CHAPTER 6

THE RETURN: POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS AND THE CHILEAN TRANSITION

■ All of the individuals of this study have been at the forefront of Chilean left politics. In that context, those termed *political entrepreneurs* consistently occupy vanguard positions. Political entrepreneurs were the leading young actors in university-based left politics thirty years ago, and they are among the protagonists of a pragmatic, ideologically moderate center-left alliance today.

The individuals considered in this chapter have proved most adept at altering their own ideologies in response to what they perceive to be their society's changing political climate. Yet, like the other cognitive ideal-types presented, the entrepreneurs' basic approaches to politics have remained constant. While the ideological discourses of the entrepreneurs have changed from the past, their fundamental approaches to politics have not.

For political entrepreneurs, politics is about strategies that produce winning coalitions and popular leadership. Entrepreneurs possess the gift of meshing political ideas with multinetwork organizational vehicles to advance those ideas. The entrepreneurs are effective alliance builders, spanning shades of the political spectrum. In the transition from military to democratic rule, the entrepreneurs of this study have played central roles in forging an unprecedented alliance with the centrist Christian Democratic Party. The entrepreneurs are also effective alliance severers. The alliance with the Christian Democrats came largely at the expense of the Socialist Party's historic alliance with the Chilean Communist Party.

Moreover, in contrast to political party loyalists and personal loyalists, political entrepreneurs regard loyalty to their parties or to particular leaders as less important than being a part of an effective political equation. While the entrepreneurs recognize the continuing need to operate politically within political parties, they have also tended to break ranks with their parties to forge new ground. The exception to this very strong pattern is those political entrepreneurs who as young people were members of the

Chilean Communist Party, for whom breaking ranks proved a longer, more painful process. Such is the case of Raúl Oliva, below. Nevertheless, unlike political party loyalists, political entrepreneurs' embeddedness in their parties is far more fluid.

Political entrepreneurs rise to leadership positions by drawing on their ties to networks outside as well as inside their own parties. Such networks may include other parties, former classmates, professional contacts, the Catholic Church, and their own families. Entrepreneurs thus take advantage of their embeddedness in various networks to position themselves politically and strategically. The political entrepreneurs discussed here come from the Chilean middle class, and university training and leadership during a period of major university reform distinguish their early political careers.[1]

Of the four types presented in this study, political entrepreneurs are most apt to shift political directions in response to traumatic political experiences. Traumatic experiences, ranging from the political polarization of the late 1960s to the military coup and the repression that followed, are the catalysts for the entrepreneurs' new ideological directions and altered relationships to their political parties. While traumatic political experiences tended to lead to ideological freezing among the personal and party loyalists of this study, the political entrepreneurs responded to such experiences by turning away from past ideologies.

Among the political entrepreneurs are those who focus on gaining visibility and votes and those who dedicate themselves to behind-the-scenes strategizing, policy making, and policy implementation. There are those who seek elected office, and others who serve as political appointees and consultants—technocrats of the political order.

This chapter will examine the lives and texts of five political entrepreneurs: Raúl Oliva, a former Communist Party leader and current Socialist Party organizer; José Miguel Insulza, Chile's minister of foreign relations; Clarisa Hardy, director of research in the Ministry of Planning; Enrique Correa, minister of government from 1990 to 1994 and currently director of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales–Chile (FLACSO–Chile); and José Antonio Viera-Gallo, speaker of the House of Representatives from 1990 to 1994 and now a senator.

RAÚL OLIVA

Raúl Oliva portrays himself as a self-made man and independent thinker, free today from the missionary role he played for many years as a

leader in the Chilean Communist Party.[2] His political journey began as a young man when he left a provincial home in the far reaches of Chile for political activism in the capital. Oliva's politics later led to his exile in Europe, which he says made him aware of the political and cultural provincialism of Chile itself. Today Oliva is an organizer in the Chilean Socialist Party, the party that he believes possesses the power and leadership capable of governing Chile. Oliva views the Communist Party as a political dinosaur, no longer the beacon for the Chilean left that he felt it was thirty years ago. Throughout his life, Oliva has proved himself an able organizer and strategist.

Raúl Oliva was born in 1945 in Osorno, a small city in southern Chile. Oliva described Osorno as "estranged from the world," while Santiago "was civilization for us." The only means of mass communication was by radio. Politics in Osorno took place only at election time. Osorno was a very traditional, hardworking community, where "daily life was mediocre."

Oliva's father was a hatmaker who taught him the trade. His mother, a devoted Catholic, worked in a hospital. From his community and family, Oliva inherited a strong work ethic. He was also an exceptional organizer. In his teens he organized a basketball club, a young people's radio program, a rock-and-roll band, a philosophy club, a French club, and a chess club.

While Oliva remembers his hometown as completely cut off from the world, 1960s events and movements were clearly felt in Osorno. Oliva and his senior high school classmates organized an "Independent Left" group in 1964. He attributed his "feeling of belonging to the left" to the influence of his teachers, who he later learned were Communists. Oliva's desire to continue in politics and to "rise in the world" compelled him to leave Osorno for Santiago:

> When I finished my high school exams, I had achieved excellent scores, and my father decided, something which for him was a big leap regarding the question of education, that I should do three more years of study in administration. His idea for me was that I would work in a bank, continue playing basketball, get married. He never liked politics, and to this day he's critical. I suffered a minor crisis. I didn't want to stay in Osorno. I had no money. My professors said it was absurd for me to stay in Osorno, that I should study law. I left for Santiago against my father's will. I was nineteen years old. I had a girlfriend who worked and who lent me money to go and register. I arrived with a

> letter from my French professor to work in a private high school. They gave me food, lodging, and a little money in exchange for my teaching. I didn't know anyone. I spent the weekends hungry because the high school was closed.

The above excerpt marks the first passage in Oliva's text where his expression shifts from first person plural (e.g., "we in Osorno believed," "we students") to first person singular. This shift marks Oliva's coming into his own as a self-sufficient young man ready to engage in Chilean political life. Oliva also knew that to become involved politically, he had to choose a party:

> All this was in 1965. I began to come in contact with students from different parties. Being an independent was viewed as a weird thing. I began to feel the need to define myself. I saw the people on the right as people with money. I had a friend who was a committed Communist militant. He began to lend me books, to take the time to listen to my great concerns. I had supported Allende in 1964, but I was only a passive Allendista. I began to read. There were two dailies on the left: *El Siglo* of the Communist Party and *La Ultima Hora* of the Socialist Party. *El Siglo* was a great paper, with articles on culture, portraits of the workers' movement. . . .
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> In the summer of that year [1965] I went to work in the countryside [where I'm from]. My parents separated. I began to read *El Siglo* every afternoon and to identify with everything the PCCH represented. I returned [to Santiago], I began to work as a teacher, I had my own place, and I bought *El Siglo* every day. Then I remember that a *compañero* at the university, a very good friend, had seen me often with *El Siglo* and he approached me and asked me if I was a communist and I said to him, "Yes," [Oliva laughs] and he invited me to a meeting. I left that meeting having found my reason for being and I began to work.
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> Immediately I was a class candidate in the student elections. The PCCH was a great organization, massive, it was, perhaps, the Communist Youth was the most influential youth group in Chile in the 1960s. From '65, '66 until '73. . . .
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> My vision [of Communist Party culture] rested somewhere between reality and the idyllic. I thought that everything we did was important, decisive, full of humanity. . . . A party militant was a missionary day and night, didn't know Saturdays or Sundays, everything had a political

> character. We were youth with a great mystique. We were carriers of an idea of change, of the revolution, which was the solution, which permitted us to resolve all the problems of this country. And we had great admiration for the party, a mythical admiration. . . . It was a blind vision, closed, we had tremendous leaders who were cultured, wise, and they had in their hands the possibility of bringing their vision to fruition. . . . We studied to learn, to be faithful.

