Part two *Masculinities, IR, and Gender Politics*

CHAPTER THREE

Masculinities in International Relations

So far the discussion has revolved around the construction of gender identities and the politics of masculinities. What, one might ask, has any of this to do with international relations? In reply, I would challenge the disciplinary assumption that international relations and the politics of identities (including gender identities) are discrete areas of research that have no important interconnections. Rather I would ask: How might the perspective on the politics of masculinities and masculinism that is discussed above illuminate our understanding of international affairs, and be brought to bear on the discipline of IR? To attempt to answer such a question is to refuse the boundary between IR and political theory or political science, and to make the boundary itself (which hides these connections) an object of enquiry. In doing this, I will follow critical and postpositivist approaches that examine the construction of IR as a discipline, rather than operating from within it.

The chapter sets out to indicate some of the complex and circular links between international relations, the discipline of IR, the politics of identity, and the production of masculinities. After briefly discussing how the study of multiple masculinities relates to the research agenda at an applied level, I will concentrate on the relationship between some aspects of hegemonic

masculinities and IR at the symbolic level. The focus here is not on the practices of international relations per se, but on the symbolic role they play in linking the politics of culture and gender identity with the discipline of IR. The chapter therefore considers some of the connections between masculinist practices, multiple masculinities, and theoretical controversies within the discipline itself.

International Relations and the Production of Masculinities

There is an interesting anomaly between the significant role that international affairs play in the production of identities, including gender identities, and the relative absence of discussions of identity in mainstream approaches to the discipline of IR. Masculinities are not just domestic cultural variables: both political events and masculine identities are the products of men's participation in international relations. As noted earlier, the Victorian English Gentleman was defined and constructed in relation to a complex, global set of racialized gender identities. As a type, therefore, he was at least as much a product of imperial politics as of domestic understandings of Englishness, aristocracy, and masculinity. In terms of the three dimensions of gender identity discussed in chapter 1, a number of two-way links can be made between international relations and the production of specifically masculine identities, as depicted in figure 3.1.

It is a commonplace observation that international relations reflects a world of men in that they influence international affairs through their physical capacities, through (masculinist) practices at the institutional level, and through the symbolic links between masculinity and power. But there is also a relationship flowing the other way (as Ehrenreich, among others has argued—see below). International relations also make men through the same channels in reverse. These two-way influences are illustrated by the arrows in figure 3.1, which demonstrate how the relationship between men and international relations is mediated.[1] The separation of elements in the diagram is illustrative only. Of course, there are complex relationships between the dimensions of embodiment, institutional practices, and symbolic meanings—which are often all present in the same "event." Nevertheless, for explanatory purposes the connections shall be briefly separated here. To illustrate this diagram and explain these connections, a fairly arbitrary selection of examples have been chosen. Some illustrate the links through all



FIGURE 3.1. The relationship between men and international relations.

three dimensions, while others operate most clearly through one or two dimensions. All have been chosen to highlight the influence of international relations on masculinities rather than vice versa, as this is the more novel claim.

Military combat in the pursuit of war is a clear example of how international relations helps to shape men. War has been deemed central to the discipline itself and has historically played a large part in defining what it means to be a man in the modern era, symbolically, institutionally, and through the shaping of men's bodies. First, the symbolic dimension: the argument that men take life while women give it, is a cornerstone of one powerful ideology of gender differences (Segal 1987). This ideology has been central to modern warfare and underpins the masculinity of soldiering and the historic exclusion of women from combat (Elshtain 1987). In symbolic terms, engaging in war is often deemed to be the clearest expression of men's enduring natural "aggression," as well as their manly urge to serve their country and "protect" their female kin, with the one implying the other (Tickner 1996).[2] The popular myth is that military service is the fullest expression of masculinity, and in 1976 there were about twenty million men under arms in about 130 standing armies worldwide, compared with only two million women (Connell 1989).

However, as Ehrenreich (1987, xvi) argues, "it is not only men that make wars, it is wars that make men"—literally and physically. Military service has served as a rite of passage for boys to be made men throughout much of the modern era, while at the level of embodiment, military training explicitly involves the physical and social shaping of the male body. Indeed it can be argued that "war and the military represent one of the major sites where direct links between hegemonic masculinities and men's bodies are forged (Morgan 1994, 168).

Joanna Bourke (1996) has examined the relationship between masculinities and embodiment in Britain in World War I, when soldiering became intimately bound up with notions of masculinity. Soldiering disciplined the male body, helping to shape its style of masculinity as well as its physical contours. This shaping was inflected by class. As one middle-class soldier, Ralph Scott, graphically noted in his diary: "I looked at my great murderous maulers and wondered idly how they had evolved from the sensitive manicured fingers that used to pen theses on 'Colloidal Fuel' and 'The Theory of Heat Distribution in Cylinder Walls.' And I found the comparison good" (quoted in Bourke 1996, 15–16).

If middle-class men found themselves transformed from bourgeois rationalists to warrior-citizens, then for the working classes the emphasis was much more on basic fitness. At the beginning of World War I, British authorities had been horrified at the quality of their raw material, as British manhood was by and large malnourished, disease-ridden, of stunted growth, and poorly educated.[3] Such men had to be "converted" into soldiers, both physically and mentally. The increased surveillance and regulation of male bodies that this entailed was sustained through the interwar years, when regular exercise through military-type drills was widely adopted in schools and other institutions. Military drill therefore constituted an institutional practice that had been established through war and that had a widespread effect on men's bodies. Drill was also deemed to make men economically efficient, to promote emotional self-control, and even to enhance brain development (Bourke 1996, 178–80).

Men who did not fight were looked down on, while the "real" men, those who fought, carried a high risk of death or physical disablement. The return of thousands of youthful war-mutilated servicemen, who were hailed as masculine heroes, changed the medical and technological approach to disablement for good, and even modified public attitudes for a while. Ini-

tially, although the most disfigured men were kept out of sight, the lightly maimed soldier was regarded as "not less but more of a man" (quoted in Bourke 1996, 58). These were "active" rather than "passive" sufferers, who deserved respect, not pity, and who were even deemed especially attractive to women as marriage prospects (Bourke 1996, 56). To be physically maimed was far more manly than to be a "malingerer," although many "malingerers" were in fact men psychologically damaged by "shell shock." The dead were also heroes. So for a while, Bourke argues, manliness was equated with physical dismemberment. In the long term however, sympathy changed to disgust at the carnage involved, and disabled former servicemen who could not fulfil a role as breadwinners became increasingly marginalized and feminized.

Although Bourke finds evidence to suggest that the majority of soldiers in World War I retained a longing for a quiet domestic life, at the extreme the relationship between masculinity, male bodies, and war can be brutal and misogynistic. Klaus Theweleit (1987) investigated the literary fantasies of the Freikorps. This was a volunteer army, derived in part from World War I "shock troops," who helped to put down the attempted socialist revolution in Germany following the war and who later became the core of Hitler's SA. These troops lived for battle and had a reputation for enjoying violence. Apparently, they both hated and dreaded women's bodies and viewed their sexuality with a kind of fascinated horror. In their novels and memoirs, the male body was depicted as dry, clean, hard, erect, and intact, but always threatened by contamination from feminine dirt, slime, and mire (Theweleit 1987, 385–402). Women's bodies were seen as messy, open, wild, and promiscuous—as engulfing swamps in which men could be annihilated. Women, communists, and the rebellious working class represented a "flood" or "tide" threatening to break down both masculine integrity and established social barriers (Theweleit 1987, 405–38). This enemy had to be repeatedly smashed to a bloody pulp to make the world safe for men and masculinity again (an activity that provided the added "thrill" of coming close to the horror of dissolution). Thus physical violence was integral to the construction of the masculine self—without it the Freikorps could not sustain their bodily integrity in the face of desire, pain, and internal viscera—the feminine Other forever lurking within (Theweleit 1989).

Continuing with the military example, militarization as an institutional process has followed different paths under different international circum-

stances. Cynthia Enloe (1993) has discussed the varied relationships between women, degrees and types of militarization, constructions of masculinity, and international practices in different locations and at different times. That the links between masculinity and militarism are contingent and are produced through institutional practices is highlighted in her account. For example, under British colonial rule, the construction of imperial armies was no mean feat, as colonized groups of men often took some persuading that soldiering was in any way a manly pursuit. Complex bargains over conditions of service had to be struck, depending on differing local requirements of manly respectability (Enloe 1993, 79). Recruitment policies have also helped to define hegemonic and subordinate masculinities. In many countries, ethnically or religiously subordinate groups of men, along with homosexuals, have historically been barred from active military service or have been given restricted roles (Enloe 1980). Such restrictions, justified by nationalist security ideologies, have helped to construct the subordinate status of these groups more generally, through the implicit and explicit links between military service and citizenship. Full citizenship rights are often denied to men who do not participate in defending the state, in much the same way as they have been for women.[4]

Within the military itself, institutional practices also help to shape different masculinities and masculine identities. Connell (1989) argues that the basis of military organization was historically a relationship between two masculinities—one based on physical violence but subordinate to orders, and another dominating and organizationally competent (in Britain this relationship between "officers" and "ranks" has reflected and helped consolidate the class system). In the last century, a third masculinity—that of the technical specialist—has become increasingly important, necessitating a "general staff" of planners, strategists, and, latterly, technicians, separate from the command of combat units (Connell 1989).

