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Michael C. Hudson (ed.)
1999
6. The United Arab Emirates: A Quarter Century of Federation
Frauke Heard–Bey
There are many criteria by which to measure the performance of a country. These might range from its economic development to its record on human rights. Internal cohesion is not usually the first yardstick that comes to mind, except perhaps when dealing with a federal state. A federation requires consensus and a continuous effort on the part of its constituent members: Each of them must want to remain part of it, and those institutions which are the function of the central body alone must be given adequate power because it is only through them that the concept of federation can become a meaningful reality.
From the beginning the unity of the United Arab Emirates was based on a great many compromises, but after two decades and a half the federation has not fallen apart despite the predictions of doubters and detractors. Measured on the experience of Arab integration in recent times it must be considered a success. The three underlying factors that have contributed to the success of the seven shaykhdoms now forming the UAE (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ra’s al–Khaimah, Fujairah, Ajman and Umm al–Qawain) are its population structure (with only around 15 percent of the inhabitants being nationals), the uneven distribution of wealth, and the traditional structure of the local society. In addition to these basic factors, however, the success of the UAE must be explained in terms of pragmatic institution–building in response to structural changes, respect for tradition, and a leadership with the ability to adapt to challenging situations.
The UAE came into being in 1971 in response to an externally created political situation described in the first part of this paper. In the second part, the institutionalization of unification, the nature of federation, mechanisms of political participation, and the constitution are analyzed. The third part examines the federation in action, discussing how it coped with a constitutional crisis, regional instability, economic issues and foreign policy challenges.
Establishing the Federation
The following historical points are of importance in terms of the situation prior to the federation process which began in the late 1960s:
The British Withdrawal
On January 16, 1968, the British government announced its decision to withdraw from all obligations east of Suez. This meant repatriating some 6,000 British troops from Sharjah and Bahrain, and relinquishing British responsibility for the security and the foreign affairs of the seven Trucial States, Qatar, and Bahrain.
There had been extensive discussions in Westminster about withdrawal, but by the end of 1967, it had seemed certain that the Gulf region would not be affected. Therefore, the British decision to leave the Gulf as well came as a complete surprise to the rulers and the people of these nine states. They were ill–prepared to face a number of unresolved territorial claims, to defend the growing oil–wealth of the region against possible predators, to deal with the different ideological trends sweeping the Arab world, and to guard against the possibility of subversion.
Two major unresolved questions faced the Trucial States: first, the Iranian claim to Bahrain, which the Iranians referred to as "our crown jewel," and to three islands belonging to the emirates of Sharjah and Ra’s al–Khaimah; second, the persistent claim by Saudi Arabia to large tracts of Abu Dhabi territory, although in 1955 Britain had unilaterally brought the Buraimi issue to a close.
The decision to withdraw the troops and to cancel all commitments was bound to have an effect on the entire region. Qatar and Bahrain had almost identical treaty arrangements with the British government as with the seven Trucial States; Kuwait had since 1961 a treaty of friendship with a clause promising British military assistance in case of an attack. For a long time, the rulers of Oman had relied on a British umbrella. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran were likely to redefine their security objectives and assume a higher profile in the Gulf region.
Regional Response
The future of "the Gulf after 1971" was widely discussed in British government circles, in particular among the Conservatives. The Gulf rulers were made aware of British thinking on these matters. But there also emerged an awareness among many of the decisionmakers in the Gulf that the time had come to actively shape the future political landscape of the region. The idea of some kind of Gulf–wide federation favored by Britain began to be discussed. The Ruler of Bahrain and the Foreign Minister of Kuwait took the initiative by visiting several neighboring Gulf states to sound out their views. The first decisive step was, however, taken by the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai when they met on February 18, 1968 on the border between their two states, resolved their frontier difficulties, and declared their two states united. Foreign affairs, defense, social services, and the very important matter of immigration were to be the responsibility of this new "Union." It is interesting to note that the two rulers did not want their newly declared Union to be the final structure in shape and size. Instead, they invited other rulers to join. Both were well aware that there was not yet much reason for euphoria—rather that they had started a process that would lead them into uncharted waters.
The response to this invitation was very favorable, and a week later, on February 25, 1968, the rulers of Bahrain and Qatar joined the rulers of the seven Trucial States in Dubai. The result was the agreement to establish a federation of the nine emirates effective March 30, 1968, while the drafting of a constitution continued (Rumaihi 1986, 55–65; Taryam 1987, 64–189; al–Alkim 1989, 8–15).
At the time most observers were surprised that the meeting resulted in considerably more than the universally expected declaration of an intention to sound out the possibilities of a federation. In fact, the 12 points of the February agreement were the skeleton of a constitution. From then on, the nine member–states were under an obligation to come eventually to an agreement on the constitution of this, their new union. There followed more than three years of searching for constitutional formulae that would be acceptable to all members.
This process of constitution–making took place under fairly unconventional conditions for such a momentous but also highly specialized task. Not only had the seven emirates of the Trucial States rapidly become so very unequal in size of population, economic capability, and ability to sustain development, but the addition of Bahrain and Qatar also introduced unexpected complications. These ranged from the striking differences in the levels of education—Bahrain and Qatar were far ahead at that time—to the readiness to hold elections for representatives to sit in a council or parliament. Bahrain, and to a lesser extent Qatar, had well–tried institutions for all essential manifestations of governmental authority.
