CHAPTER 1

INTERPRETING POLITICAL IDENTITY

■ The generation of activists who entered politics in the 1960s inspired by a revolutionary socialist project have seen their aspirations challenged at the very core by the events and transformations of the past thirty years. The once massive movements demanding radical social change have all but disappeared or have given way to far less visible, ideologically ill-defined, and isolated struggles. National regimes that claimed socialism to be their governing principle have, for the most part, collapsed. For the past several years, neoliberal conservative projects have universally dominated economic policy making and discourse. For those who for three decades have defined themselves as part of a collective ideological left, the meaning of that identity has become unclear. This absence of viable collective left projects, accompanied by what might be termed a shrinking of the political imagination, comes at a time, paradoxically, when members of the sixties revolutionary generation have assumed the reins of political society in countries across the globe.

In this context of uncertainty over what it means to be part of a collective left, this study analyzes the individual search for political ideology and meaning among former revolutionaries of the sixties generation. To do so, it focuses on the concept of individual political identity, treated here as the result of specific processes that individuals undergo to define their political ideas and roles. These processes involve a dynamic interplay among individuals' embeddedness in particular political and social structures and institutions, their cognitive beliefs and approaches to politics, and the major political experiences of their lives, which together influence their political ideologies and roles. Ideology, as it is used here, is understood as an individual's articulated set of visions for society, a kind of program that encompasses individual understandings of democracy, leadership, participation, social justice, and the roles of parties and party leaders and of what is

possible in their societies. Roles are understood as the broad and varied ways in which individuals participate in politics.

The primary contribution of this study is to sharpen the concept of political identity by proposing a set of cognitive orientations that, I argue, can be used to describe the core political identities of individual political leaders. The orientation typology focuses on the values that individuals assign to ideas, political organization, and their relationships to fellow political leaders and activists. This book centers on the formation of four types of core orientation: political party loyalist, personal loyalist, political thinker, and political entrepreneur. I argue that these cognitive orientations remain constant over the lifetimes of individuals and condition the ways individuals think and act politically at given political moments. In current debates regarding the nature of political identity, the typology of this study clarifies what remains fixed about individual political identity and what transforms according to the political moment. Through an intense examination of the lives of several Chilean left leaders, I will explore, first, how cognitive orientations are formed, and, second, why individuals act politically in the ways that they do.

A well-established literature on political leadership also advances sets of ideal-types or categories of leadership.[1] The ideal-types of political leaders developed in this literature are used to hypothesize about leadership performance and survival. Yet the literature does not address the question of the relationship between leadership types and identity formation, including transformations in ideologies as well as roles.[2] This book will systematically address such relationships.

The conceptualization of individual political identity and the four cognitive orientation types proposed here grew from my intensive interviews and study of a generation of leaders of the Chilean left political class, a generation that played a central role in the rise and fall of the 1970–1973 leftist Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende, as well as the end of the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). The people on whom this study focuses were in the national left leadership at the time of the brutal 1973 military coup d'état, some as leaders and organizers of party youth branches, but most as national political party and government figures. Many were imprisoned and tortured. All spent from five to fifteen years in exile. All returned to Chile to assume active political roles in the struggle against the dictatorship, which in 1990 ceded power to the democratically elected Concertación coalition. Now at the close of its second term, the Concertación government represents an unprecedented alliance forged between centrists and

many of the left leaders covered in this study, including several who, two decades ago, were bitter political and ideological enemies.

Today, the majority of the men and women discussed here hold central positions in the executive or legislative branches of the Chilean government, as well as in their political parties. All claim to be heirs of a left tradition, yet the contemporary expressions of that tradition vary enormously. While almost all are members of recognized left political parties, the meanings they attach to that membership vary in dramatic ways. Beneath the surface-level political trajectories of these people are also quite divergent class and cultural contexts, memories and life experiences, and senses of self and the self's relation to others.

As a result of wrenching historical and political change, these former revolutionaries have undergone profound ideological and role transformations. Nevertheless, their fundamental approaches to ideology and political organization during their early political lives continue to serve as essential referents that define their political identities today. For example, those who were inspired by the notion of a vanguard party and devoted all their energies in the 1960s to organizing and recruiting for their parties continue to play those roles, albeit in a dramatically changed political moment. In contrast, others who were the idea men for the new society in the 1960s continue to focus on new political visions and are less concerned with party organization and mobilization. The 1960s' ideas of radical social change continue both to inspire and to haunt that generation's proponents, mediated through the lenses of their core political identities. I suggest here that early and intense political socialization in an ideologically charged moment is extraordinarily important for ongoing political identity.

