

CHAPTER FIVE

The Economist, Globalization, and Masculinities

A dynamic element needs to be introduced into this hitherto static analysis. So far I have been concerned to demonstrate how constructions of masculinity in *The Economist* form a mutually reinforcing and apparently seamless web. This web legitimates hegemonic masculinity and, while actually made up of a number of shifting ingredients, gives it a sense of continuity. However, there is also an important competitive aspect to the construction of masculinities in *The Economist*, a competitive aspect that provides a dynamic atmosphere that can accommodate change fairly easily. This chapter—continuing chapter 4’s textual analysis of the paper by seeking to examine the relationship between changes in hegemonic masculinity and the topic of globalization as it was presented in *The Economist* during the period under study—concentrates on the dynamic aspect. In addition to mapping the actual changes that have taken place in the construction of hegemonic masculinity, this chapter also provides a clear illustration of the proposition made in chapters 2 and 3, that would-be hegemonic masculinities compete, drawing on strategies of masculinization and feminization in the process.

The chapter is divided into two parts: a preliminary section that briefly

explores the historic development of masculinities in business and shows how they are articulated in *The Economist* in a way that gives rise to a competitive, hothouse atmosphere of rivalry between different masculinities; and a second, more substantial, part that focuses on globalization and change. This second part starts with a general discussion of globalization and its relationship to gender, then returns to *The Economist* to examine the discourse of globalization and the accompanying changing constructions of masculinity that are produced and reproduced in the paper in confusing profusion. These, often contradictory, changes, each interpreting the relationship between globalization and gender in a different way, are identified. Some of them reflect competition between different gendered interests and some may also reflect short-term developments in the world outside, such as economic downturns and upturns.¹ However, certain trends can also be observed, trends that point toward the modernization of hegemonic masculinity in conjunction with the development of technocracy. I draw together my various observations and arguments in a short conclusion.

Masculinities in Business

Until now the analysis has focused on exposing the established models of hegemonic masculinity in circulation in both *The Economist* and in IR. The emphasis in this section shifts to examining the competitive relationship between these models, a relationship that in *The Economist* is at its clearest in the business and economics sections. As one might expect, the portrayal of masculinities in business in the pages of *The Economist* reflects their wider history.

According to Peter Stearns, early businessmen saw themselves as warriors, rather than rationalists:

War and the Darwinian jungle were the moral analogues of modern business. Not a few of the early businessmen had military experience in the wars that spanned the 1770s to 1815. Still more thought of business organisation in terms of military chains of command, with themselves as generals. Business was hailed as the modern substitute for war, with none of the bloodshed and devastation (only rising prosperity) but with all of the male virtues. "Henceforth there shall be business centuries, as in the past there have been military centuries" (Jules Burat, Paris 1845). To a middle-class

world tired of war, this was appealing. Certainly it made the businessman no whit less a man (Stearns 1979, 83).

Rationality as a prized quality arrived only in late-Victorian times with the rise of the professions and bureaucracy. Stearns argues that World War I dealt a death blow to the glorification of the warrior, so that in the twentieth century the “Darwinian jungle” became a rat race instead, with commercial survival and self-justification as family provider the only goals of more rationalist businessmen.


Connell, too, argues that the two world wars killed off versions of hegemonic masculinity organized around the heroism of violence, leaving a conflict between the masculinity of domination (patriarchal, or at least paternalistic) and one of expertise (meritocratic and thoroughly bourgeois-rational) in the postwar corporate world (Connell 1993). By the 1970s, hegemonic masculinity was organized around technocratic rationality and calculation sustained by the hypermasculine myth of toughness, power and strength, competitiveness, confidence, and ability to face down opponents (Carrigan et al 1985).

The business world portrayed in *The Economist* reflects this heritage. It is largely one of a Darwinistic struggle, and while in *The Economist's* rhetoric these struggles are often conducted through the metaphors of war and sport, evolutionary metaphors are equally common.² The international business world is portrayed as a basically evolutionary one where competition in the marketplace ensures the survival of the fittest.³ For example, in October 1996 financial firms that were not adapting to new opportunities created by technological advances were warned that “today’s insurers, bankers and brokers could turn out to be dinosaurs, with new technologies playing the role of the destructive meteor, and only a few surviving in unpredictable new forms. More technologically adept creatures may take over, remaking the industry along entirely different lines” (October 26, 1996, survey, 5).

What counts as fittest is not necessarily force, strength, or size but rather an eclectic range of traits—never stable but always changing to whatever the market requires at any given moment. At the heart of survival, therefore, is intelligence and strategy—bourgeois-rational traits rather than overtly military ones. In terms of the editorial line, at least, bourgeois-rationalism, with warrior trappings, rules the corporate world.

However, within the competitive framework formed by a master discourse of social Darwinism, more specific and contradictory constructions of masculinity have been inserted into the paper, both through advertising and through discussion of competing strategies for business success. Indeed, in an atmosphere of relentless competition, styles of hegemonic masculinity become grist to the mill of business success. Specific elements of hegemonic masculinities are played and replayed in a variety of combinations and with different emphases. For example, aristocratic constructions have had a mixed press. Some advertisements have shown status in a positive light, particularly those advertising status goods and services such as exclusive watches and first-class air travel (see fig. 4.2). Other corporate advertisements have preferred to stress technocratic expertise to status. Nomura Bank, of Switzerland, managed to combine both when it offered “Nomura knowledge” as “a priceless privilege for the very few” (November 17, 1990, 17). In the same edition, less status-conscious but nevertheless paternalistic forms of masculinity vied with the entrepreneurialism of Young Turks, so that while AETna Investment stressed “true wisdom” and “over a century of successful investment experience” (November 17, 1990, 100), showing a close-up of a wise pair of eyes under greying, shaggy eyebrows (fig. 5.1), a few pages later Knight-Ridder went for youthful energy with the following: “You’ve met the competition? Now let’s talk about us. We’re not fat cats. We’re fast cats” (November 17, 1990, 136–37). A recurrent theme in business competition was the threat of a kind of symbolic patricide (normally associated with patriarchal social systems), where size and experience competed with youth and entrepreneurial chutzpah: “The business heroes of the recent past have not been multinational company men, but entrepreneurs who have turned start ups into money machines. . . . Anybody with a bright idea and a rented garage, it seemed, could take on the giants and win” (June 24, 1995, survey, 3).

It is here, in the detail rather than the overall editorial outlook of the paper, that competition between different forms of masculinity takes place. Although the staple images of hegemonic masculinity in *The Economist* discussed here continued to be reproduced in the paper throughout the period under review, there were also some interesting changes. Established models of hegemonic masculinity, loosely organized around bourgeois-rationality with various degrees of paternalism and warrior trappings, were increasingly challenged by newer constructions of corporate masculinity, but in a



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This advertisement has been issued in the U.K. and approved by Aetna Investment Management Ltd., a member of IMRO.

FIGURE 5.1. Ad for Aetna Investment (*The Economist* November 17, 1990, 100). This advertisement offering “wisdom” identifies financial services with a benevolent paternalism. Produced in black and white, it signifies bourgeois-rational restraint rather than a display of wealth and luxury.

process that was neither simple nor straightforward. It is this process of change, which in the paper has been associated with an increasing emphasis on globalization, that the rest of the chapter will focus on. This starts with a general discussion of the relationship between gender and globalization.

Gender and Globalization

Contemporary globalization can be seen as an open-ended process involving political, economic, technological, and institutional change and is closely related to the social, psychological, and aesthetic changes associated with the “condition of post-modernity” (Harvey 1989). It is a complex condition in which, through increasing linkages and ever-more-instantaneous communications, the world is being reconstituted as a single social space (although not necessarily a single society), as time and space are shrunk. The nature and extent of contemporary developments is highly controversial and as yet unclear. Globalization has been characterized both as a long-term trend with a number of phases (Robertson 1990) and as a discontinuous phenomenon (Harvey 1989; Gilpin 1987). Its causes have variously been identified as technological progress (Rosenau 1990); developments in capitalism (Harvey 1989); and power politics in the presence of a liberal hegemon (Gilpin 1987). Robertson (1990) and Giddens (1990) name multifactorial causes. Globalization and postmodernity together either represent a dramatic break with the modern era, heralding a neomedievalism, or an intensification of various aspects of modernity (Harvey 1989; Smart 1992).

The intention here is not to get involved in academic controversies about globalization and its causes but rather to characterize it as a developing and open-ended contemporary discourse (in the full-blooded, constitutive sense of discourse—that is, involving material and institutional processes as well as rhetoric) and thus emphasize political process rather than cause and effect.⁴ The overall outcome of this open-ended process will depend on the interacting suboutcomes of a “thick” interconnecting web of ongoing political struggles, processes, and decisions in many diverse arenas of life (transcending the various divisions between private, public, and international) and in many geographical locations. Seeing globalization at least in part as a broadly political process allows one to examine the ensuing struggles over direction, nature, and scope of developments between differ-

ent interests, including power struggles between different gendered interests. In the jostling for position between would-be hegemonic groups, different “elements” or ingredients of masculinity are co-opted in new or old configurations to serve particular interests, and particular gendered (and other) identities are consolidated and legitimated or downgraded and devalued. It is important to examine such struggles, not least because they help to steer and influence more traditionally studied social, institutional, economic, and “political” developments in particular directions, as well as to reflect them.