During the next three years there were not only the rather too infrequent meetings of the nine rulers as the "Supreme Union Council," but also meetings of the deputy rulers, and a staff of negotiators delegated from each emirate, who in turn named various committees which met frequently. Some of the negotiators took upon themselves the heavy burden of traveling all over the Gulf region on "federation business" in additional to their government positions back home, because there was no one else to stand in for them. For many of them this was not only a taxing but also an exhilarating experience: They were involved in building something worthwhile for their own people—and for the first time with little outside help. Grave responsibilities were carried, often on young shoulders, but invariably with dignity and a keen desire to "get it right." The spirit of these years is a treasured memory for those who experienced them.
The Decisionmakers
The ultimate decisions in each of the constitutional issues at stake were taken by the nine rulers. Who were they at that crucial time, and what was the environment in which they lived?
In August 1966, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan al–Nahayan had taken over the rulership of Abu Dhabi from his brother Shaykh Shakhbout, who had ruled for thirty–eight years—witnessing the peak of the pearling industry and the subsequent devastating economic recession, followed by the gathering pace of the oil boom. Shaykh Zayid was expected to give the inhabitants some immediate signs of the long–awaited benefits from the new oil wealth in the country—while his brother had held back from fear the fickle world market for this commodity, oil, like the pearls before it, would not always produce enough revenue for the country. Shaykh Zayid engaged straightaway in comprehensive developments on all fronts—infrastructure, education, health, services, and institution–building. His vision, however, from the outset extended beyond the emirate of Abu Dhabi. With the assurance of steadily growing oil exports, he planned to share much of the emirate’s wealth in the spirit of Arab brotherhood; already in 1966 he donated relatively large sums to the Trucial States Development Fund, established by Britain for the seven states in the 1950s. From the inception of the federation, he made it known that a large share of Abu Dhabi’s growing funds would be available to build a viable union. Other Arab, Islamic, and Third World countries were to experience his generosity too. But already it was obvious that he saw the new federation as the most important political goal and was willing to pledge almost total dedication from Abu Dhabi’s side to its success.
Shaykh Rashid bin Sa‘id al–Maktum of Dubai had a longstanding reputation for being farsighted and economically astute. Dubai’s trade had gone from strength to strength even before he succeeded his father as ruler in 1958. Before oil was found in Dubai (and was first exported in 1969). Shaykh Rashid had devoted his considerable energy to improving Dubai’s infrastructure in order to consolidate Dubai’s position as the leading trading port for the region. At times his efforts were helped by grants and loans from his son–in–law, the Ruler of Qatar. In consequence, the two emirates that had a common currency, the Qatar and Dubai riyal, often formed one interest group in the discussions about the constitution of the new union. If the ruler of Abu Dhabi was motivated by idealism, the ruler of Dubai provided the realism.
Qatar, the second of these nine Gulf states to find oil, started exporting in 1949. In the 1950s, it became a welcoming haven for many families from the poverty–stricken Trucial States who were seeking better living conditions, a job, and education. Government institutions had already been set up, the process of legislation was underway, and at the end of the 1960s, Qatar was more "developed" than any of the other emirates except Bahrain. Qatar’s ruler, Shaykh Ahmad bin Ali al–Thani, shared much of the responsibility for the state with his deputy, Khalifah bin Hamad al–Thani, by whom he was eventually deposed in 1972. Qatar brought the most professional approach to the conference tables—which did not always impress the other participants, who were inclined to seek what was politically possible, rather than what was constitutionally correct.
The ruler of Bahrain, Shaykh Isa bin Salman al–Khalifah, was in charge of the most sophisticated of the nine emirates and also the largest, with about 200,000 inhabitants. Formal education had been introduced in Bahrain by 1919. In consequence, there were already well–established government institutions. Oil was first discovered in 1932, and Bahrainis worked at all levels in the oil extraction and refinery industry. But above all, the population as a whole was considerably more politicized than anywhere else in the Gulf. The people were following the negotiations on the ultimate shape of the new union, and they expected to have their say. Shaykh Isa did not intend to deny them certain political rights and led his country’s plea for a fair representation of Bahrainis, the largest population. Yet, Bahrain was situated a considerable distance from most of the states of the Union—it is, for instance, 330 miles to Ra’s al–Khaimah. As an island, it is not only difficult of access, but also is traditionally very much involved with other littoral states of the Gulf such as Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar had an unresolved dispute over some sandbanks and small islands. The ruler and the people of Bahrain were interested in the progress toward a union of their liking, but they followed even more eagerly the developments with regard to the Iranian claims to their island.
The ruler of Sharjah, Shaykh Khalid bin Muhammad al–Qasimi, had replaced his pro–Nasserite predecessor in 1965, at the behest of the British. While the federation negotiations were going on, exploration for oil in the vicinity of the disputed island of Abu Musa was starting, and Iran’s claims to this island introduced further complications. Sharjah had the best educated population of all the shaykhdoms of the Trucial States. A school was established there in 1952, and by 1968, many secondary school graduates had already obtained higher education abroad. Their experience was particularly valuable during the federation negotiations.