One cannot understand the last three decades of Chilean political history without understanding the influence of ideas and movements for revolutionary change on its leading political actors. While my typology focuses on individuals, it also underscores the importance of the political organizations and projects that infuse meaning into individual political actions across the political spectrum. This suggests that the typology could be used to examine the ideological and role transformations of leaders and activists in a range of cases, from the changes and continuities within the leadership of South Africa's antiapartheid movement to the influence and logic of the political right in the United States. Erik Erikson has argued that "youth is one stage of life naturally (and sometimes even morbidly) open to insight, because insight emerges from passionate experience as much as from the structure of things."[3] My study of the sixties generation of Chilean left leaders leads me

to contend that the profound immersion in and commitment to a revolutionary program of this group as young people, however ill-defined at the time, serves as a fundamental referent even in today's climate, in which the notion of totalizing projects meets with skepticism and disregard.

In order to describe better the process by which political identity is formed, this chapter examines specific rational-choice and identitarian approaches to political thinking and action currently used by political philosophers and social movements theorists who examine individual political behavior on behalf of the so-called common good. The term *the common good* is understood here to mean the good of others or the welfare of society as a whole. In choosing to examine such debates, I am assuming that individuals who are members of the left have framed their thinking and behavior largely in terms of action on behalf of the common good. Such altruistic thinking and behavior can hypothetically occur either out of pure self-interest or not.[4]

Drawing from but moving beyond rational-choice and identitarian literature, I propose an alternative model that focuses on individual political identity formation and advances a typology of core cognitive orientations. I argue that class, education, and political party are the crucial variables of early political identity formation, though the dramatic and traumatic experiences of the revolutionary 1960s generation did have a lasting effect on the identities of its activist members. To illustrate the political identity formation process and the typology, I use observations and narratives from interviews with Chilean political leaders from research and interviews that I conducted between 1990 and 1998. I conclude that individual cognitive political orientations form early in life and condition the kinds of political activities and directions that individuals pursue. The typology is a heuristic tool for understanding why people behave politically in the ways that they do.

RATIONAL-CHOICE APPROACHES TO INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND THE COMMON GOOD

As Kristen Renwick Monroe has succinctly stated, the theory of rational action "can best be understood by assuming individuals pursue their self-interest, subject to information and opportunity costs."[5] The theory assumes that individuals have fairly clear and ordered sets of values, priorities, and preferences and that they will act to maximize those preferences.

While the concepts of "rationality" and "self-interest" are distinct from one another, there is a certain tendency for both rational-actor theorists and

their critics to conflate the two. As Norman Frohlich has stated, "economic models using the assumptions of rationality and self-interest have been so successful that economists have become accustomed to using the two assumptions as if they were a single assumption."[6] Economists in this vein include Anthony Downs and Mancur Olson, who have turned to studies of politics and have served as founding fathers for subsequent rational-choice theorists across the political science field.[7]

The notions of rationality and self-interest have struck a deep chord with those working in the area of social movements. Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* inspired impressive new work in the theoretical literature on the relationship between the individual and collective action. His removal of value concerns from a model of individual behavior did a great deal to jettison theories based on "mob" behavior—behavior based on "feelings of alienation."[8] Collective action theorists such as Anthony Oberschall, Charles Tilly, and John McCarthy and Mayer Zald now focus on resource mobilization and individual calculations of perceived benefits from choices to participate in collective action. Social movements and social movement organizations themselves have come to be treated as rational actors.

In the area of political philosophy, rational-actor theorists have attempted to address behavior on behalf of the common good that seems far from self-interested. They argue that while such individual political behavior often appears to be selfless, it is, in fact, self-interested. Rational-actor conceptualizations of altruistic behavior include: (1) goods altruism, that is, the expectation of some kind of reward for having chosen to act on behalf of others; (2) participation altruism, the notion that individuals help others in order to feel good about themselves; (3) psychic goods altruism, a kind of taste for being altruistic; and (4) altruist clusters, the idea that altruists in close proximity motivate one another.[9]