Oliva recounts that there was no separation among party, ideology, and praxis. Through the PCCH leadership and meetings, the party provided ideology and program. Through *El Siglo*, the PCCH provided an interpretation of day-to-day events. For Oliva, it was a period when individual political identity became inseparable from Communist Party activism. It was his "reason for being." To achieve party recognition, Oliva performed as a "missionary," and it earned him a leadership position in the Young Communists.

Throughout Oliva's text, the narrative moves from first person singular to first person plural whenever he discusses the party. This parallels his first narrative transition from first person plural to first person singular when he moves from Osorno to Santiago. It is as though in the PCCH Oliva had rediscovered a sense of place for his organizing and leadership skills, a place he held on to from 1965 until his exile, when he began to question the PCCH's strategy and direction.

Oliva remembers himself as a proselytizer, guided by the party, a student of faith. The PCCH also provided the most important relationship of Oliva's life:

> It was during that period that I met Alicia. She was a PCCH high school student leader and I was a university student leader. In the middle of this great revolutionary atmosphere, we found love. We married in 1969.

Oliva and his wife were swept up with the Allende period, organizing in the student movement. On the day after the coup, Oliva and other student resisters were taken prisoner and held, along with several hundred Chilean citizens, in the national soccer stadium. In the process of being moved to the National Stadium two weeks later, Oliva escaped. He went underground, while his wife worked for the party at the Finnish Embassy.

Life underground was traumatic. It was a period in which communists were systematically persecuted and dozens of PCCH organizers were arrested, were murdered, and disappeared. It was also a period when Chilean

leftists were forced to question what had gone wrong during the Allende period and what their own roles had been in that going wrong. For Raúl Oliva, it was also a period when Communists doubted one another. As militant after militant fell into the hands of Chile's security forces, and as the military discovered and murdered the majority of the internal PCCH leadership in 1976, PCCH organizers began to suspect one another's complicity with the military. Oliva felt that his comrades viewed him with suspicion, primarily because he had not yet been captured. "Either you were an informant or you were a *desaparecido*!" he remembered. Such sentiments of suspected betrayals did irreparable damage to Oliva's relationships with fellow Communists. By 1977, Oliva and his wife, wanted by the military, were sent by the PCCH to Sweden as political refugees. It was not until Oliva received asylum in Sweden, he claimed, that the PCCH realized he could not have been an informant.

From 1977 to 1980, Oliva was a reporter for the Soviet-funded World Youth Organization based in Budapest. There he came into contact with communists and other left militants from around the globe. The debate he remembered being most engaged in centered on the questions of ethics and betrayal:

> The most troubling problem for us [Chilean Communists] was the betrayal. What kind of people were we? What kind of ethics could have existed to deliver the lives of other people to save your own life? Why had we been defeated? What were we pretending to be, we who were so-called pacifists, who didn't want to kill anyone, who accepted private property? Two explanations emerged: [one was that being] communist militants required even greater political will, ready to engage in armed struggle if necessary; the other, that we had been too narrow-minded in our process, our approach to change.

Here Oliva presents a fascinating linking of ethics with strategy or means. In one sector of the Communist Party (namely the Leipzig Group, described in chapter 5), party members were expected to take the moral high ground, to answer defeat and oppression with moral and political will and a commitment to give their lives in a battle against the dictatorship. In another sector, which included Oliva, the party had to recognize that the Allende government should have had a more inclusive program that systematically strove to incorporate the political center and the middle class. Oliva portrayed the Leipzig Group as exercising a kind of ethical "overkill" and he,

himself, as having to separate ethics from the reality of politics in order to advance a politically viable program:

> These distinct visions of reality provoked tremendous internal conflict for me. If being a communist meant such a Manichaean vision of things, then I'm different. If I'm different, with whom do I identify? The only communist party I related to was the Italian Communist Party. So I became one Italian communist more living in Sweden. I read the daily *Renascita*, I read Italian literature, Gramsci, et cetera. But there was one problem. It was the Communist Party, but it was a European one. It was *very* European.
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> I continued as a militant in the PCCH, but as a militant with a dissident status. A person not to be trusted. It was almost like being a "*sympathizer*." People began to watch themselves with me because I could be a very negative influence.

Oliva temporarily retreated from exile politics to study in Sweden and Spain, and he earned a master's in law. In 1983 and 1984, as signs of a political opening began to emerge in Chile, Raúl and Alicia Oliva concentrated on building capital for their return. Oliva began to draw on educational and professional networks to redefine his identity.

For Oliva, exile represented what former Brazilian exile and historian Valentina da Rocha Lima termed a "confrontation with individuality," an "individual search for identity."[3] Oliva was shocked by the control that Chilean Communist delegates exercised over their militants in Eastern Europe, possessing the authority, for example, to grant or deny their members travel privileges. "Personal freedoms, one's right to make personal decisions," Oliva recounted, "frankly were limited by the party." In exile, Oliva's complete self-deliverance to the PCCH as its "missionary" gave way. He felt increasingly "stifled" by the PCCH, uncomfortable with the fact that he was forced to remain with the Chilean Communist Youth when he was well over thirty, dismayed by the insularity of the PCCH leadership. "Communist parties are like two bulldogs fighting under a rug," Oliva said. "You see the rug moving, but you don't even hear a sound! It is a deaf and inaccessible struggle."

Through his connections to networks outside the Communist Party, Oliva developed professional contacts and secured funding from a United Nations agency to support independent research upon his return to Chile. The Olivas were granted permission to return in 1984, and after his arrival

Oliva began to work as a human rights lawyer. He remained in the PCCH but did not assume an official party role. His new networks gave him a sense of independence that he felt he had not enjoyed since his pre- PCCH days. He joined a small group of Communist intellectuals who formed a think tank to pressure the PCCH to abandon its armed rebellion strategy. There Oliva oversaw survey studies that convinced him that Chilean citizens had overcome their fear of the dictatorship but were against violence as a means to the regime's end. It also became clear to him that the PCCH itself had lost its historic popular foothold within the left. By 1988, surveys that Oliva and his colleagues conducted indicated that the PCCH would receive no more than 5 or 6 percent of the vote in national elections.

In his description of the Chilean transition from authoritarianism during the mid- to late 1980s, Oliva presents himself as virtually alone with respect to several strategic political issues. When the PCCH and others on the left claimed 1986 to be "the decisive year" to defeat the dictatorship through mass mobilizations and general strikes, Oliva claimed that he knew such a call was premature and ill-conceived. He favored negotiations with the regime. In 1987 he attempted to convince the PCCH to abandon its armed rebellion stance and push for free elections, for universal inscription in the election rosters. In 1988, Oliva, along with a small group of fellow Communists, pressed the PCCH to reverse its policy calling for abstention from the plebiscite, urging that the party join those sectors of the opposition calling upon Chilean citizens to vote "No." Oliva also pushed the PCCH, which was an illegal party according to the 1980 constitution, to consider joining the Party for Democracy, an instrumentalist party created by the Socialists. The PCCH rejected this proposal. Finally, Oliva claimed that at one point in early 1989 there was a window of opportunity for the party to join the center-left Concertación alliance, and, he alleged, he unsuccessfully pressed the PCCH to do so.

Following the 1989 elections, in which the Chilean Communist Party failed to win a single national seat, Raúl Oliva and a group of former fellow PCCH leaders held a press conference:

> We had to go public. To be a communist was like being a person of the past. You felt this kind of moral shame that you belonged to that world. People identified you as a leader of that world. . . . The alternatives were to participate in the refounding of the party, or to found our own movement with other groups.

