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Michael C. Hudson (ed.)
1999
7. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Nature Origin, and Process
Abdul Kahleq Abdulla
Few other comparable groups of states have more in common than the six Arab Gulf states that decided in May 1981 to launch their own integration venture and establish the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These states; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—have almost every conceivable commonality and a strikingly deep homogeneity. Despite their sociopolitical similarities, however, these states have found it difficult in the years since the GCC’s establishment to advance their integration and develop the organization to a point that it serves as more than merely a forum for yearly summit meetings that issues innocuous communiqués on current events in the Gulf and the wider Arab–Islamic world.
Even these largely ceremonial summits experienced a sudden deadlock during its sixteenth annual meeting in Muscat in December 1995, when Qatar withdrew from the closing session. The Qataris declared their intention to boycott any future GCC meetings attended by the newly appointed General Secretary Jamil al–Hujailan of Saudi Arabia (Al–Ahram Weekly 1995). In the wake of this discord, Bahrain and Qatar, two of the smallest GCC states, decided to step up their ongoing political feud. Bahrain extended a high–profile official welcome to the deposed ruler of Qatar, Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad. Qatar instantly retaliated by giving a rare one–hour live television interview to two leading exiled Bahraini opposition leaders.
These and other instances of open conflict inevitably renew doubts about the viability and longevity of the GCC, especially among the legion of self–professed skeptics on prospects for Arab integration. These events indicate that the GCC states have yet to settle many of their outstanding historical and political, as well as petty personal, frictions. Qatar’s unprecedented and surely embarrassing walkout at the Muscat summit fundamentally shattered the tightly guarded consensual fabric of the GCC. It was a further sign of a recently growing internal power struggle and of disenchantment with the lack of any genuine integrationist breakthroughs.
Clearly the GCC is entering a critical stage of uncertainty. Its internal cohesiveness will be severely tested. It is desperately searching for a common denominator beyond the external threat that gave birth to the GCC in 1981, when the Arab Gulf states essentially huddled together in a crisis situation that resulted from, among other things, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the subsequent Islamic revolution. But since 1991, and as the Gulf region and the whole Middle East experience persistent tensions beneath a deceptively calm appearance, fresh anxieties over long dormant disputes among the GCC states, and between the GCC and its neighbors, have been creeping into the foreground.
These mounting apprehensions, old and new, are exposing the GCC’s inability to fulfill its most ambitious integrationist objectives and to deliver on its often grandiose political and security declarations. Progress toward economic integration of the GCC is almost flat. Its oft–repeated claim that the security and defense of its members is exclusively a GCC affair finds its ultimate denial in the excessive reliance of the Arab Gulf states on United States protection. Political coordination, once the hallmark of the GCC, has declined sharply. Today the institution suffers from a credibility gap.
Furthermore, the GCC states appear to be more protective of their national sovereignty and its attendant symbols than ever before. These states are growing steadily more inward–looking and preoccupied with domestic concerns. These include, among other things, financial constraints, rising social tensions, emerging Islamic radicalism, mounting youth unemployment, desperately needed economic restructuring, and the newly assertive popular demand for greater accountability, political institutionalization, and participation. These critical internal issues, rather than the external ones (which are also serious), should be of greatest concern to the GCC’s leaders and citizens alike as the "holiday ends in the Gulf" and the GCC states gradually move away from the exceptionality of the super–rich to normality, with all its problems (Zanoyan 1995). The conventional wisdom in the Gulf today is that from now on, as the basic political and economic logic dictates, everybody tends to his own interests. It is these new realities that are making the mission of the GCC distinctly burdensome. For some observers of Gulf affairs the GCC, particularly after the Muscat stalemate, is at a turning point and may be sinking into irrelevancy.
For those less skeptical, the latest setbacks, momentous as they appear, are not sufficient to declare the GCC politically dead. The Muscat episode was surely irksome but not necessarily terminal. It was probably a timely reminder to Gulf integration enthusiasts that the political and economic coming together of the six Arab Gulf states has been and will be, as are most integration experiments, an agonizing and protracted process with many breakdowns and few breakthroughs. In the opinion of this writer, the GCC is neither dead nor moribund, and the historical process of integrating and ultimately uniting the six Arab Gulf states continues. The GCC has already, for all practical purposes, passed the test of "to be or not to be." It has amply proven its survivability. There is, to begin with, an intense sense of the durability of common interests that acts as a coalescing force. In addition, these states have made enormous tangible commitments of resources toward integration. Despite the difficulties, there is now an irreversibility in the common concerns and activities of the GCC which are essential to its welfare. Indeed, one can argue that the organization is approaching the threshold stage of implementing a common agenda of social and economic policies.
Although it is relatively new, even integration skeptics must admit that the GCC is here to stay. Indeed it has been remarkable in its durability. It is definitely proving to be one of those few cases—perhaps the only case—in the Arab world where genuine cooperation is not only working but actually substantially deepening, albeit in fits and starts (Christie 1987, 13). The fundamental operative logic of the GCC has been simple: if total political unity—theoretically at least the ultimate goal—is a practical impossibility and complete economic integration is not immediately attainable, then cooperation is the second best goal (al–Qasimi 1988, 1). This kind of ideological pragmatism in the midst of entrenched political conservatism was responsible for the birth and evolution of the GCC in a most unlikely region. This acute blend of pragmatism and conservatism has also been germane for the inner cohesiveness of the GCC and its success in surviving the daunting challenges it has faced.