Moving on from the military example to colonialism, the institutional practices of European colonialism have also helped to consolidate hegemonic and subordinate masculinities on a global scale (as mentioned in chapter 2). Backed up with pseudoscientific theories such as craniology, which linked skull size with intelligence and personality, the ranking of masculinities according to race was organized around the dimension of embodiment. In 1849 the craniometrist Samuel George Morton used skull measurements to rank Caucasians at the top of the scale, blacks at the bot-

tom, and Amerindians and Asians in the middle (women ranked with blacks, but this—see below—was in terms of "intelligence"). The Caucasian group was further subdivided, with Anglo-Saxons and Germans at the top, Jews and Arabs intermediate, and Hindus lowest (Halpin 1989). As well as skull dimensions (which were later proved to be linked to nutrition, rather than intelligence), other body parts were deemed important, with black Africans in particular being seen as super-muscle-machines suited to heavy labor (Mercer and Julien 1988). In local differentiations, paler races tended to be ranked above darker ones, and taller above shorter ones—as in the case of tall Punjabis versus short Bengalis, mentioned in chapter 2 (Sinha 1987).

This ranking was not only organized around embodiment, but was also institutionalized in colonial administration. To cite a British Empire example, in India middle-ranking locals were heavily involved in the administration itself (albeit in the lower ranks), while Parsees of Persian stock were promoted to relatively high positions and became more thoroughly immersed in British culture (with some even being educated at British public schools and universities). This contrasted with Africa, where the lower-ranking of African males meant that even junior officials were imported from Britain.

In the twentieth century, the legacy of this "scientific racism" was reflected in the ranking of mandated territories by the League of Nations in the aftermath of World War I, through which European imperial ambitions were also realized. Mandated territories were ranked into A, B, and C categories according to their degree of "civilization" and readiness for self-rule. The A category covered Iraq, Palestine, and Syria—Arabs and Jews, who were deemed nearly ready for independence. The B category covered tribal African countries such as Rwanda, Togo, and Tanganyika, which would require decades of stewardship. The C category covered "stone age" Pacific Islanders and the Hottentots of Southwest Africa, who were deemed to need centuries of external rule (Louis 1984).

Contemporary links between institutional practices in international relations and the construction and ranking of masculinities are often more subtle. Nonetheless, the legacy of colonialism, combined with the dominance of the United States, is such that the education and socialization of senior politicians, diplomats, generals, international civil servants, and other players on the international stage is still heavily influenced by European, if not Anglo-Saxon, values of hegemonic masculinity, regardless of the cultural

origins of the predominantly male players themselves. The role of elite educational establishments in the West in producing hegemonic masculinities over the last hundred years is well documented and theorized (e.g., Connell 1987; Mangan and Walvin 1987) and such institutions still tend to churn out a high proportion of international elites. Even those postcolonial political leaders most vociferously against the hegemony of Western values in international society have rarely escaped the influence of those values.[5]

The production of masculinities and disciplining of male bodies through competitive team games is another legacy of the Victorian colonial era with strong contemporary relevance in terms of embodiment and institutional practices as well as symbolism (Mangan and Walvin 1987; Jackson 1990). It affects not only sporting relations between states and the lives of international sportsmen, but also the everyday lives of boys and men in schools, clubs, and leisure time, throughout the world. The training techniques and the languages of sport and war overlap considerably, with each being used as a metaphor for the other, strengthening the connections between them (Shapiro 1989b). At the symbolic level, international sporting competitions, particularly in gender segregated team games such as football, rugby, and cricket, also mobilize and fuse national feeling, masculine identification, and male bonding among players and spectators alike (Simpson 1994).

Specific foreign policies also lead to the institutionalization of particular kinds of masculinity. Take, for example, the cold war, which according to Enloe was "best understood as involving not simply a contest between two superpowers, each trying to absorb as many countries as possible into its own orbit, but also a series of contests within each of those societies over the definitions of masculinity and femininity that would sustain or dilute that rivalry" (Enloe 1993, 18–19).

David Campbell (1992) argues that in the case of the United States, an explicit goal of foreign policy was the construction and maintenance of a U.S. identity. A "society of security" (Campbell 1992, 166) was created in which a vigorous loyalty/security program sought to define Americans in terms of excluding the Communist Other, both externally and internally. Campbell notes the gendered nature of such exclusionary practices, so that, for example, Communists and other "undesirables" were linked through feminization, as indicated by the abusive term *pinko*.[6] Although he does not emphasize the point, this U.S. identity that was constructed through Communist witchhunts and the associated tests of "loyalty" was essentially a mas-

culine identity. Indeed, it was the very same form of masculinity that was also shaped by fear of "latent homosexuality" as discussed by Ehrenreich (see chapter 2). Integrating Campbell's and Ehrenreich's (1983) work, it becomes clear that vigilance against the possibility that unsuspecting liberals might unwittingly help the Communist cause, paralleled and intersected with the vigilance needed to ward off the threat of "latent homosexuality." While the institutional practices that supported this identity were eventually reduced in reach and scope, Ehrenreich suggests that the symbolic legacy lasted longer, so that "communism kept masculine toughness in style long after it became obsolete in the corporate world and the consumer marketplace" (Ehrenreich 1983, 103). Eventually, it was not only the increasing visibility of gay men, but also the Vietnam War and its aftermath that engendered a crisis in this hegemonic masculinity of anti-Communist machismo. Not only did the enemy turn out to be women, old men, youths, and children, but U.S. masculinity was shown nightly on television, in a pathological, brutal light (Ehrenreich 1983, 105). The "emasculation" of American men following the defeat in Vietnam, and the desire to reverse this, helped to provide support for both the politics of the Reagan era and the Gulf War (Jeffords 1989; Niva 1998).

Finally, the popular media operate largely through the symbolic dimension of the links between men and international relations (see fig. 3.1). Between them, television, radio, films, books, newspapers, and magazines disseminate a wealth of popular iconography that links Western masculinities to the wider world beyond the borders of the state. There is a long-standing and continuing association in the popular media of foreign adventure with virile masculinity, ranging from boys' stories of the nineteenth century (Kanitkar 1994), through the legend of Lawrence of Arabia (Dawson 1991) and the myth of the French Foreign Legion, to contemporary potboilers and adventure films. Diplomacy, spying, and the reported activities of presidents and statesmen have helped to define hegemonic masculinities in the popular imagination. As James Der Derian has suggested, the relationship between the real and fictional worlds of espionage has been close, with influences in both directions (Der Derian 1989). The symbolic link between espionage and hegemonic masculinity is demonstrated by James Bond films, which promoted a "gentlemanly" and "aristocratic" ideal of manhood: a man of leisure leading a glamorous lifestyle—updated for cold war politics.[7]

Meanwhile, in the nonfictional world, media attention is focused on personalities, "international players" who are icons of glamorous wealth and power. In current affairs, statesmen and presidents are presented as the ultimate hero figures (or sometimes as villains)—popularized larger-than-life images of exemplary masculinity, judged constantly in terms of their manliness or lack of it. John Fiske considers "hard" news and current-affairs programs, which place such "heroes" in the context of distinctively masculine styles of production, narrative structure, and presentation, as the masculine cultural equivalent of feminine soap operas (Fiske 1987, 281). Even everyday language reveals the gendering of the world beyond state borders: not just explicitly sexual phrases such as "conquest of virgin territory," but also more mundane phrases and slogans such as "a man of the world," "travel makes a man of you," and "join the army, see the world"—these all invite men to flee the domestic hearth in the search of manhood, and the farther the better.

Much of the appeal of these glamorized connections between international adventure and masculinity is that the worlds depicted are worlds where women have traditionally been entirely absent, or were presented as threats to masculinity (Fiske 1987; Roper and Tosh 1991; Kanitkar 1994). The very word *international* implies privileged access to a higher plane above and beyond the borders of the state behind which most of us are confined. Although this may no longer be literally the case, it still carries symbolic meaning. These cultural connections, between notions of masculinity and the "international" and media representations of glamorized masculinities in an international context, whether fictional or in the guise of news and current affairs, are no less important in constructing masculinities than practices on the ground. They provide a continuing source of imaginative inspiration that informs the meaning of such practices and also help to reflect and produce the highly gendered cultural framework within which such practices are shaped and interpreted. Although they are not all directly relevant to international politics, they form a network of cultural meanings within which international relations are embedded, and without which its practices cannot be fully understood.

As well as operating at a general level, these cultural connections must also inform the nexus of personal, intellectual, and professional interests that practitioners and academics bring to their work. Academics and practitioners do not work in a cultural vacuum. It would be interesting to investigate how much men in the field use their own participation in internation-

al relations to achieve or bolster masculinity for themselves, as a core of their identities, whether self-consciously or otherwise. Challenging the gendered nature of IR will be an uphill task if it not only proves threatening to mainstream practitioners at an academic or even a professional level, but also at the level of personal identity and psychology.

