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Michael C. Hudson (ed.)
1999
13. Technology: A Disintegrative Factor in the Arab World
Nemat Shafik
European technological advances since 1498 have contributed greatly to breaking up the integrity, unity, and coherence of the Arab world. The cumulative impact of these advances over many centuries initiated a long process of sociopolitical and economic decline, and to this day the Arab countries find themselves unable to respond to the challenges posed by these advances.
Scientific and technological advances take place constantly everywhere, occurring at different rates in different countries. Invariably, one country achieves superiority in a particular field. Such superiority gives it advantages over others from which it seeks to derive benefits. It is impossible for countries to isolate themselves from the impact of technological disparities, although the response to technological challenges differs from country to country. Some readily adopt new technologies; others are much more reluctant.
Those countries which delay their response to such technological challenges are left with a permanent imprint—a scar—that marks not only their economic life, but even extends to their culture. The rise and fall of civilizations is a testimony to the constant flux of technological change. Failure to make an appropriate response may lead to the demise of an entire culture.
The impact of different technological advances on Third World countries has been multifaceted. The first, and most obvious, impact is that these advances have facilitated colonial (or neocolonial) exploitation of the lagging countries (Headrick 1981). They have posed as well new internal challenges for sociopolitical and economic change. The accumulation of these internal challenges over a long period of time has often become overwhelming; many Third World countries are unable to respond constructively to them.
Vasco da Gama ushered in the process that led to the dismantling of the Arab world when in 1498 he circumnavigated the Cape of Good Hope and reached the waters of the Gulf, thus beginning the long era of European colonization. Over many years, the Arabs fought valiantly to protect their economic system, to prevent occupation, and once occupied, to terminate occupation.
This chapter is in three sections. The first briefly depicts the powerful repercussions of European innovations and inventions in science and technology on the Arab world. It will be shown how, over a period of 500 years, the failure to respond effectively to European technological advances led to the dismantling of the unity, cohesiveness, and socioeconomic structures of the Arab world. The key here has been the inability of the different Arab governments to respond to the challenges: the inability to respond to threatening change is a sure sign of powerlessness, and paves the way for disaster.
The second discusses current patterns of Arab technological behavior. This is based on an examination of contemporary educational and investment programs and policies in the Arab states. The Arab governments have invested 5 to 6 percent of their GNP on education, and 20 to 30 percent of GNP has been devoted to Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) since independence. The Arab countries now possess considerable professional resources that cannot be put to any useful socioeconomic use because of the underdeveloped state of their national and regional institutions. This underdevelopment is a direct consequence of the strength and stability of the prevailing rent political economy (Beblawi and Luciani 1987).
Massive changes in technology are always accompanied by equally massive political and social changes: witness the effect of the industrial revolution on European countries. In fact, the science and technology aspect of the process is quite simple; the difficult part is effecting required changes in the political culture that underpins the successful utilization of a new technology.
A positive response to Western challenges would require the adoption of a successful program of technology transfer in order to narrow or close the technology gap. Technology transfer takes place over a substantial period of time, and is a cumulative and systemic process. Transfer involves changes in the political culture, the legal system, the economy, social organization, and management. But instead of adopting a program of national development in science and technology, modern Arab governments sought to secure weapons from their erstwhile enemies. This approach deepened technological dependence and accelerated the dismantling of the Arabs’ own economic and social systems. These efforts contributed significantly to social and political disintegration (Zahlan and Said Zahlan 1978; Zahlan 1997b).
The practices adopted by the Arab countries toward technology during the past two centuries depended heavily on the use of foreign consulting, contracting, and manufacturing firms; only limited efforts were made to acquire national scientific and technological capabilities. This approach deepened the rent political economy and undermined normal processes of transition to a modern industrial and performance–oriented political economy.
The last section explores future prospects. As a result of the prolonged process of deconstruction, Arab societies have become intensely technologically dependent and appear to have lost the capacity to redress the balance. The Arabs can be said to be suffering from technological anorexia; and they are disheartened because they are powerless. Arab analysts point to a state of paralysis on both the national and regional levels.
Five Centuries of Dismantling
Over the centuries, technological advances have repeatedly enabled foreign powers to interfere with the functioning of the economy and/or to undermine the security of a less–advanced region or country. The dismantling of economic and security structures is a prime consequence of these advances. This section will enumerate some of the main technological events that led to this dismantling process, which continues today.
Arab Countries Prior to 1498
Until the sixteenth century, the Arabo–Islamic world was connected by a unique system of trade and transport that unified its large population scattered over vast areas of land and sea. The system sustained the economy of each Arab and Islamic state, underpinned trade with Europe, and fed into the various international trading systems. It is useful to note that at this time the Arab world and Europe were in a state of technological parity.
