Chapter 2

AN EMERGING CHINA'S EMERGING GRAND STRATEGY

A Neo-Bismarckian Turn?

Avery Goldstein

Like many of the world's states, at the dawn of the twenty-first century China faces radically different foreign policy challenges than it faced during the cold war. Unlike many others, however, China's leaders must not only cope with a transformed international system, but also manage their country's emergence as a true great power. In response to these twin challenges, in the late 1990s Beijing began to stake out a new grand strategy.[1]

On the one hand, the new approach reflects the shifting constraints of an international system in which bipolarity has given way to a period of unipolarity that many (especially the Chinese) expect will eventually give way to multipolarity.[2] Bipolarity had presented rather clear-cut choices to an economically impoverished and militarily backward China facing serious threats from the world's superpowers. Unipolarity, if enduring, would present similarly tight constraints and simplify strategic options for China since it would continue to lag far behind what, by definition, would be a global hegemon. By contrast, multipolarity is expected to provide more room for strategic creativity, though also added uncertainty about the source and nature of future threats. The grand strategy described below has resulted in part from China's attempt to cope with the currently stark challenges of unipolarity as well as to exploit the opportunities a transition to multipolarity may present.

On the other hand, the new strategy also reflects China's growing capabilities (economic and military) that may presage its rise to a position as one of the great powers within the multipolar system expected to define international politics by the middle of this century. Greater power enables China to play an increasingly influential international role while it worries others who see such activism as potentially threatening. As explained below, the shift in Beijing's foreign policy approach that emerged during the late 1990s was in part a response to the adverse reaction China's rise was eliciting, a reaction that earlier insensitivity to such concerns had exacerbated.

Although China's new grand strategy reflects changes in the international system as well as in China's capabilities, it also bears the imprint of three important continuities. First, while the system's polarity changes, its ordering principle does not; anarchy endures, as do its consequences for state behavior. Second, while military technology yields ever more wondrous hardware and software, thus far the so-called revolution in military affairs has not reversed the verdict of the nuclear revolution; vulnerability to swift, massive punishment endures, as do its consequences for the uses of force. Third, despite playing a new role on a changing world stage, China finds itself performing in the same old theater. Because China is moving up, but cannot move out, geography and history combine to pose daunting problems for the country's foreign-policy makers. Although China faces no pressing great power threat along its borders (indeed not since at least 1800 has its periphery been less threatened) there are no guarantees that today's favorable circumstances will continue indefinitely. China finds itself surrounded by great, or potentially great, powers (as well as a number of minor powers) with whom it has a checkered history. None may be enemies today, but prudence requires a strategy for coping with the potential problems a deterioration in relations with any of them might pose tomorrow.[3]

What grand strategy makes sense for a rising, but not dominant, power surrounded by potential adversaries who are nervous about its intentions? With the qualifications noted below, the approach emerging in Beijing can be labeled "neo-Bismarckian."[4] This term is used only to suggest broad parallels in strategic choice that reflect an underlying similarity between the position in which Germany found itself as a rising power in the late nineteenth century and China's position as a rising power today. For each country, the need to reduce the risk that others would try to abort their ascent has shaped foreign policy. In each case, leaders have attempted to pursue national interests by making their country an indispensable, or at least very attractive, partner for the system's other major powers, thereby reducing the chance that potential adversaries would unite in opposition.[5] But the parallel should not be overstated, as explained below, because of substantive differences between historical eras more than a century apart, as well as differences in the two countries' national attributes.

I begin with a brief discussion designed to place China's present strategy in context. In this first part of the chapter, I consider the different expectations about China's behavior that one might infer from major strands of international relations theory, distinguish China's current strategy from some logical alternatives these theories suggest, and clarify the important differences between China's strategic choices and those identified with Bismarck. The second part of the chapter more closely examines the Chinese case. To highlight the sense in which current policy marks a significant change and to identify the sources of this change, I offer a stylized overview of China's evolving grand strategy during and immediately after the cold war, followed by a presentation of the key elements of China's neo-Bismarckian approach.

A RISING CHINA'S CHOICES

International Relations Theory and China's post-cold war role. The logic of a wide variety of major international relations theories suggests that China's growing power in a post–cold war system that the United States dominates will produce recurrent conflict as an ever more capable Beijing pursues its national interests. So many such theoretical arguments anticipate that a self-interested China's rise will have disruptive and potentially dangerous international consequences that trouble seems overdetermined. Robert Gilpin's system-governance thesis and A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler's power transition thesis suggest that a rising Chinese state seeking greater status, benefits, or simply influence in international affairs should be expected to mount a challenge to the system's reigning American hegemon. Kenneth Waltz's balance-of-power theory predicts a determined Chinese effort (building up its capabilities and searching for like-minded allies) to counter the dangers unchecked American power may pose under conditions of anarchy. Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory suggests that such Chinese efforts are likely to prompt regional states, worried about China, to respond with their own search for arms or allies, efforts that could in turn intensify China's concerns according to the logic of the security dilemma whose dynamics Robert Jervis has limned. Perspectives that do not focus on power relations yield similarly bleak expectations. Michael Doyle's democratic peace thesis suggests that an authoritarian China's foreign policy will be little constrained by concerns other than self-interest and power. Also, the international system's democratic great powers will be unlikely to refrain from confronting an undemocratic great power or to rule out recourse to the use of military force against it. Neoliberal institutionalist arguments about the effects of regimes or multilateralism point in the same troubling direction. Because international institutions are so weakly developed in East Asia, as opposed to Europe, there are good reasons to doubt their effectiveness in constraining a rising China's assertiveness that the other theories deem likely. Only theoretical per-

spectives highlighting the self-interested restraint that might accompany China's growing economic interdependence and the sobering strategic consequences of nuclear weapons offer more benign expectations.[6]

In short, most strands of international relations theory anticipate that a rising China will be a disruptive actor challenging American dominance. Initially, China's post–cold war foreign policy did seem to conform to this disturbing expectation. However, the shift in China's strategy in the late 1990s reminds us that such theories merely identify broad constraints confronting states. Understanding international outcomes requires not merely identifying such constraints, but also how particular states respond to them. This is a question that can only be answered by investigating each state's distinctive experience. In China's case, during the early 1990s there were troubling signs that it was indeed adopting the sort of assertive foreign policy many expected. But by middecade, the accumulating costs and risks of the challenger's role began to encourage Beijing to adopt the more subtle, though no less self-interested, approach I label neo-Bismarckian.

Grand strategic alternatives. I distinguish China's current grand strategy from four broad alternatives. First, under a hegemonic grand strategy China would strive to maximize its power relative to all rivals by diverting as much national wealth as possible from civilian economic needs to military modernization, and attempt to exploit its power advantages wherever possible to consolidate territorial and resource gains. Second, under a balancing strategy China would strive to offset the threatening dominance of others by a more modest effort at military modernization along with attempts to collaborate with states sharing its security concerns. As noted below, until 1996 this was the post–cold war strategic alternative China embraced. Third, under a bandwagoning strategy China would make little effort to cultivate its own military capabilities hoping to score relative gains, but instead would strive to accommodate the preferences of the system's dominant state, hoping to realize the absolute gains of increased international economic exchange and to enjoy the security benefits the hegemon would provide as a collective good. Fourth, under an isolationist strategy China would invest in military capabilities only insofar as they were essential to the minimal goal of ensuring the inviolability of the country's territorial and political integrity (e.g., a minimal nuclear deterrent combined with daunting conventional defenses along the country's periphery), while seeking to maximize economic independence through autarky.

China's present strategy differs from each of these four alternatives. It finesses questions about the longer term—whether, for example, a rising China will one day be a regional hegemon, a global peer competitor of the other great powers, or perhaps continue to lag far behind the system's leading state. Instead it focuses on the problems a rising China faces and attempts to manage current threats to vital interests. To cope with the challenges posed by a preponderant

U.S. and suspicious neighbors, the strategy combines a subtle realpolitik effort at developing national capabilities and cultivating international partners (one designed to avoid the provocative consequences of a straightforward hegemonic or balancing strategy) with a level of international economic and diplomatic engagement designed to maximize the benefits of interdependence (one designed to avoid the vulnerability consequences of bandwagoning or the opportunity costs of isolationism).

China's Grand Strategy: Historical Analogies? In thinking about China's current international role, others have looked to history rather than theory for guidance. Some have suggested analogies between China today and rising powers in the past. Of these, the most disturbing are those that draw parallels with some of the twentieth century's most disruptive international actors—Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union.[7] I instead have suggested that a more helpful historical analogy may be a somewhat less troubling one—Germany in the era of Otto von Bismarck. Like China, it was a geopolitically central rising power whose current and projected future capabilities naturally drew the attention of the system's other major actors. This broad similarity in the countries' international circumstances accounts for a rough similarity in their grand strategic design. Nevertheless important differences between the two cases account for important differences in strategic content. The historical analogy is a loose one and must be heavily qualified.[8]

Three qualifications are in order. First, Bismarck's era was a long one, and his strategy evolved over time. Although certain fundamentals endured (devising means to cope with Germany's unfavorable geopolitical circumstances that precluded English-style aloofness, yet trying to maximize strategic flexibility rather than embracing clear alignments), between the 1850s and 1880s the strategy's purpose changed. In the 1850s and 1860s, the chief goal was to preserve a precarious Prussia's emergence as the leader of Germany. Having succeeded in this task, by the 1870s the chief goal for a Germany unified under Prussia's leadership was to ensure that its newfound strength did not provoke others to combine against it. China's period of precarious security, as noted below, was the cold war era; in the post–cold war world, its strategic purposes are closer to those of Germany during the last two decades of Bismarck's era.[9]

Second, Bismarck employed an exquisitely complex strategy of careful alliance building designed to check potential enemies while Germany grew from one among several European great powers to become the dominant actor on the continent. After 1871, Bismarck claimed that Germany was a "saturated power" and eschewed expansionism that might have united rivals or stimulated the only real peer competitor (naval power Britain) from a determined effort to offset Berlin's growing strength in Europe.[10] Bismarck's diplomacy was strikingly successful during the latter decades of the nineteenth century. It subsequently broke down, however, as the complexity of the conservative cross-

cutting alliances he had managed with much difficulty proved too difficult for his less capable and more ambitious successors to sustain.[11]

Beijing, too, claims that it harbors no hegemonic ambitions. But as it seeks to prevent the hardening of a hostile alliance network while its own capabilities grow, it has not reprised the alliance-based strategy of Bismarck. Instead, as explained below, it has devised a distinctive set of policies that emphasize reassurance, linkage, and flexibility in its interaction with other states, especially cultivating more ambiguous partnerships rather than formal alliances. While differing from Bismarck's alliance-based diplomacy, the complex network of conditional partnerships China has sought to cultivate, like Bismarck's complex web of alliances, demands similarly sophisticated management and promises to test the talents of Beijing's present and future leaders.

Third, important military-strategic differences distinguish the late nineteenth century from the era in which China is a rising power. Foreign policy in Bismarck's age and after was made in circumstances where it was a question of "when," not "whether," great power war would occur. Expectations today are much different. The role of force endures, a reflection of the permissive environment of international anarchy, but its use is now more tightly constrained. Most importantly, the advent of nuclear weapons has clarified the consequences of general war among the great powers and provided strong incentives for managing those crises and conflicts that cannot be avoided.[12] In addition, the presence of nuclear weapons diminishes the plausibility of dominating by achieving military superiority (even outgunned nuclear adversaries can dissuade aspiring hegemons with threats of retaliation). This difference alters the relative importance placed on the military and economic aspects of grand strategy. While military competition continues, in the contemporary era international economic rivalry is more intense than ever before. Economic strength has always been the foundation for great power, but by the end of the twentieth century the increased significance of science and rapidly changing technology as determinants of relative power, including military clout, mean that security is better served by a strategy that facilitates economic development rather than one that seeks to accumulate foreign territory, resources, and population.[13] As a result, the costs and benefits of the use of force as a means to advance national interests are much different in the present era than they were in Bismarck's.

These sorts of differences in fact raise cautions about the usefulness of looking for lessons in almost any historical example. The broad analogy between contemporary China and Bismarck's Germany is imperfect at best and identifies only a few important similarities in the two countries' circumstances that lead to some similarities in strategic design. The comparison does, however, seem more apt than others that have been suggested. Unlike Wilhelmine Germany, China is not eagerly pursuing imperialist glory; unlike Imperial Japan,

China is not bereft of resources to the point that it is driven to minimize its dependence through expansion; unlike Nazi Germany, China does not have an ideology of racial superiority and a need for lebensraum to motivate it to conquer neighbors; unlike the Soviet Union, China no longer sees itself as the champion of a universally relevant way of life whose dissemination justifies an unremitting effort to erode that championed by its rival.[14] China is instead, like Bismarck's Germany, a nationalist rising power whose interests sometimes conflict with others', but one that so far lacks any obvious ambition or reason to indulge a thirst for international expansion, let alone dominance.

Two final points of clarification about my use of the neo-Bismarckian label are in order before proceeding. First, I am not claiming that China's leaders are self-consciously imitating Bismarck's approach (though the historical bent of Chinese strategists makes it impossible to rule out this possibility). Instead, I am simply suggesting that as a consequence of international constraints, national circumstances, and the hard lessons of China's experience in the early post–cold war years, a de facto grand strategy has begun to emerge. Second, some might argue that the term "grand strategy" overstates the coherence I identify in China's foreign policy. To be sure, in China as elsewhere, the numerous individuals and organizations responsible for formulating and implementing policy ensures something short of full coherence. Nevertheless, even though the power of the paramount leader in Beijing today is less than it was under Mao or Deng, the Chinese Communist regime's Leninist structure endures and, especially on major foreign policy matters, enables the party center to provide the broad direction within which actors must operate. It is the strategic content of this framework that I examine here.

CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGIES

China's grand strategy during the cold war. During the cold war China pursued its foreign policy interests within the tight constraints and resulting clear incentives bipolarity provided. Given the country's meager national wealth and the scope of the threat each of the superpowers posed, Beijing's foreign policy for almost four decades after 1949 was driven by a survivalist logic that frequently trumped other regime preferences. The imperatives of international structure derived not merely from the relatively clear implications of bipolarity, but also from the tightness of its constraints for a state so closely involved in the system's superpower-dominated competitive politics.[15] Any Chinese government with the limited capabilities Beijing commanded would have behaved in much the same way, relying on one superpower to counter the threat the other represented (a consequence of bipolarity), even as it sought to improve the prospects for self-reliance because of worries about the wisdom of depending on foreigners (a consequence of anarchy).[16] International-structural causes clearly illumi-

nated the broad logic of China's strategy during the cold war, and did so better for the China case than for many others (e.g., Japan, Germany, Sweden, India).

The PRC's cold war approach of counter-hegemonic coalition building was manifest after 1949 in its initial "lean to one side" grand strategy. Strong disagreements with Stalin and a sense of resentment about his tepid economic and military support for Mao's CCP notwithstanding, the Sino-Soviet alliance provided the PRC with the only available counter to a globally dominant U.S. whose deployments in the Western Pacific and track record of hostility toward the Chinese communist movement made it the principal external threat to the newly founded PRC. Counter-hegemonic balancing also informed Mao's subsequent "lean to the other side" grand strategy of Sino-American rapprochement initiated in the early 1970s. As the Soviet military buildup along its Asian frontier compounded the deep-seated political and ideological disputes between Beijing and Moscow, and as Washington demonstrated the limits of its military ambitions in Southeast Asia and then previewed its plans for retrenchment (Nixon Doctrine), China's leaders determined that the Soviet Union was the superpower posing the more serious threat. This new principal strategic concern dictated China's flexibility in improving relations with the United States (and other advanced industrial states) so that the counter-Soviet coalition would include partners more weighty than the handful of third world regimes and revolutionary movements who sided with Beijing against the USSR.