In terms of political economy, global economic restructuring—associated with the introduction of new technologies, global capital mobility, the new international division of labor, and new forms of regionalism—has set in motion a complex set of economic, political, and social changes.⁵ Gender relations form an integral part of this restructuring, not least through the casualization and feminization of the workforce, as women’s participation in the cash economy, already increasing on a long-term basis, has accelerated in recent years. This has been accompanied by the erosion of welfare provision, the collapse of the family wage system, and a corresponding increase in female-headed households in metropolitan countries. Overall, it appears that, although women’s work is playing an increasingly central part in both productive and reproductive spheres, and while some women have gained more autonomy from men in their personal lives and a few have even benefited from expanded opportunities for women at the professional level, this has been accompanied by a dramatic shift toward the feminization of poverty (McDowell 1991; Runyan 1996). But the feminization of the workforce has also killed the old compact between male workers, industrial capital, and the institutions of welfare Keynesianism in developed countries; it has also in many cases undermined men’s personal authority in the family and has reduced the value of so-called masculine attributes in the labor market. Linda McDowell goes so far as to argue that “gender is being used to divide women’s and men’s interests in the labor market in such a way that *both* sexes—at least among the majority of the population, are losing out” (1991, 401). While media attention has been focused on the loss of manufacturing jobs in developed countries and the challenge to blue-collar masculinities predicated on the male breadwinning role, there are other links between global restructuring and changes in hegemonic masculinities.

The gradual softening of hegemonic masculinities in the West (noted above in chapter 2) coincided with the start of global capitalist restructuring, which began after the collapse of the Bretton Woods currency system in the early 1970s (McDowell 1991). Other indicators also support the idea that this softening of hegemonic masculinities is linked to, or is even an integral part of, the processes of globalization. First, the decline in conscription means that military service is no longer a universal rite of passage for men, undermining the ties between hegemonic masculinity and the military.⁶ Second, activities and qualities that were previously defined as feminine or effeminate are being increasingly integrated into hegemonic masculinity as the global economy is restructured. Men in the developed world are now positioned as consumers, a traditionally feminine role (Mort 1988; Barthel 1992).⁷ Anglo-American mainstream culture is becoming increasingly, if subtly, homo-erotic, as exemplified by the narcissistic display of male bodies in advertising imagery (Mort 1988; Simpson 1994; Bordo 1999); a new “soft boiled,” killing-but-caring type of white hero has appeared in popular cinema (Pfeil 1995); and business and managerial strategies are changing to emphasize the formerly feminine qualities of flexibility, interpersonal skills, and team working (Connell 1993). While the feminization of the workforce at first meant casualization at the lower end of the job market as a strategy to reduce labor costs, as global restructuring has gathered pace, such phenomena as delayering, outsourcing, and the casualization of employment practices has started to hit professional and managerial staff. It is argued that this phase of the feminization of working practices and managerial strategies, which might on the face of it offer improved career prospects for professional women, is being accompanied by redefinitions of hegemonic masculinity, so that professional men can stay ahead of the employment game, albeit under less-secure conditions. For example, flexibility in job descriptions and career paths is being reinterpreted as “masculine” risk taking and entrepreneurialism; and computers have lost their feminine associations with keyboard skills, now being marketed as macho power machines (Connell 1995, 146). The techniques of alternative therapy forged in the 1960s counterculture, which were originally used by antisexist men and feminist sympathizers to discover their so-called feminine side, are now widely used in management-training seminars designed to cultivate interpersonal skills and group work and in mythopoetic men’s-movement workshops that claim to develop the emotional “wild man” within (Connell 1995, 206–11; Pfeil 1995). According to Donaldson, men’s-movement activists criticize hege-

monic masculinity in an attempt to colonize women's jobs in an increasingly competitive male job market (Donaldson 1993). Since there are different kinds of men's movements, some of which are more sympathetic to feminists than others, Donaldson is probably correct with respect to some of the more dubious groups.⁸ Such activities are not only socializing white, middle-class men into feminized working practices but are crucially redefining these practices as masculine. As Connell argues, "the larger consequence of the popular forms of masculinity therapy is an adaptation of patriarchal structures through the *modernization* of masculinity" (Connell 1995, 211).

In the struggle to transform hegemonic masculinity, there is a rivalry between New Men and a backlash masculinity supported by disaffected blue-collar males who have lost both their job security and their patriarchal positions in the family. In the United States these are the "angry white males" who disciplined Bill Clinton, the "new style" president, forcing him to reinvent himself as an "all American man's man" who would keep Hillary, "the wicked witch of the West," out of the public eye, at least until the latter part of his presidency (*Independent on Sunday* February 12, 1995). There is also a complex relationship of rivalry, accommodation, and even synthesis between Western models of hegemonic masculinity and those presented by the rising powers of Asia. Whereas in the past countries such as Japan and China were coerced into adopting Western standards through the treaty-port system, and incorporated them in part in order to qualify for entry into the European-dominated international society of states (Suganimi 1984; Gong 1984), now the prize is a stronger position within a more thoroughly globalized capitalist production system, and perhaps also in international politics.⁹

In all these various struggles between different styles or types of hegemonic and would-be hegemonic masculinities, each variety is being modified by the interest group(s) it represents, in response to the perceived successes of the others. At stake in these struggles is the pace and direction of global restructuring itself, and the composition of the masculine elite within that process.

Globalization in The Economist

The Economist presents itself as a global rather than parochial paper for the political and business elite. With its largely male readership and abundance of masculine signifiers, it cannot help but be heavily implicated in interpre-

tive struggles over masculinity and globalization. Over the period under analysis, changing images in advertisements and changing uses of language in the paper suggest that hegemonic masculinity is undergoing a gradual transformation. But before embarking on a detailed discussion of the presentation of globalization and changing masculinities, it is worth pointing out that the paper has been very “busy” with a confusing range of diverse, complex, and often contradictory new constructions and reconfigurations. There is no simple movement from one kind of hegemonic masculinity to another, but rather a number of gendered moves in different directions. These moves have often been contradictory, some pulling one way and some pulling another, and some even undermining hegemonic masculinity altogether. Thus there is no uniformity of imagery and plenty of room for confusion, unexpected juxtapositions, and even profeminist imagery.

However, there have been at least four main identifiable trends: (1) a decline in patriarchal and paternalistic imagery; (2) in keeping with the theories mentioned above, a softening of hegemonic masculinity toward a New Man construction; (3) in apparent contradiction to the softening trend, an aggressive remasculinization process that is associated with globalization itself and the new technologies that go with it; and (4) a degree of gender anxiety connected with all this flux and change. In the following account of these changes, the material is not neatly divided up into the four categories mentioned here. The account moves back and forth between them, to indicate the cheek-by-jowl nature of these diverse changes and the constant jostling for position between different masculinities.

The transformation of hegemonic masculinity outlined here is inherently unstable, but is nevertheless being articulated through and to large extent steered by a kind of master discourse that sets a clear framework for the interpretation of change. This master discourse is the lens through which the corporate world is viewed: it is the discourse of social Darwinism and of ongoing competition between different styles of masculinity in the pursuit of corporate fitness.

Struggles over the direction of change, outlined below, have taken place alongside a tide of rhetoric about globalization. Globalization itself has been presented as a glamorous process at the cutting edge of progressive capitalist development. It is regarded as a primarily economic force that is causing large changes in every society throughout the world—one that is “enforcing a kind of natural selection between those cultures which rise to

the challenge and those which do not" (November 9, 1996, 30). *The Economist* has tracked changes to corporate structure, management strategies, and employment patterns throughout the period in question, focusing on the intensification of competition, which it sees as a principal effect of globalization.¹⁰ Old hierarchies have been challenged, not only by financial deregulation and increased global capital mobility since the 1980s, but also by the widespread introduction of computers and new communications technology, leading to a more integrated global economy.¹¹ Globalization has been seen as wholly beneficial to developing countries, with multinational companies that were formerly seen as arms of Western imperialism now welcomed as "the embodiment of modernity and the prospect of wealth: full of technology, rich in capital, replete with skilled jobs" (March 27, 1993, survey, 3).

In developed countries, although restructuring problems, which include threats to blue-collar workers and even to highly skilled workers, have been acknowledged, *The Economist* has argued that the promise of new markets and the workings of comparative advantage would iron out any problems:¹² "Fears that low wage economies will eventually pinch many of the rich world's jobs are overdone. . . . In the long run, trade has no lasting effect on total employment in a country providing its labour markets are flexible. Emerging economies will spend their export revenues from textiles and consumer electronics on more sophisticated products from industrial economies" (November 2, 1996, 20). Indeed, globalization and information technology mean that the world economy now works more like the liberal economic textbooks say it should, with increased competition and less distortion of markets: "The theory of perfect competition, a basic building block of conventional textbook economics, optimistically assumes abundant information, zero transaction costs and no barriers to entry. Computers and advanced telecommunications help to make these assumptions less far-fetched" (September 28, 1996, survey, 50).¹³ *The Economist* has been resolutely upbeat in its assessment of globalization, arguing that "for the rich world, almost as much as for today's poor countries, the next twenty-five years will be a time of unprecedented opportunity" (October 1, 1994, survey, 3).

There appears to be hardly a cloud on the horizon of this brave new world, except for the threat of beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism spawned by a failure of developed countries to adjust by investing in education to re-

train and upgrade their formerly blue-collar workforce (October 1, 1994, survey, 22). As globalization has not been credited with eroding economic sovereignty (this idea was seen as a political smokescreen for introducing unpopular but beneficial changes in policy), it is not regarded as an unstoppable bandwagon, but rather a precious protégé that needs nurturing and promoting (October 7, 1995, 15–16).

Globalization and Frontier Masculinity

The importance that the 1990s *Economist* attached to the promise of globalization can hardly be overstated. But perhaps the most powerful boost to globalization came not through direct editorial attention to the subject, which tended to be analytical, but rather through the dominant imagery, which integrated science, technology, business, and images of globalization into a kind of entrepreneurial “frontier” masculinity in which capitalism meets science fiction. The “frontier” has historically played a defining part in the creation of a hegemonic WASP (white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant) masculinity in the United States since the nineteenth century (Kimmel 1987). It has undergone a number of metamorphoses, with accompanying imagery stretching from the cowboys of the old “wild West” to space exploration.

