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Michael C. Hudson (ed.)
1999
3. The Prospects for Arab Cooperation in a Changing Regional and Global System
Paul Noble
For nearly fifty years students of international relations have concentrated heavily on conflict and conflict&-;related topics. When attention turned to the subject of cooperation, it often centered on instances of collaborative action undertaken for purposes of conflict, e.g., alliances. 1 In recent years, however, increasing attention has been paid, both theoretically and empirically, to the question of cooperation in world politics (Oye 1986; Keohane 1984, Krasner 1983). This trend has been reinforced by the end of the Cold War and prospects of a new world order, growing interdependence and economic integration, and a new emphasis on shared interests and common security. It is both appropriate and timely, therefore, to turn our attention to the issue of cooperation in the Arab world.
The focus of this inquiry is cooperation rather than integration. Cooperation is a broader, more elastic concept. According to one well–known definition, cooperation occurs when "actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others through a process of policy coordination" (Keohane 1984). This definition, however, is a little too broad since it fails to distinguish between accommodation (i.e. the reduction or resolution of incompatibilities of interests/values between actors and/or agreement to limitations in the way actors pursue their incompatible interests/values) and cooperation in the strict sense of the term. It is in this stricter sense that the term cooperation is used here, namely the adoption of common policies and/or the undertaking of concerted/joint action by two or more actors, whether informally or in an institutional framework. This cooperation can occur in a variety of frameworks ranging from informal common fronts/alignments or coalitions/concerts of powers through formalized alliances or international organizations to outright unions of states (formal integration). Such cooperation can develop at any level, from particular pairs of states to an overall regional system. This chapter seeks to explore the problem not so much through an examination of actual attempts at Arab unity past or present, but rather through an analysis of underlying conditions both within the Arab world itself and in the larger regional and global environments that impinge on it. Specifically, it seeks to assess the impact of changing conditions in these spheres on the prospects for Arab cooperation.
As one surveys the post–Cold War, post–Gulf War situation in the Middle East, one is immediately confronted by a striking paradox. Conditions in both the Middle Eastern and global systems seem to pose significant challenges to Arab interests and thus presumably should generate clear incentives for cooperation. Yet the Arab world remains more fragmented than ever. The explanation for this, as we shall see, lies partly in the nature of the challenges faced but more importantly in conditions within the Arab world itself, not only at the level of interstate relations but also, at a deeper level, in the relations between Arab societies and, ultimately, conditions within these societies themselves. Consequently, the underlying theme of this chapter is one of considerable skepticism regarding the prospects for cooperation.
The Changing Regional System
Within the larger regional arena, Arab states face substantial challenges from non–Arab regional powers, notably Iran and Israel. These pressures, which have been accentuated by a deterioration in the Arab position on both fronts, have tended, however, to generate more divergence than consensus. The result has been continued fragmentation and increased reliance on outside powers.
The Gulf Sector
The situation in the Gulf has been of considerable concern given not only the possibility of renewed Iraqi aggressiveness but also the radically altered strategic environment (Cordesman 1993; Chubin 1994). Iraq’s massive defeat temporarily eliminated one major concern of Arab Gulf states but potentially generated another by creating an imbalance in Iran’s favor. The situation has been exacerbated by the accentuation of ethnic and religious divisions in Iraq which have rendered it more permeable to Iranian influence. The imbalance will undoubtedly grow if Iran strengthens its military capabilities and puts its economic house in order. New opportunities have also emerged for Iran elsewhere in the Arab world as well as in neighboring areas (the Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan) as a result of the growing strength and activism of Islamic movements (Sid Ahmed 1992a, 1992b).
The future direction of Iranian policy, however, remains unclear. Many believe that the increasing emphasis on resolving economic problems combined with a shifting internal balance of forces will lead to a more pragmatic foreign policy. At the same time, Iran’s greatly improved position in the Gulf and increased presence elsewhere may tempt it to pursue a more assertive, if not adventurous, policy. There have been instances of this in the Gulf, notably the pressure on Sharjah over the future of Abu Musa and Iran’s opposition to the involvement of non–Gulf Arab states in Gulf security arrangements combined with an insistence on its own inclusion in any such arrangements (Jaber 1992; Haeir 1991). Whatever the direction of Iranian policy, its growing weight and expanded involvement in the region clearly pose an important challenge.
Despite the unstable and potentially threatening environment in the Gulf, the level of Arab cooperation in this area has been limited. The weaknesses of the Arab system are evident in the failure to institute proposed joint Arab security arrangements for the Gulf. Several factors have been responsible for this failure. The security concerns of the Arab Gulf states remain acute after two major wars in the last decade and the accompanying military and power pressures. They fear that these pressures could resume when Iraq regains its strength; at the same time they cast an anxious eye toward Iran and its intentions. Given these concerns, the Arab Gulf states are eager both to increase their military capabilities and to participate in effective security arrangements (Gause 1994; Tyler 1991; Ibrahim 1991). The Arab system is perceived, however, to have a limited capacity to generate the required support; there are also questions about the reliability of any such commitments. The United States and Western powers, for their part, clearly possess the required military strength and force projection capacity to meet these states’ concerns and, in the course of the Gulf crisis, demonstrated their commitment to do so. Consequently, the Gulf states believe that their security in a turbulent area can best be assured through vertical cooperation (with the Western powers) rather than horizontal (inter–Arab) cooperation.
Divergences in approach to dealing with Iran constitute another obstacle (Gause 1994; Jaber 1991a, 1991b, 1992). Some Gulf states are inclined to conciliate Iran with a view to encouraging moderation in its policy as well as its availability as a counterweight should Iraq regain its strength and embark once again on an adventurous policy. Those who hold this view have been reluctant to proceed with Arab security arrangements if this would antagonize Iran. Others, particularly Egypt, have not necessarily objected to conciliating Iran but believe that this should be accompanied by an Arab security umbrella to reduce imbalances in Iran’s favor and limit any temptation on its part to become more assertive in the Gulf. Syria, for its part, supported the proposed arrangements but, as a quasi–ally of Iran, sought to ensure that these were not directed against it. Inter–Arab considerations have undoubtedly also played a role in hampering security cooperation in the Gulf (Sayigh 1991). One is the concern of the Gulf states that such arrangements would obligate them to provide substantial amounts of financial assistance on a continuing basis. Another is possible Saudi reluctance to accept Syrian participation owing to its close ties with Iran, or Egyptian participation because it might dilute Saudi influence among the smaller Gulf states. Internal security concerns may be another factor.
The Israeli Sector
Serious pressures have also confronted the Arab states on the Israeli front. In recent years, Israel has enjoyed a decisive advantage in power terms. This has involved a substantial superiority in conventional forces and a monopoly of nuclear weaponry as well as a capacity to project military power far beyond the frontline states into virtually all areas of the Arab world. Israel’s demographic capabilities have also been greatly strengthened through Russian Jewish emigration, thereby undercutting one of the principal arguments against an expansionist policy in the occupied territories. Israel’s position has been further strengthened by the sharp decline in Russian and East European military and political support for its principal opponents.
