CHAPTER TWO

Masculinities and Masculinism

Once gender identities are recognized as constructed by open-ended, multiple, and multidimensional processes rather than being seen as fixed constructs, then the politics of masculinity can be seen as a contested field of power moves and resistances, rather than being construed as a fixed set of power relations. This chapter analyzes the politics of masculinity, using material from both the sociological men's-studies literature and feminist contributions to the discipline of international relations. In particular, I aim to reconcile feminist critiques of "masculinism" with the recognition and analysis of multiple masculinities.

I first want to make some initial points. Although I shall draw on a wide variety of practical and historical examples (using literature relevant to international relations where possible) the intention here is not to verify or argue the case for any particular example of masculinity or interpretation of masculinism, but rather to draw on existing studies in conjunction with theoretical literature to develop and illustrate a theoretical perspective that will be applied in later chapters. Therefore, this chapter should be read as mainly theoretical.

The preceding chapter identified how gender identities are constructed

through the three dimensions of embodiment, institutional practices, and language/discourse, using a perspective that combined the Foucauldian concept of productive power operating in a diffuse manner throughout society, with postmodern understandings of the fluidity and multiplicity of identities. However, as I noted, while Foucault's notion of productive power is very useful in understanding how gender identities are produced, it is blind to gendered power inequalities. To now bring gender inequalities and gender politics into the picture, I supplement the Foucauldian emphasis on productive power and micropolitics with a broadly Gramscian approach to cultural hegemony, applied not to class, but to gender.[1]

This chapter also introduces feminist insights into gendered language and dichotomous thinking that originally derive from a different theoretical tradition, that of post-Lacanian French feminist poststructuralism. However, my interpretation of such insights has been cut loose from its Lacanian roots. Such insights are useful in illuminating how language and interpretation play an important part in the politics of masculinity, but my perspective is not one of Lacanian psychoanalytic explanation, with its view that the phallocentric structure of language unproblematically constitutes the social. Nor is it derived from the post-Lacanian, poststructuralist accounts and critiques of binary phallocentrism, which tend to embody the view that the gender order can be understood by examining such linguistic constructions and textuality alone. Language is important in the discursive construction of the gender order, but as I argued earlier, so are the other two dimensions of analysis (embodiment and institutional processes). Although I do not deny that language plays a constitutive role in general, the part that the particular linguistic constructions identified in Lacanian and poststructuralist thought play in constituting gendered social life is highly variable. It needs to be examined in context.

Michèle Barrett makes the useful point that there is a clear distinction between the role of language in the work of poststructuralists who emphasize textuality and the Foucauldian notion of discourse, which is very much related to context (Barrett 1991, 124). This is not to say that a focus on textuality is isolated from questions of political and social practice. Both Foucault and the poststructuralists see social life as being discursively produced through the organizing power of language. However, poststructuralists such as Jacques Derrida and French feminists such as Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, and Monique Wittig tend to generalize from the dualistic structures

of language they identify and deconstruct. They assume that such dualisms are overarching, or even totalizing, producing social reality in a uniform fashion. Foucault however, uncovers the individual histories of how and where particular kinds of language have informed particular social practices, and as such is making less sweeping claims about the totalizing power of the structure of language in general.[2]

A note about terminology: I use the term *masculinism* throughout when discussing male privilege and power in the gender order, not *patriarchy* or *androcentrism*. *Patriarchy* has been used extensively by feminists to describe and account for the historical and contemporary oppression of women.[3] In recent years the concept has proved increasingly problematic for some feminists, including those influenced by Foucault's conception of power (Ramazanoglu and Holland 1993, 243). In spite of reformulations that emphasize that patriarchy can come in a variety of forms, both familial and public, and intersects with other hierarchies such as race and class (e.g., Walby 1990), it is by and large associated with universalizing, ahistorical theories and vague generalizations. As a number of feminists have argued, gender relations are insufficiently coherent to warrant the term *patriarchy* in general; these writers prefer to confine the term to its older, sociological sense, where it describes (largely preindustrial) familial "father rule" (Bradley 1989, 55).

One could use the less-loaded substitute term *androcentric* to describe contemporary gender relations. *Androcentric* means man-centered, and an androcentric gender order is one that privileges men over women. Few feminists would dispute that the current gender order does just that. However, the term suggests a direct link between male anatomy and male power, which as the analysis in the following chapters shows, I would not wish to endorse. I make a distinction between men and masculinity and argue that men gain access to power and privilege not by virtue of their anatomy but through their cultural association with masculinity. It is the qualities of masculinity that are closely associated with power, rather than men per se, and the term *masculinism*, which implies a privileging of masculinity, best captures this relationship.

The basic argument of this chapter, in sum, is as follows: Feminist interventions into international relations have relied heavily on critiques of masculinism in both the discipline and practices of international affairs.[4] These

arguments have their roots in broader feminist debates over the inherent masculinism of science, in general, and the shape of feminist successor sciences (Harding 1986). One of the questions that has arisen from this debate relates to the ways in which women are divided by differences such as race, class, and sexuality, and the epistemological challenges that such differences have generated for feminism.[5] However, in this literature the concepts of men and masculinity are often inadvertently still treated as unproblematic, undifferentiated wholes. While many feminist theorists (particularly poststructuralists) might acknowledge the existence of multiple masculinities, when it comes to discussing multiple gender differences in detail, the main focus remains on women and femininities—with one or two notable exceptions (e.g., Segal 1990, Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994).[6]

Meanwhile, in "men's studies" literature,[7] where discussing masculinities in the plural has rapidly become a convention (Brod 1987), there has been some discussion of whether an overall theory of masculinity would be useful,[8] but little engagement with either the concept of masculinism or recent developments in feminist theory. This lack of engagement between feminist critiques of masculinism and the emerging literature on masculinities means that the relationship between masculinity and masculinism, on the one hand, and masculinities, on the other, has yet to be fully articulated.

However, feminist critiques of masculinism can be usefully combined with a recognition of multiple masculinities, when such masculinities are seen in terms of hegemonic and subordinate varieties, as advocated by Connell (1987) and discussed below. Such a combination retains the best of both approaches, illuminating the way in which hegemonic masculinity can remain dominant in what appears to be a relatively fluid process of gender constructions and identifications. Feminist insights into the political (rather than psychoanalytic) relationship between masculinism and power remain central, while the diversity of masculinities, the capillary nature of power struggles, and the varying degrees of access to power and the benefits of masculinism between different groups of men are also highlighted.

Although the construction of masculinities and masculine hierarchies is an ongoing, fluid, and diverse process, for analytical purposes it is useful to delineate different archetypes or ideal types of hegemonic masculinity and to attempt to periodize changes in the construction of masculinities. This would provide a history of men as opposed to a history of man, and could be

used to try to identify whose interests and which historical developments have been or are being served by the deployment of masculinist strategies, and how. All men do not benefit equally from masculinism; nor do all women suffer equally.

The remainder of the chapter will explain, expand, and illustrate this basic argument.

The Feminist Critique of Masculinism

The feminist critique of masculinism depends at its core on the uncovering and deconstruction of pervasive gendered dichotomies. It is argued that the opposites of masculine/feminine form a powerful binary symbolism that operates within an epistemology of dualisms at the center of modern Western philosophy and culture.[9] This critique was first elaborated by French psychoanalytic feminists as they reworked Lacan's theory of the developmental and linguistic separation of Self from Other. Hélène Cixous, in particular, focused on hierarchic binary oppositions, arguing that the equation of masculinity with activity and victory and femininity with passivity and defeat is a phallocentric logic that leaves no positive space for women.[10]

In the pair *masculine/feminine*, the terms are constructed as opposites, with the first term, *masculinity*, being valued over the second, *femininity*. Masculinity and femininity are defined in relation to each other, so they are in fact relational terms within a linguistic system. As masculinity is the valued term, it can be argued that femininity is merely a residual category, a foil or Other for masculinity to define itself against. Although the terms are relational, when we use this system as a conceptual apparatus through which we look at the world, they become naturalized and appear as absolute qualities. The dichotomy masculine/feminine is linked to other dichotomous pairs, which operate in a similar fashion. Thus such pairs as hard/soft, rational/irrational, strong/weak, tough/tender, culture/nature, mind/body, dominant/submissive, science/art, active/passive, inside/outside, competitive/caring, objective/subjective, public/private, abstract/concrete, independent/dependent, aggressor/victim, Self/Other, order/anarchy, war/peace, and prudence/impulsiveness are either used to define masculinity and femininity, respectively, or are otherwise associated with them, with the former term always constructed in relation to its opposite, and generally

privileged over it. Often what counts as active and therefore masculine is a question of semantics, so that for example while passivity is a devalued feminine trait, restraint is a valued masculine one.

This association of masculinity with positive value and activity is the common thread holding together all the contradictory ingredients that appear in such dichotomized thinking. In post-Lacanian analysis it is closely tied to the centrality of phallic symbolism in culture. Phallocentric discourse is based on a metaphorical link between language and a particular interpretation of male and female anatomy and sexuality. The basic argument runs thus: the penis is positively valued, whereas female genitals are not—they are associated with "lack" (of a penis). Power and activity are associated with the erect penis and the female role in heterosexual intercourse is interpreted as passive. Thus masculinity is culturally constructed as being psychologically associated with value and activity, while femininity is deemed passive. This essentially linguistic construction then permeates all other relations between the sexes and, through gendered dichotomies, social life in general (Moi 1985).