THE IDENTITARIAN CRITIQUE

Powerful critiques have emerged to challenge rational-choice approaches to political behavior, both in the field of collective action scholarship and in political philosophy. Underlying the critiques in the collective action literature is the basic concern that in the dramatic shift from emotive, value-based arguments about collective action to economistic, self-interest arguments, social movement theorists "threw the baby out with the bath water by excluding the analysis of values, norms, ideologies, projects, culture, and identity in other than instrumental terms."[10]

Identity-oriented theorists of collective action, such as Jean Cohen (who coined the term *identity-oriented*), Alain Touraine, Aldon Morris, and others fault rational-actor approaches for their failure to explain the very basis or logic for group formation and group solidarity.[11] They charge that models of collective action grounded in rational choice skirt the so-called free rider paradox—that is, they avoid coming to terms with why an individual would join a group when there are no obvious incentives to do so. Those known as social constructionists, such as Bert Klandermans, assert that because social crises "do not *inevitably* generate a social movement," the way that individuals perceive reality—the "mediating process through which people attribute meaning to events and interpret situations"—is a crucial dimension of collective action missed by resource mobilization theory.[12] Some collective action theorists, such as Michael Schwartz and Shuva Paul, argue that individual identity can be "supplanted by group logic in a context of personal relationships in which individual ties among members activate obligations of each to the group."[13]

Paralleling such a focus on the dynamic process of individual identification with a collective is philosopher Jürgen Habermas's concern for that "generalized identification which is made between an individual and the most diffuse culture of which s/he is a member."[14] Habermas termed this generalized identification an "identity-securing interpretive system."[15] He contends that "humans and society seek actively to 'find'—both in terms of locating and creating—their 'proper' and 'true' identity."[16] When the identity-securing system (including institutional and normative structures) between humans and their social structures proves incompatible, a "legitimation crisis" occurs, forcing either change or a demand for change in the social structure.[17]

In efforts to unmask those "identity-securing interpretive systems" as they exist in the political sphere, a number of political scientists have advanced political identity frameworks. These frameworks go considerably beyond U.S. political science's traditional understanding of political identity primarily as individual voter or party identity. The theoretical and methodological approaches employed draw from rational-actor, game theory approaches to institutionalist studies and survey research as well as culturally oriented ethnographic research.

In *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba*, David Laitin delves heavily into debates between social systems–oriented and rational choice-oriented studies to advance what he terms a "Janus-faced" explanation of Yoruban political identity.[18] Borrowing from Antonio

Gramsci, Laitin develops a hegemonic explanatory framework, arguing that the British imposed a stratification system on the basis of identification with particular ancestral cities. The British privileging of ethnicity over religion, Laitin argues, provides the key to the nonpoliticization of religion for the Yoruba.[19]

Laitin uses the comparative method to make his case, and he gathers his evidence through historical and ethnographic research together with small formal surveys among the Christian and Muslim communities of Ile-Ife, located in rural southwestern Nigeria.[20] Theoretically, Laitin's work is quite engaging, as he encourages a rather hybrid approach to understanding the complex relationships among ethnic, religious, and political identities. Yet he offers no real hypothesis. Like many studies of identity, Laitin's is a study of process, an ambitious attempt to understand the formation of contemporary political culture, borrowing from both rational-choice and identitarian explanations of individual and group behavior. This hybrid approach has influenced my conceptual design, which also borrows from both rational-choice and identitarian frameworks to explain a range of individual and collective political behaviors.

In a distinctly institutionalist vein, political scientists Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan approach political identity by examining the potential for recrafting citizens' self-defined national identities through electoral institutions.[21] They argue that "the sequence of elections, per se, can help construct or dissolve identities."[22] In their comparison, the authors suggest that there is a strong correlation between the holding of unionwide elections at the outset of regime transition and the surfacing of "complementary multiple identities" conducive to democratization. Using the outcomes from successive unionwide and regional elections and survey data on national identity, Linz and Stepan contrast the successful Spanish case with the bitter fragmentation of what were Yugoslavia and the USSR.

The utility of Linz and Stepan's approach is their demonstration of the power of macro institutions in forming collective political identity. While they do not deny that feelings about territorial identity are important, they stress that such feelings are largely social and political constructions and that there is more flexibility in national identity than conventional wisdom has recognized.[23]

In my study of the individual political identities of Chilean leaders I, too, place great weight on the power of institutions, particularly educational institutions and political parties. In contrast to Linz and Stepan's argument that territorially or ethnically based national identity is not so fixed or primor-

dial as has often been assumed, I have found that individuals' approaches to politics are often not so fluid or flexible as is conventionally asserted.