Academic IR and the Politics of Identity

There may be numerous ways in which international relations are implicated in the construction of masculinities and masculine identities: through the direct disciplining of male bodies, through numerous political and institutional practices, and through broader cultural and ideological links. In contrast to this possible wealth of examples, IR as a discipline has generally shown little interest in, and has been ill-equipped to deal with, issues related to the politics of identity construction.

Before the intervention of feminists, the closest mainstream IR got to acknowledging the relevance of gender identities was in the assumptions about (masculine) human nature that underpinned theory in the classical tradition—assumptions that tended to mirror the prevailing naturalized discourses of gender. For example, Keohane quotes Morgenthau as describing the "limitless character of the lust for power," which "reveals a general quality of the human mind" and that accounted for war (Keohane 1986, 11–12). After World War II, much of IR theory was revolutionized by behavioralism, which sought to turn it into a science of quantifiable and measurable exactness. Such assumptions about human nature were questioned and criticized as being vague and unprovable, but rather than the criticisms opening up a series of interesting political questions about the absence of foundational identities in politics, attempts were made to contain questions of identity in bureaucratic or psychological models of human behavior (Allison 1971; Jervis 1985), to mechanize them in the ubiquitous rational-actor model (Keohane 1984), or to do away with them (along with many other relevant topics) by resorting to purely systemic explanations (Waltz 1979),[8] all in the name of science.[9] Given these moves either to codify or, in Waltz's case, remove "human nature" from the discipline, it is hardly surprising that the politics of identity construction has been neglected.

The structuring of IR theory to exclude questions of the politics of identity has some interesting effects that serve to uphold the existing gender order and indirectly confirms the importance of international politics as one

of the primary sites for the production and naturalization of masculinities in the modern era. Consider the way in which the discipline of IR itself has historically been conceptualized in mainstream theory and analysis. International politics has been divided from politics within states in disciplinary terms because of apparently distinct features that make international politics qualitatively different from other kinds of politics. In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant view was that, while politics and "the good life" (Wight 1966, 30) could be pursued within the secure borders of states, survival, fragile laws, and uneasy alliances and balances were all that could be expected in an international arena that is above all characterized by anarchy. With anarchy (between states) and sovereignty (within states) as its principal guiding forces, IR theory found it easy to "black box" the state, deeming all that goes on in it as irrelevant except where it is expressed as "national interests" (Hollis and Smith 1990).

As the discipline of IR has developed since then, the division between domestic politics and international relations has not been strictly adhered to. It has often been breached, for example in foreign-policy analysis, when both the domestic determinants of foreign policy and the international determinants of domestic politics have been examined (Gourevitch 1978). Such breaches have led to debates over the "levels of analysis" problem, which asks whether international relations should be explained by reference to properties of the system of states, to the behavior of individual states, to pressures arising from domestic politics, or to the activities of individual people such as particular statesmen (see Hollis and Smith 1990). Moreover, characterizations of international "anarchy" have also become much more varied and sophisticated.[10]

It would be unfair and inaccurate to say that mainstream IR now "black boxes" the state, except in one or two influential examples.[11] However, anarchy of one kind or another is still the defining feature of international relations for mainstream analysis, and the domestic politics/international relations divide retains a crucial symbolic importance, as it remains the principal justification for the existence of a separate discipline of IR in the first place.

Private/Public/International Boundaries

Breaching the domestic politics/international relations division, however, will not in itself lead to a clearer understanding of the involvement of inter-

national relations in the politics of identity construction or the production of masculinities. This is because of a second boundary (or rather series of overlapping boundaries) that is rarely referred to in mainstream IR literature but that is also highly relevant to its conceptual space. This is the boundary between the public sphere of politics (and economics) and the private sphere of families, domestic labor, and reproduction, which has been challenged by feminists (Peterson 1994). In political philosophy, the private (familial) and public (political) spheres have been deemed to have different moral requirements (Grant 1991).[12] The domestic/nondomestic or familial/nonfamilial boundary has been accompanied or overlaid by other public/private divides; notably, the political/social or state/civil society division of liberalism and the more recent, and romantic, social/personal division, in which both the state and civil society fall into the public realm (Kymlicka 1990).[13] Domestic and family life has tended to fall outside both the state and civil society in liberal schemes, and the position of women and children in families was neglected in classic liberal discussions of justice and freedom. As for the newer distinction between the public realm and personal life, the right to privacy has merely tended to reinforce the idea that family relations should be exempt from questions of public and social justice (Kymlicka 1990). In spite of some contradictions between these different definitions of the public and private, together they add up to a formidable barrier to women's equality, in general, and inclusion in civil and public life, in particular.

Gender divisions and inequalities depend to a great extent on the segregation of social life into separate spheres for men and women, so that gender differences can be constructed and the lines of difference made visible.[14] The cultural and social production of gender differences and gendered character traits segregates the sexes in various ways, in order to construct and make visible the lines of difference between them. Generating gendered constructions is an integral part of any such segregational practice. The construction of conceptual boundaries between the private and the public has been challenged as just such a gender segregation. By arguing that the personal is political, feminists have successfully bridged these private/public divisions and have to some extent politicized the private spheres of family life, domestic labor, and intimate relations. Whilst few feminists would wish to abolish the notion of privacy altogether, they have successfully put such formerly private issues as domestic violence and sexual harassment on the public political agenda and have helped to promote

tax equality and benefits—entitlement equality between husbands and wives.

Putting these private/public and domestic/international boundaries together, modern life is conceptually divided into a number of highly gendered separate spheres. These can be categorized in a number of ways, but include the domestic/private (which can be divided into familial and personal); the nondomestic/public (in which public can be further divided into state and civil society); and the international. IR symbolically becomes a wholly masculine sphere of war and diplomacy, at the furthest extreme from the domestic sphere of families, women, and reproduction in the private/public/international divides of modernity. Thus personal life, domestic and family life, and even much of civil society has been evacuated from IR.

Where IR dips into the "black box" of the state, it is usually to deal with public, political, or economic issues and affairs of the state. Women and their traditional supporting roles—for example, as army and diplomatic wives, as nurses and prostitutes servicing armies, or even as production workers in defence industries—are outside the traditional remit of international relations, their activities by and large occupying lowly positions in the public sphere or being wholly confined to the private or domestic realms (Enloe 1990). As the private/public/international divisions define international relations as a virtually all-male sphere, then it follows that the activities and qualities associated with this gender-segregated space cannot help but inform the definition and production of masculinities. The emphasis on power politics in both theory and practice then reinforces the associations between such masculinities and power itself, associations that are crucial to masculinism.[15]

The private/public/international divisions inscribe an all-male sphere that serves as an arena for the production of masculinities. However, this productive power is hidden, as these very same divisions help obscure the processes of identity production. The production of masculinities is rendered invisible because an examination of the interconnections between the international and the private world of personhood is discouraged—ruled out of court as outside the remit of the discipline. Questions of gender identity are generally assumed to be private aspects of adult personality (invoking the right to privacy from public scrutiny) and are rooted in the domestic realm of childhood and family life (invoking the familial/nonfamilial

or domestic/nondomestic divide), if not determined at birth—far from the reach of IR's focus of analysis.

The private/public/international divisions that have informed the construction of IR as a discipline have rendered it utterly blind to gender politics. This traditional framework is not a natural reflection of external events, and it has rightly been challenged from within the discipline. For example, as Richard Ashley argues, the domestic politics/international relations division is a mutually defining one. In realism and neorealism, sovereignty reigns within the state, while the international realm is one of danger and uncertainty, which intrepid statesman attempt to tame.[16] However, it is the very inscription of danger and uncertainty in the international realm that allows the space within states to be defined as a well-bounded domestic social identity within which progress and the good life can take place (Ashley 1989, 305).[17] Ashley's work seeks to problematize the paradigm of state sovereignty with its division between inside and outside, domestic politics and international relations. He advocates a theoretical stance that lies at the "borderline" or "margins" of domestic and international politics (Ashley 1989, 309).

But Ashley ignores the public/private division. It took a feminist, Cynthia Enloe, to bridge the private/ public/international divide explicitly. Enloe uses the phrase "the personal is international" (1990, 195). Of course, feminist contributions by their very nature refuse the boundaries of IR as narrowly conceived. Any interest in gendered constructions is already outside the remit of mainstream IR, not to mention bringing into view gendered divisions of power, labor, violence, and resources—thus incorporating not only the marginalized spaces of women's economic activities and politicized resistance movements (Peterson and Runyan 1993; Sylvester 1994), but also the "private" worlds of diplomatic wives and migrant domestic workers (Enloe 1990; Sylvester 1994) and the international relations of sex (Enloe 1990; Pettman 1996).

Rob Walker (1992, 1993) acknowledges that the private/public boundary obscures gendered analysis as much as the domestic/international one. He recommends that critical approaches should rename the discipline to indicate a wider remit that transcends these boundaries. However renaming the discipline is not so easy. Walker's (1992) preferred title is "World Politics," a phrase that has a respectable history.[18] However, feminists and other critical contributors have not necessarily endorsed this particular change. Peterson

and Runyan (1993), for example, prefer to use "Global Gender Issues"; Connolly (1989) uses "Global Politics."