The Arabs had developed, over some two millennia, a sturdy and effective transnational trading system which reached its apogee in the eighth to sixteenth centuries. It was based on local and national technological inputs: skilled merchants and caravan managers, navigators with an extensive geographic knowledge, efficiently operated ports and trading emporia, scientifically bred camels, seaworthy dhows, and so on. Trust and mutual dependence among closely knit social groups prevailed. The socioeconomic support of the transport and trading system enhanced regional harmony and the stability of local communities.
The system of camel caravans also contributed to social integration between tribes specialized in raising camels on the one hand and city dwellers who managed much of the commercial part of the trading system on the other. Urban areas were the natural markets for goods. The level of specialization was so extensive that the trading system served all areas of the Arabo–Islamic world. The system of low–cost long–distance transport services, once in place, could then easily be extended to include bulk materials such as olive oil, soap, manufactured garments, dates, kema (truffles), sugar, and huge quantities of salt.
The mechanics of the trading system were so flexible that traders could move their business readily from place to place in response to changes in supply and demand, or in order to avoid ruthless rulers or areas of conflict. Since trade brought prosperity and employment, local governments sought to attract traders, and provide security and support facilities to ease the process of trade and the life of the traveler.
The Arab transport system was responsible for the large–scale circulation of people and information. This included the diffusion of agricultural plants, products, inventions, and all types of knowledge. Thus the trade and transport system had a powerful economic, social, and cultural impact. It also integrated the economies of the Arab countries with each other and with those of Asia, the Mediterranean Basin, and Africa. It enabled different regions and producers to exploit their comparative advantages. It brought about the exchange of goods and services between distant regions and engendered prosperity. It was also a multiethnic, multiracial and multinational system. Non–Arabs participated heavily in both the transport system and the trade.
The trading system was fully integrated into the annual haj to Mecca. The pilgrimage temporarily converted hundreds of thousands of pilgrims into traders. The custom was that each pilgrim left his or her country with some products that were traded en route to the Holy City. This converted the pilgrims’ caravans into traveling shopping malls. The annual pilgrimage leaving Rabat, for example, would travel overland across Africa (through Niger, Chad, Central Africa, Sudan, and across the Red Sea to Jiddah). These caravans visited towns and villages where the pilgrims undertook commercial transactions with the local markets. Thus the annual pilgrimage contributed to economic activity and to social and cultural transactions; it also contributed to the development and maintenance of social, cultural, and religious bonds between the peoples of the Islamic world.
The first phase of the dismantling of this system was induced by Portuguese technological advances in ship design, navigation, and naval warfare; it began in 1498 when Vasco da Gama entered Gulf waters and initiated a century of Portuguese piracy and warfare. It is well known that the technological accomplishment of the Portuguese was the consequence of a determined effort under the leadership of Prince Henry the Navigator. Prince Henry established what was probably the first dedicated research and development (R & D) institution in the applied sciences. The research work undertaken there rationalized and improved ship design and navigation. The strategic breakthrough was the invention of transoceanic ships. These ships could carry a large number of guns and could navigate the high seas. It was this naval technology that made it possible for the Portuguese and the Spaniards to circumnavigate Africa and to cross the Atlantic to the Americas.
The small but powerful Portuguese fleet interfered violently with trade between the Arab world, Asia, and Africa in the once peaceful waters of the Indian Ocean. Until 1600 the Arab Gulf had been the capital of the Arab world’s international trading system and the city of Hormuz was the physical headquarters of this vast global trading empire. The Portuguese used their superior naval force to harass and interfere with shipping, attack coastal towns, loot ships, and pillage coastal towns. The coastal towns of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean suffered considerably from these attacks. The people of the region displayed heroic resistance in the face of superior power. Egyptian naval forces tried to engage the Portuguese in a final naval encounter at Diu (1509) with the support of a Venetian naval force. The attempt failed; the Portuguese won.
Ottoman technical assistance to the cities of the Arabian peninsula ultimately saved the people of the Arab coastal towns from outright massacre by the Portuguese (unlike the native populations of Latin America who had no such a savior). The supreme test occurred in 1517: the superior land forces of the Ottoman army placed their heavy guns at the harbor of Jiddah and saved the Holy Cities of Islam from the possibility of outright occupation by the Portuguese (Guilmartin 1974).
The entry of the Ottomans into the Middle East that year saved the Gulf Arabs from probable decimation at the hands of the Portuguese. For the next three centuries, the forces of the Ottoman Empire protected the region from European devastation. However, the Ottomans themselves were unable to cope with European technological challenges and their empire eventually collapsed.