During these delicate formative years, the GCC has gotten a toehold and can now begin to climb. Its members collectively faced up to the imminent threats of the Iranian revolution. They outlasted the surmountable daily dangers of the eight&-;year Iran–Iraq war. They even bravely dug in together during the subsequent short–lived Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In addition, the GCC managed to reduce violent tensions among its member states by developing a nascent security community, albeit an imperfect one, that has enjoyed a decade–and–a–half of relatively peaceful coexistence. Economically, it created its own customs union, imposed a common external tariff, and is incrementally delivering on its unified economic agreement. In foreign affairs, the GCC has become a recognized regional organization in international politics, projecting an image, which has been noted by both friends and foes, of a somewhat collective foreign policy . Domestically, there is an evolving sense of "oneness" (Bishara 1983–84, 41), a psychological affinity to the community, and a common regional identity that spontaneously distinguishes between what happens within and what happens outside of the GCC’s geographic and political confinement. 1 The GCC states are easily identifiable as the six traditional monarchies with a unique political culture and distinct way of life that possess a commodity of vital strategic value to the rest of the world.
At its inception, the GCC was viewed by political observers, scholars and the press as a regional organization that was born to die. Ten years later, many believed that the GCC had already outlived its usefulness and had few successes to its credit. Now, many are still predicting gloom and doom for the GCC, yet it has not only survived, but has also found a receptive audience within the Gulf region and beyond. 2 The GCC continues to contradict the implication of the realist perspective in international relations theory that attempts at voluntary cooperation and integration among sovereign states in the anarchical environment of world politics generally are doomed to failure. The GCC’s persistence instead confirms the more liberal assertion that cooperation and integration are not only attainable but are part and parcel of contemporary international relations, maybe more so now than ever.
Achievements and failures notwithstanding, the GCC, like other attempts at institutionalized cooperation, remains bedeviled by profound strategic uncertainties. This situation raises some legitimate questions with uncertain answers. First, what is the nature of the GCC? Does it represent political unification or economic integration? Is it a military alliance or a security community? Or is it more a uniquely Gulf phenomenon? Second, what is the origin of the GCC? Is it a force or voluntary association? Which accounts more for its origin—internal or external factors, ideological affinity or objective necessity? Third, what are the basic objectives of the GCC and to what extent has it fulfilled them? What accounts for its achievements and failures, for its breakthroughs and breakdowns? Finally, what is ahead for the GCC? Is it going to persevere or dissolve? Will Arab Gulf integration survive or stagnate? Will it reach its ultimate goal or will it break down?
The Nature of the GCC: Contending Perceptions
The GCC, even to many of its constituent ruling elites, is something of a riddle. It occasionally eludes them as much as it puzzles close observers of Gulf affairs. Its nature and what it stands for was hardly clear at the outset, and it is certainly no clearer today. If anything, the riddle is increasingly becoming wrapped in mystery. What precisely did the six Arab Gulf states have in mind when they decided to join together to form the GCC? The thinking behind the formation of the GCC remains a closely guarded secret. Most likely, however, there was not so much sober thinking as there was an immediate, ad hoc reaction to the turbulent regional events of 1979–80—the Iranian revolution and the beginning of the Iraq–Iran war.
It is critical to note that the typically recalcitrant and normally conservative Arab Gulf states took less than three months (February to May 1981) to unanimously agree on the broad ideas and goals of the GCC, approve of its final charter, sign many intricate documents on rules and structures, and hastily announce its formal birth in May 25, 1981 (Christie 1987, 10). Such extraordinary speed is practically unheard of in the history of regional integration and is particularly uncharacteristic of the rulers of the six Arab Gulf states whose normal tendency is to procrastinate on a decision with potential ramifications for their sovereignty.
If anything, this speedy implementation of the yet–to–be refined and comprehended ideas of cooperation only confirms the widely held belief that the GCC was more of a hasty reaction than a calculated initiative (al–Alkim 1994). It also indicates that abnormal circumstances were decisive in defining the GCC’s initial scope and vision. In essence, the GCC was a panic response to a situation of profound uncertainty which enormously shaped its nature and its subsequent unfolding.
When the GCC was originally conceived, there were at least three contending perceptions of its nature and what it should stand for (Ramazani 1988, 1–3). The three were hurriedly juxtaposed and incorporated in the GCC Charter. This lumping together of plainly contradictory ideas further complicated the question as to what was being created, what it should be doing, and what it was for and what it was against. Initially, Kuwait advanced its vision of the GCC. It had in mind virtually nothing specific beyond a nonbinding Gulf common market, perhaps loosely analogous to the European community but not necessarily a replica of the European Economic Common Market. The principal emphasis in this version of the GCC was economic and social integration.
On the other hand, Oman’s view of the nature of the GCC was pointedly specific. It had in mind a purely military alliance. Oman was keen on creating nothing short of a Gulf version of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The regional and international enemies against whom this military alliance was directed were perfectly clear to Oman: Iran, South Yemen, and the Soviet Union. That is why Oman unequivocally stressed that this military alliance should openly and intimately coordinate its activities and strategies with the United States, the only superpower supposedly friendly to the six Arab Gulf states.
