CHAPTER SIX

The *Economist* / IR Intertext

The relationship between *The Economist* and IR can be examined through a number of intertextualities that are shared between the paper and the academic discipline. My intention in this chapter, in exploring this relationship, is to highlight some aspects of the gender politics of contemporary IR and the culture in which it is embedded. As established in chapter 4, *The Economist* is an important image maker and circulator of ideas between practitioners in international relations, academics in IR, and the wider cultural context of IR. The arguments put forward in chapter 3 about the competing models of masculinity that animate IR theory are therefore brought together with my analysis of masculinities in *The Economist* from chapters 4 and 5.

First, intertextualities between *The Economist* and mainstream approaches to IR are explored with a view to highlighting the way in which both glamorize and legitimate both the "international" and particular models of hegemonic masculinity in the same mutually reinforcing and mutually legitimating way. I then discuss intertextualities in terms of the characterization of globalization and the newer types of masculinity associated with globalization rhetoric. In particular, I make two points with respect to these

developments: (1) that the co-opting of realist imagery for business ends and for the promotion of a masculinist version of globalization goes hand-in-hand with a neorealist interest in IPE as opposed to security matters; (2) by considering the intersections between some postmodern interventions in IR theory and newer constructions of masculinity that appear in the paper, further light is thrown on the assertion (made in chapter 3) that such approaches may be implicated in the construction of an emerging, more-technocratic form of hegemonic masculinity.

To keep the argument in focus, I deliberately limit this discussion of intertextualities to those between *The Economist* and academic IR. In many ways, the analysis so far already depends on shared meanings of masculinity and femininity that are themselves generated intertextually, even though their antecedents are not always explicitly referred to. Many other interesting intertextualities could of course be explored to illuminate the changing cultural, political, and economic context in which both *The Economist* and IR flourish. An examination of such intertextualities would undoubtedly shed further light on developments in the changing construction of hegemonic masculinities; so would an exploration of the impact of external influences such as economic downturns and political events. The discussions below should therefore not be read as a comprehensive analysis, or even as a single coherent strand in a larger narrative process; rather, they are to be read as a partial exposition of the relationship between two sites (the paper and the discipline of IR), where hegemonic masculinities are continually being produced and contested in numerous, varied, and often contradictory ways.

Intertextualities: The Economist *and Mainstream IR*

The editorial line of *The Economist*, together with its rationalist approach to science and economics, fits comfortably with the positivist, game-theoretic world perspectives of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in IR (see chapter 4). There is also, perhaps less obviously, a close match between the signifiers of hegemonic masculinity that have saturated the paper and those deployed in mainstream IR. This intertextuality clearly illustrates the cultural connections between hegemonic masculinities and the conceptual space of "the international" within which IR operates.

The code of bourgeois-rational masculinity, itself implicated heavily in

the methodology of the positivist approach, is replicated and reinforced by the representational realism of the paper. Like the rational actors of mainstream IR, the exnominated voice of *The Economist* appears physically disembodied and socially disembedded, and the prose shares IR's propensity to elevate calculative rationality above emotion, to be instrumentalist, and to be goal-oriented. Because the prose style forms the framework through which international affairs are apprehended in the paper (just as the positivist methodology forms the framework through which mainstream approaches to IR apprehend "reality"), its importance in promoting the worldview of bourgeois-rational masculinity can hardly be overstated. The worldviews of *The Economist* and of mainstream perspectives in IR are thus complementary and mutually reinforcing.

While in this intertextuality between *The Economist* and all mainstream perspectives in IR the same or similar signifiers of bourgeois masculinity circulate in a general discourse of masculinism, there are more specific affinities between the variety of elitist versions of masculinity signified in *The Economist* and the models of masculinity that frame (political) realism and neorealism. Firstly, the house style's code of masculine coherence that is forever threatened by the feminine Other of formlessness is closely related to the "heroic" code of coherence that Richard Ashley identifies at the heart of IR neorealism (Ashley 1986; 1988; 1989). Like the narrative realism of *The Economist*, (political) neorealism makes use of a modernist narrative structure identified as a logocentric monologue, whose sovereign voice imposes a coherent and singular meaning on history (Ashley 1989, 263). This sovereign voice is structured by the interchangeable masculinist binary dualisms of order/chaos and sovereignty/anarchy. In neorealism, the "sovereignty" of the positivist method (itself analyzed by Ashley as a series of textual strategies to impose order, coherence, and narrative closure) is matched by the "sovereignty" of the state. Both are forever defined against, and threatened by, feminine anarchy and chaos—either the anarchy of multiple interpretation or the anarchy of the international system. Thus "sovereignty" is doubly signed in neorealism, both through its method (shared by neoliberal institutionalists) and through its content, which places the sovereignty/anarchy binarism at its center, thus obscuring the "radical undecidability of history" (Ashley 1989, 272). This double signaling of sovereignty in the sparsely detailed and silently affirmed "paradigm of sovereign Man" (Ashley 1989, 300) represents a deeper, even more rigorous application of the code of unilinear

coherence than other modern approaches to IR can muster. (Such approaches tend to have more complicated content, as discussed in chapter 3). Similarly, the code of coherence in *The Economist*'s house style, with its imperative to condense, simplify, and exaggerate, appears more extreme and exaggerated than in other branches of the quality press.