The use of dichotomous thinking, then, is a way of trying to fix the gender order in a way that keeps masculinity both naturalized and privileged. The exposure of this gender symbolism has led to valuable feminist work on the inherent masculinism of both science (Harding 1986; Haraway 1991) and politics (Elshtain 1981), including international relations (Grant and Newland 1991; Tickner 1992; Peterson and Runyan 1993, 1998; Peterson 1994).[11] The association of various qualities such as rationality, autonomy, prudence, strength, power, logic, boundary setting, control, and competitiveness with both masculine values and perceptions and their concurrent centrality in the disciplinary values and practices of science and politics helps to reinforce the links between masculinity and the disciplines themselves.[12] The downgraded or distrusted qualities of intuition, empathy, vulnerability, and cooperation are associated with the feminine, and as a result women are often downgraded or excluded.

In the post-Lacanian framework elaborated by Cixous and other feminist poststructuralists, the masculine/feminine dichotomy is also seen as an organizing principle of economic, social, and political life. Because it informs numerous practices that shape identities, this dichotomy produces the very gendered divisions it purports to describe, such as gendered divisions in labor, codes of dress, emotional styles, behavior, and so on. However, the

strict dualism of Lacanian analysis pays insufficient attention to the numerous contradictions between the strategies to fix gender characteristics in binary divisions and the fluidity and complexity of social life that ever threatens to reveal itself, exposing the limits and failures of such strategies and revealing them for what they are. It also underestimates the diversity of uses to which strategies of masculinization and feminization are put and the complex ways in which such strategies interact with divisions other than gender such as class, race, and sexuality. While both phallic symbolism and phallocentric discourse are fairly ubiquitous in modern Western cultures, this does not mean that the phallus is necessarily *the* transcendental signifier, or that *all* gendered language is phallocentric, even in the contemporary West. While the linguistic networks of phallocentric dichotomies undoubtedly play a major role in the constitution of the gender order, they do not determine it completely.[13]

Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan (1993), in their discussion of gendered dichotomies, appear to drop Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse as an explanation for gendered dichotomies in favor of a more straightforwardly political account.[14] Gendered dichotomies, rather than uniformly constructing gendered social relations through universal psychoanalytic mechanisms, are seen more ambiguously, as playing a dual role. Where gendered dichotomies are used as an organizing principle of social life (such as in the gendered division of labor) they help to construct gender differences and inequalities and thus are constitutive of social reality, but in positing a grid of polar opposites, they also serve to obscure more complex relationships, commonalties, overlaps, and intermediate positions (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 24–25).

Elaborating on this view, it can be argued that gendered dichotomies are in part ideological tools that mystify, masking more complex social realities and reinforcing stereotypes. On one level, they do help to produce real gender differences and inequalities, when they are used as organizing principles that have practical effects commensurate with the extent that they become embedded in institutional practices, and through these, human bodies. They constitute one dimension in the triangular nexus out of which gender identities and the gender order are produced. But at the same time, institutional practices are not always completely or unambiguously informed by such dichotomies, which may then operate to obscure more complex relationships. It is a mistake to see the language of gendered dichotomies as a

unified and totalizing discourse that dictates every aspect of social practice to the extent that we are coherently produced as subjects in its dualistic image. As well as the disruptions and discontinuities engendered by the intersections and interjections of other discourses (race, class, sexuality, and so on) there is always room for evasion, reversal, resistance, and dissonance between rhetoric, practice, and embodiment, as well as reproduction of the symbolic order, as identities are negotiated in relation to all three dimensions, in a variety of complex and changing circumstances. On the other hand, the symbolic gender order does inform practice, and our subjectivities are produced in relation to it, so to dismiss it as performing only an ideological or propagandistic role is also too simplistic.

The power of gendered dichotomies and the way in which strategies of masculinization and feminization work to promote inequalities between the sexes can be seen clearly in the gendered division of labor. "Masculine" and "feminine" traits and qualities have been used not only to support the division between paid employment and unpaid domestic work, but also to structure the segregation of employment into predominantly male and female occupations or grades within an occupation. For example, in Britain in 1985, men formed 99.5 percent of the total number employed in construction and mining; 96.4 percent of those in professional science, technology, and engineering; 96.4 percent of those in transport; 83.1 percent of those in farming and fishing; and 77.1 percent of those in professional and related fields supplying management and administration; while women formed 79.2 percent of workers in personal services (such as catering, cleaning, and hairdressing); 77.2 percent of those in clerical work; and 65 percent of professionals in education, welfare, and health (Bradley 1989, 13).

There is an extensive literature on this subject, providing both quantitative evidence on trends and numerous in-depth empirical examples of how jobs become gendered, and I will not rehearse it here. Instead, I cite Harriet Bradley, who, after surveying the literature and elaborating a number of case studies, came to the conclusion that "ideas about feminine and masculine nature and behaviour were highly involved in the gendering of jobs and resulted in the formation of gendered work cultures" (1989, 229). Gendered dichotomies here operate as an organizing principle in the workplace. Moreover, to the extent that men and women self-select "masculine" and "feminine" jobs, respectively, these dichotomies are to some extent constitutive of gender identity. Bradley found that ideas about suitable jobs for wo-

men came in part from the ideology of domesticity, but "social meanings of masculinity and femininity were also negotiated within the workplace itself" (Bradley 1989, 229). The outcome of such negotiations is important, not least because "men's jobs" and grades, which are deemed to require masculine characteristics, generally attract higher pay and status. However, there have been numerous struggles over the gendered interpretation and representation of production skills and the qualities needed for particular jobs. The propagandistic element of gender dichotomies is highlighted when one considers that some varieties and grades of employment have switched sides. The same activities can be alternatively masculinized or feminized depending on interpretation. When women have performed similar tasks to men on the production line, what counted as natural aptitude and dexterity for women (nature) has often been reinterpreted as trained skills for men (culture), with pay and conditions of work following accordingly. As Anne Phillips and Barbara Taylor argued, "skill definitions are saturated with gender bias" (1980, 79). Attempts to reverse the poor status of women's employment have also included the introduction of "masculine" management styles, such as the adoption of militarism in civilian nursing (Starns 1997).

To take another example—one perhaps more relevant to international relations: the associations between military service, masculinity, and citizenship have been strong in the modern era. Soldiering is characterized as a manly activity requiring the "masculine" traits of physical strength, action, toughness, capacity for violence, and, for officers, resolve, technical know-how, and logical or strategic thinking. It has historically been an important practice constitutive of masculinity (Connell 1989; Bourke 1999). But traditionally the "feminine" qualities of total obedience and submission to authority, the attention to dress detail, and the endless repetition of mundane tasks that enlisted men as opposed to officers are expected to perform are downplayed or interpreted as nongendered, at least to the outside world (even while, at the same time, confirming the men's subordinate status to officers within the services themselves). As Laura Marks suggests, "in general military service forces people into extraordinarily passive roles, requiring that they give up individual agency, endure humiliations and unthinkingly obey orders" (Marks 1991, 74). To highlight such aspects of soldiering in the lower ranks would be to some degree to "feminize" this activity, reduce its contribution to the reproduction of masculine identities, and simultaneously signal a reduction in its overall status. It is not the actions themselves but

the gendered interpretations placed on them that are crucial in determining which activities count as masculine and valued and which count as feminine and devalued.

Dichotomous Thinking and Oppositional Strategies

The pervasiveness of dichotomous thinking on gender and the corresponding difficulty in transcending it can be seen when one examines some of the strategies that have been deployed to dismantle masculine power and privilege. As long as masculinity is perceived as a relatively unitary, stable, and coherent phenomenon that corresponds to the experiences of all men, dichotomous thinking remains either obviously or secretly at the core of these solutions, compromising their radical potential. Three such strategies are discussed below:

The simplest proposal for the overthrow of masculinist privilege is the route taken by some radical feminists: they accept all the qualities associated with the feminine as women's natural domain but privilege these qualities over the masculine. This approach has informed some interpretations of the women's peace camp at Greenham Common, in Berkshire, England, and has been significant in radical feminist thought on the nature of war and peace (Jones 1983; Segal 1987). Radical feminist thought has inspired the sharp end of feminist activism and has consequently been successful in bringing a number of issues, especially around women's health and sexuality, to the forefront of mainstream politics.

However, in spite of this practical legacy of effective campaigns, which have, as Joan Cocks (1989) argues, improved many women's lives, radical feminist thought itself does nothing to dismantle dichotomous thinking. Rather than transcend the masculine/feminine dichotomy, the conceptual framework that radical feminists employ would attempt to replace the rule of violent and "masculine" men with the rule of peaceloving "feminine" women. As I argued in chapter 1, such a view is essentialist. Moreover, while power is generally associated with masculinity rather than femininity, such a philosophy is likely to remain marginal. Thus "the oppositional imagination" is a good deal less radical than it might at first appear because, rather than questioning the dominant discourse, it reproduces it by reinstating masculinist dichotomies in reverse (Cocks 1989).

