Notes

Introduction

1. In this book I refer to both the theory and the practice of international relations. I have used the same form (*international relations*—lowercase initial letters) for both the discipline and for the practices and issues that have formed the discipline's subject matter. Where clarification seemed to be needed, I have used IR to refer to the discipline.

2. For example, see Enloe (1993) on masculinity and soldiering; Weber (1990, 1993) on the representation of masculinity in Latin American politics, and Zalewski and Parpart (1998) on the whole question of masculinity and international relations.

3. This question has occasionally been asked by feminists before, most often specifically in relation to soldiering and war. See for example Ehrenreich (1987), Enloe (1993), and Bourke (1996; 1999), discussed in chapter 3. See also Zalewski and Enloe (1995), discussed below. However, it remains a relatively neglected question, and as yet has not been given a great deal of consideration in general terms.

4. Hoffman (1977) argues that IR has developed as a U.S. discipline, shaped by the needs of superpower policymaking. While this may be disputed, it is a fact that most scholarship that is self-identified as within the discipline of IR is in the English language, and most university departments of international relations have, until very recently, been in the English-speaking world, with the United States dominating scholarly output. This is not to suggest that international affairs are not researched

elsewhere, but they have rarely elsewhere been considered as part of a distinct and separate discipline, which has become rather insular (see introductory chapters in Holsti 1985 and Olson and Groom 1991). The boundaries of IR and its emergence as a distinct discipline is significant in gender terms (see chapter 3 below).

5. If theories are not just tools, or even critiques, but are everyday practices, as Zalewski (1996) argues, then perhaps they help construct the identities of the theorists as well as the theorized. See chapter 3.

6. What is particularly interesting from the perspective of this book is that their choice of examples is drawn largely from studies of the relationship between masculine identities and international relations. Drawing on the work of Cohn and Hartstock (among others), they argue, for example, that strategic identity has been inflected with a kind of masculinity that allows no discussion of death, pain, and destruction and that leads to the dehumanization of strategic thinking. Meanwhile, military identity, in the case of the Vietnam War, was so heavily built on ideas of manhood and masculinity that the principal U.S. war aim became not to aid the Vietnamese, nor to protect U.S. strategic interests against regional Chinese influence, but simply to avoid a humiliating defeat. That their examples of two-way influences between international relations and particular identities should so readily draw on examples of specifically masculine identities suggests that there are in fact a wealth of strong connections of this type to be explored, and that international relations forms an important site for the production of masculinities.

7. As I argue below, these dimensions are interconnected in practice and have been separated for analytical convenience only. Similarly, the two-way relationship between masculine identities and international relations has been split into completely separate strands for the purpose of highlighting the direction of influence that has been relatively neglected by academics. In any given practical situation in which men engage in international relations, the influence is likely to run both ways.

8. This covers a period of rapid political, social, technological, and economic change after the relative stability of the cold war, a period in which the term *globalization* came to the fore.

1. The Construction of Gender Identity

1. The concept is still vigorously defended, and widely applied in modified forms in, for example, rational-choice theory in politics, neorealism and institutionalism in international relations, and neoclassical economics.

2. For a history of the treatment of women in Western philosophy, see Coole (1993).

3. For a discussion of the critical literature and one formulation of this argument, see Benhabib (1992).

4. I have tended to skate over or even ignore large areas of feminist theorizing on gender in which there is no specific focus on gender identity as opposed to structural

inequalities or other issues. Therefore this is a very inadequate and lopsided account in terms of the overall development of feminist theory as such.

5. In this they shared the functionalist approach of "sex role" sociologists such as Talcott Parsons, viewing sexual differences as developing because of the functional needs of social life, although Parsons placed considerably more emphasis on patterns of socialization, rather than inherited psychobiological programming (Haraway 1991, 32). The justification for sex differences and inequalities was the same, but the relative contributions of nature and nurture were disputed. However, even in sociological sex-role theory, the assumption was that biological differences underpinned and structured the processes of socialization (Connell 1987, 47–53).

6. To give a simple example, grabbing a child forcefully might be interpreted as an aggressive act when done in the playground, and as a protective one when the child is in front of an oncoming car.

7. An early and influential exploration of the sex/gender system was provided by Rubin (1975), and gender as a category in history was later explored by Scott (1988). A history of the feminist use of the sex/gender distinction can be found in Haraway (1991).

8. A highly selective list of contributors to postwar feminist institutional analysis includes, in the radical feminist camp, Millett (1970); Greer (1970); Daly (1979); and MacKinnon (1987) on patriarchy and male power; Rich (1979) on the institution of motherhood; Brownmiller (1977) and Dworkin (1981) on sexual violence. For a liberal feminist approach, see for example Friedan (1963) on equal rights. Socialist feminist approaches include Mitchell (1971); Rowbotham (1973); Kuhn and Wolpe (1978); Eisenstein (1979); Barrett (1980); Young (1981); Phillips (1983, 1987); Burton (1985) on socialist feminist theory; Oakley (1974) and Hartstock (1983) on domestic labor; Wilson (1977) on women and the welfare state and on problems with Marxist feminism. Institutional analysis with an international dimension includes Folbre on the political economy of development (1994); Enloe on the armed forces (1983) and international politics (1990).

9. There is large literature on this in the sociology of education. For Britain, see for example Whyld (1983) and Kelly (1985); Arnot (1986). Steinham summarizes the U.S. findings on the differential treatment of girls and boys in the U.S. educational system (Steinham 1992, 118–30).

10. Selective examples include, on purchasing "femininity" through advertising, Williamson (1978) and Myers (1986); on the representation of women, Pollock (1977), Winship (1981), and Gamman and Marshment (1988); on the relationship between gender identity and media images, Coward (1984) and Betterton (1987). Cultural-studies and media-studies literature has both developed in parallel with and has regularly criss-crossed mainstream feminist theorizing on gender identity, absorbing feminist psychoanalytic theory and promoting semiotic and discursive approaches. It has also been at the forefront of debates about masculinity (see for example Chapman and Rutherford 1988).

11. Freud's basic theory on the Oedipus complex was that all infants have a polymorphous sexuality with diverse desires that are basically narcissistic and contain the possibility of bisexuality. Boys and girls are equally active in exploring their environment and their bodies, and both desire their mother as their primary love object. The psychological development of the infant as it progresses through childhood depends on the repression of some desires and the displacement of others in ways that are structured differently for boys and girls because of the different positions of the father and mother in family dynamics. The crucial change is during the Oedipal phase, where the child has become aware of its sex, and a triangle of desire and rivalry is set up between the child and its parents. In the case of the boy, his desire for his mother is repressed because he fears castration by his rival, his father. The ensuing mixture of guilt, desire, and fear structures an incest taboo, but allows for a displacement of his desire onto other women in later life. He renounces the maternal bond and chooses to identify with the powerful father instead. This identification with male power and activity may include a homoerotic element, which, unless successfully repressed, may result in homoerotic desires in later life. In the case of the girl, the progress through this phase is more difficult, because her desires have to switch from one sex to the other. During the Oedipal phase, she is forced renounce her desire for her mother and replace it with one for father and men, and at the same time renounce her active sexuality in favor of a more passive and receptive one. This is achieved through the effect of her disappointment in discovering her lack of a penis (her "castration"), which prompts her to redirect her attraction to her father, who possesses the magic item and sets up a passive desire to possess a penis by proxy—that is, through sexual intercourse with a male lover and the subsequent fulfillment of having a baby. While men repress their passive, feminine side, women repress their active, masculine side, so that gender identity and character is formed as a part of psychosexual development. It is the layering of desires and prohibitions in the unconscious, and the possibility of the eruption of previously repressed feelings or patterns in later life, that provides the complexities, contradictions, and frailties of gender identity and adult sexuality (Freud 1953a; 1953b).

12. Although Freud's explanation of often-ambivalent relationships between men has been used by radical gay theorists to analyze homoeroticism and homophobia (e.g., Simpson 1994).

13. For example, Connell (1987, 152) observes that in Ancient Egypt intrafamilial royal dynastic marriages would have made Freud's hair stand on end.

14. Feminist appropriations of Foucault include work on the relationship of women to the fashion and beauty industries (Bartsky 1990) and anorexia nervosa (Bordo 1989; 1993b).

15. This contrasts with the feminist analyses of patriarchy and capitalism cited above that understood power to be an oppressive force that some people or institutions wield over others. This oppressive conception of power was given depth by psychoanalytic theories that showed how oppressive power in society was converted into repres-

sion in our psyches. Emancipation from gender inequalities and socially produced gender differences would come from political empowerment of the oppressed, psychotherapy, or some combination of the two.

16. Although it would be fair to say that the relative strength of class divisions between women has long been an intrinsic part of socialist-feminist debates since the turn of the century (Phillips 1987).

17. A similar argument is made by Mouffe (1994).

18. Mouffe also regards different forms of identity as the stake in a power struggle (Mouffe 1994, 110).

2. Masculinities and Masculinism

1. See below for discussion of "hegemony." In synthesizing Foucauldian and Gramscian influences, I am roughly following authors such as Said (1978); Cocks (1989); and Laclau and Mouffe (1985).

2. Butler's inattention to historical context (criticized in chapter 1) owes much more to the influence of French feminist poststructuralists on her theory of gender identity than it does to the influence of Foucault.