Oliva's group condemned the PCCH 's alienation of party dissidents and announced their resignation from the PCCH to form ARCO, an alternative group composed of a hundred former PCCH members. Shortly thereafter, Oliva led the entry of ARCO as a bloc into the Chilean Socialist Party:

> I believe there isn't space for another party in Chile. In politics one has to make cold choices, and you have to have access to power. This is what politics is about. It is why I opted for the Socialist Party.
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> I think we have to produce a new identity of a progressive left in this country. And that identity doesn't exist. Who can do it? The Socialist Party, the Party for Democracy. . . . Parties have to be the representative vehicle. They also have to change. And I'm not clear yet in what sense they have to change, but they have to change. . . . None of the parties today function like parties. Historically parties organized immense sectors of the population. They represented very diverse worlds. Today they appear very weak [in terms of their organic connection to civil society]. Parties aren't attractive in a world where individuality has become so pronounced. Parties will have to engage in a practical renovation of relating on an individual-by-individual basis.

Oliva's conception of socialism today differs from his past conceptions in several ways. First, it is no longer statist. Second, it allows for economic inequality. Third, it is not an end but a process:

> I frankly think we must break with our past conception of socialism. I would say that socialism is not a final society, not a type of society, but rather a form of human conduct, a type of politics, a conception that is in the first place ethical, that refers to political and social development. I don't associate public property today with socialism. Socialists have to understand how our economy really works. They have to understand how the market functions. I believe in the necessity of [state] planning to some degree. The most developed countries in the world continue to plan—France, Spain, Italy, Germany. . . . Socialist ideals continue to be important, for example, overcoming the exploitation of man by his fellow man. . . . Yet profit will always exist. Always. Exploitation seen from an ethical point of view means establishing a limit that guarantees basic human dignity, a reasonable daily wage, recreation, education, equality of opportunity according to capacity.

> Socialists have to understand that it is impossible for the country to move forward without the businessmen of this country. This country operates with eight hundred thousand businessmen. If these eight hundred thousand hear the news that the government is going to raise taxes or something like that, these eight hundred thousand go to work depressed. The investments they had planned become paralyzed. They are human beings with characteristics that are sometimes conservative, sometimes revolutionary, audacious. We need to change the basic culture of our society.

Oliva's current ideological discourse is a far cry from his discourse of thirty years ago. Yet he continues to organize and strategize, now within the Socialist Party, working with former Communists to create and sustain a power bloc that might gain him a seat on the PSCH's Political Commission. Oliva has a successful law practice. He is hopeful about the left's chances of producing a successful presidential candidate, namely, Ricardo Lagos, to usher Chile into the second millennium.

CLARISA HARDY

Clarisa Hardy is an astute political analyst and strategist.[4] From her early twenties, when she worked in the Allende government, to today as a key assistant to government minister Jorge Arrate, Hardy has used her intellect and her skills to seek credibility as a policy maker and implementer. Like Raúl Oliva, Hardy portrays herself as an independent, self-made person, adept at using her political and professional networks to advance her work and beliefs.

Hardy comes from a liberal Jewish family. She was born in Buenos Aires in 1945. In the early 1950s, when she was a very young girl, Clarisa's father rejected Perón's request that he work for him as a filmmaker; instead he moved the family from Argentina to Chile. They moved into a middle-class neighborhood in Santiago, where Clarisa and her two siblings enrolled in a private Italian school in the neighborhood. There the Hardy children came face-to-face with anti-Semitism:

> I ended up in a private Italian school, purely by accident because it was in our neighborhood, but this was in 1952, and you had many Italian fascist immigrants here, so the social composition of the people there was absolutely adversarial. . . . My father was firmly nonreligious, so we

> three brothers and sisters did not participate in religious classes, and that marked me in school, as you can imagine. It was quite uncomfortable. Sometimes I would sit in on the religious classes and discover that the Jews had killed. . . [pause] . . . it was a terrible situation for me.

Hardy was very influenced by her father and family, and she grew up in a household where "everyone voiced their opinions at the table," a family that was "extraordinarily permissive." The family encouraged independent, liberal-minded children. She denies that her family was political, although she describes their annual trips to Argentina to visit an extremely political side of the family, including an aunt and an uncle who were "*bolche, bolche, bolche* [Bolsheviks]."

What can be gathered from Hardy's anecdotes about her home life and her first years of education is her notion of a virtual separation of politics and the political from the moral, social, or ethical foundations of her upbringing:

> My father was a Mason and ever since I was a girl I heard discussions about social justice, the persecution of minorities, et cetera. They were recurrent themes, which contributed to a kind of language of values, not political options, but in value terms—the themes of equality, justice, love.

Hardy's first involvement in politics came in the university. She portrays her period there as one of solidifying certain friendships and a social life, as much as a time to search for political direction. By her third year in college, Hardy had joined the Socialist Party, a decision apparently made by virtue of her immediate circle of friends and influences. She was an excellent student and an articulate young militant. She was chief organizer of a socialist university brigade to work in the Chilean countryside, and she demonstrated a talent for strategizing and dealmaking in concessions that she won from the government for student-peasant initiatives in the rural areas.

In reflecting on her university years, Hardy has come to believe that the Socialist Party sought her out as a leader because she was both a woman and a good student and thereby made a "good token." For Hardy, political party politics was about power and influence, exercised by males. Hardy's storytelling features a strong gendered dimension. She consistently offered portraits of the physical, even sensual, attributes of political friends and militants and her relationships to them. Like all the middle-class Chilean

intellectuals interviewed, Hardy begins her narrative in the first person rather than in the collective "we" voice. Yet, unlike those of her male colleagues, Hardy's voice shifts to the "we," referring to "my husband and I," throughout much of her adult life. When Hardy is not using "we," her spouse as a referent is assumed as an underlying presence. Among the male interviewees, with the exception of political party loyalist Patricio Rivas, this was not a storytelling pattern.

From 1967 to 1970 Hardy lived in England with her husband, where she earned a postgraduate degree in anthropology. When they returned to Chile, both she and her husband took government posts in the Allende administration, where Hardy continued to exercise her negotiating abilities in struggles over property rights. She claims that throughout the Allende period, she was "more a '*gobernista*' [a "government loyalist"] than a PSCH militant." Hardy attributed this in part to her frustrations with intraparty struggle and in part to her husband's influence as a member of the Chilean Communist Party. She sought to bridge and sustain effective party alliances within the Popular Unity administration, particularly within her own ministry. In Hardy's description of this period is the recurrent theme of an implicit assumption that the Socialist Party was a thorn in the side of the government.

> I was very much convinced of the need to defend the government more than the intraparty struggles of that period. I would say that I was an exemplary government militant, much more than an exemplary socialist militant, so much so that I had trouble in my neighborhood, La Reina. I was seen as very "*gobernista*," and very allied with the Communist Party.

Hardy had little desire to discuss the immediate aftermath of the coup. Apparently she had lent her name to protect someone else, a situation that caused a great deal of difficulty and drama in her personal life. She left for Argentina in December 1973, where she and her husband remained for a two-month period. Her husband was given a post in Geneva with the United Nations, but Hardy went to Mexico City, where many of her friends had gone into exile. Once in Mexico, Hardy decided she would stay with the children there.

> I decided I wasn't leaving Mexico, because in Geneva I would have had to dedicate myself to raising the children, learning a language, I wouldn't

> find work. So Alejandro had to resign from his UN job, and we spent nine years in Mexico City.

Hardy presents this period as the beginning of her own kind of liberation, primarily as she developed herself professionally in Mexico.

Unlike other interviewees who had been in exile in Mexico, Hardy portrayed herself as a person who became quite engrossed in Mexican politics and culture, for whom Mexico offered her first opportunity to study "on the ground."

> Before my work in Mexico I was a book academic. Here I learned how to do fieldwork, because I worked in a research center on rural issues. I traveled all around Mexico. I spent fifteen days a month working in peasant communities.