The Economist's house style replicates the neorealist predilection for parsimony and abhorrence of theoretical complication. In his elaboration of the goals of neorealist theory, Waltz argues that to attain the status of "elegance," theories must "be constructed through simplifying. . . . Simplifications lay bare the essential elements in play. . . . The aim is to try to find the central tendency among a confusion of tendencies, to single out the propelling principle even though other principles operate, to seek the essential factors where innumerable factors are present" (Waltz 1986, 37–38). These are sentiments that any editor of *The Economist* could only endorse. Waltz's prose style also echoes (and bolsters) his theoretical preference for simplification and masculine economy (see chapter 3).[1] Indeed, Waltz could be following *The Economist Style Guide* himself, so fond is he of short sentences and clipped statements such as "Laws remain, theories come and go."[2] Like *The Economist*, Waltz's prose style combines the bourgeois-rationalism of coherence in representational realism with a punchy, perhaps even aggressive tone, more reminiscent of citizen-warriors. For example, when discussing the role of theory in social science, his arguments are presented as crisp, logically progressing statements of fact: "Theories are qualitatively different from laws. Laws identify invariant or probable associations. Theories show why those associations obtain" (Waltz 1986, 32). His conclusion that "Theories explain laws" (33) is a highly contestable one (Cox 1986), although it is presented as a short statement of fact, reminiscent of *The Economist*'s exaggerated code of coherence in which feminine equivocation is banished. In Waltz's case, at least, the paradigm of masculine sovereignty is thus signified in three ways: through his positivist method and privileging of parsimony (bourgeois rationalism); through the sovereignty/anarchy binarism that structures the content of his theory (bourgeois rationalism); and through his clipped and brusque masculine prose style (citizen-warrior).[3]

Just as bourgeois rationalism forms only one strand of hegemonic masculinity appearing in realism and neorealism, so it forms only one strand of hegemonic masculinity appearing in *The Economist*. A judicious mix of bourgeois rationalism, citizen-warrior, and patriarchal masculinities applies

in both cases.[4] If *The Economist* house style embodies a masculinity that is bold, brash, and aggressive (citizen-warrior), yet measured, rational, and logical (bourgeois-rational) as well as effortlessly superior (patriarchal/elitist), as was argued above, then surely this is exactly the kind of masculinity best embodied by princes and statesmen, according to realist doctrine. The heroic tone and the "tough decisions" on what to highlight and what to ignore in a struggle effectively to "grasp" the essence of complicated issues in the text, mirror the "hard choices" required by statesmen and diplomats, who negotiate complicated and treacherous international affairs on behalf of the state (Rothstein 1991, 409).

In another parallel, the occasional lapse into the misogynistic metaphorical language of sexual conquest directly mirrors the kind of language Machiavelli used to resurrect the citizen-warrior model of masculinity from ancient Greece and Rome. Meanwhile, the Machiavellian, antidemocratic requirement of secrecy in the realist conception of diplomacy—in which success depends on only a select elite having privileged access to sensitive information, so that "the enemy" may not anticipate one's moves (Rothstein 1991)—resonates with the way in which *The Economist* interpellates it readers as privileged insiders. "Insider knowledge" is not only implied by the intimate tone of the "fireside chat" and the appreciation of the paper's irony, but has also been deliberately invoked in the promotional literature of the Economist Intelligence Unit, whose publications are produced by the Economist Group of publications and are heavily advertised in the weekly paper. The name of the unit itself suggests that insider knowledge is what it purveys. In a booklet advertising its *Foreign Report* (accompanying the April 29, 1995 issue), the reader was told that "[s]ince it first appeared 48 years ago, Foreign Report has gained an enviable reputation among decision makers and leaders. Now it's your chance to share their inside information" (leaflet April 29, 1995, inside front cover).

Subheadings described *Foreign Report* as "Your private intelligence service" and exhorted the reader to "Join the insiders." The "exclusive information and forecasts" it contained were guaranteed as "intelligence uncensored" (ibid.). The concept of "insider knowledge" clearly carries connotations of elitism and power confined to a few important men at the top, while the masses remain on the "outside." The notion of an "intelligence service" completed the picture—metaphorically presenting a world of diplomacy and spying, which resonates with both the real and fictional

spies of the cold war. James Der Derian has identified an intertextual blurring of boundaries between fact and fiction in cold war spy culture, which he argues

> represents a field of ideological contestation where national security strategies, with their endgames of impossibly real wars of mass annihilation, can be played and re-played for mass consumption as a simulation of war in which states compete, interests clash, and spy counters spy, all in significant fun. . . . In the confusion and complexity of international relations, the realm of the spy becomes a discursive space where realism and fantasy interact, and seemingly intractable problems are imaginatively and playfully resolved. (Der Derian 1989, 163–64)

Popular fictional accounts of espionage have borrowed heavily from real life, while real spies have not only consumed vast amounts of spy fiction, but are known to have also modeled themselves on fictional characters. Spy culture glamorizes the alienated world of realpolitik, and its popularity crossed all classes in the cold war period: even U.S. presidents helped to allay their fears of nuclear annihilation and national insecurity by reading spy fiction: John Kennedy reportedly was a fan of Ian Fleming's James Bond and Ronald Reagan enjoyed Tom Clancy novels (Der Derian 1989, 172).