3. For a radical feminist analysis of patriarchy, see for example Daly (1979). On dual-systems theory, see Kuhn and Wolpe (1978); on capitalist patriarchy, see Young (1981). For a later defence of the concept, see Walby (1990).

4. See, for example, Grant and Newland (1991); Tickner (1992); Peterson and Runyan (1993); Sylvester (1994).

5. The epistemological debate is between empirical, standpoint, and poststructuralist feminisms. For discussion of feminist epistemology and successor sciences, see for example Harding (1986); Nicholson (1990), and Haraway (1991).

6. As Carver (1995) argues, *gender* is not a synonym for *women*. Jones (1996), writing in an IR context, also criticizes feminists for paying too little attention to men and masculinities. Perhaps it is unsurprising that feminist accounts of gender generally tend to focus more on constructions of "femininity" and the exclusions of "women" than on masculinity or masculinities. However, this is not an excuse for deploying crude and monolithic constructions of "masculinity," particularly when care is taken to provide nuanced and contextualized accounts of women and "femininity" (Carver 1995).

7. I use the term *men's studies* very broadly to indicate a body of literature concerning men and masculinity that has been written by men. This literature is extensive and varies in its sympathy with or opposition to feminist insights. It coexists, sometimes uneasily, with contributions to the subject from feminist cultural studies and queer studies (a branch of gender studies that refuses the categories heterosexual/homosexual), and the term *men's studies* is itself contentious. Examples include Hodson (1984); Metcalf et al (1985); Abbott (1987); Brod (1987); Seidler (1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991); Kimmel (1987b); Kimmel and Messner (1989); Mangan and Walvin (1987); Jackson

(1990); Hearn and Morgan (1990); Gilmore (1990); Roper and Tosh (1991); Middleton (1992); Rutherford (1992); Morgan (1992); Hearn (1992); Brod and Kaufman (1994).

8. See the introduction in Brod and Kaufman (1994).

9. Similar dualisms may also occur in other philosophical traditions such as Taoism, but here I am concerned with the Western tradition.

10. She went on to try to transcend binarism and recuperate such a space through "ecriture feminine," an alternative style that can in fact be produced by both sexes (discussed in Moi 1985, 105–8).

11. Some feminists go so far as to argue that the masculine/feminine dichotomy is the primary one through which other dichotomies receive their status by association, because they are so readily "mapped onto" gender (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 23). This argument stretches the point too far, in my opinion.

12. This happens regardless of the actual participation of women, but of course the association of science and politics with masculinity also helps to perpetuate the underrepresentation of women in these fields.

13. For further discussion on the role and limits of phallocentric imagery, see below.

14. This is not explicitly argued by Peterson and Runyan, but is rather my reading of their work. At any rate, they make no reference to psychoanalytic discourse.

15. This is the of argument made by Grant (1991) and Tickner (1992) on behalf of international relations, and also Keohane (1991), who sees an affinity between such "feminine" qualities and his own interdependence approach.

16. As Enloe argues, large numbers of women are currently engaged in international politics but are the hidden support workers—army wives, diplomatic wives, prostitutes, nurses, and so forth (Enloe 1983; 1990).

17. See for example Hodson (1984), Metcalf and Humphries (1985), and Abbott (1987).

18. Much of the men's-studies literature produced before the 1990s was derivative of earlier feminist or role-model theories (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994).

19. As McMahon (1993) argues, much of this literature overpsychologizes gender politics.

20. Jackson's answer is to adopt a personal autobiographical style of writing as a radical strategy to make public such emotions and decenter the unified masculine subject. However, it is not clear that this in itself undermines masculine power. It depends on the context.

21. A number of feminist theorists have recently tried to transcend dichotomous thinking by the use of unorthodox language. An example in international relations can be found in the work of Sylvester (1994).

22. In my view, this argument parallels a discussion by Anne Phillips (1993). Although Phillips discusses feminist political strategies for change rather than the existing gender order, she argues that feminists need to pay attention to both the politics of ideas and the politics of presence, rather than always championing one over the other.

23. See, for example, the discussion in Nicholson (1990).

24. Examples include Carrigan, Connell, and Lee (1985); Brod (1987); Kimmel (1987b); Kimmel and Messner (1989); Seidler (1989; 1990; 1991); Jackson (1990); Hearn and Morgan (1990); Gilmore (1990); Middleton (1992); Rutherford (1992); Morgan (1992); Hearn (1992); a special edition of *Theory and Society* (vol. 22, 1993); and Brod and Kaufman (1994). Many of these contributors dislike the term *men's studies* and identify themselves as involved in profeminist men's writing or in critical studies on men and masculinity, to distinguish themselves from the mythopoetic men's movement exemplified by authors such as Bly (1991, 1992).

25. Some contributors continue to place a good deal of emphasis on pain and emotional denial as the price of power. Kaufman (1994) argues that men's power is now being undermined so that the rewards of emotional alienation are undermined and the pain highlighted. Seidler (1987, 1989, 1990, 1991) also retains a concern with rationalism and emotional repression, albeit historically contextualized. His work is a good example of the development of more sociologically sophisticated and historically contextualized accounts of masculinity within men's studies, but which nevertheless maintains a narrow focus on the gender styles and concerns of white, middle-class heterosexuals.

26. There is also the problem that the contributors are themselves in a position of privilege, which is hard to undermine from within. For example, contributors such as Jackson (1990) and Rutherford (1992) deliberately transgress the public/private split by using autobiography and their own emotional history as material for academic reflection. But given that social positions of the contributors and the power relationships in which they are enmeshed affects the degree to which emotional disclosure indicates vulnerability, it is unclear how genuinely radical such productions might be. Some have argued that it is impossible for men to be feminist or contribute effectively to the undermining of their own power. For a discussion that problematizes men in feminism, see Jardine and Smith (1987) and a counterargument by Boone (1990).

27. For example, ecofeminists have appropriated and renegotiated qualities such as "nurturing" and women's connection to nature to challenge unsustainable development (Mies and Shiva 1993). In contrast, cyberfeminists have embraced the new technologies in an attempt to forge a new relationship between "femininity" and technology (Haraway 1991).

28. Constructions of homosexuality have by and large proceeded along the same dualistic lines as sex and gender. Thus homosexuals have been understood as either feminized men or virilized women, and their relationships have been characterized in terms of active and passive partners.

29. Until the mid nineteenth century, the prevailing view was that this racial hierarchy was the result of cultural differences and degrees of "civilization." However, by the end of the nineteenth century and the advent of social Darwinism, it was seen as the result of differing biology and natural selection. Hall (1992b) documents the change of attitude and its consequences in imperial administration in Jamaica. For fur-

ther discussion of the relationship between hegemonic and subordinate masculinities, see below.

30. See, for example, Segal (1990); Roper and Tosh (1991); Cornwall and Lindisfarne (1994). In recent years there has been a small explosion of interest in masculinities in the field of cultural studies, some of which explicitly draws on Connell's theory. This is partly because it is readily compatible with the existing neo-Gramscian framework of British cultural studies (Best and Kellner 1991, 294).

31. In the Gramscian understanding of cultural hegemony, the dominant ideology is constructed from a range of preconstituted elements that can be arranged and rearranged in a thousand different ways. It is pervasive enough to be redundant, instantly recognizable—a part of what we know already (Hall 1973). In IR, the term *hegemony* often signifies a much-less-subtle form of power and dominance. See for example Gilpin (1987).

32. Even when it comes to sexuality, phallocentric discourse fails to offer the only possible interpretation of either the functioning of male genitals or of conventional heterosexual intercourse, let alone other kinds of sexuality. For alternative views of heterosexual intercourse and nonphallic masculinity, see Cocks (1989, 150–73) and Segal (1994, 136–40). For an alternative metaphor of male sexuality based on the testicles rather than the penis, see Flannigan-Saint-Aubin (1994), who illustrates this with reference to the movie *Superman*. He counterposes Superman's active and invincible phallic masculinity with Clark Kent's vulnerable, nurturing, testicular one. In the 1990s *New Adventures of Superman*, phallic masculinity was eclipsed as Clark Kent was now the hero and Superman became the difficult alter ego.

33. Ehrenreich (1995) identifies a further postwar decline in patriarchy (and see below). Competition between patriarchal and bourgeois values existed throughout the 1980s in Britain's Conservative Party, where the belief in competitive individualism (phallic) undermined and contradicted the belief in "family values" (patriarchal).

34. Cornwall and Lindisfarne (1993) treat masculinity as a totally flexible concept that is not necessarily even to be associated with males. In this they go further than Connell (1987), who sees masculinities as culturally and historically defined, but nonetheless always associated with men. Masculinity need not *always* be associated with men, but it must *generally* be so to be recognizable as masculinity.

35. An interesting argument is put forward in this context by John MacInnes (1998). He argues that masculinity does not as such exist but has been invented to explain the contradictions between a traditionally patriarchal sexual division of labor and the egalitarian thrust of capitalism and market economies, which are associated with equal rights.

36. This might also indicate a change in the status of homosexuality, which, while still being subordinate, may not be quite so far down the pecking order of masculinities as before. See above and below for further discussion of homosexuality and its subordinate status.

37. Three discussions on the problems of reproducing rather than challenging gender symbolism in the study of masculinities include Morgan 1992; Rogoff and Van Leer 1993; Coltrane 1994.

38. Foucault used the term *genealogy* to mean a method that was designed to excavate patterns of the exercise of power, starting from a question posed in the present and without having to make reference to a transcendental subject (McNeil 1993, 149).