This particular incarnation, a futuristic vision of globalization in which science and business mix to solve all our problems (including environmental ones), has been played out through special surveys with science-fictionalized titles that reflect the increasing role of virtual computer technologies in the global economy: “Telecommunications: Netting the Future” (March 10, 1990); “Artificial Intelligence: Minds in the Making” (March 14, 1992); “Defence in the 21st Century: Breaking Free” (September 5, 1992); “The Frontiers of Finance” (October 9, 1993); “The Global Economy: War of the Worlds” (October 1, 1994); “Television: Feeling for the Future” (February 12, 1994); “The Future of Medicine—Peering into 2010” (March 19, 1994); and “The World Economy: The Hitchhikers’ Guide to Cybernomics” (September 28, 1996). These titles have often been illustrated with science-fiction imagery, such as bug-eyed aliens (March 27, 1993) and battling spaceships (October 1, 1994). As can be seen from the topics covered, technology and speed were central motifs in the technocratic rhetoric of globalization that saturated *The Economist* in this period. For example, the survey entitled

"The Frontiers of Finance" (October 9, 1993) devoted twenty-eight pages entirely to the question of computing power and predictions in global financial markets.


At the same time, images of planet Earth from space and corporate advertisements in which *global* was a buzzword became ubiquitous, as in the following illustrative examples taken from the two surveys quoted above: a Bank of New York advertisement featured a picture of the globe from space and mentioned the word *global* three times (October 1, 1994, survey, 17); ABB Group deployed similar imagery of the globe with several instances of the words *world* and *global* (October 1, 1994, survey, 24–25); Singapore Telecom showed a photo of planet Earth taken from the Moon and talked about its "mission" to be at the forefront of technology (March 27, 1993, survey, 9); and Ernst and Young (see fig. 5.2) featured the globe from space, with a satellite in the foreground, while claiming to operate in the "dynamic global marketplace" (March 27, 1993, survey, 15). Although elsewhere "spaceship Earth" imagery often carries environmental connotations, in the images of globalization in *The Economist*, this aspect has rarely been highlighted.¹⁴ Instead, as in these examples, the image of planet Earth from space appeared to signify globalization in general.

This imagery positions globalization firmly in the glamorous, masculine conceptual space of the "international."¹⁵ While "spaceship Earth" images reinforce the view of the world as a single locality—"the global village"—making it appear easily accessible in its entirety (Giddens 1990), at the same time, by the space-mission analogy, globalization is positioned as "out there," and the space of globalization becomes "the final frontier." It is "out there" in the international arena, where only intrepid businessmen dare to tread, as opposed to "in here," in the domestic space of businessmen's homes, where global restructuring has directed a tide of often illegal or under-age female migrants as domestic servants.¹⁶ It is largely presented as a grand, top-down ideology that suits expansive business interests, rather than as an everyday phenomenon touching domestic lives.¹⁷ It "belongs to" an elite internationalist cosmopolitan culture of males, whom the reader is invited to join, at least in spirit. The world has become the adventure playground of the new, global business elite.

Latterly even the planet itself appears to have been too restrictive a playground in the science-fictionalized world of globalization. In corporate imagery, globalization has moved on to colonize space. For example, a Swiss



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FIGURE 5.2. Ad for Ernst and Young (*The Economist* March 27, 1993, survey, 15). “Space, the final frontier” imagery is linked to the globalization of international business.

Life advertisement asked if the reader had any “extra terrestrial plans” (November 5, 1994, 17), and UniBanco featured an astronaut on a space walk with the slogan “The ground crew was there for him: we are here for you” (September 28, 1996, 82) (fig. 5.3). Hewlett Packard similarly pictured an astronaut in space, with the caption “You never know how far you want to go with your computer. HP PCs give you room to explore” (January 27, 1996, 22). France Telecom had cyclists racing between planets with the copy “Global networking partnerships to keep you in the lead virtually anywhere” (December 16, 1995, back cover), while Inmarsat showed a Mars-like planetary landscape and the slogan “Communicate with travellers in space and time.” The Inmarsat copy read: “Long-distance truck drivers can find themselves in places so far beyond the reach of conventional communications, they might as well be on another planet” (September 21, 1996, 32–33). This imagery directly taps into U.S. frontier masculinity as immortalized by the Star Trek slogan “Space, the final frontier.”

In its boosting of the brave new world of globalization, *The Economist* promotes what Beverley Burris describes as a “technocratic ideology” (Burris 1989, 458), based on the authority of experts, the legitimacy of science, and the mystique of advanced technology. The belief that technological innovation will solve all our problems is a form of “technological hubris” (Burris 1989, 458). The consequence is that the political and social choices of elite, male, decision makers become masked by an allegedly neutral system of technical imperatives and interests. *The Economist* is often served with a large helping of technological hubris in which the politics of globalization have become obscured in the service of technocratic business interests.

Globalization, Feminization, and Japan

This technocratic frontier masculinity has not been the only masculinity associated with globalization in the paper. One concurrently running alternative has been characterized as an ongoing rivalry between competitive individualism and a more “feminized” cooperative style of management. This rivalry has often been articulated within a discourse of competition between Western and Asian business practices in corporate culture, pitting the United States against Japan and the “tiger economies” of the Far East.¹⁸ As a regular theme in the paper throughout the period in question, the story took

*The ground crew
was there for him.*



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UNIBANCO

FIGURE 5.3. Ad for UniBanco (*The Economist* September 28, 1996, survey, 81). Another advertisement that uses space imagery as a metaphor for globalization. Here the businessman is likened to an astronaut out on a space walk—a lone (male) hero at the frontier of human exploration.

various twists and turns. At times it was associated with a decline in paternalistic and patriarchal forms of business management. These were under siege as globalization and the introduction of information technology forced corporate change, in which both lifetime job security and numerous layers of management were swept away: "It all comes down to a change in thinking about how companies use knowledge. The old view was that strategy should be set by a tiny elite at the top. . . . Now the men at corporate headquarters realise that decisions are often best taken by those who spend their lives developing products or dealing with customers" (June 24, 1995, survey, 5).

In 1990 it was noted that the introduction of computers, previously predicted to further increase the centralization of corporate decision making, has in fact more often had a flattening effect, contributing to the substitution of markets for hierarchies (December 15, 1990, 89–90). In 1991, under the heading "Change, then change again: As markets change, so must managers," *The Economist* survey of management education argued that while every era has had its business and management fads, the globalization of markets and the acceleration of technological change were both contributing to the need for more permanent changes in management practices. To keep up with the pace of change, "western businesses are being forced to toss old assumptions aside" (March 2, 1991, survey, 7). In this particular survey at least, *The Economist* prescribed a range of feminizing practices: cooperative joint ventures rather than rivalry; flatter companies with less hierarchy and internal divisions; more part-time and temporary workers; cross-disciplinary and teamwork approaches; and a change in corporate culture as ethics and environmentalism emerge as a new set of "soft" issues (March 2, 1991, survey, 7–8). Note the "feminized" language in the paragraph subheaded "Soft to Touch, Hard to Grasp," which stated "the toughest challenge facing senior managers (and the business schools charged with nurturing them) could come from a hard to define set of 'soft' problems" (March 2, 1991, survey, 8).

Japan was the model for corporate change, although it was argued that the West might have problems importing the successful ways of Japanese business giants like Sony because of their failure to adopt Japanese business culture. For example, "In American and British firms, potential high fliers tend to be put on the management fast track straight out of University. . . . Potential Japanese managers spend their 20s learning their company back-

wards" (March 2, 1991, survey, 23). Japanese managers' success was due to on-the-job training, job rotation, vague job descriptions, group learning, and knowledge sharing. A month earlier it had also been reported that the importation of Japanese management techniques to the West was failing to produce the desired productivity gains because relationships between suppliers and manufacturers were too adversarial in the West (February 16, 1991, 87). These arguments about the softening of corporate culture under Japanese influence were reinforced by contemporaneous advertisements that used feminized imagery. For example, a couple of months before publication of the article just quoted, Canon, a Japanese computing and technology corporation, used the slogan "We don't just work together, we co-operate" over a picture of an oriental tunic (December 15, 1990, 112–13) (fig. 5.4); and a month before that, Komatsu, a Japanese construction-machines firm (one with more excuse than most to feature big drills and power machines) depicted a housewife with a patchwork quilt and the slogans "Hello neighbour" and "Co-operation for a better world" (November 17, 1990, 124).

On the other hand, it appeared that the Japanese now had a need for a new "entrepreneur type" of manager who was more innovative and creative. The solution would be a "marriage" in which Japanese MBA students would learn Western analytical skills but with the aggressiveness "mellowed down," while Western students would be taught to "open their minds" and have competitiveness discouraged or even penalized in favor of "team learning" (March 2, 1991, survey, 24–26). Later that year, *The Economist* reported that while for years, American and European firms had mimicked Japanese management techniques, now the Japanese were copying Westerners (August 10, 1991, 57). Consensus-forming rituals and job rotation were being played down in Japan in favor of hiring Western-style entrepreneurial "risk takers" and introducing performance-related benefits.

By 1992, Japanese capitalism was being defended against U.S. critics who saw it as unfair and ruthlessly "predatory" (April 4, 1992, 19–24). The *Economist* argued that Japanese production practices were, largely, more efficient than unfair. It was also observed that Japan's "greying corporate warriors" were being replaced by a new breed: a younger generation who were more competitive, less consensual, and keener on leisure (May 2, 1992, 99).


In March 1993, domesticated language was still being applied to new management strategies in the West. In a survey of multinationals, the usual war and sports metaphors were toned down and replaced by statements

such as “multinationalism begins at home” and “when products are more or less equal, the way to compete is to cuddle closer to the buyer” (March 27, 1993, 16). Alliances between multinationals were described as “holding hands,” while the reader was told “enemies, friends: who can tell the difference?” (20). On the other hand, technocratic standards of efficiency needed to be reasserted over research and development, which was now becoming “notoriously unruly and profligate” (19).