This intertextuality between fact and fiction in spy culture has been replayed in the pages of *The Economist*. On the fiction side, James Bond made an appearance in April 1996, in an advertisement for Omega watches (April 6, 1996, 4; April 20, 1996, 2). The advertisement showed a still photograph of the actor Pierce Brosnan from the film *GoldenEye*, wearing an Omega watch, with the caption "James Bond in GoldenEye." Bond, although fictional, was insinuated in with all the other "personalities" in this series of Omega advertisements.[5] The copy read: "The legendary secret agent James Bond is back, in a high drama, high-living and high-style adventure." James Bond, suave, sophisticated, and never too busy to frequent casinos or date women as well as outwit the thinly veiled cold war enemy, epitomized the *Playboy* lifestyle identified by Ehrenreich: one of conspicuous consumption and heterosexual flight from domesticity (Ehrenreich 1983)—but with the added bonus of an aristocratic English twist. With his aristocratic background, his unflappable cool, ruthlessness, and superior brain, Bond embodied all the virtues of an Anglicized version of a Machi-

avellian prince, his intrigues updated for a technocratic twentieth century with electronic wizardry and consumerism thrown in. As an icon, James Bond resonates particularly well with the images of elite masculinity appearing in *The Economist*'s " World Profile" (see chapter 4), which featured a glamorous world of conspicuous consumption, technological gadgetry, foreign travel, and success with women, with gentlemanly overtones. Bond's later, post-1970s appearances may have become more parodic (Ehrenreich 1983, 104), and the Omega advertisement clearly deployed his image playfully, but in the mid 1990s the Bond image was still a potent signifier of masculine power and a glamorous international elitism. Other slightly tongue-in-cheek references to James Bond have included a feature article on a James Bond convention in Jamaica, the former home of Ian Fleming (*The Economist* November 9, 1996, 149). The article concluded: "Bond taught fans less how to kill (himself or others) than how to shop, for Cartiers, Aston Martins and designer clothes." Appropriately positioned on a nearby spread (147) was a Cartier advertisement. The parodic element inevitably attached to Bond's representation in the 1990s fits well with the general irony of *The Economist*, in a kind of replay of cold war hegemonic masculinity for nostalgic half-believers, at a time of great change and uncertainty. The cold war was over, but the emerging new regime of "globalization" was not yet settled.

Turning to fact, the CIA, the U.S. intelligence agency, calling itself "the clandestine service," chose to advertise for new recruits through the pages of *The Economist* in September 1995 and again in an identically worded advertisement in December 1996.[6] On offer was "the ultimate overseas career" demanding "an adventurous spirit . . . a forceful personality . . . superior intellectual ability . . . toughness of mind . . . and a high degree of integrity" (September 9, 1995, 9; December 21, 1996, 157). The advertisement claimed that "these people are the cutting edge of American intelligence, an elite corps gathering the vital information needed by our policy makers to make critical foreign policy decisions." In a further reinforcement of the fact/fiction spies-and-diplomacy intertext permeating *The Economist*, a film/television advertisement for the paper launched in September 1996 featured the former diplomat Henry Kissinger, sitting next to an *Economist* reader on a plane journey. Kissinger is arguably one of a handful of people with the ultimate "insider knowledge" of the cold war and a master at diplomatic intrigue, who in dealing with China and the Soviet Union is widely

regarded as having successfully played the two countries off against each other in a sophisticated balance-of-power game.[7] As Peter York argued, in this advertisement, "the casting is utterly right for its targets' private fantasies" (*Independent on Sunday* October 20, 1996, review, 34).

The affinity with (political) realism occurs not only through *The Economist* replaying elements of hegemonic masculinity that happen to be in general cultural circulation, but also through much more specific constructions of hegemonic masculinity, which although cloaked in the language and conventions of bourgeois rationality, often have their roots in Machiavelli's reworking of the citizen-warrior model. Such constructions elevate and glamorize the international connection.

Globalization, The Economist, *and Mainstream IR*

In examining the intertextualities between *The Economist* and mainstream IR in terms of globalization, I wish to make two main points. The second point will be to consider intertextualities between the paper and mainstream IR on the presentation of globalization itself, but first I will argue that the mobilization of realist imagery in the service of global business has helped promote the recent neorealist interest in international political economy (IPE).

It is worth remembering that the realist constructions of masculinity in *The Economist*, such as the spy/intelligence rhetoric, have been mobilized in the service of business, rather than politics. For example the Economist Intelligence Unit provides business intelligence, not political intelligence. In the glamorized international arena of *The Economist*, the business elite wears realist clothing. This appears congruent, because international politics and business have been constructed as inhabiting very similar Hobbesian worlds. In the spaces of international and market anarchy, at the extremes, war and bankruptcy are an ever-present threat, and success is measured in terms of political or market power. The interchangeability of politics and business in this imagery gives the "low politics" of trade and political economy access to the glamour of "the international." The cold war, which represented a rivalry between giants forced to resort in the main to maneuvering rather than violence, became the model for rivalry between large multinational corporations, with the James Bond playboy image being particularly suited to both worlds. With the cold war over, global business

was thriving in the mid 1990s, not only expanding its markets into formerly Communist areas, but also deepening through having the whole planet as its production line. Cold war realist imagery may have met its sell-by date in terms of politics, but its well-established and easily recognized tropes were subsequently mobilized to promote and glamorize globalization as an elite masculine pursuit. Thus the globe became the expanded playground for playboy businessmen and their new gadgets produced by science. If the international world is glamorous, then the concept of "the globe" offers an even wider playing field, where business elites appear to "have the whole world at their feet."