Although the Portuguese inflicted considerable economic losses on Arab trade in the Gulf, they did not have the resources to destroy it. The Arabs failed to acquire or develop the necessary technological capabilities to match Portuguese naval vessels. There were the usual opportunities to do so. First, industrial espionage was facilitated by the fact that the Portuguese constructed some of their vessels in India; high–level corruption within the Portuguese navy might also have provided opportunities. Second, the very existence of the superior Portuguese vessels should have enabled Arab ship builders to develop similar structures. However, the Arabs—along with other Asians—failed to develop such strategic technologies. The field was left open for further encroachments.
Portugal’s naval technology diffused to the European Atlantic states. By the early seventeenth century, the British, the Dutch, and the French had displaced the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean. Between 1620 and 1670 these three countries introduced a new innovation: the East India Company. The English, French and Dutch East India Companies controlled fleets, marketing systems, finances, storage space, and armies.
Arab traders operated on a small scale; the totality of Arab trade depended on the efforts of a very large number of traders, each working on his own. The East India Companies were centrally managed (by the standards of those days) possessing the considerable financial resources necessary to exercise monopolistic behavior. They had the resources to purchase the entire production of spices or goods of an Asian country and thus to control markets.
The trader operating within the Arab system could no longer compete. He could no longer play the role of connecting the various communities and cultures within and on the peripheries of the Islamic world. The East India Companies rapidly eliminated Arab long–distance trade, and by the middle of the seventeenth century, the Arabs had begun to import Asian commodities from European traders.
Trade and Transport Systems Lost
By the eighteenth century, trade routes throughout North Africa and the Middle East were being reoriented toward coastal towns and European trade and transport. Whereas the Arab international trading system had been heavily land–based and internal, the new system was heavily dependent on European shipping and trade.
This loss was promptly followed by the progressive displacement of internal land–based long–distance travel services (including the haj) by European shipping. No serious Arab competition arose to challenge the rapid development of European Mediterranean shipping firms. At first this shipping attracted pilgrims from the coastal towns of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. These pilgrims opted for a comfortable sea voyage on board European ships to Alexandria where they joined the haj caravan. But the countries of the interior—Mali, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Chad—still depended on trans–Saharan transportation across central Africa to present–day Port Sudan, and from there to Jiddah by sea. Cities like Djenne and others in central Mali remain living testimonies of that period. Trade and transport to the coastal towns of Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya expanded.
When in 1832 the French occupied Algeria, and later Tunisia and Morocco, they sought to close all trans–Saharan routes which were being used by resistance movements and by "clandestine" trade. Between 1897 and 1912, British forces occupied Nigeria, the French occupied Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and the Italians occupied Libya.
Thus by the early twentieth century, the complex and rich system of internal trans–Saharan transport had been dismantled. Sub–Saharan Africa has not yet recovered from this mutilation of its sociocultural and economic life. The three imperial powers sought to isolate and dominate these countries: the cultural and economic barriers between the imperial powers and the small African states meant rapid impoverishment and cultural decay. The stoppage of the constant cultural enrichment brought about by the regular flow of pilgrims and traders between these countries could not be replaced by a few scholarships to London, Rome, or Paris.
One of the first objectives of the Algerian revolution in 1962 was to reestablish Algeria’s trans–Saharan routes to central Africa (Blin 1987). By 1964, the Algerian government began to plan the construction of desert roads with a view to linking Algiers to Niger and Mali. Plans were completed by the late 1970s. But French and other pressure prevented Niger and Mali from constructing their stretches of the road to link with the Algerian road; they were, however, provided with international assistance to extend their roads to the Atlantic via Nigeria.
Two further technological developments accelerated the dismantling of regional and local trade and transport systems: the construction and operation of railway systems by foreign firms, and the construction of the Suez Canal. By the latter part of the nineteenth century the national system of trade and transport had disintegrated to the level where it was replaced by totally imported systems with very little local participation beyond the commission agents who peddled their political influence to secure concessions (Zahlan and Said Zahlan 1978).
The displacement of camel– and dhow–based transport technology with railway and steamship technologies without the transfer of mechanical and new naval technologies meant that the Arabs lost the employment generated by operating their system of transport. Even today the Arab countries remain unable to acquire the employment derived from operating and maintaining their extensive transport systems.
Several other technological developments during this period contributed to further dismantling and underdevelopment. The first was the successful transplantation of the Yemeni coffee plant to the colonial empires of Britain, France, and Holland. The first to succeed in transplantation on a large commercial scale were the Dutch, who developed modern coffee farming in Brazil. By 1734 non–Yemeni coffee was traded in Salonica, Greece; in 1737 in Cairo and in 1739 in Aleppo. The imported coffee was sold at a quarter of the price of the higher–quality Yemeni coffee. Yemen was able to maintain the volume of its sales (at lower prices) throughout the eighteenth century, but it no longer held a monopoly on coffee production and trade (Raymond 1973). In 1850 Brazil’s share of world coffee trade rose to 30 percent and by 1914 it had attained 70 percent. Brazil’s coffee production was heavily controlled by British interests (Greenhill 1977).