By the beginning of 1994, the Japanese economic downturn was being attributed to its corporate culture, portrayed this time not as “feminized” or even “predatory” so much as paternalistic and “too stable by half” (January 29, 1994, survey, 7). A debate over “Asian values” and whether they contributed to the success of the tiger economies was now in full swing, with *The Economist* claiming that there is nothing very Asian about strong family ties and the work ethic, and nor would Asian countries be immune to the social trends that have dogged the West (May 28, 1994, 14 and 77–78).

Later that year, Japanese firms, after “decades of cosyng up to their subcontractors . . . [were] now discovering the virtues of competition” (May 14, 1994, 107), although Western manufacturers were still adopting Japanese-style informal partnerships and cooperation with suppliers, sharing business information, and in the case of General Motors and BMW even allowing suppliers to help design new cars. By 1995 Japan was seen to be exporting its economic model to developing countries as a distinctive, Far Eastern variety of “non-capitalist market economy” (January 14, 1995, 20), although Japanese multinationals themselves were continuing to “look west” to try to square their “traditional paternalism with the efficiency needed to stay competitive” (June 24, 1995, survey, 20–21). Finally, in 1996 *The Economist* endorsed the view of a United Nations (UNCTAD) world-investment report: “The latest report thinks that ‘good practice’ is ceasing to mean Japanese production methods, and is becoming Americanised yet again. . . . It also notes the creation of highly successful hybrid management systems, produced by the collision between different cultures” (March 16, 1996, review, 9).

In sum, during this period it seems *The Economist*’s rhetoric offered Japanese business culture as a model for the West that would soften and feminize Western business practices (dismantling paternalistic hierarchies in the process), while offering Western aggression and individualism as an antidote to Japanese paternalism. Whether softer or more aggressive ver-



We don't just work together



We co-operate

It's our belief that people come up with unique ideas when in a creative work environment. These ideas are then translated into products intended to serve only one purpose: to enhance the creativity of the user. *Canon makes it work.*

Canon

FIGURE 5.4. Ad for Canon (*The Economist* December 15, 1990, 112–13). Here the advertiser emphasizes cooperation and uses a picture of sewing, an activity often associated with femininity. The ad could be tied in with *The Economist's* rhetoric on Japanese managerial culture.

sions of hegemonic masculinity were to win out in the end, or perhaps some combination of the two, with the softer elements increasingly incorporated as wholly masculine traits, the reader was left in no doubt that old hierarchies and paternalism were under siege.¹⁹ Underlying this whole debate was the assumption of globalization, which when it was not being associated with “the final frontier” was clearly seen as an important priority in the tiger economies as well as in the West. After the East Asian currency crisis of 1998, the Japanese model unsurprisingly fell out of favor. Nonetheless, the multiple processes of competition, cross-fertilization, and convergence in masculine business styles from East and West witnessed by *The Economist* to that date can be seen as part of the process of forging the culture of a new and potentially globalized hegemonic masculinity.

Masculinities in Finance

The revolution in financial services has been central to the process of globalization as constructed in the pages of *The Economist*. Nowhere has the collapse of patriarchal and paternalistic imagery associated with globalization been more apparent. More often than not, as paternalistic and patriarchal imagery has declined, financial-services advertisements have filled the gap, not with the softer or more feminized images discussed above but with a variety of remasculinizing images that have helped to reposition the financial-services sector and boost its (formerly flagging) status.

The nineteenth-century world of the City of London is the world *The Economist* was originally created for. The paper was founded in 1843, as one of the key publications of the financial press that kept the City informed about itself. The imagery in *The Economist*’s “World Profile” (analyzed in chapter 4) still reflects this heritage in its promotion of bourgeois values with aristocratic trappings—the old school tie, the collector’s items, the large checks, and so forth. While modern banking in the West grew from unpromising beginnings, by Victorian times domestic banking had become a solidly bourgeois and respectable profession, with the provincial bank manager as an important if unpopular figure in the local community.²⁰ Popular prejudice against bankers, and particularly international bankers, persisted, however, fueled by a mixture of nationalism and anti-Semitism that peaked in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In some quarters, international bankers were both demonized and feminized: they were

seen as unpatriotic and cowardly, and were also credited with conspiring to take over the world, along with international Jewry, Masonry, and, latterly, Communism (*The Economist* December 25, 1993, 107–9).

The City of London elite largely escaped this negative image, drawing as it did on an aristocratic heritage. According to Will Hutton (1995), the City elite preferred to reproduce empire and the upper-class penchant for land and invisible income from stocks, shares, trading, and merchanting, rather than engaging with or financing British industry. But as Nigel Thrift argues, contrary to received wisdom, top directors and partners of City stockbroking firms were not real aristocrats, but rather formed “a distinct stratum, combining elements of bourgeois and aristocratic cultures but reducible to neither. It was a culture that (despite the trappings of land ownership) was urban rather than rural, functionally progressive rather than reactionary, and combined great dynastic aspiration with an unpretentious devotion to the ethic of work” (Thrift 1994, 339).

Aristocratic trappings were seen as investments, and real aristocrats were considered lazy and effete, in a world that was nevertheless ruled by the narrative of “the gentleman.” It was a world with strict codes of behavior and clothing, so that brown suits, for example, were regarded with horror. Trustworthiness was signified and judged by the ability to adhere to these codes, in a culture that was organized through class and sustained and regulated by a network of “men only” social institutions (Thrift 1994, 339–40).

By the mid twentieth century, the social standing of domestic bank managers and the paternalistic, bourgeois masculinity that went with it was being undermined.²¹ In the 1970s, the culture of City banking and stockbroking, too, began to change, as the “gentlemanly code” loosened its hold and finance became gradually globalized, a process that was accelerated by the financial “big bangs” of the 1980s. In the new culture of globalized finance, there has been an increase in risk and the need for risk management, and the traditional ways of working have been swept away. The homosociality has been weakened by an influx of professional and managerial women, particularly in jobs requiring a high level of social interaction. The codes of the English Gentleman have been undermined by the greatly increased presence of foreign firms, bringing expatriate workers with them. With an increasingly cosmopolitan workforce, and a weakening of the traditional rules and hierarchies, formal contracts have replaced word-of-honor agreements. Thrift argues that

In current circumstances the need for reflexivity has been much enhanced . . . leading to a greater emphasis on presentation of the self, face-work, negotiating skills and so on, because of the increasing need to be able to read people, as the signs of their social positions are no longer so foreordained and because of the increasingly transactional nature of business relationships between firms and clients. Thus trust now has to be *constituted* through work on *relationships*, not “read off” from signs of trustworthiness. (Thrift 1994, 348)

Meanwhile, in the pages of *The Economist*, banking and financial advertisements at the beginning of the period tended to be formal and austere or even patriarchal. In 1990 it was still common for banking ads in *The Economist* to feature sober pictures of a bank's chairman or founders, and extracts from a chairman's statement.²² Banks tended to stress their strength, longevity, and solidity. In some typical examples, the Swiss Bank Corporation talked of more than one hundred years of experience and an “exceptionally solid capital base” (December 15, 1990, 86); Salomon Brothers spoke of its eighty-year history as a “leader” (April 28, 1990, 110); AETna Investment stressed its “wisdom” (November 17, 1990, 100) (fig. 5.1); and First Chicago's chairman advised that “First Relationships Last” (November 17, 1990, 114). J. P. Morgan capped them all by featuring a photograph of a particularly upright, sober, and elderly former chairman taken fifty years before, together with a boast of 150 years of experience and “sound analysis” (November 3, 1990, 2–3) (fig. 5.5). These images deliberately invoked the patriarchal hierarchies and solidly bourgeois credentials of bygone eras. As such, and coming at least a decade after the global revolution in financial services had been effected (see below), they represented the last gasp of the old order and a nostalgic invocation of stability in a world of change. Even banks that preferred to get on the globalization bandwagon were cautious. NatWest Bank, for instance, stressed speed, innovation, initiative, and even adventure, but did so in a restrained format with wordy advertisements and modest illustrations (April 28, 1990, 117, 119, and 121).

By 1994–95, with only a few exceptions the images of patriarchs and founders had been largely banished.²³ Expertise was still stressed, but in the mid 1990s it tended to be a stand-alone bourgeois-rational feature, rather than being linked to paternalism and elitism, and was presented in a less formal, austere setting. For example, a number of advertisers presented inter-

national finances as complex puzzles to be solved, using colorful and amusing visual conundrums as props;²⁴ others emphasized insight or intellect.²⁵ Banker's Trust, in likening investment strategy to a game of chess, managed both (December 7, 1996, 109). Some advertising now also reflected Thrift's analysis of an increasing presence of professional and managerial women, increasing cosmopolitanism, and new emphasis on relationships and interpersonal skills. Non-Western entrepreneurs appeared, such as in the Hong Kong Bank advertisement featuring a Chinese trader on a bicycle (May 13, 1995, 112). Networking and relationships were stressed, for example by Standard Chartered, who showed businessmen and a token woman playing ball or opening doors across the globe (February 11, 1995, 4; August 12, 1995, 2; March 18, 1995, survey, 14–15).²⁶

One or two banks even took the opportunity to uncouple their advertising from hegemonic masculinity altogether. For example, J. P. Morgan broke the mold by depicting a white woman banker with a black male client (October 1, 1994, 108–9), and in another advertisement showed intimate conversation between a businessman and a businesswoman accompanied by the “feminine” terms *depth* and *flow* (April 15, 1995, survey, 36).²⁷ In a similar vein, a long-running and prominent series of Citibank advertisements featured photo stories of a range of bankers and clients presented as business couples engaging in friendly and animated discussion. Between them these advertisements covered virtually every racial and gender permutation,²⁸ the copy stressing “relationship” or “relationships” (March 9, 1996, back cover; June 29, 1996, 131; October 5, 1996, back cover), “partners” or “partnership” (February 17, 1996, back cover; April 13, 1996, back cover; May 18, 1996, back cover), “commitment” (June 8, 1996, 149), and “understanding” (March 9, 1996, back cover).