Ra’s al Khaimah, which in the past had been united with Sharjah under some of the influential and powerful Qasimi rulers, approached the negotiations with the attitude that it was therefore still one of the most important of the Trucial States. Moreover, there were reports that the exploration for oil in Ra’s al–Khaimah would lead to a big discovery, enabling the emirate to be once again on a par with Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The ruler, Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad al–Qasimi, was keen to maintain his own contacts with some of the neighboring states, such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
The only emirate of the Trucial States which is situated on the Indian Ocean coast is Fujairah. The ruler at the time, Shaykh Hamad bin Muhammad al–Sharqi, was the first to be recognized by Britain as another "Trucial Ruler"—after agreeing to give the multinational but London–based Iraq Petroleum Company’s (IPC) a concession to prospect for oil in 1952. Communications with Fujairah were still difficult because the rough track over the mountains was sometimes washed away by flash floods. The emirate asked Abu Dhabi’s delegation to speak on its behalf at some meetings. Finally, the two smallest emirates, Umm al–Qawain and ’Ajman, had rulers, Shaykh Ahmad bin Rashid al Mualla and Shaykh Rashid bin Humaid al Nuaimi, who were both very elderly but contributed continually to the ongoing discussions.
Failure of the Union of the Nine
The Conservative election victory in Britain of June 1970 again raised questions about the program for withdrawal. Finally in March 1971, the British foreign secretary announced that Britain would adhere to the timetable, previously set by the Labour government, to complete withdrawal by the end of 1971. During this period of uncertainty, some of the emirates lacked the incentive to work wholeheartedly for the establishment of the Union; some even considered the possibility of opting out.
With the help of the United Nations, whose representative, V. W. Guiccicardi, conducted an informal survey, it was ascertained that the population of Bahrain did not want to be under Iranian rule. In May of 1970, the uncertainty over Bahrain’s future was removed when Iran formally renounced its claim. By June of the following year, it became clear that Bahrain would no longer participate in the union of the nine states because on August 14, 1971, Bahrain declared its independence. Qatar in turn followed suit on September 1, 1971.
Abu Dhabi had already announced the formation of the emirate’s first Council of Ministers on July 1, 1971 (it was abolished in 1973 in a move to give greater prominence to the federal government). A few days later, the seven rulers of the Trucial States met for a series of marathon sessions in Dubai, and the formation of the state of the United Arab Emirates was announced on July 18, 1971. One of the Trucial States, Ra’s al–Khaimah, delayed joining until February 1972.
After the completion of the transfer of authority from the British government to the new state, a provisional constitution came into effect on December 2, 1971, the day which is now celebrated as the National Day of the United Arab Emirates. The experience gained over the years of negotiation as a group of nine and the results of their efforts were the very building blocks for the union of seven. The loose nature of the new federal state reflected to a certain extent the geographical, social, and political diversities of the group of nine. There was considerable temptation to gloss over the differences and to continue with an increasingly meaningless union in order to please the rest of the Arab World, which was looking for a symbol of Arab unity. The leaders and the people of the Gulf emirates were more concerned with political realism and with best preparing themselves to conduct their own affairs than with impracticable political gestures.
Provisional Constitution
The constitution eventually adopted by the seven emirates of the UAE differs little from the document that had been discussed over the years by the nine emirates. The constitutional drafts were molded in later stages by a number of expatriate Arab legal advisers and by the delegates of the nine emirates. Looking in detail at the genesis of this material over the three years, one finds that indeed a large part of the work of shaping this constitution was done by the two absent participants, Qatar and Bahrain.
The constitution of the UAE reflects the political reality of the time. First and foremost it was meant to be in force only for the first five years, to be replaced by a permanent constitution tailored more precisely to what was hoped to be, by then, a political entity well on its way to becoming a centralized state. The political reality of the time was that the individual emirates were not yet ready to give up their identity, and their rulers could certainly not imagine relinquishing their authority in the face of such crucial changes. This is nowhere more manifest than in article 23 of the Provisional Constitution, which states that "the natural resources and wealth in each emirate shall be considered to be the public property of that emirate." In consequence, those emirates which were lucky enough to derive wealth from exporting oil or from trading are constitutionally in sole possession of that wealth. It is indicated elsewhere in the constitution that regulations would be made to ensure that a certain proportion of that wealth is put at the disposal of the federation as a whole. Not stating what that proportion was to cause considerable problems in later years. Moreover, when the wealth also enhances disproportionately the more fortunate emirates’ political power, this encourages erosion rather than growth of national unity.
A further reflection of the political reality of the time was the weak role given by this constitution to the population’s representatives. In 1971, it seemed unrealistic to provide for elections (although the constitution allowed for an emirate to choose its representatives in that way). At the time, the majority of the potential electorate was totally unprepared for such an innovation. It was assumed that the small local population of each emirate would be adequately represented by a few people chosen from among the leading merchant families and tribal elders, who had always had the confidence of their people and were seen as the community leaders. Thus only forty delegates constitute the Federal National Council (FNC). Of these, eight represent Abu Dhabi, eight Dubai, and six or four the smaller emirates respectively. The powers of the Council are consultative: it is not expected to initiate bills but can comment on them and may amend them before they become law.
According to the provisional constitution, the ultimate authority in the land is the Supreme Council of Rulers, who approve all legislation and by their meeting provide a manifestation of centralized unity. But the constitution lacks any provision for enforcing regular meetings of this highest authority. Over the years, the rulers preferred the ease of informal meetings to the constraints of an imposed routine. In the absence of a mechanism that enforces debate and decision at the highest level, controversial issues can be simply left in abeyance.