Hardy claimed that on the personal as well as the professional side, she would have been quite capable, even happy, to live the rest of her days in Mexico if need be. Her children were in Mexican schools, her work was with Mexicans, and she became involved intellectually with the Mexican left. Nevertheless, as the image of her large circle of personal friendships emerged during the interview, it was clear that the core of that circle remained Chilean friends. In exile Hardy became quite close to political party loyalist Isabel Allende, to painter José Roca, to Aylwin's minister of energy, Jaime Tohá, and to a number of other Chilean political thinkers and activists. She hosted solidarity meetings in her home, organized benefits for Chile, and participated in other events against the dictatorship.

Yet Hardy did not consider herself an active socialist militant, and she neither worked for the party nor attended PSCH meetings. She claimed that she was increasingly dismayed by the perspectives and behavior exhibited by many of her compatriots toward Mexico, by a view of Mexicans as "*indios*," by the "little respect some Chileans showed toward Mexican society." Moreover, she found it strange, "in some ways a little sick, this disassociation between the personal and the political, of an 'outside militancy' very weirdly connected to either country, to Chile or to Mexico." While this contradicts her own disassociation of the personal from the political rooted in her childhood, Hardy herself virtually gave up on the Socialist Party and concentrated on her professional development and alternative networks in Mexico. Unlike party loyalists, who continued to be embroiled in their parties in exile, Hardy maintained a looser relation-

ship with her party, involving herself in other professional and intellectual networks.

Presented with opportunities for work and professional development, Hardy and her family elected to integrate more fully into Mexican life. She taught at a Mexican university, worked at a Mexican research institute, and engaged in debates with Mexicans about Mexican politics and culture.

Hardy described how Mexico had influenced the ways in which she had come to view questions ranging from the meaning of socialism to state-society relations and gender issues:

> For me, curiously, the great leap [toward a renovated socialist position] wasn't due to theoretical political discussion nor to great international moments, no, nor to the conditions leading to the downfall of the Berlin wall. . . . I think it was really a product of my professional work in Mexico and my contact with an extraordinarily more heterogeneous society than I had ever experienced, where it was not merely a question of class differences, but of something else. . . . Where only today in Chile this is appearing and has a marked political and ethnic mix, in Mexico it was basically a cultural struggle, eh, the awakening of the whole feminist theme coincided with my time in Mexico, a society extraordinarily restrictive with women. . . .
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> My contact with the Mexican university was a contrast to the Chilean university. In Mexico the university had an enormous student body and very little of "class heritage" claims. You gave classes to kids who were asleep in their seats, and when you asked why, it was because they were hungry, not because they were tired, and I discovered how Chile was a brutally stratified society. From the day you are born [in Chile] you move in an extraordinarily homogeneous world, that from birth you live in a neighborhood of a specific type, you attend schools of a specific type. So for me Mexico was the discovery of an enormous diversity irreducible to class struggle. . . .
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> I realized I was part of the guilty Chilean middle class that one tries not to claim or confront as part of one's identity but tries instead to assume another. For me Mexico was *extremely* important, the impact of modernity and poverty I lived there more strongly than the people who live it here in Chile.

Mexico represented to Hardy not only an opportunity for professional growth and accomplishment but a window on a dramatically distinct poli-

tics and culture as well. This led her to discoveries about her own society and culture of which she had previously been unaware. She perceived that she and her fellow left intellectuals had attempted to "assume another identity," as champions of the workers, transcending class boundaries. Hardy now saw Chilean society as profoundly stratified, so much so that she felt many of her colleagues and fellow militants were blind to their own class isolation. On the other hand, she had come to believe that socialism could not be envisioned solely in class terms, that ethnicity and gender issues had to be fully incorporated in a socialist project.

It was her professional achievements and contacts in Mexico that allowed Hardy to return to Chile in 1983 as an externally financed academic researcher, an arrangement that enabled her to establish herself with a leading private research institute in Chile long enough to demonstrate her abilities and to be offered a salaried position with the institute when her financing from Mexico ran out.

The timing of Hardy's return proved fortuitous on the personal and political fronts as well. The year 1983 was a pivotal year in Chilean politics, marking what many experts term the beginning of the Chilean transition from authoritarian rule. "It was a euphoric time, with the first protests," Hardy recounted. In retrospect it is clear that Chilean exiles who were returning were at some advantage if they were able to return this "early" in the transition, to integrate themselves into the large antidictatorial movements of that period, before the waning of mass mobilizations and the onset of an elite-negotiated transition process. During this period, Chilean political returnees could more readily establish their political party identities in Chile, as parties and party factions redefined their goals and strategies. In addition, there was an apparent psychological advantage for those returning early. Based on interviews and on written accounts, it is clear that the "euphoric moment" of political opening made the psychological adjustment to return less difficult for them than for those, say, who returned in 1986 and 1987 to a comparatively diminished and uncertain opposition movement.

Hardy immersed herself in her new fieldwork in Chile, which took her to organizations representing the urban and rural poor. She also became active again in party politics, although in the interview her focus regarding this period was on her contribution to organizing a federation of socialist women, a "thorn in the side" of the Socialist Party. At the time, Hardy felt, such "semiautonomous" movements as the feminist movement could practice an alternative form of power politics to challenge traditional political practices. She has since given up on that strategy.

Under the 1990–1994 Aylwin administration, Hardy became research head of Fondo de Solidaridad a Inversión Social (FOSIS), a government agency whose primary function is to make small grants and loans to micro enterprise projects. After a failed attempt in 1989, Hardy was elected in 1993 to the Central Committee of the Socialist Party.

When asked about her vision of the role of the Socialist Party in Chilean society, Hardy responded somewhat contradictorily. On the one hand, she emphasized the themes of civil society autonomy from the party, of a new understanding of the public/private divide, of a new and problematic "modern" society. On the other, she urged a restructuring of the party that would breathe new life into local-level concerns, in which the party would penetrate civil society's preoccupation with day-to-day issues and projects. On the one hand, Hardy saw a virtual divorce between the Socialist Party of the Allende period and the Socialist Party of today. On the other, she felt that the Socialist Party leadership and a significant portion of the militancy held fast to a thirty-year history, that their identities were intimately tied to the historic Socialist Party, and that a new party had to discover a way to incorporate this identity. The great challenge, as Hardy expressed it, is to develop a socialist project that reflects what can be learned from PSCH history with a complex process of modernization taking place in Chilean society and culture. Hardy suggested that the Party for Democracy might be the logical venue for such a process:

> The great challenge is how to construct a brilliant socialist proposal for this country and for the people of this country and for the history of the last twenty years that this country has lived. I think perhaps the PPD has an attraction because . . . it's a party that expressed, at a particular moment, the necessity of a democratic coming together, it didn't have any real proposal, no real project, and today it has demonstrated that it created an image using the signs that people want to see—modern, successful, accomplishments, new, different things that don't really have anything to do with the PPD in practice as just another party machine. It also benefits from not having the vast claims made upon it by a historic, organic membership. . . . The PPD's success comes from its image as something people want.

Hardy claimed that within the Chilean socialist sphere today it is possible to recognize two tendencies: one that no longer holds firm to a belief in so-

cialism as an end and a second that still places value on socialism as a goal for society. Her descriptions and her hopes for the PSCH echoed those of many members, belying a sense of frustration with the incapacity of the party to define a clear and cohesive project, while at the same time voicing an appreciation of the internal debate over what that project should be. Hardy predicted that change within the PSCH would depend more on internal balances of power than on ideas:

> But, look, it's all a process, it's a process that will break the old internal structures, the small leadership pockets, the ways of doing politics that, ultimately, [have] substantially to do with the exercise of power. You have the pressure for change given what Chile lived through, as well as the real limitations placed by the defensiveness of those very leaders, many of whom are the most resistant to big change because it threatens their own party position. . . . There is constant pressure among the parties for change, yet the only thing that moves them is the logic of power.

