CHAPTER 3

THE BINDS AND BONDS OF PARTY LOYALTY

■ Chapter 1 focused on how people form and sustain political identities, introducing the concept of individual cognitive orientations, grounded in the interplay among individuals' class, education, political party, and generational backgrounds, as well as in their own self-perceptions as political actors. Chapter 2 provided the historical context for the 1960s revolutionary generation of Chilean left leaders whose lives are the center of this study. Based primarily on interviews conducted over the past eight years, this and subsequent chapters will provide in-depth analyses of several leaders, examining the course of their lives, their understandings of politics, their contributions to politics, and their positions in the political process today. What these "autobiographies" reveal is that while the political climate changed dramatically from the 1960s to the 1990s, there is remarkable continuity across individual cognitive frameworks, across individuals' fundamental values and approaches to politics, from their early involvement in the politics of the 1960s to the present.

Moreover, as we explore the relationship between individual biographies and the larger political context, it becomes clear that particular political moments from the 1960s to today privilege particular kinds of individual political leadership. For example, the approaches of political party loyalists were far more valued in the 1960s, a period of extreme sectarian party mobilization, than in the 1990s, a period of extreme consensus politics. Nevertheless, as the 1990s decade draws to a close and sectarian politics reemerge with renewed force, I would argue that political party loyalists are also regaining prominence.

The political and social movements of the 1960s had a profound impact on the political identities of the Chilean left leadership of this period—indeed, on the entire youth-based 1960s generation.[1] Political party loyalists in particular retain a deep attachment to the hopes and vibrancy of the 1960s, in which young people as well as members of the working class ex-

perienced greater social solidarity and greater political mobility than had been known before in Chile, and in which their political parties were at their peak as mass, popular organizations. The predominance of left political parties within the union and student movements earned top political positions for working-class and student leaders who were loyal to their parties.

Memories of 1960s events—even what might be termed 1960s discourse—continue to prevail today in the lives and ideas of political party loyalists. For example, Chilean Communist Party leader Jorge Insunza spent the bulk of my interview with him retracing the 1960s battles within the Chilean left over the means to move toward socialism.[2] His discourse on revolution and the role of "the masses" is a language rarely heard in Chile today. Former Mirista leader Patricio Rivas also employs discourse more reminiscent of the sixties than of the present, a discourse he himself characterizes as "hippie-ish." The vast majority of the narratives of our interviews are devoted to their memories of that period. This is a stark contrast to those who are described by the political entrepreneur orientation. While political party loyalists refer constantly to their memories of 1960s politics to empower their self-perceptions as political beings, political entrepreneurs distance themselves from 1960s memories in order to align themselves with political images that are dismissive of left politics of the past.

The narratives of political party loyalists also reveal distinct party cultures. As described in chapter 2, the Chilean political party system of the 1960s was composed of an array of traditional left and new left parties. The Socialist Party (PSCH) and the Communist Party (PCCH) represented large, established institutions with several hundred thousand members. The MIR, MAPU, and Izquierda Cristiana had much less institutionalized traditions. Narratives of early political party militancy reflect the contrasts among these political party cultures.[3]

Internal tendentiousness dominates the texts of PSCH members across cognitive types, indicating that the relationships among leading ideological currents on the left, PSCH doctrine, and party praxis were problematic at best. For young Socialist Party leaders, the relationship between ideology and party and that between ideology and praxis are confused, uncertain. For example, Eduardo Reyes's text (examined at greater length in chapter 4) reveals a highly conflicted young militant, dismayed by the internal factionalism of the PSCH:

> When I entered the PSCH, I had read the PSCH statutes, but practically the day after joining I knew that the statutes didn't exist, you know

> what I mean? Because the day after I joined there were people who, after a night's graffiti work while we were having a cup of coffee, were already hounding me with the question, "What tendency I belonged to within the PSCH?" and I said I didn't belong to any tendency, that I had just gotten there, and there were people who wanted to recruit me within the PSCH for the MIR.

Reyes's concern over what he views as the destructive aspects of PSCH factionalism is a constant theme of his text, from his accounts of early life with the Socialists, to the present period. His reference to the PSCH statutes alludes to the contrast between the Leninist, democratic centralist internal structure of the party as outlined in the party's statutes, which Reyes supported, and the reality of the competing factions within the PSCH.

In contrast, members of the Chilean Communist Party who participated in this study generally perceived their party to be the provider of a cohesive and all-encompassing program, of an ideology that guided their activism. Party conflict is not a theme for young Communist leaders of the pre-1973 period. Rather, as exemplified in the text of former congressman and ex-PCCH leader Luis Guastavino, religious metaphors pervade the PCCH accounts—faith in party doctrine, blind belief, militants as missionaries:

> I remember when I was first making contact with the party, how they invited me to the beach, then to play soccer, and then there was a session where we spoke. We went to the beach and there were some forty to fifty people, I didn't know them, and we play soccer, and we take a break, and we sit down and a voice begins to speak. It was Citriano, who was later a PCCH congressman, and he spoke, it was an underground meeting on the beach, and I felt a kind of euphoric symphony. He spoke of the Soviet Union, of a socialist world, of a new world, he spoke of Chile, of the struggle against the dictatorship of González Videla, the struggle of the working class, of the peasants. It was a beautiful thing! And I felt very linked, it was very strong for me. . . . The struggle was worth it, for we were winning, not only did we struggle, we knew we would win.

In spite of such contrasts and other differences between these two parties in terms of the relationships among party militants, organization, ideology, and praxis, the texts of this sixties generation of national PCCH and PSCH leaders suggest that they shared the belief that their parties held the

keys to ideologies they would come to absorb, embrace, question, challenge, modify, rework, and, in many cases, abandon. While individually held ideologies would evolve a good deal over time, this early embeddedness within all-encompassing parties would have a deep and lasting influence on their core political identities—and for none so much as for the political party loyalists.

Political party loyalists represent those individuals whose identities are inextricably linked to collective organization, symbolized by their parties. Unlike other cognitive ideal-types whose members draw from networks outside their parties for their political sustenance and mobility, party loyalists rely on their parties and their tight relationships with them as their chief source of political identity.

What follows are selected narratives and analysis of four political party loyalists: Jorge Insunza, a former congressman and a top leader of the Chilean Communist Party; Isabel Allende, a congresswoman and Socialist Party leader; Adriana Muñoz, vice president of the House of Representatives and a leader of the Party for Democracy; and Patricio Rivas, a university professor and official within the Ministry of Education and a former leader of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). Jorge Insunza represents a classic political party loyalist, whose narrative and behavior are intimately bound to the Communist Party. Isabel Allende and Adriana Muñoz are loyalists to the largest left parties within the governing alliance. Patricio Rivas remains loyal to a collective that has ceased to exist.

JORGE INSUNZA

The political identity of top Chilean Communist Party leader Jorge Insunza is inseparable from his attachment to the historical strength and past ideological grounding of his century-old party. Insunza's world is centered in party structure, organization, and activity. He is deeply concerned with party order.

Born to a lower-middle-class Catholic family, Insunza attended Catholic schools until college. The oldest subject in my study, he holds that priests and historic Chilean Communist Party leaders represent the most important influences in his life. He possesses a proselytizer's authority, bureaucratic expertise, a strong sense of organization and hierarchy, and a paternalistic attitude toward his listeners and followers. Painfully aware of the damning critiques and marginalization of his party today, Insunza frequently strikes a defensive posture. Our interviews often ran like a history

lesson on the Communist Party's contribution to building and sustaining a democratic Chile.[4] The former congressman emphasized the primacy of historical tradition, party organization, and global reach:

> I joined the Communist Party in 1954. It was the year the United States invaded Guatemala. There was a great deal of student solidarity with the people of Guatemala. My first political participation was linked to that event.
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> I joined the Young Communists—and not the Young Socialists—because they were the great young left force, the most organized, the most renown in the School of Engineering of the University of Chile where I was, they were the *only* force at that time.
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> The Young Communists were extremely organized, structured. They possessed a vision that linked the international situation, the national situation, and the situation within the university movement to our tasks at hand. It could have contributed to a certain mechanicism, but really it kept us abreast of everything, we read a great deal, it was an extremely formative element for our preparation as the young vanguard, those in the struggle against fascism.

Insunza's text stresses the global ideological framework that the Communist Party provided. This framework, Insunza claimed throughout the course of the interviews, continues to be relevant in spite of the collapse of the socialist bloc, and he continues to hold firm to his belief in scientific socialism.

In his late teens, Insunza became a Communist Youth leader and was quickly absorbed by the Communist International. Insunza's text reveals a personal life meshed intimately with his political vocation.

> [In 1956] I was an elected member of the Central Committee of the Young Communists, then an Executive Committee member. Political activism became my life. In 1957 I left the country for the first time to attend the World Gathering of Youth in Moscow and for Europe, to be exposed to different cultures, societies, politics. This trip reinforced my convictions in contradictory ways. When I compared, for example, the level of development in the Soviet Union to that of advanced European capitalist societies, the contrasts were obvious. Yet the level of inequality in those societies, the disdain for basic values of social justice, seemed to me far more reason to reaffirm our convictions.

> I graduated in 1959, and political activism absorbed my life. . . . I finished my thesis in 1962, I had married, I had a little girl, I worked in the university as a researcher but was chiefly focused on political activity. Then in 1964, with the new elections and Allende a candidate, we were convinced it was possible to achieve a victory.

Insunza concentrated on the late 1950s and 1960s debate within the left over the "peaceful road to socialism," on the use, not exclusively but primarily, of the electoral process to achieve real social change. He linked party loyalty, personal conduct, ethics, and values to the left's varying ideological stances on the means for achieving socialism.