This was not the dominant trend, however. In contrast, and in competition with these new, less-masculinist images, there were also the hackneyed images of masculine virility, such as mountain peaks, skyscrapers, big cats, and big drills, and a new emphasis on masculine sport and physical strength.²⁹ AIG bank showed men engaging in a tug-of-war, (September 10, 1994, 52–53); Peregrine depicted fencing (April 6, 1996, 55); WestLB had rowing (April 6, 1996, 37); and Citibank Personal Banking featured a golfer (June 3, 1995, 38–39). One Morgan Stanley advertisement showed a huge whale surfacing, with the slogan “And the bond market thought you were dead in the water” (April 15, 1995, survey, 18–19). There was also a new em-

Why the “new” thinking in M&A isn’t new to us.

Now that some highly leveraged transactions of the last decade are under scrutiny, there has suddenly been a call for a “return to the fundamentals” of “sound business principles” in M&A and of “relationship banking.” At J.P. Morgan, however, we have no such need to get back to basics. We never left them. We will recommend a merger, acquisition, sale, or divestiture only when it is based on a sound analysis of true debt capacity and complements your long-term business strategy in a way that truly benefits your shareholders. For in our 150 years of experience, we’ve learned that placing our clients’ interests before our own is the best way to be successful in the long run. For truly objective advice in M&A, turn to one firm where sound strategic thinking is never out of fashion.

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J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. is a member of TSA.
Archive photo courtesy of The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York.

JP Morgan



Over half a century ago, J.P. Morgan, Jr., said, "The clients' belief in the integrity of our advice is our best possession."

FIGURE 5.5. Ad for J. P. Morgan (*The Economist* November 3, 1990, 2–3). This was one of a number of paternalistic banking advertisements at this time. Such ads often featured chairmen and chairmen's statements; in this case, the image was of a former patriarch, looking stern.



Morgan Stanley is a registered service mark of Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.

There's a span of several months until your deal closes. The last thing you want to hear is a rope snapping.

It's taken months to negotiate your way to this point in your cross-border acquisition. Regulatory approvals will take several months more. Meanwhile, the terms you agreed on are exposed to market volatility.

You need to protect the equity value of your purchase and future funding obligations with hedging strategies that allow you to achieve certainty in an uncertain future.

So you've planned well. And you've selected a firm that won't let those plans fall through.

A team of specialists who actively trade in cash and derivative markets throughout the world. And whose knowledge of structuring techniques and the regulatory environment assures you of solutions that are matched precisely to your risk exposures.

They can design a program that mitigates the risk of rising interest rates by hedging the cost of future financings. Or manage your foreign currency exposure by locking in favorable exchange rates.

They can help you stabilize anticipated cash flows by structuring commodity price hedges. Even shield you against the devaluation of assets in merged pension funds.

A dynamic strategy that can flex with changing events. And deliver you intact to your goal.

MORGAN STANLEY

Berkeley Chicago Frankfurt Hong Kong London Los Angeles Luxembourg Madrid Melbourne Milan Moscow New York Paris San Francisco Seoul Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Zurich

FIGURE 5.6. Ad for Morgan Stanley (*The Economist* November 19, 1994, 86). This was one of a number of advertisements in late 1994 that played on risk anxiety. Subsequent advertisements, including ones by Morgan Stanley, put a more robust spin on risk taking.

phasis on speed that had now become a valuable trait in globalized financial transactions. Another Morgan Stanley advertisement showed an aircraft undercarriage with the slogan "You have to hit the ground running" (November 5, 1994, 82); LTC Bank of Japan argued that "speed is often the difference between success and failure" (March 18, 1995, survey, 22); and Bankers Trust claimed that "speed with accuracy is the foundation of value" (August 3, 1996, 70).

A complementary set of imagery picks up on another of the changes to finance mentioned by Thrift, the increase in "risk."³⁰ The increasing social relevance of "risk" has also been theorized by Ulrich Beck (1992), Giddens (1991), and Lash and Urry (1994). These writers argue that political conflicts and social cleavages are increasingly organized by the distribution of risks rather than, as in the past, the distribution of goods. Risk societies promote reflexivity, as people reflect critically on the new, less predictable, social conditions of life. Scientific-technical elites are the new "risk winners," the hegemonic partners in an alliance between science and capital (Lash and Urry 1994, 32–35).

"Risk" has certainly become a commonly invoked image in financial advertisements. Indeed, risk of one kind or another seems to have become the principal sign of international danger and uncertainty in *The Economist* in the 1990s. In May 1992, the Bankers Trust, who "lead from strength," warned nervous potential customers that "not taking risks may be the biggest risk of all," and showed a man in an armchair being jolted into the air while pointing out that "you have to leave the cosy and comfortable if you want to move ahead" (February 29, 1992, 2). Another advertisement from Bankers Trust showed a fisherman standing on an island that turns out to be a giant fish, the slogan saying: "Risk, it isn't always where you expect it to be" (May 2, 1992, survey, 2). In the same issue, however, some other banks and insurers were still publishing images and text that invoked the earlier values: ABN-AMRO projected solidity (46); Hong Kong Bank went for longevity (survey, 7); Sun Alliance (34–35) and Barclays (survey, 25–28) presented dry words of wisdom from their chairmen, and the ING Group ran even drier columns of figures from a balance sheet (62). By autumn 1994, financial-risk anxiety had multiplied and was being variously presented as a threatening volcanic eruption (Zurich Insurance Group ad November 19, 1994, 32–33); the cause of a potential nervous breakdown (AXA ad *ibid.*, 57–59); or a rickety rope bridge about to snap (Morgan Stanley ad *ibid.*, 86) (fig. 5.6). Only

one advertiser in the November 19 edition saw global financial markets as an opportunity (Matif ad *ibid.*, 113). As Chase Manhattan had stated in an advertisement the preceding week, “in these volatile times, what you want from risk management is a little less risk and a lot more management” (November 12, 1994, survey, 5). Another bank showed a picture of a piece of cloth from a gent’s suit caught on a barbed-wire fence, warning that “risk can tear at the corporate fabric” (Chemical Bank ad October 22, 1994, 4). Since barbed wire is often associated with war (and especially with World War I) this picture invokes an image of businessmen engaging in unpleasant and risky trench warfare. In the bourgeois world of *The Economist* in 1994, risk appeared to be not a challenge to be enjoyed by citizen-warriors, but a necessary evil to be managed.³¹

However, at least one advertiser cleverly offered protection from risk anxiety while at the same time portraying risk taking as heroically and glamorously masculine. Credit Suisse, in a long-running and prominent series of advertisements, featured a series of animated but uninhabited images of protective U.S. sports underclothing, a kind of latter-day armor of helmets, padding, and braces of various descriptions, with the slogan “When you’re taking risks, you don’t want to take chances.” This particular example was of ice-hockey armor, complete with stick as weapon (November 19, 1994, 37). Other examples include American football “armor” (e.g., September 24, 1994, 41; March 18, 1995, 49) and baseball “armor” (e.g., October 1, 1994, 59).³² Indeed, after the attack of “risk” anxiety in late 1994, a hardening of images of masculinity in banking generally took place through 1995 and 1996, and “risk” became more associated with virility. This reflected an improved economic outlook, but it was also a clear example of masculinization strategies deployed to increase the status of the banks involved, and by association the whole financial-services sector. This remasculinization may also have been a reaction against the encroachment of professional women into the sector. In one example, the Union Bank of Switzerland deployed a series of images from formula-one racing, with the slogan “Master the detail, manage the risk” (October 7, 1995, 108–9). The word *risk* was repeated no fewer than five times in an advertisement that boasted that “our clients expect fast reactions, technical skill and total attention to detail, continuously, not just for an hour or two. And though the dangers are not physical, they are nevertheless very real. . . . At UBS Global Risk Management, we

combine constant attention to detail with coolness under pressure, to help drive your business forward" (October 7, 1995, 108–9).

At the same time, *The Economist's* editorial increasingly referred to risk and risk management as a route to profit. For example, in its 1995 survey of Wall Street, the paper discussed the risk model of financial intermediation, arguing that "risk has become the organising concept for the entire financial business" as distinctions between banks, insurers and stockbrokers have broken down (April 15, 1995, survey, 21). As risk became a global commodity through derivatives and other new financial instruments, it charted the competition between firms aiming to be one of an "elite of global financial firms set to dominate the business" in "a world-wide gamble" (April 15, 1995, survey, 27–28). This more upbeat approach to "risk" aggressively remasculinized financial services. Relationships with clients also came under scrutiny and were seen to be more important within a risk-management model, with some firms investing in complex conflict-management procedures. For other firms, however, the approach to relationships was baldly instrumental, with one head trader quoted as stating, "You shouldn't expect to get paid to have relationships. Relationships are simply a means by which the firm gets to take risks" (April 15, 1995, survey, 24).

The upbeat approach to risk resonates with the honor code of masculinity in which risk taking is generally admired. In the honor code, bravery and face are also paramount in relationships between men (Morgan 1992). While this code has been generally fairly muted in Anglo-American masculinities in recent years (except perhaps in fiction and the cinema), it is an important ingredient in Mediterranean and Latin masculinities and is still a type that Anglo-American men would recognize and perhaps identify with. Meanwhile, the positioning of financial risk as a sign of international/global danger adds a realist inflection.

The repositioned masculinity of international finance therefore combines elements of bourgeois rationality (instrumentalism and technology) with honor codes (display of competitive risk taking) and citizen-warrior codes (physical strength, heroically facing international danger). In addition, the globalization of finance has resulted in an increased spatial separation of finance from production, with power concentrated in a handful of specialist financial centers (Massey 1994). This is reminiscent of British imperial finances in the nineteenth century, allowing contemporary financial

masculinities to draw on this historic status cachet, but with the aristocratic trappings now replaced by technocratic ones.