The Gulf conflict had a paradoxical effect on the balance of forces on this front. On the one hand, at the regional level, the imbalance was reinforced by a noticeable weakening of the Arab position in the wake of the war. This stemmed from a series of unfavorable developments: the massive defeat of Iraq, which removed one potentially important military counterweight to Israel, and a clear weakening of Jordan, the PLO, and the Palestinian community. On the other hand, at the overall level, Israel’s position weakened because it became increasingly dependent on the United States, particularly in the economic sphere. The Gulf conflict and the dynamics of regional politics also led the United States to press seriously for the initiation of negotiations and to use its increased leverage with Israel to ensure progress toward that end. This combination of factors contributed in part to the defeat of the Likud government in the 1992 elections and a reassessment of Israeli policy toward the conflict under the new Labor government. Such a reassessment may have eased one set of threats to Arab frontline parties but in some ways it posed an even more difficult challenge. For a more flexible Israeli policy, even one that still fell short of offering an honorable settlement on some fronts, combined with the advent of a more favorable American administration, produced a marked rapprochement with the United States. Israel thus continued to enjoy clear–cut superiority over the neighboring Arab states and the advantage of ongoing control over the disputed areas, but with little or no pressure from Washington to offset this. Indeed, it benefited from increased U.S. financial assistance as well as diplomatic support for its approach to a resolution of the conflict.
The new Israeli challenge was reflected in its insistence, backed by the United States, that Arab frontline parties agree not only to the normalization of relations but also to the establishment of substantial economic links and cooperation as a condition for an as yet undetermined extent of withdrawal from the occupied territories. Given the substantial disparities in levels of economic and technological development, this could result in relations of economic dependence (particularly on the part of Palestine and Jordan) and consequently a sphere of Israeli economic dominance. This challenge was broadened considerably due in part to the multilateral mechanisms for tackling regional issues that emanated from the Madrid conference. In the context of this broader multilateral framework, Washington has urged, with considerable success, other Arab states (notably in North Africa and the Gulf) to develop contacts or undertake measures of normalization with Israel even before satisfactory final settlements with the frontline states had been negotiated. 2 It also encouraged these rear–line states to develop economic and other links with Israel to create a network of regional economic interdependence that would underpin a potential Arab–Israeli settlement. The substantial dependence of most Arab states on the United States enticed some to undertake such moves in order to strengthen their ties with Washington.
Despite the challenges posed by these developments, the Arab world has experienced difficulty in coordinating policies, let alone developing a common front. Among the frontline parties themselves there have been several obstacles to close cooperation. One is the difference in national situations vis–à–vis Israel, in terms of their recognition as national entities with an acknowledged territorial base and leadership, the relative importance of the territory to be recovered, and the seriousness of the obstacles to the achievement of these aims. Hence the stakes involved in the conflict, the perceived prospects for achieving an honorable settlement and the sense of urgency regarding negotiations have varied considerably among Arab frontline parties, as have views about tactics and the extent to which the United States can be relied on to bring about such a settlement. To these must be added clear differences about relationships among the frontline actors, particularly about their respective position and influence in the Western Fertile Crescent. This has created frictions and rivalry between Syria and all of its smaller neighbors as well as between Jordan and the Palestinians.
These problems have been reflected in differences of approach concerning procedural concessions to be made in order to advance negotiations over substance, the linkages between various bilateral negotiations, and the linkages between multilateral and bilateral negotiations. Initially many of these differences were muted because of Israeli inflexibility on all fronts. They were accentuated, however, under the Labor–led governments of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres as Israel pursued a more flexible policy, particularly on the Palestinian front. The return of a Likud–led coalition government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu in June 1996 has led to a renewed and much harder–line approach toward Syria and the Palestinians and, consequently, serious blockages and heightened tensions on these fronts (as well as on the Israel–Lebanon border). Whether this new challenge will create a stronger sense of common interest, and hence increased coordination, among Arab frontline parties is debatable given the frictions and suspicions arising from developments in the "peace process" to date. Moreover, the renewed blockages and tensions may alter the domestic balance of forces within one or more neighboring Arab countries, strengthening the position of hardliners as well as generating increased political instability.
The difficulties in developing a common Arab front also increased as a result of frictions between the frontline parties and key rearline states (particularly the Gulf countries). Their respective national situations differ, giving rise to varied interests and perspectives regarding the conflict. Moreover, since the Gulf War some Arab Gulf states have displayed a marked antagonism toward the PLO/Palestinian community and Jordan for their previous sympathy toward Iraq (Jaber 1992). In addition, both the Gulf and North African states have become preoccupied with their own immediate concerns and hence have been less responsive to the problems and interests of Arab frontline countries. The gap between these segments of the Arab world has been reinforced by the widespread interest in strengthening ties with the United States. Rearline Arab states, particularly those in the Gulf, have tended to be more responsive to Washington’s views regarding the conflict and consequently more inclined to support procedural concessions or provide assurances to Israel through bilateral discussions and ties before an honorable comprehensive settlement has been reached with the frontline countries. While the advent of a new hardline government in Israel has undoubtedly slowed or even frozen normalization measures by Gulf and North African states, the gap between frontline and rearline countries will continue to provide opportunities which can be exploited by both Israel and the United States.
The Changing Global System
In addition to substantial pressures within the larger regional arena, the Arab states also face challenges arising from major changes in the workings of the dominant system both in the politico–military and economic spheres. These too have had important implications for Arab cooperation.
The Politico–Military Sphere
During the Cold War years the global politico–military system was characterized by a combination of two–power dominance, intensely conflictual relations between the dominant powers, and the polarization of virtually all major powers into two blocs under their leadership. Within a few short years a dramatic transformation has occurred in major power relations, although the extent, durability, and even the direction of those changes are subject to considerable debate.
The changes in the distribution of power have attracted the greatest attention. Here, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union as a world power and the absence of any other effective global rival have led to a situation of apparent one–power dominance (Krauthammer 1991). U.S. preeminence is more evident and likely to persist longer in the Middle East than in any other region except the Western Hemisphere. It is the only power that has demonstrated both an ability and a willingness to deploy substantial military strength in the area. While other powers can furnish various types of armaments, only the United States has the capacity to provide a full range of weaponry. Its military technology is also regarded as more advanced than that of other powers, and hence more attractive, because of its superior performance in the Gulf War. Washington’s considerable leverage and influence over a wide range of major powers and regional states further strengthen its position in the area. To be sure, questions can be raised about how long this situation will persist. Nevertheless, U.S interests in the Middle East are likely to remain substantial–Israel, oil and the oil–producing states, and the maintenance of a satisfactory distribution of power such that U.S interests or those of key allies are not threatened. This will undoubtedly result in a continuing high level of U.S involvement in the area, far surpassing that of any other power. The military and political needs of key regional states are also likely to be considerable, thereby ensuring heavy reliance on outside support. However, although the United States will remain the preeminent external power in the Middle East for some time, such preeminence does not mean complete dominance over regional actors or control over developments in the area (Hadar 1991).
Equally significant is the change in actual relationships among the leading powers. The most striking development here has been the transformation of relations among former adversaries from intense competition and conflict to accommodation mixed with varying degrees of collaboration (Rosecrance 1992; Miller 1992; Kristof 1992). This new pattern is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Russia’s preoccupation with domestic problems and relations with its former Soviet neighbors combined with heavy reliance on the West to meet its acute economic needs effectively ensure that it will be in no position to antagonize, let alone challenge, the United States for some time. China will undoubtedly have similar, although less serious, preoccupations, but the competition will be less muted and its cooperation more limited. Relations among the leading Western powers will probably not pose any significant problems either.