Saudi Arabia also had plans for the GCC. The Saudis were eager neither for economic integration nor formal military cooperation between the six Arab Gulf states. Their priority was political and it was twofold. First and foremost was internal security and the preservation of the political status quo in the region. The GCC, according to the Saudi plan, would primarily provide the six states with a sense of collective security while each individually pursued its own policies and interests. Secondly, Saudi Arabia viewed the GCC as a fairly pliable and probably useful vehicle to promote its own foreign policy and diplomatic interests. The GCC would boost Saudi Arabia’s political standing vis–à–vis its regional power competitors—Iran and Iraq—in a region that was beginning to be thought of as a Saudi sphere of influence.
The relatively smaller states of the GCC—Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—did not have specific plans of their own. To them, the regional threat loomed large, and it mingled in their minds with those positive ideals and goals that are rightly associated with cooperation and integration. In retrospect, it is obvious that they knew little of what was taking place. Some even suspected that the GCC might be a maneuver to bring them either into the Saudi saddlebag or into what was then considered an "unholy alliance" with the United States (Graz 1990, 228). However, they happily followed the lead of the others, especially Saudi Arabia. Quite predictably, they could not openly oppose the wishes of their purportedly trustworthy bigger neighbors. To them the GCC was potentially an added insurance policy. It provided a convenient shelter for their monarchical regimes and helped to prevent radical groups or movements from gaining momentum in their newly independent states. As small states they stood to gain handsomely from economic and military cooperation, as well as security coordination, both immediately and in the long run.
All Things To All People
Even today the nature of the GCC has yet to be clearly defined. It has clearly evolved into all things to all people. Each of the member states has its own perceptions and expectations. Some now, more than before, emphasize its economic integration function. Others vigorously advocate greater military cooperation. Still others remain exclusively fixated on internal security as the principal objective of the GCC. Periodically, the GCC has vacillated among all these tenuous functions and expectations. It has yet to drop anchor at any one of them for a sustained period of time. However, as it exists today, the GCC is none of the above: it is not an economic integration body, nor a military alliance, nor a full–fledged security community.
The GCC hardly qualifies as an integration venture. Integration refers to that process by which supernational institutions come to replace national ones. It is the gradual shifting upward of sovereignty from the state to a regional structure. The ultimate expression of integration would be the merger of several states into a single state. Functionally, integration proceeds from economic and technological developments which lead to more supernational interactions and structures. This necessitates greater political involvement, which in turn drives integration further (Haas 1958, 16). Integration is clearly too generous a term to apply to the GCC, except to point it out as a classic failure of economic and political integration. After a careful review of the GCC’s economic achievements Erik Peterson concludes, "Because of these considerations it can not be said that the GCC economic program has transcended national sovereignty" (Peterson 1988, 229).
The GCC is manifestly neither a political nor a military alliance. An alliance is a formal pact between sovereign states. It stems from formal treaties between or among two or more states, binding them to collaborate on purely military or political issues. It is formed quickly during a period of intense ideological and political conflict in anticipation of a war for which collective resources and domestic energies and emotions are mobilized. A peculiar feature of an alliance is that it is formed deliberately against rather than for something. It is a determined collective effort to overcome an ideological, political, and military rival and to score a decisive victory. Short of that, one of the most pressing goals of alliance formation is to prevent an adversary from achieving a dominant international or regional position (Holsti et al. 1985). Clearly, while the GCC was partly conceived as a means of thwarting a bid for political and military hegemony by the larger regional states, it does not qualify as an alliance per se. It was probably never intended to be an alliance of any sort, let alone a military one. Since its inception the GCC has studiously done everything conceivable, in both word and deed, to avoid being perceived as an alliance against any nation.
If it is not an integration nor an alliance, is the GCC a security community? A security community refers to the attainment of a sense of community and institutions and practices that are strong and deep enough to assure durable and dependable expectations of peaceful exchange among the states in a given regional system. The bottom–line requirement for the formation of a security community is a reliable expectation of nonviolent relations between the involved states (Deutsch 1957). Beyond this, a security community can take many forms. Some involve formal mergers between members and the development of supreme central institutions with power to take binding decisions. The GCC, while ensuring relatively peaceful coexistence between its member states, does not add up to this form of security community. It patently lacks a central institution capable of making legally binding decisions (Angel in Sandwick 1987, 106–49). Even the decisions of the Supreme Council, the highest authority in the GCC’s hierarchy, are not legally binding. The Secretariat General, furthermore, has no enforcement power apart from moral suasion, and even this moral authority is becoming increasingly marginal.
The GCC does, however, qualify as a fairly loose and heterogeneous security community. This type of security community falls short of legal merger and opts instead for close cooperation among its essentially autonomous member states. Even so, while the GCC enjoys a strong sense of community and peaceful coexistence, there have been a number of unexpected hostile incidents between GCC member states. Most of these violent conflicts were short–lived clashes limited to border disputes. Yet they nearly shattered the tranquility
of peaceful coexistence within the community. These lingering border disputes—between Bahrain and Qatar, for example—have yet to be satisfactorily addressed. They likely will resurface, and hence remain a potential trigger for further violent incidents and community disintegration.