After Mao's death in 1976, China's grand strategy retained its basic orientation, identifying the Soviet Union as the main adversary and the United States as the essential member of a countervailing coalition of diverse states. Indeed, in the immediate post-Mao years (1976–1980), China's anti-Soviet diplomacy was at its zenith. Beijing basically dropped the ideological fig leaf (neo-Leninist claims about the "revisionist" roots of Soviet "socialist imperialism") that had been required in the era of radical socialism and simply sought to build a global anti-Soviet United Front based on naked claims about power and threats. During the early 1980s, however, the character of the Sino-American strategic alignment began to change as a consequence of three developments.[17] First, China's perception of the level of Soviet threat began to decline.[18] Second, after years denouncing détente as a delusion and encouraging the West to arm against the dangerous Soviet hegemon, Beijing saw its wishes more than fulfilled in the massive military buildup undertaken by President Reagan's U.S. and other leading NATO countries. Third, by the 1980s Beijing was finally deploying small numbers of nuclear delivery systems that forced Soviet planners to confront the risk of devastating retaliatory punishment should a confrontation over vital interests escalate uncontrollably. The "existential deterrence" benefits of China's nuclear arsenal reinforced the "existential alliance" benefits of the Sino-American relationship that China had enjoyed since the Nixon opening of 1972.

As a result of these developments, Deng's counter-Soviet balancing grand strategy after 1980, differed from Mao's in being less tightly constrained by the need to cultivate a de facto alliance with the United States. It also differed from Mao's insofar as the political, economic, and military content of the strategy changed along with the domestic transformation Deng and his reformers initiated in 1979. Politically, with the end of class-struggle rhetoric, China no longer relied on the Marxist categories of "revisionism" vs. "revolution" to explain the reasons for threatening Soviet behavior. Economically, with the abandonment of the Maoist development model, China sought to combine institutional changes at home with an "opening to the outside" world to stimulate rapid economic growth that might eventually provide a foundation for national strength. Such growth would in turn reduce the need in the future to depend on powerful patrons when facing international threats. Militarily, with the demythologization of Mao, the People's Liberation Army was able to reduce, if not eliminate, the longstanding emphasis on adhering to the techniques that had proved helpful in the 1930s and 1940s, the doctrine of people's war, and begin the arduous process of creating a professional army with the personnel and equipment required on the modern battlefield.[19]

During the 1980s, then, China's grand strategy was characterized by continuity in its fundamental purpose, but its content was changing. Beijing viewed the advanced West, especially the United States, less as a military partner essential to China's short-term interest in coping with a pressing security threat and more as an economic partner essential to China's long-term interest in modernization. Although China still hedged against the unlikely contingency of a Soviet challenge, it also pursued improved relations with its northern neighbor.[20] As Soviet "new thinking" under Gorbachev's leadership heralded an inward turn by the country whose expansionist tendencies China had feared, a flurry of diplomacy quickly moved Sino-Soviet relations from the phase of reduced tension and dialogue that had begun in the early 1980s, to an era of full normalization capped by the Gorbachev visit to Beijing in May 1989.

By the end of the 1980s, China's international situation could hardly have seemed brighter. Neither superpower any longer posed a serious threat to its security, and both were eager to nurture good relations with an economically awakening China. But the apparent dawn of a golden age for Chinese foreign policy in the "new world order" was not to be. Political and economic countercurrents were at work within China and abroad that soon required Beijing to scramble for a strategy that was more than "status quo plus."

China's initial post–cold war strategic challenge. China's spectacular economic performance during the early 1980s had taken a turn for the worse after 1986. Heightened job insecurity and raging inflation, together with political dissatisfaction among China's intellectuals and broad-based frustration with official corruption, created a volatile mix that produced nationwide demonstrations

when a window of opportunity opened in spring 1989.[21] This unanticipated challenge to the CCP's monopoly on political power emerged just as China's leaders were attempting to consolidate their newly favorable position in the post–cold war world. President Bush had visited Beijing two months before the demonstrations began and General Secretary Gorbachev arrived when they peaked in early May.[22] The brutal crackdown that followed in June transformed Western perceptions of the PRC and ended the era in which cold war strategic interests had greased the skids for the West's favorable economic and political treatment of the Chinese regime, its communist moniker notwithstanding.

Beijing's security environment was dramatically altered. To be sure, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union posed an immediate *military* threat (as had been the case during most of the cold war). Yet from Beijing's perspective, both posed a challenge to China's national security. The United States threatened China not only because it spearheaded the initial post-Tiananmen effort to isolate China and impose sanctions, but also because its subsequent effort at resuming constructive engagement carried the risk (for Americans, the promise) of "peaceful evolution" that might precipitate pressures for political change and domestic unrest, if not regime collapse.[23] The Soviet Union, its successor states, and former satellites threatened China by example, at least during the years of early enthusiasm for the newly democratic regimes.[24]

As if the "democratic threat" from abroad were not enough, at the same time Beijing also faced a frustrating new challenge on a matter it had long defined as an absolutely vital national interest—its sovereignty over Taiwan. After decades of harsh liberation rhetoric, beginning in 1979 the CCP had floated a series of proposals that emphasized patience on timing and tolerance of differences (ultimately permitting Taiwan to maintain its own political, economic, and military institutions if it would only acknowledge Beijing's sovereignty). During the early post-Mao era, this more generous approach may have seemed promising since it was directed at an authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT) regime that, however ideologically hostile, was at least committed to the idea that Taiwan was part of China. As Taiwan began to democratize in the late 1980s, this commitment was in jeopardy. Younger KMT politicians with roots on the island and newly active opposition politicians, especially in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), envisioned a continuation of the island's de facto independence indefinitely and, increasingly, moves toward de jure independence. If time meant greater democratization on Taiwan, and increased democratization meant an end to Taipei's traditional commitment to reunification, a policy of patience and tolerance was no longer so appealing in Beijing. Moreover, the end of the cold war had revived the importance of ideology as a driving force in U.S. foreign policy that sought to advance the spread of liberal democracy and free markets. Thus, the likelihood of American support for democratic, capitalist Taiwan against authoritarian, semi-socialist China, especially in the wake of

the brutal 1989 crackdown, increased to levels unmatched since Nixon's historic visit in 1972.[25]

As the 1990s opened, Beijing found itself in a precarious position. Its cold war grand strategy was dead, but a new direction was not yet clear. Until 1992, China focused mainly on its internal political and economic problems. Foreign policy was limited essentially to small steps to undo the setbacks in international economic and diplomatic relations that had followed the outrage about Tiananmen Square.[26] By 1992, apparently satisfied that it had weathered the political storm of communist collapses and had righted its own economic ship, the regime began to evince greater self-confidence at home and abroad.[27] With a decisive push provided by Deng Xiaoping, and sustained by his designated successor Jiang Zemin, aggressive economic reforms re-ignited rapid growth catalyzed by large-scale foreign trade and investment.[28] The economic attractiveness of China, whose communist regime was no longer deemed to be on the verge of collapse, led others to seize the opportunity China's new openness provided. China's booming growth rates even had political spillover effects on the delicate matter of relations with Taiwan. In 1993 the two sides opened unofficial talks and began to establish a framework for expanding economic, social, and academic exchanges. Then, in 1994, as memories of the CCP's brutal 1989 crackdown faded, U.S. President Clinton, despite his earlier campaign trail rhetoric against "coddling Chinese dictators," called for an end to the annual effort to link MFN with Beijing's domestic and foreign policy behavior. China's international prospects were clearly brightening.

As the PRC re-emerged from the shadow of Tiananmen and became more internationally active, however, it confronted a less forgiving world than the one it faced in the 1980s. Remarkably quickly, China's international position began to deteriorate during 1995–1996 as others reacted with alarm to what they saw as an increasingly powerful Beijing more assertively staking its claims to disputed territory in the South China Sea and to sovereignty over Taiwan. By the time the PRC concluded military exercises aimed at influencing the March 1996 presidential election on Taiwan, it faced an international environment more hostile and potentially dangerous than at any time since the late 1970s. China's regional activism had successively antagonized the ASEAN states, crystallized the view of an important segment of the U.S. foreign policy elite that the PRC represented a new threat to American international interests, and aroused Japanese fears about Beijing's regional intentions.[29] Thus, although rapid economic growth was enabling China to increase its military capabilities, these capabilities and China's actions were triggering responses that seemed likely to undermine the country's security.[30]

Growing threats: Stimuli for a new strategy. In this context, analysts in Beijing were especially concerned about the implications for China of unprecedented American capabilities combined with Washington's belief that U.S. national se-

curity frontiers are unlimited. In the post–cold war era this expansive definition of interests was allegedly leading an unchecked U.S. to undertake repeated military interventions around the globe, to engage in "frequent crude interferences in the internal affairs of other countries," and to attempt to upgrade its anachronistic network of cold war alliances as a vehicle for ensuring continued American dominance. The East Asian facet of the U.S. post–cold war strategy was to use the theory of a "China threat" to "sow divisions [among the region's states and] . . . to prevent China from becoming developed and powerful."[31] Particularly worrisome was the nearly simultaneous strengthening of two U.S.-led Pacific alliances that Beijing believed were acquiring an anti-China focus.[32]

The July 1996 declaration on the "Relations of Strategic Partners of the 21st Century between Australia and the United States" troubled China. Australia's "security outlook" embraced a belief "that potential security risks existed in its area . . . that countries in that area were building up their militaries," and that instability in "the Korean Peninsula . . . the Taiwan Strait . . . and the Nansha Islands" required the "forward deployment of the U.S. military in Australia . . . to effectively handle future regional and global challenges." Beijing clearly understood this declaration to reflect concerns about a rising China. It included not only plans for joint U.S.-Australian military exercises, and intelligence and logistical cooperation, but also permission for the U.S. "to build a ground relay station in Australia" as part of its advanced warning system necessary for ballistic missile defenses. This last item especially rankled Beijing because it raised the prospect of deployments that could vitiate one of the PRC's few areas of regional military strength. Defense Secretary William Perry's assertion that Australia was one of two U.S. "anchors in the Asia-Pacific Region," Australia in the south and Japan in the north, further reinforced Beijing's perception that the U.S. was cultivating a "triangular security framework in the Asia Pacific region" as part of an incipient anti-China containment policy, Australia's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.[33]

While Beijing worried about the potential threat of changes in the U.S.-Australia link, it was the prospect of a changing U.S.-Japan security relationship that most alarmed China. Its fears were aroused not just by the content of the revised guidelines for U.S.-Japan military cooperation being hammered out in 1996 and 1997, but also by a continuing skepticism about Japan's commitment to a peaceful foreign policy that colored Beijing's interpretation of the new arrangements.[34] Washington and Tokyo portrayed the revised policy on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation as merely an updating of longstanding security ties in light of the end of the cold war while Beijing saw in it an ominous portent. China asserted that the heart of the revision was contained in the agreement's fourth section, "outline of the new policy," which called for Japan to assume greater responsibilities in the event a crisis emerged in regions on Japan's periphery. Although the limited support activities to which Tokyo committed it-

self, and the absence of collective self-defense language suggested marginal adjustments, China strongly objected on the following grounds:

> [1] While small, the change was a continuation of a disturbing trend in Japan's military policy. In half a century Japan had progressed "from having no army to having a modernized 'self-defense force'; and from only protecting Japan's own territory to the possibility of entering 'Japan's peripheral regions'." At best, the change is a turn for the worse, a possible deviation from Japan's postwar path of peace and development; at worst it is an attempt to provide legal cover for "edgeballing" (a Ping-Pong equivalent for "salami tactics") the constitutional proscriptions on Japan's international military activity.
>
> [2] Because the concept "Japan's peripheral regions (*Riben zhoubian diqu*)" is vague, and because the guidelines state that the concept is not defined geographically, but is determined by considering the nature of the situation, at any time the periphery could be arbitrarily expanded.
>
> [3] The pretext for this change (that in Japan's peripheral regions after the cold war there are still unstable and untrustworthy factors) reveals that the real motive for the change is a concern about China[35]

Beijing was determined to minimize the anti-China potential of a shifting U.S.-Japan alliance. Most importantly, this meant ensuring that the peripheral regions for joint action did not include Taiwan and its surrounding waters. China repeatedly sought clarification on this point, but found Japanese statements less than fully reassuring. In September 1997, Koichi Kato, Secretary General of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, for example, offered the following mixed message about Taiwan: "Our position is that the Taiwan issue is a Chinese domestic issue. But it is an important question whether, in the event military action is taken from Mainland China toward Taiwan, against the residents' will, whether we can remain unconcerned."[36]

During his February 1998 trip to Japan, China's Defense Minister Chi Haotian asked again for clarification.[37] His Japanese hosts responded by stating that the security treaty is a bilateral matter not targeting any third country, that it does not aim at interfering in other countries' internal politics, and that Japan's stance on Taiwan is already set forth in a Sino-Japanese joint declaration—Japan will not change its policy of maintaining only informal relations with Taiwan. Though diplomatically proper, this position again fell short of what China wanted to hear, since the absence of formal links to Taipei in no way rules out the possibility that Japan could, under the terms of the revised relationship support U.S. military operations in the area around Taiwan if a crisis

developed. In any case, given the inherent uncertainty about promises in an anarchic international realm, even more forthcoming statements from Tokyo could not have eliminated China's lingering fear that Japan will assist the U.S. in the event of a renewed military confrontation in the Taiwan Straits.[38]

Responding to the threats: Strategic alternatives. China's growing capabilities and assertive behavior in the mid-1990s seemed to be nurturing an increasingly hostile, potentially dangerous, international environment. What could China do about it? One alternative would be a determined effort to rapidly augment the PLA's capabilities in the hope that it would more than offset any countermeasure others might adopt. Essentially, this would have represented a bet against the logic of the security dilemma, or at least a gamble on the inefficiency of others' attempts to counterbalance China's efforts via arming or alliance formation. Such "internal balancing" might at first glance seem to have been more plausible than ever in light of China's improving economic situation in the 1990s. But the experience of the early nineties cast doubt on the viability of this approach. Beijing's accelerated military modernization after 1989, a serious effort but one exaggerated in foreign analysts' great leaps of faith about the operational significance of equipment purchases and changes in military doctrine, was not quickly transforming the PLA into a first-class, great power fighting force able to take on all comers.[39] China's economy was simply not yet able to provide the quantity and, more importantly, the quality of resources necessary for a serious effort at militarily outracing its chief competitors who were already demonstrating a determination to respond in kind.[40]

Resource constraints aside, a self-reliant military buildup may have been unattractive because China's leaders were wary of repeating what they understood to be the Soviet Union's foreign policy mistakes. China's economic reforms were enabling the PRC to avoid the "Soviet disease" at home, but its foreign policy in the mid-1990s already seemed to be increasing the risk of suffering the "Soviet disease" abroad.[41] By this I mean a lesser great power whose international behavior, political character, and geographic location lead a broad coalition to view it as more threatening than the world's most powerful state.[42] As the 1990s unfolded and others worried about what they saw as the PRC's disturbing program of military modernization and assertive regional behavior, China faced a real risk that it could find itself, like the cold war Soviet Union, surrounded by states that had decided to align with, rather than balance against, the hegemonic U.S.[43] Indeed, Beijing's foreign policy shift described below specifically sought to discourage others from embracing calls for a new strategy of containment, aimed this time at China.[44]

Because China's leaders believed that the underlying problem they faced in the mid-1990s was others' exaggerated threat perceptions, an attempt to discredit such views was another possible response to their country's deteriorating security situation. Official spokesmen did in fact consistently denounce the "China

threat theory" as absurd—arguing that the PRC's national defense buildup was purely defensive.[45] Chinese analysts emphasized three points—shortcomings in the country's economic and military capabilities,[46] its benign intentions,[47] and the risk that threat exaggeration and attempts to contain an imaginary China threat could result in a tragic self-fulfilling prophecy.[48] By itself, however, Beijing's well articulated effort to discredit "China-threat theory" failed to effectively reassure regional and global actors; "cheap talk" predictably mattered less than uncertainties created by an increasingly powerful China's assertive actions.