Those who prefer to integrate the masculine and feminine halves of the

dichotomies often suggest that the solution to the dominance of masculinism is to increase the participation of women in the public sphere, and particularly their representation in political, economic, scientific, and academic elites. In what is known as the standpoint feminist view, it is argued that because the gendered division of labor has given women different experiences to those of men, women would bring different perspectives and practices to these fields, thus filling in the missing feminine half of the picture (Harding 1986; Hartstock 1987). Their increased participation would improve both theory and practice by engendering wider and more rounded perspectives in policy making and more holistic theoretical approaches to human subjectivity. Masculinist practices and disciplines are seen as handicapped by operating with only half of human experience. Early feminist interventions in international relations have tended to adopt this line.[15]

The problem with this kind of argument is that it, too, like radical feminism, assumes that the qualities associated with masculinity and femininity are clearly attached to men and women, respectively; if they are not, the increasing participation of women may not yield the desired results. For example, large numbers of women might be absorbed into international politics as soldiers, diplomats, and academics with minimal disruption if they were willing to adopt so-called masculine values. Admittedly, to sustain such values in public life, such women would largely have to be from the privileged middle classes. They would have to have "wives" or servants to take care of their domestic responsibilities, if they were to adopt such a "masculine" lifestyle wholeheartedly.[16] An invisible army of support workers would still be needed to underpin the public face of international politics. Class and race are also relevant here (as they are in all gendered situations) so that while white, middle-class women might be increasingly "masculinized" as they participated more fully in the public world of international politics, it would be at the expense of working-class women and women from other ethnic groups who would remain "feminized" and marginalized. The attempt by U.S. President Bill Clinton to appoint Zoe Baird to the position of attorney general, only to come unstuck over her employment of illegal immigrants as domestic staff, showed both the possibilities and limits of women's incorporation into political elites on these terms (*The Economist*, January 30 1993, 4).

It may be necessary for women to adopt so-called masculine attributes to gain acceptance in the political world and be seen as politically powerful.

Peterson and Runyan (1993) argue that a no-win situation applies to women who are politically successful. They are either accused of propping up the status quo by supporting masculine agendas or, if they appear to act "like women" or represent "soft issues," they are accused of reinforcing the traditional feminine stereotype, so that

> as long as female political actors are perceived either as traditional women or "invisible women" (because they are acting like men), gender expectations are not really disrupted. Paradoxically, even when women wield the highest state power, by continuing to behave in gender-stereotypical ways, they reinforce rather than challenge the politics of gender. . . . There is no simple, one-to-one relationship between the presence of women in power and the extent of feminist politics. (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 71)

Only if the proportion of women in international politics became very large, and their visibility very high, might their simple presence seriously disrupt the association of its particular values with masculinity. Otherwise (to return to the dimensions discussed in chapter 1) swapping female for male bodies in traditionally masculine arenas does little to disrupt either the symbolism or practices of the gender order.

Just as an increase in women participating in the public side of international politics on its own would not guarantee a change in the practice of politics, neither would the importation of feminine characteristics automatically redress the gender imbalance, especially if women themselves were still underrepresented in positions of power. The limitations of attempting to reclaim traditionally "feminine" values for men as a radical strategy can be seen in men's-studies literature, where this was a prominent theme in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Men were urged to discover and develop their emotional, intuitive, and nurturing sides through therapy and consciousness raising in men's groups of various kinds.[17] Loosely based on object-relations psychology,[18] the argument was that men en mass were somehow emotionally retarded or emotionally illiterate, locked into lonely isolation and incapable of intimacy, as this quote from an antisexist newsletter suggests:

> As men we are very out of touch with our feelings—we have had the language of feeling beaten out of us, often literally, during childhood. Those

> feelings we are left with have acquired connotations which make us shun or misapply them. So—love and warmth imply shame; joy and delight imply immaturity; anger and frustration imply physical violence. We need to reclaim our feelings and shed the connotations—to learn that feeling is good for us. (quoted in Middleton 1992, 119)

Male power is either ignored in these accounts or is seen as not worth the price of such emotional self-denial. Emotional vulnerability is seen as the key to "authenticity," to unraveling male power and violence, and removing inequalities between the sexes.[19] Being impersonal and unemotional is equated with being powerful.

However, not only does it not necessarily follow that emotions undermine power, but the argument that men are less emotional itself derives from the rational/emotional dichotomy of masculinist discourse and in itself reinforces gender stereotypes. At the level of social experience, the picture is much more complicated. A certain amount of aggressive competitiveness is sanctioned and the public expression of male anger and rage is sometimes tolerated (Hodson 1984, 9)—for example, in combat. In private, as David Jackson argues, there exists "a whole range of unsettling emotions that they [men] try to keep buttoned up but that leak out in personal relations, usually at home" (Jackson 1990, 2).[20] The social positions of the persons involved and the power relationships in which they are enmeshed matters, too. For example, the high-ranking U.S. general, Norman Schwartzkopf (known to the British media as Stormin' Norman) was seen to weep in public at a moment of power and victory at the end of the Gulf War. Far from signaling weakness, appropriate public displays of sensitivity such as crying can be a legitimizing sign of the New Man's power (Hondagneau-Sotelo and Messner 1994, 204). It is not that emotional expression per se is prohibited for men, but rather that the circumstances and ways in which it is sanctioned vary. By oversimplifying and overgeneralizing from the rational/emotional dichotomy, this approach tends inadvertently to universalize the experiences of white, middle-class, Anglo-American, heterosexual men and has thus been criticized for being both racist and heterosexist (Mercer and Julien 1988; Dowsett 1993; Rogoff and Van Leer 1993). In Mediterranean and Latino cultures, for example, men are far more open to public emotional expression and sentimentality than this line of argument would suggest, without any undermining of their "machismo."

Transcending Dichotomous Thinking

It is very difficult to transcend dichotomous thinking altogether since we are limited to some extent by the structures of language we have inherited.[21] Nor should one underestimate the usefulness of the feminist insight that gendered dichotomies construct masculinity and femininity as opposites, treat masculinity as active and femininity as passive, and valorize the masculine. This insight illuminates the close association between masculinity and power in modern Western culture.

However, if the masculine half of gendered dichotomies is always valued more highly but the ingredients of the masculinity are ambiguous or contradictory, then there is room for political and interpretative struggles over what counts as masculine, and consequently who gets power and status. Peterson (1994) argues that a critical analysis of gender dichotomies must include an examination of both their concrete power effects and their conceptual aspects.[22] This can be achieved by the use of historical contextualization, which includes an appreciation of the relational nature of the "masculine" and "feminine" in any particular situation. So critiques of "masculinist" international relations must specify *how* the ingredients of "masculinity" and "femininity" get to be defined in relation to each other in the particular context under examination. Such a contextualization might include spelling out the specifics of how the deployment of gendered dichotomies forms part of power struggles over the *interpretation* of practices and groups of people—groups that are not necessarily made up of women. It would show how apparently stable gender divisions are the temporary result of strategies of masculinization and feminization in which dichotomous thinking is used as a tool of masculinist power struggles.

Such a perspective employs an understanding of power forms and power struggles as relatively diffuse and widespread and is therefore much closer to Foucault than Lacan. However, this kind of analysis, while moving from a fixed picture of binary symbolism to one of process, still retains an underlying male/female division. If only the division between men and women is constantly examined, then even such contextualized analysis as advocated by Peterson can increase the attention paid to and apparent salience of the very gender differences that feminists wish to dismantle.

Criticisms of "masculinism," whether in international relations or elsewhere, need to go well beyond the mere identification of the widespread

use of gender dichotomies and the privileging of so-called masculine traits if they are to achieve anything other than a reinforcement of these dichotomies. If neither the increasing presence of women, viewed as honorary men, nor the importation of "feminine qualities" into political life will of themselves necessarily disrupt the prevailing gender order, and radical feminist prescriptions would disrupt, only to reverse it, then a more sophisticated approach is required, an approach that deconstructs gendered dichotomies more thoroughly and pays attention to their contradictions.

Multiple Masculinities

One way of transcending dichotomous thinking on gender is to move away from an analysis of *masculinity* (singular), albeit relationally defined and historically contextualized, toward an analysis of *masculinities* (plural). In feminist terms this is a risky project because if the postmodern emphasis on difference is already threatening to undermine the feminist project by dissolving the category of women as an oppressed group,[23] then an examination of the differences between men threatens to dissolve, or at least obscure, our view of the oppressor as a group. On the one hand, theorists need to avoid reinforcing gender dichotomies, but on the other, in emphasizing a pluralism of masculinities, they may well ignore or underplay masculinist power relations and the overall privileges of men. Susan Bordo warns that "there are dangers in too wholesale a commitment to either dual or multiple grids" (Bordo 1990, 149).