> The combination of the success of the Cuban Revolution and the electoral defeat of Allende led to a tendency to promote armed struggle as a viable avenue and to a real attack within the left on the PCCH. The PCCH was characterized as reformist, pacifist, et cetera.
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> It was a political period in which the PCCH was able to maintain and sustain a large popular following, maintaining its argument regarding the peaceful road, but it was also a time when we should have thought more deeply about the military question. . . . This is a period in which the influence of the Cuban Revolution was expressed also in a contradictory way—on the one hand, the process of social transformation taking place there, of basic relations within society was dramatic and was a positive influence, but on the other hand, the interpretation became that there was only one way, and during all this time, the 1960s, the whole discussion focused on the *paths* to revolution, to a point where we had to put everything into it, and this is a theme more false than Judas, because, finally, it was really an intransigent, academic debate, which nonetheless became the most impassioned, all-encompassing struggle. And those—and this is a point worth exploring for the historical record—those who were in the most ultra-left positions then are the biggest reformists today, and you can see this by first and last name! It is a political fact.
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> *Q: And how would you explain this?*
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> I think it's a manifestation, in the first place, of a fundamentally individualist conceptualization of the march of history, of the self affirmation of the role of the individual in history. Of course I believe in the importance of individuals, but if we are going to examine history as we should, as the struggle of masses, then this type of posturing

> should be handily dismissed. I also believe that the interpretation of history must have a scientific base, and must be treated as such. This may sound a bit dogmatic, but I think it is often difficult for those today to distinguish between a certain degree of dogmatism and the need for a sound theoretical base to analyze history and popular struggle.

Insunza's distinction between the individualists and his own understanding and approach to Chilean politics carries several meanings. First, it is a condemnation of those who place what he would term voluntarist, individual behavior before class-based, structural analysis. Second, it is an implicit condemnation of those whom Insunza views as power-hungry, self-interested politicians. Insunza consistently links individual leadership and activism to collective struggle led by a vanguard party, a party that had chosen to support Salvador Allende as the presidential figure.

Insunza contrasts his own ideological continuity with that of those who once berated the electoral road to socialism and who now, Insunza claims, are the ultra "reformists," who he regards as focused exclusively on the electoral dimension of democracy. Insunza hammered home the message of the PCCH's historic commitment to electoral democracy as the strategic key to the left's success:

> We [Communists] defended to the hilt the democratic path as the most viable, necessary road for the left to government. We defended the democratic government of Frei. . . . We then identified completely with Allende, with the commitment of the Popular Unity platform, with his path. . . .
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> We worked from sunup to sunup, not sundown—sunup of the following day. We worked all day. The Political Commission of the PCCH met every day to go over economic plans, support for the government, everything. We worked like crazy. We had the absolute conviction that it was a process in which we could triumph. You know that Allende won with 36 percent of the vote. There was another round of elections six months later, the municipal elections, and the left took almost 50 percent of the vote. It was a political watershed. It meant that in six months of governing we had achieved something, we on the left. You know that in the parliamentary elections [in March 1973] we obtained 46 percent of the vote, only as the left. It proved that this three-thirds dilemma [in which a third of the Chilean vote tended to go to the left, a third to the center, and a third to the right] could be

> overcome if we could prove to Chile that we were capable of managing a successful economy. . . .
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> The right understood perfectly well after the March 1973 elections that they had been defeated, and as history is a dialectical process, this led to their decision to promote a coup. They realized that the only way to defeat us was militarily. And we began to realize this was a strong possibility, but we just didn't have the time to plan our defense. . . . We began to work to build a mass capacity, including an armed capacity. They weren't contradictory positions, but, of course, if there had been an ability to build both capacities things might have been different. . . .
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> Once the army had decided to support a coup, a coup was inevitable. The other branches of the armed forces were secondary, but the army was decisive. In terms of the small dramas of the time, anecdotes—we had some ten thousand men who had some degree of military preparation, principally concentrated in the great industrial centers. [Allende supporter, army general] Prats had some knowledge of this and was in agreement that there should be some kind of containment of a coup attempt. After the *tancazo*—the first coup attempt, though not institutional—in July, he designated Pinochet to help design a resistance plan to a coup. So Pinochet knew exactly what little potential, or the most significant potential that existed. It really adds a dose of hypocrisy to the story, the great propaganda after the coup about the tremendous resistance plan. The reality is there was little.

Insunza emphasized that the defeat of the Popular Unity government was not historically determined, that had there been more focus on educating and training "the masses," politically and militarily, "things might have been different." He expressed remorse for the left's failure to develop a military policy that incorporated both the armed forces and the popular sectors. This emphasis in Insunza's text lends ideological continuity to his defense of the PCCH's policy of armed rebellion in the 1980s. It is a conscious logic on Insunza's part. Yet this stress on failing to arm and train the masses is ironic, given his strong criticism of the "ultra-leftists" earlier in his text.

Later Insunza alluded to the PCCH's internal critique of its own responsibility for the defeat of the Popular Unity government. In our predominantly open-ended interview, however, Insunza chose not to elaborate on this self-critique:

> I remained in Chile after the coup in clandestinity from 1973 to 1975. At the end of 1975 I had to leave the country . . . to protect the leadership it was resolved we would leave. I remained in exile from 1976 to 1983, when I returned and remained underground until 1990. It was a period of great political and theoretical reflection for all of us on the left as we sorted out what the reasons were for our defeat. I was focused very much on the question of power. I feel strongly that we Communists engaged in a very serious and honorable reflection, trying to get to the bottom of what our own responsibility was in the defeat.

Insunza's subsequent description of his exile in the former German Democratic Republic and in Moscow is another example of the continuity in his identity between past and current ideological beliefs, a reflection of how a party loyalist identity can tend toward ideological freezing rather than ideological transformation:

> I spent my exile in East Berlin from 1976 to 1980 and then in Moscow from 1981 to 1986. I would not be honest if I didn't tell you that my experiences in the German Democratic Republic reaffirmed my conviction as a communist. First, because it was a society in which social equality was highly valued, their handling of the questions of health, of diet—I had never seen anywhere like it, certainly not in Chile, a capitalist country. The attention we received freely, the social welfare standards we enjoyed . . . I got to see how workers lived. . . .
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> Nevertheless, I also recognized levels of division in German society, which for us Chilean Communists were plainly undemocratic and clashed with our value structures. Regarding certain forms of education, for example, there was a formalism that bothered me, a *dirigiste* approach. I commented upon this to a German comrade, and his explanation was that to have this system function economically, socially, and politically, a high degree of centralism was necessary. I did feel a good degree of defensiveness. Yet in an important sense, this is justifiable. You know, today, after the collapse, it is as if everything in the socialist bloc had been terrible, everything bad, and there is a focus on its antidemocratic character. But these great theorists of capitalism fail to mention in their great indignation with Stalinism that capitalist societies did everything in their power to prevent the possible democratization of these socialist societies. You cannot discuss democracy in these

> societies out of the context of the Cold War. And that is why we communists didn't consider legitimate public criticism of the socialist countries for their incomplete transformations. . . .
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> Democracy comes from the historical development of a society. In Chile there is a long democratic tradition with the participation of the Chilean Communists, which the Chilean Communists have helped to construct! In Cuba, Cuba has never had a democratic tradition. Their capacity is extremely limited. They're confronting a major power that seeks their destruction. . . .
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> History has demonstrated that the Chilean Socialists have been largely noncritical of the nondemocratic socialist experiences around the world, that their criticisms have come out of their attempts to differentiate themselves from the Chilean Communists, that if you closely examine Chilean history you would have to arrive at the conclusion that it has been the Communists, not the Socialists, who have been the strongest promoters of democracy.

Insunza returned to the grounding of the PCCH in historic national movements for democratization, again contrasting the Communists' record with what he asserts is the Socialists' historic disregard for democracy. For Insunza, it is imperative that I understand that the PCCH is a party committed to democratic principles and that it is only adverse forces—in Chile and around the world—that have prevented socialist societies from democratizing. It is also ironic that his criticism of the PSCH's failure to criticize publicly the socialist bloc countries comes in his text after his own explanation for the PCCH's failure to do the same.

In the 1989, 1993, and 1997 national elections, Insunza ran unsuccessfully for Congress, though he and the PCCH gained slightly in support. He continues to assert the necessity of a democratic centralist party. Today Jorge Insunza is one of five members of the PCCH's Political Commission. His party remains the historic Chilean left force that publicly berates the neoliberal paradigm and that claims the model is reaching exhaustion:

> Not only in Chile but throughout the world, the "drunken stupor" of neoliberalism is ending, and there is a returning to a search for alternatives to capitalism. This whole notion of "an end to ideology" is coming to a close. Chile is celebrated today around the world as a great success of the neoliberal model, and if one looks at this in terms of transnational capital interests as well as the interests of the national monopolies, it

> is true that the model is a successful model. Yet I want to signal to you three separate studies [a 1998 United Nations Development Program, a World Health Organization study, and an International Labor Organization study], not conducted by our party, that suggest otherwise. . . . And I think the results are a very strong accusation against the system, against its essential inhumanity. If the great majority are found to be so unhappy, it is a huge mark against the model, a model that favors extreme social disparity and an increasing exclusion of large sectors of the population, and for those of us inspired by Marxist analysis, not in dogma, but in creating an authentic, meaningful politics, I found in Marx's reflection a solid explanation: that capitalism, in its very core, is incapable of creating a socioeconomic model that is sustainable as a social, cultural basis for society.

Insunza does not claim that his party holds the alternative to Chile's current trajectory. Nevertheless, in a show of remarkable continuity, he appears to draw from an old Communist International position: that the productive forces will sooner or later reach their point of maturation and a new stage will be inevitable.