The provisional constitution does not stand the test of constitutional experts—it is a weak and incomplete document. But it was for that reason that it could be adopted without further long discussion by the seven emirates’ delegations in the summer of 1971. Its very vagueness constituted the room for compromise that made the handshake, the deal, and the signature possible. A more sophisticated written constitution, at a time when the venture into a modern unified political structure was still perceived as a tentative experiment, would have meant a less honest inception of this federal state. It can be argued that the fact that this rather imperfect provisional constitution has yet to be replaced may indicate that the political environment has still not matured enough to make such a replacement meaningful. An answer may lie in an assessment of the political developments of the UAE over the past quarter century.
Institutionalizing Unification
The Federation
The establishment of the United Arab Emirates in the final months of 1971 was the response to a political necessity. For the population of these emirates it was also an economic and social convenience. But whether the young states would survive as a federation, whether it would grow from being merely the sum–total of seven tribal societies to become a genuine "motherland," and whether the inhabitants of the coastal population centers as well as of the many remote villages would become a nation would all depend on the interplay of a great number of factors.
The UAE was based on a constitution over which the notion "compromise" was written in large letters. The rulers and their advisers made commitments to the new state on behalf of their emirates, but the people themselves participated little. Most observers expected only a minimum of federal governmental structure at that time. That absolute minimum had to include the matters over which the British government had held authority, such as defense, foreign affairs, and immigration.
Since 1971 the UAE government has extended its authority to the extent that it affects every citizen’s day–to–day life. One may point to a great number of imperfections and to many still unfulfilled hopes and expectations such as greater economic equality, less autocratic rule, or better decisionmaking processes, but there is now no doubt that the government of the UAE is able to respond to demands in the same way as any other government. The most recent demonstration of this ability was the role played by the UAE during the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, both during the war and afterward. There were internal consultations during the crisis at different appropriate levels. The federal decisionmaking process—though it might be expected to be slow—came up with results in a way undistinguishable from those of the governments of any of its centrally ruled neighbors. The UAE took an unequivocal stand with regard to the Iraqi invasion, welcomed Arab and other initiatives to find a peaceful solution, and was decisive in its support for the allies when it came to the military confrontation.
Growing Political Participation
The federation was set up by the traditional decisionmakers, assisted by a group of educated nationals with the support of the established merchant community and encouraged by the British Foreign Office. At the time the people were neither in conflict with, nor critical of these traditional authorities, but saw them as acting on their behalf within the framework of the familiar tribal system. Many warmly welcomed the federal state and there was no active opposition to it. Such positive but largely passive attitudes soon gave way to expectations which a growing number of UAE nationals actively voiced as they became more aware of the political scene in their country.
The 1973 October War involving Israel and its Arab neighbors was the first occasion when the UAE experienced the full impact of being swept up in the tidal wave of Arab politics. These events also heightened people’s awareness of, for instance, the expectations of the other Arab countries that they would share in the oil wealth, the need to distribute the wealth more evenly inside the UAE, the possibilities for more formal—as opposed to traditional tribal—participation in the decisionmaking process, and the desire to have one strong UAE force rather than a number of defense forces.
The Permanent Constitution
When the time came in 1976 to replace the provisional constitution with a permanent constitution, a lively public debate ensued for the first time about the future political scene in the UAE. (Heard–Bey 1996, 378ff; Taryam 1987, 234ff; Peck 1986, 131ff). A committee of twenty–eight was charged with drafting the permanent constitution with the help of a legal expert. The committee was divided between those who saw themselves as delegates of their home emirate and sought to promote the particular preferences of their ruler and others who saw an opportunity to change a great many things in the political life of the UAE, which they perceived as outdated, divisive, and inappropriate for the future. This second group—what one might call the "independents"—sought as the first objective for the new constitution greater centralization at the expense of the powers exercised by each ruler and his court. They also hoped to introduce more direct and democratic participation by the people in deciding the affairs of the federation. The independents wanted more efficient distribution of the wealth of the country. Some among them suggested abolishing Article 23 of the provisional constitution, thereby making the income from oil or any other natural resource the property of the whole nation. The committee’s draft of the permanent constitution envisaged a compromise, requiring each emirate to transfer 75 percent of its income to the federal treasury.
The committee also agreed on a compromise for the composition of the Federal National Council, which would have done away with the allocation of a fixed number of representatives for each particular emirate. Instead the assembly was to have a large number of seats divided among the emirates according to the number of nationals in each of them. The role of the Council was also hotly debated since several committee members had hoped to give it full legislative functions. The question of national security, another burning issue, was not resolved in favor of the maximalists, who wanted to forbid the individual emirates from retaining a local force. The draft permanent constitution did go a long way in this direction, though, saying that only the federal authorities may establish and maintain a military force. Private Emiri guards, whose number would have to be limited by law, would still be allowed.
One of the main issues throughout this exercise was the extent to which the centralized powers (always referred to as "federal") should be strengthened at the expense of the emirates’ individual powers. Some members of the drafting committee vigorously opposed such proposals, especially those who represented Dubai and Ra’s al–Khaimah. The debate then widened to the question of whether or not there should even be a new constitution—whether it was not better to continue with the provisional one, gradually changing it over time. It eventually transpired that Dubai would reject the new constitution.