Walking this tightrope is not easy. For example, in men's studies the earlier tendency to reinforce stereotypes has since the late 1980s progressively been replaced by more sophisticated theoretical approaches that acknowledge the complexities of masculinities and contextualize them historically.[24] However, even in these accounts there is a constant problem of slippage back to merely reproducing taken-for-granted concepts of masculinity or to providing more refined versions of role theory, as their own authors sometimes admit (Hearn and Morgan 1990, 9; Seidler 1990, 223).[25] Alternatively, when masculinities are adequately historicized there is a tendency toward a bland pluralism in which relations with women drop out of the picture altogether, so that men's studies still often loses its grip on power, subordination, and potential radicalism (Brod 1994, 86).[26]

One strand of the literature on masculinities that avoids this problem is

derived from the article "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity" (Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 1985) and a subsequent book by Connell (1987). The article suggested that multiple masculine identities existed in a hierarchy of power relations, and Connell's book both developed this theory and provided a multidimensional account of gender identity with a particular focus on masculinities. In Connell's account, gender differences and hierarchies are seen as being produced through social structures (the sexual division of labor, the relations of power, and the sociopsychological structuring of sexual desire and emotional attachments) that are themselves constituted by repeated practices, including discursive practices. Connell argues that there are many masculinities and, presumably, femininities in existence at the same time, but that there are nonetheless dominant patterns of masculinity, or "hegemonic masculinity," that operate at the level of the whole society and that shore up male power and advantage (Connell 1987, 183–88). Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in opposition to a range of subordinate masculinities, as well as their female corollary, the ever-compliant "emphasized femininity." In Connell's view there can be no equivalent hegemonic femininity, because while there may be prevailing constructions of femininity, and some women may be more privileged than others, all femininities are subordinate to hegemonic masculinity. Of course, Connell's theory does not necessarily mean that women are entirely unable to reconstruct femininity in an empowering way, and indeed overturning this inequality in the power to define gender identities remains a central goal of feminism.[27]

In this gender hierarchy, gender intersects with other factors such as class and sexuality. Connell argues that hegemonic masculinity is above all heterosexual and is defined in opposition to homosexuality. This point is backed up by Jeffrey Weeks (1987), who argues that although erotic activity between men and men and women and women is probably universal, the concept of a distinctly homosexual identity is not. In Europe, male homosexual identities (and their corollary, heterosexual identities) did not emerge until the late nineteenth century, and close relationships between women were not demarcated until even more recently. Previously the emphasis was on prohibited behavior, such as sodomy, but there was no concept of a special type of person who indulged in it, with distinctive desires or aptitudes. As Lynne Segal argues, even now, when male homosexual identities are well established and are seen as founded on homoerotic desires and behav-

ior, not all homoerotic behavior confers such an identity. The phenomenon of male rape in prisons and other all-male institutions rarely confers a homosexual identity on the rapist. Indeed, such rape occurs, various studies conclude, as a way of asserting power and masculinity: "A male who fucks another male is a double male" (Segal 1990, 247).

But while the relationship of sexual identities to particular kinds of behavior remains fairly loose, male homosexual identities have been clearly constructed in opposition to hegemonic masculinity (female homosexual identities have until recently had a more shadowy and ambiguous existence, due to the passive cultural construction of female sexuality).[28] Heterosexual hegemonic masculinity depends for its existence on the presence of a stigmatized subordinate homosexual masculinity. Otherwise it would cease to be clearly heterosexual.

Connell himself does not stress this point, but other commentators have argued that hegemonic masculinity is also racist and is defined against a number of nonwhite subordinate masculinities. A global, racialized hierarchy of masculinities was created as part of the institutionalization of a complex set of race and gender identities sustaining European imperialism—identities that still have a cultural legacy today. Broadly speaking, British and French imperialists imagined "the Orient" as an exotic, sensual, and feminized world, a kind of halfway stage between "Europe's enlightenment" and "African savagery." While oriental men were positioned as effeminate (and oriental women as exotic), black Africans of both sexes were deemed uncivilized and, in a projection of European sexual fantasies, seen as saturated with monstrous lust. In Britain, sex was seen as both natural (uncivilized) and a threat to the moral order. White women, particularly middle-class women, were regarded as lust-free symbols of this moral order who, unless they were protected, were potentially in danger of being raped by black male "savages." The "English gentleman" positioned himself at the top of this hierarchy as a self-disciplined, naturally legitimate ruler and protector of morals. He regarded his sexuality as overlaid and tempered by civilization. He became the embodiment of imperial power, seeming to rule effortlessly, and justifying his colonial mission as a civilizing one. As a type, then, the Victorian English Gentleman was at least as much a product of imperial politics as of domestic understandings of Englishness, aristocracy, and masculinity (Hall 1992a). In the United States, a similar sexualization of

race took place under slavery, where the construction of white women as chaste, domesticated, and morally pure was accomplished through the positioning of black slave women as promiscuous, black men as brutes and potential rapists, and white men as protectors (Said 1978; Mercer and Julien 1988; Mohanty 1991). Chinese male immigrants, who occupied the halfway house of indentured labor, were seen as both effeminate—because they often did women's work in laundries and kitchens—and as a sexual threat to white women (Fung 1995).[29]

Connell suggests that because of its generalized and ideological nature, hegemonic masculinity is a very public, simplified, and idealized model of easily symbolized aspects of interaction, rather than a statement of the actual personalities of the majority of men. But he is sufficiently post-Marxist to view ideology as a productive, discursive practice, rather than as a species of false consciousness. Hegemonic masculinity is also constitutive of, and embodied in, numerous institutional practices, such as enforced competitive sport for schoolboys. Individuals are therefore forced to negotiate their identities in relation to practices and relationships informed by hegemonic masculinity and the alternative gender models on offer. The more that individual men publicly identify with hegemonic masculinity, or collaborate with such public images, the more they help to boost their own position. However, compliance—in any degree, and no matter how unconscious or grudging—helps to shore up existing inequalities. The interplay between different masculinities is as much a part of the gender order as the interplay between masculinities and femininities. Posing challenges to hegemonic masculinity at both the individual and the institutional level is therefore at the heart of sexual politics.

The concept of hegemonic and subordinate masculinities is extremely useful in that it acknowledges multiple masculinities while keeping sight of power relations, and it has been successfully applied by feminists and others in recent British literature on gender identity and gender that focuses on men.[30]

There are, however, three drawbacks with Connell's approach. First, he is not entirely successful in his own theoretical attempt to move beyond structuralism: there is, on the one hand, a tension between his focus on practice, dynamic relations, fluidity, and change in the construction of gender identities and, on the other, a more than residual structuralism when

discussing the gender order. His separation of the gender order into structural categories of analysis (labor, power, and cathexis) brings with it a static logic, as he argues himself when criticizing other categorical approaches (Connell 1987, 60). Moreover, his categories themselves are inconsistent. As Segal argues, power and desire are really ubiquitous and should be ingredients in all structures; whereas labor is more specifically a structure. The state and language are also specific structures, but the trilogy of labor, state, and language would take him back to the economic, political, and ideological categories of Althusserian structuralism. (Segal 1990, 102).

Second, Connell's reduction of discourse to ideology is crude. While discourse does indeed contain a strong ideological element, discourse does not run counter to the material world; rather, it informs material practices—just as Connell himself argues that practices affect bodies.

And third, Connell's theory of hegemony is somewhat underdeveloped. He references Gramsci and clearly belongs to the tradition that has extracted Gramsci's (1971) theory of cultural hegemony from its Marxist and class-based context. However he does not distinguish this particular interpretation of hegemony from other uses of the term.[31] More importantly, Connell does not really specify whether hegemonic masculinity is consciously promoted by elite groups of men to serve their interests or whether it is wholly sustained by the largely unconscious identification and collaboration of the majority. If it is the former, then he stays closer to Gramsci's original understanding of hegemony, which is achieved largely through an ideological ascendancy over a cultural mix; moral persuasion and consent rather than brute force (although such ascendancy may be backed up by force). If the latter, then he would be adopting a more Foucauldian approach to hegemony. In this case, while elites and knowledge producers are heavily implicated in the production of hegemonic masculinity, masculinism is not a conspiracy of elites. Rather, it is endemic at all levels of society as different groups and interests jockey for position in micronetworks of power relations. Heterogeneous, vital, and unstable power relations operating at the "molecular" level produce weighty and relatively rigid "hegemonic effects" (Foucault 1980, 93), as opposed to the alternative vision of an oppressive power radiating out from a central point. As Raymond Williams argued, elites are implicated in the dissemination of cultural hegemony through their participation in a lived system of meaningful practices that reproduce and confirm

their own identities, rather than through a conscious or deliberate strategy of domination (Williams 1977a, 110). Arguably, this latter approach is more satisfactory since it avoids dubious conspiracy theories.

Masculinity, Masculinities, and Masculinism

An analysis that pays attention to how masculinism creates hierarchies of masculinities as well as inequalities between men and women goes some way toward undermining a simple dualism of masculinity/femininity, without losing its grip on power relations. This is where a contextualized understanding of the feminist concept of masculinism, such as Peterson's, can mesh with the literature on multiple masculinities that draws on Connell's theory of hegemonic and subordinate masculinities (shorn of its problematic structuralism).