If this interchangeability between business and politics in realist imagery has helped glamorize business and globalization in *The Economist*, then it has also helped to give the neorealist approach to IPE a glamorous appeal to young men that was once reserved for strategic studies. Waltz's neorealism retains a traditional focus on high politics and war, but in this he stands rather alone. Other neorealists such as Robert Gilpin (1987) have concentrated instead on IPE. As cold war realist imagery has been co-opted by business and finance, they have been able to make the move from "high" security politics to the "low" politics of trade and economics without any great threat to their masculine status as realists.

Another affinity between the corporate world of *The Economist* and neorealist IR and IPE is that they all share a social-Darwinist lens on the world. As argued in chapter 5, the corporate world of *The Economist* is one in which the fittest survive, in terms of corporate strategies and styles as well as companies. Through sociobiology, the behavior of men has also been explained in terms of social-Darwinism, giving *The Economist* a super-Darwinist lens on the world. Meanwhile, in the realm of IR theory, there has been a convergence between neorealist theories of IR and neoclassical theories of free-market economics, also around super-Darwinism. A clear example of the confluence of sociobiology, *The Economist*'s rhetorical style, and neorealist IR theory appears in Frances Fukuyama's article "Women and the Evolution of World Politics" (1998). Writing in a curt style reminiscent of both Waltz and *Economist* leader writers, Fukuyama argues that the competitive, war-prone nature of international relations is largely determined by masculine biology and genetics. He states that "female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik" (Fukuyama 1998, 25) and that "the line from chimp to modern man is continuous" (27). This is

basically a Hobbesian view of the world (albeit one that Fukuyama would like to see constrained) dressed up with scientific explanation. Fukuyama's argument is reductionist in that he equates chimp behavior with human behavior, and the traits of individual men with large-scale, institutionalized social phenomena such as warfare (Ehrenreich 1999). He also makes the classic sociobiological assumption that traits that are "rooted in biology" (Fukuyama 1998, 27) are more difficult to change than mere culture, and that humans are "hard-wired to act in certain predictable ways" (30). His references to recent genetic research, for example, ignore the complex relationship between genes and their environment in which environmental influences may dictate which genes are switched on, or "expressed," and when (Ridley 1999). While the point of Fukuyama's article may have been to discuss the influence of women on international politics (of which more below)—and he displays a self-consciousness about masculinity previously absent in this type of IR theorizing—his analysis of "Man" and his social environment is, if anything, cruder than that reflected in *The Economist* (at least on the paper's science pages) but nevertheless shares the same basic perspective.[8] Man is a creature who is constantly competing for dominance in a status hierarchy.

Fukuyama's article refers to the "evolution of world politics" in its title, and it associates developments in global politics with the evolution of humankind. His brand of evolutionary history echoes the explicit incorporation of evolutionary theory into the neorealist cannon. The stated intention of deploying evolutionary theory is to add a dynamic dimension to analysis, to explain change. In a special edition of *International Studies Quarterly* devoted to evolutionary theory and its impact on both strategic studies and IPE, the "evolutionary analogy" is employed because "[i]n our view, biological and social systems are both subject to evolutionary processes and for that reason share certain similarities. They are complex systems that exhibit selection pressures, and cooperative and synergistic features; and in their transformations they employ innovation and thrive on innovation" (Modelski and Poznanski 1996, 316). Neorealism is deemed to show "a close affinity" with social Darwinism, in which innovation replaces mutation and economic and social competition replaces natural selection (ibid., 319). Haraway's observation that theoretical developments in the human and natural sciences have always been closely linked to technological and theoretical developments in capitalism is again relevant here. Apparently, even Dar-

win acknowledged his debt to Malthus. Thus it is hard to imagine "what evolutionary theory would be like in any language other than classical capitalist political economy" (Haraway 1991, 39). Both employ the language of progress, scarcity, and competition.

This interchangeability between the concepts of natural selection and the processes of social and economic competition is strikingly similar to much of the globalization rhetoric of *The Economist*, discussed earlier. In both *The Economist* and IR there are apparently seamless connections between capitalism, sociobiology, and international relations in their construction of "the paradigm of Man" (to borrow Ashley's phrase), and their mutual reliance on social-Darwinism. This super-Darwinist worldview tends to promote a bourgeois-rationalist-with-warrior-trappings version of hegemonic masculinity (warrior trappings boost the credibility of the hegemonic masculinity of international business, as bourgeois rationalism on its own can appear rather tame and domesticated). The international—or, rather, global—business arena is perceived to be a ruthlessly competitive environment governed by the "natural selection" processes of economic competition, and permeated by the same aura of danger and uncertainty as is the world of international relations.

