Introduction

ONE of the achievements of feminist contributions to international relations has been to reveal the extent to which the whole field is gendered.[1] The range of subjects studied, the boundaries of the discipline, its central concerns and motifs, the content of empirical research, the assumptions of theoretical models, and the corresponding lack of female practitioners both in academic and elite political and economic circles all combine and reinforce each other to marginalize and often make invisible women's roles and women's concerns in the international arena (Enloe 1990; Grant and Newland 1991; Tickner 1992; Peterson and Runyan 1993, 1998; Sylvester 1994; Pettman 1996). The world of international relations appears to be truly a man's world, both through the predominance of men in practice and through the "masculinist underpinnings" (Tickner 1992, xi) of the discipline, whereby success is measured in terms of the "masculine" virtues of power, autonomy, and self-reliance.

Having established that international relations is a male-dominated and masculinist field, feminist contributors have rightly gone on to focus most of their energy on reclaiming women and "femininity" from the margins. This is not to say that men and masculinity have been entirely neglected,[2] but

the relationship between masculinity and international relations has not yet been fully articulated. More might be said about how masculinity or masculinities shape both the theory and practice of international relations. But one could also ask, what place does international relations (both theory and practice) have in the shaping, defining, and legitimating of masculinity or masculinities? Might causality, or at least the interplay of complex influences, run in both directions, in mutually reinforcing patterns? Might international relations discipline men as much as men shape international relations?[3]

My starting point for thinking about the relationship between masculinity and international relations was Ann Tickner's (1992) book *Gender in International Relations.* First, Tickner traced the masculinism and misogyny of realism, where the ideal of the glorified male warrior has been projected onto the behavior of states. In realist discourse, security is seen to rest on a false division between a civil(ized) domestic political order and the "natural" violence of international anarchy. This division is traced back to Hobbes's view of the state of nature as a state of war—a dangerous and wild place where men had to rely on their own resources to survive. The international realm, outside the jurisdiction of a single government, was deemed to be anarchic and, as such, like a state of nature. As Tickner argued, women were largely absent in Hobbes's picture. She went on to discuss Machiavelli, who, although in the context of a very different tradition, characterized the disordered and "natural" realm of anarchy itself as feminine. If Hobbes's men were in a state of nature, then Machiavelli's men wished to have dominion over it. Given that Hobbes and Machiavelli are often (in spite of their differences) quoted in the same breath, these "founding fathers" of the discipline have between them contributed to a vision of international relations in which women are virtually absent and where heroic men struggle to tame a wild, dangerous, and essentially feminine anarchy.

Second, after examining the realist approach to security, Tickner looked at the masculine assumptions underpinning the models used in international political economy under the heading "Three Models of Man" (67). These were the abstract rational-actor model favored by liberal economists; game-theoretic models applied by economic nationalists; and the capitalist production model used by Marxists. As Tickner pointed out, all three models have been criticized by feminist theorists for offering only a partial, and masculinized, account of human agency and production. Third, she ex-

plored the role of nature in international politics and argued that the control and domination of nature has played a crucial part in the development of modern international relations, which cannot be divorced from men's control and domination of women, who are generally more closely associated with nature than men, through their reproductive role. In the final chapter, Tickner considered feminist alternatives to masculinist theorizing and mentioned alternative conceptions of masculinity, as well as possibilities for there being a nongendered model of human action.

Tickner's analysis suggests that masculinist perspectives in IR do not apply a uniform understanding of masculinity, but rather make use of a number of different "models of man" (Tickner 1992, 67). She also warned against the essentializing tendency of separating women from men as undifferentiated categories. However, as I shall argue in chapter 2, the suggestion that there may be a number of masculinities operating in IR theory is rather overshadowed by the main thrust and structure of her book, which tends to oppose a monolithic "masculinism" against an equally monolithic "feminism." This is a pity because the structure thus serves to essentialize both masculinity and feminism. Clearly not all feminisms are compatible, and neither are all models of masculinity. For example, men cannot be both in a state of nature (the Hobbesian, realist view), and yet have control and domination over it (the neorealist view) at the same time. Thus the historical eclipse of realism by neorealism in the postwar period represents a reversal of the relationship between man and nature as conceptualized in international-relations (IR) theory.