Ann Tickner moves in this direction in her feminist analysis of IR theory. She emphasizes the "masculinist underpinnings" (Tickner 1992, xi) of the discipline, but at the same warns against the essentializing tendency of separating women from men as undifferentiated categories. This tendency "ignores the ways in which women's varying identities and development interests as farmers, factory workers, merchants, and householders bear on gender relations in different contexts" (Tickner 1992, 95). At various points in her book, she explicitly examines different models of "man" and "masculinity" (see my introductory chapter), and offers a variety of feminist critiques. She also mentions alternative conceptions of masculinity not featured in IR theory, and in her final chapter discusses the possibilities of a nongendered model of human action.

However, in spite of these nuances in the detail, her book's overall structure and main thrust, in counterposing "international relations" against "feminism," tends to oppose a monolithic and one might say essentialized masculinity—identified as "hegemonic masculinity" (e.g., 131, 136) or "idealized manhood" (e.g., 132)—in IR theory against an equally monolithic opponent known as either "feminist theories" (57, 132), "feminist approaches" (132), or "feminist perspectives" (133–34). The overall effect is one of theoretical confusion and an undifferentiated eclecticism in deploying incompatible feminist approaches.

Tickner also slides all too easily between different terms and models that are not all defined by the same characteristics. For example, it is not clear

whether Connell's concept of hegemonic masculinity, introduced in the first chapter and then used throughout the book, refers to one or all of the various models of masculinity discussed in different chapters. Meanwhile, the main thrust of her argument, which is to make a case for the reformulation of IR theory to redress the masculinist balance by including women and so-called feminine qualities, tends to divert attention from, and hence play down, the significance of the different masculinities she identifies. Moreover, the goal of integrating explicitly feminine values into IR is presented as a step toward the development of a nongendered approach to IR. However, these two aims may prove contradictory. The assumption that they are inherently compatible is another example of the lack of differentiation in Tickner's otherwise groundbreaking book.

In order to integrate the critique of masculinism with a recognition of multiple masculinities fully, it is necessary to shift the focus away from an exclusive interest in the exclusion and devaluation of women and femininity and toward an analysis of the politics of "masculinity" itself. One needs to specify the relations between the terms *masculinity*, *masculinities*, and *masculinism*, and explore the role of masculinism in relationships between different masculinities. Tickner goes halfway to doing the former. Implicit in her analysis is the assumption that active and positively valued traits and qualities associated with masculinity in general are more closely representative of hegemonic masculinity than of subordinate varieties. This seems a reasonable assumption, so that, in the masculinist practices outlined above, the qualities identified as masculine in gendered dichotomies can be seen to relate most closely to hegemonic masculinity. Thus, gendered dichotomies promote and reinforce not just any masculinity but the hegemonic masculinity of white, heterosexual, middle-class men. That this is so can be instantly seen when one considers the rational/irrational or rational/emotional, mind/body, and culture/nature dichotomies. The superior male mind that lies behind these masculinist dichotomies is a white, imperial one—since, as discussed above, black men are associated with the body, as are women and homosexuals.

Hegemonic masculinity itself is tied to phallocentrism through the scientific imagination that posits masculine reason and culture as active and acting on the relatively passive body of nature within which woman is apparently mired—*active* (signifying the phallus) and *passive* (signifying lack) here being the operative terms. Similarly, both the image of penis as

weapon and the conventional construction of heterosexual relations revolve around phallocentric discourse. Hegemonic masculinity, then, can be seen to be largely, but not exclusively, phallocentric in modern Western culture. To argue this is not necessarily to endorse a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective. Arthur Brittan (1989) argues for a broadly Foucauldian analysis of phallocentrism: the phallic myth is propagandized by priests, psychiatrists, and doctors, and enters the practice of sexuality through the embodiment processes of social practices and their associated emotional power. However, it is not safe to assume that hegemonic masculinity has always been or always will be dominated by phallocentric imagery (as Lacanian analysis would imply).[32] As noted in chapter 1, the equation of women with passive nature and men with active culture itself constituted a reconceptualization of gender as part of broader philosophical changes during the Enlightenment period. Phallocentric imagery, although prevalent in contemporary culture, is only one of several ways of characterizing hegemonic masculinity.

Joan Cocks argues that the transition to modernity has been accompanied by a gradual change in the form of male dominance, from a power primarily based on patriarchal rights to one won through phallic superiority (Cocks 1989, 210–14). This change is linked not only to Enlightenment philosophical developments but also to the whittling away of the spatial base of patriarchal relations through changing economic and cultural factors related to the industrial revolution and the rise of capitalism and bureaucratic power. For example, patriarchal rights were undermined by the collapse in the family/household system of production, large-scale urbanization, and increasing state regulation of social life. The shift toward phallocentric legitimation was a way for male power to save itself, but it was also facilitated by the new liberal championing of individual freedom, the scientific disenchantment of desire, and the rise of utilitarian beliefs that paved the way for a commodification of sexual gratification, so that "one could thus argue that the triumph of phallic right was as much the consequence of as the antidote to patriarchal right's decline" (Cocks 1989, 214).

Moreover, Cocks argues that the eclipse of patriarchal power is not complete and even now antagonistic masculinist interests representing these two forms of power still compete,[33] suggesting that there are struggles between men over the constitution of hegemonic masculinity. Such long term changes in the legitimating grounds of male dominance suggest that hege-

monic masculinity itself can be seen both as a plastic phenomenon, and as a vehicle for keeping the associations between masculinity and power alive under changing circumstances. Hegemonic masculinity gets transformed, through constant challenges and struggles, to resemble whatever traits happen to be most strategically useful for the getting and keeping of power.

Such a perspective has its critics. Victor Seidler argues against any social constructionist approach that would view masculinity as power: "If we adopt a conception of masculinity which simply defines it as a relationship of power, or as the top place within a hierarchy of powers, then we are tempted into thinking that it is possible to "abandon our masculinity" (Seidler 1990, 219). He argues that such a temptation is itself a typically masculinist, rationalistic stance that follows Kant in believing that one can change one's inclinations by will. Seidler sees contemporary Western masculinity as principally defined by the Enlightenment legacy of rationalism and detachment, combined with the Protestant ethic of self-denial. Although Seidler's desire to undermine a particular variety of elitist bourgeois Protestant masculinity is laudable, his methodology is problematic. If gender identity is seen in the terms in which it was described in the preceding chapter, then, even if hegemonic masculinity is, in the end, a relationship of power, it cannot easily be "abandoned," because that power is produced through practices and inscribed in men's bodies and their psychologies as much as in language or the rational mind. Seidler's critique grossly underestimates the material consequences of productive power, which cannot be negated at will.

On the other hand, if the term *masculinity* is treated as an empty referent, having no stable content at all beyond its association with power, there is the danger of dissolving the meaning of masculinity altogether.[34] Even if masculinity is subject to endless revision and reinterpretation, it still has to be recognizable as masculinity, otherwise, the gendered divisions its construction supports are erased.[35] This question of gendered meaning operates on at least two levels. First, all masculinities have to appear to have enough in common to qualify as masculinities; and second, if each individual variety of masculinity is itself unstable, it must have sufficient continuity to be recognizable as a distinct variety. While subordinate varieties of masculinity may and do become indistinct at times, hegemonic masculinity, in particular, has to be recognizable as "real" masculinity to keep its powerful position in the gender order.

A useful way of looking at both masculinity as a generic term and the ex-

istence of plural masculinities is proposed by Harry Brod, who applies Wittgenstein's philosophical concept of "family resemblances" to masculinities: "Just as members of a family may be said to resemble each other without necessarily all having any single feature in common, so masculinities may form common patterns without sharing any single universal characteristic" (Brod 1987, 275–76). If this model is adopted, it can be seen that there is considerable room for fluidity in the construction of masculinity or masculinities. As long as there are enough common characteristics with some other masculinities, to make each variety recognizable as such (in terms of the particular historical and cultural context in which it is produced), new elements can be introduced to accommodate change. Hegemonic masculinity can then be seen not as a fixed set of dominant traits but as a constantly negotiated construct that draws on a pool of available characteristics, which, although they may be mutually contradictory can be put together in different combinations depending on circumstances. Different pools of characteristics may be available at different times and in different cultures (some are delineated below in a genealogy of hegemonic masculinities). No two images or manifestations of masculinity need be exactly alike. Thus, the mix-and-match nature of hegemonic masculinity accounts for its many contradictions, while the overlap in constructions and the incorporation of individual characteristics into gendered dichotomies provide continuity and naturalize "masculinity" as a powerful, timeless, and stable phenomenon.

The pool of available characteristics is also subject to gradual change over time, and characteristics of subordinate masculinities can be plundered to reinvigorate hegemonic masculinity, while previously hegemonic characteristics can be dropped or devalued. For example, the homoeroticism of ancient Greek martial masculinity was largely dropped in later Western martial masculinities. On the other hand, the contemporary positioning of heterosexual men as consumers in the West is involving a reincorporation of sensual and eroticized images of men into mainstream Anglo-Saxon culture not seen, in Britain at least, since the eighteenth century.[36]

The perspective outlined here tries to avoid dissolving *masculinity* altogether, on the one hand, and reinforcing gender dichotomies, on the other. Critics might argue that if men routinely exhibit so-called feminine characteristics, and if the similar activities and qualities can be labeled masculine

or feminine depending on interpretation and a change of emphasis, and if the term *masculinity* has no stable ingredients, then why take the claims of feminists seriously at all? It took years for feminists to establish that gender oppression is significant in its own right—that it is neither an ideological distraction from the real divisions of class nor the result of an easily rectified faulty application of liberal values. This achievement is important and should not be undermined.