There are clearly problems of definitions in the usage's of the words *international*, *global*, *world*, and *politics*. The problem with *international* is that in IR it tends to denote relations between discrete states. Replacing *international* with *world* is an attempt to move beyond this to include the supranational, subnational, and transnational. If IR has also been associated with a technical, problem-solving approach, as argued above, then to substitute the term *politics* for *relations* is clearly not only an attempt to bring back the political but also serves to emphasize the scope of political theory beyond state borders. *World politics* thus suggests a discipline that is not bounded by any particular "level of analysis" and that acknowledges the relevance of political theory. On the other hand, many activities that Walker and other critics of mainstream IR wish to cover might not fall within the definition of "politics"—even fairly widely cast. Peterson and Runyan's use of the word *issues*, instead, indicates the wider nature of the topics they cover. The word *global* instead of *world* also signals the fact that they acknowledge the new global gender division of labor associated with globalization (see chapter 5 for full discussion). This is in keeping with the trend in which the subdiscipline of international political economy (IPE) is increasingly being referred to as global political economy.[19] Perhaps while *world* signifies a flexible approach to the place/space of relevant activities, *global*, through its association with the term *globalization*, implies that the world has itself become a more tightly integrated space. On the other hand, Pettman (1996) prefers the combination of *Worlding Women* and *international politics*—even while discussing the global division of labor. Meanwhile, Sylvester (1994), Tickner (1996), and Stearns (1998) stick to *International Relations*.[20] If nothing else, this confusing state of flux shows that the process of inscription is never complete and indicates the degree to which traditional boundaries of the discipline are now being challenged.

The implication of the above critique is to take seriously the cultural production and interpretation of masculine identities as a political process in its own right, a process that both informs and is informed by other, more conventionally defined, political and military struggles identified in IR literature. That this cannot be done within conventional approaches should be clear. If one cannot simply take mainstream IR and "add women" or "add femininity" to get a properly gendered analysis (Peterson 1992b), neither can

one take mainstream IR and merely "add men," or "add masculinity," or even "add masculinities." This is where Adam Jones (1996), who wrote an article on the subject of introducing masculinities into IR analysis, is misguided. Critical of feminists who seek to overturn mainstream analysis altogether, he takes the view that a realist/neorealist perspective should be reworked to include different masculinities as gender "variables," with a particular focus on subordinate groups of men. However, this approach would take masculinities as already given variables and would largely ignore the way in which international relations is implicated in their production. The epistemological limitations of such analysis would obscure the politics of masculinities—that is to say, the relational and power-laden processes of their construction.

Multiple Masculinities in IR Theory

Having established that IR as a discipline is implicated in the production of masculinities, and in particular hegemonic masculinities, one can then tease out a number of different and competing masculinities at play in the field and consider the relationships between them. In order to do this, it is convenient to follow the common practice of dividing the discipline into several competing perspectives. Over the years there have been a number of different ways in which this has been accomplished. Steve Smith (1995) identifies ten different categorizations of the discipline, arguing that as tools of the power/knowledge nexus, such categorizations are constitutive and that they obscure as much as they illuminate.[21] They are constructed to reflect normative concerns and to silence alternative interpretations, and they suffer from lumping together sometimes disparate arguments. In the case of this text, the normative concern is to uncover and challenge gendered constructions, to identify disciplinary divisions with contemporary relevance and the models of masculinity that underpin them.

To this end it is useful to follow a modified version of the interparadigm debate characterized as between the three perspectives of realism/neorealism, liberalism/pluralism, and neo-Marxism (Smith et al 1981). This division has been widely used since the beginning of the 1980s; it is the basis of many IR textbooks and "has become the accepted wisdom of most international theorists" (Smith 1995, 18).[22] It also shares a good deal in common with Wight's earlier (more ideologically based) three Rs categorization of real-

ism, rationalism, and revolutionism (Wight 1991), providing some historical disciplinary continuity. This kind of threefold division has the benefit of being widely used and easily recognized both in IR and IPE, and has previously been adopted by feminists. For example, Tickner, in her "three models of man" (1992), sees models of masculinity as dividing broadly along realist, liberal, and Marxist lines.

However, as Smith (1995) argues, there is no even division between the three perspectives in terms of academic output. Since World War II, IR has been dominated by the realist/neorealist camp, with the liberal/pluralist (now neoliberal institutionalist) perspective coming a respectable second. There has been a real debate between these two perspectives (probably reflecting U.S. foreign-policy concerns), but the neo-Marxist camp has been largely marginalized, especially since the collapse of Soviet Communism. Meanwhile, other "revolutionary" theories have emerged. Andrew Linklater has usefully remodeled the three Rs for the 1990s with critical theory replacing neo-Marxism in the third (the revolutionary, or emancipatory) category (Linklater 1990). One might add that the new poststructural and postmodern perspectives in IR share in this revolutionary zeal, and all three come under the category of postpositivists (as do feminists). In this spirit, I here divide the discipline into three broad categories. The first two, realism/neorealism and liberalism/neoliberalism, form the most prominent prongs of modern IR theory. They can be seen to draw on well-established models of hegemonic masculinity. The third category is of (admittedly diverse) theorists. They fall into a postpositivist perspective, which, although it currently occupies a marginal position, promises to remodel (in the case of critical theorists), overthrow (in the case of poststructuralists), or otherwise transcend modernity and modern theories—including, by implication, the entrenched forms of hegemonic masculinity that such modern theories represent. While this categorization is immensely crude, it captures the main fault lines in contemporary debate and divides the upholders of the status quo from those who might be expected to be more gender aware and more sympathetic to feminist concerns.[23]

Symbolically, realism can be seen to embody hegemonic masculinity, in that it is the perspective of elite white men, in which the ideal of the glorified male warrior has been projected onto the behavior of states (Tickner 1992). However, even within realism a number of different and contradictory archetypes and formulations of hegemonic masculinity are in play.

Machiavelli, for example revised the Greek archetype of the warrior-citizen for modern times, while Hobbes combined elements from the patriarchal model uneasily with an individualism associated with the emerging bourgeois-rationalist model (Elshtain 1981). In spite of their incompatibility, both are considered founding fathers of contemporary realism.[24] The postwar importation of scientific methods and economistic assumptions has now overlaid the warrior-citizen and patriarchal elements with bourgeois rationalism. The historical eclipse of realism by neorealism is usually presented as one where vague generalizations about human nature were superseded by the promise of positivist scientific rigor, but it can also be seen as a reversal of the relationship between man and nature as conceptualized in IR theory. In the Hobbesian view, man in the international arena is in a state of nature, not standing over nature. Indeed, rather than man having control over nature, nature is in control of man. It is this apparently unmediated natural anarchy that provides the excuse for "stag fighting" over territory and helps to legitimate hegemonic masculinity by naturalizing it. This is a very different use of the concept of nature than the one projected by the scientism of neorealist discourse, with its emphasis on control.[25]

Such contradictions do not appear to have undermined the appearance of continuity in the realist/neorealist tradition. Indeed, the credibility and durability of the realist approach may partly lie with the fact that it does appear to combine and embody traits that have been associated with male power and dominant masculinity under different historical conditions, providing a manly trait for every occasion. For example, a combination of warrior and patriarchal masculinities lay behind what Connolly (1989) describes as the twin strategies of European imperialism: conquest and conversion. Conquest involved the supremacy of adventurous men in the warrior mold, while conversion to Christianity involved a patriarchal approach. In the twentieth century this was overlaid by the mantra of modernization—a bourgeois-rational practice that has replaced religious conversion as the key Westernizing tool. In embodying all three of these models of hegemonic masculinity, realism can implicitly lay claim to this history of imperial masculinity as its own, now thoroughly sedimented and naturalized, source of authority.

In contrast, rival liberal and pluralist perspectives have depended more singularly on the bourgeois-rationalist model. Given that realism and neorealism (which by this account appear to draw on a number of varied mascu-

line archetypes) have dominated international relations for decades in spite of regular announcements of their demise, it is worth recalling the argument above, that masculinities that are hegemonic have a broader range of traits to draw from than others.

These different archetypes of masculinity imply different relationships to women and feminism. The heroic warrior-citizen model tends toward overt misogyny since "it involves a notion of manliness which is tied to the conquest of women. In Machiavelli's own words, 'Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force'" (Tickner 1992, 39). Meanwhile the patriarchal model ignores women. Where were the women in Hobbes's state of nature? As Rebecca Grant argues, "men dominate the conceptual scheme, leaving no room for the question of how gender relations affect the transition out of the brutish state of nature and into society. Women are invisible in the 'state of nature'" (Grant 1991, 10). Presumably, the "invisible" women were in a state of *nurture* (producing the next generation); otherwise, life would have been nonexistent rather than merely "nasty, brutish and short" (Tickner 1991, 31). Women fared little better in the alternative, romantic, republican tradition, as in Rousseau's state of nature, reason and understanding could be attained only by men (Grant 1991, 11).