39. As both Seidler (1988) and Morgan (1992) point out, Weber's seminal work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* can be fruitfully read as a discussion of modern bourgeois masculinity.

40. Notably the waning of personal violence and heroism associated with the honor code and dueling after World War I (Connell 1993).

41. For a smaller group of profeminist men, the liberation of women implied the liberation of men from the restrictions of traditional masculinity.

42. For discussions, see for example Mercer and Julien (1988), Staples (1989), and Segal (1990).

43. One strand of anti-Semitism earlier this century saw Jews as a "third gender," the males, whom it was considered had broad hips and narrow shoulders, being predisposed to homosexuality, while the "masculinized" females had narrow hips and broad shoulders—and, worst of all, relative social equality (Gilman 1995).

44. The term *hypermasculine* is used in the contemporary literature to mean exaggerated displays of physical toughness (which in terms of the archetypes mentioned above would belong to the warrior and honor traditions of hegemonic masculinity) and has close connections with the concept of machismo. It is possible to imagine *hypermasculinity* being applied to extreme examples of other forms of hegemonic masculinity—for example, an extremely cold, ruthless and calculating rationality. Therefore, like masculinity itself, the term has no ultimately stable meaning.

45. For example, in the NAFTA negotiations of the early 1990s, the feminized and indigenous image of Mexican workers worked against Mexico's inclusion in the deal (Marchand 1994). Meanwhile, Chicanos in California have the opposite reputation—one of excessive machismo and participation in gang violence, a reputation that descends from the North European view of the conquistadores (Zinn 1989).

46. Class, sexuality, and race are not the only criteria dividing grades in the hierarchy of masculinities. As Brod argues, such categories fail to encompass anti-Semitism, which creates a cultural or religious divide (Brod 1994). Edwards (1994) stresses age as a factor, while Hearn and Collinson detail a long list of divisions: age, appearance, bodily facility, care, economic class, ethnicity, fatherhood and relations to biological reproduction, leisure, marital and kinship status, mind, occupation, place, religion, sexuality, size, and violence (Hearn and Collinson 1994, 109).

47. Mercer and Julien explore the contradictions of being gay and black (Mercer and Julien 1988).

48. Connell makes a similar argument in respect of the tattoo- and motorcycle-

style of white, working-class, protest masculinity, which coexists with a contemporary breakdown in the gender division of labor, an acceptance of women's economic equality, and an interest in children (Connell 1993).

49. Hypermasculinity is not just projected onto subordinate groups but is also associated with a more generalized backlash against changing divisions of labor, particularly in popular culture (Connell 1993).

3. Masculinities in International Relations

1. A more conventional way of looking at the relationship between men and international relations is through the "levels of analysis problem" (Hollis and Smith 1990). See below for a discussion of why this is problematic in gender terms.

2. Before the creation of Israel, anti-Semites regarded the Jews' lack of a warrior caste as proof of their status as a dubious effeminate "third gender." Their lack of physical involvement in soldiering was supposed to make them believe that their bodies were "merely extensions of the psyche." Therefore psychosomatic illness was a deemed a distinctly Jewish phenomenon and psychoanalysis dubbed a "Jewish science" (Gilman 1995, 187).

3. Not for the first time. The earlier Boer War had provoked similar anxieties about the physical quality of recruits (Bourke 1996).

4. A contemporary example is of Arab citizens of Israel and of Palestinians in many other Arab countries.

5. For a discussion of the dominance of Western values in international society (for which one can read "the values of Western hegemonic masculinities"), see Bull and Watson (1984: parts 3 and 4). While many postcolonial leaders have been directly or indirectly influenced by Western standards of hegemonic masculinity, there remain considerable cultural contradictions and tensions between such standards and other cultural forms. I disagree with Hedley Bull's (1984) view that Western values have come to form a universally acceptable common standard of international society.

6. This feminization of undesirables echoes the Nazi constructions of feminine Others documented by Theweleit (1987, 1989) and discussed above.

7. Spies who defected to the other side were associated with deviant sexuality and therefore tainted with deficient/subordinate masculinity—both in fiction and reality.

8. As Richard Ashley has argued, Waltz's systemic theory, produced in his book *Theory of International Politics* (Waltz 1979), has not been entirely successful in this project, as it contains an uneasy tension between systemic causation and methodological individualism (Ashley 1986).

9. As Robert Cox (1986, 212) argues, although its roots are in historical enquiry, a good deal of IR theory has thus been transformed into an ahistorical form of "problem-solving theory" in which current parameters and power relations are taken as permanent. The mode of thought ceases to be historical, even though the materials used are derived from history.

10. See for example Axelrod and Keohane (1986) for a vision of "cooperation under anarchy" and Buzan (1993a) and Buzan et al. (1993) on "structural realism" and "mature anarchy."

11. Waltz's (1979) neorealism is an influential contemporary example of this approach.

12. This assumed difference still underpins theories of moral development. See Benhabib (1992) for a discussion of these issues in relation to gender.

13. Thus there are three uses of the word *private:* (1) as in *civil society* (private enterprise, rather than the public state); (2) as in *familial* or *domestic*; and (3) as in *privacy*. There are also two uses of the word *domestic*; it can mean either within the family or within the state.

14. It has been argued that in societies where there is greater segregation of the sexes, there are generally more marked gender inequalities (Gilmore 1990).

15. Coincidentally, it was only after women had made inroads into the public sphere of politics through gaining the vote that IR became institutionalized as a separate discipline in the academy. See Grant (1991).

16. In a reversal of my argument above, the gendered subtext of realist discourse (handed down from Machiavelli) inscribes the anarchy of the international realm as a feminized space, contrasting with the masculine realm of sovereignty within states. However, it is this very characterization of the international as full of feminine danger that in part excludes women from participating in its affairs. Feminine dangers need to be tamed by men—women could only multiply them. See Tickner (1992) and below for further discussion of the gendering of realism.

17. As feminist security theorists have argued, this model falsely attributes a condition of safety and security to the inside of states, where women tend to face their greatest dangers (Tickner 1992).

18. There is not only a journal of that name, but it has also been used in book titles such as the Smith et al (1981) edited volume *Perspectives on World Politics*. The view that IR should not be separated from politics and political theory is also gaining ground. For example, in the mid-1990s edited volume *International Relations Theory Today* (Booth and Smith 1995), five out of fifteen chapters were explicitly devoted to this theme.

19. For example, the British International Studies Association subgroup on international political economy (IPE) has renamed itself after global political economy (GPE).

20. This book includes the words *international relations* in its title to indicate that the discipline of IR is the subject under discussion, although the approach is one of gender politics.

21. The ten categorizations are international theory versus political theory; communitarian versus cosmopolitan thought; the three Rs (realism, rationalism, revolutionism); the three waves or great debates (idealism, realism, behavioralism; the inter-

paradigm debate (realism/neorealism, liberalism/globalism/ pluralism, neo-Marxism/structuralism); state centrism versus transnationalism; neorealism and neoliberalism; the postpositivist debate; constitutive versus explanatory theory; foundationalist and antifoundationalist international theory. In my view, the three Rs and the interparadigm debate are loosely parallel, and realism, state centrism, and neorealism are fairly closely related, as are transnationalism, liberalism, pluralism, and neoliberalism. In the postpositivist debate, constitutive versus explanatory theory, and foundationalism and antifoundationalism cover similar ground.

22. Steve Smith gives the examples of Little and Smith (1991); Olson and Groom (1991); McGrew and Lewis (1992); and Viotti and Kaupi (1993), whose books are schematically organized by the debate. Smith cites a number of theorists for whom it has also been a starting point: Holsti (1985); Hoffman (1987); Whitworth (1989). He attributes its first use to Michael Banks in 1984. However, while Banks may have coined the phrase *inter-paradigm debate*, this was predated by the first edition of *Perspectives on World Politics* (Smith et al, 1981), which introduced the idea that the discipline could usefully be divided into these three contemporary perspectives, which provide not only alternative ideologies but also alternative accounts of the relevant actors, processes, and outcomes of international affairs.

23. In the great bulk of North American output, the main division is between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, but the more substantial disagreement is between both the positivist schools, on the one hand, and the postpositivists, on the other (Lapid 1989; Smith et al 1996).

24. An examination of Tickner's (1992) detailed account of realist masculinity shows how mutually incompatible elements have been shamelessly combined, although she does not stress this herself.

25. It would be worth noting whether this change occurred at the same time as the appearance of a nuclear capability that could to all intents and purposes annihilate nature.

26. References are too numerous to mention, but for discussions of the theory see for example Keohane (1984); Jervis (1985); and Axelrod and Keohane (1986).

27. Seidler views socialism as having been hampered by this legacy, and also views poststructuralism as a part of the rationalist tradition (as do some feminists—see below).

28. This has been extensively discussed in the liberal/communitarian debate in political theory, where John Rawls (1972) uses a rational-actor model to underpin his theory of universal justice, and critics argue that his model contains implicit norms (Sandel 1984).

29. There is also much use of heavily sexualized language and banter—perhaps more in keeping with the citizen-warrior model of masculinity than the rational-bourgeois one, although the effect is much the same—to sanitize and provide emotional distance from the subject matter (see Cohn 1987).