The Arabs, who had already lost their creative capacities, were unable to acquire, adopt, or develop alternative technologies to contain these technological challenges. These activities gave the kiss of death to the transnational Arab trading system. The forces that bound the Arab communities to each other were thus loosened; the cohesiveness of the Arab and Muslim countries began to weaken. It is of critical importance to appreciate that the strength of the Arab and Muslim worlds was based on a common market and not on political unity; many of the Arab countries were in conflict, but this did not eliminate trade and cultural exchanges between them.
Industrial Revolution
The second phase of technology dismantling was induced by the industrial revolution. In the early nineteenth century the main industry in many Arab countries (especially Syria, Egypt, and Iraq) was textile manufacturing. One of the chief byproducts of the industrial revolution was the rapid development of textile industries, which quickly undermined the traditional textile industries which were firmly based in the Arab countries (especially in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and Morocco) where textile technology was very advanced and self–reliant. By the 1830s these local industries collapsed in the face of European imports. Attempts to acquire new textile technologies are still going on: the Arab countries still lag behind the advanced levels now prevalent in Europe.
The textile revolution was only the beginning. Steam power, machine production, chemical sciences and technology, electrification, petroleum production and refining, communication technologies, radio, electric power and engineering, and countless advances in medical science, construction technologies, city planning, and management systems all had dramatic consequences for the Arab world.
Every technological advance in Europe, and later in the United States, contributed to the continuing decline of inter–Arab cohesiveness. The acquisition of Western military technologies, beginning with the Ottomans and Muhammad Ali, led to the progressive divorce of military institutions from their local environment and to their progressive integration into the military–industrial–intelligence complexes of Western powers.
The introduction of railways into the Arab world via the turnkey mode of contracting pioneered the still–prevailing procedures for trade in technology. During the age of camel caravans and dhows the Arabs were masters of the transport technologies then in use; the new mechanical technologies were imported without any effort being made to acquire them. New technology was imported in a dependent mode and packaged with its consultants, contractors, operators, and financiers. The cost of all of this dependent luxury was enormous; the resulting Egyptian and Ottoman debts had well known economic and political consequences: the occupation of Egypt in 1882, and the collapse of the economy of the Ottoman Empire.
Indigo became a popular dye in Europe during the sixteenth century when it displaced woad. By the eighteenth century European powers began to plant indigo in their colonies. India and Java became main suppliers; Egypt also developed the production of this dye. However, the rapid development of modern chemistry accelerated after 1825 when Faraday discovered benzene, and culminated in the synthesis of indigo in 1890 by Heumann. By 1913, the market for natural indigo collapsed: the industrial production of dyes had taken off.
Colonization and Independence
The third phase of technology dismantling began with the direct occupation of Arab countries when practically every technical decision of importance was made by the emissaries of the occupying powers. The net result was the further divorce of the elites, the culture, and the economy from technical matters (Zahlan 1997a). The Arabs were not unique in experiencing such colonialist devastation: China did not do much better. Japan benefited from observing China’s experience and as a result opted at an early date for closing the technology gap. But the Arabs at that time lacked the ethnic homogeneity and enlightened leadership to pursue a similar strategy. Even the "best" Arab case—Egypt under Muhammad Ali—could not measure up. Muhammad Ali’s efforts at industrialization are overrated: he did not appreciate the political and economic implications of the new technologies that he sought to import. Furthermore, he did not identify with Egyptians who were being treated as second–class citizens in their own country.
The fourth phase was ushered in by political independence. When independence was finally achieved, the rulers and elites of the new states who came forward had little knowledge of contemporary developments in science and technology. Foreign control of the political life and economies of the Arab countries was less complete than the foreign control of government operations and of technological activity. Not only did all equipment, industrial supplies, and maintenance services have to be imported but also the Arab countries depended completely on foreign consulting and contracting services when they sought to alter their economic circumstances. As Helie notes after the departure of the French in Algeria and the disorganization of economic life:
More important is the fact that the colonial machine itself was put back into operation, insofar as possible after independence. It is difficult to believe that [the government] is capable of dealing with the new problems that are arising. Under colonial rule, the administration’s objective was to maintain order; its new goal must be to promote economic development (Helie 1973).
A similar observation was made by Charles Debbasch (1975).