The bourgeois-rationalist model of masculinity is less aggressive, more egalitarian and democratic. As outlined in chapter 2, it idealizes competitive individualism, reason, and self-control or self-denial, combining respectability as breadwinner and head of household with calculative rationality in public life. In this model, superior intellect and personal integrity is valued over physical strength or bravery. The relationship between this model of masculinity, women, and feminism is more subtle and complicated than in the case of the warrior-citizen or patriarch. Its philosophers have championed women's rights, and feminism itself has its roots in bourgeois-rationalist thought (Pateman 1988; Coole 1993). It is above all a modern form of masculinity, the first New Man—linked to the Enlightenment, the modern state, and the development of capitalism. In its purist and most abstracted form, as the rational-actor model, it is also the most ubiquitous characterization of human action in contemporary IR, not just in liberal approaches but rather directly or indirectly informing much mainstream neorealist and neoinstitutionalist scholarship, ranging from IPE, through public-choice approaches to politics, to strategic studies.[26]

Victor Seidler (1987; 1988; 1989) traces the history of this model of masculinity, viewing it as the dominant contemporary form, not only in terms of theoretical categories but also in terms of gendered identities. He explores the rational/emotional, mind/body, and reason/madness dichotomies of Western thought and their association with developing notions of masculinity and femininity in the post-Enlightenment period. Seidler argues that the rationalist tradition sees emotions and desires as threatening. Both Kantian thought and Protestant culture posit an inner freedom from emotionally driven inclinations as the ideal. Feelings and emotions are seen as both imperiling masculine superiority and questioning the sources of masculine identity. The body, its desires and frailties, similarly poses a threat to masculinity and pure reason. Acting only from reason and duty serves to strengthen the autonomy of men. Otherwise they are in a position of servitude, when reason becomes a slave to the passions. Therefore self-control over one's emotions and body have come to be hallmarks of masculinity. Emotional and dependency needs as well as sexual desires are transformed into issues of performance and control or displaced onto "feminine" Others such as women, gays, Jews, and blacks (Seidler 1987, 86–90). Including himself in this tradition, Seidler argues that "the connections we might otherwise have developed to our somatic experience and emotional selves have become so attenuated that we can no longer experience them as a basis for grounding our experience" (Seidler 1989, 18). As a result, bourgeois-rational men have been locked into externalizing and intellectualizing their experiences and have a bias toward self-denial and self-rejection.[27] With their identity defined in opposition to "feminine" dependency, emotionality, and bodily enslavement, they are, by and large, instrumentalist in thought and goal-oriented in action (Seidler 1989, 12).

The rational-actor model, as used by IR theorists (although it is not exclusive to IR, by any means) fits this psychological profile well. It posits that actors have exogenously given preferences or aims that they can rank in order of importance; that they will then seek to optimize these aims, and that they will weigh up the expected costs and benefits (and, in more sophisticated versions, risks) of alternative courses of action in seeking to achieve their goals. Physically disembodied and socially disembedded, it assumes personal autonomy, instrumental rationality, and goal orientation. Various modifications to the model have been introduced to take into account of the constraints on pure rational action that actors may encounter in practice

(Keohane 1984). Although its adherents claim it as an objective, politically and culturally neutral model of behavior into which any values can be inserted, it contains implicit normative and prescriptive aspects.[28] The model's power to socialize is evidenced by the abstract "rational" discourse of defence intellectuals, where dry euphemisms reign and for whom any display of emotion or recognition of human frailty is the ultimate "feminine" taboo.[29] Carol Cohn reports a conversation with a white male physicist who had been working with a group of defence colleagues on the modeling of "counterforce attacks": "All of a sudden," he said, "I *heard* what we were saying. And I blurted out, 'Wait, I've just heard how we're talking— Only thirty million! Only thirty million human beings killed instantly?' Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn't even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman" (Cohn 1993, 227).

In spite of its pretence at being a universally applicable model of human behavior, the rational-actor model is clearly grounded in highly individualistic and instrumental values. It both derives from and promotes a particular variety of hegemonic masculinity emanating from post-Enlightenment North Europe: the bourgeois-rational individual of liberalism. This variety (which is more Lockean than Rousseauian or Machiavellian) requires certain social and political conditions in order to flourish, such as a strong private realm in which relatively autonomous individuals capable of critical self-reflection can develop (Benhabib 1992).

Although some feminists have criticized the paradigm of autonomous rational man for universalizing masculinity through its generic pretensions (Harding 1986; Tickner 1992), defenders of the rational-actor model might argue that women need not be excluded—that the assumption that women, too, are capable of autonomy and reason is an egalitarian one, to be counterposed to centuries of contrary propaganda. They might follow the early feminist Mary Wollestonecraft (1929) in arguing that to view all forms of reason and rationality as masculine is to essentialize gender difference and buy into the very gender dichotomies that feminists are trying to escape. This line of reasoning is very seductive and has led some contemporary liberal feminists, such as the economist Nancy Folbre (1994), to embrace a modified version of the rational-actor model. In her account of gendered global economic development, incorporating the political economy of family policy and the hitherto invisible economics of reproduction and family welfare into her analysis of economic-development strategies, Folbre tries to sub-

sume the rational-actor model within a feminist diagnosis of the structure of patriarchy. In her scheme, patriarchy and capitalism are structures that constrain the actor's options in different ways. In the case of patriarchy, it is according to gender.

The problem with this type of argument is that it ignores the basis on which liberalism (and liberal feminism) developed. As Carole Pateman argues, the social contract of liberal theory contains within it an implicit and hidden sexual contract. The social contract between freedom-loving individuals takes place only in the public sphere, a sphere that (as was argued above) not only excludes familial relations, domestic labor, and the unequal position of women in marriage, but also depends on them for its existence. The private sphere is a necessary foundation for public life, and as such is part of civil society but is kept separate from politics and "civil" life. While men could pass back and forth between the two spheres, women were not just excluded from the original social contract: they were the subject of it. Women represented everything that the individual was not. Thus the social contract was a fraternal pact and "far from being opposed to patriarchy, contract is the means through which modern patriarchy is constituted" (Pateman 1988, 2).[30]

On the other hand, there is an affinity between liberalism and all feminism. After all, it was the bourgeois-liberal tradition, with its rationalist approach and universalizing concepts, that provided the intellectual climate for feminism to develop in the first place, in the name of universal equality (Banks 1981; Coole 1993). This is where the tangled and contradictory roots of feminism and bourgeois-liberal thought begin to show themselves. Liberal feminism thus remains hampered by its contradictory aspiration to (masculine) rationality (Pateman 1988). The demand for female equality has grown out of liberalism, but cannot be realized within it (Eisenstein 1981).[31] Returning to Folbre's scheme, we can see that as the rational-actor model of free individuals relating to each other in civil society itself underpins capitalism and implicitly relies on modern forms of "patriarchy," then neither can be seen as structures that lie outside the model.

The affinities and connections between early feminism and bourgeois rationalism might explain some of the similarities between feminist and liberal critiques of realism, which have encouraged neoliberal institutionalists such as Robert Keohane to take an interest in feminist perspectives (Keohane 1991). Keohane is a great supporter of the rational-actor model and has

done much to popularize game theory in the subdiscipline of IPE.[32] His initial interest in feminism stemmed from what he saw as some mutual common ground. For example, while the concept of cooperation, often highlighted in standpoint-feminist approaches, may be a dangerous sign of feminine weakness for realists, bourgeois-rationalist men such as Keohane can accommodate it when it is deemed to be in one's rational self-interest to do so (Keohane 1984). In striking contrast to liberal political theorists, liberal institutionalists in IR and IPE often adopt communitarian values, although these are derived from liberal individualistic premises.[33] Thus, as Keohane notes (1984 and 1991), he and standpoint feminists alike tend to emphasize cooperation, interdependence, empathy, community, reciprocity, networks, mutual enablement, and confidence-building measures as ways out of the security dilemma and other international problems (Keohane 1991). Whether such qualities count as feminine or not rather depends on one's model of masculinity.

However, in spite of considerable overlap between liberal and standpoint-feminist critiques of realism, bourgeois rationalism remains problematic for all but liberal feminists for a number of reasons, not least its paternalism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Keohane has been accused of merely incorporating those aspects of feminism that suit him, those aspects that are least threatening to the status quo and his own concerns. As Cynthia Weber argues (1994), rather than engaging with feminist claims seriously, Keohane has dismissed the more challenging and radical strands of feminism in pejorative terms. This twin strategy of incorporation and demonization thereby dilutes feminist threats to the orthodoxies of IR theory.

The rational-actor model cannot easily be divorced from the historically specific and highly gendered framework of meanings within which it was developed. Although less prominent in IR, the Marxist model of Man also suffers from the problem of universalizing a particular model of masculinity. Cast in the image of the worker-hero derived from an industrialized, blue-collar masculinity, he, too, inhabits the nondomestic world and leans heavily on masculine reason and fraternal relations. This strategy has helped some previously subordinate men—namely, peasants and manual workers—to get more political power, at least for a while, in many parts of the world. But the Marxist understanding of class and labor excludes and naturalizes women's domestic labor (Tickner 1992). So as Soviet women found, they could enjoy "the dignity of labor" and join "the brotherhood of man" as long as they shouldered a double burden, and molded themselves

in the image of the masculine industrial laborer—while continuing their "invisible" work as women in the family as well.