There is considerable debate about whether the end of the Cold War will result in the erosion or even disappearance of the two core Western alliances (NATO and the U.S–Japanese alliance) (Brown 1988, ch. 11; Tucker 1990; Cumings 1991) Certainly, Western allies may feel less dependence on Washington due to declining military–security concerns. However, if they wish to display greater autonomy and play a larger role in international affairs, they are likely to concentrate their efforts closer to home (Eastern Europe and perhaps Africa in the case of the European powers and Asia in the case of Japan). It is there that they have a more direct interest and a better chance of enhancing their influence. In the Middle East Washington will probably face only muted competition from its Western allies for some time (Hadar 1991). The major exception is North Africa, where France and other European states have significant interests. France, Britain, and others will also compete to supply conventional arms throughout the area.
The United States is likely to retain its preeminent position in the Middle East longer than elsewhere outside the Americas. It has been successful so far in capitalizing on this position to ensure not only muted competition but even a significant degree of cooperation (or at least acquiescence) on the part of other intrusive powers on certain basic issues, notably the handling of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the containment of Libya and, to a large extent, Iraq (but not Iran), and the control of nonconventional arms transfers. Thus, Arab states are confronted not only by U.S preeminence but also varying degrees of concerted action by the major powers on some key issues. 3 However, while the United States will remain the preeminent intrusive power in the region for some time, this does not guarantee either the continued cooperation of other intrusive powers on key issues or the maintenance of a substantial degree of control over regional actors and developments.
The Economic Sphere
The changes in the global economic system, while less dramatic than those in the politico–military sphere, are no less significant. The patterns here differ noticeably, however, from those just outlined (Bergsten 1992). While the United States has become the predominant politico–military power, in the economic sphere its position has slipped as the capabilities of other states and economic units have grown. What has emerged is an unbalanced tripower system with the United States enjoying a clear but diminishing lead. There is a further structural difference. The politico–military sphere has been characterized by the disappearance of the Soviet bloc and attempts to maintain, if not strengthen, a core coalition of Western powers under U.S leadership. In the international economic system, on the other hand, a more complex pattern has arisen with the emergence of two major power–centered economic groupings (the European Union, North American Free Trade Agreement and an embryonic East/South–
east Asian economic network). These regional groupings still operate, however, within an overarching framework of common institutions, giving rise to tensions between trilateral and tripolar tendencies. Finally, the politico–military sphere seems likely to be characterized by accommodation and possibly partial collaboration among the leading powers. In the economic sphere, however, there is a prospect of increasing assertiveness and rivalry among the leading Western powers, given U.S determination to reverse its economic decline, and Europe’s and Japan’s willingness to pursue their economic interests more forcefully (Garten 1993).
This divergence in global economic and politico–military patterns is reflected in the Middle East although not in full force. In the first place, the pattern of economic involvement in the area is less concentrated than in the politico–military sphere. Regional trade ties are relatively diversified. U.S financial capabilities, while considerable, are not unlimited, as evidenced by its need to turn to Japan, Germany, and the Gulf states to help pay for the cost of the Gulf War. U.S capacity to increase economic assistance to the area is also limited while other Western powers have greater potential and may figure more prominently in this area in the future. Still, the U.S economic position in the Middle East is stronger than it is at the global level. Its decisive action in the Gulf crisis and the continuing reliance of key Gulf producers (and Western consumer states) on the United States for the protection of the area’s oil resources have given Washington a strong say on energy issues (Sarkis 1992). Moreover, while its position may be slipping, the United States is still the largest supplier of economic aid to the area and the leading player in international financial institutions dealing with Third World aid and debt. This provides it with important leverage vis–à–vis less well–off Arab states although such leverage is likely to decline if shifts in global economic strength continue.
Because of the better balance in resources, the level of intrusive power competition also tends to be greater in the economic sphere. With their enhanced capabilities, the rising economic powers are in a position to play a more active and independent economic role in the Middle East. Incentives to do so certainly exist in view of the importance of Middle Eastern energy supplies and the presence of substantial markets backed by considerable financial resources. However, there are also constraints. The United States enjoys a decided advantage in much of the area arising from its protective responsibilities in regard to Gulf oil–producers and its central role in the Arab–Israeli conflict. The ensuing special relationships with key Arab states tend to restrict the ability of potential rivals to compete in establishing markets or enhance their trade and influence through economic assistance. Hence, while economic competition among intrusive powers will increase in the Middle East, it is likely to be less intense than elsewhere.
This transformation of major power relations has important consequences for Arab interests and inter–Arab relations although these vary depending on the sector. In the politico–military sphere, the ending of superpower rivalry has limited one source of division within the Arab world. However, the new strategic environment has not led to any real increase in Arab politico–military cooperation. In fact, the Gulf War, along with the ensuing postwar problems confronting the Arab world, have tended to generate much greater cooperation (and reliance) between Arab states and the Western powers than among the Arab states themselves. Thus during and after the Gulf War the security and territorial concerns of many Arab states remained acute. This was true not only of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states but also of the parties on the Israeli front. Both sets of states felt a strong need for tangible support and allies to ensure their security, contain potentially threatening regional powers, or secure Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Based on the experience of the Gulf War and the postwar period, most were convinced that the United States and the Western powers were likely to prove more effective and reliable than fellow Arab states in protecting these basic interests. The resulting intensification of reliance on these intrusive powers limited the potential for meaningful Arab security and political cooperation.
While such widespread shared reliance on the U.S. and Western powers admittedly facilitated accommodation and perhaps some degree of cooperation between Arab states, it tended to remain "dependent cooperation" (i.e., under the aegis of an intrusive power). This situation accorded with the view that cooperation requires a strong leader or hegemon except that in this case it was an external hegemon. This type of cooperation has continued into the postwar period but is problematic because it can develop only as far as the preeminent power is prepared to allow.
Nevertheless, the reshaping of the strategic environment poses significant challenges to many Arab states and thus could potentially create incentives for cooperation. In particular, the combination of one–power dominance and intrusive power cooperation on key issues has clearly limited the options available to regional states (MacFarlane 1991; Selim 1992). The alternatives have been either to turn to the preeminent power or to proceed with little outside assistance. Such a situation has reduced Arab leverage and may limit the responsiveness of the sole remaining superpower, thereby potentially harming Arab interests. This, in turn, might provide a spur to Arab regional cooperation in the long run.
The dynamics of the global economy have also generated considerable pressure on the Arab world. The accelerated development of major power centered regional trading blocs, in particular, has posed major challenges. Faced with this trend, the interests of many Arab states would probably be served by developing a common front and negotiating jointly in order to protect or enhance access to these markets (El–Rafei 1992). Cooperation would also be useful in expanding export opportunities within the Arab world to partially offset possible difficulties in access to traditional markets and to develop more competitive enterprises in today’s globalized market. Admittedly the better balanced and more competitive three–power structure of the global economy provides Arab states with more options in pursuing their economic interests, thereby reducing some of the impetus for cooperation. Still, these features are by no means fully present yet in the Middle East. Moreover, in spite of tripolar tendencies the leading economic powers continue to act substantially in concert trilaterally on economic issues of importance to Arab states, notably debt rescheduling and energy questions. Hence the challenge remains.
Compared to the politico–military sphere, the position of Arab states in the economic sphere is more varied and consequently the issue of the framework for cooperation is more complex. The have–not states have experienced serious economic difficulties since the late 1980s due to accelerating development needs and a rapidly accumulating debt burden, a situation exacerbated by the economic strains generated by the Gulf War. The ability of fellow system members to meet the economic needs of these states, at least in the aid sphere, has been substantial. However, the capacity and willingness to do so has been limited in practice due to both economic and political constraints. In fact, the intrusive powers, headed by the United States, took the lead in attempting to alleviate the most pressing concerns of some states, notably in the areas of compensation for losses suffered during the Gulf War and debt restructuring or cancellation (Greenhouse 1991).