A third alternative for the PRC would be to secure an ally (or allies) thereby combining its clout with others to deal with the heightened insecurity it faced in the mid-1990s. But the lack of sufficiently capable partners sharing China's concerns limited the feasibility of this approach. It is true that the one significant bright spot for China's diplomacy early in the decade was an improving relationship with the new Russia, especially as a vendor of military hardware that the PRC could not produce for itself. But the purchase of limited amounts of Russian weaponry could not provide a sufficient counter to the more advanced, and potentially larger military forces that seemed to be arraying themselves against China on issues ranging from the Spratlys to Taiwan to the Diaoyus. Nor would close relations with a struggling Russia enable China to pursue its chief international economic goal—further integration into the global economy (especially accession to the WTO) to ensure that foreign trade and investment would continue to play its role in keeping the country's national engine running. On the contrary, the opportunity costs of cultivating an alliance against the U.S. and its Pacific partners were too high. A turn toward hostile alliance systems would jeopardize the benefits of participation in the relatively open post–cold war international economic system essential to China (and Russia's) continued modernization.[49]

Shared resentment of U.S. international dominance (in Russia over having to accept NATO's eastward expansion, in China over refocused U.S. bilateral alliances in Asia and American leadership of the West's demands that China meet the standards set by the developed industrial states on matters from human rights to market access) did produce rhetoric condemning U.S. hegemony. However, this shared *welt angst* would be no more effective in dealing with the tangible challenges to China's interests in the 1990s than Maoist rhetoric about unity with the third world had been in the 1960s. A militarily and economically ineffectual Russia could not even provide the sort of security benefits that the quasi-alliance ties to the U.S had in the last two decades of the cold war. In short, a Sino-Russian alliance was not a viable option.

The unattractiveness or infeasibility of the obvious alternatives led China instead to adopt policies that, taken together, I label their neo-Bismarckian strategy. These policies aimed to reverse the trend of the mid-1990s whose continuation might have resulted in China confronting an encircling coalition

incorporating virtually all of the major and minor powers in the region as well as the heavily involved U.S. They represent a pragmatic attempt to deal with the consequences of "China-threat" perceptions that an increasingly sophisticated leadership began to view as understandable, though misguided.[50] From mid-1996, China's foreign policy focused on two broad efforts. The first entailed actions, and not just words, to reassure China's neighbors by enhancing the PRC's reputation as a more responsible and cooperative player. The key to this component of China's new approach was a more active embrace of multilateralism and Beijing's widely touted self-restraint during the wave of currency devaluations that accompanied the Asian financial crisis. The second aspect of the new policy turn aimed to reduce the likelihood that others would unite to prevent China's slow but steady rise to the ranks of the great powers. Most importantly by cultivating "strategic partnerships" in its bilateral relations with the world's major states, Beijing hoped to increase the benefits they perceived in working with China and to underscore the opportunity costs of working against it. The following section discusses these two distinctive components of China's grand strategy that emerged most clearly after 1996.

CHINA'S NEO-BISMARCKIAN TURN: REASSURANCE

Multilateralism. China was skeptical of multilateralism in the early post–cold war period. Beijing valued participation in multilateral institutions mainly as a symbol of the PRC's status as an actor that must be included in deliberating matters of regional or global importance. Its skepticism reflected a concern that these forums were subject to manipulation by the United States and Japan to put pressure on China.[51] For solving issues touching on its vital interests, Beijing instead preferred bilateral diplomacy (or unilateral action) backed by the country's growing capabilities. Experience soon suggested, however, that the original calculation of the costs and benefits of multilateralism, and the advantages for China of the bilateral emphasis, was misguided. Even in its dealings with relatively small powers in the South China Sea disputes, bilateralism was not providing Beijing with the leverage it hoped for; when disputes intensified, regional adversaries, whose unity China feared would be manifest in multilateral settings, united anyway.

In the mid-1990s, then, China began to evince a new appreciation of the benefits of multilateralism.[52] Beijing apparently concluded that accepting the constraints that come with working in multilateral settings was preferable to the risk of isolation and encirclement that its aloof stance and assertive behavior were creating.[53] The shift to a more receptive posture on multilateralism was expected to help dampen the "China-threat" perceptions that so worried Beijing; continued participation was expected to further the perception of responsible international behavior more convincingly than the repeated official denun-

ciations of "China-threat theory." Agreeing to the CTBT, cooperating with the effort to promote peace on the Korean peninsula, joining with other leading members of the nonproliferation regime in condemning the South Asian nuclear tests of 1998, more flexibly engaging the ASEAN states, and negotiating agreements on the disputed borders with its former Soviet neighbors, have been part of an embrace of multilateralism that serves China's national interest in countering fears of its unilateral assertiveness.[54] Indeed, multilateral forums, once seen as a potential vehicle for outside pressure, are now seen as offering an opportunity to counter some of the threats to China that were developing in the mid-1990s. Beijing has touted multilateral security arrangements, including arms control, as an alternative to regional developments it saw as dangerous—specifically the strengthening bilateral military alliances (i.e., U.S. ties to Japan and Australia) and deployment of increasingly advanced weapons systems (especially ballistic missile defenses).[55]

Beijing's warmer embrace of multilateralism represents, as Iain Johnston and Paul Evans suggest, a significant shift from past practice.[56] But it should not be mistaken for a conversion to supranational values. Instead, it represents a component of China's neo-Bismarckian grand strategy designed to advance national interests, in this case by reassuring those who might otherwise collaborate against a putative China threat. However real, the embrace is partial and conditional; China continues to resist efforts to place on the multilateral agenda sovereignty disputes it insists can only be resolved through bilateral negotiations.[57]

Currency responsibility. As with the change in its position on multilateralism, China's policy on currency devaluation while the East Asian financial crisis deepened and threatened to spread around the globe since 1997 reflected the broader foreign policy goal of transforming the reputation China was acquiring in 1995–1996 as an irredentist, revisionist, rising power, into the reputation China was cultivating in 1997–1998 as paragon of international responsibility. What would have constituted an economically sensible Chinese reaction to the currency devaluations undertaken by major trading states in East Asia is debatable. Economic considerations aside, however, Beijing expected its announcement and repeated assurances that it was not going to devalue the yuan to maintain the competitiveness of Chinese exports, to pay significant international political dividends. It worked. Foreign analysts intermittently predicted that China would devalue because declining exports were hurting national economic growth at a moment when the regime was undertaking painful domestic reforms. The more they speculated, the greater the payoff for Beijing in terms of a reputation for responsible internationalism that seemed to contrast with the narrowly self-interested approaches of others in the region, and the greater the payoff for Beijing in terms of the increased credibility of its international promises that seemed to contrast with the unfilled or broken promises of others as well. Even if devaluation of the yuan had ultimately become an economic ne-

cessity, the longer China could delay the decision the more likely it would have been able to portray the step as a result of the others' failure to assume their responsibilities for regional economic health (especially Japan) while China had shouldered more than its share.[58] In the event, Beijing did not devalue during the financial crisis. Although a few analysts argued that the decision reflected not altruism but rather economic self-interest, China had nevertheless succeeded in reaping a significant political benefit.

CHINA'S NEO-BISMARCKIAN TURN: GREAT POWER DIPLOMACY

Actions to reassure others and transform China's international reputation are important features of Beijing's current grand strategy, but China's principal focus remains its bilateral relations with the world's other major powers. In this respect, the neo-Bismarckian turn in the PRC's foreign policy gradually emerged in 1996 when Beijing began to label its preferred arrangement with major powers "strategic partnerships."[59] Although the invocation of this precise term would vary, the approach to bilateral diplomacy it represented endured. China has attempted to build a series of relationships with the other major powers that enhance its attractiveness as a partner while maximizing its own leverage and flexibility by not firmly aligning with any particular state or group of states. Rather than explicitly identifying friends and enemies among principal actors on the international scene, China sought to establish partnerships with each as a way of binding their interests to China's and reducing the likelihood that any would be able to cobble together a hostile coalition. Asserting that the old categories of ally and adversary were a relic of power politics that prevailed until the end of the cold war, Beijing attempted to link itself to each of the world's other major powers in order to increase the costs they would face if they took actions that ran contrary to China's interests.[60] Cooperation in improving the opportunities for foreigners to benefit from trade with and investment in the China market, and Beijing's cooperation on managing the security problems of weapons proliferation and terrorism, are among some of the more important benefits that great power partners would put at risk if they opted to press China on matters sensitive enough to sour bilateral relations.[61]

Great-power partnerships were not only hailed as a force for international peace, stability, and mutually beneficial economic relations. As repeatedly emphasized in discussing the first one established with Russia, they were also expected to serve as a vehicle for fostering the emergence of a multipolar international system in which the U.S. would no longer be so dominant—a result that China sought to hasten.[62] This partnership approach had the added value for China of enabling it to pursue its interest in offsetting American dominance without resorting to the directly confrontational (and given the current power

distribution, probably futile) alternative of straightforward counterhegemonic balancing. Indeed, by eschewing alliances and instead cultivating strategic partnerships, Beijing not only hoped to avoid antagonizing others, and perhaps exacerbating concerns about its international intentions. It also anticipated a propaganda advantage insofar as it could portray U.S. foreign policy as stubbornly anachronistic, criticizing Washington's effort to reinvigorate, expand, and redirect its alliances in Asia and Europe as reflecting a cold war mentality that others were discarding.[63]

What is the content of a strategic partnership, and with whom are they being established? In practice, the essential elements are a commitment to promoting stable relationships and extensive economic intercourse, muting disagreements about domestic politics in the interest of working together on matters of shared concern in international diplomacy, and routinizing the frequent exchange of official visits, especially those by representatives of each country's military and regular summit meetings between top government leaders. Although resting on some of the same principles of mutual respect and noninterference that constituted the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" set forth in the mid-1950s, strategic partnerships are arrangements that go well beyond mere tolerance. Beginning in 1996, China has pursued such partnerships with Russia and the United States, but developments in bilateral relations with Europe and Japan suggest that it may expect others to follow.

China-Russia. The formation of a strategic partnership with Russia set the pattern for China's preferred approach to bilateral relations with the major powers. Boris Yeltsin's initial state visit to China in December 1992 had laid the groundwork for improving Sino-Russian ties in the post-Soviet era and resulted in the September 1994 joint announcement during Jiang Zemin's return visit that China and Russia were establishing a "constructive partnership." At a third summit meeting in Beijing in April 1996, the relationship was redefined as a "strategic cooperative partnership."[64] The broader significance of the term used was not immediately obvious, and some wondered whether the arrangement was in fact simply a step toward an old-fashioned alliance, especially since it emerged amidst sharpening Sino-Russian concerns about U.S. international dominance in Europe and Asia (NATO's eastward expansion; Washington's recommitment to a broad security role in the Western Pacific as well as the March 1996 aircraft carrier maneuvers demonstrating an enduring unofficial U.S. support for Taiwan). For reasons outlined above, however, an alliance targeting the U.S. was not particularly attractive to China or Russia.[65] Nevertheless, their shared anxiety about the role of an unchecked American superpower provided a solid foundation for this most stable of the partnerships that Beijing would cultivate.[66] Indeed, during the first decade of the post–cold war era, Sino-Russian anxiety about U.S. capabilities and intentions deepened, not only in response to NATO expansion and Washington's strengthened ties to American allies in East

Asia, but also in response to what these partners saw as the U.S. penchant for foreign military intervention and its ever clearer determination to deploy ballistic missile defenses.[67]

Because Moscow and Beijing each have territories over which they seek to secure sovereign control (for Russia, Chechnya; for China, Taiwan and perhaps someday Tibet or Xinjiang), both have become increasingly wary of the role that a more fearless U.S. might decide to play.[68] U.S. missile defense plans reinforced the Sino-Russian concerns about continued "hegemony" that American interventionist behavior nurtured.[69] Ballistic missile defenses pose a serious challenge for Russia and China insofar as they raise the possibility of altering the military-strategic context in ways that would be distinctly disadvantageous for both. In the present strategic setting, Russian and Chinese missile forces offer an affordable offset to the advantages the U.S. military enjoys on the modern battlefield. In a world with extensive missile defenses, Russia and China would have to worry about the possibility that great power strategic competition would be decided in an arena of expensive, advanced, conventional armaments where U.S. economic and technological strengths give it a huge and, for the foreseeable future, enduring advantage. If so, both Russia and China might have to shoulder a much heavier military burden simply to maintain their current levels of security in an extended era of American unipolarity.[70]

Such shared security concerns have become the basis for a robust Sino-Russian strategic partnership despite problems that plague their bilateral relations (most prominently, profoundly disappointing economic ties and recurrent tensions over the high profile of Chinese nationals in Russia's far eastern regions).[71] President Putin's July 2000 state visit to Beijing repeated a pattern Yeltsin and Jiang established in the mid-1990s—reemphasis on the countries' interest in opposing and hastening the end of American-led unipolarity (warning against outside intervention in others' internal affairs and against deploying allegedly destabilizing missile defenses) but no breakthrough on deepening a bilateral economic relationship that continues to be limited by Russia's enduring weakness.[72] Because its ties to Russia provide military-strategic benefits (permitting China to turn its attention to security concerns in the East and South, complicating U.S. attempts to isolate Beijing on matters such as arms control and the hard sovereignty principle behind its claim to Taiwan) and also access to weapons it can neither produce itself nor purchase elsewhere, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership remains vital to the PRC.[73] But because the relationship does not provide the economic benefits necessary for China to sustain its great-power aspirations, and because of remaining mutual suspicions rooted in recent history as well as the belief that rivalry between big neighbors is natural and will be hard to avoid once Russia recovers from its economic downturn, the PRC hedges its bets. China limits its ties to Russia by drawing the line short of alliance while also working to build partnerships with other great powers, espe-

cially those that can better serve its immediate grand-strategic interest in economic modernization.[74] In this effort, managing China's relations with the potentially threatening U.S. remains the top priority.[75]

China-U.S. At the October 1997 summit in Washington, the PRC and the U.S. agreed to work toward a "constructive strategic partnership." The term had been chosen, after some haggling, in order to [1] indicate that the countries would work together to solve problems threatening peace and stability (thus, a partnership); [2] underscore the significance of this bilateral relationship for broader regional and international security (thus, strategic); and, [3] distinguish it from the closer ties already in place with Russia (thus, the need to work on making strained bilateral relations more constructive).[76] The announcement and subsequent discussion emphasized the mutual economic benefits of exchange between the world's largest developed and developing countries, the advantages of close consultation on political and security issues (including establishing a Beijing-Washington hotline, regular meetings between cabinet level officials, exchange visits by military personnel, joint efforts on counter-proliferation, environmental protection, and drug enforcement) as well as the importance of not permitting differences on any single issue (e.g., human rights, trade disputes) to obscure the big picture of common strategic interests.[77]

Just as some observers at first misinterpreted the Sino-Russian strategic partnership as a way station to an alliance, some mistakenly anticipated that the Sino-American strategic partnership was intended to herald an era of close cooperation that would preclude traditional great power conflict. Some who viewed the U.S. as a counterweight to China, worried that Washington might subordinate their interests to the exigencies of a Sinocentric Asia policy. Diplomatic pleasantries and lofty summit rhetoric aside, however, the announced effort to build a Sino-American strategic partnership was actually a search for a workable framework to manage the significant differences and conflicts of interest between the two most active major powers in Asia after the cold war. For its part, China had no intention of abandoning its aspiration for increased international influence, even if that conflicted with an American interest in preserving its primacy. Instead, strategic partnership with the U.S. was designed to better enable China to cope with the potentially dangerous constraints of American hegemony during China's rise to great-power status. Partnership made cooperation conditional, linking it to American behavior that did not infringe on core Chinese security interests and clarifying the benefits a hostile U.S. might forfeit.

Since 1997 Beijing has indicated that a souring of the relationship might lead it to: (1) give preferential economic treatment to other partners (Japan or Europe); (2) complicate U.S. diplomacy by exercising the Chinese veto in the UN Security Council; (3) be less circumspect in its export controls on sensitive military technologies (especially nuclear and missile technologies) to states about which the U.S. has strong concerns; (4) delay its participation in agreements

that comprise the nonproliferation regime, especially the Missile Technology Control Regime and the proposed agreement to cut off fissile material production; (5) limit its cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, especially in Central Asia; (6) play a less helpful role in containing regional tension in Korea or South Asia.[78] China, in short, saw partnership as a way to realize its strategic interest in linkage—highlighting the price the U.S. may incur if its actions reduce Beijing's willingness to play a constructive role on economically, diplomatically, or militarily important matters. Given the material advantages of the U.S., such costs may not much constrain American policymakers. But for now, limited leverage may simply be the best of a bad lot of options available to a relatively weak China.[79]

During Jiang Zemin's 1997 visit to Washington, Chinese and U.S. leaders both expressed the hope that in working toward the constructive strategic partnership bilateral relations would evolve in a positive direction. At first, however, the priority was on avoiding renewed confrontation (such as that in the Taiwan Strait during 1995–96) rather than finally resolving existing conflicts or promoting still more ambitious cooperation.[80] Yet even with this modest aim, and despite a successful follow-up return visit to China by President Clinton in June 1998, events soon began to pose a stiff test of the still "under construction" Sino-American strategic partnership that prompted a reconsideration of its value both in Beijing and Washington.