However, the perspective outlined here still allows for such gender divisions to be taken seriously, not least because of the practical consequences of the widespread interpretation of people, activities, and qualities as masculine and feminine. Such practical consequences include the largely gendered division of labor, as discussed above. Further, however contradictory the term *masculinity* appears on close examination, it remains meaningful to large numbers of people and is associated with power. Therefore men, even men at the bottom, have generally been more successful in claiming power (through its association with masculinity) than have women. In a complex intertwining of the hierarchies of race, gender, sexuality, and class, men as a whole have always had an edge over women, even though particular groups of men may have been less privileged than particular groups of women.

The trend toward discussing masculinities rather than masculinity does not completely escape the problems of inadvertently reinforcing the very social constructions that are ostensibly under attack. The use of concepts such as hegemonic and subordinate masculinities, rather than the adoption of a completely deconstructionist stance, is a compromise, as the very identification of power relations itself is part of their reproduction, and as such may reinforce them.[37] Rogoff and Van Leer question the usefulness of the concept of masculinity (even as masculinities) by arguing that this merely renews the academic currency of an oppressive concept: "if we do not in our readings relentlessly dismantle culture's boundaries, we may find that our studies leave us stranded in hegemony, not "speaking to" the topic, but speaking for it" (Rogoff and Van Leer 1993, 760). This is a risk that cannot be avoided if theory is to be constructed rather than deconstructed. Unless one is convinced that the deconstruction of theory will of itself entirely dissolve such power relations, it is a risk that has to be taken. It can be minimized, however, by starting from the premise that there is a good deal of

contradiction, complexity, and fluidity in gender constructions, and by deploying the concepts of hegemonic and subordinate masculinities as useful analytical constructions rather than as concrete phenomena to be observed.

A Genealogy of Hegemonic Masculinity

The hegemonic model is fleshed out in the following sections. I do this by drawing on a wide variety of historically and geographically disparate accounts of masculinities (although all focusing on Anglo-American constructions in one form or another). My aim is to reflect upon some of the numerous points of overlapping and cross-cutting of the available narratives, to build theory from the bottom up. In particular, I want to extract some understanding of the periodization and ingredients of hegemonic masculinity in order to identify some archetypes, to highlight the flux and change in hegemonic masculinity, and to examine the pattern of relationships between hegemonic and subordinate varieties and the role of masculinist practices in these relationships.

The focal point lies not in the history of masculinities itself, but rather in how patterns identified in historical and contemporary accounts can illuminate the question of the relationship between different masculinities, power, and the masculinist practices discussed above. It is, therefore, a minor kind of genealogical inquiry.[38] The accounts drawn on were, of course, originally provided in the context of a variety of different agendas: they are embedded in different perspectives and thus contain different emphases. Some emphasize the role of the economy, some race, others sexuality. Between them, they offer a wealth of useful material for identifying patterns in masculinities and illustrating the deployment of strategies of masculinization and feminization in the construction of masculinities and the policing of male behavior.

An examination of the literature that attempts to trace the history of hegemonic masculinity in the West reveals at least four ideal types, or social categories, of dominant masculinities. These are inherited from different periods of European cultural history. The ideal types consist of the Greek citizen-warrior model; the patriarchal Judeo-Christian model; the honor/patronage model; and a Protestant, bourgeois-rationalist model. These types have been identified from a variety of sources. The Greek citizen-warrior model and its legacy is discussed by Stearns (1979), Elshtain (1981), and

Tickner (1992), among others; the patriarchal Judeo-Christian model by Stearns (1979), Elshtain (1981), and Cocks (1989); the honor/patronage model by Morgan (1992) and Connell (1993); and the bourgeois-rationalist model by Seidler (1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991), Morgan (1992), Tickner (1992), and Connell (1993).

These types are heuristic devices and are not completely distinct. The honor/patronage model is heavily indebted to the Judeo-Christian legacy, and as Stearns and Elshtain suggest the bourgeois rationalist model is to some extent the result of a fusion of the Greek citizen-warrior with Judeo-Christian ideals. The Greek model combined militarism with rationalism (Stearns 1979) and equated manliness with citizenship in a masculine arena of free speech and politics (Elshtain 1981). In contrast, the Judeo-Christian ideal of manliness emphasized a more domesticated ideal of responsibility, ownership, and the authority of the father of fathers. The honor/patronage model was an aristocratic ideal in which personal bonds between men, military heroism, and taking risks were highly valued, with the duel as the ultimate test of masculinity (Connell 1993). The bourgeois-rationalist model idealized competitive individualism, reason, and self-control or self-denial (Seidler 1988), combining respectability as breadwinner and head of household with calculative rationality in public life.[39]

The influence of the various archetypes of hegemonic masculinity has waxed and waned historically. For example, martial masculinities, prominent in Greece and Rome, lost status in the Middle Ages. Under the papal "domestication" of Europe (in which there was a series of overlapping jurisdictions, national sovereignty being muted), power was in the hands of clerics, and mainstream masculinities tended to be agricultural or monastic in the Judeo-Christian mold. Meanwhile the military life was by and large relegated to a soldier caste. The revival of military service as an important feature of masculinity and citizenship, central to the identity of men, was associated with the rise of city-states and then nation-states (Stearns 1979; Elshtain 1981). As argued above, modernity has also brought a slow decline of the patriarchal Judeo-Christian model and its replacement by bourgeois-rationalism.

At any one time, the core ingredients of hegemonic masculinities can be made up of elements drawn from various of these ideal types, whose previous layers, reformulations, combinations, and manifestations lend an air of continuity and timelessness to today's construction. The mutual incompati-

bility of these basic types has not prevented some creative combinations of their elements in constructing apparently unified and singular masculinities. Realist masculinity in international relations is a case in point, having borrowed from all of these traditions. In fact, the credibility and durability of the realist approach may partly lie with the fact that it does appear to combine and embody traits that have been associated with male power and dominant masculinity under different historical conditions (see chapter 3).

Flux, Change, and Crisis in Hegemonic Masculinity

A brief reading of the recent literature on the history of masculinities suggests that, even within the modern period, dominant styles of masculinity can change quite rapidly, almost from one decade to the next. There was a change from the "men of letters" in Britain in the mid nineteenth century to the "hypermasculinity" and flight from domesticity of the new colonialism in the 1890s (Roper and Tosh 1991; Mangan and Walvin 1987). There was a crisis of masculinity in the United States associated with the symbolic closing of the frontier in the 1890s (Kimmel 1987a), and an attempt to regain the strenuous masculine life culminating in World War I (Filene 1987). Alternatively, World War I was the beginning of a twentieth-century crisis in masculinity and a terminal blow to martial masculinities (apart from a brief fascist interlude that attempted to turn the clock back) (Tolson 1977; Stearns 1979; Brittan 1989; Connell 1993). Then came the twentieth-century splitting of Victorian hegemonic masculinity into varieties based on expertise, domination, and the emergence of working-class hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1993); another period of hypermasculinity in the cold war of the 1950s, also associated with the flight from the domestic in both Britain and the United States (Segal 1987) or, alternatively, with rigid domestication in the breadwinner role (Ehrenreich 1983). This period, too, has been identified as one when masculinity was again "in crisis" (Brod 1987).

Finally, there are the proliferating diagnoses of change in recent times, culminating in what Connell describes as a "contemporary multilateral struggle for hegemony in gender relations" (Connell 1993, 613). This variously seems to point to progressive change and the unraveling of hegemonic masculinities (e.g., Abbott 1987; Connell 1990; Kroker and Kroker 1991; Simpson 1994); less progressive change and the reconfiguration of hegemonic masculinities (e.g., Moore 1988; Stacey 1993; Messner 1993; Forrest

1994); resistance (e.g., Faludi 1991; Le Doeuff 1993); a crisis of masculinity (e.g., Kimmel 1987a; Brod 1987; Buchbinder 1994; Faludi 1999); a lesser legitimation crisis (e.g., Brittan 1989); or an ambiguous mixture of all of these (e.g., Segal 1987, Pfeil 1995).

One reason for the different and apparently contradictory histories outlined here is that different authors may be focusing on different sections of society or different constructions or archetypes of masculinity, and possibly generalizing too much. It is very likely that crises of masculinity occur for different groups of men and different strands within hegemonic masculinities at different times. As for contemporary changes, they are still unfolding. The different interpretations to some extent reflect ongoing struggles where the overall direction of change is still ambiguous.