These powers are also in a much better position to address problems of market access. Hence, while the regional capacity to meet important national concerns is greater in the economic than in the politico–military sphere, most have–not Arab states have concentrated their economic hopes and efforts at the intrusive power level. The economic concerns of the major oil–producing states are nowhere near as acute as those of the have–not states. They are still important though, especially in an international oil market which has been relatively soft. Since the leading economic powers constitute the major markets for oil exports, considerable emphasis has been placed on relations at this level. However, unlike the situation in the politico–military sphere, these vertical relationships have not prevented the development of varying degrees of cooperation among Arab oil producers.
While collaboration with outside powers may be easier and produce more results in the short term, it is questionable whether quasi–exclusive reliance on this form of cooperation is healthy or stable in the longer run. In a situation of one–power dominance combined with muted competition and partial concert among the intrusive powers, Arab leverage may be limited; consequently the United States may be less responsive to the interests of Arab states. For example, concerted efforts to limit weapons transfers may result in the freezing of serious imbalances (Sayigh 1992). The U.S might lose some of its incentive to press forward and ensure progress toward an honorable settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict or to act evenhandedly in doing so. The absence of serious major power rivalry could, after a while, reduce the incentive to continue providing substantial support to some Arab states. More worrisome still, Washington may act in an overbearing manner to enforce its views and promote its interests while exerting strong pressures on Arab states deemed to be unfriendly. 4
In all these situations, Arab division would make matters worse–reducing Arab bargaining power even further, increasing the vulnerability of states to pressures, weakening Arab security, and reducing the possibilities for an honorable settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict or other conflicts with non–Arab regional powers. In short, while the new strategic environment may place obstacles in the way of inter–Arab cooperation in the short to medium term, it may also pose a serious challenge to Arab interests and possibly strengthen the incentives for Arab cooperation in the long run.
Overall then, Arab states face important challenges not only on various regional fronts but also from the dynamics of the global politico–military and economic systems. When a number of states are similarly positioned in relation to conditions in these systems, and more particularly are faced with pressures or threats from the same source, one would normally expect some sense of shared concerns and interests to develop. It is in this sense that we can talk of "Arab" interests, at least on the part of those Arab states most directly affected by particular pressures if not within the Arab world as a whole. The existence of a sense of affinity and common identity, however minimal, among significant segments of Arab societies can also provide a further (subjective) foundation for the notion of "Arab" interests. In any case, the shared concerns and interests might be expected to generate incentives for cooperation.
There have been, however, two major problems in this regard. The first is the fragmentation of concerns within the Arab world, at least between subregions. Owing to the variety of challenges, the Arab states diverge considerably in their hierarchy of concerns. The GCC states have been preoccupied with the situation in the Gulf, involving problems of military and power–security as well as transnational and internal political security. The parties on the Israeli front have been concerned primarily with the achievement of a satisfactory settlement that would result in the recovery of their territory and, in the case of the Palestinians, the achievement of political independence. These states are also burdened by significant internal difficulties. Egypt, for its part, has been concentrating on its internal political and economic problems, while at the same time, for external purposes, trying to demonstrate its value as a force for moderation and stability in the region. Finally, the Maghrib states have been preoccupied with domestic concerns as well as relations with key European states.
The second problem is that even where common concerns exist, as in some subregions, there is both divergence regarding the appropriate response and, ultimately, a pronounced tendency to rely heavily on the lone superpower and other intrusive powers to deal with the concern. In other words, the various regional and domestic challenges which the Arab States face have indeed encouraged them to engage in cooperation, but it has been vertical cooperation (with the leading intrusive powers) rather than horizontal (inter–Arab) cooperation. This combination of the fragmentation of concerns and the globalization of responses is the most direct and immediate, though probably not the most fundamental, obstacle to Arab cooperation.
The Changing Arab System
Prospects for Arab cooperation depend ultimately on the situation in the Arab world itself. This includes not only prevailing conditions and relationships within the Arab state system but also, at a deeper level, trends in relations between Arab societies and, ultimately, internal developments within these societies.
Inter–State Relations
The Legacy of the Past
Relations between states are rarely impressed upon a tabula rasa. The current attitudes of Arab state elites are conditioned to some degree by previous attempts at cooperation and integration. Given the marked linguistic, cultural, and even religious homogeneity among Arab peoples and elites, the idea of unity understandably has had considerable appeal. Unfortunately, at the height of its appeal in the 1950s and 1960s, what might be termed Bismarckian and revolutionary approaches to this goal tended to predominate. Both approaches involved a strong challenge to the legitimacy and autonomy of existing states. The Bismarckian approach involved a core power employing relatively coercive methods to achieve these goals. The revolutionary approach sought to promote unity through internal upheavals in the countries concerned, encouraged and supported by a regime or political movement in a neighboring country. A leading regional state usually sought to assume a predominant role in this process, although other patterns were possible. President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s unity efforts involved a mixture of these two approaches, but with greater emphasis on the latter. However attractive the principle, these approaches proved counterproductive. Given both the ends sought and the means by which these were pursued, unity efforts came to be viewed in many countries as highly threatening to a broad range of state, regime, and societal interests. In short, in the context of an ongoing process of consolidation of the postcolonial state system, the idea of Arab unity came to acquire strong negative associations even among elites who originally supported the idea.
Fortunately, approaches to cooperation in the Arab world have moderated significantly. Some key features of what might be termed a European Community approach have emerged in inter–Arab relations. The legitimacy and autonomy of existing state units are now more widely accepted, and the institutional arrangements envisaged reflect this, namely cooperation councils, common fronts, and functional cooperation. Moreover, the methods employed in promoting unity are far less forceful, centering primarily on diplomacy, bargaining, and rewards. Finally, the element of one–power dominance is muted. As a result, the idea of cooperation is now seen as less threatening. Nevertheless, the legacy of earlier approaches has by no means disappeared. These resurfaced in recent years in Saddam Hussein’s apparent hegemonic policies in which the Bismarckian approach predominated.
Power and Influence
One factor which has received considerable attention in analyses of international cooperation has been the pattern of power within a system. In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch underlined the importance of a core state in the development of what he termed "security communities" (Deutsch 1957). A.F.K. Organski and long–cycle theorists have also stressed the pacifying, if not cooperation–generating, effects of the predominance of a single power (Organski 1968, Thompson 1988). This has also been a prominent theme among students of international political economy who have emphasized that cooperation requires the presence of a "hegemon." While the latter argument is expressed in general terms, it is essentially an explanation of economic cooperation, more specifically the development of a liberal (open) international economy. Moreover, some have argued that while the existence of a hegemon may be necessary to initiate international economic cooperation, once established, this cooperation can, under certain circumstances, survive the hegemon’s decline (Keohane 1984).
These arguments emphasize two important contributions of the core power. One is the exercise of leadership. The other is the possession of a sufficient concentration of capabilities to provide key services or collective goods to members of a given system. For some it is the provision of politico–military services, such as protection from outsiders or conflict–management within a group. For others, it is the ability to furnish a variety of economic services needed to sustain a liberal economic order. If these arguments have some validity, then conditions in the Arab system at earlier periods were probably more conducive to cooperation than they are today. In the 1950s and 1960s Egypt enjoyed a preeminent position and arguably could have served as a core power. 5 However, the way in which its power was exercised proved detrimental to cooperation. Since the 1970s, though, the Arab system has had no clear leader. More recently, Iraq began to emerge as a potential core state but engaged in a premature and rash drive for predominance. Since its overwhelming defeat, the situation has reverted to a more balanced pattern.