American support for the partnership began to erode dramatically by late 1998. Disillusionment followed from disappointment with China's renewed clampdown on political and religious dissidents, accusations of Chinese corporate and military espionage aimed at acquiring advanced missile and nuclear warhead technologies, and the belief that after the accidental U.S. bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade the Communist Party leaders had cynically fanned the flames of anti-Americanism resulting in violent demonstrations targeting the U.S. embassy in Beijing. Although high-level American envoys to China still privately invoked the term "strategic partnership" during their meetings with PRC leaders, in the U.S. the phrase virtually disappeared as a public way to refer to Sino-American relations, except when used pejoratively by critics of Clinton administration policy.[81]

In China, however, the upshot of the ongoing turmoil in Sino-American relations after 1998 was different. Although the unexpected downturn in relations with the U.S. so soon after the two successful Jiang-Clinton summits provoked a sharp internal debate, by late summer 1999 China's top-level leaders apparently decided that the grand strategy in which great power partnerships were a central feature would remain in place.[82]

The different reactions in Beijing and Washington to the troubles that beset bilateral relations after late 1998 are partly explained by contrasting visions of the strategic partnership. The American understanding of a "constructive" rela-

tionship included not only the anticipation of growing international cooperation, but also the expectation that in the interest of good relations China's leaders would at least temper their domestic political practices in ways that the U.S. would find more palatable. China's expectations were quite different, however. Strategic partnership with the U.S. was a means for advancing China's own interests. In this view, because China's interests paralleled those of the U.S. on some major international issues, the partnership appropriately facilitated cooperation. Parallel interests led to joint condemnation of India's nuclear tests in 1998 (for Washington, a general interest in nonproliferation; for Beijing, specific concerns about a potential military rivalry with India).[83]

Parallel interests also led to coordinated efforts to restrain North Korea's missile program (for Washington, an interest in limiting the capabilities of a "rogue" state; for Beijing, an interest in reducing the risks of war on its border and eliminating the rationale Pyongyang was providing for advocates of early U.S. deployment of theater and national ballistic missile defenses). But since a central purpose of partnership with the U.S. was also to facilitate continued economic development necessary for China to become a genuine great power, Beijing was not willing to sacrifice what it saw as a vital national interest in preserving a key aspect of the foundation for growth—the domestic political stability it associated with the one-party communist rule that so troubled Americans.[84] Simply put, China's understanding of strategic partnership was that it meant a relationship both sides viewed as important enough to sustain despite such areas of disagreement.[85]

Given this Chinese understanding, among the small group of relatively insulated Communist Party leaders who determine the country's foreign policy, support for working toward a constructive strategic partnership with the U.S. endured. It did so despite the intensifying American criticism of China's human rights record, the release of the Cox Committee report alleging a long history of Chinese espionage in the U.S., the double embarrassment for Premier Zhu Rongji of first having the proposed terms for China's accession to WTO that he carried with him to Washington in April 1999 rejected, and then having its major concessions to the U.S. revealed before he even returned to China, and finally the May 1999 American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.[86]

To be sure, these troubling events did spur a vigorous debate among China's foreign policy elite about the feasibility of working toward a constructive strategic partnership with the U.S. Indeed, after the May 1999 embassy bombing there was at least brief consideration of shifting to a new line that emphasized straightforward opposition to American hegemony by uniting closely with Russia and the developing world.[87] Such a shift would have amounted to a change of grand strategy for China. By late summer 1999, however, a consensus had formed. While China's leaders embraced the internal critics' more suspicious view of U.S. intentions, they also acknowledged that an important lesson of the

war in Kosovo was that the American advantage in relative capabilities was proving remarkably robust and, therefore, that the transition to a multipolar world would take longer than previously anticipated.[88] Under such circumstances, China's own interests led them back to the simple conclusion that there was simply no feasible substitute for developing a positive working relationship with the U.S.[89]

In part this conclusion was based on the bracing realities of relative military power and the enduring economic importance of the U.S. for China's modernization. In part, however, it was also a reaction to newly troublesome developments on the Taiwan front during the summer of 1999, when the island's president, Lee Teng-hui, publicly floated his idea that ties with the PRC should be viewed as "special state-to-state" relations. This stance seemed to inch the island further in the direction of independence and predictably elicited a strong reaction from the mainland.[90] The mini-crisis that resulted had the potential to drive a final nail in the coffin of the Sino-American partnership that seemed to be on the verge of total collapse following the Belgrade bombing just one month earlier. In the event, the Clinton administration's carefully calculated reaction contributed to the PRC's decision to salvage the Sino-American strategic partnership. President Clinton sent envoys to both Beijing and Taipei who not only urged Beijing to act with restraint, but also warned Taipei that there were limits to the conditions under which it could count on support from Washington—a tacit warning against provocative moves toward independence.[91]

With a presidential election on Taiwan looming in March 2000, and the possibility it could trigger a serious crisis if it led to the victory of a candidate committed to independence, China could ill afford to sacrifice the sort of leverage its working relationship with the U.S. seemed to provide. Writing off the strategic partnership with the U.S. would not only complicate China's ability to enjoy the full fruits of participation in the international economy and clearly put China in the cross-hairs of an incomparably more powerful U.S. military. It would also free the U.S. to further upgrade its security ties with Taiwan since there would no longer be valued links with China on matters such as proliferation or Korea that would be put at risk. By the time the CCP's top leaders gathered at the seaside resort of Beidaihe in August 1999 for their annual policy review, they evidently concluded that the partnership approach to relations with the U.S. and the opportunities for linkage that it created still served their nation's vital interests in development and unification; it therefore would remain a central feature of the foreign policy approach China had embraced since 1996.[92]

China-Europe. In order to further reduce the likelihood of confronting a broad coalition united by its hostility toward China, after April 1996 Beijing also intensified its efforts to build partnerships with other actors it envisions as key players in a future multipolar world—the European states and especially

nearby Japan. As a practical matter, however, China's cultivation of bilateral relations with these partners has differed from its approach to Russia or the United States. And apparently because it views the broader effects on international security as smaller than those obtained through its relations with Russia and the U.S., Beijing refrained from using the term "strategic" to describe these partnerships, though in practice they establish many of the same linkages (e.g., the lure of mutually beneficial economic arrangements and the promise of constructive efforts to address major international problems such as the Asian financial crisis and tensions on the Korean peninsula). China has in fact chosen a distinct label for its ties with each of these other major powers—"long-term comprehensive partnership" with France; "comprehensive cooperative partnership" with Britain; "trustworthy partnership" with Germany; "long-term stable and constructive partnership" with the EU; "friendly and cooperative partnership" with Japan.[93]

Because a united Europe does not yet formulate a single foreign policy, China has worked separately on partnerships with its leading states (France, Britain, Germany) while also dealing with the representatives of the EU as a whole.[94] The lure of upgrading bilateral relations with China and especially the interest in improving economic ties, induced first France (1997), and then each of the other leading European powers to stake out a less confrontational posture on the PRC's human rights policy and agree to ease the conditions for China's trade with Europe.[95] While cultivating its partnerships with France, Britain, and Germany, in 1998 the tempo of building China's links with the EU also accelerated. The fanfare that accompanied the first China-EU summit in April 1998 (labeled the beginning of "a new era" in relations with China), the announced plans "to intensify high-level contacts, including possible annual summits,"[96] the EU's June 29, 1998 meeting that approved a new China policy "establishing a comprehensive partnership,"[97] and a series of visits to Europe by China's top three leaders (Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Zhu Rongji) suggest that Beijing may be laying the groundwork to use the term "strategic partnership" to describe its relations with the EU if it is ever convinced that the entity is able to speak with a weighty single voice in international affairs.

China-Japan. In comparison to its ties with the major European states, China's political relationship with Japan, though recently improving, has advanced more slowly. Because Japan does not yet play an international political or military role commensurate with its capabilities and because China remains nervous about the uncertain prospect of Japan departing from its familiar role as a limited and constrained junior ally of the U.S., the approach to a partnership with Japan has been somewhat ambivalent. In 1997, when Beijing was celebrating smooth cooperation with Britain on the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, and issuing joint statements with France's President Chirac about shared interests in building a multipolar world, China was still expressing its displea-

sure with what it saw as signs of an anti-China undercurrent in Japan—renewed controversy about the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, thinly veiled China-threat references inserted in Tokyo's Defense White Papers, and especially the revised guidelines for the U.S.-Japan security relationship.[98] Even so, China also emphasized Japan's self-interest in fostering better bilateral relations in an increasingly competitive global economy, an argument given a fillip as the spreading Asian financial crisis after summer 1997 compounded the challenges already confronting a stalled Japanese economy.[99] In 1998, as the twentieth anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty loomed, China indicated its own expectation that "[t]he two sides will construct from the high plane of orienting to the 21st Century a new framework of relations of the two big neighboring nations."[100] Yet, because of the historical legacy of Sino-Japanese animosity and because China either believes Japan cannot or should not play a leadership role on most international-strategic matters, Beijing reportedly resisted Tokyo's private suggestions that their extensive bilateral ties be described as a "strategic" partnership.[101]

In early 1998 China's asking price for announcing any sort of Sino-Japanese partnership seemed to be a more convincing display of contrition for Japan's behavior in China during WWII, and ironclad assurances that Tokyo would not become involved in any future Taiwan Straits crisis under the terms of the revised U.S.-Japan security guidelines. Beijing may have anticipated that an economically troubled Japan, needing a viable partner in the region, would so covet improved ties that it would be willing to accommodate China. Japan resisted. At the November 1998 Tokyo summit meeting between President Jiang and Prime Minister Obuchi, Japan refused to go beyond previous public apologies for its wartime role in China.[102] It also refused to go beyond its basic Taiwan policy recognizing Beijing as the sole government of China or to offer promises about actions it might decide to take in unforeseeable future circumstances. The result was that no ceremony was held to sign a communiqué. Instead, in his post-summit speech Jiang simply announced that the two countries had "agreed that we should establish a friendly and cooperative partnership in which we make efforts together for peace and development."[103] Observers immediately labeled the Chinese president's visit to Japan a disappointment, contrasting with his highly publicized successes in other countries.

Yet the apparent setback at the 1998 summit seems to have been small and temporary. Indeed, in substance if not in name the Sino-Japanese relationship continued to develop most of the characteristics of a strategic partnership—extensive economic ties, regular summit meetings including reciprocal visits by top government officials, and even military-to-military exchanges. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji's visit to Japan in October 2000 seemed to represent a renewed effort to boost the partnership and to further mute some of the problems that had marred Jiang's 1998 trip.[104] To the extent the two sides are able to move be-

yond their differences about dealing with the historical legacy of Japan's aggression in the mid-twentieth century, it becomes easier for Beijing to establish the sorts of linkages it hopes will influence Japan's readiness to cooperate with any American regional effort to promote policies that are deemed "anti-China." Of course, even a robust Sino-Japanese partnership cannot enable Beijing to shape debates in Tokyo about matters such as missile defenses and Taiwan as effectively as Japan's long-standing ally in Washington. But to the extent China succeeds in cultivating a sound working relationship with Japan on important regional security concerns and offers attractive economic opportunities to vested Japanese interests, it expects to at least alter the cost-benefit calculations underlying Tokyo's foreign policy choices.

CONCLUSION

China's emerging grand strategy links political, economic and military means in an effort to advance the PRC's twin goals of security and great-power status. Politically, China pursues multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to mute threat perceptions and to convince others of the benefits of engagement and the counterproductive consequences of containment. Economically, China nurtures relations with diverse trading partners and sources of foreign investment, weaving a network of economic relations to limit the leverage of any single partner in setting the terms of China's international economic involvement. Militarily, China seeks to create some breathing space for modernization of its armed forces. To the extent the strategy mitigates perceptions of an overly assertive China, it mutes the security dilemma dynamics that might otherwise (as in the mid-1990s) lead others to respond in ways that offset even measured improvement in the quantity and quality of the PLA's capabilities. And to the extent the strategy facilitates the country's economic development through integration with the global economy, it promises to increase access to advanced technologies essential for China's military if it hopes to move beyond the short-term, second-best solution of importing Russian equipment (most of which falls short of the best available) and attempting to reverse engineer Chinese versions.[105]

China's emerging grand strategy, then, integrates available means with preferred ends. Yet the short period in which its logic has been evident raises the question of the strategy's durability. As noted above, the approach has already survived at least one tough test—the challenge serious Sino-American conflicts posed to one of its central features (great power partnerships) during the first half of 1999. Whether it can survive the repeated tests it will surely face in coming years, such as the tensions following the collision between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter in April 2001, remains to be seen. There are, however, broad domestic-political and international-power considerations that suggest the strategy may have staying power.

Elite support. First, China's current grand strategy seems politically sustainable within the elite coalition that shapes China's foreign policy. The new approach arguably represents a viable compromise between more exclusively "soft" and "hard" lines, each of which were partly discredited by the events of the mid-1990s generally, and the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995–96 in particular. After Washington had surprised and angered Beijing by granting Lee Teng-hui a visa in May 1995 that enabled him to continue his campaign to raise Taiwan's international profile, China's leaders quickly coalesced behind a decision to more clearly warn Taiwan (and the U.S.) about the dangers inherent in even small steps toward independence. Beijing shifted from the softer reunification line emphasizing cross-strait dialogue set forth in Jiang Zemin's January 1995 speech to a harder line emphasizing action (including military exercises and missile tests).[106]

As noted above, however, the international ramifications of China's heavy emphasis on coercion proved troubling. By March 1996, "soft" diplomacy and "hard" coercion had each revealed their limited usefulness. Against this background, China's subsequent, more nuanced foreign policy line has obvious attractions. Insofar as it steers a middle course, the present approach appeals to those, especially among the military elite, who worry not only about the willingness of the Foreign Ministry to compromise in the face of foreign, especially American, pressure but who also recognize the difficulties China faces in developing a capability to offset potentially threatening U.S. power.[107] For others, especially younger civilian elites affiliated with the Foreign Ministry, the strategy's emphasis on more active diplomacy, including multilateralism and great power partnerships, provides an alternative to relying too heavily on coercive power as a tool to ensure China's interests, an approach that experience suggested would evoke a clearly counterproductive international reaction.

International-power realities. As has often been noted, China's contemporary leaders, like their predecessors, prize the practice of realpolitik.[108] Beijing's keen sensitivity to the importance of relative capabilities is a second reason to anticipate the durability of the current strategy. Because China's ability to improve its international power position is sharply limited both by the burden of a still developing economy and by the long head start of its advanced industrial rivals, the foreign policy line Beijing has pursued since 1996 is likely continue for at least several more decades. Contemplating the sorts of changes in China's circumstances that would lead Beijing to discard its present grand strategy any sooner suggests why.