Discussions in chapter 5 traced some of the historic connections and affinities between "frontier" culture, "foreign adventure," and "the international," all of which occupy a conceptual position far removed from domesticity and have helped construct certain elitist and expansionist versions of Anglo-American hegemonic masculinity. It is unsurprising, then, that this "frontier culture" can be found in academic IR as well as in *The Economist*. The anarchic world depicted in both academic theory and popular culture necessitates and indeed injects a heroic element into the "frontier" activities of entrepreneurs (and, by association, the academics who study them) as an anecdote related by Ashley (1996) confirms: a female colleague suggested that "you boys in IR . . . always talk as if you're out there on the plains somewhere, on horse-back, galloping alone" (quoted in Ashley 1996, 240).

Moving on to examine the presentation of globalization itself, in *The Economist* it has been characterized as an economic phenomenon, the product of an interaction between market forces and scientific innovation (as discussed above). The effects of globalization have been analyzed in terms of changing management strategies and employment skills, new global divisions of labor, competition between U.S. and Japanese styles of capi-

talism, and technological wizardry in finance. Although a whole host of meanings have been encoded into the globalization discourse, related to such issues as reflexivity, risk, adventure, informality, and gender, these form a subtext. Ostensibly, globalization has been presented as a largely material phenomenon, and little, if any, direct attention has been given to the politics of subjectivity.

As it is in *The Economist*, so it is, by and large, in mainstream IR and IPE. The term *globalization* has become widely used as a general metaphor for changes in the world economy, such as increased economic integration and interdependence, combined with instantaneous communications (Hurrell 1995; Strand 1996), and as such has been bandied about a great deal in post–cold war discussions of the international order and the contemporary nature of world society (e.g., Luard 1990; Axford 1995; Holm and Sorensen 1995; Hirst and Thomson 1996). Where globalization has been more explicitly theorized in mainstream IR and IPE, it has been seen, for example, as the result of benign U.S. power in the world economy (Gilpin 1987),[9] the triumph of economic liberalism (Fukuyama 1989; Ohmae 1990 and 1995), or determined by technological progress (Rosenau 1990). This type of upbeat theorizing concentrates on technology, economics, and high politics, all staple masculinist fare of *The Economist*.

There are also some more specific connections. For example, Gilpin, like *The Economist*, maps a rivalry between U.S. and Japanese capitalism in terms of corporate culture: "The economic differences between Japan and its economic partners are not merely economic disputes; they result from a cultural clash of societies with different national priorities, social values, and domestic structures" (Gilpin 1987, 377). Later, Gilpin analyzes the competition between the U.S. and Japanese economies in terms of "evolutionary fitness." He argues that whichever country's corporate culture adapts most effectively to the global economic environment—that is, whichever country can achieve the best "fit"—will dominate the global economy (Gilpin 1996, 427). This social-Darwinist argument fits in well with the general outlook of *The Economist* on globalization.

This mainstream IR literature (and the portrayal of globalization in *The Economist*) contrasts with the sociological and social-geography literature on globalization that also examines risk and reflexivity (Giddens 1990; Lash and Urry 1994), the relationship between globalization and postmodernism (Harvey 1989; Giddens 1990; Lash and Urry 1994), and time/space disrup-

tions (Harvey 1989; Giddens 1990). In considering the subjective aspects of globalization as well as the material and political ones, this alternative literature has spawned a new global politics and sociology literature that examines such matters as the dissolution between cultural experience and territorial location (Tomlinson 1997), the decentering of the state and new kinds of citizenship (Albrow 1996), and reflexive connections between individuals and global institutions (Spybey 1995)—all relevant to IR. The impact of globalization on international relations and global political economy is far-reaching. However, discussions are generally confined to a narrow range of topics: economic competition between states, struggles between governments and markets over control of economic policy, a deepening of interdependence, and new opportunities to shrink the "globe" through high-tech warfare. The dominant trend is to stick to the staple fare of economics and technology, together with state and interstate politics.[10] As Julian Saurin (1995) argues, to understand globalization one needs a new mind-set, one that is not focused on territorialism and comparative method but one that, rather, can understand the global reconfiguration of social authority, including principles of identity and representation as well as resource allocation and distribution. The politics of subjectivity connected to globalization have a bearing on IR and IPE, and wherever the politics of subjectivity are to be found, gender constructions are usually heavily implicated. Moreover, wherever this is not explicitly acknowledged, it is likely to be implicitly coded.

Globalization, The Economist, *and Postpositivist IR*

Postpositivist approaches to IR have generally cast more widely for an analysis of globalization than have mainstream approaches. Feminists, for example, have examined some of the gender implications of global restructuring (e.g., Peterson and Runyan 1993, 1998; Runyan 1996; Pettman 1996; Marchand and Runyan 2000). Critical and postmodern theorists have examined the discourse of globalization itself (Kofman and Youngs 1996) and have related globalization to new local/global relationships (e.g., Walker and Mendlovitz 1990); to inequality (Hurrell and Woods 1995); to the development of global cities (Shapiro and Neaubauer 1990); to an emerging global civilization (Bateson 1990; Brown 1995); to time/space contractions (Der Derian 1990); and to risk and reflexivity (Elliott 1995). A *Millennium* special

issue (1995) was devoted to a critical discussion of the relationship between globalization and liberalism.