> So what is the reality? I can say to you that in the immediate future there is little possibility of developing an alternative program here in Chile based on the general social well-being, that we have not yet reached that phase. And for the forces on the left, the weight of defeat is still very profound. The forces of the left were not liquidated, much to the chagrin of the Pinochet regime, nor were they peacefully liquidated as many capitalists had hoped to have happen through the media, psychologically, even democratically, if you will. This did not happen. Clearly today there is a restoration process going on, not just within the PC. As a powerful symbol of this I would point out that ten days ago [in May 1998] the Chilean Socialist Party, in their congress in Concepción, decided to retake the position that their party has roots inspired in Marxism, something they had abandoned three years ago, and now they return to a position they had assumed around 1943, that Marxism is an instrument of analysis that is useful, as is secular humanism and liberation theology–based Christianity. This is very important, given the role of the PSCH in the Concertación over the last several years, their wholehearted adoption of neoliberalism, and now the PSCH's own reaction.

Insunza struggles to reassert the PCCH as the true representative of Chile's popular sectors, the party that can lay claim to concern for Chile's popular tradition. The definition of the "popular sectors" has shifted, however, to encompass all whose chief concerns and identities are politically marginalized, including ecologists and certain feminist sectors, as well as the poor majority:

> So we're optimistic, not over the immediate term, we're not kidding ourselves, but we do think conditions are being laid down for there to be an alternative, an anti-neoliberal alternative, and we believe that social sectors are in a phase where they are deciding to be in favor [of] or against neoliberalism, and that their articulation, in their multiple ways, is essentially a rejection of neoliberalism. For example, the ecologists don't really have the notion today that the system itself has to change, rather they protest against specific manifestations of the system, but we believe that if they're serious, that this green banner they wave will eventually combine with a red one, not that there will be a hegemonic takeover, but rather an alliance to work together. Among feminist circles as well, though I use this carefully, for not all feminist strands lend themselves to this course of action, but from within some feminist sectors are struggles against the structure that favor fundamental change. . . .
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> We see a struggle for a socialist ethic, not because every sector has a revolutionary bent, but because they are challenging things like corruption, egoism, the rupture of solidaristic links, and they join us in believing these should not be sustained in our society.

Insunza's text calls for a collective sense of struggle championed by his party. In his text, in his discourse, Insunza uses the first person plural, "we," far more often than the first person singular, "I." Other political party loyalists echo this discursive pattern, a pattern not shared by the political thinker and entrepreneur cognitive orientations of this study. The "we" bonds Insunza to his party. As a true political party loyalist, he processes and expresses his politics through the lens of the party itself. Insunza's political identity is inseparable from his party.

ISABEL ALLENDE

Like Jorge Insunza, political party loyalist Isabel Allende, daughter of the late president, maintains a political identity intimately linked to the past.[5]

Isabel Allende is a torchbearer, a keeper of the flame, whose political behavior is tightly bound up with her representation of past traditions and symbols. The family name of Allende is inseparable from the Chilean political class, and it has been the defining institution of her life. The family as referent dominates Allende's text, not only as she discusses her personal life but also as she puts forth her politics. Allende's political identity and public persona rely on the memory of her late father. Yet unlike the personal loyalists of the next chapter, Allende uses her family name to build and strengthen the Socialist Party. In contrast to the "Allendistas" of chapter 4, who are inherently critical of the Socialist Party and who are often more loyal to the memory of the leader than to his party, Isabel Allende uses her family credibility to enhance her party's image.

> My best memories are of our times in [our beach house in] Algarrobo, in terms of family, leaving behind so much of what our daily life was, as you can imagine, just the relaxation, the swimming, the sharing of our lives together was very important. . . . The other side of our lives was here [in Santiago], in this house where you and I sit, the house where we have lived since I was seven years old, the activities of this home. And my father would leave in the morning, but he would always, almost always, return home for lunch, and rarely did we eat alone. Even as little girls [my sisters and I] were there joining in the conversations, listening to the conversations—conversations that were usually about international affairs, Chile—with Latin Americans from all over, Europeans, incredible dialogues, always.
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> My father—my father, he believed that the lunch hour was a time for meeting, not just within our family, but with other families. It was always a family atmosphere, but with a great deal of conversation. So from early on I realized, when I went off to school, that I was from a very different kind of family.
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> I began in a very small school, and then I was sent to an English school, which I never liked. My father believed a great deal in being able to speak other languages—this was very important to him, communication—and I would say it was one of the only undemocratic decisions made in the family. We switched schools without being asked if we wanted to or not.
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> And I repeat, this question of conversations in the home, it separated me from my girlfriends. Politics was a part of my daily life from very early on. I breathed it always. It wasn't that I was a party militant

early on, no, I was in a private school. . . . It was more how I perceived things differently from my schoolmates. . . .

I was never a *real* party militant, never was. I had dramatic experiences during the campaign. From early on in my childhood, the two most influential phenomena politically were the conversations at lunch, and when I accompanied my father on campaign trips, to hear how people conversed about things. The campaigns were difficult, the effort exerted, the organization, and, of course, facing the defeats. These influenced me quite deeply. The senatorial campaigns. I remember in 1961 for three months during the summer, going door to door in Viña, Valparaíso, with our pamphlets, house to house, and I witnessed a great deal, the poverty, . . . an old woman without water, without basic services. A very powerful experience conversing with people this way.

In 1961, at sixteen, I went on my first trip abroad, with my parents, to Cuba. It made a huge impression on me. It was the beginning of the revolution. We were so *influenced* by Cuba. It was a beautiful sight, what was going on, speaking with the peasants, with workers, with housewives, what was going on in terms of education, health—which particularly impressed my father as a physician, everything just beginning, very impressive. Returning to private school that year was like a douse of cold water, I was so enthusiastic about Cuba, my girlfriends about the next party. . . .

In 1963 I traveled with my family again, to China and to the Soviet Union, and I had to admit that from Chile, one didn't perceive the incredible differences, the Sino-Soviet struggles, so it was quite eye-opening for me. . . . In China the communes, the collective system. The USSR I also found extremely interesting, we went to the theaters, cultural events, and I was amazed by the lines, the *lines* to get into the movies, the theater, people could afford to go and enjoy cultural events. We went to Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. Then we jumped to Western Europe, where we went to Italy and England. Our objective at that time was to look for support for the 1964 campaign.

Unfortunately the 1964 campaign was so . . . aggressive, the campaign of the PDC, of the Socialists, and it distanced a lot of people who were once friends . . .

Well, returning to this trip, it was a six-month trip. I was seventeen. It influenced me a great deal. We then ended up in Mexico, which we loved, and to which we returned, once immediately before the coup, and a week later, on the twelfth to thirteenth [of September 1973].

Throughout Allende's text, politics and family are intertwined. Allende recognizes how her life experiences, from her immersion in her father's campaigns to her world travels, set her apart from others. There is a great deal of nostalgia in her voice, particularly in her memories of the summer house and in the daily conversations at the family table. It is a nostalgia magnified by her continuing to reside in the very house she lived in as a child.

Since her early militancy in the Socialist Party, Allende, like her father, has been tied to the more moderate wing within the party. It is a wing that has carefully sought to differentiate the party from the centrist Christian Democratic Party by drawing from the Socialists' historic progressive nationalist program and by using a collectivist rhetoric in defense of human dignity and social justice. This differentiation has become more pronounced over the issue of Chile's position regarding the arrest of Pinochet. On behalf of human rights and dignity, Isabel Allende led the Socialist Party's support of the former dictator's arrest. The leaders of this tendency include Minister of Government Jorge Arrate and Senator Ricardo Nuñez, both of whom were close friends and colleagues of Isabel Allende's in the pre-1973 period.

> I joined the Socialist Party in the university, this is when I began my career as a militant. Life in the university was normal, intense, it was the 1960s, so Cuba was very much alive, we protested in the streets, we were beaten up. . . . We felt it was a moral imperative to defend Cuba, the Cuba thing, the most important phenomenon in Latin America at that time. I feel very defined by that period. And obviously, in '68 we felt very much that big changes were ahead. This was the period of struggle over university reform. . . .
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> The Socialist Youth was very tied to *lo popular*, to folklore, guitars, the *peñas* [coffeehouses], the shantytowns. It was the generation of black stockings, the ponchos, the guitars, the *kemas* [indigenous musical instruments]. It was a period of liberation.
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> My group in the university was Ricardo Nuñez, Armando Arancibia, Luis Alvarado, Enzo Faletto, Germán Correa [all of whom are important Socialist leaders and thinkers and (with the exception of Faletto) have served as congressmen or cabinet ministers in the postdictatorial period]. . . .
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> Then came 1970 and all of that. In March of 1970 I began to work in the National Library. I have to say that leading up to this period it

> was a personal search for me, that I wasn't incredibly defined in terms of my own direction, a search without a great deal of clarity. Beginning in the National Library was an extremely important period in my life. I was there from January of 1970 to 1973. It meant, in essence, that in the midst of those years I was able to remain calmly in the National Library. . . .
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> It was an important formative period for me there in the library, for I rose to direct a program. It was the first time I had to deal with a staff, in a way which was, let's say, which was to try not to politicize work conditions in what was such a politically charged national climate. We functioned in an extremely merit-based way, we devoted a good deal to training, it was really quite a beautiful experience. And I am convinced that I was chosen to direct the program not because I was the daughter but because they felt I was capable of directing it in the way necessary, which I did. People perceived I had real leadership capacity, not for my last name, but because of who I was. And that was very empowering. . . .
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> I also participated in a very reflective socialist study group, an exceptional group, really, composed of Jorge Arrate, at the time executive secretary of Codelco, the Central Bank president, the foreign minister Clodomiro Almeyda, a group of highly connected government people, respected intellectuals. It was a way for me, who was not in the government, to stay abreast of what was going on, to *observe* the debates going on. It was a nucleus that actually functioned for about fifteen years. We would meet once a week, at one person's house, at another's house. Obviously, the themes of the group were the national questions, policies, the critical political junctures.