30. Although my preferred reading of the word *patriarchy* relates to a specific historic type of gendered hierarchy (see chapter 2), I am here following the more general use of the authors cited in this section.

31. As Eisenstein suggests, this may mean that, in the end, liberal feminism has a more radical potential than it intends, in that the achievement of women's equality in the public sphere would of necessity involve the transcendence or transformation of liberalism.

32. Susan Strange, arguably the founder of IPE as a subdiscipline, denounced this trend as one of "imitating economists" (Strange 1995, 167).

33. This in itself highlights the fact that while the liberal/communitarian debate in political theory, and latterly in IR (see Brown 1992), is presented as a huge divide, in practice their outlooks are very similar (see Taylor 1989b).

34. More recently, Francis Fukuyama (1989) has replayed a version of this argument, suggesting that realism has become dangerous and irrelevant with the end of the cold war. He likens realism to chemotherapy, which is harmful to the patient if it is continued after the cancer has been killed.

35. This was indeed a time when more and more complex models of international decision making were being produced. See, for example, the numerous complex diagrams mapping U.S. foreign-policy making, produced by Alger (1991; originally published in 1977).

36. See chapter 6 for further analysis of Waltz's prose style.

37. In a similar vein to the discussion here, Lucian Ashworth and Larry Swatuk trace the history of IR as a masculine contest between two types of masculinity—warrior realism and rational liberalism—with emasculation as the crucial weapon (Ashworth and Swatuk 1998).

38. Since these concerns were expressed, some edited volumes on IR theory have taken to including a token chapter on feminism (e.g., Booth and Smith 1995; Smith, Booth, and Zalewski 1996; Burchill and Linklater 1996) but feminist analysis has still not been thoroughly integrated into other postpositivist perspectives.

39. The analogy between man and state is a central plank of the masculinism of IR. The model for masculinity here is the bourgeois-rational model discussed above.

40. This is also the case in Waltz's later *Theory of International Politics*, where "man" has been banished, but states as rational actors are incompatible with the argument that systemic forces alone explain war (Ashley 1986).

41. The indiscriminate projection of oppositional characteristics onto disparate groups may account for the apparent affinities between marginalized perspectives, such as the similarity between the so-called African worldview and the feminist standpoint perspective. See Mohanty (1991).

42. This is particularly ironic, since Derrida's aim was to decenter "logocentrism," rather than reinforce it.

43. Linklater's earlier work tended to ignore both women and the gender issue—hence, titles such as *Men and Citizens in International Relations* (1982).

44. This is not the case in some other social sciences, where such perspectives are rapidly becoming the new orthodoxy.

45. There is also the thorny question of to what extent male academics can legitimately speak for feminism. While there is plenty of room for them to speak for feminism as in supporting it, speaking for feminism as in representing it is more tricky. For a discussion on whether men can be feminists, see Boone (1990). It is also worth noting that there are problems of representation within feminism, even when all the participants are female.

46. In Baudrillard's usage, simulacra are repetitions without originals, in an age where the opposition between original and copy has been lost; hyperreality is the result of the real being continually manufactured as an intensified version of itself (Baudrillard 1983; Connor 1989, 151).

47. Der Derian's academic output can be divided into two categories (see Huysmans 1997): his earlier genealogical work (e.g., *On Diplomacy* 1987) and his later "symptomological," or semiological, works (1989 onward). It is the latter type of analysis that I want to discuss here.

48. It is an "intertextual" method outlined in more detail in the volume *International/Intertextual Relations* (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989). For a discussion of *intertextuality*, see also chapter 4.

49. For the U.S. forces, the glamour of the simulation technology obviously competes with the need for tough heroes to engage in "realistic" action. This perhaps represents a struggle between a masculinity based on World War II heroism, which lasted through the cold war, and a newer one, organized around "virtual" skills.

50. My thanks to I. R. Douglas for drawing my attention to this point.

51. The fear that new technologies would be appropriated for masculinity is one factor behind cyberfeminist attempts to develop a constructive rather than critical feminism-technology relationship (see Haraway 1992).

52. Not that earlier strategists did not have their own rhetorical games. These were organized around highly sexualized imagery, which itself served to reduce anxiety by translating deadly nuclear war into mischievous boyish games (Cohn 1987). Such rhetoric was commonplace in cold war strategic circles, but by and large was excised from the more formal academic writings that aspired to "objectivity."

4. *The Economist*'s Masculine Credentials

1. *The Economist* identifies itself as a newspaper, although it is published in the format of a weekly journal. Its content is more like that of a newspaper than a journal or magazine. It has a number of other unusual characteristics, such as the anonymity of its authors (there are no by-lines). It also always refers to itself, and is convetionally referred to by others, as *The Economist*, rather than, as would be more usual for a newspaper, the *Economist* (this convention is followed here, and is discussed below).

2. Circulation details published in *The Economist*'s "World Profile," an in-house document made available to would-be advertisers in the early 1990s (source: *The Economist*). By September 1993 circulation had reached 534,000 (*The Economist* September 4, 1993, 26). In 1995, *The Economist* claimed to reach "our world-wide readership of over two million businessmen [*sic*] in more than 175 countries" (April 15, 1995, 112), although it is not clear whether these were all subscribers. It is very likely that many copies are read by more than one individual through institutional subscriptions.

3. During the period studied, weekly sections were devoted to politics and current affairs from Britain, Europe, the United States, and Asia, plus other "international affairs" coverage, and to business news, finance and economics, and science and technology. In addition, special surveys were conducted on topics such as the European Community (July 3, 1993) the world economy (October 1, 1994 and October 7, 1995), "the future of cities" (July 29, 1995), the internet (July 1, 1995); defence technology (June 10, 1995); the software industry (May 25, 1996), and international banking (April 27, 1996). A series of briefs entitled "Face Value" profiled various business leaders and entrepreneurs (e.g., Marc Andreessen, August 5, 1995, 72; Peter Tsang, February 3, 1996, 62). Special reports also regularly featured a selection of IR topics such as the United Nations (June 12, 1993 and October 21, 1995), the future of Europe (August 7, 1993), "peace in the Middle East" (September 18, 1993), "dealing with China" (November 27, 1993), "the new world order" (January 8, 1994), foreign aid (May 7, 1994), democracies and war (April 1, 1995), Iraq (April 8, 1995), Japan's relationship with Asia (April 22, 1995), nuclear proliferation (March 25, 1995), ethnic cleansing (September 23, 1995), Northern Ireland (February 17, 1996), Bosnia (January 20, 1996), terrorism (March 2, 1996), and Israel and Lebanon (April 20, 1996).

4. Examples, again chosen from the period under study: "Economics Focus" features regularly examined theories and research produced by academic economists (e.g., "Inflation," May 13, 1995, 122, and "Development," April 27, 1996, 116). "Management Focus" features examined contemporary managerial strategies and new managerial theories (e.g., "Transformation," May 6, 1995, 91, and "Trust," December 16, 1995, 83), as did a comprehensive survey of management education (March 2, 1991). Newly published scientific research formed the main source for weekly science features (e.g., "Downsizing Genes," February 10, 1996, 105, and "The Superconducting Tease," April 29, 1995, 129). Academic sources in politics and IR were used for special features such as "The Covert Arms Trade" (February 12, 1994, 21–23), which drew on the work of Michael Klare in the *World Policy Journal*, Ed Laurence in *Political Science Quarterly*, and Chris Smith in *London Defence Studies*. "The Left in Western Europe" (June 11, 1994, 2123) cited Geoff Mulgan and Robin Murray of the Demos think tank; "Islam and the West" (August 6, 1994, survey, 1–3) discussed Samuel Huntington's well-known 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article that predicted a clash of civilizations; "America and Japan" (April 13, 1996, 21–25) quoted a debate on U.S. foreign policy sparked off by Joseph Nye in the IR journal *Foreign Affairs;* and "Democracy and Technology" (June 17, 1995, 21–23) referred to the theories of Alvin and Heidi Toffler. In addition, a special 150th-

anniversary edition (September 11, 1993) included commissioned articles by Ali A. Mazrui (director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, New York); Henry Louis Gates (head of Afro-American Studies at Harvard University); Lawrence Freedman (head of war studies at King's College, London); Michael Waltzer (a professor at Princeton).

5. For example, an article on Europe by John Major, the former British prime minister (September 25, 1993, 23); one proposing a new international economic regime by Jeffrey Sachs, professor of economics at Harvard University (October 1, 1994, 27); one on U.S. foreign policy by Raymond Seitz, former U.S. ambassador to Britain (May 27, 1995, 23); and one on "reforming Japan" by Ichiro Ozawa, Japan's former opposition leader (March 9, 1996, 19).

6. For example, Barry Buzan and B. A. Roberson cite five different issues of *The Economist* in their discussion of the relationship between Europe and the Middle East in the 1990s (Buzan and Roberson 1993, 132, 141–42); while in the same volume, Carlton cites two issues when discussing civil war and terrorism (Carlton 1993, 172, 175). In another example, contributors to the *Review of International Studies* (Halliday 1994, 117; Crystal 1994, 147; and Grieco 1995, 25, 37) have all cited *The Economist*. These are merely illustrative examples; there are numerous others.