The relationship between masculinity and international relations appears to be more complex than a straightforward masculinist/feminist dichotomy would allow. If there are a number of different and perhaps incompatible masculinities at play in the discipline, then this raises new questions: What is the relationship between them? How do they fit in with feminist understandings of masculinism? What is their significance for the gendered identities of men who participate in international relations?

These questions made me turn to the emerging literature on multiple masculinities that is being produced by feminists and theorists of men's studies outside the discipline of IR. Here I found useful approaches with which to think through such questions (see chapters 1, 2, and 3). It has been established that neither masculinity nor femininity are monolithic and unchanging categories (Brod 1987; Riley 1988; Nicholson 1990). Indeed, there

are a variety of masculinities and femininities at large in Western culture, as well as variations historically (Roper and Tosh 1991) and between cultures (Brod and Kaufman 1994; Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994). Which attributes count as masculine or feminine depends on circumstances and is subject to change and struggle. Recent literature in the field of gender studies points to a global hierarchy of masculinities dominated by a loosely coherent and evolving hegemonic form (Connell 1987; Brittan 1989). This current, Western (largely Anglo-American) hegemonic masculinity is being reforged and reframed in the light of redefinitions of the feminine and other challenges posed by both feminism and the feminized, exoticized, non-European world (Chapman and Rutherford 1988; Segal 1990). It is also being undermined, perhaps more seriously, by the internationalization of the economy, deindustrialization, and the rise of the woman worker, which has more to do with the requirements of capitalism than with feminism. Indeed, the "crisis" and possible transformation of hegemonic masculinity triggered by globalization, and wrought through multiple gendered struggles and rivalries, is a major preoccupation in the literature (Kimmell 1987a; McDowell 1991; Hanke 1992; Connell 1993, 1995; Pfeil 1995).

Reading this literature, I became convinced that both IR and international relations on the ground must be playing an important part in these contemporary struggles over the future shape of gender relations. No account of the transformation of a hitherto globally dominant Anglo-American hegemonic masculinity can afford to ignore the influence of an Anglo-American masculinist discipline that reflects the outlook of the hitherto (at least for the last few hundred years) globally hegemonic powers of the West.[4] Putting together all three of my concerns—that international relations might influence men and masculinity as well as be influenced by them; that there are a number of different masculinities at play in the field; and that an important contemporary issue is the challenge to hegemonic forms of masculinity in connection with globalization—has brought me to the central issue that this book will address. My main question is: What role does international relations play in the shaping, defining, or legitimating of masculinity or masculinities? My supplementary question is: What is the relationship between this role and the process of globalization that offers challenges to the existing gender order? Such questions cannot be answered comprehensively in the space of a single volume. While making some observations that I believe to be pertinent to the questions in general, this book

will concentrate not on the practices of international relations, but rather on the role that the discipline of IR plays in such matters. This role will be explored through an analysis of the discipline itself, together with an examination of its relationship to changing gender symbolism and the discourse of globalization in the wider culture.

These questions are relevant for a number of reasons. First, the field of international relations has been dominated by (often elite) men, and—in the division of modernity into private life/domestic politics/international politics—it is conceptually situated at the furthest extreme from the private life of families, where women are positioned. It thus seems a particularly appropriate site for an investigation into masculinities, and particularly into their dominant, or "hegemonic," forms. In this book, the focus will remain on the relationship between IR and the construction of hegemonic Anglo-American masculinities. I argue that these masculinities have strong historic links with the notion of the international—links that have been forged through "foreign adventure" and colonialism. The connections between Anglo-American hegemonic masculinities and Anglo-American notions of the international realm beyond the state's borders are such that one cannot regard such masculinities as purely "domestic" constructions. It is therefore my view that a study that wants to make sense of the contemporary challenges and changes in Anglo-American masculinities must take account of the international dimension. This book will, hopefully, thus provide insights that are useful to both students of international relations, and to those interested in masculinities more generally.