In reflecting about her own balancing between the public and the private, Hardy appeared nostalgic about the life she left in Mexico, about a simplicity in her life there when she was not playing "hardball" politics. On the other hand, she admits she enjoys playing hardball politics. Today, Hardy is part of a small group of socialist women who are challenging the men from within the party to cede a degree of control. Her political identity represents a relatively new and rare type for Chilean politics, for it combines roles and value structures uncommon to the Chilean political class: first and foremost, Hardy is a woman and a respected thinker. She has written extensively and does a great deal of public speaking on poverty and social welfare policies in Chile. While women are not entirely new to the Chilean political party elite, women intellectuals are. On the other hand, while women intellectuals are numerous in Chile, for the most part they have steered clear of postauthoritarian party politics, "out of disgust," as several have expressed it. Hardy today plays a key role in Chile 21, the think tank of Socialist Party leader and presidential hopeful Ricardo Lagos. Should Lagos be elected in 1999, Hardy is likely to earn a high-level cabinet position.

When asked to name the two or three most important events in her life, Hardy laughed, and responded with little hesitation. "The coup, of course," she said. "And then, you may think this is strange or funny—motherhood."

ENRIQUE CORREA

Enrique Correa has consistently exhibited an entrepreneurial approach to politics, from his involvement as a cofounder of MAPU in 1969 to his role as the country's first minister of government in the postdictatorial period.[5] Correa is considered one of the top four strategists of the negotiated transition from authoritarian rule of the late 1980s, credited with convincing the left that Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin was the best candidate to lead Chile's transition. As minister of the agency that serves as the "communicator from the president to the people" from 1990 to 1994, Correa was perhaps second only to President Aylwin as the government's most visible representative. Within the Chilean political class, Correa has tended to win more praise from the right than the left. As one right-wing congressman said of him, "Aylwin should erect a monument to Correa, because he has been an indispensable man for the government."[6]

Enrique Correa grew up in the mining province of Ovalle, north of Santiago. His mother came from a working-class Catholic family and considered herself a devoted communist, and his father was a Mason from a middle-class Santiago family. In addition to the influence of growing up in a mining region representing Chile's oldest left stronghold, Correa attributed his early political leanings to progressive, activist currents within the Catholic Church:

> I was a Christian. Why? Because at the time [of my youth], the most developed, most new, most exciting and vibrant community was the Christian community. It was an explosive force, particularly when combined with the student movement at the end of the 1950s, beginning of 1960s. . . .
>
> I really think that for all of us the most important referent was the church. Today I'm a pretty "Lutheran" Catholic. I really don't accept any of the moral directives from the church. I'm quite a liberal. Really my sense of belonging to the Catholic Church is a social, a *cultural* thing. It provides me with family roots. A sense of belonging. And I strongly believe that it's impossible to understand our history, Chile, without understanding this sense of belonging to the church that we all feel.

Correa's explanation of his attraction to the church suggests that he was as drawn by the power and leadership potential as by the message of the church. He does not identify with the church's moral teachings. Correa views the church as a site for social and political identity and activism.

Nevertheless, when Correa was a young person, his attraction to the Catholic Church represented more than just a "sense of belonging." At the age of twelve he had joined the Young Christian Democrats. In his early teens, Correa cofounded a Catholic Student Youth chapter in Ovalle. At sixteen, he entered the seminary. After a year, he returned home to help support his family and ailing father. A year later, instead of returning to the seminary full-time, Correa entered the philosophy department of Catholic University in Santiago. Throughout his adolescence, Correa felt "torn between his vocation for politics and his vocation for the priesthood."

At Catholic University, Correa was strongly influenced by several of his religious professors, all of whom were politically active, including Brazilian exile and philosophy professor Paulo Freire; Father Gonzalo Arroyo, a leader of the Christians for Socialism Movement; and Jesuit priest Hernan Larraín, who was also director of the leading Catholic journal *Revista Mensaje*. At the university and through his political work, Correa also became close friends with an array of young Christian political activists, including fellow political entrepreneur José Antonio Viera-Gallo, María Antonieta Saa (socialist mayor of Conchalí from 1990 to 1994, now a congresswoman), and Jaime Ravinet (Christian Democratic mayor of Santiago). Correa described his Catholic University period as an "agitated one," a period of struggle over university reform and of heated debate over new directions inspired by Vatican II (1963–1965).

At twenty-two, Correa was elected president of the Young Christian Democrats. Yet, like many of his colleagues, he found that his initial support for Frei turned to dismay over the "reformism" of the administration. "The Frei government," Correa stated in a 1968 press conference, "has exhausted its reformist efforts. Only a revolutionary alternative remains."[7] In 1969, the Christian Democratic Party brought Correa before its Disciplinary Tribunal for public statements urging the PDC to join forces with the revolutionary left:

> What the Young Christian Democrats want is that in 1970 the electoral battle be between two sides, between two opposing and exclusionary blocs: on one side, the right and imperialism, and on the other, all those forces which advocate the substitution of capitalism. Because today the dilemma is clear: socialist revolution or right-wing regression.[8]

After publicly condemning President Frei for ordering troops to remove a group of squatters, an action that resulted in six deaths, Correa was re-

moved from his post as president of the Young Christian Democrats. In May 1969, after an ideologically charged PDC Congress in which President Eduardo Frei Sr. advocated and won the PDC's continued adherence to "forging its own path," rather than allying with the left or right, the majority of the young PDC leadership left the party to form the MAPU, which became a formally recognized Marxist-Leninist party and a staunch supporter of the Allende candidacy for president.

Correa describes the MAPU's shift from Catholicism and Saint Thomas to Marxism-Leninism and Althusser as a logical process of replacing one all-encompassing framework and vision for another:

> I really think we of the MAPU were the most successful at being a revolutionary vanguard party. We had Catholicism on the one hand, and Marxism on the other. Althusser was a guru of ours. I even had the chance to meet him—a very strange meeting. It was in Berlin, and a friend took me to meet him, and I remember Althusser was sitting in the dark, all the lights out, and I introduced myself and mentioned some people he knew. . . . And he said, "Ah, you were one of the founders of the MAPU." And I said, "Yes, professor." And he asked, "And do you think that was a good idea?" And I said, "No, professor." [Correa laughed.]

This anecdote is telling in that the memory of Correa's historic meeting with a political "guru" focuses on what they both recognize as a failed strategic decision to form the MAPU.

Together with fellow entrepreneur José Miguel Insulza (discussed below), Correa worked during the Popular Unity period in the Ministry of Foreign Relations under the leadership of Clodomiro Almeyda. In 1972, when the MAPU split between the faction that favored Allende and the PCCH's more moderate approach to transformation and the ultra left's call for a less compromising, rapid transformation of society, Correa chose the former. Together with José Antonio Viera-Gallo, José Miguel Insulza, and a handful of others fresh from the same university networks, Correa cofounded the MAPU–Worker Peasant Party (MAPU-OC).

At the time of the coup, Correa fled into exile:

> I lived in Moscow, in East Berlin, I came to know well the principal communist leaders in Europe. We were never very friendly with the Cubans. Sure, Oscar Guillermo Garretón[9] [a former MAPU leader who

> headed Chile's metro system for the transportation ministry under President Aylwin] lived there, he was more to the left, we all were in a sense. We were pretty Leninist. Yet by 1975 we were changing.
>
> I'm a bad case to discuss about daily life in exile, because while I was proscribed from entering Chile for ten years, I have to say that about 60 percent of that time I lived in Chile and 40 percent abroad. In any case, there were two phases to my exile. The first in 1973 and 1974 in Moscow, and the second, say between 1977 and 1981 between Berlin and Rome.