7. In the past, free trade has been the paper's religion. The founder, James Wilson, was convinced that it would "extend civilisation and morality throughout the world" (*The Economist* September 4, 1993, 26). For more recent support for free markets, see for example the leader "The Modern Adam Smith" (July 14, 1990, 11–12) and "Gatt: Remembering the Unthinkable" (November 7, 1992, 15). For an application of liberal economic theory: "Zero Inflation" (ibid., 21–24). On democracy and the rule of law, see for example "Democracy Works Best" (August 27, 1994, 11–12) and "Democracy and Growth: Why Voting Is Good for You" (August 27, 1994, 17–19).

8. On liberal feminism see "Europe's Women: How the Other Half Works" (June 30, 1990, 21–24). Admittedly, *The Economist* may be more extreme in the degree of its social liberalism than the majority of IR readers—for example, it supports the legalization of heroin and other drugs (May 11, 1996, 14) and also supports homosexual marriage (January 6, 1996, 17).

9. See, for example, editorial support for the United Nations on its fiftieth birthday (October 21, 1995, 18) and support for European Monetary Union (September 30, 1995, 16).

10. For discussions of the degree to which liberal institutionalist goals have been hampered by the requirements of political realism, see the following articles that appeared in Christmas double issues: "The State of the Nation State: She Is My Country Still" (December 22, 1990, 73–78); "A Multipower World: The Great Dance Resumes" (December 21, 1991, 65–67); and "The Shape of the World: The Nation-State Is Dead. Long Live the Nation-State" (December 23, 1995, 17–20).

11. As evidenced by the following quote: "A quarter of a century ago, when multi-

national firms suddenly loomed large on the radar screens of pundits and politicians, they aroused a mixture of awe and fear . . . [but] global enterprises have not taken over the world" (March 27, 1993, survey, 5).

12. See for example "Survey of the World Economy: War of the Worlds" (October 1, 1994) and also the leader "The Myth of the Powerless State" (October 7, 1995, 15–16) and the accompanying "Survey of the World Economy: Who's in the Driving Seat?" (October 7, 1995).

13. For example, "Rational Economic Man: the Human Factor" (December 24, 1994, 96–98) examined the rational-actor model and the theoretical modeling of rationality. "Evo-Economics: Biology Meets the Dismal Science" (December 25, 1994, 97–99) discussed game theory and evolutionary theory as they apply to political and economic competition and cooperation. Almost any issue of *International Studies Quarterly* will contain at least one article that applies game theory or rational-choice theory, while a recent special edition entitled "Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences" (40, no. 3, 1996) was devoted to the confluence of game theory and evolutionary theory in IR.

14. For example, the well-known and distinguished political economist Robert Gilpin characterizes himself as a "liberal in a realist world" (Gilpin 1986, 304), a description that also aptly fits *The Economist*.

15. Published in *The Economist*'s in-house "World Profile" (see note 2). The survey consisted of a mailed eight-page questionnaire, sent to a sample of 10,811 subscribers, with a response rate of 64 percent. It was conducted by Research Services, Ltd., and Erdos and Morgan, Inc. (USA).

16. The following is a selection of the international academic IR and related jobs advertised in 1995: professor of European politics, European University Institute, Florence (January 7, 86); senior lecturer in politics (international relations), University of Hong Kong (January 7, 90); lecturer in development studies, LSE (January 7, 85); executive director of the Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (January 21, 12); assistant director, International Institute of Strategic Studies (February 4, 9); head of European Programme, the Royal Institute for International Affairs (February 4, 115); and editor of *The World Today* (April 22, 134); director of the Foreign Service Programme (February 18, 122) and director of the Refugee Studies Programme (March 18, 135), both at Oxford University; ethnic conflict analyst (March 4, 132) and lecturer in international relations and European studies, Central European University (March 25, 156); professor of South East Asian Studies, John Hopkins University (March 25, 159); lecturers in European integration (April 1, 125) and contemporary European studies (September 30, 156), Queen's University, Belfast; professorships in European politics and IPE at Warwick University (April 22, 135); chair and lectureships in international relations and politics, University of Sussex (May 6, 138); research project managers in IPE at the Catholic Institute for International Relations (June 10, 121); director, the Mershon Center for National and International Security, Ohio State University (July

1, 12); professor of the history of international relations, at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva (July 8, 118); professor of politics and international relations, University of Reading (July 15, 104); lecturer in Iberian politics, Loughborough University (July 15, 105); chair in development studies at the University of Wales, Swansea (July 29, 84); six posts in European integration and North-South relations, University of Bonn (August 26, 92); academic officers, development and peace and security studies, United Nations University, Tokyo (October 14, 168); lectureship in European studies, University of Bradford (October 21, 159); research associates for *Adelphi Papers*—international security issues (December 9); chair of politics, reader in comparative European politics and lecturer in international relations, University of Nottingham (November 4, 170); and associate professors of international political economy of Latin America and the Pacific Basin, Boston University (November 25, 155).

17. Selected academic courses and research fellowships in the field of IR advertised in 1995 include midcareer fellowships in international affairs/development, Princeton University (January 7, 92); senior research fellow on the Middle East, Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies (January 7, 85); various studentships in regional security, King's College, London (February 18, 123); postdoctoral fellowships in the political economy of European integration, Bremen University (March 11, 146); M.A., international studies and diplomacy, University of London (April 1, 130); courses on international peacekeeping and mediation, Lester B. Pearson Training Centre, Canada (April 8, 125 and July 8, 113); M.Sc in international policy, University of Bristol (May 6, 133); international summer school, London School of Economics (May 13, 141); fellowship in gender and development, Institute of Development Studies (June 10, 119); fellowship in international relations of Northeast/Southeast Asia, Australian National University (August 5, 100); senior fellowships in international peace and conflict resolution, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington (August 12, 93); M.A. in international relations, International University of Japan (August 19, 86); Ph.D. internships in peace, multilateralism, and governance, United Nations University, Tokyo (September 2, 126 and December 2, 137); short courses in EU development, Oxford European Centre for Public Affairs (September 30, 154).

18. UN agencies advertising for staff in *The Economist* in 1995 include the ILO—the International Labour Office (e.g., February 18, 11); UNESCO—the Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (e.g., April 22, 12); UNDP—the Development Programme (e.g., April 22, 13); UNEP—the Environment Programme (e.g., May 13, 11); UNPF—the Population Fund (e.g., May 13, 10); UNOPS—the Office for Project Services (e.g., May 20, 130); UNFAO—the Food and Agriculture Organisation (e.g., June 17, 9); UNICEF—the Children's Fund (e.g., August 5, 13); UNHCR—the High Commission for Refugees (e.g., August 26, 9); ESCAP—the Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (e.g., October 14, 12); IFAD—the International Fund for Agricultural Development (e.g., October 21, 12); WIPO—the World Intellectual Property Or-

ganisation (e.g., November 11, 158); IAEA—the International Atomic Energy Agency (e.g., November 18, 14).

19. Including, in 1995, USAID—the U.S. Agency for International Development (March 18, 134); the Commonwealth Secretariat (e.g., April 22, 13); the Inter-American Development Bank (May 6, 10); the European Commission (e.g., May 27, 11); European Monetary Institute (e.g., June 17, 7); OECD—the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (e.g., June 17, 10); the World Bank (e.g., August 12, 9); British ODA—the Overseas Development Administration (e.g., August 26, 94); the CIA—the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (September 9, 9); OSCE—the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (e.g., November 4, 172); WTO—the World Trade Organisation (e.g., November 18, 164); and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (December 9, 129).

20. For example in 1995, Amnesty International (January 7, 10–11); Human Rights Watch Africa (March 4, 134); East-West Consulting (April 15, 129); International Council of Voluntary Agencies—a forum for NGOs (May 6, 11); the Great Britain–China Centre (June 17, 10); Transtec (July 1, 109); the European Movement (September 16, 161); and Parliamentarians for Global Action (November 18, 164).

21. See Fiske (1982) for a concise summary of the methods of analysis used in cultural and communications studies and a fuller explanation of the terms used here. Hartley (1982) also covers similar ground, but with particular reference to news reporting.

22. For a discussion of the general application of textual and intertextual approaches to IR itself, see Shapiro (1989a).

23. Black British viewers with Caribbean roots may have a very different relationship to such an image: they may instead conjure up nostalgic feelings for "home," or they may associate the image with employment such as subsistence fishing or plantation labor, or perhaps even slavery itself.

24. Cultural theorists have made use of Louis Althusser's (1971) concept of "interpellation," a form of hailing or invitation through which ideology constructs or recruits individuals as subjects. Texts, it is argued, "interpellate" the reader, inviting them to take up particular ideologically inflected subject positions in relation to the material being presented via a number of rhetorical and/or visual strategies. See discussion in Fiske (1987, 53–58). In the case of the clichéd palm tree/tropical beach advertising image example above, the viewer is assumed to be white, British, and dissatisfied with the drudgery of daily life. Viewers are invited by the images to positively identify with a bourgeois subject position of a more leisured class, enjoying luxury in paradise.

25. Women are used to having to adopt a masculine reading or viewing position in relation to media output.

26. Although *The Economist* has an international readership, it carries (some) different advertising material in different parts of the world, and also has in recent years

produced minor editorial variations (such as a smaller section on U.K. politics and current affairs in the U.S. edition). The edition I examine in this study is in all cases the one read in the United Kingdom.

27. For example, in the palm tree/tropical beach example discussed above, a "wild reading" would be one that associated the image with subsistence fishing.