On the other hand, the increase in the number of images of sports and physical strength in financial services can be partly attributed to an Americanization of financial masculinities in the City of London. Indeed, *The Economist* has itself been subject to increasing Americanization as it became a key player in the increasingly global financial press. This is reflected in its advertising mix, in which U.S. firms are heavily represented, in its large section devoted to U.S. domestic politics, and in its occasional guest articles by leading U.S. economists and politicians, such as Madeleine Albright, the U.S. secretary of state (February 15, 1997, 21–23).

With no long indigenous history of feudal aristocracy behind it, WASP masculinity has always been less secure than that of the English Gentleman, and has therefore been more dependant on “frontier” toughness and the late-nineteenth-century Anglo-American cult of physical fitness and youthfulness for its genesis. Education in colleges such as Harvard and Yale in the late nineteenth century was designed to produce a U.S. aristocracy, but one inflected by a heroic ideal, a kind of (anti-Semitic and generally racist) cowboy philosophy that included admiration for “the rougher manlier virtues,” a love of physical strength and courage, of athletic contests, and fighting (Higgs 1987, 165). Education was modeled on the neo-Spartan British public-school system, as it was believed that “the time given to athletic contests and the injuries incurred on the playing field are part of the price which the English-speaking race has paid for being world-conquerors” (Henry Cabot Lodge, quoted in Higgs 1987, 165).

If British “character” was molded through colonial power, then a distinct American “character” was to be formed through the challenges of conquest on the “frontier,” with the Western territories seen as a vast internal empire (Mrozek 1987, 226). Although the cult of this “muscular Christianity” has waned, sporting ability and physical fitness continue to be important ingredients in U.S. hegemonic masculinity. Thus through historic connections with earlier manifestations of “frontier masculinity,” the imagery of sports and physical strength also resonates with the construction of globalization as a “frontier.” As well as representing an Americanization of hegemonic masculinity in *The Economist*, the increase in male-oriented sports imagery, combined with technocratic imagery and the mobilization of “risk” as a sign

Most providers of information solutions think they reach the finish line when they reach the customer.

But reaching the customer's customer separates the leader from the pack.



Lately, many companies are racing to demonstrate their customer service solutions. But only Unisys understands that the best way to help customers is to help them reach *their* customers.

Through our unique CUSTOMERIZE process, we offer a pragmatic and disciplined series of steps for helping you turn customer service into a strategic advantage.

Unisys professionals will team with you to evaluate your enterprise from a customer service perspective.

Unisys offers a powerful combination of information services, technology expertise, and industry-specific experience to help enhance your ability to retain customers and win new ones. The benefits speak to your bottom line.

Greater customer-perceived value means greater

margins. A competitive advantage in customer service means improved market share. According to a recent independent study, the profit impact of a simple 2% increase in customer retention can be the equivalent of a 10% reduction in overheads.

Not least, Unisys leadership in systems integration and open systems enables us to optimize the value of your existing technology investment at the same time as our CUSTOMERIZE approach produces tangible results for your organisation.

UNISYS
We make it happen.

cus-tom-er-ize v.t. **1.** To make a company more responsive to its customers and better able to attract new ones. **2.** To customerize an organisation's information strategy, e.g., to extend systems capabilities to branches, booking offices and other points of customer contact and support. **3.** What Unisys does for a growing number of companies and government agencies worldwide. See CUSTOMER SERVICE, COMPETITIVE EDGE, BUSINESS-CRITICAL SOLUTIONS, REVENUE GENERATION.

For more information fax Graham Roberts or (44) 895 862807. And ask how Unisys can help you reach your customers – and serve them better.

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
FIGURE 5.7. Ad for Unisys (*The Economist* November 5, 1994, 93). One of a number of advertisements in *The Economist* in the mid 1990s that emphasized physical fitness, an important attribute of U.S. constructions of masculinity. This one sought to position computing as masculine.

of international danger, may also be a way of restaking a claim to nondomestic masculinity in arenas where women are now encroaching.³³


Meanwhile, in Computing and Telecoms . . .

In the trend toward invoking masculine physical strength and global imagery and linking them to technology and speed, there has been a clear convergence between financial-services advertisements and computing advertisements. In the latter, such U.S.-inflected masculinizing motifs had been well-established since the mid 1980s (Connell 1995). Illustrative examples from *The Economist* include the following advertisements featuring physical strength: for Oracle—a photo of a coal miner, with the slogan “data mining” (November 5, 1994, 114–15); for Unisys—men’s athletics (ibid., 93) (fig. 5.7); for IBM—a weight lifter (June 3, 1995, 103); and for Telia Telecoms—a shot-putter (May 13, 1995, 90). Digital featured power by associating an image of an ocean wave with a flexed bicep (February 11, 1995, 57); signifying both power and speed were Knight Ridder’s computer as “power tool”—a large drill—(April 29, 1995, 94) and for EMC² a fast car (November 5, 1994, 90). That physical strength and sporting imagery should be popular with computing advertisers should come as no surprise, given that the industry is dominated by U.S. firms. But as to why computers should be associated with hegemonic masculinity is less obvious, given that desktop computers, when first introduced in large numbers, were used mostly as word processors by female clerical staff. The association between computing and masculinity has had to be forged through carefully chosen advertising imagery (Connell 1995).

In *The Economist* this association was constantly being reestablished and reinforced. One advertisement featured a baby boy playing on a computer under the slogan “Born in Bell labs” (October 5, 1991, survey, 46–47). More recently, Acer showed a large picture of a man’s chest and a smaller picture of a father and son playing with a home PC, using the slogan “No wonder the big guys, and the little ones, choose ACER” (November 12, 1994, 110–11). Meanwhile EMC² characterized their information storage as a lean and muscular (white) male chest and stomach, opposing it to its fat and flabby rivals (September 28, 1996, 107) (fig. 5.8). The masculinity of telecoms has also been reinforced by such items as an *Economist* survey of telecoms headlined “The New Boys” (October 5, 1991) and the advertising slogan



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The world's leading companies have put their information at the centre of their growth strategies. Access to that information is critical. And high-performance storage holds the key.

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FIGURE 5.8. Ad for EMC² (*The Economist* September 28, 1996, 107). Another ad from the mid 1990s that associated computing with both masculinity and physical fitness.

"Man's intelligence leads to ways to communicate" (October 5, 1991, 53). However, later in the period, as with financial services, one or two firms have also used softer or more feminizing imagery: Lotus Notes used the slogan "communicate, collaborate, co-ordinate" (May 13, 1995, 60–61). Hewlett Packard presented a female computer-systems engineer to prospective clients with the slogan "She'll make it work" (November 19, 1994, 25), and followed this image with one of a Latina systems-support engineer (January 28, 1995, 2–3).

Computing and telecoms firms also seem to have been much quicker on the uptake of globalization imagery than banks and financial services. A popular global image from the late 1980s (reminiscent of James Bond films and *Dr. Strangelove*) was deployed by Fujitsu: a darkened control room full of computers and decision makers, with a huge map of the world (October 5, 1991, survey, 10–11). In addition, the new links between the worlds of computing and finance were first made explicit in telecoms and computing ads. The ones described below appeared fairly early in the period, when banking ads were still fairly austere and formal. Fujitsu computers for example featured a photo of a young U.S. investment banker, ready for the fray, with jacket off and braces (men's suspenders) showing (March 10, 1990, survey, 18–19); Northern Telecom boasted about the billions of dollars it shifted a day in financial markets (March 10, 1990, survey, 20–21); and Cable and Wireless displayed a stock-market trading floor (October 5, 1991, survey, 25).

Increasing Informality

If financial services, computing, and telecoms advertisements between them were dropping paternalism in favor of either an aggressively remasculinized image of hegemonic masculinity and globalization, or, less often, the softer, more feminized imagery discussed earlier, there was also a marked trend toward a relaxed informality in some computing and telecoms advertisements. By 1995 businessmen in smart suits were being replaced by a young computer nerd with long hair and informal clothing (AST computers ad May 27, 1995, 91), a stonemason in sweater and cap (IBM ad February 25, 1995, 40–41), a cool, black U.S. blues musician (IBM ad December 16, 1995, 40–41), and a father telecommuting from home in an open-neck check shirt, accompanied by his daughter and teddy (AMP ad October 12, 1996, 93). A youthful, long-haired and footloose AT&T man was labeled as

"A rucksack, 2 degrees, 3 credit cards and a potential customer" (May 13, 1995, 99).

These images were part of a more widespread trend toward informal depictions of masculinity in the paper. For example, in the October 12, 1996, edition, while Hyundai (154–55) featured a photo of chairman Chung Mong Koo and his mission statement (together with a moonscape and satellite, in a hybrid of patriarchal and technocratic/globalization imagery), this fairly formal advertisement was very much in the minority. It contrasted with relaxed European and American images of masculinity, such as the president and CEO of the Orvis company out fishing in his denim shirt, fleece sweatshirt, and padded fisherman's waistcoat in an advertisement for Chubb Insurance (41).³⁴ Meanwhile, in the same issue, Hugo Boss men's clothes had jettisoned their usual suits for jeans and a denim shirt, although still with a tie (87), and Armstrong International executive headhunters featured a (male) "managing director" in a casual leather jacket (108).³⁵ Informality in these advertisements was being constituted as a desirable and "cool" masculine trait.