The problem in the Arab system runs deeper, however, than simply the existence of a diffusion rather than a concentration of power. The current relatively balanced multipower pattern is not really a "balance of power" but a "balance of weakness." In other words, all the leading Arab states suffer from substantial inconsistencies with regard to key components of national capabilities. Those possessing significant military capabilities (Egypt, Syria) are burdened by serious economic weaknesses, while the Arab state with the greatest financial capabilities (Saudi Arabia) has major military deficiencies. Iraq has been the only power with significant potential in both areas, but its military and economic capabilities have now been severely damaged. Moreover, all have suffered periodically from uncertain domestic political situations which have further weakened them. In short, none of the key states has had the consistent strength required to be a fully effective and energetic player in the regional system.
Furthermore, even in areas where individual powers are relatively strong, the actual level of capabilities is generally insufficient to provide the relevant collective goods or support required by other members of the system. This is particularly true with respect to military security–where the capacity to project force over distances in a short period of time is limited. The same applies, to a lesser extent, to the capacity to provide economic assistance. The problem is compounded by uncertainty regarding the reliability of system members. Hence, as noted, Arab states have generally turned outside the system to the major powers for the support required to meet their needs.
While the absence of a core power with the requisite capabilities and leadership potential would appear to limit the prospects for cooperation, the emergence of a core coalition of leading Arab states might serve as an effective substitute. In other words, though no individual Arab power might be sufficiently effective due to inconsistent capabilities, a combination of such powers with complementary capabilities arguably could achieve the same effect. While there is much to commend in this argument, there are two major problems. First, regardless of their complementarity, the inadequacy of the capabilities in both military and economic spheres relative to system members’ needs would probably preclude primary reliance on Arab support. Secondly, even if a coalition of leading Arab states could be a relatively effective substitute for a core power, such a coalition has yet to emerge. During the Gulf crisis, the joint involvement of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria in the effort to contain Iraq seemed to create the seeds of such a coalition. Hopes that this alliance might be transformed into an effective long–term coalition were raised by the Damascus Declaration (FBIS 1991; Butt 1991). In this agreement, plans were made for Egyptian and Syrian military contributions to Gulf security paralleled by important Saudi and Gulf state financial contributions to these have–not states. Since the war, however, few, if any, concrete measures have been taken to translate these plans into reality (Jaber 1991; Daoud 1992). As a result, Egypt and Syria withdrew their troops from the Gulf area, and trilateral political cooperation eroded. Postwar developments cast doubt, therefore, on the emergence of an effective coalition of leading powers that could provide direction to the Arab system. Without such a coalition to provide a solid political framework for cooperation, fragmentation is likely to prevail.
Revisionism and Conflict
Another important factor shaping the prospects for cooperation is the degree of compatibility of the interests of Arab states and the level of revisionism and conflict. In this latter area the situation has improved compared to earlier periods when unity figured prominently on the Arab agenda. Previously the level of revisionism was very high, as various states (notably Egypt) and political movements sought to bring about extensive change in virtually all aspects of the status quo. Such policies had considerable appeal among elements of the elite and broad segments of the public in all Arab countries. However, they were viewed as highly threatening by most regimes, whose fundamental interests and values were severely challenged. Proposals for common fronts, mergers, or even increased ties tended to be perceived in this light and were usually resisted. Now, the Arab state system is characterized by relative moderation. While the status quo may not be accepted as fully legitimate even by state elites, no major state is highly revisionist, at least not since the defeat of the Iraqi challenge. This is due in part to the balance of weakness which tends to limit major threats to the status quo.
The substantial decline in revisionism has clearly enhanced the possibilities for accommodation within the Arab system. However, there are still conflicting interests and sources of friction which are an impediment to cooperation. Differences concerning position and influence have been a persistent problem area. As noted, the dramatic weakening of Egypt’s position post 1967 and the advent of a more balanced multipower structure contributed to a significant reduction in revisionism. Since then, a combination of inconsistent capabilities and the fluctuating external as well as domestic fortunes of leading Arab states has produced both a leadership vacuum and an unstable power hierarchy in the Arab system. This shifting and uncertain balance of forces has tended to encourage recurrent maneuvering for position as well as periodic assertiveness. This revisionism and competition has been manifested both in the overall system and at the subregional level.
Conflict and rivalries have persisted in varying degrees since the latest Gulf War and continue to serve as an impediment to cooperation. The most profound division has been between Iraq and the other leading Arab powers. The recent experience of extensive Iraqi revisionism accompanied by forceful action has generated acute security concerns, particularly on the part of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, concerns that are reinforced by fears of a resurgence of such revisionism. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria will therefore undoubtedly retain a strong interest in the containment of Iraq, at least as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. This severe split renders an overall concert of Arab powers all but impossible. It might be argued, however, that this persisting conflict, and the accompanying threat perception, should facilitate, if not encourage, cooperation in the form of a core coalition of the remaining powers. In reality, the usual effect of such severe threat perception in the Arab world has been to generate cooperation with outside powers rather than with other Arab states. The present situation is no exception.
The other principal axis of conflict emerging from the Gulf crisis has been the pronounced split between the former Arab coalition partners and countries that sympathized in varying degrees with Iraq (especially Jordan, the Palestinian community, Yemen, and the Sudan). Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular, adopted a tough stance toward these parties and have been slow in modifying it. Some of these lines of conflict cut across subregions, but in many cases the Gulf War simply reinforced prior tensions between preeminent subregional powers and lesser states in their immediate area. More generally, in the wake of the crisis, some Arab powers adopted a more assertive policy in their subregions in order to improve their security or consolidate their influence. This reassertion of geopolitics has been evident in varying degrees in the case of Saudi Arabia vis–à–vis smaller Gulf and Arabian peninsula states as well as in the case of Syria within the Western Fertile Crescent (historic Syria) and Egypt within the Nile Valley (Salamé 1988). More muted differences also persist to some degree among the former Arab coalition partners, thereby rendering cooperation problematic. Some of this centers on concerns about position and influence. Egypt, not satisfied with its previous isolation or a limited sphere of influence in the Nile Valley, seeks to assume a leading role within the Arab world, albeit in a very different manner than in Nasser’s day (Aftandilian 1993). Cairo believes that its capabilities, experience, and diplomatic connections enable it to contribute significantly to the advancement of Arab (and Egyptian) interests, notably in the promotion of stability in the Nile Valley and adjacent areas, the achievement of an honorable settlement on the remaining Arab–Israeli fronts and the development of an Arab security umbrella in the Gulf. It feels that its overall weight, pragmatic policies, and diverse connections enable it to serve as a bridge among Arab states. Other Arab powers, while recognizing Egypt’s contribution, are reluctant to see it play too large a role in their respective areas and thus weaken their influence.
Syria seeks to establish itself as the leading power in the Western Fertile Crescent due to its overall weight and historic role and expects other Arab states to accept this preeminence (Drysdale and Hinnebusch 1991). It is also convinced that a common front of neighboring states under its leadership is necessary to defend Arab interests vis–à–vis Israel. Otherwise Israel would be able to divide these states in any negotiations, seriously weakening the chances for a satisfactory settlement on any front. Syria believes that it must play a leading role here, not only to be taken seriously by Israel and the major powers but also to strengthen its position in the larger Arab system. Other major Arab states appear willing to accept Syria’s local preeminence, but only up to a point. Iraq was a major exception but is presently too weak to mount any challenge. Egypt and Saudi Arabia acknowledge Syrian primacy in Lebanon, within limits, but prefer to see Jordan and the Palestinians retain their autonomy, in part to ensure the maintenance of pragmatic policies toward Israel.