However, in spite of considering the implications of globalization itself in more critical and varied ways, many of which include a reflexive or subjective aspect, some postpositivist contributions, as was suggested in chapter 3, nonetheless play into the hands of the emerging hegemonic masculinity of technocracy, which in *The Economist* is firmly linked to globalization.

The poststructural obsession with breaking down boundaries and occupying of previously feminized space has parallels with the new informal working practices of the technical elite. As suggested in my analysis of *The Economist*, these working practices were themselves previously coded as feminine but are now being successfully colonized for hegemonic masculinity. Thus the occupation of previously feminized space in postpositivist IR does not necessarily break from the dominant trend in contemporary hegemonic masculinity; rather, in some cases it can be seen to complement it. This trend undermines the claim of Ashley and others who do not explicitly tackle gender issues to "speak from the margins," at least in gender terms.[11]

In addition, as mentioned in chapter 3, postmodern IR theorists such as Der Derian and Shapiro have shown an enthusiasm for new technology that is characterized in playful, science-fiction terms. Just as the rhetorical style of Waltz uncannily paralleled phallogocentric Economese, so does Der Derian's rhetoric echo the science-fictionalized world of technology associated with globalization in *The Economist*. The technophilia is similar. Der Derian's close attention to military and telecommunications hardware, his reference to fast cars, and his general techno-celebratory stance have already been mentioned. Similarly, *The Economist* shows an enthusiasm for technology and has linked globalization to images of fast cars, space rockets (which are themselves associated with military hardware), and machine power. Der Derian deliberately uses language with high-tech, scientific connotations. So does *The Economist*. The mixing of science with fiction is also similar. Der Derian has invoked hidden powers in the "deep black" (Der Derian 1990, 304), and used terms like *cyberspace*, *chronopolitics* and *simulation sickness* (301), while *The Economist* has borrowed the H. G. Wells title *War of the Worlds* (*The Economist* October 1, 1994, survey cover) and also shown bug-eyed aliens (March 27, 1993, survey cover). *The Economist*, too, has used terms like *cybernomics* (September 28, 1996, survey cov-

er). Der Derian and *The Economist* have both used the imagery of space and speeding into the future. Der Derian praises the futurists, who he argued "burned brightly" (Der Derian 1990, 306). *The Economist* meanwhile deployed its own version of futurism in surveys such as "The Future of Medicine—Peering into 2010" (March 19, 1994, survey title). Both have made references to "the frontier," as in "Speed: The Final Frontier" (Der Derian 1990, 306) and "The Frontiers of Finance" (*The Economist* October 9, 1993, survey title).

In this use of language, Der Derian may be tongue-in-cheek, but then so is *The Economist*. The tone of take-it-or-leave-it sophisticated irony serves to distance the author/newspaper from the rather crude promotion of techno-celebratory masculinity and, at the same time, to (re)produce and promote those very things. More generally, if technocratic masculinity is more reflexive and self-conscious than other varieties of hegemonic masculinity, as Thrift (1994) argues, then so is postpositivist IR more reflexive and self-conscious than other perspectives.

The stylistic intersections between Der Derian's work and the masculinist constructions associated with globalization in *The Economist* are numerous enough to implicate this particular strand of postpositivist IR in the promotion of an emerging, hegemonic, technocratic-frontier masculinity that is heavily Americanized. Indeed, put together, the incorporation of previously feminine elements by writers such as Ashley and the technological "virtual reality" themes of writers such as Der Derian fit in well with the twin-track softening and remasculinizing constructions of globalization in *The Economist*, which, as I have argued, serve just such an emerging global technocratic masculine elite. This does not mean that these postpositivist contributors to IR would themselves be included in such an elite, nor does it even mean that they would meet such a development with approval, but it does show the limits of "the oppositional imagination," to employ the phrase used in Joan Cocks's 1989 title, particularly when it is blind to its own gender constructions.

In terms of the discipline of IR, these stylistic intersections show how those postpositivists who remain gender blind, rather than representing a break with positivist perspectives in IR, may rather provide continuity. They do this by inadvertently adding new constructions of hegemonic masculinity to the pot of masculine rivalries that already animates the discipline. In failing to break from masculinist conceptions of international relations, they

may be enabling such rivalries to continue, so that the discipline of IR remains an important site for the symbolic shaping and reshaping of hegemonic masculinity.

The Significance of Intertextualities

The above exploration of intertextualities reveals a very high level of correspondence between *The Economist* and IR theory, in terms of both the construction of masculinities and the characterization of the international realm, including its latest trend, globalization. This correspondence represents a web of mutually reinforcing influences between IR, *The Economist*, and the wider Anglo-American popular culture that they both tap into. While the basic models of citizen-warrior, patriarchal, honor/patronage, and bourgeois-rational masculinities have been in circulation a long time, and certainly predate both *The Economist* and the founding of IR as a distinct discipline, the particular conjunctions of ingredients taken from these models is constantly evolving.