Allende's nostalgic tone continued through her discussion of the pre-1973 years. Her recounting of her position in the National Library as an important formative experience in her life was meant to call attention to her belief that it was the one activity of her life that was free of family association. Nevertheless, Allende's participation in a top-level Socialist Party nucleus, despite her lack of a formal political position, is testimony to the privileged position her name grants her in Chilean politics.

Upon the invitation of Mexican president Luis Echeverría, whose family was very close to the Allende family, Isabel Allende and her mother became exiles in Mexico. Allende's discussion of life in Mexico reflected the relative ease that her family experienced there. Her text also revealed how

she came to personify the image of her father as she spoke out against the Chilean dictatorship in trips throughout Mexico and other countries.

> So much of my time before 1980 was spent traveling on solidarity campaigns, all over the world, at great personal costs, abandoning my children, great personal costs, although upon reflection I think it was inevitable. After 1978, while I clearly sympathized with the Altamirano, Arrate, Nuñez camp, I distanced myself from the party for a period, to become a student again, dedicating myself to books, this time from a clearly different outlook in Mexico. It was a way of opening myself up, it was very important to me. This was roughly from 1980 to 1982.
>
> I began to travel again in 1982. This was also a period of break with the Communist Party, which had changed so radically. We began to focus so much on the basic question of democracy, democracy, it was distinct in its framework from socialist agendas of the past, this deliberate focus, emphasis.
>
> And our comrades began returning, first Nuñez, then others, the period of the return, of more and more contact with Chilean reality. . . .
>
> And I continued on solidarity trips, not as a party militant, but increasingly close to this.

In this text, Allende portrays her role as "the daughter" as virtually inescapable in terms of her responsibilities to the Socialist Party and to the struggle against the Pinochet regime. Though she "distanced" herself from her party, it was only for two years. Allende claims her renewed political involvement was "inevitable."

> In terms of my own return [to Chile], in 1986 I was encouraged to join a group returning but who had to negotiate with Pinochet, and I absolutely refused this. I finally was able to return in 1988, a month before the plebiscite. . . .
>
> It was quite emotional, a shock to return, to fly over the snowcapped Andes, to go to the Plaza de Armas, to see La Moneda presidential palace, where Salvador Allende died. What helped was the enormous generosity, the people in the streets warmly welcoming my return, the incredible generosity. The impact on me was tremendous. It is an important memory I retain, the first few days of the return.
>
> Yes, there have been important changes in Chile. The first thing I felt was this very competitive spirit. Less solidarity. A capacity, not to

> look deeply at much, not to remember much, to take the most comfortable, easiest path, a generalized egoism. The stratification. The world of poverty, marginality distant from this other world. . . . And here it affected me to see this visual separation, not what I remember of 1973. I can now circulate within the world I live in and work and not really see what's happening! This whole sense of community we once possessed seems somehow lost. Now the message is not to butt your nose into others' business. There are real changes, real changes. I think there is still a generalized lack of trust among members of our society. The kind of transition was very complex, slow, behind closed doors in a sense, mystical. . . .

The notion of the loss of community is echoed throughout the texts of the political party loyalists. It contrasts sharply with the tenor and description of the past recounted by other types in this study. Chilean political entrepreneur Clarisa Hardy, for example, who also spent her exile years in Mexico, claims that her years in Mexico enabled her to see Chilean class stratification and the lack of solidarity of the pre-1973 period all the more clearly (see chapter 6). Such contrasts suggest a tendency toward romanticization of the past on the part of the party loyalists.

In discussing the 1990s transition period, Allende was unafraid of expressing her frustration on several fronts: first, with what she terms a failure to "re-create" a solidaristic social fabric to combat inequality; second, with what she views as the extreme consensus politics of Chile's political class; and third, with an incapacity to address a basic sense of insecurity among Chileans regarding their future:

> This has clearly been a process of transition, with its advances and its setbacks. Perhaps the major disappointment has been that we thought we would have reached a point by now where we were firmly establishing a limit, an end to the continued trajectory of inequality, a level of inequality Chileans did not know in the past. This has not happened. . . . We have failed to re-create an integrative sense within society, a common bonding. When everyone celebrated the Chile-Italy game and went to the Plaza Italia last night [June 1998] it was one of the very few times we could see different sectors of society banding together.
>
> Another of the many themes weighing upon us is how these elaborate processes of establishing political agreements in order to advance a legislative measure are interpreted by society. We are clearly viewed as

> the political class of consensus. It has created a real distance between the political class and society. Ironically, this sense that we must avoid mobilization, disagreement, has begun to cause mobilization within society against perceptions of this great consensus within the political class. It has been a process that has impeded participation from the population, that in turn has created a demand to be heard. I think we have reached a point where we need less politics of agreement and more differentiation, more participation, more mobilization to distinguish among ourselves, an end to the blocking of important social gains by the right, against labor reform, for example. This has been a transition that has been substantially blocked, frozen. . . .
>
> Another theme which is important to discuss is what this whole model of modernization has signified for the citizenry, and that is that citizens are terrified, are insecure, it is this subjective dimension. Before, people in Chile were used to labor stability, for example, that they could be secure in one job, in their career, that they would live and die in the same career. Today in this globalization process, et cetera, et cetera, the process requires more flexibility. Everyone talks about labor flexibility, but the difference is there are no protective measures accompanying this flexibility. Entire careers disappear, or they require new technological training, or there is a lag time between the training for new demands and the ability to work in them. And here we are failing. The subjective element is as important as the objective one. People feel subjectively unprotected, and, for that matter, objectively as well. The labor situation is not at all clear, and we have not been able to resolve the question of assuring the very basic needs of a family.

Allende continues to accept and to nourish her identity, firmly embedded in family and in the Chilean Socialist Party. She has attempted, unsuccessfully, to head the Socialist Party. In 1993, however, she was elected to the Chilean Congress. She is now also vice president of the PSCH. Like other Socialist Party and Party for Democracy leaders, Allende is very concerned about the recent insinuation from within the Christian Democratic Party that the socialists have not proven to possess governance capacity. As the daughter of the last socialist president, Allende is increasingly assuming the delicate role as her father's defender on behalf of the credibility of her party:

> There are still very real fears. And anything that appears as conflict is something seen as very worrisome. In principle, all of us want to avoid

conflict, but there are times when trying to avoid conflict will only create more conflict. Today we are in absolute denial of conflict, which creates a kind of consensus that in part is superficial. There is a very real part of the population that remains traumatized. The whole theme of conflict, violence, is very worrisome for them. But on the other hand there is a kind of vulgarization of politics, on one side from the right, and from the other side [the Christian Democratic Party], in a move that is quite wrong, to try to profile itself as the party that guarantees stability.[6] We have the same abilities, the same interests, the same capacities. So our challenge at this moment is how as the Concertación to move forward toward the next presidency united but getting rid of this tendency to create scary ghosts. . . . We have to break this pattern.

In part for this reason the Salvador Allende Foundation is planning a great homage to Allende on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his death, a great act that will take place in the National Stadium, with international participation. And I feel a great need to do this, a great homage in all its senses. And why is this necessary? I think it is absolutely necessary to recapture, reappropriate the symbol of Allende if we want to move forward, we must dispel the ghosts. I can understand this strategy coming from the right, as a strategy. Not from the Christian Democrats. They do this because there is clearly a certain part of the population that has hesitated to define itself.

We will carry out this homage as a major cultural event but also as a recognition of what democracy stands for, what Allende stood for, that democracy is also related to social justice, in favor of social justice, he favored a revolutionary process through democratic channels, "opening steps toward change in pure freedom." . . . a testimony in its many forms. And I feel doing such a homage to Allende, to resuscitating a memory, implies not being a prisoner of that memory. We're in another period, this will be opening a space. We are still in a very constricted, restricted democracy . . . and yet we as the left are not divided and we are united in the Concertación. This is where the PDC is wrong and we must come up with a solution for the presidential candidacy that will not reinflict wounds. Otherwise we will be on a dangerous path, which I really believe we can avoid. We have learned something from the past—the PDC could not govern alone in the 1960s, we could not govern alone in 1970.

As sectarian politics return to the fore, party loyalist Allende's identity increases in prominence, as she works to remobilize important sectors within Chilean society toward the party. Together with Congressman Juan Pablo Letelier (a son of former Chilean ambassador to the United States Orlando Letelier, who was assassinated in Washington, D.C., by Chilean government mercenaries in 1976) and other Socialist Party members of the Chilean Congress, Isabel Allende traveled to London to voice strong support for the British arrest and pending extradition decision against Pinochet. Letelier and Allende have become the most visible Socialist Party leaders in their stance against the Chilean executive's argument that Pinochet should be released immediately and returned to Chile. Drawing upon the continued reverence within the popular sectors for Salvador Allende, Isabel Allende is concentrating her efforts on championing a Socialist Party message of human rights and dignity, as well as a call to the party's fellow militants and to Chilean citizens to support a Ricardo Lagos presidency.

ADRIANA MUÑOZ

Like Isabel Allende, Adriana Muñoz is a torchbearer, first for the Chilean Socialist Party and now for the Party for Democracy.[7] Muñoz is the first vice president of the Chilean House of Representatives. The text of this congresswoman and party loyalist emphasizes her socialization in collectivities, namely, her neighborhood community, her generation, and her party. It is an attempt to relay a continuity between her past roots and the communities she was publicly elected to represent.

Nevertheless, unlike Isabel Allende, Adriana Muñoz is a feminist.[8] The contrast between Isabel Allende's and Adriana Muñoz's texts reveals the gendered dimension of individual political identity arrived at in this study. Not once in our three-session, five-hour series of interviews did Allende discuss what it was like to be a woman in a male-dominated party and politics. Like her male counterparts interviewed for this study, she kept a notable *silence* regarding the possible influence of intimate personal companions and relationships on their political thinking and behavior. The one exception to this was Patricio Rivas (below), who consistently discussed his personal relationships and their influences on his political behavior and ideological evolution over the course of his life.