Correa described the dynamic debates among the Chilean left and the European and Soviet left over the Popular Unity experience. More important to him than the theoretical battles over socialism, however, were the battles over means and strategy. Being a Leninist, for example, was not so much at issue as was the interpretation of Lenin regarding the question of necessary class and organizational alliances. For Correa, the exile experience "taught" the Chilean political class how to compromise. It transformed what he termed the "absolutism" and "integralism" of the Chilean left into more "rational," "civilized" political players:

> I really believe that the Chilean exiled political class gained a great deal of political sophistication abroad. I think that the *política de los acuerdos* ["politics of agreements"] today has two roots: one, of course, was to bring a close to the dictatorship, [and] it was absolutely necessary; the other was that we have a more developed, more *civilized* way of doing politics today. We learned how to do politics. Before we didn't do it and today we do. We have learned to distinguish between politics and war. Before 1973 we were not distinguishing between them. Today we do. I would suggest this is a *synthesis* of what was going on, what changed after 1973. War is war and politics is politics.

After returning to Chile clandestinely under several guises, Correa returned as himself in 1983 and threw himself into opposition politics, first at the side of the Chilean labor leaders who organized the first mass mobilizations against the dictatorship. By 1986 he had judged that the social and political landscape would not support a dramatic, "rupturist" approach to ending the dictatorship. He was among the first on the left to advocate a strategy of alliance with the Christian Democrats behind the transition path outlined in the 1980 constitution.

Correa became the "number two man" behind chief Christian Democratic strategist Genaro Arriagada in the Comando Por el No, the opposition's 1988 plebiscite campaign. On the heels of the opposition's victory in the plebiscite, Correa became executive secretary of the Concertación alliance, the seventeen-party center-left coalition that would bring Patricio Aylwin to the presidency. Aylwin, who more than two decades earlier had led the charge for Correa's expulsion from the Christian Democratic Party, would now consider Correa his closest ally on the left.[10]

Today Correa is regarded as an ultra-pragmatist, a political realist whose hopes for social transformation are tempered by the balance of power in Chile. Correa's political behavior, his gift as a dealmaker, is consistent with his past. Correa also recognizes that his fellow members of the left political class have little taste for political conflict:

> For example, Boeninger, Foxley, Cortázar, and I,[11] the four of us are really the nucleus of the modernizing organ of the [Aylwin] government, and it has been amazing to us to see the kinds of errors committed out of fear of conflict, errors either of bad organization or the rapid resort to exercise the "*mano duro*" [meaning, "to send in the police or troops"] to resolve conflict or protests.

Correa's discussion of fear of conflict in Chilean society today (to which we will return in the final chapter) raises the issue of the difference between "rational" and "irrational" conflict, particularly in light of his previous discussion of the difference between "war" and "politics." He does not resolve this issue.

With regard to the direction of political parties, Correa favors moving away from party adoption of all-encompassing programs. He is uncomfortable with the old style of party militancy, which he views as alienating and out of touch with a modernizing Chile. He depicts a Socialist Party leadership divorced from its internal base:

> I believe that the concept of a partisan-based militancy, understood as adherence to a line, to a thesis that applies to the national, regional, and local levels, is going to be in real crisis as the country civilizes more. I think that politics will become more "single-issue," based around certain themes rather than doctrines, not even around global issues. I think that the regionalization process was successful, and I

think that ten years from now we'll see other kinds of alliances, other forms of understanding. Which I see as quite positive. I have the impression that people will continue to belong to parties based on certain general visions, certain loyalties, certain men who want to be president, but they'll do so expecting very little. Parties will become less important to problems in the communities, the problems of a region, the party will no longer be the dominating force. I think the concept of militancy in a party will be extremely reduced to party bureaucrats, for those who aspire to state positions.

Take me, for example. In two years from now, I'm going to be in a far more relaxed position politically than I am today. And I don't want to go around campaigning for the socialists. Of course I'll be involved in the presidential campaign, but I don't want to go around carrying keys for the socialists. The PPD is an interesting phenomenon, because its members are more relaxed. It's still a little too light for me, floppy.

When I say I'm a socialist today, it means I'm interested in forwarding a long-term vision for the left of this country. Secular. I think as Chile becomes more developed, the central questions will be the struggles for particular civil freedoms—now the question of divorce, for example, freedom for young people, reform of the police, and there will be less timid approaches to these issues. The PPD is better equipped than the PS for this, because the core of the PS is filled with extremely traditional members.

Let's take a look at the first ten or twelve public figures recognized as important leaders of the country and look at who the socialists are: Lagos, who is fourth after Aylwin, Frei, and Foxley, then I come in somewhere after that, then Viera-Gallo. If you take Lagos, Viera-Gallo, and myself, we represent half or more of the Central Committee, but we are far from representative of this internal order of militants, these young guys who live extremely insulated in their world, and I think the logic of being a militant leads them to this.

Enrique Correa recently headed the Chilean branch of the Latin American Social Sciences Faculty (FLACSO-Chile), whose senior members chose Correa for his visibility and his potential for raising substantial financial support, particularly from the Chilean government.[12] Today he is a successful private sector entrepreneur. In our interview Correa said he planned to make an eventual run for the Senate.

JOSÉ ANTONIO VIERA-GALLO

Like his close friend and political party colleague Enrique Correa, Chilean senator José Antonio Viera-Gallo[13] has been a key strategist in the Chilean left's consensus politics. Correa and Viera-Gallo share the controversial distinction of being the two leaders of the left to sit down at the table on more than one occasion with General Augusto Pinochet. Viera-Gallo was Chile's speaker of the House in the 1990–1994 Aylwin administration, and Enrique Correa considers Viera-Gallo an ideal future president.[14]

Viera-Gallo's text emphasizes pragmatism. Yet he is a conflicted thinker and admits to the contradictions within his discourse, claiming to be both a liberal and a social Christian, an individualist and a collectivist. In contrast to Enrique Correa's air of comfort with his political beliefs, Viera-Gallo projects discomfort with what he perceives as a failure to replace his "totalizing" past visions with an alternative framework. Moreover, Viera-Gallo assumes an ironic tone in his narrative, as he portrays his past self as somewhat divorced from his present self. He exaggerates his past identity as a revolutionary in light of his current image as a reformist politician. The tension between past and present identity pervades Viera-Gallo's narrative.

Use of irony is a common narrative approach, as oral historian Alessandro Portelli describes with reference to the narrative mode of *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*:

> Narrators are capable of reconstructing their past attitudes even when they no longer coincide with present ones. . . . In one of the most important oral testimonies of our time, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*, the narrator describes very vividly how his mind worked before he reached his present awareness, and then judges his own past self by the standards of his present political and religious consciousness. . . . *Irony* is the major narrative mode: two different ethical (or political, or religious) and narrative standards interfere and overlap, and their tension shapes the telling of the story.[15]

Viera-Gallo was the only child of a diplomat, and the family lived in countries throughout the world, "under several forms of authoritarianism—Argentina under Perón, Peru of Odría, Portugal of Oliveira Salazar, and the Dominican Republic under Trujillo." Viera-Gallo's father was a staunch conservative, and Viera-Gallo's first political affiliation (which lasted less than a year) was with a conservative youth group at sixteen.

Viera-Gallo was considered a prodigy, educated within the Chilean Catholic establishment and highly influenced by progressive Catholic intellectuals. At the age of twenty-one, he graduated from the Catholic University Law School. He began teaching law and working with the Instituto Latinoamericano de Doctrina y Estudios Sociales (ILADES), a Jesuit intellectual center, where Viera-Gallo came into contact with leading liberation theologians. He became increasingly active in politics, joining the "rebel" wing of the Young Christian Democrats, the wing that would form the MAPU. At twenty-five, Viera-Gallo was named an undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice of the Allende government.