The current approach might be abandoned under two scenarios—one in which external constraints became much tighter, and one in which they became much looser.[109] If China, while still relatively weak, found itself facing dire threats from one or more great powers, a situation similar to that which the PRC faced during much of the cold war, Beijing would be constrained to

reprise that era's simple balancing strategy—relying on China's nuclear deterrent as the ultimate security guarantee while attempting to secure the backing of a powerful ally, perhaps transforming one or more of its strategic partnerships into a straightforward security entente.[110] Alternatively, if China's relative capabilities were to increase dramatically, or if Beijing concluded that the system's other most capable actors no longer posed much of a constraint on action, it might believe that it no longer needed to reassure others or prevent their collaboration. China might then shift to a strategy that more assertively attempted to reshape the international system according to its own preferences. Such a relaxation of the external constraints on China's foreign policy could result if unexpectedly successful economic and military modernization rapidly elevated the PRC to superpower status or if China's most capable competitors proved unable or unwilling to remain internationally engaged. Under such circumstances, China would not be free to do as it pleased on the world scene, but it would have greater latitude than it now does to follow preference rather than necessity.[111]

For the foreseeable future, however, neither of these more extreme alternatives seems as plausible as a slow but steady increase in China's economic and military clout within an East Asian region where rivals remain vigilant.[112] Indeed, China's analysts prudently anticipate a protracted and multifaceted struggle between American efforts to prolong the present era of unipolarity and other countries (especially China, Russia, and France) attempting to hasten the transition to a multipolar world.[113] China's leaders understand that their country's military capabilities will lag significantly behind those of the U.S. for at least several decades[114] They now also understand more clearly than in the early 1990s that even though the PLA's growing capabilities remain limited and even if, as Beijing insists, its intentions are benign, neighboring countries naturally harbor doubts about China's future international role that the U.S. can decide to exploit if it wants to hem China in.[115] The need to minimize the likelihood of provoking such a dangerous deterioration in its international environment is an important reason why some variation of China's current grand strategy is likely to endure. Beijing faces strong incentives to continue to rely on policies that strive to advance its interests without relying on methods (unrestrained military armament or explicit alliance) that would alarm potential military rivals and alienate valued economic partners.[116]

China's current grand strategy may well remain attractive to leaders in Beijing. What, then, are its implications for international security? The process by which a similarly complex and subtle approach, crafted by Bismarck, came unraveled in Europe at the turn of the last century suggests that there may be reason to worry about the hidden weaknesses and dangers of what currently seems to be a benign a policy that benefits both China and its neighbors. The chief danger, as noted above, is not likely to be an echo of the sort of aggressive na-

tionalism that reared its head in late Imperial and Nazi Germany. Chinese nationalism is a potent force to which the country's legitimacy-challenged leaders must attend, but it is a nationalism that focuses on protecting the territorial and political integrity of the country as delimited at the close of World War II. Whatever the bitterness about the ravages of imperialism China suffered during the Qing dynasty, this has not resulted in demands to redress such historically distant grievances. China's principal claims to territory in the South and East China Seas (the Spratlys, Taiwan, the Diaoyus) are not evidence of a revisionist, expansionist mentality, but rather Beijing's determination to restore what it believes are the outlines of the de jure status quo. As Thomas Christensen's chapter about the dynamics of the security dilemma in the China-U.S.-Japan triangle suggests, however, even policies to preserve the status quo may contribute to confrontational relations (especially when the unavoidable consequences of anarchy are compounded by historically grounded mutual suspicion, as in the Sino-Japanese relationship he describes). Yet China's behavior since the mid-1990s suggests that its leaders have attempted to mute the intensity of the counterproductive security dilemma its behavior had been exacerbating. Since the security dilemma can be managed, but not eliminated as long as the condition of anarchy endures, even self-interested efforts to cope with its effects should be welcomed.

The real danger, or more troubling possibility, is not that China will abandon its neo-Bismarckian strategy in favor of an ambitious, expansionist crusade but that unintended consequences might follow from the strategy's success. Like its nineteenth-century forerunner, the neo-Bismarckian approach entails extensive and intensive linkages among states with competing and common interests. As long as relations are more cooperative than conflictive, fostering tight interdependence may be attractive. But the risk in this sort of arrangement is that when problems emerge they ripple through the system in unpredictable ways that defy efforts at management. Should China's relations with any of the major powers significantly deteriorate, especially if the international system finally does become truly multipolar, the remaining partnerships might be reinterpreted as de facto alliances. States intimately entangled, unable to remain aloof, might feel compelled to choose sides. As noted above, because international norms, economic self-interest, and the advent of nuclear weapons have dramatically altered the role of force for resolving interstate dispute, a disastrous "fail deadly," scenario—a twenty-first-century version of July 1914—seems implausible. An era of renewed international division into rival economic and military blocs would be unfortunate enough. The largely benign consequences of a prudently self-interested China's adherence to its neo-Bismarckian grand strategy in the present era of low tension should not obscure the complexity and challenges such an approach poses for all drawn into its orbit.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I thank Cheng Chen and Tang Wei for their research assistance. I also thank the Smith Richardson Foundation as well as the Center for East Asian Studies and the Research Foundation at the University of Pennsylvania for their financial support.

In addition to cited publications, this chapter draws on approximately 80 hours of interviews the author conducted in Beijing (65 hours in June–July 1998, March–April and October, 2000), Tokyo (15 hours in March 1999). The interview subjects (promised confidentiality) were civilian officials and military officers, as well as advisers and independent analysts. In Tokyo, these included individuals affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nomura Institute, the Okazaki Institute, Japan's self-defense forces, journalists, and academics. In Beijing, these included individuals affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of National Defense; the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences; the PLA's National Defense University; the China Institute for International Strategic Studies; the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, the Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, the China Institute of International Studies, the China Society for Strategy and Management Research; four institutes within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Institute of American Studies, Institute for the Study of World Politics and Economics, Institute for Asian-Pacific Studies, Institute of East European, Russian, and Central Asian Studies), and scholars at Beijing University, Qinghua University, and the Foreign Affairs College.

ENDNOTES

1. Grand strategy here refers to the distinctive combination of military, political, and economic means a state employs to pursue its goals within the constraints posed by the international environment. national goals, as well as the means to pursue them, vary. at a minimum, states seek "to survive and flourish in an anarchic and often threatening international order that oscillates between peace and war." see Paul Kennedy, "Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition," in Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 6; see also Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1979): 91–92. Some states, however, have interests that are more expansive. Although few are as ambitious as history's aspiring hegemons (Napoleon's France, Hitler's Germany, Hirohito's Japan), the world's leading states have usually sought to shape, and not just survive in, their international environment, typically in ways that will further enhance the wealth, power, and status of their country.

2. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5–51; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18 , no. 2 (Fall 1993); Waltz, "Intimations of Multipolarity," typescript, March 1998.

3. Moreover, minority peoples, whose loyalty to Beijing is questionable, populate China's border regions (especially Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia). This raises concerns about neighboring countries exploiting ethnic unrest if relations with China deteriorate.

4. Swaine and Tellis refer to China's current grand strategy as "the calculative strategy," also emphasizing that China's approach is one for a state that faces a very tough challenge in trying to become a peer competitor of the currently dominant U.S. See Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. xi. On the alternative possibilities for adjusting relations between a dominant and rising power, see Robert Powell, *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

5. For an application of Bismarckian strategy to the case of the U.S. in the post–cold war world, see Josef Joffe, "'Bismarck or Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 94–117. Joffe discusses the strategy's appropriateness for a dominant, geopolitically insulated state. China may be a better candidate for analogy with Bismarck's Germany, since it lacks the geographical separation of the U.S. and is a rising, but not yet dominant state.

6. For a more detailed discussion of these theoretical expectations and China's role in the post–cold war world, see Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," *International Security*, 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98): 36–73.

7. See, for example, Arthur Waldron, "Statement of Dr. Arthur Waldron." *House Armed Services Committee*, June 21 2000, http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/00–06–21waldron.html. See also Edward Friedman. "The Challenge of a Rising China: Another Germany?" In *Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century*, edited by Robert J. Lieber. (New York: Addison Wesley, 1997).

8. I thank Walter McDougall and Marc Trachtenberg for their criticisms that helped me refine my thinking about the China-Bismarck analogy. On the usefulness of historical analogies applied to China, see Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, "Will China Join an Encompassing Coalition with Other Great Powers?," in Richard N. Rosecrance, ed., *Creating an Encompassing Coalition to Prevent International Conflict* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp. 298–314. For a less sanguine view of China embracing a Bismarckian approach, see comments of U.S. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, in "The Role of Armed Forces in Regional Security Cooperation." *Pacific Forum, CSIS, PacNet 34*, August 25 2000, http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/PacNet-082500.htm.

9. Kissinger's characterization of post–Franco-Prussian War Germany might well be applied to post–cold war China: "Once Germany was transformed from a potential victim of aggression to a threat to the European equilibrium, the remote contingency of the other states of Europe uniting against Germany became a real possibility." (*Diplomacy*, p. 134). For an overview of these themes, see Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstsone, 1994): 122–123, 125, 134, 158. On Bismarck's diplomatic efforts, see also W. N. Medlicott, and Dorothy K. Covney, (eds.), *Bismarck and Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972); D. G. Williamson, *Bismarck and Germany, 1862–1890* (New York: Longman, 1986); Theodore S. Hamerow. "Introduction." In *Otto Von Bismarck: A Historical Assessment*, edited by Theodore S. Hamerow, xxii–xix (Lexington,

MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972); George O. Kent, *Bismarck and His Times* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978).

10. Medlicott and Covney, *Bismarck and Europe*, pp. 178–179 ; Williamson, *Bismarck and Germany, 1862–1890*, p. 65; Hamerow, *Otto Von Bismarck: A Historical Assessment*, p. xv; Kent, *Bismarck and His Times*, p. 104.

11. Kissinger argues that the strategy ultimately proved unsustainable even for Bismarck. See *Diplomacy*, pp. 127–128, 136, 146, 160–161, 166.

12. On the nuclear revolution, see Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). In addition, and only partly related to the advent of nuclear weapons, norms against the use of military force to achieve political objectives are stronger today than in Bismarck's era. Although such norms are no guarantee that states will refrain from warfighting, among the great powers the brutal lessons of twentieth-century military conflicts reinforce normative pressures, making it a less attractive option than in earlier eras and one that increasingly demands extensive justification before both domestic and international audiences.

13. For the strong form of this argument, see Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1985); see also Steven Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the cold war," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, no. 2 (1990): 1–51. Cf. Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," *International Security* 18 no. 2 (Fall 1993): 125–153. The collapse of the Soviet Union may provide the clearest evidence of the importance of economic competitiveness rather than control of resources in the contemporary era.

14. My Chinese interlocutors noted, and some lamented, the lack of any universal appeal in their country's current pragmatic, eclectic socioeconomic program that is tailored to its particular problems. They explicitly contrast this with the revolutionary socialist paradigms of the Soviet Union and Maoist China, as well as with the universality of political and economic principles that underpin what Joseph Nye labels contemporary America's "soft power." See Joseph S. Nye Jr. and William A. Owens. "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 3 (March/April 1996): 20–36; Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.-Decline or Renewal," *Foreign Affairs* 67, no. 2 (Winter 1988): 76–96.

15. China's borders served as the venue for the superpowers' three biggest foreign military operations of the cold war era (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan) as well as the site for several escalation-threatening crises between Beijing and the system's duopolists (the Taiwan Straits during the 1950s, the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, and perhaps Indochina in 1979). China's international behavior suggested it was the unusual case where structural constraints are so tight, that personality and national attributes need play only a distant secondary role in analyzing its foreign policy. For a debate about the usefulness and limitations of structural-realist explanations of foreign policy, see Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why *Not* Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996): 7–53; Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is not Foreign Policy," *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996): 54–57; and Elman's re-

sponse, pp. 58–61. See also the debate about the neorealist research program contained in the *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4 (December 1997).

16. See Avery Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World," *International Organization* 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 39–72.

17. For a survey of China's varying willingness to set aside differences in its negotiations with the U.S. see Robert S. Ross, *Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

18. As indigenous resistance efforts garnered international support that hamstrung Moscow's position in Afghanistan and the efforts of its ally, Hanoi, to consolidate its position in Cambodia, Beijing's sense of alarm about events on its periphery ebbed. Ahead of their western counterparts, some Chinese analysts even began to argue that the Soviets had, to use Paul Kennedy's term, entered the phase of imperial overstretch, suggesting that the shortcomings of the Soviet economy were finally limiting Moscow's ability to meet the ever-escalating demands (quantitative and qualitative) of military competition in the bipolar world. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage, 1987); Wenqing Xie, "U.S.-Soviet Military Contention in the Asia-Pacific Region, *Shijie Zhishi*, 16 (March 1987), in Foreign Broadcast Information Service [hereafter FBIS], March 31, 1987, pp. A2, A5; Bei Jia, "Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Asian Pacific Region," *Guoji Yanti Yanjiu*, April 13, 1987, FBIS, May 14, 1987, pp. C8-C14.

19. For literature on the initial wave of post-Mao military modernization, see Paul H. B. Godwin, *The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); Ellis Joffe, *The Chinese Army after Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Charles D. Lovejoy and Bruce W. Watson, eds., *China's Military Reforms* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); Larry M. Wortzell, ed. *China's Military Modernization* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).

20. On some of these changes, see Liu Di, "Deng Xiaoping's Thinking on Diplomatic Work—Interview with Liang Shoude, Dean for College of International Relations for Beijing University." *Ta Kung Pao*, November 2, 1997, p. A6, FBIS. See also Liu Huaqiu, "Strive for a Peaceful International Environment," *Jiefang Ribao*, November 3, 1997, p. 5, FBIS.

21. Three circumstances created a "window" for the airing of grievances: the death of sacked CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang in April 1989 created an opportunity for students to take to the streets under cover of mourning activities; the arrival soon afterward of the international press corps to cover the May Sino-Soviet summit provided a degree of protection from police repression; and the seventieth anniversary of the May 4th movement's most celebrated demonstrations offered a thematic focus on the issues of patriotic demands for political modernization. See Andrew J. Nathan, and Perry Link, (eds.), *The Tiananmen Papers* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

22. China welcomed Gorbachev's visit as decisively ending the cold war in Asia, but fretted over the "blowback" from political reforms in the Soviet bloc that were more ambitious than those the PRC had initiated a decade earlier. Author's interviews, Beijing June–July 1998.

23. Indeed, one analyst labeled peaceful evolution "the theory of China's collapse." See Liu, "Strive for a Peaceful International Environment."

24. See John W. Garver, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism," *The China Quarterly*, no. 133 (March 1993): 1–26.

25. Several of my Chinese interlocutors stressed the importance of the contrasting images of "democratizing Taiwan" and "Tiananmen China" that prevailed in the U.S. after 1989, arguing that these conditioned the American reaction to Taipei's mid-1990s initiatives to elevate its independent international profile.

26. China's cooperation, or at least acquiescence, at the United Nations during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990–1991, was a noteworthy part of Beijing's effort to rebuild Sino-American relations. Deng Xiaoping called for China to maintain a low profile during this troubled time. See "Beijing Urged to Keep Regional Power Focus," *South China Morning Post*, September 29, 1998, available online, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/SCMP-980929.htm and interview #66c.

27. In retrospect, it was asserted that China had "withstood the impact from the drastic changes in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, smashed Western sanctions." (Liu, "Strive for a Peaceful International Environment.")

28. See Suisheng Zhao, "Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour: Elite Politics in Post-Tiananmen China," *Asian Survey* 33, no. 8 (1993): 739–756. Nicholas R. Lardy, *China in the World Economy* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994).

29. Author's interviews, Beijing, June–July 1998. As a research analyst on Chinese politics at the National Institute of Defense Studies in Japan's Defense Agency suggested: "[O]ne must question why we hear 'arguments of a China threat.' In that respect, we can point not only to China's assertion of territorial rights without the approval of concerned nations, rapid economic growth, justification of the use of military capabilities, modernization of weapons, and lack of transparency in military spending, but China's erstwhile about-face in diplomatic stances . . . When one deals with any country that is prone to about-faces, one cannot avoid a sense of insecurity." (Nobuyuki Ito, "Reading the World: The Strategic Environment in the 21st Century," *Tokyo Asagumo*, January 8, 1998, p. 1, FBIS) For assessments in the early 1990s that anticipated some of these concerns, see Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/1994): 5–33; Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 149–168; cf. Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 169–194.

30. The pattern, of course, reflects the familiar logic of the security dilemma. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.

31. Fu Liqun, "Several Basic Ideas in U.S. Strategic Thinking," *Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, 1 (February 20, 1997): 28–37, FBIS. See also Zhang De Zhen, "Qianghua Junshi Tongmeng Buhe Shidai Chaoliu," *Renmin Ribao*, January 31, 1997. (*Renmin Ribao* articles available online at http://www.snweb.com/gb/people_daily/gbrm.htm.)

32. Bilateral security cooperation between the U.S. and ASEAN states, including joint military exercises, and Indonesia's security agreement with Australia were also driven by worried perceptions of China's growing power and assertive regional behav-

ior. See Masashi Nishihara, "Aiming at New Order for Regional Security—Current State of ARF," *Gaiko Forum*, November 1997, pp. 35–40, FBIS.