This constitutional controversy, together with a dispute over immigration policy and the general reluctance of some of the other rulers to follow Abu Dhabi’s example and give up regional powers in favor of a stronger and more unified central state, motivated President Shaykh Zayid to announce that under those circumstances he would not accept a further term of office when his five–year term expired in December 1976. In any event, the Supreme Council of Rulers decided at its meeting in July 1976 not to approve the draft permanent constitution but to extend the validity of the Provisional Constitution for another five years. Fearful of the possibility of the disintegration of the fledgling federation and of the dire consequences for the entire region, Shaykh Zayid did accept a further term of office as president.
Managing Domestic and Regional Pressures
Constitutional Crisis
Thus the changes that a group of nationals, chiefly from Sharjah, had worked for and that many people in the region had hoped for, were not adopted. But the spirit of reform remained alive after December 1976, most obviously in the newly constituted Federal National Council. The Council of Ministers, too, benefited from the presence of fifteen university graduates in its midst. Between these two institutions, the ideas that had been discussed in preparing the draft of the permanent constitution were taken up again at a time when it was obvious that the country needed decisive leadership and cohesion in view of the growing instability of the Shah’s regime in Iran in 1978. The Council of Ministers and the Federal National Council formed a joint committee, with the hope of convincing the rulers individually that it was time to give up their particularism and support a strong national government. The group visited each court on more than one occasion and also arranged for a joint debate of the Federal National Council and the Ministers on June 27, 1978. Eventually, a memorandum was prepared by this joint committee and submitted to all the rulers, suggesting—even demanding—the speedy resolution of these issues which had been pending since 1976. (Taryam 1987, 240–42; Heard–Bey 1996, 407–14).
These suggestions gained the enthusiastic support of the president of Abu Dhabi and the rulers of Sharjah, Fujairah, and ‘Ajman, which led to a confrontation between Abu Dhabi and Dubai in March of 1979. The matter had to be put to the Supreme Council of Rulers, which convened in Abu Dhabi on March 19, 1979, to study the memorandum of the joint committee as a first step toward resolving the brewing constitutional crisis. While the Supreme Council was in session in the guest palace in Abu Dhabi, a large number of students, citizens, and tribesmen demonstrated outside in support of the points raised in the memorandum, but also in support of the president, who was seen as the guarantor for a more unified, hence more effective government of the UAE.
The urge to rush to the street to demonstrate was a novelty in the UAE, and was most certainly provoked by the daily television footage of demonstrations in Iran. But otherwise, there was nothing in common with the events on the other side of the Gulf. When the president interrupted the session of the Supreme Council to speak to the people outside, there was a wave of sympathy between them. All the demonstrators wanted was for Shaykh Zayid to take the government of the entire union more firmly into his own hands and thereby—it was hoped—to deliver the benefits of Abu Dhabi’s wealth more directly to the entire country, to render its defense arrangements more effective, to prevent duplication of infrastructure and industrial projects, and to regulate the influx of immigrants.
The president was ready to comply, but not all the members of the Supreme Council were as ready to give up so many of their traditional powers, which were still considered to be the hallmark of each emirate’s statehood.
Compromise could not be achieved for some days, during which the demonstrations continued, and Shaykh Rashid, the ruler of Dubai, published a counter–memorandum. In essence, his statement was an equally convincing plea for unity within the federation. In his view, this had to be achieved by first concentrating on better services for all parts of the country; only when there were no longer such huge differences in the living standards of the national population throughout the federation did it make sense to unify more completely.
The intervention of mediators, in particular the foreign minister of Kuwait, Shaykh Sabah al–Ahmad al–Sabah, finally resolved the impasse. The cabinet was dissolved on April 26, 1979, and Shaykh Rashid, ruler of Dubai, formed the new government as prime minister. This solution, although a very helpful compromise, was yet typical of the way in which confrontations so often have been overcome: instead of clinging to a principle with the tenacity of one’s conviction, one embraces and thereby silences the opposition. In this case, the astute manager of Dubai’s economic successes, the realist with a team of practical people behind him, undertook to improve matters where he had seen them lacking. Shaykh Rashid’s cabinet turned out to be effective, in particular in improving conditions in remote areas. Far from harboring any resentments over the earlier differences of opinion, the president and the prime minister worked very effectively together. Dubai also started to contribute to the federal budget.
Although the "activists" of the 1976–1979 period had not achieved many of their objectives, they were ready to give the new government time to implement changes in its own way. After all, the constitutional crisis had never developed into an all–out confrontation. The supporters of the memorandum never opposed their rulers but urged them to take more positive, even bold, political decisions rather than clinging to their routines. Thus, the issue was settled quietly. Not only was the president ready to stand for another term in office (his third), but the prime minister was also reelected in 1981, and the validity of the Provisional Constitution was extended for yet another five years at that same time. It was therefore a sad blow for the entire country when the prime minister became very ill and increasingly unable to discharge his duties; yet it was not deemed right to confer the premiership on anyone else during his lifetime. Shaykh Rashid died in October 1990.
The War Years of the 1980s and After
The 1980s witnessed no serious attempt to reform the political system of the UAE. There was even a noticeable decline in the role of the Federal National Council, which met less frequently, and spent much of its time on routine business. Thus the assembly did not develop many initiatives. This does not mean, however, that there was less constructive political will at work. While the Iran–Iraq War was raging dangerously close, the UAE had to try to keep out of the firing line—literally so far as shipping and petroleum exports were concerned, and figuratively in the sense that it was caught in a difficult political balancing act between the two nations at war. In such circumstances, building political unity in the UAE could not fruitfully be achieved through public memoranda, debates, and demonstrations. It was obvious to everyone that internal dissension of any kind would have been detrimental to each member state and every institution in the federation. Throughout the Iran–Iraq War, then, the status quo in domestic politics remained unchallenged. However, this pragmatic way of dealing with an exceptional war situation had become the universally accepted norm by the beginning of the 1990s. Thus it came as no surprise that the text of the provisional constitution of 1971 was declared the permanent constitution in the course of celebrations for the twenty–fifth anniversary of the federation in December 1996.