The Charter of the GCC is of no help in clarifying its nature and specifying its political philosophy. The Charter generously employs lofty terms such as unity, integration, cooperation, and coordination. These are used casually and interchangeably to describe the immediate objectives and the ultimate goals of the GCC. In the two–paragraph preamble of the Charter, the term "unity" appears twice, "integration" and "coordination" each appear three times, and "cooperation" is mentioned five times. The term "unity," referring to the political unity of the six Arab Gulf states, is described as the ultimate goal of the GCC. "Integration" is reserved for the more mundane social and economic fields. "Cooperation" and "coordination" turn up in connection with political and policy–related interests. The Charter speaks openly of the ultimate aim of unity and of an eventual confederal union of the GCC states. As to the more immediate objectives, article four of the Charter mentions such far–reaching goals as achieving cooperation in all fields, strengthening links in different fields, establishing similar systems in all fields including the economy, commerce, communications, legislation, administration, and, not least, technology. Conspicuously missing in the Charter is any specific reference to cooperation in the field of security and defense. Yet security has been consistently the most visible preoccupation of the GCC. It is an open secret that while volumes of press releases and official statements have kept up the charade of a focus on economic cooperation, the urgent concerns and discussions within the GCC have actually focused on defense and internal security (Nakhleh 1986, 8).
This seemingly unwitting constitutional ambiguity inevitably heightens the confusion about the actual nature of the GCC. It is tempting to simply brand the GCC as a one–of–a–kind institution (Christie 1987, 14). But this characterization only evades the need to seriously scrutinize the GCC, especially when it claims to have pioneered an era of regional integration in the Arab world. In short, whether it is a unique or a standard cooperation and integration initiative, today it is manifestly easier to identify what the GCC is not than affirm what it is.
This lingering doubt about the GCC’s true nature is of course linked to the still more ambiguous issue of its origin. Even today, the origin of the GCC is open to dispute. The central unresolved question is: what factor(s) precisely gave rise to the GCC? Was affinity or necessity fundamentally responsible? Was the GCC a natural product of a long history of association between the six Arab Gulf states or was it basically an immediate response to the sudden turbulent regional events of 1979–80? In other words, was internal or external cause more important in the final decision to establish the GCC? The more general and perhaps more relevant question is: under what conditions are cooperation and integration among states likely to occur?
The Origin of the GCC
According to the realist theory of international politics, states rarely engage in cooperation and integration (Waltz 1979, 106). The gains to states are not sufficient to initiate cooperation, which is ordinarily permeated with strategic uncertainties (Lida 1993). Interestingly, states often become even more reluctant when one state realizes in the process of cooperation that possible gains may favor others more than itself. Even in the most unlikely case, where there are absolute gains to all members, states do not promote cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities. The "self–centered" nature of international politics is such that it rarely encourages nations, especially newly independent states, such as the GCC states, to initiate regional cooperation and integration.
The GCC rather is a deviation from this allegedly ironclad rule of international politics. Despite the theoretical improbability, the GCC was born. Its member states are earnestly engaged in conscious policy coordination in all fields. These states, despite uncertainties, have found it desirable to cooperate to pursue mutual interests and to realize potential tangible gains. They willingly, though incrementally, adjust their expectations and actions and adopt to the logic of policy harmonization, so that all eventually end up better off than they would have otherwise. They seem to appreciate the largely beneficial consequences of interstate cooperation and coordination.
The GCC seems to be not only a theoretical but also an empirical oddity. It is possibly the only contemporary cooperation venture for which objective domestic realities had absolutely no relevance for its initiation. Strangely enough, the GCC is not a product of local social pressure since there are virtually no political parties or interest groups, apart from the ruling families, credible enough to push the GCC states toward regional cooperation. The GCC is detached from internal social realities. It has no broad popular base. Its social base is nearly as narrow as the ruling families and as limited as the six heads of state. Equally, the GCC is not a product of any particular economic development or technological advancement. It is not demand driven, and it does not follow the usual logic of spillover, as the liberal and functionalist theory of integration would maintain (See Keohane 1984). Technological and industrial advances, which liberal theorists posit as the principal cause of regional integration (witness the European common market), have little if any relevance to the creation of the GCC. Functional and structural spillover did not directly launch the GCC.
The GCC is equally an anomaly in its regional setting. Contrary to a widely held belief, the Gulf region is not conducive to ideas of peaceful coexistence and regional cooperation. The Gulf, which is composed of eight states (the GCC countries, Iran, and Iraq) that vary in size and importance, is a chronically conflict–oriented region (Abdulla 1994). There have been more serious occasions of conflict and dispute than occasions of cooperation and peaceful coexistence among these eight states. Throughout their modern history, these geographically clustered states have engaged in conflicts in many forms: tribal wars, border wars, oil wars, and not least, political and ideological wars (Litwak 1993). Notwithstanding the settlement of some border issues in recent years, most of these ongoing conflicts remain dormant and regularly reemerge to catalyze fresh conflict.
Hence, when it comes to the Gulf region, dispute is the rule, whereas institutionalized peaceful coexistence and cooperation is the exception (Abdulla 1994, 2). One might say that the GCC as an integration project was certainly a rational idea, but that it was established in an inhospitable environment. Its purposes seem antithetical to the fractious and parochial characteristic of Gulf politics. Certainly, such an endemically conflict–oriented region desperately needs confidence–building initiatives such as the GCC. The only problem is the essentially exclusivist predilection of the GCC ruling elites. In addition, of course, the current GCC formula notably excludes the Gulf’s two largest states: Iran and Iraq.