28. This is similar to the phenomenon where the appropriation of Western status symbols, such as the business suit, by non-Western peoples, can, when translated into local cultural contexts, result in incongruous juxtapositions that appear absurd or ridiculous by Western standards, and merely confirm the wearer's subordinate status in Western eyes.

29. This is not to say that some mischievous readers may not deliberately make wild readings in order to gain pleasure in subverting what they regard as the intended effects of the authors. In the palm tree/tropical beach example discussed above, a subversive reading would be one that deliberately refused the expected subject position and connotations and instead perhaps associated the image with neocolonialism or environmental degradation. How subversive alternative readings might prove, whether intentional or unintentional, is a question that has exercized contributors to cultural studies in recent years (see for example Fiske 1987, 18–20 and 62–83; and Bordo 1993, 260–63 for a critique of Fiske).

30. The bias toward men of course realistically reflects the fact that most of the international business and professional elites *are* men, but also has the effect of reinforcing and helping to (re)produce the associations between such elites and masculinity.

31. Of course, it may well be that subscribers falsely inflated their status in replies to the survey, or that lower-status subscribers were heavily represented in the 36 percent of subscribers who failed to respond to the questionnaire.

32. Women's handbags have never, to my knowledge, been advertised in *The Economist*, and perfume advertisements are extremely rare (although Ralph Lauren have advertised a men's fragrance—November 19, 1994, 4). The figures for purchases of perfume and women's handbags may have been included to promote the paper to would-be advertisers of such products (perfume advertisements, at least, appear regularly in such men's magazines as *GQ—Gentleman's Quarterly*, and *Arena*). On the other hand, they may have been included to guarantee an image of heterosexual success, stated in terms of buying presents for women (this interpretation is reinforced by the accompanying pictures, discussed below). It may be important to include such signals in this overwhelmingly masculine world, which could otherwise carry homoerotic overtones, rather as Hugh Heffner put centerfolds in *Playboy* magazine (Ehrenreich 1983). (An altogether more mischievous reading would be to interpret such figures as evidence of a high level of cross-dressing among the masculine elite, who in Britain at least have long had a reputation for minor deviations from the sexual "norm.")

33. *Active* may be a code word to signal health and virility, as *affluent* alone might indicate old duffers in their dotage.

34. Nelson Mandela appearing here probably signified a liberal interest in current

affairs—although another reading might suggest that the reader could be an elite black, perhaps with an upper-class education.

35. As with the figures for purchase of perfume and women"s handbags, these items are most likely to have been included as guarantors of heterosexuality and heterosexual "success." However, jewelry has occasionally been advertised in the paper, as in the series of Garrard advertisements appearing in late 1996 (e.g., December 7, 1996, 36), trading on its royal connections as "the Crown jewellers." *The Economist* does deliver a readership that would be able to make frequent duty-free purchases in international airports, so perhaps there was also a commercial logic at work here.

36. The annual Richard Casement internship offers a young, would-be science correspondent three months internship at *The Economist* (see, for example, January 28, 1995, 95). Special science and technology survey topics included science (February 16, 1991), artificial intelligence (March 14, 1992), telecommunications (October 23, 1993), medicine (March 19, 1994), earthquake engineering (April 22, 1995), and biotechnology (February 25, 1995).

37. Until late 1995, the paper reported the arts in a section entitled "Arts, Books, and Sport." The section reviewed books, mostly with a scientific or political content, although some novels were included, and carried short pieces aquainting the reader with recent developments in the arts, such as opera, music, and theater, together with pieces on architecture, sport, and other cultural topics. See, for example, "Art, Books, and Sport," May 14, 1994 (131–36), which had reviews of books on diplomacy, Latin American affairs, and industrial decline, as well as a "novel of the month" and articles on American composers, films made in India, Chinese culture, and cricket. Throughout most of the period under review, science and technology was given a higher profile than the arts. However, on November 11, 1995, the "Arts, Books, and Sport" section was replaced by a shorter weekly section entitled "Moreover" and a monthly pull-out supplement, "Monthly Review of Books and Multimedia," thus changing and also boosting the relative importance of arts coverage (see chapter 5).

38. This does not seem to deter them, however. See Waltz (1979) for an IR-inflected defence of the scientific method in the social sciences, and Hollis and Smith (1990) for a discussion of the merits of scientific explanation versus (historical) interpretation in IR.

39. Psychometric tests do show a small but consistent male advantage in spatial ability (recall and selection of shapes, mental rotation and identification, geometric skill) *from adolescence* onward. However, contrary to popular belief, such tests show no reliable gender difference in either general mathematical ability or verbal skills (Archer and LLoyd 1985, 30–38). As Connell argues, small overall differences between the sexes should be seen in the context of a huge overlap and a large variation within each sex group, which is far greater than any difference between the sexes (Connell 1987, 170). As to the cause of such differences, as they appear in adolescence, one might speculate that they are related to the deliberate gendered choices that adolescents make regarding subject interests (mentioned above).

40. The average time devoted to reading each issue of *The Economist* in 1990 was one hour and fifty minutes, spread over four occasions, with 88 percent of subscribers reading more than three-quarters of the paper (World-wide Subscriber Survey, Source: *Economist*).

41. Realism as a genre or narrative style is not to be confused with political realism, the IR perspective, or philosophical realism (although clearly there is some affinity between the three).

42. Examples of the literature are Watt 1957, Barthes 1973, Williams 1977b, Belsey 1980, MacCabe 1981.

43. For further discussion of the deployment of masculine and feminine representational codes and conventions, see Fisk 1987 and Betterton 1987.

44. Indeed, Fiske characterizes TV news as essentially "masculine soap opera" (Fiske 1987, 308).

45. This may have been different in the past—apparently Sir Walter Layton, editor in the interwar period, added the words "time alone will tell" to the end of articles to soften the opinions therein (*The Economist* December 22, 1990, 34).

46. This is a general observation. Clearly there are many specific differences between the conventions of these different genres, and between them and the conventions of *The Economist*. Although in the detail such distinct genres may diverge a good deal, nonetheless I think there are enough similarities and echoes to make general intertextual comparisons.

47. Fictional detectives and spies make rather more use of understatement than does *The Economist*, which as I argued above, prefers exaggeration, although irony is used liberally in all three cases (see below).

48. Western heroes are not always required to be superintelligent, and so are perhaps more wholeheartedly in the citizen-warrior mold, although they are often loners, individualists who operate at the margins or "frontiers" of society. See chapter 5 for a discussion of "frontier masculinity" in *The Economist*.

49. Another randomly chosen example: October 12, 1996 (19–22). *The Economist* told the South African government to give Inkatha more power and to be nicer to whites to consolidate post-Mandela democracy; told Britain to keep its options open on the single European currency and to resist French pressures to extend the Eurotunnel concession; told the United States to leave the question of euthanasia to each individual state; and told Cambodia's prime ministers to be tough with their former friends in the Khmer Rouge.

50. The term *phallogocentrism* is derived from the concepts of phallocentrism (privileging the masculine in language) as used by feminist theorists (see chapters 2 and 3 above) and logocentrism (privileging "the Word"), as used by Derrida. See for example Grosz (1989) for a discussion of the relationship between these two terms. Flax (1990) defines phallogocentrism as the fantasy of control and omnipotence associated with "the Word."

51. The "fireside chat" is the strategy of radio journalism, with its combination of intimacy (the domestic setting) and authority, with the spoken word effortlessly and commandingly floating out of nowhere/everywhere. As a written paper, *The Economist* can never fully achieve this quality.

52. See the epithets mentioned above, from *The Economist*'s discussion of its own house style (December 22, 1990, 34). Also discussed is the fact that some readers find the style patronizing. I expect they do not like being lectured at in words of one or two syllables.

53. For example, the cover of the September 7, 1996 issue sported the headline "Saddamned if You Do, Saddamned if You Don't," with a cartoon of Saddam Hussein's head emerging from a jack-in-the-box. Inside, cartoons depicted a diminutive Tony Blair facing up to a huge trades-union horse (19) and a huge fat businessman (20). A photograph of a rugby scrum was captioned "Scrambling for money" (21); a photograph of Bob Dole, the U.S. presidential candidate, pointing upward with his index finger, was captioned "Isn't that a vulture?" (46); and a photograph of two children reading a book accompanying an article on literacy was captioned "The day the TV broke" (47). Such examples were typical and ubiquitous.

54. See discussion of Judith Butler's account of the subversive potential of parody in chapter 1. Kroker and Kroker (1991) also argue that "masculinity" has been taken to such hysterical extremes that it is "imploding," although their thesis seems overoptimistic in the light of previous episodes in history (see Kimmel 1987a, for example).

55. A successful example of this was Douglas Hurd's announcement that the British should "punch above our weight" in foreign affairs, as a way of mobilizing support for military spending and intervention in Bosnia. See Shapiro 1989b on the genealogy of the sport/war intertext and its representational uses in world politics. In the academic world of IR, the metaphorical use of sport and gaming to represent war and politics has developed into a full-blown epistemology in "rational choice" and "game theory" approaches.

56. In subsequent years, however, the use of this type of metaphor has been avoided. This may reflect increasing editorial sensitivity to the possibility of offence.

57. This is by no means the only way in which heterosexual masculinity need be characterized or interpreted. See Cocks (1989) and Segal (1994) for alternative, more women-friendly, constructions of heterosexual masculinity.