33. By April 1997 Japan and Australia were engaged in a dialogue to expand their bilateral defense ties, and to cooperate in facilitating U.S. military presence in the region. "Australia, Japan: Hashimoto, Howard Discuss Security Issues, Environment," *Tokyo Kyodo*, April 29, 1997, FBIS. See also Tang Guanghui, "Behind the Warming of Australian-U.S. Relations," *Beijing Shijie Zhishi*, 20 (October 16, 1996): 19–21, FBIS; "Australia: PRC Criticism Over Security Pact With U.S. Noted," *Melbourne Radio Australia*, August, 7, 1996, FBIS; Zhang Dezhen, "Qianghua Junshi Tongmeng Buhe Shidai Chaoliu," *Renmin Ribao*, January 31, 1997. In addition New Zealand doubled the power of its Waihopai spy station to facilitate intelligence-gathering efforts with the U.S., Australia, and Britain, allegedly to maintain the ability to monitor China that was forfeited when Hong Kong reverted to PRC rule. See "New Zealand: Spying Capacity Upgrade in New Zealand Linked to China," *Agence France-Presse*, July 30, 1997, FBIS.

34. See, for example, the analysis by Lt. General and Deputy Commandant of the Academy of Military Sciences, Li Jun: "A half century has passed, and facts show that Japan's strategic culture has really made no appreciable progress." Li contrasted Japan's refusal to confront its militarist past with "the kind of self-introspection" the Germans had undertaken and that had "promoted European reconciliation." Li Jun, "On Strategic Culture," *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, no. 1 (February 1997): 8–15, FBIS. Another analysis argued: "In recent years, the 'pacifist' trend in Japan that has dominated for a long time in the post-war period has weakened, with an obvious rightist political trend developing through such things as the glorification of aggressive wars, requesting revision of the peace constitution, and advocating the 'right to collective defense' in joint operations with the United States." (Ma Junwei, "Political Trends in Japan Following the General Election," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, February 20, 1997, no. 2, pp. 11, 14–16, FBIS.) See also a similarly alarmist assessment, focusing especially on Japan's military modernization in Xia Liping, "Some Views on Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, December 20, 1996, no. 12, pp. 12–15, FBIS.

35. Zhang Guocheng, "Ling Ren Guanzhu de Xin Dongxiang—Rimei Xiugai Fangwei Hezuo Fangzhen Chuxi," *Renmin Ribao*, June 14, 1997; Zhang Guocheng, "Hewei 'Zhoubian You Shi'?—Xie Zai Xin 'Rimei Fangwei Hezuo Fangzhen' Qiaoding Zhi Shi" *Renmin Ribao, September 25, 1997* My Chinese interlocutors dismissed as unbelievable the idea that the revisions were not undertaken with China in mind. They gave little credence to the U.S. and Japanese argument that the main reason for the revision was the need to better prepare for joint response to a possible military crisis on the Korean peninsula. Author's interviews, June–July 1998.

36. "Japan: Kato on Domestic, International Politics," Interview by Columbia University Professor Gerald Curtis *Tokyo Chuo Koron*, September 1997, pp. 28–43, FBIS.

37. "Chi Haotian yu Riben Fanwei Tingzhang Guanhuitan, Huijian Riben Zimindang Ganshizhang he Zhengtiaohuizhang," *Renmin Ribao*, February 5, 1998.

38. When the *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported that the peripheral region to be covered under the revised guidelines "would be 'the Far East and its vicinity,' including the Tai-

wan Strait and the Spratly Islands, the Government immediately denied that it would decide in advance which areas should be covered by the guidelines. Instead, said Kanezo Muranoka, the Government's chief Cabinet Secretary, a decision will be deferred until an emergency arises." *New York Times*, April 29, 1998, p. A6. In late summer 1998, press reports suggested that Jiang Zemin postponed his state visit to Japan not because of the massive floods in China (as officially asserted), but because Japan's leaders were rejecting a summit communiqué that would include the sort of firm pledges (the "three noes") about one-China that President Clinton had issued during his 1998 trip to the PRC. See "Chinese President Jiang's Visit to Japan May Be Delayed to Next Year," *Agence France-Presse*, September 10, 1998, from clari.world.asia.China, ClariNet Communications Corp. [hereafter clari.China]; see also "Japan Rejects Any Chinese Pressure Over Taiwan," *Agence France-Presse*, October 28, 1998, clari.China. My Chinese interlocutors expressed very strong skepticism about Japan's intentions toward China's claim over Taiwan. Many Chinese assert there are close ties between (allegedly influential) Japanese "rightists" and Taiwan's independence movement. One Chinese analyst who plays an important advisory role on Beijing's Taiwan policy argued that Japan's leaders are not less meddlesome on the Taiwan matter than the U.S., but only much more "cunning." (Author's interview, Beijing, June–July 1998).

39. See Goldstein, "Great Expectations"; Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: Norton, 1997); cf. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Knopf, 1997).

40. Armed aloofness was feasible if China wanted only to ensure that its homeland was free from foreign occupation forces and safe from damaging military strikes (China's modest nuclear arsenal served this dissuasive purpose). But armed aloofness would not serve an internationally active and engaged China with a more ambitious agenda, but limited resources. Authors interviews, Beijing, June–July 1998; also "Beijing Urged to Keep Regional Power Focus."

41. Since 1978, China's communist leaders have aggressively addressed the domestic strain of the Soviet disease, a stagnant planned economy along with vested political interests that block serious attempts at reform.

42. Walt has described how such perceptions of the Soviet threat induced patterns of alignment that were anomalous from the perspective of balance-of-power theory. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

43. Author's interviews, Beijing, June–July 1998.

44. For overviews of the containment vs. engagement debate, see David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China: Calculating Beijing's Responses," *International Security*, 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 202; Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Containment' of China," *International Security*, 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 107–135.

45. Chi Haotian, "Zou Fuhe Woguo Guoqing Bing Fanying Shidai Tezheng de Guofang Xiandaihua Jianshe Daolu," *Qiushi* 188:8 (April 1996), p. 10. For an attack on "China threat theory" as a latter day version of the "yellow peril theory," labeling it a

"'threat to China' theory," and a "trick to intimidate and hold China back," see Li Jun, "On Strategic Culture," *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, no. 1 (February 1997): 8–15, FBIS. A lack of sensitivity to others' worries is not unique to Chinese leaders. See Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, 20, no. 3 (April 1968).

46. Assessments of China's aggregate, rather than per capita, capabilities overlook the country's huge, largely rural population. Satisfying demands for improved living standards as well as national development, it was asserted, both limits the resources Beijing can allocate to the military (whose budgets are claimed to be small compared with those of other major powers, especially the U.S.) and requires a peaceful international environment. ("Jieshou Meiguo Youxian Xinwen Dianshiwang Jizhe Caifang, Jiang Zemin Changtan Zhongmei Guanxi ji Taiwan Deng Wenti," *Renmin Ribao*, May 10, 1997; "Tulao de Wudao," *Renmin Ribao*, January 22, 1997; Liu, "Strive for a Peaceful International Environment," p. 5; "Jundui Yao Shiying Gaige he Fazhan de Xin Xingshi, Gengjia Zijue Fucong Fuwu Dang he Guojia Da Ju," *Renmin Ribao*, March 11, 1998.

47. China's own bitter historical experience of exploitation at the hands of imperialist powers after 1800, it was asserted, has taught it to treasure independence and peace, and to oppose power politics—that is why others should believe its pledge never to seek hegemony ("Jiu Zhongmei Guanxi, Taiwan Wenti, Zhongguo Renda Zhidu deng Wenti: Qiao Shi Jieshou Meiguo Jizhe Caifang," *Renmin Ribao*, January 17, 1997; "Chi Haotian Zai Riben Fabiao Yanjiang, Zhuozhong Chanshu Zhongguo Guofang Zhengce," *Renmin Ribao*, February 5, 1998).

48. See Wang Jisi, "Shiji Zhi Jiao de Zhongmei Guanxi," *Renmin Ribao*, March 1, 1997.

49. Author's interviews, Beijing, June–July 1998.

50. Many of my interlocutors discussed the changing reaction within China to "China-threat" arguments during the mid-1990s—from righteous indignation to a sense that they reflected the sort of anxiety that normally accompanies the emergence of a new great power on the international scene, especially as the Soviet threat that had previously led others to subordinate many secondary disagreements with China evaporated. (Author's interviews, Beijing, June–July , 1998).

51. See "Analyst Interviewed on APEC's Prospects," *Chuon Koron*, December 1995, pp. 30–44, FBIS. Han Hua, "Zhang Yishan [Chinese Foreign Ministry Official] on China's Multilateral Diplomacy," *Wen Wei Po*, January 7, 1997, p. A2, FBIS.

52. A shift many of my interlocutors emphasized (Beijing, June–July 1998). At the Fifteenth CCP Congress in September 1997, General Secretary Jiang's report placed a new emphasis on multilateral diplomacy, "the first time China has announced that it would take vigorous part in multilateral diplomatic activities. It is a major change in China's diplomacy." (Liu, "Deng Xiaoping's Thinking on Diplomatic Work and China's Diplomatic Policy.")

53. In a review of China's position reflected in the ASEAN Regional Forum, Masashi Nishihara of Japan's Defense University noted that when China first took part in 1994 it was "cautious about multilateral diplomacy," but gradually began to change its position when "pressed by participating countries." Nishihara argued that "[t]he reason that China has become active in multilateral security cooperation is that it must

have concluded that it was more advantageous to pursue its national interests from the inside, rather than remaining outside of multilateral diplomacy." ("Aiming at New Order for Regional Security—Current State of ARF," *Gaiko Forum*, November 1997, pp. 35–40, FBIS. See also Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, (eds.), *Engaging China* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 258–261.

54. At every opportunity China proudly points to the April 1996 five-nation treaty (among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) as "the first multilateral treaty signed to build confidence in the Asia-Pacific region" and cites it as a "powerful rebuttal of the 'China threat theory'," evidence that "instead of being a 'threat,' China actually plays a constructive role in preserving peace and stability in its peripheral areas." (Xia, "Some Views on Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia"; "Five-nation Agreement Provides Model in Peaceful Conflict Resolution," *Jiefang Ribao*, April 27, 1996, p. 4, FBIS.) In March 1997, when the "Inter-sessional Support Group on confidence-building measures of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)" was held in Beijing, it was emphasized that "China has placed importance to [*sic*] this three day meeting because it's the first on multilateral dialogue and cooperation hosted by China." "ARF Support Group Meeting Ends in Beijing," *Xinhua*, March 8, 1997, FBIS. See also "Roundup: China Becoming Active Force in Multilateral Cooperation," *Xinhua*, January 2, 1997, FBIS. China has also cautiously endorsed the idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, though it argues for substantial preliminary discussions, and "track-two" initiatives prior to convening formal meetings. (Han Hua, "It is Better for Multilateral Dialogue to be Started by Scholars," *Wen Wei Po*, November 13, 1997, FBIS.) The idea of relying on unofficial "track-two" diplomacy was touted by several of my interlocutors, who saw it as a way to expedite the exploration of options about which powerful elements of Chinese officialdom are skeptical.

55. Xia, "Some Views on Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia"; see also Johnston and Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions." There are other benefits from multilateralism as well. Because an influential segment of China's foreign policy elite now see multilateralism as an integral part of the diplomatic portfolio that true great powers now possess, it has become important to those who expect their country to fill such an international role. See also Thomas J. Christensen, "Parsimony is no Simple Matter: International Relations Theory, Area Studies, and the Rise of China," unpublished ms., February 26, 1998, pp. 35–36; Johnston and Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions." Multilateralism also provides China with forums within which representatives of the developing world are likely to support Beijing's "hard sovereignty" views. See "Quanmian Kaichuang Jiushi Niandai Waijiao Xin Jumian—Dang de Shisida Yilai Woguo Waijiao Gongzuo Shuping," *Renmin Ribao*, September 6, 1997. This is not only reflected in upholding the "noninterference" principle in disputes about human rights, but also arms control, when China positions itself as the champion of developing states' preference that the terms of multilateral agreements remain sensitive to their sovereignty concerns, rather than enshrining absolute principles, such as maximum transparency, that advantage the advanced states. See "Wo Caijun Dashi Zai Lianda

Yiwei Qiangdiao, Ying Fangzhi Ba Caijun Mubiao Yinxiang Fazhanzhong Guojia," *Renmin Ribao*, October 16, 1997; "Wo Daibiao Tan Junshi Touming Wenti, Chanshu Kongzhi Xiao Wuqi Wenti Lichang," *Renmin Ribao*, November 18, 1997; "Wo Dashi Zai Lianheguo Caijun Weiyuanhui Zhichu, Jianli Wuhequ Youli Heping," *Renmin Ribao*, April 10, 1998.

56. Johnston and Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions."

57. Author's interviews, Beijing, June–July 1998.. On the instrumental value of participation (China gains access and say-so) as well as the image value (avoiding opprobrium but also creating opportunities for "backpatting"), see Johnston and Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions," pp. 237, 251–253, 261. China's instrumental use of multilateralism indicates that its understanding differs from the more expansive definition of multilateralism articulated by Ruggie. See John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

58. During the visit of EC President Jacques Santer, China's central bank governor promised to hold the line on the yuan in 1999, "as part of [China's] 'responsible attitude' to the Asian financial crisis." ("Yuan must Remain Stable, says China's Central Bank Governor," *Agence France-Presse*, October 30, 1998, clari.world.europe.union, ClariNet Communications Corp.) Santer in turn referred to China as "the pillar for the region's economic and financial stability." See "EU Chief Congratulates China As Pillar of Asian Economy," *Agence France-Presse*, October 26, 1998, clari. China; "China's New Premier Takes Centre Stage But Avoids Limelight," *Agence France-Presse*, April 4, 1998, clari. China.

59. Whatever other adjectives are used to label these relationships (e.g., constructive or cooperative) "strategic" is the key adjective. Though China uses the "partnership" label for good relations with smaller states, it reserves the term "strategic partnership" to define a "new way of handling relations between major countries in the post–cold war period." See "China: Qian Qichen on 'Constructive' Strategic Partnerships," *Xinhua*, November 3, 1997, FBIS; Lu Jin and Liu Yunfei, "New Analysis: From Beijing to Washington and From Moscow to Beijing—a Revelation of New-Type relations Between Major Powers," *Xinhua*, November 9, 1997, FBIS; Zhang Yifan, "From 'Playing Card' to Establishing Strategic Partnership," Special interview with Yang Chengxu, Director of the China Institute of International Studies, *Hsin Pao*, December 25, 1997, p. 5, FBIS. Bilateral ties with smaller states are also designed to cultivate mutual interests in ways that raise the costs of severing the relationship by embracing policies hostile to China. Unlike those with major powers, these partnerships are not seen as strategically crucial for determining the fundamental nature of international relations. See "Quanmian Kaichuang Jiushi Niandai Waijiao Xin Jumian—Dang de Shisida Yilai Woguo Waijiao Gongzuo Shuping," *Renmin Ribao*, September 6, 1997; Han Hua, "Jiang Zemin to Go to Kuala Lumpur in Mid-December to attend East Asia-ASEAN Summit, China to Establish Partnership with ASEAN," *Wen Wei Po*, December 3, 1997, p. A1, FBIS; "Chinese President Tells ASEAN Summit Of Hopes For "Good-Neighbourly Partnership," *Xinhua*, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 18, 1997.

60. See "Prospects of China's Diplomatic Activities in 1998," *Beijing Central People's Radio*, January 25, 1998, FBIS. On the alleged obsolescence of alliances in the post–cold war world, see "Gouzhu Xin Shiji de Xinxing Guojia Guanxi" *Renmin Ribao*, December 8, 1997, p. 6. On China's refusal to pursue its interests by traditional means, see Liu, "Deng Xiaoping's Thinking on Diplomatic Work." As for the character of the different type of relations China is now cultivating: "In these partnerships we won't find a clearly us-against-them characteristic . . . . These new strategic partnerships often have a two-fold nature. More often than not, the two sides are both partners and competitors." ("Interview with Song Baotian, Deputy Director of the China Institute for International Relations," *New Report and Current Events, Beijing China Radio International*, November 13, 1997, FBIS.)

61. As an official review of China's diplomacy put it: "Indeed, 1997 is a year of great success. China's booming economy should be put at the top of all supporting factors. . . . [N]o one living in today's integrated global economy can afford to neglect such an enormous and dynamic economic powerhouse. Therefore, as foreign companies flooded into the country, business contacts entailed comprehensive dialogues and deeper understanding, which gave China an upper hand both in advancing confidence, coordination and cooperation and in reversing bias, antagonism and menace which may be the result of legacy, ignorance or, simply, malice." See Shi Nangen, "1997: A Fruitful Year in China's Multi-Dimensional Diplomacy," *Beijing Review*, no. 7, February 16–22, 1998, p. 7, FBIS. Several interlocutors frankly noted that the transfer of arms or dual-use technology to states like Iran was one of the few "cards" in China's hand when dealing with the world's other great powers.