Whereas the young UAE nationals of the 1970s were largely educated in Arab universities, and had been exposed to the political ideas prevalent in those universities in the 1960s, the new generation of young technocrats taking over in the 1980s and early 1990s have been educated for the most part in Western universities and have learned the value of pragmatism. Members of this generation have moved into positions in the ministries, the military, the newly formed Central Bank, and the oil industry, where they worked effectively for the benefit of the UAE. While abroad, they identify themselves with the UAE rather than with their home emirate. Returning home, they work in the central administration in Abu Dhabi or Dubai. This is the generation that identifies practical ways of advancing the interests of the state of the UAE. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the constitution is now rarely mentioned in public. Reality has overtaken its shortcomings.
One day a new generation of young visionaries will take up the task of bringing the constitutional document, on which the federation should rest, in line with reality–and thereby chart a clearly marked route for the political future.
Economic Issues
The years since 1971 have seen steady progress in consolidating unity, which began as a fragile statement of intent. It should not be forgotten, however, that the fledgling federal state started off with a very rosy economic future. (Khalifa 1979, 62–74). Abu Dhabi’s and to a lesser extent Dubai’s growing income from oil helped to encourage the other emirates to join with them in 1971, and ever since oil money has remained an essential factor in maintaining the momentum of building the federal state. Soon after the UAE was formed, an unexpected fourfold rise in price and the considerable oil production increases generated a windfall of oil revenues, which peaked in 1980 at $14.3 billion before declining as the oil price fell. During the Gulf crisis, increased production again resulted in an estimated $15.6 billion of oil revenues for the UAE in 1990.
This is not to say that economic issues have never been a problem for the federation over the last two decades and a half. On the contrary, the fact that the lion’s share of income accrued to only two of the seven emirates has caused tension. But the extent to which the non–oil emirates have benefitted has to be judged by comparison with conditions in these emirates before 1971 (Heard–Bey 1996, 164–237). Success in the federation was nevertheless not an automatic consequence of the country’s income from oil, in particular because the people have anyway learned to expect from the central authorities tangible improvements in their lifestyle.
The Foreign Policy Component
As soon as the UAE was declared in December 1971, steps were taken to impress on foreign nations that this was not another of the loose and short–lived British constructed federal states. The UAE immediately became a member of the Arab League, the United Nations, and various UN bodies. Diplomatic relations were established with many countries. Patient diplomacy brought results where they were most urgently needed. In 1974, Saudi Arabia recognized the UAE after their common border had finally been agreed upon, and the friendship of this most important and powerful neighbor was confirmed.
The UAE as an independent state was primarily interested in confirming its credentials as a good Arab and Islamic country. The 1973 war and its aftermath gave the UAE the opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the Arab world–even though its conservative system of government differed from those of many Arab nations. Declarations of all kinds, acts of solidarity such as the oil boycott of the U.S. and the Netherlands, and above all, the generous aid to many Arab countries and communities from the early 1970s onward—were usually made in the name of the UAE, thereby strengthening the image of unity at home and abroad. The UAE has also provided considerable financial aid to a number of Islamic and Third World countries. There was a flurry of involvement in international conferences, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with many more countries. Some foreign relations decisions had to be handled carefully because different emirates attached different importance to relations with particular countries for historical reasons. Relations with Iran fall into this category because of Dubai’s traditional trade across the Gulf (al–Alkim 1989).
In recounting the efforts of the late 1970s to forge a much more effectively structured union for the UAE, in which he was personally involved, Abdullah Taryam writes: "the citizens themselves remained faithful to the union and worked for its preservation. Far from accepting existence within the narrow limits of a provisional constitution, they behaved in a spirit of unity." (1987, 247). This underlines the fact that the federation is a success at least where it matters most—in the hearts and minds of the local population. Its success since its very inception in presenting itself abroad as a fully integrated political entity is equally impressive. Such positive experiences are relevant for the Arab world in general and will be highlighted below.
Relevance of the UAE’s Experience
Leadership style
The UAE’s success in building a federation that has already survived longer than any other Arab union in modern times is due primarily to strong leadership. On the twenty–fifth anniversary of the UAE in December 1996, the by–now usual media outpouring of sycophantic praise for the president, who had returned from abroad on account of ill health to a tumultuous welcome in November, reached unprecedented proportions. This should not distract us from trying to understand a leadership style that has proved so successful—both at home and abroad. The strength of leadership in this region has rarely been a function of its might, but rather of its ability to strike a good compromise at the right time. To cite a historical example, Abu Dhabi’s main tribal confederation, the Bani Yas, wedged between the Wahabis and the Qawasim, managed to maintain its independence from both—staying aloof from their escapades and quarrels throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or patiently negotiating with one or the other party until compromise was reached.