58. Banking advertisements may have been especially heavily represented in this issue (October 7, 1995) since it contained a survey of the world economy. They consisted of the following advertisers (in order of appearance): Swiss Life (14); J. P. Morgan (23); Bank of America (86); Deutsche Kommunalbank (survey, 10); Citibank (survey, 13); Jardine Fleming (survey, 17); Banco Bozano Simonsen (survey, 19); Komercni Bank (survey, 20); Polish Development Bank (survey, 25); Gulf International Bank (survey, 35); Sakura Bank, (survey, 36); Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank, (survey, 40); Credit Suisse (survey, 48); Mitsubishi Bank (106); Union Bank of Switzerland (108–9); Flem-

ings Save and Prosper (111); Geneva's Private Bankers (125); New York Stock Exchange (131); ABN-AMRO (136); SBC Warburg (140–41); West LB (184).

59. In order of appearance: Texas Instruments (October 7, 1995, 20); Microsoft (35); Unisys (45 and 47); Canon (60–61); CODA (64); IBM (72–73); J. D. Edwards (80); GE Information (survey, 4); AT&T (survey, 46–47, and 105); Hewlett Packard (117); Odyssey (126); NTT (144–45); Nokia (152); Royal Mail (181).

60. Ads are listed in order of appearance. Airlines: Singapore Airlines (October 7, 1995, 24–25); Meridiana (31); Iberia (39); Air France (52–53); Lufthansa (67 and 69); Cathay Pacific (95); American Airlines (102); and Swissair (149). Hotels: Holiday Inn (51); Hotel Schille (77); Imperial Hotel (111); Okura and Reed Continental, (survey, 30); Palace Hotel (survey, 40). Executive aircraft: Astra Executive Jets (83).

61. Ads are listed in order of appearance. Gents' clothes: Thomas Pink, (October 7, 1995, 4); Giorgio Armani (29); Holland and Holland (48); Hugo Boss (71); Army Field Jackets (161). Watches: Omega (2–3); Audemars Piguet (19); Seiko Kinetic (32); Vacheron Constantin (122).

62. Ads listed in order of appearance. Bayer (October 7, 1995, 26); Hughes Electronics (42); ABB (survey, 2–3); Arab Petroleum Investments Corp. (survey, 14); LG Group (100–101); Alcatel Alsthom (139); Samsung (112–13); Hyundai (182–83).

63. Ads listed in order of appearance. BMW (October 7, 1995, 40–41); Jaguar, (78–79); Honda, (91); Samsung (112–13); Vauxhall (120–21); Toyota (132–33); Saab (150–51).

64. Advertisements for newspapers and journals (October 7, 1995, 54; 85; 99; 118 and 154; and survey, 39, 45); business conferences (74; 84; 88; 89; 134; 143; 146; and survey, 9); British army reserves (36); luggage (57); Eurostar (58) and commercial radio (114). Export zones and government promoters include Pakistan (22 and 26); Taiwan (29); Dubai (96); and Malta (146).

65. Other exclusive watches, mostly Swiss, advertised include Rolex (e.g., May 1, 1993, back cover); Blancpain (e.g., April 29, 1995, 16)); Breitling (e.g., April 29, 1995, 79); Movado (e.g., June 3, 1995, 10); Patek Philippe (e.g., June 3, 1995, 45); Willabee Ward (e.g., May 6, 1995, 129), and International (May 6, 1995, 32–33). Executive jets are also regularly featured, with no fewer than three different brands being advertised in one single edition (September 7, 1996): Learjet 60 (24); Galaxy (35); and Gulfstream (60).

66. See discussion in chapter 2 and also Peterson and Runyan (1993) on the double bind that prominent political women are placed in with regard to gender.

67. This provoked a letter of protest from one (male) reader (March 18, 1995, 8).

68. Such constructions of hegemonic masculinity were not the only ones on offer, and I shall discuss alternative, perhaps even destabilizing images of masculinity in chapter 5, together with a more detailed analysis of the competitive and sometimes contradictory relationships between these various models.

69. Similar experiences may apply to black male readers, whose ability to identify with elite masculinity may also be disrupted.

70. Indeed, women are invited to take up masculine subject positions a great deal of the time by the narrative structures and conventions of films, books, and television programs. The instability of such subject positions may result in unstable, schizophrenic identities (Mulvey 1975). Whether there is room for a specifically "female gaze" is hotly debated (Fiske 1987; Gamman and Marshment 1988).

5. *The Economist*, Globalization, and Masculinities

1. As this is intended as a primarily textual analysis, I have not explored such intertextualities with short-term changes and events in the outside world.

2. Although military metaphors were routine in the period studied (as in all news and current affairs reporting—see above), warriors themselves were rarely explicitly invoked, and when they were, they were distinctly sanitized. For example, an ad recruiting British army reserves talked in terms of how military service could improve one's management techniques—"as recommended by leading management consultants" (October 7, 1995, 36). Military-style clothing was on offer in the same edition, with the "genuine leather U.S army field jacket" that, the ad stated, "millions of fighting men swear by" (October 7, 1995, 161).

3. The market is also deemed to ensure the delivery of consumer satisfaction and widespread economic progress in a largely benign process.

4. A similar discursive approach to globalization is adopted by Kofman and Youngs (1996).

5. While I concentrate on economic changes here, I do not mean to endorse the view that globalization can be reduced to, or is wholly driven by, political economy. See my concluding chapter.

6. This is not necessarily the same as a decrease in militarism itself. Women as soldiers may be relegitimizing the military. See Enloe (1993, 60).

7. Although men may have made purchases in the past, their identities were more bound up with production than consumption. Through the 1950s and 1960s, consumers were equated with housewives. Now "lifestyle" purchases that help to define one's identity and personal products are aimed equally at men and women. David Evans takes the view that the enormous amount of energy focused on sexuality and the proliferation of sexual identities in the West over the last few decades needs to be understood in relation to the material interests of the market and state. Evans views them largely as the product of a shift of emphasis away from relations of production to the promotion of new forms of commodification through a differentiated marketplace (1993).

8. The mythopoetic men's movement popularized by Robert Bly (1991; 1992) among others has been heavily criticized in the men's-studies literature as an antifeminist, backlash phenomenon with rituals strikingly parallel to nineteenth-century masonry. It allows privileged white men to see themselves as gender "victims." See, for example, Kimmel and Kaufman (1994); Connell (1995); Yudice (1995); and Pfeil (1995).

9. See "Japan: The New Nationalists," (*The Economist* January 14, 1995, 19) and further discussion below.

10. See "Survey of Financial Centres: Can the Centre Hold?" (June 27, 1992); "Survey of the World Economy: Fear of Finance" (September 19, 1992); "Survey of Multinationals: Everybody's Favourite Monsters" (March 27, 1993); "Survey of Wall Street: Other People's Money" (April 15, 1995); "Survey of the World Economy: Who's in the Driving Seat?" (October 7, 1995).

11. Between 1986 and 1989, currency trading doubled, and then increased one-third again by 1992, to $900 billion a day (September 19, 1992, survey, 9). By 1995 it approximated $1.3 trillion. The stock of international bank lending rose from $265 billion in 1975 to $4.2 trillion in 1994, while in 1992 total cross-border ownership of tradable securities stood at $2.5 trillion. McKinsey estimated that the total stock of financial assets traded in the global capital market increased from $5 trillion in 1980 to $35 trillion in 1992, twice the GDP of OECD countries, and forecast a total of $83 trillion for the year 2000 (October 7, 1995, survey, 12).

12. "The share of low skilled labour has fallen to only 5–10% of total production costs in developed economies, from 25% in the 1970s" (October 1, 1994, survey, 29), while data processing, accounting, computer programming, and the like was also being increasingly farmed out to workers in developing countries (30).

13. See also the special leader "Technology, the Future of Your Job and Other Misplaced Panics" and the special "Technology and Unemployment" on February 2, 1995 (front cover and 23–26).

14. Garb (1990) explores the widespread use of "whole Earth" imagery. He argues that such images privilege a single external viewpoint and thus provide a "univocal model" (269) of the world that appears singular and whole (in contrast to the multiple, multisensory world of experience and premodern narrative). It also carries connotations of a historic transcendental quest associated with the masculine ego and a patriarchal God. In the light of Garb's analysis, it is quite easy to see why the one Earth image has been used to promote globalized business.

15. As Doreen Massey argues, *global* is already coded as masculine through its other meaning, as in global/universal, rather than local/particular (Massey 1994).

16. One of the largest exporters of female domestics is the Philippines. Filipinas with good education and qualifications still often end up as migrant domestics. They remit income home, thus keeping their families fed, and collectively play a crucial role in their country's economy and balance of payments. This is the less glamorous underside of globalization (Ling and Chang 2000).

17. This contrasts with feminist discussions of the globalization of production that concentrate on the implications for the everyday lives of ordinary people (McDowell 1991; Runyan 1996).

18. This discourse was by no means confined to or even initiated by *The Economist*. Economic rivalry between the United States and Japan was generally topical from the late 1980s, when the two economies became intertwined through the U.S. budget

deficit. It has also permeated academic IPE discussions of globalization. See below for discussion.

19. Rivalry between management styles had also been reported in Europe, where the need to cooperate in the single market in order to compete globally has been hampered by a clash of managerial styles, with patriarchal "Napoleonic" bosses in France pitted against flexible but secretive Italians, ageing technocratic experts in Germany, and rapidly rising youngsters with a broad if sketchy overview in Britain (*The Economist* December 7, 1991, 70).