Feminism and party loyalty have often represented competing forces

within Muñoz's political identity. In a country morally shadowed by a conservative Catholic Church hierarchy, Muñoz's outspoken stances in favor of a divorce law (which Chile does not have) and of the right to an abortion in extreme cases cast her as a threat to "family" and to Chilean tradition. They are positions that her party has failed to champion.

In recounting her youth, Muñoz stressed her bonds to community life:

> In the period that I was born, well, I was born in 1948, I'm a Libra and I come from a Christian family, a mother who was a housewife and a father who was a store owner. I'm the oldest of five children, and I was born in a neighborhood known as Recoleta, and my young life revolved around the community-oriented neighborhood, the collective. Later I studied in a parochial school run by nuns. All of us studied in religious schools, from kindergarten through high school. . . .
>
> Collective life in a neighborhood is a beautiful thing. It's something that deeply influenced me, my friends during that period, neighbors who to this day are my friends even though they've left the neighborhood and I've stayed, our games in the street, games that mobilized the whole block, we were twenty or thirty kids in the street . . . and there was a strong sense of solidarity, of equality, because there were middle-class sectors in my neighborhood, but there were also poor sectors and I remember having grown up with poor children who were at the same level as I, we were very equal, we all felt we belonged to the same neighborhood. We all went in different directions—those of us who were from the middle class became professionals, those who were poorer, well, many ended up alcoholics, others, well, it's a life that stamped you with a kind of seal of community . . . we were from the same generation and we were very together.

Like other political party loyalists, Muñoz is nostalgic about community life growing up in the 1950s and 1960s. In her reflections, nevertheless, she reveals how class differences led to contrasting life trajectories. Muñoz's emphasis on organic ties to Chilean communities fits her public persona as a congresswoman and her focus on grassroots loyalties and recruitment.

Muñoz's political career began in the university student movement. Muñoz was a sociology major at the University of Chile "in the most politicized years, '66, '67, '68." The university represented her first exposure to coeducational, secular education.

> I began to participate in discussions at levels I had never known before. The arrival of all the foreign professors, the arrival of Brazilians, Argentines, Uruguayans [to Chile] marked the development of sociology as a science in Latin America in that period, and, well, our positions became more politicized. We had professors like Clodomiro Almeyda [Chilean Socialist Party leader], a Marxist, and I intellectually became a Marxist, I began to find that Marxism made sense, and already in 1966, 1967, I began to want to become a militant, and I became a militant of the Communist Party (PCCH), because my closest friends were PCCH members, but then I became frightened. I had the sense that if I got my PCCH card I would somehow lose my freedom, I had the sense that it would be entering a party where I couldn't leave on my own will, and so I didn't join officially, and later I met people from the Socialist Party (PSCH) and I became a militant in the Chilean Socialist Party.
>
> *Q: In 1967?*
>
> I joined the PSCH before the end of 1966, because in 1967 they gave me my card.

For Muñoz there was little temporal separation between her initial exposure to left ideological currents and the decision to become a political party militant. She "intellectually became a Marxist" and explored both the PCCH and the PSCH in the same year. This represents a common pattern of individual political identity formation in this study, where ideological conviction quickly leads to joining a party, and the party is seen as the locus for defining theory and praxis.

It is unclear from Muñoz's narrative why she was afraid of the PCCH. Perhaps anti-Communist sentiment while growing up in a right-wing Catholic family, coupled with parochial school from kindergarten through high school, had affected her "sense" of the Communist Party, but it is impossible to judge from her text.[9] It was also not uncommon in this highly charged political atmosphere for students to have a negative experience with one party and to decide to join another. In any case, Muñoz quickly became a leader within the National Federation of Students of the University of Chile (FECH) as a political secretary and later as a Socialist Party delegate. She completed her degree in rural sociology, and as a PSCH militant and rural sociologist, she became an undersecretary in the Allende administration's Department of Agriculture. She was

twenty-two years old. Muñoz's narrative captures how consuming militant life proved to be.

> As militants we were in nuclei. I belonged to one that included professionals and functionaries of central Santiago, and we were extremely active although ideologically divided, and I was in the more hard-line tendency. . . . I became a Trotskyist at twenty. In 1969 I traveled to Cuba, where I was exposed to the whole bureaucracy of being socialized in a socialist state . . . and I returned to work hard for the revolution. . . . We were a group trying to extend and further the kinds of changes afoot. Perhaps in this sense we contributed to the chaos, yet we were trying to radicalize the party from within, and I worked in a peasant union, and it was a period of a lot of rage, as I was able to reflect on it somewhat once I was in exile. We were trying to redistribute the wealth, and of course we were, we were the generation imbued with the great paradigms, with the great revolutionary models and tendencies, the Bolshevik, the Cuban, the Chinese, the PLO, and we were trying to apply these models to the Chilean case. . . . And when we had time to reflect in exile on how out of touch we were with the sense of security Chileans cherish and how threatened they felt by our great schemes. . . . I was so swallowed up by my militancy, by the internal struggles within the party and by our struggles with the right. We were completely oblivious to the risks. We were mainly young people, a period led by young people. I was twenty-four when we left the country.

This sense of being "swallowed up" in the intensity of party militancy continues to be the defining feature of Muñoz's cognitive political orientation. From her early political involvement, Muñoz's political behavior, like that of other political party loyalists, has been that of a dedicated party "workhorse." This behavior is consistent throughout Muñoz's political career, an unflagging loyalty in spite of the difficult personal and political moments in her life.

Muñoz and her five-month-old child followed her husband into exile in Austria. After a year of living with "their bags packed" in hopes that the dictatorship would be short-lived, Muñoz and her husband began their gradual assimilation into Austrian life. Muñoz began postgraduate work at the University of Vienna, where she completed a master's degree in political science. For four years she worked at a university international relations in-

stitute, where she focused on Latin America, and she began a doctoral program. Yet, as was common among exiles, Muñoz's marriage fell apart, and she gave up her studies to return to Chile and to Chilean politics:

> I began the doctoral program in political science and sociology but then abandoned it to return to Chile because I entered an extremely strong family crisis period and I separated from my husband and I was also feeling, let's say, I had always felt that in spite of all my effort to fit into this new reality, this new society, for my personal characteristics I couldn't do it. I began to feel each day that life had less meaning. Then I had a strong conflict with my son, who felt completely Austrian, who was very happy in school. . . . I just felt that I couldn't go any further in Austria, that I couldn't develop a personal project that satisfied me . . . and I felt this strong urge to return. Many people were going back and forth during this period and spoke to me about Chile. My mother came to visit, my father wasn't well, and in 1982 I managed to return without any problems of getting in.
>
> The return was a real struggle. I had no work. I spent almost two years selling signs at my brother's store . . . and finally I was able to get an investigative project approved by a Chilean NGO to establish my professional life again.

After a number of difficult years of reestablishing herself, Muñoz became a visible figure in the Chilean feminist movement and in the Chilean Socialist Party.

> [In 1985 and 1986] I began to work with Ricardo Nuñez in his efforts to reconstruct the Socialist Party. In 1986 we socialist women held a national conference of women from throughout the country. More than eight hundred women came, and we reconstituted the Federation of Socialist Women, which had been formed in 1966. It was a very interesting project where we women who were returning from exile had really become feminists, and we socialists managed to incorporate the feminist question into the party. It was an incredible fight against some of the most traditional sectors, the old-timers, but it was a real victory. . . . I played an active role in this, my militancy increased, I returned in a sense to my old militancy, and we women pushed to establish a presence in the Political Commission [of the PSCH], in the Central Committee. I was chosen to represent the feminist federation on the Political Com-

> mission . . . and later I was proposed by the federation again to be a congressional candidate.

In this text we see Muñoz push the boundaries of her political party loyalty to struggle for a women's agenda. As a feminist, she remained within the Socialist Party at a time when many feminists abandoned party politics out of frustration and disgust.[10] Muñoz attempted to incorporate gender issues through party machine politics.

Muñoz continued to champion a feminist platform as a congresswoman, certain that while the PSCH did not match her visibility on the issue, the party stood behind her. However, Muñoz's promotion of legislation to protect domestic employees, to establish a divorce law, and, most controversially, to legalize abortion in extreme circumstances did prove to be a test for her own party as well as for the Chilean legislature.

Like other congressmen and congresswomen in this study, Muñoz is sketchy regarding a new set of visions to guide her politics and identity:

> We have an enormous task today, and that is somehow to reconstruct, reformulate, or formulate better a new and genuine idea of socialism. Given today's times we have little time to think, at least for those of us doing politics, and we hope that other comrades are reflecting and discussing all this. . . . We have to make people believe that we socialists have renovated, and that it is reflected in our way of carrying out politics. . . . We need a vision for the year 2000. We need a utopian vision, because I believe that a party without utopia, without proposals—I don't think we have to return to parties of dogmas, but we do need ideas. I am afraid that in the parties' attempts to advance, ideas are displaced, the party becomes an instrument of power, the concentration of power in few hands to serve personal interests and society loses out. . . .
>
> On the other hand, we also depend in important ways on our base, on those with ties in the community who win support for the party through their battles to deliver concrete goods to the community, on their service to their communities, not because of their political discourse but because of their abilities to tackle concrete daily problems, for those without homes, without employment. . . . And I spend much of my time fighting for concrete projects, working with a range of social community leaders to solve the problems of the people. And after these fights everyone wants to be in the party of the congress-

> woman, it really is like that, without my asking for it. Like right now there is a squatter settlement where sixty families are living in absolute misery, and, well, because of my work, they all want to be in the party of the congresswoman without my having delivered a single speech.