As undersecretary, Viera-Gallo most remembers the trauma surrounding two issues of utmost importance to the Popular Unity government: first, his work on constitutional reform regarding property rights and state ownership; and second, his struggles to improve Allende's relationship with the Catholic Church and with the Christian Democratic Party. Viera-Gallo was a key figure in orchestrating what proved to be unsuccessful meetings between the president and the cardinal and between the president and then president of the Christian Democratic Party Patricio Aylwin. The failure of these leaders to reach an accord regarding the government's program and direction foreshadowed the Christian Democratic Party's support for a military overthrow of the government. The impasse during these meetings made a lasting impression on Viera-Gallo.

With the aid of his wife's family immediately following the coup, Viera-Gallo was granted political asylum by the Vatican. He secured work with the ecumenical research institute Partito Comuniste di Italia (IDOC) and served as a United Nations consultant on questions of development and disarmament. In Rome, he was soon swept into the debates between Chilean exiled intellectuals and politicians and the thinkers and politicians of the Italian Communist Party.

Viera-Gallo traced what he perceived to be the common traditions in the countries' political cultures, particularly the peculiar blends of Communist and Catholic culture and ideology within the Italian Communist Party:

> I took the significance of Italy to be that a group of Catholics who were in the armed resistance against Mussolini joined the resistance with Communists and, in the end, became Communists themselves yet continued being Catholics. The overall mentality of the Communist state is that mentality which believes there is a global vision of the world, that there is a kind of integralist vision that undergirds a scientific politics,

> in this case Marxist, but also religious. . . . Well, we Chileans and Italians alike knew perfectly well then that the world was headed toward communism. [He laughed.]

Nevertheless, set back by several events domestically, internationally, and internally, the PCI failed to maintain electoral momentum at the national level. Viera-Gallo alluded to the many struggles of the PCI, and, tangentially, of the exiled Chileans, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s:

> We lived through all the phases, the historic compromise, Communist dissidence with Carillo [head of the Spanish Communist Party], with Marchais [of the French Communist Party], all the Italian polemics with the Soviets, with the Chinese, the discussions of Prague. . . . We experienced the crisis of Italian communism before Gorbachev. I witnessed all my friends who had been so committed, who had been through the bombing in Vietnam, who had been in Cuba, who had been to fight in Angola, or to help, in short, all those people began to feel uncomfortable with the [Italian Communist] Party . . . and they began to publish in the papers, they began to be in crisis, and we were struck with a good deal of confusion throughout this period, because for us the Italian Socialists were really on the back burner . . .

With support from the Europeans, Viera-Gallo founded *Chile-América*, the leading Chilean left polemical journal during the dictatorial period. *Chile-América* became a forum for left debate regarding such questions as responsibility for the fall of the Popular Unity government, necessary alliances to defeat the dictatorship, and the form and program for a transitional government. The journal was also the site for Chilean intellectuals' early explanations of socialist renovation and the reformulation of the meaning of democracy. Viera-Gallo discussed the origins of the socialist renovation process:

> The most profound motive [for the socialist renovation process] was the 1973 crisis, because it was a total defeat. Then there is the influence of exile, of international events, and of the urgency to define a left position before the country that is viable, for a country that has changed dramatically, that is another country.
>
> All this took us in two directions. The first was the recuperation of democratic values, for which we were struggling against Pinochet. It was absurd for us in our struggle against Pinochet, invoking the ban-

> ner of human rights, democracy, and freedom if what we wanted was the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is a contradiction, a contradiction that all the parties, including the PCCH, were facing. It was such a strong contradiction that we couldn't avoid it. So we came to champion democracy in all its luster because this is what we were struggling for.
>
> The other renovation, which was much more difficult, which required much more work, was the question of the logic of the market, because if you want democracy, well, the only way to organize the economy collectively that we are aware of until now is through dictatorship, so it became a very difficult question, one that still requires much more thought.

In 1983 the Pinochet regime granted Viera-Gallo permission to return to Chile. Like his fellow MAPU-OC leaders, Viera-Gallo threw himself into strategizing for an alliance between the Christian Democrats and the left in Chile. Viera-Gallo played a key role in securing improved relations between sectors of the left and the Catholic Church, a role reminiscent of his role during the Popular Unity years. For his effective work as a negotiator, Viera-Gallo garnered the support of the Concertación to run for Congress in the 1989 elections. In 1990 Viera-Gallo became Chile's speaker of the House, a role that he felt demanded his greatest efforts to date as a consensus-seeker.

Today as a national senator, Viera-Gallo wrestles with establishing a coherent political vision, though he finds little time to devote to the question. He urges the left to explore systematically the relationship between democracy and the market:

> In this last period, there has been a great recuperation of liberalism . . . particularly the exaltation of the market, economic freedom, and a kind of ignoring of the question of political freedom, leaving to one side the whole critique of social inequality made by some liberals, some thinkers, from which socialism really emanates. I think that socialism must recover in some sense the liberal tradition as socialists reflect on the totality of the socialist experience.

In an interview with journalist Faride Zerán, Viera-Gallo discussed the political and philosophical contradictions with which he lives:

> It's very possible, in the course of one's life, and under distinct circumstances, to think black one day and white the next, concerning the

> same issue, because that material has different meaning in different contexts. And in that sense, one has the right to be contradictory. . . .
>
> I live the contradiction [of being a liberal and a Christian]. I am like Harlequin. Harlequin was made up of pieces. I'm a little communist, a little liberal, a little bourgeois, a little Catholic. . . . We're all made up of pieces of things, not of one great, coherent, total truth.[16]

In an important sense, José Antonio Viera-Gallo reflects the top leaders of the Chilean left today: leaders of a political class who have proved themselves able to return to national political leadership, focused on political process rather than on a comprehensive alternative vision for the country.

> I like my parliamentary political role. My work has concentrated on reforming the judicial system. I hope the Concertación remains united, and I am doing everything possible to see to that. I think the best and most probable candidate for the future is Ricardo Lagos.
>
> I feel people do what they can given the conditions in which they live, the circumstances in which they're able to participate, in other words, there is a big part of our lives not dependent upon ourselves. It depends on others. You just have to deliver yourself over to life's chances, history. I can't say I have a particular project. I hope I am contributing to making a better Chile, given the experiences we have lived. . . .
>
> I love these expressions of Gramsci, like: "To be a pessimist reflects intelligence, optimism reflects real will." I think it's important to be pessimistic in terms of not shielding yourself from certain realities, but to be optimistic regarding the future and the possibilities. There are clearly many things that worry me a great deal, within the Concertación—those, for example, who aren't supporting Lagos, this worries me, it has to do with a bit of an idiotic vision of society. What worries me the most is that I do not exclude the possibility [that] the right will win in the next elections. And this worries me not only because I do not share many of their ideas, but because I think politically, historically, it will be very bad for the country. It would be like a return to some kind of renovated Pinochetism.

JOSÉ MIGUEL INSULZA

In a December 1998 national survey concerning the Pinochet arrest and the Chilean government's handling of the situation, Chileans from left

to right gave Foreign Minister José Miguel Insulza[17] the highest approval rating of all those politicians involved in the crisis.[18] Insulza is recognized as one of Chile's foremost political strategists in the arena of international relations. Over the past five years, Insulza has been involved in the country's chief bilateral and multilateral negotiations regarding such issues as free trade, multinational investment in Chile, and the Chilean debt. Insulza's performances on these issues earned him his current cabinet post as minister of foreign relations. Insulza also has a gift for behind-the-scenes dealing, a gift he has employed since his early days in Christian left politics.

Insulza was born in a middle-class Santiago family in 1943. Like Correa's parents, Insulza's mother was a Catholic and his father a Mason. Politics was not a particular concern in Insulza's family. Rather, his father admired individual achievement. Insulza did well in school. In his systematic way, he entered the University of Chile in April and joined the Young Christian Democrats in May because, he said, he saw the Christian Democratic Party as the great new force with a number of capable leaders. Insulza would become a major Christian Democratic Party student leader and the head of the Federation of Students his last year in law school.