Second, if both the discipline and practices of international relations are heavily implicated in the construction of hegemonic masculinities, and if both the "content" of international politics and the "fixing" of masculine identities are simultaneously "achieved" when men engage in activities in the "international arena," then strategies aimed at dismantling the field's inherent masculinism, if at all successful, are likely to prove personally challenging to large numbers of men. Removing masculinism would involve a drastic reformulation of models of masculinity and alternative understandings of what it means to be a man and where men belong. For many men, it would involve no less than a revolutionary change of identity. In this case, revealing the mechanisms by which such identities are constantly being produced and reproduced might help reveal opportunities for change that can be exploited by feminists and their sympathizers.

Third, the salience of questions of culture and identity in international politics has been highlighted recently. This can be seen in both in the post-cold war resurgence of ethnic rivalry and of identity politics in domestic, international, and transnational situations (e.g., Smith 1992; Waever et al 1993; Huntington 1993; Joffe 1993; Davis and Moore 1997) and in the writings of postpositivist academics (Ashley 1989; Rengger 1989; Connolly 1991; Campbell 1992; Weber 1995; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Doty 1996; Linklater 1996). As Yosef Lapid argues, "a swing of the pendulum toward culture and identity is . . . strikingly evident in post-Cold War theorizing" (Lapid 1996, 3). This is in response to an awareness among IR scholars of their mounting theoretical difficulties with apparently "exponential increases in global heterogeneity and diversity" (Lapid 1996, 7).

In the more mainstream analysis, the significance of resurgent identity politics for the practices of international relations has been examined—for example, in relation to potential East-West conflict (Huntington 1993), to European Community integration (Waever et al 1993), to transnational ethnic groups (Davis and Moore 1997), and not least in relation to ethnic conflicts that have flared up in the aftermath of the cold war (Brown 1993; McDermott 1994; Gagnon 1994). Postpositivists, in contrast, have tended to view the question from the opposite direction, asking rather how both the practices and the theories of international relations might be implicated in the construction of politicized identities. For example, David Campbell (1992) has shown how U.S. foreign policy has been used to construct a U.S. identity; Roxanne Doty (1996) has argued that British postwar Commonwealth and immigration policy helped to reconstruct British identity; and Cynthia Weber (1995) has explored the performative nature of apparently stable sovereign identities. That theories, too, might be implicated in identity construction follows from the observation that the production and circulation of theories is a power- and culture-laden set of practices in itself. Thus Richard Ashley (1989) has been able to show how realism uses dualistic language and the notion of "anarchy" to construct a "sovereign" identity, and William Connolly (1991) has discussed how the notion of identity has always, in one way or another, been predicated on difference.[5]

The approach to identities taken by postpositivists runs counter to the tradition of regarding identities as biological, sociological, or psychological givens. In the postpositivist view, identities are seen as mutable and as constituted through political, social, and discursive processes, rather than as

foundational or fixed. Examining the politics of identity construction forms part of the expansion of "the political" out of formal politics and international relations and into other areas of life that were perhaps previously assigned to sociology (Rowe 1995). However, what counts as political is itself a political question. Politics has no natural borders but is defined and contested differently in each age. Different things get politicized, and identity is politicized right now—as is testified by contemporary controversies over multiculturalism, feminism, race, and religious and ethnic identities. Traditional political conceptions of the self that pay no attention to the politics of identity but merely take identities as the foundation of politics are not adequate to the task of mapping such contemporary struggles (Emmett and Llewellyn 1995). Nor can they account for the ways in which the politics of identity construction might intersect with and inform other, more conventional forms of politics.

Feminist contributors to international relations share this interest in the politics of identity construction with other postpositivist approaches. The politics of identities is, after all, heavily gendered, and has long been at the core of feminist concerns (Nicholson 1990). Virtually all feminist international-relations scholarship that examines gender constructions, divisions, and exclusions deals with, implicitly if not explicitly, the oppositional construction of masculine and feminine gender identities. However, recently some feminist IR scholars have given more explicit attention to the production and reinforcement of a range of particular hierarchical gender identities—those created, for example, through colonialism and nationalism (Pettman 1996; Tickner 1996a). Others have examined more fluid forms of identification and the role of discourse in their construction (Weber 1990; 1993; Sylvester 1994). These trends follow developments in mainstream feminist theory that have moved away from dualistic and toward multiple and fluid analyses of gender that emphasize difference (Nicholson 1990). This book will contribute to this new stream of feminist IR scholarship that is beginning to examine the multiple and changing intersections of identity construction.