Table 3.1 Official Aid Flows (Bilateral and Multilateral) Within the Arab World
(in millions of $US)
|
|
1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Recipients | 4708 | 5534 | 2567 | 823 |
| Eastern Arab World | 335 | 3803 | 1530 | 236 |
| Arab Africa | 600 | 1561 | 973 | 322 |
| Unspecified | 248 | 168 | 91 | 182 |
Source: Adapted from Pierre van den Boogaerde, Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and Arab Regional Institutions, Occasional Paper 87 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1991), Table 32. Van den Boogaerde's tables are drawn from IMF and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development staff calculations.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, views itself as the leading power among Arab Gulf states as well as within the Arabian peninsula and is determined to preserve, if not enhance, this position. While Riyadh clearly had substantial security concerns in the Gulf, it was hesitant to proceed with the proposed Arab security umbrella. This was due in part to doubts about the effectiveness and reliability of such arrangements, as well as apparent Iranian objections to the abovementioned proposals. Saudi Arabia also had reservations about an Egyptian and Syrian politico–military role in the Gulf, albeit for different reasons. Concerns that such arrangements might create an entitlement to substantial financial aid were also involved. The combination of reservations about Egyptian and Syrian involvement in Gulf security arrangements and a lukewarm view of their economic needs has generated resentments and cast a shadow over both states’ relations with Saudi Arabia (Sayigh 1991; Rodenbeck 1991).
Apart from the conflict between Iraq on the one hand and its immediate neighbors as well as the remaining Arab powers on the other, few, if any, of these conflicts are particularly acute or insurmountable. Nevertheless, the frictions they generate clearly contribute to Arab fragmentation.
Regime and Ideological Differences
The Arab world has been characterized not only by pronounced heterogeneity but also by severe challenges on the part of some regimes to the legitimacy and security of others. While welcomed by many Arabs, these challenges were perceived as highly threatening by most Arab regimes. Since unity proposals were frequently viewed as an instrument for the achievement of these ends, they met with strong suspicion and resistance. Now, however, the differences between regimes, at least in regard to the nature of their economic systems, have declined. With the advent of more pragmatic regimes there has also been a pronounced de–ideologization of interstate relations. Certainly no major Arab state presently poses a serious ideological threat to the others, apart possibly from a potentially resurgent Iraq and a somewhat unstable Sudan. The legitimacy of regimes continues to be questioned, even challenged significantly, but the real challenge comes not from other regimes but rather from opposition forces, primarily Islamic fundamentalist movements, linked loosely in a fundamentalist "internationale."
Table 3.2: Worker Remittances Within the Arab World
(millions of $US)
| 1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1138 | 5999 | 6004 | 6440 |
Source: Adapted from Pierre van den Boogaerde, Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and Arab Regional Institutions, Occasional Paper 87 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1991), Table 35. This table was derived from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, various years.
An ideological cold war exists within the Arab world, but for the moment it is being waged primarily within Arab states and societies rather than between them. Regime differences are not at this point a major source of conflict between Arab states. This could change quickly, however, if an Islamic movement were to come to power or achieve a dominant influence within a key Arab state. Regime differences could also widen and generate increased tensions in the event of more extensive moves toward democratization either in countries currently undergoing limited democratic experiments or in others newly embarking on such a path.
Table 3.3: Intraregional Trade in the Developing World (1989)
(as % of the trading activity of regional states)
|
|
Exports | Imports |
|---|---|---|
| Asia | 31.1 | 29.2 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | 13.9 | 17.4 |
| Middle East(a) | 6.2 | 7.2 |
| Africa(b) | 5.8 | 6.1 |
a Middle East figures include Iran and Israel but exclude Arab Africa.
b Africa figures include North Africa.
Source: Adapted from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics
In addition, the 1991 Gulf War and ensuing developments have served to reinforce or intensify differences, both between and within Arab states, over a number of issues which are likely to become more divisive with the passage of time. These include economic disparities, the role of Islam, and the policy to be pursued toward Israel and Iran as well as the United States. These developments further complicate the task of developing cooperation not only at the overall Arab level, but also within subregions.
Intersocietal Relations
Intersocietal relations constitute a deeper set of conditions affecting the prospects for Arab cooperation. These consist basically of the degree of complementarity between the peoples, societies, and economies of the area as well as the extent of interconnectedness between the countries involved. Together, these factors determine the strength or weakness of the societal bonds underpinning a state system. At first glance conditions here appear relatively favorable to Arab cooperation–more favorable, seemingly, than in any other regional system of developing states. However, when one probes more deeply, the situation appears more problematic. A steady erosion of these societal bonds occurred over the last two decades and intensified noticeably in the wake of the Gulf War. Indeed, the change in intersocietal relations has been more substantial than that in interstate relations.
The most obvious factor is the extensive homogeneity of Arab peoples and elites. This has tended to generate a strong sense of kinship and even common identity within the Arab world. For a considerable period, this broader sense of identity rivaled individual national identities among important sectors in many states. This facilitated the development of a substantial level of transnational social communication in which information and currents of thought circulated widely and resonated strongly across state borders. Membership in the larger Arab family generated a perception of common interests and led to a sense of solidarity when any segment of the community found itself in conflict with a non–Arab actor. Key elements in Arab societies identified closely with, and were responsive to, leaders and movements in other states that gave voice to these common interests. Belief in a common identity also gave rise to the view that political unity was a desirable objective. These bonds created a potentially strong foundation for Arab cooperation.
During the 1970s and 1980s these bonds eroded considerably. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait further weakened the sense of solidarity in important segments of the Arab world. This was particularly noticeable in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states, where the crisis had a twofold effect. At one level, the immediacy of the threat and the forcefulness of the assertion of Iraqi interests generated, among elites and publics alike, a stronger sense of identification with their own states and societies. At the same time, it created marked animosity not only toward Iraq but also toward those Arab peoples who sympathized with it, all of whom had been beneficiaries of considerable financial assistance from the Gulf states. The resulting sense of betrayal led to an intensified psychological distancing of these regimes and societies from the rest of the Arab world. 6 This has been reflected not only in punitive measures toward countries siding with Iraq but also in an apparent diminished sensitivity to the concerns and needs of other Arab societies generally. In turn, Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti pressures on Yemen, Jordan, and the Palestinian community, as well as against nationals of these countries residing in their territory, have generated strong resentment among the target communities. As a result, relationships among these peoples have been badly frayed. Finally, in Egypt, the unfortunate experiences of many of the nearly one million persons who had worked in Iraq during the 1980s tended to undermine feelings of Arab kinship and limit the responsiveness to Iraqi appeals. Egyptians also resented some of the attitudes of their Kuwaiti and Saudi allies after the war (Fandy 1991). In short, the crisis and its aftermath appeared in many cases to accentuate the differences between Arab peoples and elites as well as to intensify attachments to individual states and their interests.