In her December 1993 run for reelection, Muñoz lost. Opinion was split on why she was defeated. Many hold that she failed to have the necessary financial and moral support of her party. Others, including Muñoz herself, asserted immediately after her defeat that the Chilean right and the Catholic Church ran a U.S.-style propaganda campaign to portray her as a virtual baby killer and that her opponents employed scare tactics among her former supporters from Santiago's shantytowns. In our June 1998 interview, however, as Muñoz reflected on her defeat, she asserted that her 1993 loss had more to do with her own failure to communicate well with her constituency, to engage more closely with her district's needs. Muñoz does not blame the PSCH leadership, so central to orchestrating party campaigns and electoral lists.

From 1993 to 1997, Muñoz served under PSCH minister of government José Joaquín Brunner as the Socialist Party's liaison between the executive and the Congress. By mutual agreement between the PSCH and the PPD, Muñoz publicly renounced her PSCH membership to become a leader of the Party for Democracy (PPD), which, in contrast to the PSCH that erected it, has recently made a strong effort to recruit women for high-level positions.[11] In 1997 Muñoz ran again for public office, this time under the PPD banner in a different district. As a party loyalist, she continues to organize for the PPD, focusing on recruiting shantytown women in mobilizations for just wages and protections.

When asked to reflect on her life and name the most important influences, Muñoz cited collective, generational experiences, rather than a specific person or figure in shaping her political identity:

> I've never had particular people who have been amazing influences on me, rather collective moments, and more than anything, my time in the university, my revolutionary generation, which held a powerful conviction for change. It was a great period of confusion but also one where we felt we had to change things, so it was my friends, my friends on the left who made me feel part of a revolutionary left movement to change society, in all its good senses. The idea that everything is possible, everything can be changed for the better. I think this has

> marked me more than anything else, to be part of a generation euphoric for change.

PATRICIO RIVAS

"My closest friends are in the Rettig Report," said Patricio Rivas, referring to the Aylwin-commissioned investigation of gross human rights violations on the dead and disappeared under the Pinochet dictatorship.[12] Rivas was only twelve when the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), was founded, and he joined the group shortly thereafter. By the age of nineteen, Rivas had become a major party organizer.

Patricio Rivas was born into a middle-class, half-Basque, half-Jewish family in the capital. Their home was in a vibrant neighborhood bordering the Plaza Italia, close to downtown Santiago, and the neighborhood represented a central focus of Rivas's early life.

> In my neighborhood we had an unusual and beautiful thing going. We started a kind of debating society. On the one side was a kind of Mills, humanist perspective, on the other, Trotsky. All of the Christian types ended up in the MIR. Every Saturday we would get together, and we were theoretically very competitive. We would read from the Frankfurt School, Adorno, Marcuse. Even our parties were boring, we were so focused on this. Five from this group are disappeared today.

The theme of the disappeared and dead was the central referent of Rivas's text. Of approximately forty persons specifically alluded to in Rivas's recollections, more than thirty were killed or disappeared. Rarely did Rivas mention a name or describe an individual without referring to whether the individual was alive or dead. The story of Rivas's life was inseparable from the stories of others' deaths. Rivas is a torchbearer for his dead comrades.

The death of the other becomes all the more present (and haunting) in the text because of Rivas's emphasis on the collective—on bonds to the party, on collective responsibility to fellow militants, on the importance of work with "the masses."

> In school I met a group of young Miristas. I liked them all. I found them intelligent, responsible. And they took things very seriously. This was no longer our Saturday discussion group. We were very moral,

> humanist. We read things like "Moral Force," by an Argentine revolutionary. Works of Che linking ethics, morality, and revolution. The Cuban Revolution—Martí. I started to feel part of a grand process. It was a kind of intercontinental identity. . . .
>
> . . . I remember how we all felt around the time of Allende's election. It was a difficult decision within the MIR to decide to vote for Allende, but ultimately that is the decision we made. . . . I remember a group of us gathering in the morning of Allende's victory at the Plaza Engaña, we had established an entire system of communications in case anything were to happen, you have to understand. We thought that what was coming was either socialism or a coup! (He laughs.) . . .
>
> . . . and later that evening, when Allende's victory was pretty assured, driving around in a small car, five of us squeezed in, observing everything. And we passed the Cerro Santa Lucia and there were masses and masses of people! And I remember we began to sing. Do you know the work of Elias Canetti? He has a passage in the introduction to one of his books about what it is like to feel part of a mass of people, standing skin touching skin, losing one's individual identity to become part of a collective identity, that is so much what it was like. . . .
>
> . . . in terms of the Allende period, it had to be the most beautiful in all senses, in individual terms, in terms of the collective, culturally.

In this excerpt, Rivas refers consistently to the notion of individuals "as part of a collective identity," "a kind of intercontinental identity." He associates this collective identity with revolutionary commitment, whether it is belief in Che's model of the ethical, moral, guerrilla revolutionary or support for Salvador Allende. Rivas's recounting of Allende's victory is full of an elated imagery—the sights, sounds, and senses ("skin touching skin") of a collective moment.

Rivas depicted a tight-knit, highly organized revolutionary party, which he claimed remained united from its founding in 1965 to the first major split in 1979. He emphasized what he termed the MIR's moral and ethical influences on the Chilean left.

> I went from being in charge of the community commandos, the industrial cordons, being connected to the masses, I felt so close to the workers movement!—I also realized that the MIR was far more organized than I knew, that it infiltrated many areas, that many had traveled to Cuba for training. The other thing about the MIR I realized

> was its moral and theoretical influence on the Chilean left, on the Socialist Party, that Miguel Henriquez (MIR leader) met with Allende every week. You realize that you are involved in a serious group . . . this includes the Christian Democrats, too, conversing. So I realized I was involved in work at the mass level, and that the MIR was greater and more organized than I had imagined.

Rivas thus felt that he was a part of the vanguard of an effective and highly influential ideological movement.

The majority of the Mirista militants were underground from 1965 to 1970. In 1970 the MIR made the decision to have most of its militants surface publicly, although by 1972 much of the leadership and chief organizers had returned underground in anticipation of a military coup. When the coup occurred, Rivas had already been moving from house to house with false identification for several weeks. All were armed. Yet until the coup, Rivas claimed, he had not committed a violent act in his life.

> And the coup came . . . And [my ex-wife] Alexandra and I agreed on a communications system, that we would be in touch every five days, indirectly through the family, and my son was crying, because children are so acutely aware of stress situations. And I left. When the coup came, everything changed, everything, everything, your way of seeing the other, everything.
>
> One of our biggest problems was the lack of gasoline. So, someone made a decision, it was a decision only a Central American could think up because we're too rational (ha, ha). We called her Ms. Moneypenny because she always had secret information, we teased her a lot. She was enchanting. Very clandestine because she was another nationality, she was a singer. Very cultured. . . . Moneypenny said, "But the street is full of cars." And we said, "So?" And she said, "But you have a gun, and one has to do what one has to do." I said, "What, go take one from somebody?" She said, "In Chile I learned that if you desire to do something, you do it. But in Central America I learned that one can't always do something in the way one wants." For me this was the first exercise of violence. And we went. She and I go out in the street in her car, and we pass this Fiat 125, and she says, "This is a good car." And I said, "At the light stop, and I'll get out," and I really had no idea what I was doing. This was a whole new ball game. Everything was different from what we had formulated. So I got out and I said the most ridiculous,

stupid thing in the world, I said, "Get out of this car in the name of the people!" The guy looked at me, could see I wasn't comfortable, and said, "But why should I?" And I said again, "In the name of the people." So we begin this argument. And you know what saved this situation? He had a girl in the car who so angered me, she said, "*Terrorista marxista*!" And this made the guy more indignant, and I hit him. I knocked him to the ground, and I realized I had done something against all the rules in the manual, something you shouldn't do when you have a pistol, but I didn't fire at him. I got in the car and drove off. The car was full of gasoline. And we went through the car and found a revolver and in the glove box, $3,800 in dollars. Pure coincidence. Pure coincidence. And we drove around in that car all day until we ran out of gas. Carrying people to and from places, connecting people, carrying people to the factories.

I also lived the most important deception of that morning. I went to a factory in Vicuña Mackenna where we had really organized for this [coup possibility], at least somewhat, and I meet up with a comrade, someone who today is in the PSCH, and we meet car to car, because there weren't many cars in the street there, and I told him it would be good for him to go to San Bernardo where there was a mobilization I heard about on the radio. And he said, "No, I'm going to seek asylum." And I said, "But how?" And he said, "This doesn't have any future, no future." He said, "I want to be frank with you, I could have invented something." And in this sense he was very honest. "I'm going to get my family and I'm leaving. I can leave you my car. I just have to arrive at the Embassy where I'm getting asylum. I'll hide the keys in my car." He gave me all his money. He began to cry. He hugged me, and he left.

So when we ran out of gas this time I knew how to rob a car. None of this waiting at the light, the name of the people, nothing. I went right up to a guy and ordered him to give up his car. And the guy looked at me, a guy about forty years old, and he said, "Here. Now resist," and he left. Then I discovered it was a CORFO [Chilean state agency] car. But in any case, he gave me the car, he just gave it to me. The keys, the papers.

And for the first time, on the eleventh and the twelfth, we resisted. We were living what the Tupamaros had described to us, the Argentines who arrived in Chile, those who had been Peronist guerrillas, these "*terceristas*" who we would later be with in Central America, in Nicaragua. We were in combat. But it was a very unorganized strategy.