In the absence of a region–wide expansion of the GCC, the Gulf will remain a tense region. The GCC’s creation has only deepened political rifts among the major regional powers because Iran and Iraq are understandably suspicious of GCC intentions and motivations (al–Alkim 1994). They justifiably view the GCC as a tool of Saudi diplomacy which aims to assume a greater regional role at their expense. It is precisely since the birth of the GCC that Gulf conflicts have become distinctly more violent and bloody. The last two tragic Gulf wars amply testify to this higher level of brutality. Since the creation of the GCC, Gulf disputes have also tended to attract unusual international interest. Purely Gulf conflicts instantly transcend regional confinement and are transformed into acute crises with massive global consequences (Heikal 1993).
The GCC was born despite overwhelming odds and can only be attributed to complex sets of internal and external causes. These include, among other things: unique family and tribal ties, deep socioeconomic similarities, identical political and cultural values and beliefs, shared historical experience, intense dependency on oil and oil revenues, geographic proximity, a distinct pattern of interstate interactions, a common perception of friends and enemies, a sudden change in the regional balance of power, the emergence of an anti–status–quo regime in Iran, the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, intensified superpower rivalries in and around the Gulf region, emerging Saudi diplomatic assertiveness, and growing American apprehension about the Gulf security and its vital interests in this highly strategic region.
Each one of these important factors played a role in the making of the GCC. Undoubtedly, considering the many odds against its creation, all of these factors had to combine to create a decisive push in the direction of its official launching. The question as to which one of these factors or combination of factors is more decisive is still as valid as it was in 1981. One way to resolve this question would be to classify all the possible causal factors into two broad variables: ideological affinity and objective necessity. The GCC is a product of both these variables. They have contributed equally to its birth, first as mere idea and then as actual reality. Cultural and ideological affinity is structurally the constant cause. It has been around for centuries and most likely will persist as an ongoing source of harmony among the six Arab Gulf states. Ideological affinity unequivocally set the idea of the cooperation in motion well before the official establishment of the GCC. Objective necessity, however, was and is the catalyst behind the GCC’s creation and continuance. It invariably asserts its primacy and urgency under specific circumstances and at given historical junctures. It usually plays a decisive role in transforming latent ideas into action. Hence, factors of affinity as the background cause, and factors of necessity as the efficient cause, jointly gave rise to the GCC in 1981.
Building Blocks for Cooperation
A sense of community, or what Deutsch (1957, 123) calls "compatibility of major values," is an essential condition for the formation of amalgamated or pluralistic security communities; clearly it is also necessary for regional cooperation in general. Any serious attempt at cooperation and integration presupposes the existence of national and ideological affinity that goes well beyond expediency and rationally calculated self–interest. It is universally acknowledged that states with similar characteristics are more likely to cooperate than dissimilar ones (Axelrod 1984). In the case of the GCC states, their political and ideological affinity is, quite simply, exceptional.
What binds them together is a common religion, Islam, a common language, Arabic, and a common heritage and tribal background which is earnestly preserved despite rapid modernization. They also enjoy a common system of governments which are basically single–family, single–tribe centered (Gause 1994). Except perhaps for Saudi Arabia, they all fit neatly into the category of physically, militarily, and even psychologically small states (al–Ebrahim 1983). In addition, there is a shared history, geographic proximity, and a roughly equal standard of living, which has been inflated by oil revenues. Similarly, their economies are totally oil based and their societies are predominantly subsidized, which has created a "rentier mentality" and a relaxed way of life peculiar to the GCC states (al–Naqeeb 1990). These and many other sociopolitical commonalities and exceptional qualities bind the GCC states together. They have effectively and skillfully used their unique political and ideological attributes to their advantage and formed an apparently exclusive club.
Beyond the visible harmony of its states, the GCC benefited greatly from the personal and psychological affinity of its founding fathers. Elite affinity in this case is unprecedented, and certainly more true and relevant to the formation of the GCC than the normal and perhaps exaggerated affinity between its states. The GCC leaders live next to each other not only in space and time, but also quite palpably in cognitive framework. Epistemologically and psychologically, they belong to the same paradigm. They are a group of rulers who speak, think, and act in tandem and usually have no fear of being misunderstood by each other. This is especially so when it comes to the question of preserving their way of life and the one–family form of government. Understandably, the ruling families take an active interest in each other’s welfare and longevity.
These rulers made the right decision at precisely the right moment with hardly a ripple of dissent. Their decision to establish the GCC instantly proved a winner. There was an element of enormous simplicity in the formation of the GCC: it was conceived purely as a process of elite integration. Its conception was entirely consistent with the unusually personalized politics of the GCC states (Gause 1994, 143), and despite rigorous bureaucratic attempts to deepen its scope and mandate, it has been and will remain deliberately elitist.
While ideological and personal affinity are essential ingredients here, hard–core interests rather than sentimental ties are what eventually led to the development of cooperation. States formally join together to achieve tangible domestic and foreign policy goals and cooperate to enhance each other’s security. That is why cooperation becomes not merely desirable but actually indispensable under acute circumstances. A specific situation must exist to justify the development of cooperation. Indeed, cooperation is entirely unnecessary under normal circumstances: when relative harmony prevails, a state might be unwilling to cooperate in such a way as to benefit its partner state. However, failure to cooperate under acute circumstances may lead to devastating consequences, especially for vulnerable states such as those constituting the GCC (Ahrari and Noyes 1993).