This analysis has not tried to establish whether particular constructions of masculinity, or of globalization, have appeared first in the theoretical constructions of the discipline, *The Economist*, or elsewhere. Regardless of its origin, for any particular construction to become significant for the production of masculinities on the ground, it needs to be repeated across a variety of diverse media. As a widely read, high-quality newspaper serving the global elite, *The Economist* has political and economic influence. It is therefore very likely that its images of elite masculinities, even if they are created without conscious intent, are equally influential. If this is true of *The Economist*, then it is so much more so with IR, which has the added credentials of academic rigor and the status as the highest form of knowledge on international affairs. Even if the discipline of IR is not the originator of particular models of masculinity, its minimum influence is as an intellectual cornerstone of ideas on gender and masculinities: it endlessly repeats, endorses, promotes, legitimates, and above all naturalizes particular versions of hegemonic masculinity.

To some extent, neither IR theory nor *The Economist* can help but be enmeshed in the power games of the culture within which they are produced and circulated.[12] However, given its authoritative position with regard to the production of knowledge, IR theory both could, and should, be

far more mindful of its promotion and endorsement of hegemonic forms of masculinity. The degree to which the masculinities that inhabit IR scholarship actually construct the identities of individual men on the ground depends on processes of identification, which are informed by how the IR/popular culture nexus, partially explored here, interacts with institutional practices and experiences of embodiment. This can happen in various combinations of mutually reinforcing and/or contradictory ways. However—because the discipline of IR constructs a gender-segregated sphere that is thoroughly saturated with masculinities; because it carries the highest status as knowledge; and because, as this chapter has shown, it is closely woven into the wider culture through heavily gendered intertextualities, IR can be seen to play an important part in the symbolic aspect of gender identification. In the case of an expansionist version of Anglo-American hegemonic masculinity, which as this book has argued continues to be partially constructed through a relationship with the international or the global, the role of the discipline may even prove to be crucial.

Afterword on the Intertext and the Impact of Feminism

In the latter part of the period under study, there were some changes in the representation of gender in the pages of *The Economist*. It was suggested above that the process of globalization and the gendered struggles between would-be hegemonic masculinities associated with this were increasingly accompanied by highly ironic, self-conscious bouts of gender anxiety over masculinity. It was also noted that the coverage of women and "women's issues" in the paper during 1995 and 1996 was increasing, although often confined to humorous peripheral anecdotes that were considerably less serious than the traditionally masculine affairs of the main text. The effect of this was ambiguous—such sidebar anecdotes acknowledged but could have helped contain and neutralize feminist threats to hegemonic masculinity through derisory humor. However, perhaps they also insinuated previously taboo or unsettling material into the paper, in a fashion that would not cause the current readership to turn away. Moreover, advertisements showing women in strategic business roles were also increasing. Although at the end of 1996 the overall effect of *The Economist* was still comfortably masculine, the long-term implications of these trends might prove more subversive.

It is perhaps worth a brief examination of the paper's post-1996 editorial content to search for clues as to where such trends might be leading. A glance at some of the paper's subsequent treatment of women and feminism suggests that, combined with some of the more woman-friendly advertising being included latterly, perhaps irony did have the effect of habituating the readership to a range of threatening topics, which had some potential to undermine hegemonic codes of masculinity.

It has already been noted that the number of articles mentioning women and feminism increased during 1995–96. In the three years following the end of the study (i.e., 1997–99) it is my impression that *The Economist* continued to pay more attention to women and explicit gender issues. The contributions of women (other than major figures such as Mrs. Thatcher, who had always received good coverage) were fairly regularly included, with, for example, a review of women's history books (September 12, 1998, review 13); a review of crime fiction that included female writers alongside male ones (June 19, 1999, review, 5); and occasional obituaries of interesting women, such as Dorothy West (August 29, 1998, 89), Anita Hoffman (January 9, 1999, 96), and Mary Jane Rathbun (April 24, 1999, 124). In 1998, a sixteen-page survey was devoted entirely to the issue of women and work (July 18 1998, survey, "Women and Work"). This contrasted favorably with an article on women's work in 1990 that spanned only four pages (June 30, 1990, 21–24) and a two-page "schools brief" on women at work in 1994 (March 5, 1994, 96–97). Offensive language such as the use of the rape metaphor was also conspicuous by its absence. If material about feminists had largely been sidelined to humorous boxes in 1995–96, by 1999 it was the turn of non-hegemonic masculinity: for example, a story about "Japan's pretty boys" and their increasing consumption of "men's beauty products," appeared in a sidebar (July 10, 1999, 77). Although the occasional leader had always promoted equal opportunities for women, feminism now received some serious supportive coverage in the body of the paper, with for example a favorable review of feminist literature (March 13, 1999, review, 3–4). Feminism was also described as "the most far reaching contemporary struggle for recognition" (June 19, 1999, review, 8) in a critical review of Francis Fukuyama's (1999) book *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order.* Fukuyama's analysis of social change was taken to task for technological determinism, and he was criticized for ignoring the impact of

feminism, characterized by the reviewer as the real driving force behind the changes Fukuyama identified (*The Economist* June 19, 1999, review, 7–8).