The feminist concern with identities also has wider relevance. Indeed, because of the attention that has been given to the politics of identity construction in feminist scholarship, this is an ideal place to begin looking for more general theoretical insights into the subject. In their essay "Questions about Identity in International Relations," Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia

Enloe (1995) used examples drawn from feminist research to make more general claims about the relationships between international relations and identities.[6] They argued both that the processes of international relations help to construct particular (gendered) identities and that processes of identity formation affect international politics. These influences take place in ways that realism, pluralism, and structuralism/globalism are all "too restricted ontologically, methodologically and epistemologically to consider" (Zalewski and Enloe 1995, 297).

Contemporary interest in questions of identity is not confined to international relations but goes right across the social sciences, relating to three forms of identity crisis that we appear to be experiencing all at once, and on a global scale. These include a crisis of identity within modernity, with disillusion over modern notions of progress and universalism; a continuing crisis between modernity and what is left of nonmodern and premodern forms of life; and a crisis relating to the need to reorient and reinvent ourselves in relation to rapid globalization. As the process of globalization is itself also challenging the traditional boundaries and subject matter of IR, it is particularly important to be able to make connections across a wide range of disciplines at this juncture, "to tease out important points of convergence between international relations and cognate fields" (Linklater and MacMillan 1995, 11).

In combining feminist theory, men's studies, IR theory, and cultural studies approaches in order to examine the contemporary relationship between IR, globalization, and hegemonic masculinity, this book attempts to do just that. My questions about the relationship between international relations and the shaping of masculinities, while specifically addressing an issue of relevance to gender politics and making use of feminist insights, can hopefully further the general development of postpositivist enquiries into contemporary questions of identity in international relations and in politics in general.

Before outlining the structure of the text in more detail, I would like to make two more points. First, in my discussion of "hegemonic masculinity" I have by and large confined myself to the Anglo-American case. I justify this on the grounds that through the British Empire in the nineteenth century and the superpower status of the United States in the twentieth, Anglo-American culture is itself in a hegemonic position within international relations, and thus, globally, Anglo-American hegemonic masculinity is likely

to exert a disproportionate influence. Meanwhile, in disciplinary terms the Anglo-American influence is also very strong, and the theoretical underpinnings of the discipline largely reflect the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. On the other hand, to restrict the bulk of my analysis to a discussion of Anglo-American hegemonic masculinity may run the risk of dealing only with the stereotyped and the trite—not to mention giving yet more attention to the powerful and overprivileged at the expense of the marginalized, a strategy that goes against the grain in feminist circles. However, the observation that this construction of masculinity has become so easily identified as a stereotype is not a good reason for assuming that it no longer has any power. The intention here is not to reproduce such stereotypes but to unpack them and reveal the power moves that keep them influential. It is always wise to "know thine enemy." As a white, middle-class, educated Englishwoman I am already intimately acquainted with the kinds of masculinity that I investigate here. To critics who would prefer to see my efforts expended on those who are rendered invisible by mainstream IR, I reply that as a relatively privileged woman, I am not personally well placed to speak for the majority of marginalized Others—nor do they necessarily wish to be "spoken for" by such as myself. Better that my efforts be concentrated on an aspect of the gender order that impinges on my own daily life, and of which I can claim to have personal knowledge.

Second, this intimate knowledge, while extremely useful as a background to investigating hegemonic forms of masculinity, may also to some extent compromise my own position as a feminist; I may be too close to it, having unconsciously absorbed aspects of hegemonic masculinity into my own identity and work. For example, this book discusses masculinist codes of representation and masculinist rhetoric at length, and is critical of such language in both *The Economist* newspaper and in IR theory; however, the reader may notice that my own writing style is at times not dissimilar and that it can reproduce the very rhetorical strategies that I criticize. After years of education in the British university system and of reading academic books and papers, not to mention ten years of reading *The Economist* every week, virtually from cover to cover, it is hardly surprising that some of it has rubbed off on me. I have unconsciously learned to reproduce the codes of hegemonic masculinity in my writing because these are the codes that have met with credibility and academic success. Carol Cohn had a similar experience when she immersed herself in a U.S. center for defence intellectuals.