Interparadigm Debates and Multiple Masculinities

Below I will consider postpositivist constructions of gender, but first I would like to suggest that gendered rivalries between different models of masculinity may have had a hidden and unacknowledged influence on the interparadigm debate. In chapter 2 I argued that masculinities are relatively fluid, combining different traits to suit the occasion. Then strategies of masculinization and feminization are often deployed to upgrade or downgrade rival masculinities in a pecking order, or hierarchy of masculinities, with gendered power and status as the potential reward for the hegemonic position. As each perspective in IR is associated with particular constructions of masculinity, there is scope for such strategies in the often-acrid rivalry between them.

Realism, largely developed in a cold war climate, had an affinity with the type of cold war masculinity discussed above—the masculinity of tough-talking presidents and of John Wayne and James Bond. Its ascendancy over prewar liberalism was in part achieved through a successful "emasculation" of liberalism and of liberals as "failed men" (Ashworth and Swatuk 1998, 82) who had sought to domesticate international politics with Enlightenment reason but had ended up appeasing Hitler. However, by the early 1970s and the era of détente, the dominance of realism was coming under attack from new perspectives, particularly liberal transnationalism. One of realism's critics, Robert Rothstein, argued that realism was outdated and dangerous:

> What it has done has been to foster a set of attitudes that predisposed its followers to think about international politics in a particularly narrow and ethno-centric fashion. . . . And once decisions have been made, it has provided the necessary psychological and intellectual support to resist criticism, to persevere in the face of doubt, and to use any means to outwit or dupe domestic dissenters. The appeal of realism is deceptive and dangerous, for it rests on assumptions about state behaviour which have become increasingly irrelevant. (Rothstein 1991, 416)

In Rothstein's view, realism was an oversimplified perspective in which "the only guide to the future is the past" (ibid., 415). He considered that it re-

mained popular only because it suited statesmen, allowing them the dominant role as general operators in all manner of international affairs. However, generalist statesmen were themselves no longer up to the challenges posed by international relations, which would be better handled by suitably qualified experts.

The point of outlining Rothstein's argument is not to establish its veracity (or otherwise) but to show how it makes use of a gendered subtext. Rothstein's loyalties were clearly to bourgeois-rational experts rather than citizen-warriors. Statesmen, who followed the Machiavellian antidemocratic requirement of secrecy in diplomatic affairs, embodied a citizen-warrior masculinity, bolstered by patriarchal privilege. Such citizen-warriors and patriarchs were no longer what was required to run international affairs—but rather bourgeois-rational experts would usher in a new age of international cooperation. Rothstein was in effect deploying a New Man strategy here. Just as New Men in chapter 2 boosted their own position by pathologizing blue-collar workers as being unsophisticatedly macho and crudely violent, so Rothstein bolstered bourgeois rationalism and its associated liberal theories by implying that realism embodied a pathological variety of masculinity, with dangerous outdated traits.[34]

For a while, liberal transnationalism was in the ascendancy. However, in the late 1970s Kenneth Waltz led a counterattack and defence of realism, now reconfigured as neorealism, a perspective that in terms of intellectual rigor would "meet philosophy of science standards" (Waltz 1986, 27). In this "scientific" turn, Waltz was clearly grafting bourgeois-rational masculinity onto the base of citizen-warrior masculinity bolstered by patriarchy, which Rothstein had earlier criticized. In order to fend off the threat of bourgeois rationalism, Waltz was trying to incorporate it into a realist perspective, to regain realism's historic postwar ascendancy. He was particularly keen to emphasize the importance of parsimony and theoretical "elegance." He warned against "the accumulation of more and more data and the examination of more and more cases" (Waltz 1986, 30), arguing that this leads to being "overwhelmed with useless detail." He criticized "today's students of politics" (Waltz 1986, 31)—that is, the pluralists and liberals of the 1960s and 1970s—for doing just that.[35] He also, in his "systemic" theory, was intent on cutting out all factors that he saw as irrelevant to the "laws" governing the system of states, including the "low politics" that liberals and pluralists concentrated on at the time. He dubbed their theories with the pejorative term

reductionist because they "explain international outcomes through elements located at national or subnational levels" (Waltz 1986, 47). When analysis erroneously considered factors that by rights should have been confined to domestic politics, the consequence was that "so-called variables proliferate wildly," leading to "endless arguments that are doomed to being inconclusive" (Waltz 1986, 52).

The gendered subtext here is that pluralist and liberal perspectives were being feminized by Waltz in order to put them down. Theoretical overcomplication that creates confusion is akin to so-called feminine woolly mindedness, in signifying lack of masculine reason and purposefulness. Lack of parsimony and the wild proliferation of variables is akin to a feminine propensity for uncontrolled verbosity and indulgence, and signifies a lack of masculine self-control. Such failings contrast neatly with Waltz's own punchy, curt, and slightly aggressive prose.[36]

Liberals and pluralists were also contaminating the discipline through its domestication. Although this charge of domestication was made on the basis of bringing "domestic politics" into international relations, its force could only have been strengthened by the fact that the bourgeois form of masculinity that liberal and pluralist perspectives embodied was itself more domesticated in the other sense: the sense of home and hearth. Both domesticity and lack of mental clarity have feminine connotations, and one could argue that through such arguments Waltz and others strove to reinforce their rehabilitation of realism by subtly feminizing the Other of pluralism. While Waltz himself yokes bourgeois-rational method onto a fundamentally citizen-warrior tradition, he wields a compact and pushy style to give it "muscle." Yoked to the idea of "parsimony," this style gives the manly impression of being the academic equivalent of those popular male heroes of few words but many deeds.[37]

In the 1980s, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism converged around a core methodology of rational actors, game-theoretic models, and an increased interest in international political economy. Their principal disagreement was over the degree of cooperation or conflict inherent in the international system, as modeled by game theory, rather than the bigger issues that had divided earlier realists and liberals (see, for example, Keohane 1984). This convergence coincided with, and may have been prompted by, the deregulation of international finance and global economic restructuring. But at the same time, there was a transformation of masculinities asso-

ciated with international banking and finance (Thrift 1994). Just as academic neorealists were starting to take political economy more seriously (e.g., Gilpin 1987), so new financial forces in the global economy were being clothed in the cold war imagery of masculinity, images redolent of the diplomat and spy, complete with high-tech gadgetry. Both these developments might reflect the interplay between a reorientation of hegemonic masculinities and the processes of globalization.

This will be discussed in later chapters. For now, it is sufficient to note that the concerns of neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism have increasingly converged. Their rivalry is more muted. Instead, the latest big debate in IR theory is one between the combined forces of positivist neoliberal and neorealist institutionalists, on the one hand, and postpositivists, on the other (Lapid 1989). This debate, too, is informed by gendered rivalries. In particular, it is worth considering the relationship between changing constructions of hegemonic masculinity (which as will be argued later are connected to globalization) and the influence of postpositivist approaches.

Hegemonic Masculinity and the Postpositivists

Rather than initially looking for the types of masculinity embodied in postpositivist approaches to IR, this section will first focus on the gender awareness of selected postpositivist approaches and their relationship with feminism. This is because the best safeguard against inadvertently embodying forms of hegemonic masculinity and continuing the masculinist rivalries that have hitherto inhabited the discipline would be through explicit gender awareness, critical self-reflection, and the incorporation of feminist insights into theory and analysis. Critical self-reflection in theory (through deconstruction) has been held up by a number of postpositivists as their guarantee against replicating the power/knowledge constructions of modernity (Ashley 1988; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Walker 1993; Smith, Booth and Zalewski 1996), and therefore one might expect them to extend such self-reflection to issues of gender.

However, some feminists have expressed concern over the continued absence of sustained gender analysis in some other postpositivist approaches to international relations, despite the obvious compatibilities and epistemological affinities (such as deconstructing dualisms and identities; abolishing the international/political divide; exploring exclusionary strategies, and trans-

forming the agenda) between these and feminist approaches to international relations (Whitworth 1989; Peterson 1992b). Christine Sylvester discusses the claim of some postpositivist dissidents to write from the margins and to bring into view that which has been excluded from modern perspectives. While such contributors acknowledge that both woman as the Other of man and femininity as the Other of masculinity fall into the category of exclusion, and even discuss the gendering of core concepts such as sovereignty, anarchy, autonomy, and dependence, they have so far failed to follow this observation up by drawing on feminist scholarship in their own work, or including feminist contributions in their edited collections.[38] In this respect, they have ended up implicitly reproducing the masculinism they might otherwise undermine (Sylvester 1994, 149–50).