Tracing the ups and downs of more than a quarter century of federation, one could rarely find an instance when Abu Dhabi used its wealth to foist a decision on others. Instead, the prevalent political management style in the UAE largely depends on a plethora of meetings—the formal ones with all their much–loved protocol, and the informal ones at the camel racetrack or in the desert—as well as on telephone calls, messages, intermediaries, and go–betweens. From the outset, all parties recognize that a compromise must be achieved and that it does not really matter how long it takes. What is important is to help the other side to save face, compromising in a positive spirit so that all parties feel that they have achieved a "happy ending." In March 1979 the constitutional crisis could easily have led to a clash between Dubai and Ra’s al–Khaimah on one side and Abu Dhabi and other emirates on the other side, but this was avoided because the two leaders holding contrary views stayed away from the crucial meeting. Subsequent attempts at solving the impasse followed the usual pattern of bilateral contacts, delegations, and mediators all testing out various configurations of compromise. All parties made use of the fact that contemporaneous developments in Iran, the Arab world, and Pakistan put their domestic differences into perspective. The solutions reached—in this instance in a painstaking behind–the–scenes search for compromise—provided a good basis for further and better cooperation between the two emirates within the federation from 1979 onward.
The strength of this political style is an attitude of tolerance, the absence of doctrinal or ideological fixation, and infinite patience. Its weakness is that success or failure ultimately depends on the leaders alone. There is little room for a corporate approach or for teamwork, although advisers may be consulted. Also in this system, the time factor is obviously of relatively little importance, yet not all developments wait for compromises to be worked out in their own time. This political style is common elsewhere in public life throughout the federation—where it may be manifested not as a purposeful search for a compromise but rather as the unnecessary delay of a much–needed decision.
Traditional Democracy
While a tribesman now has little influence on the choice of the next ruler in his emirate, and has little say in who represents his emirate in the Federal National Council, he nevertheless remains confident that if he has a substantive grievance, he can put it to his shaykh. UAE society is small enough and structured enough that this line of communication for all intents and purposes should be open in both directions. The shaykh’s majlis was and is an institution designed to facilitate this vital privilege: direct communication. Thus, even now, people voluntarily acknowledge a ruler’s authority. Criticism is aimed not at the traditional structures and their proponents, but increasingly at the inadequacy of the people around them and at the way in which the rest of the public machinery functions.
It is important to note that such voluntary continuation of this grassroots type of democracy still works and is operational for most of the nationals in the country, though not for the expatriates. For example, the chairman or the manager of a business may hold an open majlis, to which staff, employees, and others are expected to come occasionally. Throughout the Arab world there is a ready understanding of this voluntary interaction between the people and those whom they acknowledge to be their leaders.
Stabilizing Influence
Would the Gulf’s stability have suffered if the UAE had split apart? The unified stance that the federation has presented to its neighbors and to the world in itself has had a stabilizing influence on the area. By the 1970s, the UAE was already involved in efforts to mediate within or between other Arab states. The question of the form the union of the nine emirates should take was of paramount importance to their immediate neighbors in the Gulf. In the three years before 1971, the politicians and rulers of the nine emirates thus became engaged in intensive diplomatic activity with each other and the neighboring states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. They visited each others’ countries frequently and thus became knowledgeable about each other in a way that might otherwise not have happened. When, in subsequent years, matters of Gulf–wide importance, for instance oil prices, had to be discussed, leaders followed this pattern of easy, ad–hoc, mutual consultation that had been established while preparing for the federation before 1971. The decision to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 1981 is likely to have been inspired by the example of unity in diversity in the UAE (see chapter 7).
In setting up the UAE, the principle of solidarity among the seven shaykhdoms was very important. It is most likely that even if the federation had not come about in this form, the poorer emirates would have benefitted from the wealth of the richer ones. It is well–known that the UAE has generously aided other Arab countries, but it has also always been a keen participant in Arab issues, forthcoming with demonstrations of political solidarity. Both were offered even while the memory was still alive of the critical if not deprecatory Nasserite and Ba’thist comments about the conservative governments of the Gulf which had been made in the past by some of the current recipients of aid. The selfsame principle of focusing on the future rather than the past was again evident when the UAE joined with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in an International Monetary Fund–sponsored plan to help the ailing economies of those Arab states which suffered most as a consequence of the Gulf War.
The UAE and Oman were the two GCC countries most active in keeping the lines of communication open to both sides during the first Gulf War of 1980–88, when it was recognized that ideological differences with Iran should not detract from the fact that the Iranian people would always remain neighbors with whom the UAE would want to have a peaceful relationship.
Managing a Multinational State
The UAE probably has the most varied population mix of any of the Arab countries; dozens of foreign nationalities account for well over 80 percent of its population. While watching the rapid changes in the population structure of the country during the 1970s, a great many local politicians were very concerned about the consequences for the national identity of the local population, their security, and the additional burden on the government–provided services. Today such issues are still discussed, but there is now more confidence that the problem of the population structure is manageable. A great deal of effort has been made to regulate immigration and labor matters with the aim of making it extremely difficult for immigrant workers to put down roots. Most of these economic migrants from all over the Third World are badly off back home and are willing to accept a low status in the host country so long as they can earn enough to support their families at home. Should they leave, they are easily replaced by other migrants ready to work for even less. This "over the horizon" labor force potential encourages the authorities and the people of the UAE to view labor as a mere commodity governed by market forces, and effective measures to deal with the population structure are deferred to an ever later date.