The extraordinary regional and international circumstances of 1979–80 left the six small Arab Gulf states with no choice but to coordinate policies. The GCC was at the time an objective necessity. The unstable situation in the region triggered the process of the formalization of cooperation. Rapidly unfolding events presented the GCC states with formidable challenges, dangers, and ultimately choices that necessitated a major transformation of the usual thought process. The logic of the situation demanded a higher degree of security and military consultation and closer political coordination.
The most threatening aspect of the 1979–80 events was surely the Islamic revolution in Iran, which quickly led to the downfall of the Shah (Ramazani 1988, 6). The Arab Gulf rulers viewed with utmost alarm this abrupt termination of the most powerful monarchic regime in the Gulf. These rulers, for better or worse, had grown accustomed to the Shah and his somewhat grandiose regional design. In many ways the Shah was just like them: a monarch, a strategic ally of the West, a relentless enemy of communism, a cogent defender of the regional status quo. His sudden downfall was shocking and believed to be a bad omen.
Worse yet was his replacement. A menacing Islamic revolutionary republic was a complete contrast to the largely moderate regime of the Shah. The new revolutionary regime in Iran did everything possible to heighten fears among the already timid and vulnerable Arab Gulf states. It immediately raised questions about their Islamic credentials—long an indispensable pillar of their legitimacy. It exposed their "unholy" ties with the West, particularly the United States, which formed the bedrock of their security underpinnings. Further–
more, the new revolutionary regime made it amply clear that it intended to actively export its Islamic revolution to its neighboring countries and, with God’s help, to the rest of the world (Manashri 1990). For the Arab Gulf states to face up to this radical and revolutionary regime, cooperation was inevitable. It was no longer a luxury, nor even a free choice. It was simply an urgent objective necessity.
On top of this political and ideological challenge came the Iran–Iraq War in September 1980, a direct consequence of the downfall of the Shah. The war proved to be not only the longest interstate war of the twentieth century but, more important, the bloodiest conflict in the recorded history of the Gulf (Hiro 1990). The human, social, and economic destruction it caused far exceeded any imaginable expectations (al–Nasrawi 1986). It shattered the relaxed and easygoing mode of the Gulf of the 1970s. All these benign feelings—the general sense of optimism associated with the 1973 oil boom and the dreams of building the new and modern welfare state—vanished as the war raged and grew ever more threatening. The whole region was in state of untenable war; defense and security instantly became the top priority. The commitment of the regimes to sociopolitical change waned. Foreign involvement in Gulf affairs reached an all–time high. Oil prices plummeted, and oil, once the supreme element of bargaining power, was no longer a credible resource.
At such an incredible moment, the mood inescapably supported a collective response and concrete cooperation, especially since there were no psychological impediments to policy coordination at the decisionmaking level. A summit of cooperation–makers was promptly convened in Abu Dhabi on May 25, 1981. In a tableau of unity the six rulers initialed the official establishment of the GCC and proclaimed a new era of cooperation which no one had thought was possible in such a tension–prone region. It is now time to ask: has the GCC fulfilled its economic, political, and military objectives?
GCC Process: Euphoria and Stalemate
Given the right blend of affinity and necessity, states can engage in regional cooperation and integration. But once cooperation is officially put in motion, it invariably experiences moments of both noticeable breakthrough and dismal breakdown. Failures and successes alternate, and both are an integral part of the process of building and consolidating integration and cooperation (See Nye 1968, 859). At the center of all cooperation and integration processes runs an underlying tension between national and supranational loyalties. This tension accounts for the frequent go and occasional stop of cooperation between states, those of the GCC included. Since its inception, the GCC has routinely oscillated between short–lived euphoria and agonizing protracted stalemate. Yet one thing did not happen: the GCC did not break apart.
At the most fundamental level, then, the GCC’s principal achievement has been the fact of its establishment and its endurance thereafter. Its sustainability since its inception, in and of itself, is impressive. The six GCC states, remarkably, have maintained their apparent cohesiveness. No defection has occurred nor was one seriously contemplated by any member state, no matter how dissatisfied.
As fundamental as this achievement sounds, it is markedly timid and marginal compared to the grandiose stated goals of the GCC. In this context, survival is a nonachievement achievement. The GCC, as illustrated, came into being as the result of objective necessity, not free choice. Necessity is the cement that binds them still. Dangers lurk ominously just around the corner: Iran, Iraq, foreign workers, Islamic fundamentalism, and social tensions. The internal and external threats are sufficient to keep these states within the boundaries of the GCC shelter, a calculatedly worthwhile political and security guarantee in times of crisis as well as in more normal times.
More specifically, the GCC has achieved one of its overriding individual and collective objectives, namely to make it through the turbulent period following the events of 1979–80. The central goal of the GCC during this extraordinary period was survival of its member states. The GCC states survived the ideological onslaughts of the Islamic revolution in Iran. They stayed as clear as possible from the eight–year–long Iran–Iraq war without having been sucked into it. They dealt wisely with the regional and international consequences of the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and stayed out of the entangled superpower rivalries steadily submerging the Gulf region. They even survived the end of the oil boom era and the subsequent economic and financial austerity of the 1980s. At the end of a turbulent decade, GCC states found themselves surprisingly unscathed. This was an undeniable success, and a great deal of the credit for it deservedly goes to the GCC (Graz 1990, 262).