The ruling political elites had had no formal or informal training in the requirements and implications of science and technology which had become so central to the industrialized world in the late twentieth century. The modus operandi of the new national governments was that each ministry or parastatal was designed to operate as an independent authority, resulting in the maintenance of the old colonial "referral system." This deepened and promoted the process of dismantling. This system prevails today and its spontaneous formation can be seen taking place in the embryonic Palestinian National Authority.
The new leaders sought to develop their countries through the rapid expansion of educational systems and investment in new industries. Cultural distortions and alienation were intensified by the accelerated programs adopted at this time.
Because they wished to accelerate the process of development, the new national elites who took over from the colonial powers unknowingly adopted methods that ultimately led to even greater technological dependence. Thus they unwittingly established a culture and a political economy that sustained the turnkey approach so well established during the previous centuries. Did they have an alternative? Certainly. Arab elites instead could have adopted a strategy of acquiring and accumulating technology—the course adopted by Western European countries when confronted by the British industrial revolution of the early nineteenth century, and also adopted by Russia and Japan.
The rich oil–producing countries such as Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council had the financial resources to bring the totally dependent technological behavior of the past to new levels of sophistication: the concepts of client–in–hand (GCC, Algeria), "explosive development" (Iraq), "technologie–de–pointe" (Algeria), and other such innovations were developed to bizarre levels. Foreign consulting firms conceived and designed enormous projects, foreign accounting and law firms monitored them, and an army of foreign contractors and foreign labor implemented them. In an effort to emulate their richer neighbors, the poorer Arab countries did their best to adopt similar models.
These advanced forms of technological dependence had numerous advantages: they gave decisionmakers the satisfaction of being totally independent of their society and of its underdevelopment; they made decisionmakers feel they had found a magic wand which, when used to sign multi–billion dollar contracts, could transform the work of Bechtel and others into their own science.
Truly wondrous things were built: power and desalination plants, hospitals which could boast the best and latest in medical sciences, irrigation schemes, enormous dams, transport systems, airports, airlines, military installations, radar stations, remote sensing facilities, solar stations, communications systems super–guns, even gold–plated cars and yachts. Liquid Natural Gas technology was brought to Algeria, yet Algerians did not have to contribute to the process. Those who mediated these lavish contracts earned enormous commissions. Well–placed people accumulated multi–billion dollar personal fortunes. They and their progeny now adorn foreign magazines, and their weddings in London, Cannes, or Paris are the talk of the town.
The Arab countries total GFCF, during the past two decades, was in excess of $2,000 billion (in current prices). If this sum were to be converted into 1991 dollars, these investments would probably total between $4,000 and $5,000 billion. The 1993, combined GNP of the Arab countries resulting from this enormous GFCF was barely $380 billion. The gap between the Arab world and industrial countries has continued to grow, and the Arab economies suffer from chronic stagnation and low productivity.
Instruments and Patterns of Technological Development
The major instruments of national technological development have been reasonably well known for at least the past two centuries. The process depends on the availability of qualified professional resources (hence university education);R&D; national consulting and contracting firms; the relevant economic and financial institutions to support technological development; and science policy.
University Education
There has been a significant and dramatic expansion of the proportion of Arabs who have completed four or more years of higher education: in 1948, they constituted only 0.06 percent of the population; and by 1990 they had increased to 1.5 percent, and by 1996 to an estimated 2.0 percent. This translates to 8 percent of the economically active population.
In 1984 the Arab countries had a total of 81 universities (ALECSO 1989); these had an enrollment of 1.5 million students. The number of universities increased to 175 in 1995; the Arab governments had also established some 360 two– and three–year post–secondary institutions by 1991. These enrolled some 3.2 million students (Qasem 1998).
The proportion of the 20–24 age group enrolled in post–secondary education in 1991 was 11 percent for the entire Arab world. (By comparison, the EEC average is 14 percent.) In the different countries this proportion was: 27 percent for Jordan; 13–19 percent each in Egypt, Qatar, and Syria; and below 5 percent each in Sudan, the Yemens, Mauritania, and the UAE. Some 35 percent of these students are enrolled in technical and scientific subjects (Qasem 1998).
No accurate and detailed statistics are available on the number of engineers in the Arab world. At a 1989 meeting of the Federation of Arab Engineers in Kuwait, the president of the Federation stated that there were 600,000 Arab engineers in the Arab world. This is a large and significant number: by comparison, there were 1.4 million engineers in the United States in 1986. Arab universities were graduating more than 30,000 engineers annually in the late 1980s, more than graduates from French or British universities. Needless to say, the economies of France and Britain are far larger than that of the entire Arab world.
It is clear from these figures that the Arab states have access to a large and increasing supply of professional manpower, from national as well as foreign universities. Much of the emphasis of Arab foreign education has been in science and engineering: it can be safely assumed that there are substantial numbers of Arabs specialized in every sub–field of science and engineering. In some fields, the number of scientists or engineers may be in the tens of thousands, while in others it may be in the hundreds.