Airline advertisements had also by and large jettisoned their patriarchal images of formally dressed businessmen being waited on by pretty stewardesses.³⁶ Some replaced the stewardess with "man meets machine" technocratic images of businessmen (or parts of their bodies) juxtaposed with airline seats and equipment, sometimes complete with measurements and specifications (Qantas ad June 3, 1995, 84; United Airlines ad June 3, 1995, 59; KLM/Northwest ad February 11 1995, back cover; Continental Airlines ad May 13, 1995, 56; Air France ad October 7, 1995, 52–53). Others such as the Meridiana airline stuck to the more traditional image of male hands emerging from the cuffs of a suit and clutching a leather briefcase (March 30, 1996, 59).³⁷ However, some airlines went in for softer and more informal images. A British Airways advertisement featured a businessman being cradled in his mother's arms like a baby (March 23, 1996, 22)—a businessman image that displayed striking vulnerability when compared to the usual picture of power and privilege. Another "soft" advertisement, for Swissair, pictured a businessman as a daddy kissing a daughter good-bye, with the caption "If you want to get a kiss from someone you love in the morning, pack in a full day's work and be back home to say goodnight, best choose Swissair" (May 27, 1995, 22).³⁸

The layout of the paper itself also gradually became more informal. The

typeface changed to a more open, rounded style on May 25, 1991. On November 11, 1995, the old-fashioned and rather gentlemanly “Arts, Books, and Sport,” a weekly section, was replaced by a shorter one entitled “Moreover,” which together with a monthly “Review of Books and Multimedia” that includes reviews of CD ROM titles covered a wider range of topics, reflecting the postmodern interest in culture at many levels, low as well as high.

And it was not only through the change of typeface and organization that the look of the paper changed. When cartoons featured on the front cover, they were no longer line drawings with restrained color added (as on November 24, 1990, when “The Tories Choose” was illustrated by a drawing of a ruckus reminiscent of children’s comics), but were bold pictures in increasingly lurid colors. The cover on 16 December, 1995, featured a cartoon mock-horror picture of a tombstone and ghoul advertising the resurrection of Communism in movie style: “Communism II. . . . It’s Alive! . . . Just when you thought it was safe for democracy”—all this done out in violent mauve, vivid blue, and orange and yellow. After February 1996 the front cover picture was no longer confined to a formal box but was allowed to fill the whole page. Some of these changes reflect the availability of new, cheaper printing techniques, but they also give a less formal, less restrained feel to the paper.

What is striking about all this increase in informality is that it has been constituted as masculine. A breakdown of patriarchy and an increase in informality would at first sight appear to be in the interests of gender equality. The standard feminist critique of masculinist working practices describes masculine management styles as autocratic, overly hierarchical, rational, and focused on efficiency and task orientation. These are contrasted with feminine management styles that are seen as based on relationships, consensus, collaboration, teamwork, and cooperation (Court 1994). These “feminine” management styles have now been introduced on a widespread scale, and are associated with informality. However, with this new informality being constituted predominantly as masculine, it does not undercut hegemonic masculinity as much as one might expect.

Research into informal management practices in computing and high-tech industries suggests that they do not necessarily constitute an improvement for women. Margaret Tierney found that informal working practices are in fact sex discriminating—that formal promotion procedures are replaced by a “laddish” social network that grooms young men to rise up the

ladder. Women and those men who do not fit the “lad” culture are excluded from this important source of advice, support, and visibility and are consequently regularly overlooked.³⁹ Not only that, but in the new informal work culture, old-fashioned patriarchal hierarchies are themselves being increasingly feminized, with “girls” and “wimps” being seen as more comfortable with rules and hierarchy and less able to deal with flexibility (Tierney 1995). The recasting of rules and hierarchy as feminine has been a cultural sea change not confined to the workplace. For example, the same characterization of rules and hierarchy dominates 1990s action films, in which violent and wild but soft and sensitive killing/caring tough-guy heroes are hindered by feminized, domesticated, impotent, and ineffectual bureaucrats in suits (Pfeil 1995). This reversal is powerful propaganda in the struggle to claim previously feminized traits for hegemonic masculinity as it moves into the new territory of globalization.

Technocracy and Hegemonic Masculinity

Nor need an increase in informality necessarily conflict with the technocratic-frontier masculinity discussed earlier. Indeed, it may complement it. Beverley Burris associates the trend toward informality with the development of technocracy as a form of organizational control. In technocratic organizations, the workforce is divided into “experts” and “nonexperts.” Technical complexity replaces organizational complexity in a culture that values “conspicuous expertise,” because “in technocratic organizations who you know becomes less important than how knowledgeable you can appear” (Burris 1989, 453). Rigid rules and hierarchies are replaced by flexible, collegiate, collaborative working styles and enhanced communication for largely male “experts.” Meanwhile, for the rest, the nonexperts and “paraprofessionals,” work becomes increasingly routinized and regimented under computer control, geographically isolated and feminized (done by women). The fact that both experts and nonexperts use the same technology—namely, computers—masks the very different ways in which their work is organized.

The move to technocratic organization reflects a further stage in the gradual breakdown in patriarchy and increase in technocratic rationality observed by Cocks (1989) and Ehrenreich (1995). However, Tierney’s analysis clearly supports the idea of a link between technological globalization im-

agery and the increase in informality, since both would be implicated in the development of technocracy. If this is the case, then much of the new, “softer” imagery in *The Economist* and its advertisements could be mobilized for a new technocratic hegemonic masculinity, at least as easily as it could be mobilized *against* hegemonic masculinity. In terms of *The Economist*, Bill Gates of Microsoft represents the “expert” technocrat par excellence. In the “Battle of Titans” (September 21, 1996, 106)—the competition to dominate the next generation of computers—Gates was pitted against Larry Ellison of Oracle. The two men have very different personal styles, although neither appear to be remotely domesticated. Gates has been characterized as a workaholic for whom “starting a family has made no difference to his famously long work hours. Even his \$30m house is portrayed more as a showroom for Microsoft technology than a home” (106). Ellison, by contrast “works out, sails his boats, flies his planes, dates a lot, and meditates in the replica of a Japanese monastery he built” (106) and talks about his feelings for nearly an hour. In contrast to Gates the technocrat, Ellison represents an expansive but touchy-feely latter-day playboy. In this particular rivalry between would-be hegemonic masculinities, *The Economist’s* money was on Mr. Gates: “so far in this industry, obsession has proved more rewarding than reflection” (106).

Gender Issues Acknowledged

Another development in *The Economist* toward the end of the period under study was a new (although not always serious) interest in masculinity, which paralleled the increasing interest in women and feminism discussed in chapter 4. This may have reflected increasing awareness and anxiety about masculinity associated with the changes discussed above. For example, the paper made a tongue-in-cheek suggestion to tax the sexes differently, since men “impose disproportionate costs on society” through crime (May 13, 1995, 113), and also reported on the activities of gay businessmen and the strength of the “pink pound” (May 6, 1995, 38). Particularly striking was, in 1996, a new-found self-consciousness and anxiety about masculinity. Masculinity had been occasionally mentioned previously, such as when at Christmas/New Year’s 1992/93, in the context of a general discussion of the whole nature/nurture debate and new sociobiological research, it was reported that universal dichotomous gender differences existed. These were

described along the contrasted lines of competitiveness, roughness, and mathematical and spatial ability in boys and character-reading, verbal, linguistic, and emotional interest in girls. Such differences were evidenced by such things as the bias toward males in crime statistics across the world and were attributed to genetic or hormonal differences between the sexes. Homosexuality was also claimed to be due to brain differences (December 26, 1992, 61–64).

The sociobiological argument resurfaced at Christmas/New Year's 1995/96, but this time it was reported rather more ironically, with "half-playful dread" and the headline "The Male Dodo: Are Men Redundant?/Are Men Necessary?" (December 23, 1995, 121–23). It was jokingly argued that by the middle of the twenty-first century, men will be "marginal" or an "expensive nuisance" (121). After listing men's perceived weaknesses such as more inherited diseases, more troubled childhoods, more death by violence, rising unemployment, poorer health, and earlier mortality, it was argued that these were all due to testosterone (even rising male unemployment was attributed to this hormone, since brain is replacing brawn in work). Testosterone, "the supreme female invention" (123), apparently makes males fight and take unnecessary risks, and weakens the immune system.

The explanation given was an evolutionary pressure toward a more stable and industrious femininity, counterbalanced by the need for genetic diversity, so that Mother Nature conjured up men as "genetic sieves" (122). Those that survive "beating each other up or risking their lives against predators and parasites" in a "deadly jousting tournament" (123) clearly have superior genes and get to impregnate women, ensuring the genetic health of the species. In addition, scientific research has shown that in the growing embryo, the placenta is largely the product of genes from male sperm that "almost viciously set about exploiting the mother's body, not trusting the maternal genes to do so selfish a job" (123) and thus ensuring foetal survival. In this ultracompetitive masculine world, even the womb is a war zone. Thus testosterone-induced risk taking, competitiveness, and aggressiveness are half-jokingly seen as the only thing preventing the extinction of the male of the species, and not a good long-term bet for survival, given scientific developments in biotechnology and artificial reproduction, not to mention the threat to testosterone and the male sperm count posed by ubiquitous oestrogen-mimicking modern chemicals.⁴⁰ Anxieties about falling male sperm

counts were aired again at greater length six months later, on August 3, 1996 (77–79).

Of course, this analysis of masculinity fits in well with the general outlook of *The Economist*—promoting a super-Darwinistic, survival-of-the-fittest model that serves to explain the workings of international politics, international capitalism, evolution, and the nature of “Man,” all in similar terms. “Man,” then, thus described, becomes ideally suited to the pursuit of international capitalist enterprises, and his “success” in such a competitive global economic game is seen to reflect his personal survival strategies, the “success” of his genes, the proof of his (superior) manhood. As noted above, Haraway argues that there has been heavy cross-fertilization between theoretical developments in the human and natural sciences—a cross-fertilization that is connected to the development of capitalism. When it comes to sociobiology, “it is a striking fact that the formal theory of nature embodied in sociobiology is structurally like advanced capitalist theories of investment management, control systems for labor, and insurance practices based on population disciplines” (Haraway 1991, 59). Haraway demonstrates how sociobiologists analyze biological objects “in terms of the systems sciences rooted in military combat, competitive sexuality, and capitalist production” (1991, 65). It is therefore perhaps not surprising to find apparently seamless connections between sociobiology, capitalism, and international politics in *The Economist*.