On the other hand, Saddam Hussein’s appeal to Arab nationalism and Arab solidarity did strike a responsive chord among substantial sections of the population in many states, including those in the anti–Iraq coalition. The crisis also revealed a heightened sense of Islamic identity which has become an additional and more powerful basis of transnational identification and responsiveness in the Arab world (Piscatori 1991). These broader identities may even be strengthened should the United States and Western powers overplay their current dominant position in the region or, more generally, come to be perceived as hostile to the interests and values of Arab–Islamic countries and indifferent to the fate of Islamic peoples under attack in various parts of the world (e.g., Bosnia, Chechnya). Thus it is premature to proclaim the definitive triumph of local nationalisms and the end of any broader sense of community within the Arab world. Too many common frustrations and concerns remain among Arab peoples. Raison d’état may have gained ground at the expense of raison de la nation (Khalidi 1992), but the latter has by no means disappeared. Indeed, before long it may emerge reinforced and transformed by raison de l’"umma" (the Arab–Islamic community).
The question of economic complementarity and economic links constitutes another important dimension of intersocietal relations. While this matter is perhaps best left to economists, some points are worth noting. One is that most Third World regions are characterized by considerable similarity in their productive activities, thereby limiting the prospects for economic exchange and cooperation. This holds true to a substantial extent for the Arab world, at least within subregional clusters of states, e.g., the Gulf states with their oil, petrochemical, and banking activities, as well as the Maghrib states and several states in the Nile Valley and Western Fertile Crescent regions, each with their particular concentrations of agricultural activity. Nevertheless, a significant degree of diversity and complementarity exists as well, particularly between these subregional clusters. Some countries have a developed agricultural sector (or the potential to create one) while others have little or none. Some are substantially endowed with energy resources while those of others are modest or nonexistent. The manufacturing and service sectors are developed in varying degrees across the Arab world, sometimes with different concentrations. Finally, certain countries have substantial supplies of capital but only a limited supply of managerial talent and skilled or unskilled workers. Others lack capital but are relatively well–endowed with workers. In short, to a noneconomist at least, there appears to be a potentially meaningful degree of complementarity which could constitute a base for economic cooperation.
This complementarity was translated into a variety of economic links in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, the Arab world developed some of the strongest economic links of any regional system of developing states. The intraregional flow of financial resources (from the oil–producing states) and workers and professionals (to the oil–producing states) has arguably been the highest in the developing world (see tables 3.1 and 3.2). However, trade links have been relatively weak (see table 3.3). Since the mid–1980s, these links have declined considerably due largely to a dramatic softening in the international oil market. The economic constraints on cooperation have, if anything, intensified since the recent Gulf crisis. The two wealthiest Arab states (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) have experienced a substantial drain on their financial resources as a result of costs incurred in supporting the coalition war as well as the expense involved in postwar reconstruction and further development of their military capabilities (Sadowski 1991; Mohamedi 1993; Boustany 1994). Thus their capacity to serve as an engine of Arab economic cooperation is limited at this stage.
In addition to the purely economic constraints on cooperation, political factors have also played an important role. Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti anger at the stands taken by various Arab states and societies during the Kuwait crisis led to the cessation of financial assistance to these countries. It also resulted in the displacement of large numbers of their nationals from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Brynen and Noble 1991). Those displaced are unlikely to be replaced to any significant extent by nationals of other Arab countries. Instead, the wealthy Gulf states seem inclined either to make do with fewer foreign workers or to rely on non–Arab replacements who are liable to be less troublesome politically. Beyond this reaction to recent events, there is a more general political constraint on economic cooperation. This involves the apparent unwillingness of Arab governments to accept any meaningful division of labor or mutual economic dependence for fear that it would be vulnerable to interruption as a result of political rivalries or tensions. In short, the prospects for economic linkages are probably limited as much by political considerations as by economic factors. Whatever the cause, the absence of developed economic links clearly limits the sense of interdependence which is an important foundation stone of cooperation among states.
Domestic Conditions
Domestic political conditions and state–society relations generally constitute a further level of factors affecting the prospects for cooperation. In the 1970s, after many years of internal turbulence, domestic instability in the Arab world declined somewhat. Among the contributing factors were the oil boom, which reduced socioeconomic tensions in many countries, and the substantial strengthening of the internal security apparatuses and coercive capabilities of Arab regimes. By the late 1970s, there were renewed manifestations of instability with the increasing assertiveness of Islamic fundamentalist forces, bolstered in part by the revolution in Iran. Despite the renewed pressures, Arab states and regimes proved relatively resilient due to previous improvements in their internal security and economic capabilities. The period was also characterized by an upsurge in cooperation between internal security forces in the Arab world. This was reflected particularly among the GCC states but also among other pairs of states and even at a broader multilateral level within an Arab League framework. This phenomenon deserves further exploration, but it would be ironic indeed if the mukhabarat constituted the vanguard of Arab cooperation in the 1980s and 1990s.
Since the late 1980s, domestic tensions have been rising again throughout much of the Arab world. These were accentuated in many cases by the Gulf conflict and its aftermath, which exacerbated not only socioeconomic tensions (due to postwar financial exigencies and sharply reduced intraregional personnel and resource flows) and sociocultural tensions (reflected in the heightened appeal of Islamic fundamentalism stemming both from the search for cultural authenticity and deepening socioeconomic difficulties), but also political frustrations arising from continuing authoritarian rule (Brynen and Noble 1991; Daoud 1991). To these may be added new sources of tension and strain, notably emerging resentment at what is seen in some quarters as domineering behavior and insensitivity to Arab interests on the part of the United States and Western powers as well as potential frustrations in the event of failure to make real progress toward an honorable settlement on the Syrian–Israeli and Palestinian–Israeli fronts. In short, while Arab regimes (including that of Saddam Hussein) have proved resilient to date, we are in a period of increased pressure for change and possibly renewed political turbulence.
What impact is such political instability likely to have on Arab cooperation? On the one hand, these developments may encourage some regimes to work together to prevent movements that constitute a common threat (e.g., political Islamists) from coming to power or to contain them if they are successful in one or two states. Elements of such an approach appear to be present in the reactions of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, and perhaps others to developments in Algeria and the Sudan, in one case quietly supporting a regime that cracked down on fundamentalists, in the other exerting pressure on the regime to moderate its policies. Such cooperation might simply involve parallel activities behind the scenes or might be more closely coordinated in the form of an "anti–holy" alliance or common front.
On the other hand, intensified domestic instability is more likely to impede cooperation. In the first place, it could lead governments to concentrate their attention and energies on the internal front to the detriment of inter–Arab cooperation. If they felt vulnerable domestically, they might avoid joining an overtly antifundamentalist front in order to deflect pressures from themselves. Secondly, states would probably place little faith in regional security cooperation if potential partners suffered from pronounced instability. In such circumstances, questions would undoubtedly arise about the reliability of any commitments made. Thirdly, the presence in one country of strong opposition movements that were regarded as a threat by neighboring regimes could hamper any form of cooperation involving the flow of persons and ideas between these societies. Other regimes would be reluctant to engage in such cooperation for fear of the possible spillover effect of these movements on their societies. Finally, internal instability might also bring about a significant modification or transformation of regimes. The result would be an increased heterogeneity of regimes, either in terms of political structure (e.g., pluralist/liberalized vs. authoritarian regimes) or in terms of the types of elites and directions they were pursuing (e.g., Islamic fundamentalist vs. secularist or moderate Islamic regimes). In the former case, cooperation would be more difficult because political liberalization would probably lead to media criticism directed at the authoritarian partner, which in turn would resort to pressures to have it stopped. In either case, each regime would regard the other as a potential threat. On the whole, therefore, intensified political instability and pressures for change are likely to prove detrimental to cooperation, at least in the short to medium term.