Doctoral–level education is still highly underdeveloped; specialization is pursued abroad. The number of Arab students abroad may be of the order of 250,000. Most of these are working toward advanced degrees in the sciences in leading industrial countries. For example, about 80 percent of Arab students in the United Kingdom are working toward Master of Science or doctorate degrees. The brain drain among Arab students abroad is very high; the brain drain to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries is in excess of 500,000 professionals.
R & D
The total number of professors in Arab universities in 1995 was more than 100,000 (63,000 in science and technology; 38,000 in the humanities) compared with 51,000 in 1985. The proportion of faculty members holding a PhD increased from 55 percent in 1985 to 63 percent in 1991 (Qasem 1998).
There were about 250R&D centers (excluding hospitals, but including research departments and/or programs) in the Arab world in 1984. The universities have 65 centers and/or programs under their umbrella. The centers vary in size, resources, competence and track record. Of the centers outside the universities, 75 percent were established since 1970. Half of theR&D centers were engaged in research in agriculture, nutrition, water and irrigation, marine sciences, and the biological sciences; 14 (6 percent) were in solar energy; 9 (4 percent) in oil and petrochemicals; 11 (4 percent) in ecology; 11 (4 percent) in basic sciences and computer science.
Research activity in the Arab countries is thus highly focused on applied subjects, with a priority in medicine and agriculture: 38 percent in medicine; 20 percent in agriculture; 17 percent in engineering; 17 percent in the basic sciences; and 8 percent in economics and management. The most common research areas are: agronomy, food technology, nutrition, general and internal medicine, general biomedical research, pharmacy, ecology, remote sensing, and water resources. Despite the valiant efforts of a number of scientists, however, basic research is on such a small scale that it is virtually nonexistent (ALECSO 1989, Zahlan 1998).
There were 1.7 researchers outside the university per 10,000 economically active manpower (and 2.7 per 10,000 if the university research workers are included); the equivalent numbers for a select number of countries was: 66 (USA), 99 (Russia), 58 (Japan), 36 (UK), 39 (France). There were 44.6 researchers (with MS and PhD degrees) per million inhabitants, and 0.021 researchers per $1 million of GNP (ALECSO 1989). Expenditure onR&D in the Arab world was $750 million 0.2 percent of GNP in 1995 (Qasem 1998). By comparison, India spent 0.7 percent, Brazil spent 0.6 percent, and industrial countries devoted around 3 percent.
Commitment toR&D can also be compared on the basis of data from the Institute of Scientific Information (USA) on the number of publications in refereed journals. In 1995 the scientific output of various countries (measured as the number of publications per million inhabitants) was: 144 (South Korea), 42 (Brazil), 19 (India), 11 (China), 26 (Arab world), 840 (France), 1,878 (Switzerland), and 1,926 (Israel) (ISI 1996).
The Arab countries are near the top of the Third World level of activity, but far below the levels of industrial countries. Thus, although the output may be comparable, the application of scientific findings is more constrained than in other large Third World countries where there are no political or economic barriers to the circulation of ideas and expertise.
Arab universities have been, and still are, the leading centers for both basic and applied research in science and technology. The number of institutions whose scientists published one or more scientific papers increased from 289 in 1977 to 407 in 1983 and 708 in 1989. The annual growth rate of the number of such institutions was 8 percent. Many of these institutions are hospitals, and are not therefore classified (see above) asR&D centers.
Researchers in the Arab world published a total of 2,612 publications in refereed journals of international standing in 1983, 5,043 in 1989 and 7,139 in 1995. The share of oil–producing countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) in total Arab publications increased from 14 percent in 1967 to 19 percent in 1977 to 31 percent in 1983 to 41 percent in 1989 and to 39 in 1995. Most of this output from oil–producing states came from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In fact, Kuwait demonstrated a striking capacity to attract and retain Arab scientists: In 1989, the professors at Kuwait University alone published more than all the scientists working in all Iraqi research institutions; in that year, Kuwait University (356) was the second largest producer in the Arab world (Cairo University with 377 publications ranked first). And in 1990 (just before the Iraqi invasion) Kuwait University was the leading publishing institution in the Arab world. In 1995 Kuwait had recovered to 66 percent of its 1990 level of R & D activity (Zahlan 1997b).
R & D organizations play a major role in successful planning, design, and operation of economic installations. However, because the consulting and contracting services utilized in establishing industrial plants are generally imported on a turnkey basis, the demand for localR & D services is still limited. Technological dependence severely constrains the development of the requisiteR & D capabilities to support and service the various economic sectors.