In the UAE, as in some other Arab countries of the Gulf, the original tribal population will probably never again be numerically dominant. The Kuwait crisis highlighted the question of whether the small local populations of these countries might some day allow immigrant inhabitants to qualify for nationality, equal citizenship, and a share of the nationals’ rights and obligations. Being the most acutely affected, the UAE may need to consider earnestly the status in particular of the many long–term Arab residents in their midst, whose loyalty to the country is a valuable asset for its future development.
Freedom of Information and a New Realism
Educational facilities in the UAE are at present still too limiting for exceptionally clever students, but the obstacles that so often stand in the way of students seeking further education abroad—in particular, lack of funds or ideological constraints—are absent in the case of young UAE nationals. The availability of funds, both governmental and private, for citizens to travel, study abroad, or benefit from the latest in educational technology is primarily a direct consequence of the country’s oil wealth.
The fact is that no shackles are put on the individual’s quest for knowledge and information, which is a credit to the country’s tolerance compared to some of its neighbors. In many countries, government policy or pressures from within the society prevent citizens from trying to understand the rest of the world sufficiently well to form a balanced view; the new generation is thus subjected to ideological limitations and as a consequence is not well–equipped to think independently. In contrast, the UAE authorities initiated a dramatic reappraisal of information services at the outbreak of the Gulf War and (initially to preempt rumors) began transmitting CNN uncensored for 24 hours a day. With television sets in almost every building being now connected to satellites and the Internet, information from around the world enters the UAE unhindered.
The openness and tolerance practiced in the UAE are appreciated by expatriates, who find it possible to practice their own religion and lifestyle and to choose from a great number of international newspapers or television programs. Those limitations which are being imposed where possible are predicated on moral rather than ideological grounds. However, this tolerance is of particular importance for the new generation of citizens who are expected to lead the country in its economic and political interaction with the rest of the world. Many young people are fascinated by wealth and lack the motivation to achieve through hard work. But many others—often the deeply religious—have already made the most of their opportunities to combine the heritage of their resourceful ancestors with the skills and knowledge that modern education, information, and travel can offer. This will be a very valuable asset for the future, and may eventually give this young country an advantage over some of the traditionally leading but now sadly self–limiting Arab countries.
Conclusion
Strange as it may seem at first, the three main factors that contribute to this country’s success as a federal state are its population structure, with only around 15 percent of the inhabitants being nationals, the unevenly distributed wealth, and the traditional structure of the local society.
Every UAE national—however humble his or her material and educational circumstances and status within this society—by virtue of not being part of the non–national majority, has a vested interest in the continued integrity of the traditional society with tribal shaykhs and rulers at its apex. Being part of this structure is the basic reason why a national family is able today to lead a life in which poverty has been left behind—indeed a priori none can be lower than "middle class" because all manual laborers are immigrants. In dress, lifestyle, tastes, and a host of traditional customs as well as newly acquired habits, nationals endeavor to set themselves apart from the immigrant majority.
An inseparable feature of this social structure is, however, that it has the tribally legitimized leadership with its increasingly material vested interests and patronage as its focus. The seven ruling families in principle still have equal political power, and this is borne out by the fact that the 1971 constitution, which not only gives the emirates much independent political status, but also confirms and consolidates the individual rulers in their positions, has not been superseded. A society with a more normal population mix would have taken steps to constitutionally redefine the role of the traditional leaders, and a natural consequence of such steps would have been reshaping the federation from within.
The wealth of some of the emirates has been a mainstay for the federation’s continued cohesion. The practical benefit of oil revenues to the less wealthy is an invaluable asset for the federation; it is also important that the not so fortunate emirates have little option but to continue to operate within the existing framework because they cannot hope to survive outside the federation. Given the spirit of the early 1970s, the issue was rarely whether giving to the "have–nots" was generous enough; but rather that the "have not" tribal leaders did not want to give up any of their sovereignty in exchange. A more institutionalized routine for distributing the wealth within the country could have been established if there had been a more ready reduction in the attributes of regional particularism and sovereignty. At times such issues may be hotly debated, but are unlikely to lead to confrontation under the current circumstances primarily because the basis of the local society’s minority structure cannot be called into question. Then too, this rapidly developing wealthy state has built up practical, nonpolitical ways to administer the benefits of a modern way of life throughout all the emirates, to all nationals, and to a large extent, to immigrants, too. Thus for many practical purposes, the federation is becoming increasingly centralized.
When the UAE was set up, it was essentially a creation of the rulers, and could not have been built without them. Now the national society, by dint of being in a position quite "apart from" the rest of the population, preserves and confirms those very features which make the country continue to adhere to the conditions under which the federation was created and thereby continues to legitimize its rulers’ role within the federation. Under those circumstances, there seems to be no urgency even to change an outdated written constitution or to upgrade political institutions which are still to some extent rudimentary. In spite of such imperfections, but due largely to the society’s ingrained tolerance and sense of realism, the UAE has indeed thrived, and more than a quarter–century after its establishment can be considered a successful experience in Arab integration.
References
al–Alkim, Hassan Hamdan. The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates. London: Al–Saqi, 1989.
Heard–Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition. London: Longman, 1982; 2nd edition, 1996
Khalifa, Ali Mohammed. The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979.
Peck, Malcolm C. The United Arab Emirates. London: Croom Helm, 1986.
Rumaihi, Muhammad. Beyond Oil. London: Al–Saqi, 1986.
Taryam, Abdullah Omran. The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950–1985. London: Croom Helm, 1987.
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