62. Multipolarity is seen as a desirable goal, not an imminent reality. Some analysts finesse (or muddle) this point by referring to the foreseeable future as a multipolar world with only one superpower (Author's interviews, Beijing, June–July, 1998). In practice this seems to mean an international system with one true great power (i.e., unipolar), but several regional powers. In the late 1990s, Chinese analysts (echoing the declinist arguments set forth in the West during the late 1980s) emphasized evidence of the shrinking U.S. share of the international economy and predicted that this would contribute to an increase in resistance to American foreign policy leadership. See Fu Fuyuan, "Zhiyi Shidai de Qiwen," *Renmin Ribao*, September 9, 1997; "Iraq Crisis Revealed Collapse of U.S. Global Authority: Chinese Analysts," *Agence France-Presse*, March 9, 1998, clari. China.; "Yici Yiyi Zhongda Yingxiang shenyuan de Fanwen—Zhuhe Jiang Zhuxi Fang E Yuanman Chenggong," *Renmin Ribao*, April 27, 1997; Liu, "Strive for a Peaceful International Environment"; Tang Tianri, "Relations Between Major Powers Are Being Readjusted," *Xinhua*, December 15, 1997, FBIS; "Jiu Zhong'E Liangguo Zui Gaoji Huiwu, Shuangbian Guanxi Deng Wenti, Jiang Zhuxi Jieshou Eluosi Zizhe Caifang," *Renmin Ribao*, April 18, 1997; "Li Peng Zai Mosike Jishou Zizhe Fangwen," *Renmin Ribao*, February, 19, 1998. At the turn of the century, especially after the U.S. military operation in Kosovo, Chinese analysts became more pessimistic about the pace of America's decline. Multipolarity was still deemed an inevitable outcome, but one that might be more distant than originally anticipated.

63. See Zhao Gangzhen, "Daguo Guanxi, 'Huoban Re'," *Renmin Ribao*, April 21, 1998. Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian told U.S. Defense Secretary William

Cohen during his January 1998 visit to Beijing "that at present, relations between major powers are undergoing a strategic readjustment. In the new situation, neither expanding military alliances [i.e., NATO] nor strengthening military alliances [i.e., U.S. alliances with Japan and Australia] is conducive to maintenance of peace and security." ("China: Expanding Military contacts part of Diplomatic Strategy," *Xinhua*, February 20, 1998, FBIS.)

64. See Yinwan Fang and Guojun Yang, "Beneficial Enlightenment for Large Countries to Build a New Type of Relationship," *Xinhua*, April 25, 1996, FBIS; Wu Songzhi and Yi Shuguang, "Gongzhu Mulin Youhao Hezuo Guanxi," *Renmin Ribao*, April 22, 1997; "Zhong'E Zui Gaoji Huiwu," *Renmin Ribao*, November 7, 1997. Some of my interlocutors attribute the precise phrasing to Yeltsin.

65. Zhou Guiyin, "Xin Shiji De Guoji Anquan," p. 71; Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo Shixing Daguo Waijiao Zhanlüe," pp. 9–10. When Russian Premier Primakov floated a trial balloon (subsequently disavowed by President Yeltsin) about a Russia-India-China defense alliance, China (and India) rejected the idea. See "China Cautious on Primakov Plan," *The Hindu*, December 23, 1998, LEXIS-NEXIS, Read-Elsevier Inc. [hereafter LEXIS-NEXIS]; "Russia, India Reject Three-way Strategic Axis with China," *Agence France Presse*, May 25, 1999, LEXIS-NEXIS; Tyler Marshall, "A China-India-Russia Axis: Within The Realm Of Possibility," *Los Angeles Times*, September 22, 1999, p. 11, LEXIS-NEXIS.

66. Several of my interlocutors doubted the robustness of the Sino-Russian partnership and argued that it was little more than a formality originally sustained by the close personal relationship between Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin. Others emphasized that on most practical matters, that bilateral ties have steadily deteriorated since 1994. See also Zhao Longgeng, "Zhong'E Zhanlüe Xiezuo Huoban Guanxi Maixiang Jianshi Zhi Lu," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, no. 5 (1999): 32–33; Li Jingjie, "Pillars of the Sino-Russian Partnership," *Orbis* 44, no. 4 (2000): 527–539. These concerns, however, seem at least overstated. It is difficult to identify hard evidence that the partnership actually weakened during the final years of Yeltsin's rule and, if anything, it has seemed to strengthen in President Putin's administration. When the Russian premier visited Beijing in November 2000, China's premier claimed that "Sino-Russian relations are enjoying their best period ever." (Francesco Sisci, "Neighbours Push For Better Ties With Russia—CHINA: Military Transfers Get Boost After Talks," *The Straits Times* (Singapore) November 4, 2000, p. 39, LEXIS-NEXIS.) See also Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo Shixing Daguo Waijiao Zhanlüe"; "Joint Statement by the PRC President and the Russian Federation President on the Antimissile Issue," *Xinhua*, July 18, 2000, FBIS. And on the Russian side, a December 2000 Gallup poll revealed that a "majority of Russian politicians, journalists and business leaders view China as Moscow's most important strategic partner" ("China Is Russia's Most Important Partner: Poll," *Agence France-Presse*, December 4, 2000, clari.China).

67. See Huang Zongliang, "Miandui Beiyue Xin Zhanlüe Chonggu," *Xin Shiye*, no. 5 (1999), reprinted in *Zhongguo Waijiao* (2000), no. 1, pp. 25–28.

68. "PRC: More on Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership," *Xinhua*, April 25, 1996, FBIS; "PRC: Qian Qichen, Primakov Hold Breakfast Meeting," *Xinhua*, April 25, 1996, FBIS; "Joint Statement by the PRC President and the Russian Federation Presi-

dent on the Antimissile Issue." For a Chinese view questioning Russia's real interests in the Taiwan Strait, see Yiwei Wang, "Dui Tai Junshi Douzheng," p. 28.

69. Their concerns are clearly manifest in the Sino-Russian Presidential joint statement on missiles defense, see "Joint Statement by the PRC President and the Russian Federation President on the Antimissile Issue." See also Chen Ying, "Zhanqu Daodan Fangyu Xitong Yu Dongya Anquan Xingshi," *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan*, no. 4 (1999): 28, 30; Zhu Feng, "TMD Yu Dangqian Zhongmei Guanxi," *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi*, no. 5 (1999), p. 10.

70. See Lu Youzhi, "Chongxin Shenshi Zhongguo De Anquan Huanjing," *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi*, no. 1 (2000): 59; Chen Ying, "Zhanqu Daodan Fangyu Xitong," p. 28. The political cross-pressures are already evident in Moscow and Beijing as leaders disagree about how best to invest scarce military resources as U.S. missile defense loom. See "Political Scientist Criticizes Planned Reform Of Russian Missile Forces," *Interfax News Agency*, July 26, 2000, LEXIS-NEXIS; Fred Weir, "Putin Tries Big Shift in Military Strategy, " *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 2, 2000, p. 1, LEXIS-NEXIS; "Chuanwen Jiang Zemin Zhishi Gaibian Zhonggong de Guofang Zhengce." Many Chinese go further, explicitly arguing that missile defenses are intended to be part of the U.S. effort to prevent the rise of China. See Zhu Feng, "TMD Yu Dangqian Zhongmei Guanxi," p. 12. For an American view that the most important purpose for U.S. missile defenses is indeed to cope with a more powerful China, see the comments by Peter Brookes, a leading Congressional adviser in Gay Alcorn, "China 'Real Reason' for Missile Shield," *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 28, 2000, http://www.smh.com.au/news/0007/28/text/world03.html; also Peter Brookes, "The Case for Missile Defense," *Far Eastern Economic Review*," September 7, 2000.

71. See Chen Xiaoqin, "Buru 21 Shiji De Zhong'E Guanxi," *Zhongguo Waijiao*, no. 3 (2000): 31–35; Zhao Longgeng, "Zhong'E Zhanlüe Xiezuo Huoban Guanxi." In the mid-1990s, Russia and China set the target for two-way trade volume at $20 billion by the turn of the century. As the new millennium dawned, trade volumes remained in the $5–6 billion range, with Russian sales of raw materials and modern weapons the only real bright spots.

72. See "New Agency Interviews Russian President on Visit to China," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 18, 2000, LEXIS-NEXIS; "China, Russia Issue Beijing Declaration," *Xinhua New Agency*, July 18, 2000, LEXIS-NEXIS; "Joint Statement by the PRC President and the Russian Federation President on the Antimissile Issue." See also Gilbert Rozman, "Sino-Russian Relations in the 1990s: A Balance Sheet," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14, no. 2 (April–June 1998): 93–113; "PRC Academics Interviewed on Putin's Visit to China," *Hong Kong Ming Pao*, July 19, 2000, p. A15, FBIS.

73. Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), p. 155.

74. See Huang Zongliang, "Miandui Beiyue Xin Zhanlüe Chonggu"; Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo Shixing Daguo Waijiao Zhanlüe," p. 7. One of my interlocutors insisted that the push for still closer Sino-Russian relations since Putin's ascent has come mainly from the Russian side, with some Russian scholars advocating open alliance with China, and even (in a throwback to a proposal the Chinese rejected in 1958) sug-

gestions to establish a joint naval fleet based in Dalian. Author's interview, October 2000.

75. Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo Shixing Daguo Waijiao Zhanlüe," p. 7; Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky, Daniel L. Byman, Roger Cliff, David Orletsky, David Shlapak, and Ashley J. Tellis, *The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999): xiii-xiv, 3–5.

76. Discussions about announcing plans to work towards such a partnership were initiated in July 1997 when China's foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state met in Malaysia. See Liu Huorong, Wu Dingbao, and Yang Zhongyi, "China: Qian Qichen Holds Talks with Albright," *Xinhua*, July 26, 1997, FBIS; "China: Further on Qian-Albright Comments after Talks," *Xinhua*, July 26, 1997, FBIS; Guo Jian, and Su Xiangxin, "China: Shen Guofang Hails Jiang Zemin's Us Trip," *Zhongguo Xinwenshe*, November 2, 1997, FBIS; He Chong, "China and the United States Declare Their Endeavor to Build a Constructive and Strategic Partnership Relationship," *Zhongguo Tongxunshe*, November 3, 1997, FBIS. This marked the last stages of negotiations about holding the 1997 and 1998 summits. Serious talks about the summits began during July 1996, in the wake of the 1995–96 Sino-American tensions over Taiwan. See Ross, "The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation," p. 113.

77. Gu Ping, "Sino-Us Relations Are Facing Historic Opportunity," *Renmin Ribao*, October 19, 1997, FBIS; He Chong, "China and the United States Are Exploring the Possibility of Establishing a 'Strategic Partnership'—First in a Series on Prospects of Jiang Zemin's U.S. Visit," *Zhongguo Tongxunshe*, October 22, 1997, FBIS; "Jiu Zhongmei Guanxi, Taiwan Wenti, Zhongguo Renda Zhidu Deng Wenti: Qiao Shi Jieshou Meiguo Jizhe Caifang," *Renmin Ribao*, January 17, 1997; He Chong, "China and the United States Declare Their Endeavor to Build a Constructive and Strategic Partnership Relationship"; "Interview with Song Baotian"; "China: Pact to Prevent Naval Accidents Initialed," *Xinhua*, December 12, 1997, FBIS; Chi Haotian, "A Year of Our Army's Active Foreign Contacts," *Renmin Ribao*, December 26, 1997, p. 7, FBIS; "China: Expanding Military contacts part of Diplomatic Strategy," *Xinhua*, February 20, 1998, FBIS. The U.S. was eager to expand such exchanges not only to lessen the chance of inadvertent conflict, but also to counter an allegedly dangerous Chinese overestimation of American hostility and underestimation of American military capabilities that it can bring to bear in a war in Asia. See Jim Mannion, "Pentagon Study Sees Danger in Chinese View of U.S. Power," *Agence France-Presse*, March 7, 1998, clari.China. On common interests in Korea, Zhou Guiyin, "Xin Shiji De Guoji Anquan," p. 70.

78. On China's role as a "balancing" force in the UN, see Teng Xiaodong, "Dialogue on 1996 International Situation: China in the United Nations," *Jiefangjun Bao*, December 26, 1996, p. 5, FBIS. Since 1999, Beijing has indicated the link it sees between U.S. decisions to share TMD technology with Asian states, especially Taiwan, and the efforts to institutionalize the Missile Technology Control Regime. China's view is that joint work on TMD amounts to the spread of missile technology to Japan and Taiwan. Author's interviews, June–July, 1998, March–April, October, 2000. See also Jin Xin, "Meiguo Yanfa TMD De Yitu Ji Dui Quanqiu He Woguo Anquan De Yingxiang," *Guoji Guancha*, no. 4 (1999): 24; Monte R. Bullard, "Undiscussed Link-

ages: Implications of Taiwan Straits Security Activity on Global Arms Control and Nonproliferation," *CNS Reports*, October 11, 2000, Available at the website of Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/.

79. Wise tactics can enhance the effectiveness of its linkage strategy. China's cultivation of ties to the U.S. business community, for example, helps it to maximize the political appeal of maintaining good Sino-American relations. See Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, p. 117.

80. A point my interlocutors emphasized. After Lee Teng-hui's visit to the U.S. in May 1995, Beijing was especially interested getting the U.S. to reiterate the one-China philosophy that informed three joint communiqués (Shanghai 1972, Normalization 1978, Arms Sales 1981). See "Jiang Zemin Zhuxi Huijian Ge'er Fuzontong Shi Tichu Fazhan Zhongmei Guanxi," *Renmin Ribao*, March 27, 1997; Gu Ping, "Zhongmei Guanxi Mianlin Lishi Jiyu," *Renmin Ribao*, November 5, 1997, p. 1.

81. In the U.S., by late 1998, the phrase was increasingly viewed as a symbol of the Clinton administration's naivete in dealing with China, much as conservative critics of Nixon-Ford foreign policy saw "détente" as a symbol of naivete in U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. Early in the 2000 U.S. electoral cycle, key advisers to the Republican Party explicitly argued that China should be viewed as a strategic competitor, rather than a strategic partner, a position criticized by Chinese analysts. See Condoleeza Rice, "Campaign 2000—Promoting The National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, January-February, 2000, 79, no. 1, pp. 45–62; "Commenting on Recent U.S. Policy toward China" *Hong Kong Wen Wei Po*, July 27, 2000, FBIS. One well-informed Chinese interlocutor emphasized that following the Belgrade bombing, every high-level U.S. visitor privately emphasized the American interest in continuing to work toward the "constructive strategic partnership." Though not rejecting the phrase, the Chinese side did not echo the American invocation until Tang Jiaxuan's meeting with Albright in June 2000 at which they discussed plans for a Jiang-Clinton meeting at the September 2000 UN millenium summit. Jiang's use of the term in a speech on the eve of his meeting with Clinton was intended both as a way of punctuating the end of the post-bombing bilateral tensions and also as a signal to the U.S. public that China remained interested in working toward a constructive strategic partnership after the Clinton era. ("Jiang Zemin on Sino-U.S. Ties, Taiwan, WTO, Tibet: Text of Speech by President Jiang Zemin at Luncheon Held by U.S. Amity Group in New York," *Xinhua*, September 8, 2000, FBIS.) For China's press coverage that continued to highlight the term "strategic partnership" as a goal for Sino-American relations even if the term was not attributed to Chinese leaders, see "Wrap-Up: Jiang Zemin Meets U.S. National Security Adviser," *Xinhua*, March 30, 2000, FBIS; "Tang, Albright Say Sino-U.S. Ties Can Move Forward; Discuss PNTR, Taiwan, NMD," *Xinhua*, June 22, 2000, FBIS; Erik Eckholm, "U.S. and Top Chinese Officials Try to Smooth Over Differences," *New York Times*, July 14, 2000, p. 7.