In spite of her criticisms of the highly gendered, abstracted, and euphemistic language that was used to cloak U.S. nuclear-defence thinking, she soon found herself talking the talk. This was the only way to be taken seriously: "What I found was that no matter how well-informed or complex my questions were, if I spoke English rather than expert jargon, the men responded to me as though I were ignorant, simpleminded or both. . . . A strong distaste for being patronized and dismissed made my experiment in English short-lived" (Cohn 1987, 718).

There is a dilemma here for feminists, of whether to try and avoid masculinist language but risk not being taken seriously, as Christine Sylvester (1994) has done, or whether to make strategic use of it to gain credibility for feminist arguments (or otherwise subvert it for feminist ends), and perhaps risk compromising one's own feminist message. In my own case, the thought of trying to change the style in which I write is daunting, although my own attitude to academic language is fairly irreverent: I sometimes use an ironic tone and frequently lapse into colloquialisms. While a playful approach to academic language could be seen as subversive, unfortunately, this too can have masculinist connotations. Thus my own use of language can at times mirror the ironic, journalistic tone characteristic of *The Economist*, which I criticize. To some extent complicity is the lot of us all, as poststructuralist feminists, following Foucault, have argued. As long as we engage in social interaction, there is no "innocent" position, even for the oppressed (Haraway 1991; Bordo 1993; Sylvester 1994). I can only hope that the ideas expressed in this book challenge the status quo rather more than the language they are written in might help to support it.

Mapping the Text

The book is organized into two parts. Part 1 (chapters 1 and 2) will concentrate on theoretical issues connected with the construction of identity; theorizing masculinities; and feminist critiques of masculinism. Chapter 1 surveys different theories of gender-identity construction—drawing on feminist social psychology, sociology/social anthropology, cultural studies, and political theory—to develop a model that demonstrates the "embeddedness" of gender identities. The chapter reveals the processes of identity construction through the dimensions of embodiment, institutional practices, and symbolic or discursive constructions. The argument here is that we should

move away from static or unilinear conceptions of gender identity (whether essentialist or otherwise) toward an understanding of gender identification as a more multiple and fluid process, without losing sight of the historical and cultural contexts and the material and corporeal constraints that nonetheless have to be negotiated.

Chapter 2 moves on to an examination of the gender politics of masculinity and explores how masculinist practices (as identified by feminists) influence the relationships between different groups of men as well as the relationships between men and women. This involves theorizing and historically situating masculinities and includes an explanation of the notion of "hegemonic masculinity," its qualities, and its relationship to other masculinities. Some of the historical connections between manhood and hegemonic masculinity in the Anglo-American tradition are then traced, and some ideal types identified. The involvement of masculinist practices in policing male behavior and in the competition between different masculinities is also examined.

Part 2 (chapters 3 to 6) examines the relationship between international relations and the gender politics of masculinity from the point of view of the theoretical perspective developed in part 1. In order to do this, I found it necessary to consider the cultural context in which the discipline of IR is situated. It is through the sharing of ideas and perspectives on the world between the discipline and popular culture that the effects of the discipline (as opposed to the practices of international relations) in shaping masculinities can be most clearly seen. The channels through which such ideas are shared are represented, in this instance, by *The Economist* newspaper, which as I shall argue below is an important and influential site for the cross-fertilization of ideas between popular culture, practitioners, and academics in the field. This is the case not only with regard to the overt subject matter of international affairs, but also, as I hope to demonstrate, with regard to the historic and contemporary gender politics of masculinities—not least in relation to the challenges of globalization.

The relationships between international relations, masculine identities, and popular culture (as represented here) are summed up in figure 1. These relationships all involve influences running in both directions. In the figure, the arrow running from masculine identities toward international relations is the one more usually considered, whereby international relations is said to reflect the interests and identities of men and masculinity.