On the other hand, deterministic sociobiological explanations of human behavior are hard to square with a philosophy of free will and personal responsibility. On September 14, 1996, under the banner of “The Genetic Illusion,” with a cover showing a man on DNA puppet strings, *The Economist* argued that “man” is not preprogrammed, after all. Man can apparently go against his nature, with the acid test being not whether it is difficult for someone to make a particular choice, but whether it is impossible (13).

In the same edition, the “Lexington” column reported on “the feminisation” of America (60). This was evidenced by such phenomena as an increase in female delegates, tears, and “sob stories” at political conventions, transvestism and role reversal (in both sexes) on prime-time television and in movies, the burgeoning male cosmetics and girdles market, and the involvement of women in offensive combat positions in the armed forces. Lexington briefly mentioned the debate over whether this “represents a success for women or just a devious new form of male domination,” but the col-

umn's main point was that gender differences are narrowing. The topic came up again just a fortnight later (September 28, 1996), in a five-page special entitled "Men, Tomorrow's Second Sex," accompanied by a leader with the title "The Trouble with Men." Both the feminization and "male as genetic sieve" arguments were rehearsed again, together with a joking fantasy future without men at all, men being now biologically redundant due to sperm banks—and culturally redundant, to boot, as knowledge-based societies "may be safer in women's hands" (September 28 1996, 20). This time, and more seriously, an explicit link was made between globalization, economic restructuring, and the feminization of society and employment in "rich" countries. This was accompanied by a wealth of evidence and statistics to suggest that women perform better at school and are steadily improving their position in the workplace (with some provisos about sex discrimination), mainly due to the collapse of blue-collar work and the unwillingness of blue-collar men to accept what they see as "women's work," even when it is reasonably well-paid. Although professional men were seen to be adjusting reasonably well to social and economic change, by adding some "'new man' attitudes" (25), blue-collar men were not, since "down at the bottom of the ladder where men are men and women change the nappies [diapers] (but also have the jobs), there are troubles of an entirely different order"(20).

The Economist's argument ran that women's move toward equality has been at the expense of blue-collar men and that the price will be testosterone-induced social dysfunction in men that threatens the whole of society. This, it seems, is kept in check only by work, marriage, and the family. All three are linked and were currently under threat, since unemployed men are also unmarried, and sons of single parents and stepparents have more social problems. Without the socializing forces of work, marriage, and the family, men would turn to the "fundamentalist masculinity" of criminality and gang warfare. The argument that men can be civilized only through having to provide for and look after the "purer sex" in the breadwinning role, and that professional men are more "civilized" than the rest, runs deep in the West. It was the foundation of the late-Victorian gender ideology that took women and children out of the factories and made the wives of professional men into an imperial symbol of civilization. *The Economist* did not propose "turning the clock back" (30), but the combination of biologism and "breadwinner" ideology in the analysis left little room

for alternative solutions and made the stated commitment to the equality of women seem rather lame. The best *The Economist* could offer were piecemeal reforms such as the employment of more male teachers and the decriminalization of drugs, both of which would be more compatible with a cultural rather than biological explanation of gender difference.

What is striking about all this analysis is not the generally masculinist drift of such cobbled-together arguments, but rather the fact that masculinity was no longer taken for granted. This itself could be part of the trend toward masculine self-consciousness associated with the positioning of men as consumers (Mort 1988) and an increase in self-conscious presentation and “impression management” as personal reputation replaces hierarchical position in the workplace (Collinson and Hearn 1994). However, the degree of sarcasm and embarrassed self-mockery involved in its treatment of the topic was extreme, even for *The Economist*. The moral panic over the collapse of the family, that bastion of patriarchy, was also uncharacteristic. Together with the rather confused mixture of contradictory ideas drawn from liberal, patriarchal, and biologically determinist perspectives, in a paper that has been generally known for its faith in both individualism and progress and its cool-headed logical analysis, these factors suggest that in spite of all the hype, globalization was provoking a high level of gender anxiety.

This gender anxiety was also reflected in one or two advertisements. For example, two weeks after the “Trouble with Men” special, NCR ran an advertisement (October 12, 1996, 116–17) that, under the heading “Big Consumer is watching you,” portrayed the image of a huge woman peering through the glass wall of an office, towering over the workers. The copy read: “There’s nowhere to hide. The Age Of the Consumer has hit the financial services industry and consumers know it” (October 12, 1996, 116). Globalization in this case was not so much a boy’s game, but rather a very feminine threat.

The appearance of gender anxiety and the increase in self-consciousness about masculinity suggest that hegemonic masculinity has indeed been undergoing a transition process that leaves it temporarily vulnerable. In the light of this, the increasing visibility of women and feminist issues mentioned in chapter 4 may not reflect only a continuing process of assimilation, but could be more ambiguous. In a transition period, the increasing appearance of women, however treated, is as likely to undermine the gender order as it is to reinforce it.

THIS CHAPTER HAS identified a hothouse atmosphere of competition between different masculinities in *The Economist* and has then traced a bewildering array of gendered moves that have taken place in association with globalization. These moves involved not the simple replacement of one type of masculinity by another, but complex overlaps and reconfigurations forged from a mixture of elements drawn from different archetypes. Change itself has been presented as an evolutionary battle of styles for economic and political dominance.

The competing imagery includes a collapse in patriarchal and paternalistic forms; a rivalry and synthesis between individualism and feminized Japanese cooperation; the development of a U.S. frontier-expansionist masculinity with science-fiction trappings; a continuing bourgeois-rational emphasis on expertise; some challenges from the positive appearance of women and blacks; "risk winners" in remasculinized financial services; a general increase in informality; an Americanization of masculinity through the use of images of physical strength and sports; competition between expansive, hard-playing, and nerdy hard-working technocrats; some negative images of women as threats; and a degree of gender anxiety.

This apparently confusing array of imagery together amounts to an attempted (re)construction of hegemonic masculinity. As Robert Hanke (1992) argues, changes in hegemonic masculinity are worked through a variety of mechanisms, including negative symbols of masculinity and feminized constructions. In this case, changes in hegemonic masculine imagery linked to the processes of globalization appear to be moving in at least two main directions at once, as old hierarchies are broken down further and there is a move from administrative to fiscal coordination of bureaucracy (Connell 1990). On the one hand, there appears to be a softening of hegemonic masculinity associated with consumerism and a feminization of management styles; on the other hand, there is a cult of even more rationalized technocratic efficiency. This combination of moves allows for previously feminine characteristics to be repositioned as masculine, and for outdated paternalistic rules and hierarchies to be positioned as feminine.

Hegemonic masculinity is being reconfigured in the image of a less formal, less patriarchal, but more technocratic masculine elite that has the whole globe as its playground. This emerging hegemonic masculinity contains elements of both continuity and change. The aggressive deployment of "frontier masculinity" (now tied to contemporary globalization) provides

a link to the past, as does the use of imperialist imagery. The need for softer, more informal qualities in business—qualities previously associated with “femininity”—has not been matched by demands for increased women’s status but rather has been associated with Japanese business masculinity.⁴¹ Whether Japanese and other Far Eastern businessmen were really being invited to share in the new globalized hegemonic masculinity of technocracy was less clear.⁴² Given the persistence of racist and colonial metaphor elsewhere in the paper, and the West’s colonial history of absorbing useful traits from other cultures that remained subordinate, it would seem unlikely, in spite of the paper’s liberal, race-blind editorial stand. Indeed, coding Japanese business culture as “soft” or “feminine” may be a new twist on the pre-existing racist stereotype of the “effeminate oriental” who is “mute, passive, charming, inscrutable” (Mercer and Julien 1988, 108).

What seemed to be conspicuously missing from *The Economist* (and this was in keeping with its liberal values and faith in progress) were positive images of the kind of backlash masculinity, popular among some right-wing groups, that seeks to restore patriarchal privilege in the family and the workplace. In its editorial pages, *The Economist* has endorsed neither social conservatism nor economic protectionism and has been against large bureaucracies and organizational rigidity. *The Economist*’s loyalties are nearly always to the future, creating a permanent atmosphere of threatened patriicide. This contradicts and undermines the lingering patriarchal imagery in advertisements and promotional literature.⁴³

On the other hand, the process of change has not been smooth. Not only are dichotomized gender ideologies particularly vulnerable during periods of change, when settled patterns of gender difference and gender segregation lose legitimacy, but the process of change has itself been disrupted by other trends that undermine hegemonic masculinity and posit an alternative vision of globalization. It has been disrupted by the increasing representation of women, in both editorial and advertising, by the increasing coverage of feminist and gender issues that have to be reported if *The Economist* wishes to keep its reputation for progressive liberalism, and by bouts of gender anxiety over masculinity itself. The bouts of gender anxiety, as argued above, stretch the usually legitimizing device of irony to its limit. Connell (1990, 534) suggests that what he calls “hysterical tendencies” in the media, together with the cult of the ruthless entrepreneur (so prevalent in the 1980s), may be signs of the unraveling of hegemonic masculinity rather than

its transformation. If the masculinist imagery in *The Economist* is typical of a wider cultural shift, then there is room for feminists to exploit the contradictions between the “softer” and “harder” forms of masculinity that are on offer, to contest the coding of informality as “masculine” and “hierarchy” as feminine; and to nurture those alternative relationships, identities, and narratives that will renegotiate the relationship between diverse groups of women, femininity, and globalization.

However, in terms of *The Economist* itself, on balance, those factors that would undermine hegemonic masculinity have played a minor role in comparison with the dominant, science-fictionalized imagery of frontier masculinity and the promotion of technocracy, with its informal, cooperative-style working practices and a “risk winning” technical elite. In conclusion, *The Economist* is itself a prime site where the interpretive wars and symbolic struggles involved in the jostling for position between would-be hegemonic masculinities is played out—a site that is particularly relevant in terms of the construction of a contemporary, masculinist-inflected discourse of globalization. In the next chapter, this textual analysis of the paper is brought together with the earlier discussion of masculinities in IR, to see what light the one can shed on the other.