Such a plethora of crises and changes identified in the literature lends weight to the argument that masculinities are fluid constructions and that dominant masculinities are constantly being challenged, reconstituted, and reinvented in different sections of society, in adaptation to changing economic, political, and social circumstances. Indeed, one might be led to expect crises or subcrises of hegemonic masculinity in particular locations or sections of society to be an almost permanent social feature. But such crises should not necessarily be seen as a sign of the imminent demise of male power for they are part-and-parcel of the adjustment process, so that, as Brittan argues, "while styles of masculinity may alter in relatively short time spans, the substance of male power does not." (Brittan 1989, 2). The pessimistic view (from the perspective of feminism) is that unraveling masculinities is "a utopian aspiration because new hegemonic masculinities are always being refigured and reconstituted, perhaps more quickly than the older ones unravel" (Stacey 1993, 711).

Some contributors see current challenges to hegemonic masculinity as particularly significant, however. Stearns, Segal, Weeks, and Connell all agree that by the end of the nineteenth century a clear and distinct, definitively heterosexual, Anglo-American model of manhood had crystalized, emerging through industrialization, bureaucratization, medical classification, British "public schools" (which actually are top private schools) and their U.S. counterparts, and imperialism, and that this model has survived, with modifications,[40] as the manly ideal throughout most of the twentieth century. It is perhaps this ideal of hegemonic masculinity that is now breaking down, or at least being seriously challenged by the strain of globaliza-

tion, economic restructuring, the positioning of men as consumers, changes in family structure, and feminist, gay, and postcolonial political challenges, to mention only a few of the elements that make up "the condition of postmodernity" (Harvey 1989).

The idea that changes in dominant forms and constructions of masculinity can be provoked by wider economic and social changes is supported by some readings of gender history. Kimmel argues that major crises in hegemonic masculinity and consequent redefinitions have occurred at particular historical junctures, during times of rapid social change and disorder, when structural changes transformed the institutions of marriage and the family, often bringing new opportunities for women. Masculinities have then changed in reaction to new constructions of femininity, as "since men benefit from inherited definitions of masculinity and femininity, they would be unlikely to initiate change" (1987a, 123–24).

Kimmel's two cases were Restoration England (1688–1714) and the late-nineteenth-century United States. In the former, large numbers of men suffered contradictory loss of occupational autonomy and at the same time were led to expect increased individual independence when family craft workshops were threatened by the rise of liberalism, mercantilism, and migration to cities. On top of this, women were becoming wageworkers rather than partners in the old family workshops and they were consequently asserting sexual agency—equality of desire and equal rights in marriage. Many men abandoned their traditional role within the family, moved to the city, remained unmarried and/or (according to female pamphleteers) became feminized through their concern with dress, hairstyles, and cross-dressing—with becoming a beau or a fop. This feminization was linked to city life, to exotic foreign "French" influences, and was associated with sexual and political treason (Britain was at war with France at the time). Meanwhile, in a conservative backlash against such developments, traditional masculinity was promoted by association with patriotism and virility (successful resolution of the war with France).

In the case of the United States, the city was also linked with the threat of feminization, in the economic context of rapid industrialization, the deskilling of male workers, the closing of the frontier, mass immigration, the economic crash, and industrial unrest. By the late nineteenth century, expansive U.S. "frontier masculinity," for which the West signaled freedom and a virile optimism, was no longer tenable. Instead, the industrialized, bureaucratized, closed in world of the city beckoned. In contrast to the fron-

tier, Frank Lloyd Wright described the city of New York as a "mantrap of monstrous dimensions" (quoted in Kimmel 1987a, 142). The city was seen to threaten masculinity through vice, cultural threats from immigrants and Jews, the increased public presence of women, and the loss of authority of traditional institutions such as the church. The crisis of masculinity formed part of the general social unrest that brought U.S. society to the brink of collapse, as all the familiar routes to manhood became blocked at the same time as women were demanding suffrage. Male responses to the crisis included accusing women of being "mannish" lesbians and an abhorrence of the idea that boys should be brought up almost exclusively by women in nuclear families—part of a dangerous feminization of U.S. culture. Masculinity was revived through appeals to religious fundamentalism, the "country life" movement, and health and sport fanaticism.[41] From these two cases Kimmel concludes that "masculinity was a relational construct and was to be reconstructed, reasserted or redefined in relation to changing social and economic conditions and the changing position of women in society" (1987a, 153).

Hearn (1992) criticizes Kimmel's historical approach to change in hegemonic masculinity as economically determinist. There is danger in seeing changes in dominant masculinities as purely reactive processes, determined by wider forces and structural changes. This undermines the claim that gender divisions are powerful in their own right (Donaldson 1993). Kimmell's analysis is overdependent on examining economic and structural changes to the neglect of the interplay between gender and other axes of hierarchical differentiation. In the second period that Kimmel examines, the late 1890s, Anglo-American hegemonic masculinities were not only being challenged by economic restructuring, they were also being defined in relation to the newly emerging category of "homosexual," and in terms of super-Darwinistic theories of racial superiority (discussed above). Kimmel's observations are instructive, but the picture is more complex than his rather economically determined analysis allows.

The relationships between hegemonic and subordinate masculinities play a key role in the gender order, at least as much in the policing of male behavior as in the subordination of women. As Donaldson remarks,

> through hegemonic masculinity most men benefit from having control of women; for a very few men, it delivers control of other men. To put it another way, the crucial difference between hegemonic masculinity and oth-

> er masculinities is not the control of women, but the control of men and the representation of this as a "universal social advancement," to paraphrase Gramsci. (Donaldson 1993, 655)

Feminization, Conformity, and Subordination

The threat of feminization is a tool with which male conformity to hegemonic ideals is policed. This threat works when subordinate masculinities are successfully feminized and then demonized. The creation and labeling of the homosexual as a distinct deviant type served this purpose (Weeks 1989). As Barbara Ehrenreich argues, the threat of effeminacy, or latent homosexuality, was used to coerce men in the United States in the 1950s into forming a reliable workforce that would voluntarily support wives and children. Masculinity was equated with adulthood, marriage, and the breadwinning role, and homosexuality was demonized as the ultimate escapism (Ehrenreich 1983, 24). This ideology was backed up by theories from a host of psychological, medical, and sociological experts. Any man who failed fully to live up to the breadwinning role by walking out on wife or job—or worse, failing to get a wife or job in the first place—might be diagnosed as suffering from "latent" or "pseudo" homosexuality. Every heterosexual man was on his guard against such possibilities. It was the equation of latent homosexuality with femininity as well as with sexual deviance that guaranteed its effectiveness as a threat.

Ironically, it was not until the 1970s, when (largely through their own efforts to turn around their subordinate position) the increased visibility of gay men as a distinctive cultural and political group allowed more freedom for heterosexual men to indulge in formerly suspect behavior without losing their heterosexual citizenship privileges:

> Where the notion of latency had established a secret continuum between the heterosexual and the homosexual, there was now a sharp divide, like a national boundary: Gays on one side, "straights" (as they now became by default) on the other. . . . Homosexuality might still be feared and stigmatized, but it could no longer be used as the null point in a hypothetical scale of masculinity. With the old equations between homosexuality and effeminacy broken, "straight" men were free to "soften" themselves indefinitely without losing their status as heterosexuals. (Ehrenreich 1983, 130)

Clearly, feminization as masculinist strategy operates not only to circumscribe and downgrade female activities, but is also a powerful tool in the construction and maintenance of hierarchies of masculinities. It has been used not only to police the boundaries of hegemonic masculinity and ensure a large measure of conformity, but also to differentiate between and create hierarchies of subordinate masculinities—although not without contradictions. An illustration of this can be seen in the context of British imperial rule over India. While all "orientals" were deemed effeminate, some were more effeminate than others, so that a hierarchy of racialized masculinities emerged, based on degrees of manliness and effeminacy. Mrinalini Sinha (1987) demonstrates how Bengali men were successfully subordinated by nineteenth-century British rulers by being given a political status below that of the "martial races" of northern India and the Punjab, as part of an imperial divide-and-rule strategy. Bengali men were seen as both effeminate and morally corrupt because of their sexual practices and their diminutive size, which in the British imagination were linked. The Bengali practice of consummating marriages at puberty was interpreted by the British as a sign of an effeminate lack of self-control, the cause of moral corruption, debilitating masturbation, and stunted physical growth (through early pregnancy). The British introduced a "consent" act, which prevented the early consummation of marriage and made Bengali men the only men subject to accusations of rape within marriage. That the British had removed Bengali men's sexual power over Bengali women was interpreted by Bengali men as a slight to their manhood, which emasculated them still further in their own eyes. It is ironic that a group of men labeled as effeminate should be stigmatized by charges of rape, that most masculine of offenses. Nonetheless, the successful feminization of Bengali men put them below the Punjabis in political clout and status. Punjabi men, the recruiting ground of the Indian Army, consummated their marriages later (late teens), and were, needless to say, taller than Bengalis.

Strategies of feminization used to downgrade groups of men may be more contradictory and precarious than strategies that straightforwardly masculinize men and feminize women, but their relative success in the above examples indicates that masculinism can privilege elite males at the expense of feminized Others, regardless of sex or gender. Such masculinist strategies at least partially separate the concept of masculinity from its association with the male sex because they deny that some men are masculine. Once masculinity is thus separated from men, feminist analyses of patri-

archy—whether seen as a single ahistorical system of male domination, as operating in a dual system with capitalism, or even as a unified system of capitalist patriarchy—are no longer tenable, for this is not the rule of all men over all women on the basis of their sex alone; it rather involves multilayered hierarchies, in which gender, race, sexuality, class, and other factors mix in a relatively fluid process.