Even the most apparently sympathetic renderings of poststructuralist critique may miss important gender implications. Take Richard Ashley, a prominent IR poststructuralist, for example. He has exposed and deconstructed the paradigm of "sovereign man" (Ashley 1989) that lies behind the concepts of sovereignty, anarchy, and states as rational actors. In a widely used analogy, the state is treated like an individual, who as an autonomous rational actor is implicitly a male individual (discussed above). The state's territorial integrity is seen as analogous to an individual's bodily integrity, and its sovereignty is analogous to an individual's autonomy.[39]

Ashley argues that the practice of combining atomistic conceptions of man and state sovereignty with systemic arguments about the logic of anarchy is inherently contradictory. For example, in Waltz's *Man, the State, and War*, although Waltz himself emphasizes the need to combine explanations based on human nature, the state, and the international system, Ashley argues that such methodological contradictions make this difficult. In Ashley's deconstructive reading, even though men and states are characterized as rational actors—decision-making autonomous individuals who maximize self-interest—the logic of anarchy at the systemic level of international relations leads to the conclusion not that "man" makes war, but rather that war makes "man."[40] "Man" is thus revealed as an unstable concept, being conceived of at one and the same time as both an original or foundational identity and as a subject whose behavior is determined by the international system. To expose these contradictions is to uncover one of the "transversal struggles" (Ashley 1989, 296) through which knowledgeable practices of power inscribe meaning, to reveal that

> a paradigm of sovereign man, far from being a pure and autonomous source of history's meaning, is never more than an effect of indeterminate practical struggles in history. It is to see the figure of man as an effect that is always resisted, always an effect that might not happen, and therefore, always an effect in the process of being imposed, resisted, and reimposed, often in transformed form. (Ashley 1989, 297)

Ashley argues that modern statecraft projects the paradigmatic voice of sovereign man as a textual strategy that externalizes dangers and that "shall be disposed to recognize as intrinsically problematic or troubled—and at a minimum to exclude from serious discourse—other persons not similarly disposed to recognise these dangers, externalise them and try to bring them under control" (Ashley 1989, 303). In the context of his discussion of IR theory, the "other persons" can be taken to mean the "feminized" discourses of alternative approaches to the discipline. The paradigm of sovereign man is explicitly linked in Ashley's analysis to bourgeois-liberal conceptions of the autonomous self—that this is a particular form of hegemonic masculinity should be clear from the discussion above. However, because of his focus on the totalizing discourses of modernity, Ashley sadly has less to say about the citizen-warrior model of masculinity that also informs such "heroic" constructions (so that *sovereign man* equates with *sovereign statesman*—see discussion above).

Ashley clearly uses the word *man* knowingly—he is aware that it is both a generic and a gendered term, which is opposed to the feminine Other of anarchy. He even quotes Julia Kristeva, a feminist poststructuralist, in his consideration of texts (Ashley 1989, 281). Yet he does not explore even the more obvious gendered dimensions of his discourse: the exclusion of women in this paradigm. While Ashley chooses to treat his material purely as a discussion of rhetorical strategies in the production of academic knowledge, his material is also relevant to the identities of men and the ongoing construction of hegemonic masculine identities. He concludes that "modern statecraft is modern mancraft. It is an art of domesticating the meaning of man by constructing his problems, his dangers, his fears" (Ashley 1989, 303). Such a conclusion should apply not only to the production of modern theories of IR, and to the creation of "man" as a subject in the text, but also to the production of hegemonic masculine subjectivities on the ground through its association with practical participation in modern forms of poli-

tics. Ashley's analysis is too abstract and disembodied to acknowledge or explore this dimension. In spite of his critique, he remains in the rarefied mental world of metanarrative and the philosophy of "Man." The real Other(s) of such a paradigm include not only "woman" but also subordinate masculinities and marginalized groups of men.[41]

Ashley is heavily influenced by both Foucault and Derrida, neither of whom address the question of male power directly, in spite of their preoccupations with the power/knowledge nexus (Nicholson 1990; Ramazonoglu 1993). The failure to take on board the insights of feminist scholarship (in Ashley's case, even while quoting feminist scholars) is not confined to poststructuralists in international relations. Moreover, as Jane Flax argues, male poststructuralists still largely operate within the mentalist tradition of Western philosophy, however much they argue they are displacing it. In privileging abstract thought over lived experience in their consideration of the production of knowledge, they reinforce phallogocentrism—the fantasy of control and omnipotence associated with "the Word"—even as they criticize it (Flax 1990).[42] As Susan Bordo, discussing Flax's argument, concludes: "The Great White Father (who also has a class identity . . .) just keeps on returning, even amid the seeming ruptures of post-modern culture" (Bordo 1993, 281). Continuing to recuperate the Other in conceptual terms alone will not necessarily mean progress as far as women and subordinate men are concerned. To quote Bordo again, "we deceive ourselves if we believe that post-modern theory is attending to the 'problem of difference' so long as so many concrete others are excluded from the conversation" (Bordo 1990, 140).

These criticisms also apply to some extent to the work of critical theorists. Although critical theorists (like feminists), straddle the modern/postmodern boundary, they are regarded as postpositivists in Smith's (1995) categorization of the postpositivist debate in IR. As Benhabib argues, critical theory and Habermasian discourse ethics remain in the rationalist tradition of Western philosophy, with its emphasis on abstract principles and procedures—paying all too little attention to concepts such as "the concrete other" and the "ethic of care" traditionally associated with feminine morality in their rendering of ethics and politics (Benhabib 1992). As such they embody and promote bourgeois-rational masculinity. However, it must be said that recent efforts have been made to incorporate Benhabib's and other feminists concerns on this issue (see, for example, Linklater 1996), and critical

theorists such as David Campbell and Rob Walker (both discussed above) have to date offered the most satisfactorily gendered analyses outside of explicitly feminist circles.[43]

A cynical argument is that, these exceptions notwithstanding, for the majority of academic postpositivists, challenging Enlightenment dualisms allows the "pimps of post-modernism" to get "a bit of the Other" by indulging in academic cross-dressing. Like 1970s and 1980s New Men, they enjoy playing with the previously forbidden fruits of femininity (and other exotic cultures) without engaging with feminism seriously or surrendering their gender privileges (Moore 1988). In spite of such accusations, there is no doubt that in challenging the assumptions of modern theory, academic postpositivists have opened up a conceptual space for change, with possible gender implications. Peterson has noted that "to the extent that masculinism is privileged, forms of knowledge—including postpositivism—associated with the 'subjective' and the 'feminine' are devalued and resisted as inferior to 'hard science' with its claims to objectivity, certainty and control" (Peterson 1992b, 196). Postpositivist approaches remain marginal to the bulk of IR scholarship.[44] Under these circumstances, incorporating feminist scholarship might expose such perspectives and the male academics who pursue them to further marginalization.[45] However, failing to do so will undoubtedly play into the hands of masculinist interests.

Indeed, some dissident discussions may even unwittingly mark out new agendas for emerging hegemonic masculinities to colonize, particularly those by contributors such as James Der Derian (1989, 1990, 1995) and Michael Shapiro (1990), who are influenced by Baudrillard's postmodernism of "hyperreality" and "simulacra" (Baudrillard 1983).[46] And here I would like to discuss Der Derian's work in more detail than I have hitherto given to other contributors to IR. This is not to demonstrate that he has ignored gender issues (which he has), but rather to identify more clearly what new form of masculinity his work might embody. The significance of this will become apparent in later chapters.

Der Derian's more recent work takes fragments of texts from different genres and interweaves them into a "magic world, a pastiche of science fiction, cartoons, Disneyland, CIA reports, spy novels, IR theory, movies and so on" (Huysmans 1997, 337).[47] This is an interpretive method designed to pull together popular culture and political and academic sources and to de-differentiate between genres, refusing conventional disciplinary bound-

aries.[48] As such, it has some common ground with the aims of this book and could in theory be sympathetic to feminist concerns. However, Der Derian displays a particular fascination with speed and the virtual world of new technology, and the language that goes with it. He has in fact been accused of being excessively "techno-celebratory" (Der Derian 1995, 1).

At first sight, Der Derian's approach to technology, and particularly the technology of war, is critical. In a 1990 article, he argues that poststructural analysis "can help us understand something that cannot fully be understood: the impact of an array of new technological practices that have proven to be resistant if not invisible to traditional methods of analysis" (1990, 297). He then discusses the antidiplomatic discursive power associated with such "technostrategic" practices (which make use of technology for the purpose of war) as simulation, surveillance, and speed, drawing on the ideas of Baudrillard, Foucault, and Virilio, respectively. Simulations of various kinds, he argues, are proliferating and displacing reality—so that simulated electronic targeting overrides reality in deciding who gets shot, and the novels of Tom Clancy keep realism in favor in state affairs. Surveillance is being comprehensively extended into international relations through satellite technology and other electronic means. Speed has meanwhile displaced geography as the primary basis of military logistics, giving tactical vision increased strategic importance. The impact of these factors taken together means that "the war of perception and representation demands more of our attention and resources than the seemingly endless collection and correlation of data on war that goes on in the field of international relations" (308).

While Der Derian is clearly against the normalizing power of such practices, which induce both "simulation syndrome" (303) and paranoid, overdetermined decision making, his playful use of language, combining science-fiction terms and a sophisticated, ironic tone with academic analysis, all work against his disapproval and could serve to glamorize or lend legitimacy to his subject matter. For example, his prose is littered with terms such as *chronopolitics*, *cyberspace*, *hyperreality*, and *simulation sickness* (303), all mimicking or derived from science-fiction sources. Admittedly, he has not appropriated these phrases for academic use himself: *chronopolitics* comes from Virilio, *hyperreality* from Baudrillard, and so on. However, they are obviously used with relish and in the context of a playful approach to language. When discussing "the panoptic surveillance machine" (308), he even adds a touch of chilling, science-fiction mystery and suspense, describ-

ing the machine as a "power" that is "here and now, in the shadows and in the 'deep black.' It has no trouble seeing us, but we have great difficulties seeing it" (304). Through their association with the cutting edge between science and science fiction, such terms do add glamour to the subject matter. Der Derian is aware of the power of the language he uses. He is happy to heavily promote the term *simulation* in spite of, or perhaps because of, the fact that "'simulation' also has the obvious advantage of sounding more serious than 'gaming' and of carrying more of a high-tech, scientific connotation than 'modelling'" (301).