Another factor shaping the potential for cooperation is the evolving character of Arab domestic economic and political systems. Previously, the prevalence of state–run command economies may have made the development of economic links and cooperation easier in one sense. Since governments controlled key sectors of the economy, they did not have to contend with autonomous enterprises motivated by their own economic interests. Rather, they could conclude economic agreements relatively easily, based on calculations of "national" political and, to a lesser extent, economic interests, without too many complications or too much bargaining with autonomous societal interests. This may have facilitated economic cooperation in the short run. However, since it represented politically driven intergovernmental cooperation, it was vulnerable to interruption due to changes in relations between the states concerned. The present trend in Arab states toward economic liberalization may make economic cooperation more complicated in the short run since it will require the initiative, or at least the acquiescence, of autonomous interests. Nevertheless, it arguably will lead to more durable economic links since these will be economically, rather than politically, driven and will create interests within the societies themselves that favor cooperation. These should be less vulnerable to interruption in the medium to long run.
Similar paradoxical trends are evident when one turns to developments in Arab political systems. As in the economic sphere, it could be argued that authoritarian political systems make Arab cooperation easier because such cooperation could be undertaken by the principal decisionmakers without having to contend with the views and interests of many autonomous political and social forces. Extending this argument, if pressures for change were to lead to a widening of political participation and the mobilization of new forces in one or more Arab countries, efforts at cooperation by those regimes would become more complicated due to the need for responsiveness to a broader range of political and social forces. From an alternative perspective, however, authoritarian systems are viewed as hindering the growth of civil society. This in turn limits the development of transnational civil society (in the form of transnational associations and movements) which is regarded as a potentially important foundation for Arab cooperation. Political liberalization and democratization, on the other hand, would tend to encourage the development of Arab transnational civil society which could provide a much firmer and more reliable basis for Arab cooperation, especially in the longer run. In the short to medium term though, the burgeoning of transnational civil society could render Arab cooperation more difficult. The primary beneficiaries would undoubtedly be Islamist movements and associations whose linkage in larger transnational groupings would prove destabilizing not only for individual regimes but also for inter–Arab relations.
Perhaps the most serious domestic impediment to Arab cooperation, however, is the absence of any regimes that could serve as poles of attraction for other Arab societies. Regimes in key Arab countries, and indeed in the whole of the Arab world, appear to be tired and unable to engage in any significant internal renewal with respect to competence, integrity, political participation, and social justice. As a result they possess little appeal either within their own societies or within other Arab societies. No Arab regime, therefore, enjoys the prestige or moral authority that would enable it to serve as a pole of attraction for the populations of other Arab countries and thus generate some measure of enthusiasm for inter–Arab cooperation.
Overcoming Obstacles
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent shockwaves of the Gulf War have brought about important changes in both the Middle Eastern regional system and the major power intrusive system. These, in turn, pose serious challenges to the interests of many Arab states, which arguably should provide a substantial incentive for Arab cooperation. Paradoxically, however, the Arab system remains as fragmented as ever. Part of the explanation, as we have seen, lies in the fact that the very multiplicity of the challenges facing Arab states has led to a divergence rather than a convergence of concerns.
Moreover, even where a group of Arab states faces a major common challenge, the very seriousness of the problems confronting them has inevitably led to reliance on, and cooperation with, the leading intrusive power(s) in preference to inter–Arab cooperation. This tendency to rely on the intrusive powers is understandable given their substantial capacities to deal with the concerns in question. However, even if it is evident why vertical ties constitute the primary axis of cooperation, it still remains puzzling why there is so little horizontal cooperation, if only as an insurance policy in the event of uncertain major power support or as a device to limit dependence on or to achieve increased leverage vis–à–vis these powers. The explanation for this lies ultimately, as we have seen, in conditions within the Arab world, not only in the area of interstate relationships but increasingly also in terms of intersocietal relations and domestic conditions. The obstacles to Arab cooperation are clearly formidable.
Overcoming these obstacles will require not just a modification of objective circumstances but, more importantly, some fundamental shifts in approach to international relations within the Arab world. One such shift concerns the bases of cooperation. Underlying notions of common identity and kinship should certainly not be taken lightly since these constitute an important motivation and basis of legitimization for attempts at Arab cooperation. For such attempts to be successful, however, Arab leaders must move beyond purely identitive considerations and give greater prominence to interest–based considerations and appeals. This should be accompanied by a shift in the way interests are defined away from a short–term atomistic approach (focusing only on the interests of the individual states) toward a longer term, interactive or holistic approach (focusing on the linkage of the fortunes of Arab states and larger Arab interests) (Buzan 1991). Such a shift, in turn, should lead to a broadening of security horizons not just in terms of the range of interests to be protected or promoted but also the strategies to be employed; in other words, it should be a shift from simple self–reliance or reliance on outside powers to collaborative approaches in association with other Arab states. This need not entail cessation of cooperation, let alone confrontation, with these powers. Rather what is required is the progressive strengthening of Arab ties and a better balance between horizontal and vertical cooperation.
Acknowledgment
This study is part of a larger research project on The Changing Face of National Security in the Arab World which has been supported by the Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l’Aide à la Recherche (FCAR), the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Inter–University Consortium for Arab Studies. The author is grateful for this support as well as for the comments and constructive criticism of Rex Brynen.
Endnotes
Note 1: Some attention was paid to the topic of cooperation in the work of the functionalist school (1940s–50s) and the integration theorists (1950s–60s). However, these efforts were vastly overshadowed by analyses of conflict, crisis, and war. Back.
Note 2: These steps include high–level Israeli visits to Morocco and Tunisia and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations, New York Times, September 2 and October 3, 1994; a similar high–level visit to Oman, Le Monde, December 28, 1994; the convening of meetings of the multilateral working groups on water issues and arms control in Oman and Qatar respectively (April–May 1994) with large Israeli delegations in attendance; the decision of the GCC states to end the secondary and tertiary economic boycotts of Israel and to ease other restrictions on third parties who deal with Israel (Le Monde, October 2 and 3, 1994); the convening of the Casablanca and Amman regional economic conferences (November 1994 and October 1995). Back.
Note 3: In general, controlling the transfer of arms and military–related technology will undoubtedly prove to be the most problematic area for cooperation; see the reports in The New York Times of January 21, June 10 and 13, and July 9 and 10, 1991; January 31, May 28 and 31, 1992; and Feldman and Levite 1994. Back.
Note 4: Strong concerns about this were expressed when the U.S, Britain, and France were considering what measures to take against Libya for its alleged role in the explosion of a Western airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, and related terrorist incidents. These concerns were manifested even in countries like Egypt which are closely associated with the U.S; see Loutfi El–Kholi, "The Libyan–Western Crisis: a Preliminary Reading," Al–Ahram Weekly, March 12, 1992 and Mohamed Sid–Ahmed, "Is the New World Order Aimed at the Arabs?," Al–Ahram Weekly, April 30–May 6, 1992. Back.
Note 5: Egyptian preeminence rested less on its hard material (i.e., military and economic) capabilities than on what might be termed its political capabilities, namely the tremendous appeal of its leader and his policies within other Arab countries, and the strong position of the regime at home. Nasser's Egypt sought, but never really achieved, a hegemonic position within the Arab system in part because its material capabilities were insufficient for the purpose. For a more extensive discussion, see Noble in Korany et al., 1991. Back.
Note 6: One indication of this can be found in the Al–Hayat survey of Kuwaiti public opinion reprinted in the Journal of Palestine Studies (Autumn 1991). Back.
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