82. For examples of the calls for a more explicitly anti-American line in China's foreign policy, see Chu Shulong and Wang Zaibang, "Guanyu Guoji Xingshi," p. 21; Lu Youzhi, "Chongxin Shenshi Zhongguo De Anquan Huanjing," p. 60. On the debate's unusually wide range of views and its resolution see Tao Wenzhao, "A Foreign Policy

Debate in China after the Tragic Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade," unpublished ms., Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Jiang To Pressure Clinton Over Taiwan Stance," *South China Morning Post*, August 14, 1999, p. 1, LEXIS-NEXIS; Ching Cheong, "Cross-Strait Dispute: China Gives Peace A Chance," *The Straits Times (Singapore)*, August 25, 1999, p. 40, LEXIS-NEXIS.

83. Zhang Wenmu, "Heshihou Nanya Xingshi Ji Zouxiang," *Zhanlüe yu Guanli*, no. 2 (1999): 46–49; Zhou Guiyin, "Xin Shiji De Guoji Anquan Yu Anquan Zhanlüe," p. 70; Peng Shujie and Liu Yunfei, "Partnership Promotes China's All around Diplomacy."

84. Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, pp. 9–20, ch. 2.

85. Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo Shixing Daguo Waijiao Zhanlüe," p. 7; Chen Demin, "90 Niandai Zhongmei Guanxi Tanxi," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, no. 9 (1999), reprinted in *Zhongguo Waijiao* (2000) no. 1, pp. 20–24; Jin Canrong, "Zhongmei Guanxi De Bian Yu Bubian," *Guoji Jingji Pinglun*, no. 11/12 (1999), reprinted in *Zhongguo Waijiao* no. 2 (2000): 21–25.

86. For Chinese comments on the series of problems in bilateral relations, see Lu Youzhi, "Chongxin Shenshi Zhongguo De Anquan Huanjing," p. 60; Fang Hua, "Yatai Anquan Jiagou De Xianzhuang," p. 13.

87. Author's interviews March–April 2000; See also Zhou Guiyin, "Xin Shiji De Guoji Anquan Yu Anquan Zhanlüe," p. 71; Lu Youzhi, "Chongxin Shenshi Zhongguo De Anquan Huanjing," p. 60; Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, p. xl. For a more strident view of the U.S. as enemy even before the Belgrade bombing, see Zhang Wenmu, "Kesuowo Zhanzheng Yu Zhongguo Xin Shiji Anquan Zhanlüe," *Zhanlüe yu Guanli* no. 3 (1999): 3.

88. Pillsbury *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, pp. 13–15, 25, 27–28, 58; Chu Shulong and Wang Zaibang, "Guanyu Guoji Xingshi," p. 17; Xiao Feng, "Dui Guoji Xingshizhong," p. 3.

89. Author's interviews March–April, October, 2000; Sun Jianshe, "Shiji Zhijiao," pp. 21, 22; Chu Shulong and Wang Zaibang, "Guanyu Guoji Xingshi," p. 21; Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo Shixing Daguo Waijiao Zhanlüe."

90. See "President Lee's Deutsche Welle Interview," July 9, 1999, in http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/SS-990709-Deutsche-Welle-Interview.htm. For the many interpretations, clarifications, and criticisms his statement provoked, see the articles and papers collected at http://taiwansecurity.org/TSR-State-to-State.htm.

91. Ross, "The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation," p. 116.

92. On reports that Jiang and the other top CCP leaders decided at their August 1999 Beidaihe gathering to clearly signal the U.S. that continued cooperation required Washington's help in trying to rein in Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui, see "'Source' Says PRC to Pressure U.S. over Taiwan Issue," *Agence France-Presse*, August 14, 1999, FBIS. See also Zhou Guiyin, "Xin Shiji De Guoji Anquan Yu Anquan Zhanlüe," pp. 69–70. Sensitive to the internal criticism that had surfaced over the previous year from ideological conservatives worried about the disruptive consequences of further exposing the country to the forces of globalization and from military conservatives who preferred a more bluntly coercive Taiwan policy, China's top leaders moved slowly in re-

pairing its relations with Washington. The initial steps came at the informal Jiang-Clinton talks during the Auckland APEC meetings in September 1999. See Xu Hongzhi and Huang Qing, "Advancing Toward Multipolarization Amid Turbulence," *Renmin Ribao* December 16, 1999, p. 7, FBIS; also Chen Jian, "Jiang Zemin Talks With Former U.S. President George Bush in Beijing on March 2 About Bilateral Ties, WTO," *Zhongguo Xinwen She*, March 2, 2000, FBIS; "PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen Meets Albright on Sino-U.S. Ties, Taiwan," *Xinhua*, June 22, 2000, FBIS; "Sino-Us Military Exchanges Resume Gradually." *Hong Kong Wen Wei Po*, November 4, 2000, FBIS; Tong Ying. "PRC Expert Views Us Elections, Explains Why Beijing Feels Relieved," *Hong Kong Wen Wei Po*, November 10, 2000, FBIS. For a skeptical Chinese view about U.S. sincerity in salvaging the partnership, see Ding Kuisong, "Zongjie Guoqu Mianxiang Weilai," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, no. 10 (1999), reprinted in *Zhongguo Waijiao* no. 2 (2000): 12–13. On China's limited willingness to compromise in order to foster the strategic partnership, see Khalilzad, et. al, *The United States and a Rising China*, pp. 5–9.

93. See Xue Longgen, "Zhengzai Shenhua Fazhan De Zhongfa Quanmian Huoban Guanxi," *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan* no. 5 (1999): 26.

94. "Prospects of China's Diplomatic Activities in 1998." Chinese analysts, like their foreign counterparts, disagree about the chances for the EU to develop a common foreign policy. Of the EU members, France and Germany are viewed as important international powers in their own right. Britain, however, is often viewed as simply following the American lead (Author's interviews, June–July, 1998).

95. "Presidents Jiang and Chirac Agree to Build 'Comprehensive Partnership'," *Xinhua*, May 15, 1997, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; "China: France's Foreign Minister Gives Press Conference," *Xinhua*, January 23, 1998, FBIS; Han Hua, "Four Keys in 1998 Chinese Diplomacy," *Wen Wei Po*, March 4, 1998, FBIS; "Editorial: Great Success in China's Big-Nation Diplomacy"; "China's International Status Is in the Ascendance," *Ta Kung Pao*, July 6, 1998, FBIS; Wang Xingqiao, "A Positive Step Taken by the European Union to Promote Relations with China," *Xinhua*, July 10, 1998, FBIS; Peng Shujie and Liu Yunfei, "Partnership Promotes China's All around Diplomacy"; Huang Xingwei, "Sino-British Relations Develop Steadily," *Xinhua*, October 18, 1999, FBIS; "Diplomatic News Highlights for 23–29 Oct.," *Xinhua*, October 30, 1999, FBIS; Si Jiuyue and Huang Yong, "Zhu Rongji Held Talks with Schroeder, and Delivered Important Speech to German Industry and Trade Council," *Xinhua*, June 30, 2000, FBIS.

96. See "China and EU To Step Up Dialogue, May Hold Annual Summits," *Agence France-Presse*, April 2, 1998, clari.China; "Chinese Premier's First European Trip Crowned with Glory," *Agence France-Presse*, April 8, 1998, clari.China; "EU Adopts New Anti-Dumping Rules for China," *Agence France-Presse*, April 28, 1998, clari.world.asia.China.biz, ClariNet Communications; "European Union Calls for New Partnership with China," *Agence France-Presse*, October 29, 1998, clari.China; "President Jiang Zemin To Tour Italy, Switzerland, Austria Next March," *Agence France-Presse*, October 28, 1998, clari.China; Ren Xin, "1996: A Year of Diplomatic Feats for China," *Beijing Review* no. 1,(January 6–12, 1997): 9–13, FBIS. China sees ASEM itself as a potential counterbalance to U.S. dominance, particularly on eco-

nomic affairs, in the emerging multipolar world. See Huang Qing, "Ya'Ou Huiyi he Duojihua," *Renmin Ribao*, April 9, 1998.

97. "China's International Status Is in the Ascendance"; Wang Xingqiao, "A Positive Step Taken by the European Union to Promote Relations with China."

98. Zhang Guocheng, "Riben de Daguo Waijiao," *Renmin Ribao*, December 19, 1997.

99. See Avery Goldstein, "The Political Implications of a Slowdown," *Orbis* 43, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 203–221; Liu, "Deng Xiaoping's Thinking on Diplomatic Work"; "Editorial: Great Success in China's Big-Nation Diplomacy."

100. "Prospects of China's Diplomatic Activities in 1998." See also Shi Nangen, "1997: A Fruitful Year in China's Multi-Dimensional Diplomacy."

101. As noted above, China and Japan ultimately agreed to the term "friendly and cooperative partnership." Despite the passing years, and regardless of generation, most of my interlocutors continued to note the persistent historical impediments to completely normalizing Sino-Japanese relations. Author's interviews, June–July, 1998, March–April, October, 2000. See also Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23 no. 4 (Spring 1999): 49–80.

102. For the continuing tension in China's approach to Japan, compare "Japan, China Agree On Mutual Visits By Warships: Report," *Agence France-Presse*, April 26, 1998, clari.China; and "China Wary of U.S.-Japan Military Pact," *UPI*, April 28, 1998, clari.China. Prior to President Jiang's late 1998 trip to Tokyo, a Japanese foreign ministry official indicated that there would be no strengthening of Japan's noninterventionist commitments regarding Taiwan, and Prime Minister Obuchi refused to commit himself to issue a formal written apology for Japan's wartime aggression against China. "Japan Rejects Any Chinese Pressure Over Taiwan," *Agence France-Presse*, October 28, 1998, clari.China. My Japanese interlocutors familiar with the internal and bilateral negotiations prior to Jiang's visit to Tokyo, stated that Obuchi's decision not to offer Jiang the sort of explicit public apology South Korea's Kim Dae-jung had just received reflected (1) the belief that Japanese leaders had more than once expressed remorse about Japan's behavior in China (but not Korea) during WWII; and, (2) the conviction that China's leaders would never be satisfied, accept a proffered apology, and consider the matter closed (a promise Kim Dae-jung made in advance of his summit with Obuchi). Author's interviews, Tokyo, March, 1999.

103. Yumiko Miyai, and Mami Tsukahara, "Jiang Hails New Era in Japan-China Ties; 3 Hecklers Held for Interrupting Waseda Speech," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 29, 1998, LEXIS-NEXIS; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China, Japan Struggle on Accord; Leaders Fail to Sign Joint Statement after Disagreement over Apology for War Atrocities," *South China Morning Post*, November 27, 1998, from LEXIS-NEXIS. See also "Chinese President Jiang's Visit to Japan May Be Delayed to Next Year"; Michael Zielenziger, "Talks Fall Short for China, Japan," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 27, 1998, p. A1, A4. For an official characterization of the state of Sino-Japanese ties after the Jiang visit see "China-Japan: Bilateral Political Relations," available at Regions link of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC website, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4278.html.

104. On Tokyo's mixed interests, see Jiang Lifeng, "Zhongri Guanxi De Xianzhuang Yu Weilai," *Riben Yanjiu* no. 3 (1998): 6–15. One of my interlocutors famil-

iar with the Chinese Foreign Ministry's deliberations, insisted that Premier Zhu's visit represented a victory for those advisers who believed that China should emphasize the importance of Japan's integration within a regional economic community, and that this meant de-emphasizing, though not forgetting, disputes over issues "left over from history" on which Jiang had focused attention in 1998 (Author's interviews October 2000). Indeed, Zhu subsequently advanced this general idea of fostering region-wide cooperation at the ASEAN plus three summit meetings in November 2000 (Robert J. Saiget, "China Pushes Higher Profile for ASEAN Talks with Japan, South Korea." *Agence France-Presse*, November 22, 2000, clari.China).

105. The controversy about how much the Chinese learned about rocket guidance from working with the U.S. company Loral in investigating a failed satellite launch, suggests other potentially fruitful linkages between the economic and military aspects of the grand strategy. See Jeff Gerth, "Congress Investigating Sales of Satellite Technology to China," *New York Times*, April 16, 1998, p. A5; "The Sanctity of Missile Secrets," *New York Times*, April 15, 1998, p. A24; See also Michael Hirsch, "The Great Technology Giveaway?" *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 2–9.

106. See "President's Speech On Taiwan Reunification" *New China News Agency*, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 31, 1995, LEXIS-NEXIS; Author's interviews, June–July, 1998; Ross, "The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation." For arguments emphasizing basic consensus on core security questions such as Taiwan, see Paul Heer, "A House United." For an assessment that sets forward multiple reasons why China views Taiwan as a core security interest, see also Wang Yiwei, "Dui Tai Junshi Douzheng," p. 29.

107. Christensen's interviews suggest the military's strong disdain for Foreign Ministry officials. See Thomas J. Christensen, "Realism with Chinese Characteristics: Beijing's Perceptions of Japan, the United States, and the Future of East Asian Security," Research report submitted to the Asia Security Project, Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, November 28, 1996, typescript, p. 16.

108. See Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China" in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture Of National Security: Norms And Identity In World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 219–220, 247; Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (1996): 37–52; Pillsbury *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, pp. xxxv, xxxvix; Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, pp. xii; 231, 233, 236.

109. See Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, pp. 152, 153–179; 183–97.

110. See Yan Xuetong, "Dui Zhongguo Anquan Huanjing," pp. 7, 8; Chu Shulong and Wang Zaibang, "Guanyu Guoji Xingshi," pp. 18–19

111. See Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, pp. 231, 233, 236.

112. See Brzezinski *The Grand Chessboard*, pp. 164, 165–167; Goldstein, "Great Expectations." For Chinese views that anticipate a more threatening environment, see Sun Jianshe, "Shiji Zhijiao Dui Woguo Anquan Huanjing De Sikao, pp. 20, 21; Yan Xuetong, "Dui Zhongguo Anquan Huanjing," pp. 5, 6. For assessments of the power

trajectories of various countries, including discussions of "comprehensive national power," see Yan Xuetong, *Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fenxi* (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1997): 87–95; Gao Heng, (ed.), *2020 Daguo Zhanlüe* (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Renmin Chubanshe, 2000); Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*.

113. Lu Youzhi, "Chongxin Shenshi Zhongguo De Anquan Huanjing," pp. 57–58; Sun Jianshe, "Shiji Zhijiao Dui Woguo Anquan Huanjing De Sikao," p. 19; Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, pp. 13, 15, 25, 28, 58; Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo Shixing Daguo Waijiao Zhanlüe," pp. 6, 7; Chu Shulong and Wang Zaibang, "Guanyu Guoji Xingshi," p. 17; Xiao (12/99), p. 3; Xiao Feng, "Dui Guoji Xingshizhong," pp. 1, 2. On China's confidence in the inevitability of multipolarity, however slow its arrival may be, see Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, pp. 65–72, 73–76.

114. Yan Xuetong, "Dui Zhongguo Anquan Huanjing," pp. 7, 9. For a Chinese vision of naval modernization consistent with the notion that the first three decades of the twentyh-first century are a period in which China must strive simply to catch up with the world-class military powers, see Liu Yijian, "Zhongguo Weilai De Haijun Jianshe Yu Haijun Zhanlüe," *Zhanlüe yu Guanli* no. 5 (1999): 99, 100. Consequently, at the turn of the century, China's most innovative military strategists have focused on the need to cope with their country's present material disadvantage by emphasizing investment in improving the technological quality of selected forces and by developing clever varieties of asymmetric warfare. See Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, ch. 6; Zhang Wenmu, "Kesuowo Zhanzheng Yu Zhongguo Xin Shiji Anquan Zhanlüe," p. 4; Yan Xuetong, "Dui Zhongguo Anquan Huanjing," p. 10; Chu Shulong, "Lengzhanhou Zhongguo Anquan Zhanlüe Sixiang De Fazhan," p. 13; "Chuanwen Jiang Zemin Zhishi Gaibian Zhonggong De Guofang Zhengce"; Khalilzad, et. al., *The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999)pp. 39–44, 48–59. For China's method of calculating comprehensive national power, see Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, p. 203, ch. 5.

115. Yan Xuetong, "Dui Zhongguo Anquan Huanjing," pp. 8, 9; Chu Shulong and Wang Zaibang, "Guanyu Guoji Xingshi," p. 20.

116. See Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, pp. xxxvix. As noted above, China understands this assertive approach to be the self-defeating path the Soviet Union followed. See Guo Shuyong, "21 Shiji Qianye Zhongguo Waijiao," pp. 92–93, 94.