Arab science and technology human resources are more than adequate, and could constitute an integrative social factor. But in the absence of rational and appropriate science policies and adequate financial resources, the potential of this human resource is dissipated. As the figures on publications indicate, for every nine Arab science and engineering faculty members, only one publishes a paper annually (60,000 faculty and only 7,139 publications in 1995). The reason for such a low figure is the lack of resources and the absence of demand for services by nationals: both the public and private sectors depend nearly exclusively on foreign firms for technical services. The inappropriate policies now in force promote (albeit not deliberately) the continuing disintegration of Arab society.
Consulting, Contracting and the Market for Technology
The Arab world provides a large market for technology products and services. This can be readily seen from the large number of identical contracts that are awarded in a number of technological fields. Contracts for the same technology are awarded repeatedly over short periods of time—often simultaneously—in several Arab countries. Such a market provides excellent opportunities for technology transfer because technology is best acquired as part of the repeated undertaking of similar projects. The absence of adequate financial and insurance services to support national consulting and contracting firms, combined with the absence of adequate technology policies, are the main reasons for the slow pace at which technology trickles into the region (Zahlan 1984).
Contracts with foreign consulting and contracting firms are in agricultural development (terracing, irrigation, drainage, water works), construction (from buildings to public works), transport systems, industry (cement, food, iron and steel, oil production, phosphates, metals), educational technologies, aviation, communication, and so on. (Emery, Graham and Oppenheimer 1986; Zahlan 1981; Ilgen and Pempel 1987; Zahlan 1990, 1991).
Since the national markets of each Arab state for sophisticated technological services are small, any serious effort to transfer technology has to involve substantial Arab economic cooperation. There has been no significant effort to date to implement inter–Arab cooperation in technology.
The subject of technology transfer to the Arab world, in both Western and Arab literature, has become synonymous with trade. In this type of analysis, the Arab is a client of foreign technology and is no longer a participant in a process of technological development. Publications on trade with the Arabs usually focus on the suppliers of technology; the consumers are rarely mentioned. Emphasis is often placed on the competition among the various industrial powers for the lucrative Arab markets; the behavior of the Arab trading parties tends to be of minor interest. This may be because much of the planning and decisionmaking is done by foreign institutions. The leading Arab development institutions (and, of course, Arab governments) utilize foreign consulting firms almost exclusively.
This point is illustrated and reflected in the authoritative United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study entitled Technology Transfer to the Middle East (1984). In it, the authors note: "Although Middle East technology trade has increased, OTA’s research indicates that technology transfers have been limited. . . . OTA’s research shows that technology is much more easily traded internationally than it is absorbed by recipients in developing countries"(5).
Although the 600–page OTA report distinguishes clearly between technology transfer and technology trade, it still regards trade with the Arab world as technology transfer. For example, in chapter 5 on Petrochemical Technology Transfer (119–82) less than two of its sixty–three pages are devoted to the subject of "Absorption of petrochemical technologies." But even this has little to do with the topic at hand: "absorption" turns out to mean training technicians to push the right buttons! The rest of the chapter is devoted to petrochemical production (by plants designed and installed by non–Arab companies), foreign company participation in the venture, the restructuring of global trade in commodity chemicals expected to result from the investment, implications for U.S. policy, and so on.
The OTA report goes on to express its views on the manpower constraints on technology transfer: "In the Middle East a number of factors constrain technology absorption. They all relate to the considerable technological distance that must be bridged between the suppliers and the recipients. Chief among them is a disparity between human and financial resources" (5–6).
The OTA report gives the impression that the Arab countries are importing advanced civilian technologies, while in fact the bulk of the imports consists of very simple and mundane products. According to Technology Trade with the Middle East the Arabs import far more food, live animals, and tobacco than they do aircraft! (89–116).
Most of the imports of the Arab world consist of construction services (road construction, simple houses, airports, bridges, silos, water works, etc. for some $50 billion annually); equipment (cars, trucks, tractors, forklifts, etc. for some $35 billion annually); food (milk, meat, cereals, etc. for some $25 billion annually); and so on. Only limited amounts of high technology products are imported, and these account for barely 10 to 15 percent of total imports.
The construction of petrochemical plants, refineries, and water desalination plants is well within the capabilities of Arab manpower and organizations today. Arab firms lack neither the technical expertise, nor the natural, financial, or human resources to undertake such projects. What is missing is a variety of other inputs, such as financial, legal and technical support services that Arab governments, unlike those of the OECD countries, do not make available to their national organizations.
Science Policy
The weakness of the Arab science and technology system and the absence of effective science policies in the Arab world have made the economic integration of technological activity very difficult (Zahlan 1980, 1981, 1997b). The inability to formulate and adopt sensible technology policies has contributed to the continuing disintegration of Arab society and culture.