> Yet at the same time the coup instigators were also unsure of us. So it was very chaotic, *very* chaotic. And twice we had direct confrontations with troop columns. Once, at five in the afternoon, and it was the MIR leadership. If there is one thing about the MIR, one must recognize that the leadership itself was out there resisting. At six, seven o'clock we're all resisting in the industrial zones, some unorganized, others more coordinated.
>
> Then at midnight there is a change of house, and we're carrying a radio set from one house to another, and one comrade was shot and died, and that was my first experience with the death of a comrade at my side. I had him in my arms while we searched for another comrade, a woman who was a doctor, and I was scared, and he didn't move. Yet there was kind of a mystique around our resisting. The comrade who died was the child of a Spanish émigré from the Civil War. So somehow, it was very clear, this whole situation. My first encounter with death.
>
> We fought on the twelfth, until there were many wounded by gunshots, we didn't have any gasoline, nothing. Until at noon, we made the decision to stop. It was hard to convince several, but we were also quite disciplined, so if the decision was to stop, we stopped. But we were all worried we would be surrounded. But at seven that evening, we could see workers walking through the streets, lines and lines of workers going home. It was a complete contrast to what we had imagined, a complete contrast.

This uninterrupted passage of Rivas's memories of his activities on the day of the coup is a rich and multilayered text, and it is worth close analysis.

The passage intimately links the personal—his leaving his ex-wife and his son, who is crying—with the political. The coup would change "everything, everything," his most intimate relations, his way of seeing the other.

The story of Rivas's first armed robbery is telling in its illustration of the abyss between revolutionary theory and discourse, on the one hand, and the reality of launching a concrete revolutionary struggle, on the other. The MIR's message of those years was armed struggle, and many of the party's militants went through military training in Cuba. In addition, during the late 1960s, discrete groups of Miristas had been involved in crimes "in the name of the people," including bank robberies. Yet here was a head organizer who reveals a level of naiveté probably not uncharacteristic of his comrades, many of whom would die violently in the years to come.

Rivas's encounter with a Mirista fleeing the country challenges his identification with the MIR as a committed collective, united to face the coup as the party determined. For Rivas, the act of ignoring orders by the MIR leadership to remain in the country was unthinkable. His individual political identity was intimately intertwined with MIR ideology and strategy, and it was not until his years in exile, from 1976 to 1984, that such links would be transformed.

Rivas's sense of identity to the collective was shaken but not shattered by his comrade's decision to flee Chile. He coolly robbed another car, this time from someone sympathetic to his perceived actions. His account of resistance on the eleventh and twelfth not only recovers his belief in the MIR, particularly its leadership, but links the MIR's resistance to what he sees as the historic resistance movements of the Southern Cone and to the defenders of the Second Spanish Republic. He momentarily creates the sense of a great "mystique" around those combating the military.

Yet the final passage represents a Mirista's revolutionary idealism coming to terms with the realities of the immediate situation, namely, that Chilean working people were not rising en masse to challenge the coup.

From the day of the military overthrow until June 1974, when he was arrested by Chilean Air Force Intelligence (SIFA), Rivas remained in Chile clandestinely, changing his appearance and his identity several times, making contacts, channeling information and resources. His memory of that eight-month period is vivid, and he virtually recounted it week by week. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of his recollections of that period is his perception that the MIR was highly organized, successfully building itself to face the dictatorship.

> About a week before Christmas I made contact with [a comrade]. She looked terrible, and I couldn't understand it, because it was a period when we were more confident, were recuperating, organizing big things, feeling almost untouchable, impossible to catch. We had false documents from the PSCH, from the PCCH, everybody. She said, "Bautista [van Showen, one of the top three Miristas leaders,] disappeared." . . .
>
> So the MIR reorganized, and I was really in charge of internal coordination. We modeled our cell structures on the Bolsheviks, one person in charge of three people. We began to organize Resistance Committees, all of that. . . .
>
> And we really perfected our communications systems, our cell structure, all our letters were written on cigar paper, which was terrible, and

> we dressed very elegantly and walked with packages of spaghetti in our hands [to identify ourselves for rendezvous], and they had letters in them. . . . And we were fine, Bautista was the only one who had fallen, until March. . . .
>
> And this is important, because I began arguing over a series of issues with [our head of military operations], and I want to be fair to his side, he's dead now, and I love him very much, but over how quickly to implement our offensive strategy, and we weren't really clear about the parameters within which we were working offensively and defensively, and I said, "But everyone is scared to death! It can be a war between us and them, but not between the government and the people!" It was a very, very difficult discussion, for me particularly. He was much older than I, had much more political experience than I, but we loved each other a lot. And one day we were arguing in a Citroen . . . and we were fighting a lot, and I got out of the car and he followed me in the Citroen, saying, "Get back in, get back in!" It's like we were a married couple (he said, laughing). Finally we made up. . . .
>
> And a close friend arrived from Concepción . . . and through the summer a lot of our clandestine scheme broke down. I was out in the street, meeting with people, but it was okay because they were to be trusted. But at the end of the summer, beginning of March, our national committee organizer Roberto Moreno was captured, as well as another comrade on the political commission. The air force got them. So this was a big blow, but not so big because we had shown the capacity to recuperate fairly rapidly from something like this.

Throughout this passage, Rivas insists on the ability of his party to reorganize and "perfect" itself, even in the face of the disappearance of one leader and the arrests of several others. Yet the fact that several of the leadership fell by March, and that Rivas himself was arrested in a setup in June, would suggest that the MIR was *not* so organized as Rivas perceived. The argument that Rivas recalls between himself and the head of Mirista military strategy was not over whether the MIR could successfully challenge the military, for both of them assumed that the MIR could and should do so. Rivas was head of internal coordination, which may explain his insistence that the MIR was highly organized. Yet the intensity of Rivas's memories of this relatively short period may also cause him to perceive that the MIR resisted for a far longer time than was actually the case.

In prison, ideological resistance assumed new meaning, namely, that of

physical and psychological survival. Rivas recounted the various "phases" of his imprisonment with the SIFA, from the first nine months he spent incommunicado, blindfolded on a bed, to his "discussion sessions" with SIFA officials regarding theoretical and strategic differences within the left. He also described an intra–armed forces struggle between air force intelligence (SIFA) and army intelligence (DINA) over his custody, in which the air force agreed to hand him over for a brief period with the stipulation that he be returned. By the end of his incarceration, Rivas had suffered permanent damage to his spine. Mirista resistance had now come to mean managing to stay alive:

> And one day I receive the possibility of a visa and grant to Belgium, and I'm able to commute my sentence from prison to exile, so it happened like this: One day I was taken hooded and I was hooded all the way to the plane! From there to Europe. Very strange. And in Europe I meet up with my friends, the mother of my son, and there's a party. I arrived in Europe extremely sad to be exiled from my country, but I arrived, too, with the sensation, with the total conviction, "I'm alive! I was not defeated!" Am I explaining myself okay?
>
> I remember saying to an old Communist comrade, when he asked me about the MIR, "We're fine. We're alive, which is a statistical error because we should all be dead!" This was one of the greatest errors of the dictatorship, because it made us all the more committed to our cause.

Rivas's major exile experiences from 1977 to 1984 were in Mexico, Central America, and Colombia, where he spent a good deal of time with guerrilla leaders. In perhaps a counterintuitive way, these experiences, Rivas claimed, contributed to his contention that the MIR leadership's 1979 decision to return militants as guerrillas to Chile was wrong, was suicidal. It was a decision made by a vote of three to two, and Rivas was one of the two on the losing side.

In 1984 Rivas returned clandestinely to Chile, still committed to the MIR. By this time, many Mirista militants had died in raids, captures, and shoot-outs with the military. Rivas could not escape the tremendous sense of responsibility he felt for being a part of such a fatal strategy.

> . . . a girl, my aide, who I adored, who was eighteen, nineteen years old . . . and we're still not clear what happened, but I will tell you. She got involved in a group, and she was part of my communications sys-

> tem, my assistant, and they detect her, and I don't have time to tell her because I had a clandestine group in my house, and they kill her. And this was like reliving my past. But the question is responsibility, and I had direct responsibility for her. And it meant my rethinking everything and a serious set of discussions with my comrades, and because I didn't know where the blow came from, I decided to get everyone out of the country I was responsible for, everyone. Which meant getting the resources, the money together, a huge nightmare.

In the final analysis, while there were divisions within the MIR regarding a number of theoretical and strategic positions, Rivas implies that the MIR division fundamentally had to do with whether to continue to risk lives in the name of resistance to defeat the dictatorship. In an important sense, the MIR leadership was creating new forms of embeddedness for its militants that could mean their death.

> The most difficult thing for me to talk about is the MIR division. We tried to take division as a constructive way to revive the party. As for the leadership, we concluded that there was no possible way to correct the great error we had made [of returning militants in 1979]. And I remember spending nights and nights and nights arguing over whether we should divide or not, this was the atmosphere. And the second factor in all of this was how to begin *saving* lives, even if it were [only] two or three. Of course, politics continued, our political discussions, but this other [dimension] was operating strongly, our mistake, our responsibility. Imagine. We sent people to Chile without contacts for their own security, with few resources, few safe houses, and the dictatorship called this the great Soviet-backed terrorist attack they were combating, but we had nothing, nothing of real substance. . . . And we divided, and this was extremely painful, these were people I love very much, and we separated. . . .
>
> Then I experienced an acute physical crisis because of my back, from the torture, one day I can't walk, and I have to get help. I had problems with my spine, and they had to operate, and I felt from the MIR as if I were betraying them, leaving them because I had to be operated on—I was operated on in Mexico. And the division was classic, those internationally with those in the historic MIR against those in Chile on the ground. And when I was being operated on they killed

> one of my closest friends in Chile. They killed him. And I began to realize that the whole picture was so fragile. It was evident.
>
> . . . we fought, we fought, we fought so much, and I would arrive home and I would think, "But we're fighting and we're how many, three hundred, five hundred?" It was a difficult, difficult period. And on top of all this, with all the discipline of the party. It was schizophrenic.