Nonetheless, these states frankly admit that they do not place significant faith in the GCC’s ability to guarantee their security and survivability. This became particularly clear after the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which severely tested GCC’s security and military credentials. It is damning evidence of the GCC’s failure in security matters that its states unilaterally opted for foreign protection and are now more hopelessly dependent on external military protection than ever before (al–Alkim 1994). Foreign, primarily American, military protection is an ever–present and embarrassing reminder to the GCC states that in its absence they would not likely survive for long.
This issue of security and survival aside, the GCC, true to its stated goals, has measurably increased official coordination and interstate interactions in almost every field since its inception. In terms of consistency and frequency of official meetings, the GCC’s record is outstanding. The meetings of the Supreme Council—the GCC’s highest authority, composed exclusively of heads of states—are extremely regular. Their frequency is probably unmatched by any other meetings of Arab heads of state (Anthony in Sindlar 1988; and Peterson 1988, 43). Since the creation of the GCC until 1996, the Supreme Council has been convened 17 times.
Equally important is the frequency of the meetings of the Ministerial Council, composed of the foreign ministers of each state. The Ministerial Council, which acts as the executive branch of the GCC, had met 59 times as of March 1996—nearly four meetings per year. Resolutions on substantive matters have been discussed and approved, which in turn has deepened cooperation in economic, social, and political fields. Other cabinet–level meetings have been as prolific and as productive as the Ministerial Council meetings. During the GGC’s existence, for example, GCC ministers of finance have met 40 times; minister of commerce and economics 22 times; ministers of petroleum 21 times; ministers of transportation and communication 20 times; ministers of information 17 times; ministers of interior 15 times; ministers of defense 14 times; ministers of education 12 times; and ministers of justice 7 times. In addition, there have been hundreds of other regular cabinet and high–level official and unofficial meetings, and thousands of lower–level meetings to deliberate issues of common concern (GCC Documents 1995).
These meetings have had a certain significance. They have achieved at least a modicum of the institutional integration necessary to turn mutual ideas into joint legislation. Sadly, however, they have been typically high on talk and low on action. Putting words into action is proving to be extraordinarily difficult. The GCC is only forward–looking when it comes to high–profile summit meetings that produce ceremonious declarations and lofty pronouncements. Very few of these words have been matched by substance. Hence, the GCC is far from acting in concert on either domestic or foreign policy. On the contrary, and in spite of elegant meetings and declarations, absolutely none of the traditional prerogatives of national sovereignty have been forfeited in favor of the supranational authority. In fact, the GCC rulers seem to have studiously avoided this, as the GCC is already irritating some sensitive nerves of national interests (Peterson 1988, 232).
Implicitly, the ground rule among the founding fathers was that the GCC would not be allowed to develop beyond its point of origin, that is, as a malleable organization designed to promote the harmonization of elite concerns. The six rulers, while they may settle for increased coordination among their officials and states, watchfully guard against any further institutional and policy integration that threatens their uneasy personal and constitutional authority (World Press 1995). This lends the GCC a brittle quality. What the rulers once did, they can also—at any moment—undo. The GCC remains structurally foundationless. It is, like many other grand projects in the Gulf, a house perilously built on sand. But as long as it remains convenient and the six rulers find it politically expedient and personally satisfying to announce, now and then, broad policy outlines that are high on declaratory rhetoric, but pointedly low on specifics, the GCC will stand.
Economically, the GCC’s most concrete achievement has been the unified economic agreement that was adopted with great ceremony during its second summit meeting in 1981. This 28–article document was proclaimed the concrete framework for the economic integration of the GCC states. The nonbinding agreement, typically replete with generalities, calls for elimination of custom duties, coordination of import and export policies, free movement of labor and capital, joint oil, industrial, and technological policies, construction of a common economic infrastructure, establishment of a unified investment strategy, and coordination of financial and monetary policies. As it turns out, very few of these ambitious plans have advanced beyond voluminous quantities of paper work and uncounted hours of technical committee meetings. The once–vigorous talk of immediate economic integration of the GCC states remains just talk (al–Kuwaiz 1983–84, 45). More disappointingly, even economic cooperation has fallen sharply on the GCC’s list of priorities. The GCC states realize that there is little need for the integration of their essentially self–propelled oil–based economies. Furthermore, each GCC state is currently overwhelmed by its own recurring budget deficits and unusual financial hardship.
Militarily, regional events have given the GCC no choice but to focus almost exclusively on defense and security concerns. Despite a high proclivity for cooperation in the military field, even here no major breakthrough has been forthcoming. The most noticeable achievement is the regular annual meeting between the armed forces chiefs of staff and ministers of defense. Additionally, pan–GCC military exercises were conducted in 1983, 1984, and 1987. In 1984, the GCC established the Peninsular Shield, a purely symbolic and inherently impotent joint force combining units of all six states. The GCC has yet to build a credible system of deterrence and defense (Dietl 1991). Ironically, conventional wisdom now considers it more prudent for each GCC state to strengthen its own security and defense infrastructure and separately negotiate and sign defense agreements with the United States, the ultimate military power in the Gulf (Yetiv 1995), as a first step toward an integrated military system.