FIGURE 1. Mapping the text of part 2, by chapter. This diagram shows the relationships between international relations, masculine identities, and popular culture. The common observation that international relations reflects the world of men and masculine interests is represented by the broken arrow. The more complex, two-way relationships that are discussed in this book are shown by the solid arrows, with the relevant chapters indicated alongside.

To mention just a few of these connections: international relations is a world of traditionally masculine pursuits—in which women have been, and by and large continue to be, invisible (Enloe 1990; Halliday 1991; Peterson and Runyan 1993, 1988). The focus on war, diplomacy, states, statesmen, and high-level economic negotiations has overwhelmingly represented the lives and identities of men. This is because of the institutionalization of gender differences in society at large and the consequent paucity of women in high office. Between 1970 and 1990, for example, women worldwide represented under 5 percent of heads of state, cabinet ministers, senior national policymakers, and senior persons in intergovernmental organizations (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 6). States have historically been oppressive to women, who have often been denied full citizenship. Rights and duties of citizenship have depended on the bearing of arms, a duty by and large confined to men (Stiehm 1982). Men form not only the decision makers, but also the law enforcers, backed by the threat of violence (Enloe 1987). In fact, masculine violence has become thoroughly embedded, institutional-

ized, and legitimized in the modern state (Connell 1990). Meanwhile, the rhetoric of nationalism has been found to be heavily gendered (Parker et al 1992), with national identity often being articulated through control over women (Kandiyoti 1992). Although many women have been active in national-liberation movements, nonetheless, nationalism has been found to have "a special affinity for male society [which] legitimizes the dominance of men over women" (Steans 1998, 69).

By default, then, if international relations are deemed to be about the very public world of high office at state, interstate, and multinational business level, they have reflected the interests and activities of men. In addition, as mentioned above, much of IR theory is itself infused with gender bias, in that it reflects and celebrates interests and values that are associated with masculinity. The principles of realism are drawn from classical and renaissance theories that similarly ignore or downgrade both women and femininity in favor of masculine qualities (Grant 1991; Tickner 1992). The twentieth-century search for a science of IR has exacerbated this historic bias toward masculinity. For example, Morgenthau privileged masculine conceptions of objectivity, rational interests, power as control, and the separation of instrumental political goals from morality over more feminine conceptions such as interdependence and power as mutual enablement (Tickner 1991). The same goals of scientific objectivity, emotional distance, and instrumentality have infused postwar international-relations practices, especially in the United States, where academics and political appointees tend to have close links.

The now-well-documented ways in which international relations are said to reflect the interests and identities of men and masculinity are not followed up in any detail in part 2 of the book. Instead, chapter 3 explores the much-less-examined line of influence running in the opposite direction, from international relations to masculine identities. It gives examples of how such influences work through the dimensions of embodiment, institutional practices, and symbolic or discursive constructions (as introduced in chapter 1).[7] Examining the symbolic dimension in more detail, the chapter then takes a particular interest in the way the discipline of IR has been constructed, and also in the gender politics of masculinity that operate through internal rivalries between alternative perspectives and that appear to make use of the ideal types of Anglo-American hegemonic masculinity identified in chapter 2. Chapter 3 ends with a question about the relationship between

postpositivist contributions to the discipline, new forms of hegemonic masculinity, and globalization.

The remainder of the book takes up the argument that there is a relationship between globalization and challenges to hegemonic masculinities that may involve a reformulation of the relationship between masculinities and the international. Examining the cultural context within which IR operates, chapters 4, 5, and 6 form a case study of *The Economist* newspaper during the period 1989–96 and its involvement in the politics of masculinity.[8] Because of its influential position in international current affairs, the paper has strong links both to changing masculine identities on the ground and to the construction of masculinities in the discipline of IR (see fig. 1).