By 1999, the subject of (hegemonic) masculinity, too, was receiving less hysterical, more evenhanded coverage. For example, a piece headlined "The Trouble with Boys" (May 29, 1999, 35–36) suggested that the "near obsession in officialdom" over the recent poor performance of British boys in literacy and English-language skills and its underlying causes (including the suspicion that this was connected to feminism in the classroom) was misplaced, because "boys' language skills tend to lag behind those of girls' [*sic*] the world over" (35). In the past this was less apparent, not least because educational selection in Britain was "skewed deliberately" (35) to balance the sexes. Far from agreeing with the government's concerns, the article pointed out that there was little talk of extra help for girls who lagged behind in sciences, and that ethnicity and class correlated far more closely with educational outcomes than did gender. Another article, the following month, headlined "Mournful Man" (July 10, 1999, 109–10) reviewed a number of books that discussed the modern complaint that men are increasingly marginalized or at a disadvantage. Again, the article showed little sympathy with this viewpoint, which was "ridiculously exaggerated" (110), at least in the hands of the anthropologist Lionel Tiger. The article mentioned the need to keep things in perspective, and asked "how many men would willingly trade places with women?" (109). It is interesting to contrast this brisk and level-headed coverage of the topic of masculinity in these two articles with the hysterical tone of similar discussions in 1996.

It seems that the initially ironic introduction of material that might be regarded as irrelevant or anxiety provoking, or perhaps both, to an overwhelmingly elite male readership did pave the way for a gradual change in *The Economist*'s mainstream coverage—a change that could eventually undermine the paper's masculinism. There is perhaps a parallel here with a remark Carol Cohn made in a different context. When discussing a flippant and humorous acronym that defence intellectuals used to disguise a particularly unpalatable aspect of nuclear war, she observed: "but it seems to me that speaking about it with that edge of derision is exactly what allows it to be spoken about and seriously discussed at all. It is the very ability to make fun of a concept that makes it possible to work with a concept rather than reject it outright" (Cohn 1987, 713). Having been exposed to the coverage of

explicit gender issues for a while in a similar fashion, perhaps *Economist* readers had become habituated to reading about women, feminism, and the contemporary state of masculinity. More serious coverage would then appear relatively unremarkable.

Although these examples are not a systematic study of the whole period, they point to the increasing integration of women and gender issues into the general fabric of the paper, admittedly on a small scale and on a generally Eurocentric basis. While previous reference has not been made to the status of contributors to the paper, it is interesting to note in this respect that throughout the 1990s, although the readership was overwhelmingly male, the paper had a number of women journalists in senior positions, such as economics editor, diplomatic editor, and environmental editor. The chief executive from spring 1992 to summer 1996 was also a woman, Marjorie Scardino. Subsequently, in 1996, Scardino was promoted to the position of chief executive of Pearson (a media conglomerate that part owns *The Economist* Group), thus becoming the first female chief executive of an FT-SE 100 company. Clearly there is no glass ceiling for women at *The Economist*. However, the presence of women in newspaper publishing has so far done little to change the culture of work in the field, which involves long hours and unexpected demands that are fairly incompatible with child-care responsibilities. Scardino has children, and a profile of her published in the *Independent on Sunday* revealed that she apparently got around such problems by having a model New Man husband, who while working part-time was "now firmly established as 'principal carer' for the children" (Peter Popham, *Independent on Sunday* October 20, 1996, 19).[13]

The article also stated that Scardino was personally responsible for the increase in humor and irony in the paper during her period as chief executive, with jokes latterly appearing even in its annual reports (*Independent on Sunday* October 20, 1996, 19). Without imputing any particular motives to this promotion of irony and humor, and while not wishing to overstate the effect of the changes that it has been associated with, the increase in visibility of feminism and explicit gender issues that have come in its wake have at least tempered if not undermined the relentless competition between masculinities that has otherwise characterized the paper.

Since *The Economist* offers a representational window onto more general gender power struggles, and given how closely the gendered imagery of *The Economist* and IR theory mirror each other, change in one may coin-

cide with or presage change in the other. So, as a corollary to the changes in *The Economist* in the latter half of the 1990s, perhaps students of IR can also expect a more serious treatment of gender issues in mainstream academic literature. Fukuyama's (1998) article "Women and the Evolution of World Politics," mentioned above in connection with its sociobiological underpinnings, is notable in this respect. Fukuyama's point is that, on the whole, women are different, and that the feminization of politics with its concurrent shift toward "a less status and military-power-oriented world," at least in the "democratic zone of peace" (Fukuyama 1998, 35), is a good thing, although limited in scope by the presence of competitive, aggressive males. He also refers to demographic changes, in which elderly women are predicted to form powerful voting blocs in democratic countries by the mid twenty-first century. Although Fukuyama's article completely ignores feminist literature (as does his 1999 book, also criticized above), and instead relies on dubious and hackneyed sociobiological theories to underpin its claims, this is an interesting argument—and one that does not have to depend on faulty sociobiological reasoning. It also does at least indicate that women are no longer "invisible" to mainstream male academic theorizers. It is a mainstream article by a mainstream male author in a mainstream journal, for whom women and women's demographic power are no longer invisible but are regarded as having a potentially profound influence on the shape of international relations. Such developments suggest that while feminists and mainstream IR theorists may continue to talk at cross-purposes, as a frustrated Ann Tickner has pointed out (Tickner 1996b), perhaps they will not always appear to inhabit entirely different disciplines.