Politically, the GCC has scored some major achievements by diligently creating images of unity both in domestic policy and foreign affairs. The GCC deliberately promotes itself as a group of exceptionally similar states that are not only interacting and coordinating regularly through shared institutions, but also significantly developing an unmistakable sense of common regional identity. The gradual centralization of regional identity, which is a natural outcome of an increase in interstate interactions, is the GCC’s principal political achievement.
The GCC has also emerged by now as an internationally recognized regional organization with clout. In the Arab world, the GCC is envied for its record–breaking endurance (al–Shraidah 1995). It is considered as an illustrative example, if not a prototype, of a potentially successful Arab regional integration experiment. The GCC is readily perceived, at least by the international community, as a unified political actor. It certainly appears to act as a body in the United Nations and similar international governmental and nongovernmental gatherings (See al–Alkim 1994). The wide range of diplomatic activities carried out by the GCC since 1981 has acquired a distinct and recognizable Gulf character. The GCC, and needless to say oil, are the most visible vehicles for so–called Gulf diplomacy, which is branching out well beyond the confines of the region and the Arab world. The GCC has been effectively utilized as a tool to achieve the goals of Gulf diplomacy through close and productive consultation between its states.
Disintegrative Pressures
Even in the political field, the GCC has by no means replaced the individual foreign policies of its member states. It is, of course, difficult to gauge just how far the GCC states sincerely want commonality in their foreign policy. Oman continues to maintain a rather peculiar foreign policy orientation toward Iran, Iraq, the Palestinian issue, and alliance with the United States. Kuwait, certainly before the Gulf War, had its own interpretation of world politics. The UAE, too, perhaps influenced by Oman, has ventured into an independent foreign policy. More recently, the small state of Qatar has emerged as the unlikely maverick member of the GCC. It is fiercely asserting its unilateral foreign policy strategy vis–à–vis Iran, Iraq, and even Israel without undue regard for other GCC states’ interests and sensitivities. Saudi Arabia, however, still exerts, at least behind the scenes, the greatest political influence within the GCC. Most GCC states at least pa y lip service to the Saudi view of world politics. But Saudi influence is eroding measurably and the junior partners are acting more autonomously in defiance of Saudi political hegemony.
In short, the process of cooperation between the six Arab Gulf states is unexpectedly producing its exact opposite. The GCC states are visibly asserting their peculiarities and asserting their autonomy not only in foreign affairs but actually in all fields. These states are finding it extremely difficult to maintain even the minimum degree of cooperation. Lately, the chemistry among GCC states has not been great even at the elite level, as so clearly indicated by the Muscat fiasco and the controversy in 1997 over Qatar’s decision to host the fourth annual Middle East regional economic meeting, with Israel in attendance, at a moment when the Arab–Israeli peace process was in a state of acute crisis. Appearances notwithstanding, on many policy issues the GCC states are clearly more divergent and less homogeneous than it was once assumed.
Disparities in views and capabilities between these states not only exist but in several crucial respects are also compelling. It is not true that all the GCC states are oil states: some (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE) are major oil producers, but others (Oman and Qatar are much smaller producers, and one (Bahrain) is effectively a non–oil state. It is not true, either, that all six of them are equally rich: some are super–rich, some are not so rich, and some are relatively poor. Nor is it true that all these states are monarchies. There is only one king among the six rulers; three others are emirs, one is a sultan (the only and perhaps the last sultan in the Arab world), and there is one lonely "president" (the UAE’s Shaykh Zayid, who is periodically reelected by his own Supreme Council which is composed of six relatively independent shaykhs). Equally, it is not true that all the GCC states are conservative or traditional: some are indeed socially and politically conservative, and even reactionary; some are part modern and part traditional; and some are either socially or politically liberal. Furthermore, they are sharply different in size, stage of development, political experience and maturity, level of education, demographic composition, and economic and military capabilities. As a matter of fact, there is also considerable hidden animosity and flagrant suspicion among them. This is especially true of the smaller states, which invariably seek protection from being politically absorbed by the larger and more dominant states. Most significantly, even elite cohesiveness, the bedrock of the GCC, is cracking as a new and younger generation of rulers begin to replace the aging founding fathers. In this respect, the case of Qatar going off on its own is only an indication of things to come.
These diversities and differences are neither peripheral nor easily glossed over. They have existed all along but are now becoming more potent as disintegrative factors. They explain why integration has not been forthcoming and why cooperation has been and probably will remain bumpy. Nevertheless, it was undoubtedly a historical moment when the six GCC rulers first came together in Abu Dhabi. It is still a considerable achievement that they are able to stand united and meet annually in a spirit of politeness to discuss matters of mutual concern.
Endnotes
Note 1: The topic of Gulf identity has generated lively discussions. For different views on this subject see the special edition of Journal of Social Affairs 9, 35 (Spring 1992) (In Arabic). Back.
Note 2: The first opinion survey to measure public attitudes toward the GCC was conducted by Shamlan Y. Al–Isa and Kamal al–Manufi in 1985, " Trends in Kuwaiti Public Opinion Regarding the GCC" (In Arabic). For a brief discussion of its findings see Emile Nakhleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council, Policies, Problems an Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 87–94. Back.
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