While Der Derian's language can undermine his apparently critical approach to new technologies, other clues suggest that his own relationship with technology is rather more ambiguous. In a piece about Der Derian's visit to the U.S. forces training facility at Hohenfels, Germany—where, in a thinly veiled "Bosnia," simulated battle-training for "operations other than war" was taking place (1995, 8)—Der Derian comments that the briefing officer, one Major Demike, "clearly had a take-no-prisoners attitude toward the English language" (8). However, all the major's high-tech jargon is then served up by Der Derian in a commentary on his briefing, including descriptions of operations training in which, for example, "simulated artillery attacks are launched via Silicon Graphics workstations, and hits are assessed according to probability software which calculates trajectories, terrain and the grid locations of vehicles and troops which are constantly updated by Global Positioning Systems" (9). After this we visit the "Warlord Simulation Centre," with its computer and satellite equipment and the "MILES" (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) laser stores, the trip culminating in a lurid description of battles simulated with lasers in the "cyber-Box."

On one level, this account could be seen as simply an ironic replaying of the techno-enthusiasm of the military—another game Der Derian is playing with the language of new technology. After all, he is attempting to convey the atmosphere at Hohenfels itself, where the technology is clearly revered, and his commentary is wry. He picks up the major on his assumption that soldiers are always male and so a female voice announcing casualties would stand out against the background noise: "My query about what happens when women eventually join combat simulations was met with a blank stare by the major" (9–10). Der Derian's juxtapositions also show the absurdity of statements such as when, after showing video footage of simulated battle in "the Box," a Colonel Wallace said, "None of this stuff is

staged, it's all live from live footage taken by the Viper video teams in the Box" (11). Der Derian sums this up as a "knack for paradox" (11). Earlier, Colonel Wallace is reported as having said that "virtually everything we do is real. There's nothing simulated in the Box" (9).[49] The lightly mocking tone of Der Derian's account could be interpreted as a way of displacing the importance or credibility of this heroic techno-babble, and he indulges in frequent, sophisticated wordplay, such as when describing a four-hundred-page "White Paper" outlining the purpose of all this training: "In po-mo terms, this "White Paper" was this year's model for the hi-tech, post–Cold War simulations and training exercises that would prepare U.S. armed forces for pre-peace keeping non-interventions into those post-imperial spaces where once- and wannabe-states were engaged in post-war warring" (13). Unfortunately, any serious criticisms hidden in this light-hearted banter are undermined by Der Derian's own complicity in the underlying technophilia. First, there is always the suspicion that playful enjoyment of the language reflects playful enjoyment of the technology itself. But the relationship between Der Derian and the military technology he describes involves more than ironic language games. Technology is given a central place in Der Derian's account of his tour of Hohenfels and is presented as if self-evidently important.[50] His account of the simulated battle in the "cyber-Box" is not confined to the plot but also comes complete with hardware weaponry specifications. His enthusiasm for technology is signaled not only by the amount of space he devotes to descriptions of military hardware, but also by such statements as "ever since *Kraftwerk* droned their ode to the 'Bahn, Bahn, Autobahn,' I've felt a strong urge to travel at hyperspeed encased in German steel" (6). Here Der Derian not only betrays his love of technology and speed but also invokes a classic image of rebellious youthful masculinity in this fleeting homage to rock-and-roll and fast cars. Of course, any good postmodernist would deny innocence, but Der Derian's fascination with the world of virtual technology comes through very strongly in his work. Later in the piece, he interviews Paul Virilio, a critical theorist of the new technologies and a source Der Derian much admires and draws on repeatedly (Huysmans 1997). In the course of the interview, Virilio reveals his own ambiguous relationship to the new technologies:

> I think that the power of technique will lead to its religion, a technocult, a kind of cybercult. Just as there is an Islamic, a Christian, a Jewish inte-

> grism, there is a technical integrism in power, which is made possible with the technologies of information. Fundamentalism, in the field of technology, is just as dangerous as the religious one. Modern man killed the god of transcendence, the god of Judeo-Christianity, and he invented a machine god, a deus ex machina. One should be an atheist of technique. I try to be an atheist of technique. I am in love with technique. My image is that of the fight between Jacob and the Angel. He meets god's angel but in order to remain a man he must fight. This is the great image. (quoted in Der Derian 1995, 23)

Virilio's ambiguous relationship with the new technologies, which he both loves and is critical of, is seen as a manly battle, with Virilio cast in the role of tragic hero, a warrior doomed to fight the thing he loves. Grappling with new technology is clearly portrayed as a masculine thing.[51]

Arguably, the struggle against the seductive angel of information technologies and their strategic applications is a struggle that both Virilio and Der Derian are losing. Their fascination with "virtual" technology resembles the earlier "toys for the boys" fascination with missile technology exhibited by more conventional contributors to strategic studies. Both groups, earlier strategists and postmodern contributors, display a degree of nihilism. In the case of earlier strategists, this was through the pathological emotional distance and absurdly abstract air of unreality surrounding such dangerous concepts as mutually assured destruction, or MAD, as it was known (Cohn 1987), and in the case of postmodernists, it is through their invocation of Nietzsche (e.g., Der Derian 1990). Both indulge in playful language games with masculine associations, the earlier strategists using a highly sexualized language of explicit phallic symbolism (Cohn 1987) and the postmodernists through forays into the world of fiction such as *Top Gun* and *Miami Vice* (Shapiro 1990) and through aping the rhetoric of *Boys' Own* science fiction. The main difference is that in the postmodern version, the playful language makes it into the academic journals and books, rather than being translated into the formal language of "objective" science.[52]

However, transgressing the boundaries of acceptable rhetoric and mixing fiction with "hard facts," self-consciously irreverent as it may be, is not enough to ensure the radical credentials of postmodern writers. The U.S. forces clearly do not see Der Derian as a threat; if they had, they would not have given him privileged access to U.S. armed forces state-of-the-art train-

ing facilities in the first place. More likely, and in spite of the apparent stupidity of some of the commanding officers, they see him as a tool in a propaganda war in which potential enemies will hopefully be cowed and bamboozled by the appearance of high-tech wizardry. What the armed forces may be less conscious of, however, is how hegemonic masculinity may be being remodeled in the process (a remodeling to be discussed in more detail in the following chapters). Since feminist interventions form a substantial contribution to the postpositivist debate in IR, postmodern academics have less excuse to participate so enthusiastically in such a process.

I HAVE ARGUED here that an awareness of multiple masculinities raises new questions about the relationships between different masculinities and international practices. This chapter also raises questions about the boundaries of the discipline, as one effect of traditional conceptualizations is to inscribe IR as a primary site for the production of masculinities, while at the same time obscuring this process, by eliminating personal life and questions of identity from its scope of analysis. In addition, the relationship between masculinities and IR needs to be seen as part of a broader set of historic and contemporary cultural connections between masculinity and "the international" that are themselves politicized; the relationship needs to be analyzed in the wider context of "world politics," or a similarly broadly conceived successor discipline. Such a perspective would be no respecter of levels of analysis or existing disciplinary boundaries. This is not to suggest that anything and everything should come under the remit of IR, but rather that it should not be viewed in isolation and that its gendering practices cannot be "seen" from within.

Meanwhile, the discipline itself both reflects and (re)produces the dynamics of competing masculinities in the struggle for hegemony. In this context, the struggle between institutionalist and postpositivist approaches can easily become one between competing masculine futures (or may even result in some new hybrid hegemonic masculinity). In crude terms, if realists and neorealists can be characterized as warriors and patriarchs, and institutionalists and liberals as embodying varieties of bourgeois New Men, then some postpositivists (not critical theorists) can be seen as the "rebels without a cause" of IR theory—rebels whose rock-and-roll sci-fi masculinity may become the future orthodoxy.

Intellectual rigor notwithstanding, the academic discipline of IR is not exempt from the general observation that the more men align themselves with hegemonic masculinities, the more they boost their own credibility and perpetuate that hegemony (Connell 1987). This is true in epistemological as well as sociological terms. The further away from hegemonic masculinities their perspectives roam, the more easily such perspectives are marginalized. Most female academics are already on the professional margins (Caplan 1994), and as such have less to lose by endorsing feminist approaches. Postpositivists open up an intellectual space that can either be used for undermining the gender order or for the reconstitution of hegemonic masculinities. Take on board feminist scholarship in a sustained fashion and they risk further marginalization; keep quiet, and they will find their work recuperated for masculinist purposes. Under such circumstances, challenging the gender order is clearly in the interests of all marginalized perspectives in IR, and not just avowed feminists. Without a clear commitment to dismantling the gender order, some postpositivists may merely facilitate the further transformation of hegemonic masculinities to serve a new era of globalization.