The case study is intended to perform three functions. First, it provides a concrete illustration of the argument that there is a jostling for position between would-be hegemonic masculinities in which strategies of masculinization and feminization are deployed. Second, it illuminates how models of hegemonic masculinity that inform and construct gendered identities are (re)produced and circulated between popular culture, the conduct of international relations, and the academic study of IR. The focus is on the contemporary cultural environment within which IR operates, a culture in which academic IR represents the more codified end of the production of and commentary on politics and current affairs. Third, it illuminates and further develops the argument, first suggested at the end of chapter 3, that new perspectives within academic IR are linked to and implicated in changes to hegemonic masculinity being wrought in connection with globalization.

In terms of the arrows of influence in figure 1, chapters 4 and 5 explore the two-way relationships between hegemonic Anglo-American masculine identities on the ground and popular culture, as represented by *The Economist*. In chapter 4, the discussion is focused on the representation and construction of Anglo-American models of hegemonic masculinity; in chapter 5, the focus is on changing constructions of masculinity and globalization. Chapter 4 starts with an overview of the arguments that are put forward in the case study and then seeks to justify the choice of *The Economist* newspaper as an important site for the cross-fertilization of ideas between the academic world of IR and the wider cultural milieu. There is a brief explanation of the type of study that is made of *The Economist* and of the conceptual tools deployed. The remainder of the chapter demonstrates *The Economist*'s elite masculine cre-

dentials. It shows how the newspaper is saturated with the imagery of well-established constructions of hegemonic masculinity, which form a generally mutually reinforcing masculinist framework or "lens" through which readers of *The Economist* are invited to view both the world and themselves. Thus the act of reading the paper can help construct readers' own gendered identities. For this discussion, I make further use of the ideal types of hegemonic masculinity first introduced in chapter 2 and used in chapter 3 when discussing competing perspectives in IR.

Chapter 5 moves on to discuss how, within the overall masculinist framework of *The Economist*, rival models of hegemonic masculinity are in competition with each other and how masculinist strategies are deployed in the jostling for position that takes place between them. The chapter discusses how this competitive masculine imagery is mobilized in the construction of "globalization" as a masculine space. Tracing the changing mix of gender imagery that has accompanied the rise of rhetoric on globalization, I argue, with references to concurrent changes on the ground, that this change suggests new developments in the ongoing struggles over the construction of Anglo-American hegemonic masculinities.

Chapter 6 explores the third leg of the triangle in figure 1—a leg formed by the two-way influences between international relations and popular culture as represented by *The Economist*. Explicit connections are made between the rival models of masculinity on offer in *The Economist* and those embodied by various approaches to IR. Thus I illuminate the gendered moves that form a subtext to new developments in the discipline. I find a close match between the constructions of masculinity in the paper and in the discipline—including an affinity between those constructions of masculinity that in the newspaper are associated with a glamorized and masculinist discourse of globalization, and the contents of some postpositivist scholarship, which as a consequence is implicated in the transformation and reinvention of hegemonic masculinity.

All these arguments are pulled together at the end of *Manly States*. Reflecting, in my conclusion, I further discuss the particular perspective on gender politics that I have adopted throughout. Some conclusions are drawn as to the development of Anglo-American models of hegemonic masculinity in the 1990s and their relationship to developments in the discipline of IR. Finally, some comments are made about the implications of these findings for both feminist theory and feminist praxis.

   In this book I seek to demonstrate that international relations plays a significant role in the creation and maintenance of masculine identities. This is an important aspect of gender relations that deserves more attention because it generates new insights into the gendered processes of international relations. These insights are not confined to refining feminist critiques of masculinism in IR—which is worthwhile in itself—but have potentially far wider relevance. One aspect is the establishment of a new agenda for applied research, which can generate knowledge about the construction of particular masculine identities through particular international processes, and how these identities and the relationships between them then feed back into international decision making. Such research may be conducted from within a postpositivist perspective; indeed, it may require it. Consequently, this book, while postpositivist in outlook, is an example of constructive, rather than merely critical, theorizing. Hopefully it will help persuade some skeptics of postpositivism of the practical value of postpositivist research. In addition, the book shows that postpositivist theorizing has not yet been freed from implicit gender constructions. I hope, therefore, that my arguments will convince some postpositivist fellow travelers who are sympathetic to feminism but still skeptical of the importance of gender to their own research efforts, to think again.