Insulza's narrative is frank, matter-of-fact, and a bit sarcastic. He portrays himself as personally distant from his fellow party members:

> In terms of my friends—my best friends were not my political friends. Of course I became closer with people with whom I worked closely, but my personal friends were not my political friends—not even my girlfriend was in the PDC.

Unlike the other individuals in this study, Insulza claimed to have no guiding political figures in the course of his political career and thought:

> I have to tell you that I wasn't one of those great admirers of leaders. I can't think of anyone who was a really important figure for me. I suppose Frei was [he said, in the context of our discussion of the Frei administration].

When asked about his participation in student political projects, Insulza downplayed any enthusiasm for work on behalf of the common good:

> My generation was a generation that did a great deal on behalf of the poor, worked in the urban shantytowns, in the countryside. Not me.

> I lived with my parents until the day I married at twenty-seven, and I liked it that way. I never liked to participate in these great projects in the countryside.

After graduating from law school, Insulza worked in the Ministry of Education. In 1967 he returned to study, first at the left intellectual center and degree-awarding institute, the Latin American Social Science Faculty (FLACSO-Chile), where he studied political science, then at both the University of Chile and Catholic University, also in the field of political science.

After a good deal of internal deliberation, Insulza left the Christian Democrats in 1969 to join the MAPU. He did not leave the PDC at the same time as his fellow PDC-turned-MAPU members. He questioned the strategic sensibility of forming a new party, a strategy that he worried would only contribute to increased ideological and political tension in the country. Like Luis Maira, Insulza was being groomed by the PDC to be a future national leader. Nevertheless, he left the PDC after what he felt were the Frei administration's dangerous capitulations to the military following retired army general Viaux's failed coup attempt. He became a cofounder of the MAPU-OC, the more moderate of the New Left intellectual parties, whose tendency was to stand behind Allende against the more radical Socialist Party leadership.

In 1970 Insulza was awarded a scholarship to continue his political science studies at the University of Michigan. He attended the university that year and for part of 1971, until political events at home lured him back to Chile, where he was immediately appointed an adviser to Allende's foreign relations minister, Clodomiro Almeyda.

Despite Insulza's interest and immersion in international relations, he did not believe that international movements or events had had an important impact on his thinking or on the course of events in Chile in the 1960s and early 1970s:

> In terms of international influences on my thinking then, of course there were things going on, Cuba, et cetera. But looking back on it all, I'd say that our conflicts, the way things went, were extremely national in focus. Chileans have always been an internally focused people.

On September 11, 1973, the day of the coup, Insulza was in Paris attending a conference of the non-aligned countries. On September 12, he flew to Buenos Aires and began to organize his family's exodus from Chile.

He sought exile in Italy, because it represented the heart of MAPU-OC's political organizing, and "they were party orders." Insulza was based in Rome from January 1974 until 1981, when he received financing to teach and do investigative work at CIDE in Mexico.

> Throughout my exile, I was the MAPU-OC's chief organizer and fundraiser. I survived personally with small academic projects. We had militants all over the world, and we were constantly organizing, strategizing to reunite and renovate what had been the Popular Unity coalition. We participated heavily in the debates between the two wings of the Popular Unity coalition. When the Socialist Party split in 1979, things were quite shaky. It affected us a good deal. We had good relations with the rest of the left. We really only fought heavily with the MAPU. I was head of the MAPU-Exterior.

Insulza sketched a detailed map of Chile's exile network, complete with political party headquarters, factions, and leaders spread across the globe. He described the arduous process of organizing the negotiations that took place in the 1980s among the many sectors of the left leadership—the meetings in East Berlin, Rome, Mexico City, Paris, and Caracas, the splits and realignments, and the rise and fall of left coalitions, including the Popular Unity coalition, the Convergence, the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Democratic Movement, and the socialist bloc. Insulza led the reuniting of the MAPU and the MAPU-OC, and as a member of MAPU's Political Commission, he was a crucial strategist in both the 1989 Concertación campaign and MAPU's joining the Chilean Socialist Party.

During this period, Insulza was also a prolific writer, best known for his work on the globalization of production and the question of United States hegemony. His writing has consistently been with an eye toward the ramifications of international trends for Chile:

> The paradox today is that while the advanced capitalist world has begun to speak of a recomposition, of a new institutional organization of production, in our countries we are still experiencing the profound crisis phase that those countries experienced much earlier.
>
> Because the great problem for us is that while the world advances toward greater regionalization, we continue looking to the horizons of the North and continue fragmented internally, realizing that we have nothing to do with our neighbors and with those at our level.[19]

While Insulza has been a strong promoter of Latin American multilateral accords, his focus over the past five years and in his present position as minister of foreign relations were on "the horizons of the North," namely, on a NAFTA accord for Chile. When questioned about his political transformations over the years, Insulza responded uncomfortably and somewhat defensively:

> I find it problematic to try to look back on what my thinking was then and compare it to what it is now. I was not among the most rebellious of that period, yet certainly I and my political group have moderated . . .
>
> That's the reality of the times, and it clearly has been appropriate for us to adapt to the political moment.

While Insulza's politics have become more moderate, he still professes a profound concern for social transformation and social equality:

> We have gotten rid of a lot of the dogma, and I view that as positive. Today we are in far better shape to confront the challenges we are all aware of, particularly the challenge of democracy, but also the challenge of justice. . . . If history has been the history of injustice, of confrontation, of class struggle, of international inequality, our history has yet to be entirely written.

In a 1995 informal editorial comment in its "gossip" section, the daily *El Mercurio* criticized Insulza for his performance at the funeral of Socialist Party leader and former senator Aniceto Rodríguez. At the funeral, Insulza joined his fellow socialists in the singing of the party anthem, "The Marseilles," which *El Mercurio* stated had not been "renovated" for the times. Specifically, *El Mercurio* disapproved of the foreign relations minister's singing of a line alluding to the "imperialist creature" when he was in the midst of "negotiations with the 'imperialist creature' regarding the incorporation of Chile into NAFTA."[20] While *El Mercurio*'s jab was in jest, the image of Insulza singing the anthem reflects the old, seemingly sentimental attachments long overshadowed by "modern," pragmatic, moderated perspectives that leaders like Insulza harbor.

POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS COMPARED

Samuel Huntington claimed that he who organizes his country's politics holds the key to his country's future.[21] Of the four cognitive orienta-

tions presented in this study, the political entrepreneurs as a group have consistently been the top "players" in their generation's left Chilean politics. They are keen judges and interpreters of the political moment. They possess a talent for negotiating and strategizing and for forging and severing alliances.

It is no coincidence that three of the five political entrepreneurs came from the MAPU, an extremely small yet ideologically and strategically significant New Left party. In 1969, the MAPU represented the political entrepreneurs' perfect achievement. The party's top membership was composed of elements of the most important political and educational elite networks in the country, including some of the left elite of the Catholic University Law School and the young left elite of the Christian Democratic Party. Together, these networks housed a revolutionary political ideology within a Leninist vanguard party structure. It was an explosive formula that, as Enrique Correa alluded in his interview, its founders would later regret. Nevertheless, the political entrepreneurs from this grouping would be primary architects in the transition from military rule and the postauthoritarian government.

Today the ideas housed within the Socialist Party–Party for Democracy bloc are not totalizing, proactive projects. Rather, they tend to take the form of defensive postures within a neoliberal economic framework and a political scenario highly sensitive to the demands of the civilian right and the military—thus the language of "defense" of the poor and disenfranchised, "protection" of the old, "defense" of human rights.[22]

Chilean political analyst Antonio Cortés characterized the tenor of the Concertación government as "entrepreneurial." "It would be aprioristic and arbitrary to speak of the rightward shift of the government," Cortés wrote. "It is really an 'entrepreneurialization,' due to the logics of its development strategy."[23] Such a characterization certainly favors the leadership embodied by this study's political entrepreneurs.