This passage blends several layers of pain and trauma—the experiences of party division, comrades dying, collective responsibility, intense physical agony from past torture, and the irony of feeling the traitor because of the personal need to leave (if only momentarily) the morass. The issues of life and death that divided the MIR also kept Rivas clinging to it for several years. In April 1992, however, he publicly resigned as head of the MIR-Politico and announced his decision to join the newly founded and short-lived Autonomous Union Movement (MAS). A party somewhat styled after the Brazilian Workers' Party, the MAS represented an eclectic coming together of several small traditional and New Left factions. Rivas's decision to join the MAS was in stark contrast to the decisions of several of his former comrades, many of whom joined the PSCH and now hold high-level government and party posts.[13]

In terms of his cognitive framework, Rivas has strongly identified throughout his life with what he perceives as a collective ideological left. In his early years of activism, Rivas links himself with what he views as a mass movement, a collective of students, workers, and intellectuals in Chile. He sees the Chilean movement as part of an intercontinental movement of Latin American revolutionaries. With the fall of the Allende government, Rivas's sense of the collective narrows to focus intensely on his fellow Mirista comrades and on the revolutionary left leaders with whom he comes into contact in exile.

While the MIR represented the central form of institutional embeddedness for Rivas, one that molded his early commitment to revolutionary struggle, his relationship with the MIR proved extremely dynamic, marked by dramatic internal conflict and the loss of intimate fellow leaders and militants. As a Mirista leader, Rivas came to know other Latin American revolutionaries who would have a dialectical effect on his political thinking and action.

In his return to Chile, Rivas's identification with a collective expands once more, though it is tempered by his exile experiences, new realities in

Chile, the fragmentation of traditional social movements, a sense of fear of the real power of the military and its supporters, and the recognition that important sectors of the Chilean left were moving toward negotiation rather than confrontation with the regime.

Rivas possesses a self-awareness atypical of the other party loyalists of this study. He is an intellectual, and in a sense he bridges the typology of loyalist and thinker. From 1992 to 1993, Rivas headed a small group of former Miristas and other former revolutionaries who were attempting to build a movement inspired by the structure and evolution of the Workers Party of Brazil (PT). It fizzled. Today Rivas searches for a collective sense through his university teaching and his work with the cultural division of the Ministry of Education.

> This country is strange, I don't even know how to explain it. The left is in a very profound crisis. Really the word "crisis" is too soft. It is like a loss of identity, an inability to confront itself. But at the same time, over the last two years I have found, teaching in the university, that while it is clear people are living with pain, a sadness about everything that happened, there is also a generation of people emerging not tied to this pain. But they are not thinking in political terms. It is in cultural terms—music, rock, literature, poetry, film. There is some kind of change occurring from below, something distinct. So I think this cycle of pain is closing. A very long period, this Catholic sense of pain, long, long. It's a very Catholic pain.
>
> Given politics is so disreputable today in Chile, the change is coming through culture. If you look at student movements, you can find that in the 1920s, 1930s, something similar occurred, where there was this need to recognize the other, to know oneself. And I feel that within a few years there will be a very radical social-cultural movement here. If you look at the last university election in the Catholic University, the left won, in the University of Chile, the left won, in the University of Santiago, the left won. So you ask yourself, how is it that the left does this? People are not drawn to the formally political. For me the political class today is made up of these professional men who do politics, things are frozen.

What continues to dominate Rivas's political identity is his deep embeddedness in the revolutionary generation of the 1960s and in the MIR, and his political discourse and behavior continue to reflect this connec-

tion, though couched today in what might be described as poststructuralist terms:

> Why am I still a leftist? I will tell you in the most simple terms in the world. Because it is not at all certain that what exists today is the best possible world it can be. And because it is not the best it can be, I try to do two things: I try to think about the maximum possible change that will cause the minimal human damage. This is one theme, almost an epistemological one. How to accomplish the most change with least suffering, when what in fact has been happening is maximum suffering with the least change. And the second theme is to think absolutely collectively, with everyone. People of different religions, skin colors, identities, how everyone can feel part of the same humanity. This is my aesthetic understanding of what it means to be on the left.
>
> In terms of those I admire, Miguel Henriquez [a founder of the MIR who was killed]—not out of nostalgia, out of pure love. Che. Not out of nostalgia either. Because I love him. Clearly the Beatles. Maybe the Rolling Stones, too. And Michel Foucault. And now what I tell you will seem strange, for he's a complex character. Of those living, I admire Marcos, in Chiapas. Marcos because he was able to create a sense of humor, and I love that. Marcos is a very impressive thing. I feel that the challenge for the left is to achieve social meaning where capitalism as it exists is simply an episode in a completely transformative project for humanity.
>
> Why am I not in the PSCH or the PCCH? Well, the PCCH bores me. And the PSCH I am very distanced from. To create a true force for change, an alternative collective, it might require any number of people. In the U.S. Revolutionary War, it required some ten million. To create the Cuban Revolution, let's say, four hundred thousand. You need some number, but one never knows what the number should be. If you want to take a trip, to explore a place, to change a piece of the world, you don't do it alone, but maybe you don't need so many. It is not purely arithmetic, it is moral, it is a force, of impulses, energy, of believing in yourself. In terms of numbers, if you identify all those who consider themselves socialists in Latin America, the number is very large, but they don't do anything. The PCCH in Chile is very small, but is large compared to the situation of other communists of the world, and the PCCH continues to do a lot being very small. . . . How can a group move a people? If there is no passion, there is no politics of the left.

> We can sit here and discuss different logics, Gramsci, et cetera, but our greatest challenge is to bring many people together on this very small planet, and if we don't, we are condemned, if not to extinction, to ever greater crises.
>
> Why am I a leftist? I'll tell you very simply. Because capitalism is for shit. But what is the alternative? I don't know, I can't sit here and tell you, I don't know. The first great attempts have failed, failed miserably . . . and I have no shame for what I did. It's my life, and I won't come out with some ridiculous claim, like if it happened now I would do it differently. One does what one knows. And that's what I knew, and I'm very proud of what I did. Very proud. . . . And I continue to believe that you, me, all of us are the last monkeys, but the first man has yet to appear. The man who is profoundly humane has not yet appeared. And this world will end with us if we are not capable of producing certain changes. . . .
>
> Many times I have felt guilt for being alive. Because I am a statistical error. But I don't know why, it's chance, so I have this responsibility to history and to my history to continue thinking with the same courage. I can't accede to this hug of death, because it is the death hug of power. I can't renounce everything I've done, I've believed, not because I'm a fanatic, I'm not a fanatic because I do try to understand others, to understand why they think and act the way they do. We're at the very beginning of a long process to create human beings. . . . And we have accomplished little things that are so important, the creation of the word, for example, communication. And we feel tenderness, love.

LOYALISTS COMPARED

For the political party loyalists of this study, the political party as a collective enterprise looms as the dominant referent of their individual political identities. From their first participation in politics to the present, party loyalists have dedicated their lives to organizing and activity within the confines of their parties. Unlike political entrepreneurs, who draw from several organizational networks for their political identities, party loyalists rely on one.

Political party loyalists of this study are also marked more strongly than other types by their embeddedness in the 1960s generation. While all those of this study can be defined as members of that generation, the party loyalists have been more attached to the political, social, and cultural move-

ments and expressions that characterized the period. This is reflected in the discourse and ideological sentiments of party loyalists, from their voiced nostalgia about the period to their use of 1960s events as constant referents for their current activism. Others in this study, such as the thinkers and the political entrepreneurs, spend far less time discussing the 1960s, or they "repackage" the 1960s in their current discourse on modernization and neoliberalism. Party loyalists' narratives often seem to be frozen in the discourse of the 1960s or at least clearly adapted from the cultural and political expressions of that period.

Of the party loyalists examined in this study, Jorge Insunza best illustrates the type. He holds fast to the Leninist roots and the past glory of the Chilean Communist Party. He remains dedicated to retrieving the importance of his party in Chilean politics. Rather than sacrifice the PCCH for a political organization more reflective of current political tendencies—a characteristic behavior of the political entrepreneurs of this study—Insunza remains with the PCCH. He continues to place tremendous value on effective organizing of his party's bases, of those militants who represent support and mobilization networks for party promotions and campaigns. As a party loyalist, Insunza derives political meaning from his ability to recruit members, to attract militants to the party. Such a role overall was particularly valued within political parties in the 1960s, in a period of mass mobilizations and movements.

Throughout the 1990s transition period, as the means for securing political support changed, where public opinion polling, focus groups, and media campaigns dominate political party attention, political parties placed far less value on militant recruitment. In the age of the sound bite and the demobilization of Chilean society, party loyalist Insunza became "old-fashioned." He is embedded in 1960s-generation imagery and in nostalgic representations of their political parties. Given the dynamics of the Chilean transition and the state of international communism, this holding on to such past representations politically marginalized the former congressman.

In contrast to Insunza, loyalist Isabel Allende is integrally linked to a left party that has sought to reinvent itself. Allende has cautiously supported this reinvention, though her discourse and identity continue to represent the Socialist Party's old, albeit moderate, guard.

For Adriana Muñoz, political action is today a more deliberative, conflictive process than in her past, as she is torn by the dual identity of loyalist and feminist. Yet Muñoz has not privileged her feminism over her loy-

alty to the party, a behavior that would be characteristic of the thinkers of this study.

Patricio Rivas's attachment to past revolutionary ideals and the comrades who died for them continues to overshadow his current political decision making. He searches, unsuccessfully, for what he perceives to be a sense of social solidarity and meaning infused in the MIR in a new political collectivity.

Chapter 4 will examine the second cognitive orientation of this study, the personal loyalist. Like political party loyalists, personal loyalists are party organizers and recruiters. Yet unlike party loyalists, personal loyalists privilege particular individuals whom they hold as heroic, and their identification with those heroes represents the primary referent in their lives.