Of all Arab countries, Egypt has been the most explicit regarding the importance of developing science and technology policies. It has made many attempts—all unsuccessful—to develop such policies (Zahlan 1980; UNESCWA 1986). The OTA report (469) summarizes seven major recent studies on Egypt (three by UNESCO, one by USAID, one by UNCTAD and two by an Egyptian institution in collaboration with U.S. institutions): all find a lack of integrated science and technology policy in Egypt.
Unemployment, alienation, marginalization and the intensification of civil unrest and violence are all direct or indirect indicators of the absence of an integrated science policy and of the impact of that absence on the economic life of the Arab world.
Reflections on the Future
The technological dependence of the Arab countries has enhanced their vulnerability to outside interference and reduced the degree of internal national integration. National integration depends on economic exchanges within society. Dependent technology policies reduce such exchanges. Instead, economic exchanges take place with foreign countries without involving the national population. The extent of forward and backward integration within the national economy of any Arab state is very limited. As a consequence the degree of socioeconomic interdependence within each country is limited and declining. The extent of inter–Arab trade (5 percent of total trade) is insignificant. The counterpart of weak internal cohesiveness is a high degree of dependence on imports. In general the extent of Arab dependence on imports for all necessities of life is striking. The case of Iraq is a dramatic illustration of the depth of dependence.
Since 1970, an increasing number of Arab countries have been entering the fruitless arena of civil unrest, economic paralysis, and civil war. The countries where civil wars have taken place (Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, Algeria) have not been able to find solutions to their original socioeconomic problems.
The most optimistic view one can adopt is that the Arabs are in a state of transition: they are leaving their dependent phase and entering a self–reliant one. How likely is it that they can effect such a transition?
On the positive side, they possess enormous human, strategic, and natural resources which, if efficiently managed and put to effective use, could arrest further decline and induce a rapid change in fortune. But, in order to do so, they need to adopt a performance–oriented political economy and an appropriate science policy. Is this likely to occur? Is it likely that the highly developed rent political economy which prevails in every Arab country will cede its control under mounting economic pressures?
All countries, including those of the Third World, have immediate access, at low cost, to world–wide knowledge and technological experiences. Further–
more, ongoing technological advances are constantly equalizing industrial and Third World countries by reducing the importance of carry–over technologies: industrialists in the West must constantly destroy their own obsolete physical assets, along with the corresponding obsolete forms of social organization, in order to replace them with new technologies and organizational forms.
All Third World countries face two major challenges: how to increase the flow of technology and how to develop a niche in the world economy. The systematic pursuit of policies that improve the competitiveness of national labor is of paramount importance. For example, modern information technology is transforming all modes of management and organization, as well as capital goods. All countries have to learn these new technologies. Here industrial countries have the edge, because their populations possess a level of education high enough to facilitate the process of adaptation.
On the negative side, the Arab countries face a number of challenges: population pressure, the dematerialization of the world economy, and declining Arab labor productivity. Mounting population pressure will decrease the resources available for undertaking economic reforms. By the year 2050, an expected increase of some 400 million inhabitants will bring the total population to some 700 million. Half of these will be below the age of 18. This young population could be an important force for positive and creative change if provided with proper education and training. The absence of appropriate technology policies, however, could transform this abundant and youthful population into a disruptive and destabilizing force. The dematerialization of the world economy and the expanding number of gas and oil sources worldwide have combined to reduce Arab income and increase the cost of imports.
Increasing labor productivity in the Newly Industrializing Countries is reducing the attractiveness of the Arab countries for foreign direct investment. Most of the subcontracting to the Arab states now is for low–value–added and low–technology activities.
In other words, internal and external factors are not favorable to promoting technological development. During the past 500 years the Arabs have enjoyed short periods of favorable balances of trade; for example, Egypt enjoyed a low population and an export market for highly lucrative products and services from 1810 to 1870; similarly, several Arab oil–producing countries benefited from the golden period of oil exports during the 1970s and 1980s. In both cases, however, these blessings were squandered. Today, and in the years to come, the Arab countries could bring about prosperity through the elimination of waste and the induction of innovation.
The future of any country is contingent on its capacity to produce the goods and services in demand. The fierce international competition between the industrial countries is all about retaining their capacity to do just that. The major tool in this competition is science and technology. The Arab world has remained outside this competition because it has not sought to acquire the requisite political economy. But no future is foreclosed; a failure to respond to a technological challenge is not synonymous with technological determinism. The Arabs’ failure to respond was a consequence of the prevailing political economy. The Arabs retain the capacity to alter their political economy. All countries retain the potential power to shape their own future.
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