This conclusion is, in part, influenced by William Bloom's *Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations*, an explicitly psychological conceptualization of political identity. Bloom's work is an effort to provide international relations theory with a framework that "explains how to argue coherently from the individual to aggregate group or mass behaviour, which explains political integration and mobilisation."[24] Drawing extensively from psychologists Sigmund Freud, George Mead, and Erik Erikson, as well as from social systems theorists Talcott Parsons and Jürgen Habermas, Bloom develops a model based on individuals' needs to identify with and internalize the actions and attitudes of prominent figures in their environments.[25] On this basis Bloom attempts to explain what he terms a "national identity dynamic," in which citizens of nations "act together to protect and to enhance their shared identity."[26] As evidence of this process, he analyzes how political elites evoked national identity sentiment in medieval England and France.

Bloom's is an ambitious effort to address the perennial failure within international relations theory to account for intrastate identity formation. Yet in attempting to shrink the unit of analysis to the individual in order then to return to the state aggregate level, Bloom succumbs to a similar shortcoming. He recognizes no intrastate identity conflict, only identity with the nation. In providing a framework for individual political identity, Bloom loses the richness of difference, of a dialectical interplay between individuals and their identifications with others. My approach to individual identity is based on a more complex range of political positions, sentiments, and behavior revealed in identities that may lend themselves to distinct understandings of the meaning of loyalty to the nation-state.

Underlying the past decade's scholarly turn to identity is a fundamental disenchantment with purely materialist explanations for individual and collective action. In a sense, identity studies "bring culture back in" as a crucial dimension of the interpretive framework, a dimension virtually discarded in the backlash to modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s.

This does not mean, however, that materialist interests are no longer an important part of explanatory frameworks based on identity. My own work signals class background, for example, as a crucial variable of political identity formation. Moreover, many theorists have advanced arguments regarding individual political behavior that implicitly or explicitly draw from both rational-action and identitarian approaches. In their critique of ra-

tional-choice theory, therefore, identitarians by no means discard the notion that individuals think and behave in commonsensical, rational ways. Rather, questions such as values, ideology, and culture are explicitly incorporated in identitarian approaches.

Critics of the attempts of rational-choice theory to explain altruistic behavior do challenge such efforts explicitly on normative grounds. Such critics charge first, that rational-choice attempts to explain all forms of individual political behavior lead to no more than tautologies; second, that the notion of "choice" itself is problematic in many cases of individual behavior; and third—and most fundamentally—that models that exclude individual sentiments of love, duty, and concern for those other than self not only are inaccurate reflections of society and community but also lead to highly problematic prescriptions for the polity and society.

In their study of the usefulness of rational-choice explanations of altruistic behavior for explaining the cases of rescuers of Jews under Nazism, for example, political theorists Kristen Renwick Monroe, Michael Barton, and Ute Klingemann have found the notions of "participation altruism" or "psychic goods" to be "frustratingly tautological," largely because of their difficulty to operationalize. They write that "the idea of psychic goods is so all-encompassing that it can mean anything and thus cannot be tested reliably."[27] In order to understand political action in the face of traumatic events, they advance the notion of cognitive frameworks, understood as "that particular part of an individual's beliefs about how the world works that is used to organize and make sense of reality."[28] They argue that one's sense of self and one's self in relation to others "acts to delineate and define the boundaries of possible behavior." Through interpretation and discourse analysis of the narratives of intensive interviews conducted with both rescuers and nonrescuers of Jews in Nazi Germany, Monroe et al. determined that the rescuers demonstrated a "perception of self as part of a common humanity" so pronounced that it consistently produced behavior on behalf of others and limited the range of perceived options for action when, objectively, the range for action was far greater. For example, rescuers did not see *not* aiding Jews in determined situations as an option, despite the fact that it was an option and that to participate in such rescues could (and often did) result in extremely negative consequences for the rescuers and their families.

In my own study of Chilean left leaders, I, too, have found a clear distinction between those whose sense of self appears virtually inseparable from particular collectivities and those who are individualist in their cognitive orientation. Those who are individualist emphasize in their discourse and be-

havior their own stature and that of other individuals in society. In contrast, others clearly identify themselves with particular collectivities, such as the working class, and that identification is evident in the way they express themselves. Eduardo Reyes, for example, whose father was an illiterate farmworker in the province of Bio Bio, favored first person plural throughout the entire interview. It was "we working people," or "we students," or "we socialists," rather than "I." As described in chapter 4, Reyes, today a member of the Socialist Party Central Committee, risked his life during the early years of the dictatorship in clandestine efforts to organize the party; he was captured, imprisoned, tortured, and exiled. Reyes's identification with the actions and beliefs of former president Salvador Allende on behalf of the Chilean working class continues to define his own political ideas and roles.

