished document submitted to the ARF, February 1, 2000), p. 2.

123. This analysis is based on comparisons of the November 1999 version of the Singapore PD paper, the Chinese comments on this draft submitted to the ARF in 2000,

the revised April 2000 version of the Singapore PD paper, and subsequent Chinese responses to this revised draft, submitted on January 9, 2001.

124. The language on sovereignty and noninterference was already quite strong in the original draft paper. That is to say, China is not an outlier in promoting this kind of language in ARF discourse. The outliers on PD at the moment are the Canadians, who have pressed language that does not subject PD to consensus decisionmaking that includes respect for human rights, and that allows for military actions such as peacekeeping operations. Canadian diplomats have complained that many Western states have raised very few objections to the issues raised by the Chinese and others and have not been strong supporters of the Canadian position, fearing that the relatively fast-track intrusiveness of the Canadian proposals may undermine support for PD in the end. Interview with Canadian diplomats involved in ARF policy, July 2001.

125. The MOFA-commissioned report on comprehensive security explicitly advocates strengthening the PD capabilities of the ARF, though as of this date there has been no concrete manifestation of this argument in China's diplomacy.

126. Sun Xiaoying, "Zhongguo ying bu ying rang chu Nansha qundao?" [Should China give way on the Nansha islands?] *Nansha Wenti Yanjiu Ziliao* [Research materials on the Nansha question] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Asia-Pacific Research Center, 1996) pp. 295–302; Shang Guozhen, "Lue lun Nansha wenti guojihua qushi ji women de duice" [An outline discussion of the internationalization trends on the Nansha question and our countermeasures] *Nansha Wenti Yanjiu Ziliao* [Research materials on the Nansha question] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Asia-Pacific Research Center, 1996) pp. 288–295.

127. "Chairman's Statement of the Third ASEAN Regional Forum" (Jakarta, July 23, 1996), p. 4.

128. Zhang Zhirong and Wu Chong, "Jiejue Nansha zhengduan de duice xuanze" [Choices in countermeasures for resolving the Nansha dispute] *Nansha Wenti Yanjiu Ziliao* [Research materials on the Nansha question] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Asia-Pacific Research Center, 1996) pp. 258–272, at p. 267; Zhou Liangbiao and Ye Hong, "Jiejue Nansha wenti bixu zhongshi jingji kaifa" [To resolve the Nansha problem we must pay attention to economic development] in *Nansha Wenti Yanjiu Ziliao* [Research materials on the Nansha question] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Asia-Pacific Research Center, 1996) pp. 313–317, at p. 317.

129. On how UNCLOS constrains China's claims and options see Lu Jianwei, "Nansha wenti zhengduan ji duice" [The conflict over the Nansha problem and countermeasures] *Nansha Wenti Yanjiu Ziliao* [Research materials on the Nansha question] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Asia-Pacific Research Center, 1996) pp. 302–313, at 312.

130. Interview with think tank specialists on China and relations with South East Asian, May 1996.

131. Amitav Acharya, "The Impact of Multilateralism on Chinese Regional Security Thinking and Behavior: Snapshot of Beijing Views" (Unpublished paper, 1998). Also interview with Canadian embassy officials, Beijing China, April 1996, and interview with Canadian embassy official, Beijing, October 1998.

132. Evidently the first White Paper was called a white paper on "arms control and disarmament," even though it covered topics included in defense white papers, because top Chinese military leaders did not want it to appear that China was bowing to external pressure to produce a white paper on defense per se. (Comments by senior National Defense University officer, March 1997.) The drafters of the 1998 white paper explicitly examined a range of possible templates, and rejected some South East Asian examples for being too slim and non-transparent.

133. For which activists were pushing hard. See for instance CSCAP 1995: 4.

134. ARF Chairman's Statement, 1996, pp. 4–6.

135. The agenda focus on "joint" exercises had been set by China, and it ran into opposition from the US and its allies, as they are the ones who run "joint exercises." China does not. The ISG failed to reach consensus on the issue. While this was a setback for the CBM process, a range of alternative proposals was floated for implementing other versions of this kind of CBM. The Chinese ran into heavy criticism for this proposal. Subsequently the proposal was dropped. Interview with Canadian diplomat involved in ARF policy, May 5, 1997; interview with PLA officer involved in ARF policy, January 1999.

136. Desjardin, "Rethinking Confidence Building Measures," p. 7.

137. See the ARF Chairman's Summary and "Regional Forum Seminar on Defense Conversion (Beijing, September 2000).

138. Interview with senior US diplomat involved in ARF policy, February 2001; interview with Canadian diplomats involved in ARF diplomacy, July 2001.

139. "Chinese Paper at the ARF-ISG-CBMs in Brunei" (ms. November 3–5, 1996). Also, interview with Singaporean embassy official, Beijing, China, April 1996.

140. Vietnam has been one of the more vocal opponents of efforts by countries such as Canada to dilute the sovereign centric language or to include military options such as PKO in ARF documents on PD. See for instance, "Vietnam's Views on Singapore's Discussion Paper" (Asian Regional Forum submission, January, 2001). Interview with Canadian diplomats involved in ARF diplomacy, July 3, 2001. India also stressed the importance of protecting sovereignty, and opposed military PD mechanisms. See its comments on a paper submitted to the ARF by India in 2000 entitled "Preventive Diplomacy."

141. For a discussion of transnational activist and "accountibility politics" see Kecik and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders; for a* discussion of Durkheim's analysis of morality, see Freidrich Kratochwil, "The Force of Prescriptions" *International Organization* 38(4) (Autumn 1984): 753–775.

142. Conversation with former senior Chinese diplomat and speechwriter for senior officials in the MOFA.

143. This is a point made in Evangelista's study of transnational effects on Soviet arms control policy. See Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, ch. 16.

144. See James Jonson, "Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation between Critical Theory and Rational Choice," *American Political Science Review* 87(1) (March): 74–86; John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution" in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an*

Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3–47; Risse, "Let's Argue."

145. Kuklinski and Hurley, "It's a Matter of Interpretation," p. 127.

146. Jennifer J. Halpern, "Elements of a Script for Friendship in Transaction," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(6) (December 1997): 835–868.

147. Though even this is problematic from an institutionalist perspective. As realpoliticians the Chinese should have been especially suspicious of an institution that activist states like Canada, Australia, and to some extent the U.S. supported. The information that their involvement should have supplied, for realpolitician skeptics, was precisely that the ARF was a potentially constraining institution.

148. George W. Downs et al., "Designing Multilaterals: The Architecture and Evolution of Environmental Agreements." (Paper presented to American Political Science Associate Annual Conference, Washington DC, August 1997).

149. Indeed, the dependent variable in Downs et al. is not the interests, preferences, or behavior of any individual state (say, the potentially worst or most important defector). Thus it is possible that the (admittedly lower) observed level of cooperation (as they operationalize it) may still be a function of socialization. It is also possible, counterfactually, that the depth of cooperation might have been even shallower had there been no socialization effect in transformational institutions. Too much is blackboxed in their empirical tests, such that they cannot show one way or the other whether there are any socialization effects in either transformational or strategically and sequentially constructed institutions.