Subordinate Masculinities

In the proliferating literature on the representation of subordinate masculinities, the twin themes of effeminacy and pathological deviance crop up again and again. The psychological legacy of imposed racist gender identities is complex.[42] However, broadly speaking, the racist legacy of empire still positions indigenous men and those with ethnic roots east of Turkey (including Jews in the Diaspora) as effeminate (Brod 1994; Fung 1995),[43] while blacks and men with roots in South Europe are seen as pathologically "hypermasculine" (Mercer and Julien 1988; Segal 1990).[44] Mexicans, who have links both with Southern European and with indigenous cultures, are labeled as both effeminate and, perversely, "macho."[45]

Class and sexuality cut across this racial hierarchy, giving many permutations and nuances, in highly attenuated grades of masculinity.[46] Homosexuality is deemed effeminate, while working-class masculinities get the "hypermasculine" tag in comparison with the middle-class "new man." Thus a working-class black man might be doubly hypermasculine, while a middle-class, Asian gay man would be doubly, or even triply, effeminate. Other composite positions are more contradictory, such as the gay, black, middle-class man.[47] In practice, most men find themselves in composite, contradictory, and shifting positions with regard to the finer nuances of differentiated masculinities, aligned with hegemonic masculinities in some respects, subordinated in others.

Much of the literature on subordinate masculinities is couched in terms of oppression and resistance. There are divergent and contradictory assessments of both working-class and black machismo. Afro-Caribbean and Afro-American machismo (as represented in the 1990s by gangster rap), plays on colonial fantasies and fears about black-male sexuality, "brute" strength, and danger, while perpetuating homophobia and misogyny (Mercer and Julien 1988, 113). It can be seen as a kind of negative and ultimately self-destructive

form of resistance to emasculation by white culture; on the other hand, it can be seen as an ironic, unsettling, and empowering way of manipulating the stereotypes thrust upon black men by the dominant culture, or even as a positive display of fraternity and cultural pride (Zinn 1989).

Asian youths in Britain have tried to circumvent being feminized through the adoption of black American street styles in an attempt to shake off the image of oriental effeminacy that they think makes them more vulnerable to racist attack, with contradictory results (Mac an Ghaill 1994). The 1980s "butch shift" among gay men can similarly be interpreted as either a positive form of resistance to their feminization (Segal 1990), a regressive capitulation to hegemonic codes of masculinity (Kimmel 1990; Edwards 1994) or as a contradictory phenomenon that has successfully dislodged the association between macho masculinity and heterosexual men in Britain, while also reinforcing gender stereotypes (Forrest 1994).

Meanwhile working-class masculinities are characterized either as outdated, regressive, and misogynist (Kersten 1993) or are seen to have provided the solidarity and aggression needed for real collective power in the labor force, at least in the past (Tolson 1977). Some racist, white, male youths in South London have even taken to mixing black cultural forms in with their racism, as a kind of "cultural dowry" that endows toughness and machismo (Back 1994, 182).

These differing interpretations suggest that nonhegemonic groups of men are more often than not caught up in a contradictory and complex process of simultaneously participating in and resisting their oppression and the constructions of masculinity that are thrust upon them, so that subordinate and oppositional styles of masculinity are neither wholly regressive nor wholly progressive. Indeed discussing styles of masculinity in isolation from other practices can obscure rather than illuminate both structural inequalities and progressive changes.

For example, on the basis of style alone, New Man sensitivity might be seen as more progressive than Chicano machismo, but in terms of domestic practices it may well be the other way around. Hondagneau-Sotelo and Messner (1994) argue that in the United States hegemonic masculinity is being reconstituted in the New Man image: among other things, middle-class men can now enjoy the emotional fruits of parenting without losing their class and gender privileges, and simultaneously deflect feminist criticism. New Men cultivate a public gender display of emotional sensitivity

and participation in parenthood that may be at odds with the reality of their day to day lives.

The public face of subordinate masculinities, with their collectively constructed displays of masculinity and machismo, might also be at odds with men's experiences. Hondagneau-Sotelo and Messner point to three arenas where male Mexican immigrants to the United States have lost their patriarchal privileges: in spatial mobility, familial authority, and household labor. Mexican immigrant family life, with its high rate of female employment and shared domestic chores, may well be more egalitarian in practice than the family life of New Men, who often pay only lip service to domestic responsibilities.[48] But the ideological image of the New Man needs a counterimage to stand against, and hence "those aspects of traditional hegemonic masculinity that the New Man has rejected—overt physical and verbal displays of domination, stoicism, and emotional inexpressivity, overt misogyny in the workplace and at home—are now increasingly projected onto less privileged groups of men: working class men, gay bodybuilders, black athletes, Latinos and immigrant men" (Hondagneau-Sotelo and Messner 1994, 207). Similarly, Barbara Ehrenreich reports that blue-collar males have been seen as "the lowest level of consciousness, the dumping ground for all the vestigial masculine traits discarded by the middle class" (Ehrenreich 1983, 136).

This projection of currently unwanted characteristics onto subordinate groups, branded as pathological or aberrant varieties of masculinity, appears to be ascendant over the earlier projection of effeminacy, as hegemonic masculinities increasingly soften.[49] If subordinate masculinities are being increasingly pathologized through accusations of hypermasculinity, then this will have consequences for the effectiveness of the feminization strategies discussed above. There may be an opportunity for educated women and other previously "feminized" groups such as middle-class Asian men to alter their position in the gender hierarchy, as the qualities associated with them in gender ideology more closely match the requirements of a softer hegemonic masculinity. As hegemonic masculinities change, so might the whole pecking order shift and reform in a slightly different configuration.

Struggles over the representation of subordinate masculinities form part of the political process of their construction and disruption, but it is important to recognize that such representations are no more a mirror of the actual social experiences of men in subordinate groups than the mascu-

line/feminine dichotomy is a mirror of male and female experience. Nonetheless, as Rosa Linda Fregoso argues, while white Euro-Americans have access to a heterogeneous body of masculinities from which hegemonic masculinities are fashioned and refashioned, subordinate groups of men have far less choice: "Contrary to the historically variable and shifting range of hegemonic masculinities, the representation of the identity of racially subordinated groups stands out for its monologic and homogeneous economy, resting virtually on the negative side of the masculine equation" (Fregoso 1993, 661). It is perhaps this difference in the range of choices that, more than any other factor, distinguishes the construction of restricted and restricting subordinate masculinities from enabling and powerful hegemonic ones.

To summarize the theoretical perspective endorsed in this chapter: there is no single narrative of masculinity. The concept of masculinity is revealed as a plural and fluid construction as soon as it is historically contextualized. The proliferation of differing interpretations of the history of masculinities merely highlight this fluidity and draw attention to the importance of interpretation itself in the construction of masculinities. For analytical purposes, it is useful to draw out different models or ideal types of masculinity, even though such types are very generalized and do not conform to the lived experience of particular men.

Feminist critiques of masculinism offer insights into the association of masculinity with power, but tend to view masculinity as a monolithic entity. The reconciliation of such critiques with the identification of plural masculinities can be achieved by using the concepts of hegemonic and subordinate masculinities. These heuristic devices indicate plurality while also highlighting power relations, both those between men and women and those between different groups of men. In a masculinist culture, anything that is associated with hegemonic masculinity carries a higher status and better access to power than anything associated with the feminine. However, as masculinities have no necessarily fixed ingredients, what qualities, organizations, practices, or peoples get to be associated with masculinity is a political question and is the subject of a series of heterogeneous power struggles going on at all levels of society. Masculinist practices work both to maintain the status of hegemonic masculinity and to ensure that it evolves

to meet the requirements of retaining power and privilege for elite (usually white, middle- or upper-class, heterosexual) men under changing circumstances. Masculinist strategies do have their limits: since they depend on an arbitrary list of qualities being anchored by a metaphorical association with male anatomy, they are obviously less effective when masculinities become denaturalized and may be especially vulnerable to failure in times of rapid change.

Hegemonic masculinity is constantly being challenged and reconstituted in struggles that involve the strategies of masculinization and feminization of peoples, groups, values, occupations, and practices. Feminization, masculinization, and the identification of pathological varieties of masculinity are all tools in the war of interpretation that position different masculinities and groups of men in relation to each other, as well in relation to women, under changing circumstances. Changes in the gender order, including changes in the construction of masculinities, are often triggered by structural changes in society and form part of the political struggles over the direction of change. Competing visions of masculinity then are mobilized simultaneously in the pursuit of different ends. The power of hegemonic masculinity appears to lie in part in its flexibility in comparison with the restricted and monological representation of subordinate masculinities.

In the arguments put forth in the first part of this book, it can be seen that the overall approach to gender endorsed is one that emphasizes identifications rather than fixed identities, and power-laden political processes rather than static structures. In part 2, this approach will be used to help reveal and clarify the unfolding politics of masculinity that saturate the discipline and practices of international relations.