20. In the Middle Ages, moneylending (usury) was condemned as the devil's work and largely relegated to Jews, who were excluded from most other professions. The emergence of (Christian) merchant bankers who issued bills of exchange at a discount, rather than charging interest directly, heralded the start of modern banking in the fourteenth century.

21. This was aptly demonstrated by the role of Arthur Lowe in the British television comedy *Dad's Army*. Set in World War II, when military masculinity would have been in the ascendant, he played a bank manager whose position in the Home Guard depended on his high status in the community, but who made an incompetent soldier in practice. His pomposity and incompetence were both subject to ridicule.

22. For example, banking and financial advertisements featuring pictures of chairmen included J. P. Morgan (November 3, 1990, 2–3) (see fig. 5.5) and First Chicago (November 17, 1990, 114). The conglomerate ABB capitalized on this trend with a picture of its chairman, "Bill Coleman [the] banker" (April 28, 1990, 60–61). Meanwhile, extracts from chairmen's statements also proved popular. They appeared, for example, for General Accident (April 28, 1990, 91); Sun Alliance (April 28, 1990, 114–15); and J. F. Fledgling (July 14, 1990, 24; December 15, 1990, 26).

23. Exceptions include Goldman Sachs, with a picture of its founder (September 24, 1994, 24) and Geneva's Private Bankers, with a formal brass and woodwind quintet in venerable surroundings (October 7, 1995, 125).

24. Examples include Kleinwort Benson (January 28, 1995, 89; February 11, 1995, 87 and 89); Price Waterhouse (February 11, 1995, 80; March 18, 1995, 96); Standard London (Asia), Ltd. (September 7, 1996, 59); and Zurich Insurance Group (April 6, 1996, 46–47). Also (although it is not a bank) similar puzzle imagery was used to represent the international arena by Wartsila Diesel Group (February 25, 1995, 124).

25. For example, Merrill Lynch (April 22, 1995, 89) and the ABSA bank (September 7, 1996, survey, 2) offered insight, while Sedgwick compared itself to Leonardo da Vinci (September 21, 1996, 113).

26. Other examples include Sanwa Bank "building a vast network of personal contacts" (March 18, 1995, *survey*, 74); Swiss Bank Corp., with "the key to relationship[s]" (April 22, 1995, 84–85); and ABN-AMRO, "the network bank" (October 5, 1996, 52–53).

27. Compare with the earlier, patriarchal J. P. Morgan advertisement discussed above (fig. 5.5).

28. These advertisements have featured regularly in *The Economist* since 1994. In

1996 they included the following permutations (not an exhaustive list): a white male banker with two white clients, one male and one female (February 17, 1996, back cover); an Asian male (probably the banker) and an Asian female (March 9, 1996, back cover); a black male banker and a white female client (April 13, 1996, back cover) a white female banker and a white male client (May 18, 1996, back cover; June 8, 1996, 149); a Latin male banker with white male and female clients (May 4, 1996, inside back cover); and a white male banker and an Asian female client (October 5, 1996, back cover).

29. On hackneyed images, for example, Swiss Life (May 13, 1995, 28) and Perpetual (May 27, 1995, 67) favored mountain peaks and skyscrapers; Morgan Stanley used a tiger (June 3, 1995, 82–83), and AIG insurance used a gold miner with huge upward-pointing drill (November 12, 1994, back cover).

30. For discussion, see Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991).

31. This rash of risk anxiety was probably related to the general economic downturn at that time.

32. Over the same period, Credit Suisse also ran advertisements with more hackneyed images of masculine virility, such as mountain peaks and skyscrapers (e.g., November 12, 1994, 21).

33. Barthel (1992) argues that commodity fetishism in male business clothing in the 1980s also served this purpose.

34. The contrast with the patriarchal imagery of financial services a few years earlier is striking. Compare the company president in the Chubb insurance advertisement discussed here with the formal patriarchs discussed above.

35. In ads for men's clothes, the poses of the male models also became increasingly coy and homoerotic; Hugo Boss, for example, showed a young man coyly looking up from under his eyelashes/brows (May 6, 1995, 55; March 23, 1996, 51).

36. Although some still persisted. Singapore Airlines was a long-running exception to this rule. It still tended to feature stereotypical "exotic" Asian stewardesses (e.g., March 23, 1996, 2–3). American Airlines also featured a male business passenger and hostess in 1994 (October 22, 1994, 64).

37. The image of the disembodied male "hand of power" has been very common in *The Economist*, advertising everything from wristwatches (e.g., Corum, March 30, 1996, 45) to international telecommunications (Deutsche Telecom, March 30, 1996, 32–33).

38. This New Man father-image contrasts with an earlier Lufthansa advertisement that also featured a businessman-father and little girl image, but in this one the daughter had a "good feeling . . . knowing that someone close to you is in the best hands" (November 3, 1990, 63), emphasizing expertise and safety for daddy, whose place is in the big wide world, rather than him actually wanting to spend time in the domestic realm.

39. As Jackson argues, male bonding as an institution has long been used to regu-

late women and powerless masculinities (Jackson 1990, 170), although the computer "lads" culture seems to be less based on physical bravado than the historical examples he gives. Women are excluded by the content of male bonding banter as much as by time-and-place constraints caused by domestic commitments. As Cockburn argues, "Men bond with each other by using women as symbolic, humour-laden material in their masculine discourse" (Cockburn 1990, 83), with the heavy, heterosexist content preventing misconstruction.

40. Of course, much of this biologism resonates with the arguments of some radical feminists, as does the prospect of a future of artificial reproduction without men (see chapter 2).

41. Japanese business practices, for all their "softness," are not noted for their sympathetic treatment of women's employment aspirations.

42. The economic crisis in East Asian economies since 1998 makes this outcome even less likely.

43. Whether this undermines patriarchy itself, or merely existing patriarchs, is a moot point.

6. The *Economist*/IR Intertext

1. This economy is masculine when contrasted with the feminine confusion of "so-called variables [that] proliferate wildly" (Waltz 1986, 52) in the case of Waltz's pluralist rivals.

2. *The Economist Style Guide*—which gives detailed explanation of how to write in Economese—is an in-house booklet that was published by *The Economist* in February 1994.

3. Both *The Economist*'s house style and Waltz's prose strike me as so extreme as to be constantly verging on parody, although I doubt that, in Waltz's case at least, the intention was humorous. This perhaps illustrates the difficulty I have as a female reader in taking any of this hypermasculinity seriously. There is also the question of whether parody—whether intentional or not—can itself undermine hegemony (see Butler 1990a).

4. The patriarchal model of masculinity is fairly muted, both in political realism, where it derives largely from Hobbes's input, and in *The Economist*, where it appears mostly in status-oriented business advertisements. See discussion above. Honor codes of masculinity also make a minor appearance in *The Economist*. See above.

5. Usually featuring successful male sports personalities, although occasionally there is a female star. Examples include Rod Davis, sailor (April 22, 1995, 2–3; June 3, 1995, back cover); Cindy Crawford, model (December 2, 1995, 2–3; December 16, 1995, 2–3); Bryn Terfel, singer (December 9, 1995, back page); and Ernie Els, golfer (May 4, 1996, 2; May 18, 1996, 4; June 1, 1996, 2).

6. That it openly recruits at all is astonishing to a U.K. readership used to extreme government secrecy.

7. For Kissinger's own account of his role in the cold war and detente, see *The White House Years* (Kissinger 1979).

8. *The Economist* acknowledges the influence of environment on the expression of genes—indeed, Matt Ridley, cited above with reference to this point, is himself a former science editor of *The Economist*.

9. A rather more critical analysis is provided by Strange (1990), who also saw globalization as a product of U.S. power, but in a less benign light.

10. As always, there are some exceptions to the general criticism here. For example, in Waever et al (1993), Waever examines the conflicting but twin processes of fragmentation and integration in his discussion of societal security for Europe in the 1990s. This combination of political and cultural fragmentation and integration is widely theorized as connected to globalization (see, for example, Harvey 1989) although the word *globalization* is not specifically referred to by Waever. In his chapter, Buzan (1993b) argues that the current spate of "internationalization" may lead to identity problems. Waever and Kelstrup (1993) also make mention of postsovereignty and postmodernity in their discussion of European identities. This is one fairly mainstream volume (or at least not postpositivist) that does pay attention to subjective questions connected to globalization, however obliquely.

11. Those male postpositivists—such as Jim George, Rob Walker, and Steve Smith—who explicitly acknowledge gender issues have a much better claim to be "speaking from the margins."

12. As mentioned in the introduction, my own writing style is also complicit in that it reproduces many of the codes of hegemonic masculinity.

13. This solution was earlier advocated by liberal feminists such as Betty Friedan (1983) and is in keeping with *The Economist's* editorial commitment to liberal feminism.

Conclusion

1. This problem parallels my own lapses into Economese, which is also fun to do, and, as mentioned in the introduction, may prove less subversive than intended.

2. For further discussion of this point, see Hooper 1999a.

3. It would no doubt also interfere with their own personal gender identifications and pleasures.

4. For example, continuing the globalization theme, one interesting line of enquiry might be how gender relations and masculinities are responding in developing countries such as China, where, in many cases, traditionally patriarchal rural families are now finding that, through the setting up of manufacturing plants that recruit only young women, teenage daughters are becoming the main or only breadwinners.