Jane Mansbridge deems theory based solely on self-interest to be of little use: "The claim that self-interest alone motivates political behavior must either be vacuous, if self-interest can encompass any motive, or false, if self-interest means behavior that consciously intends only self as the beneficiary."[29] My own study of the Chilean left leadership clearly questions the rational-choice premise, which claims self-interest as the sole explanation for political action. As I describe in subsequent chapters, there is a good deal of evidence to demonstrate that individuals like Reyes act on behalf of a collective or an ideal even when those actions are pursued at personal cost—taking an "unpopular but principled" stance as a candidate in an election campaign and organizing politically under tremendously repressive conditions are two common examples.

On the question of the *empirical* accuracy of individual action's being guided by "choice," critics such as David Johnston argue that a great deal of individual behavior is not a product of choice, and that where choice is, in fact, involved, the process of choice is far less ordered and clear than rational-choice models allow.[30] Johnston suggests, in part, that individuals live multiple roles, roles that often possess distinct, and conflicting, "value structures" and that therefore require constant internal deliberation and result in constant ambivalence regarding choice of action. Individual political behavior, then, is the result of an unending and extremely dynamic process of defining individual identity. Johnston and others cite the classic case of a person who is both a parent and a professional. The demands of a career are often diametrically opposed to the needs of children.

My study supports the concepts of competing roles, distinct value structures, and the constant need for deliberation within individuals' political identities. A common "two personae" dilemma occurs for the individual

who is both an intellectual and a professional politician. Throughout his political career, for example, Chile's ambassador to Mexico Luis Maira has consistently deliberated between his hierarchy of values as a visionary thinker and the needs and priorities of political party leadership. This deliberation often surfaces publicly, and Maira's proposals and decisions are perceived as either "intellectually appealing" but "bad political judgment" or "a sell-out to political interests over political principles."

A second such dilemma occurs for an individual who is both a professional politician and a feminist. As described in chapter 6, former Socialist Party Central Committee member Clarisa Hardy expresses enormous frustration with her party and her society's "backwardness" regarding women's rights. She admits to questioning herself daily regarding her continued presence and activism within her party because of these issues, and since 1990 she has announced her exit from the party several times. In short, there is no neat hierarchy of values that individuals internalize and express; rather, individuals constantly wrestle with multiple value hierarchies, ideas, and roles. Nevertheless, it is possible to detect individual patterns of political approach and behavior that reflect core cognitive orientations over considerable spans of time, from early involvement in national politics to political behavior in far later years. Despite her frustrations with the Socialist Party's failure to respond adequately to women's issues, for example, Hardy remains in the party because it is to her mind the best organizational vehicle for her professional and intellectual priorities and values.

A normative set of questions underlies all these debates among rational-choice theorists, identitarians, social constructionists, and other students of political thinking and behavior. The questions center, fundamentally, on what we hold to be the essence of human nature and, therefore, to be "the possible" for an ideal politics and society. Are individuals so motivated by self-interest concerns that political theorists can reduce political behavior models to this premise? Or is individual political action so inspired by concern for the collective that models of political behavior must incorporate such dimensions at the risk of losing clarity and explanatory power? Or is neither option sufficiently descriptive of reality?

My study suggests that analyses of political thinking and action require a multilevel approach that incorporates cognitive, structural, institutional, and experiential dimensions. Such an approach reveals motivations that are self-interested and collectively oriented, that are always *cognizant* both of fellow leaders and activists and of a larger community, and that are ideologically as well as organizationally driven. I argue that structures and institutions in-

fluence the early development of individuals' cognitive beliefs and actions, while individuals' memories of their first public political experiences sear their consciences and are lasting influences on their political identities.

For leaders of the 1960s Chilean revolutionary generation, moreover, I argue that the core political identities formed in the late 1960s have specific consequences for Chile's political climate today. I will show how the traumatic events of the late 1960s and the rise and fall of the Allende administration forever marked the political identities of those examined in this study, freezing the ideologies and roles of some, transforming the ideologies and roles of others, all mediated by cognitive orientations formed early in their political lives. Cognitive orientations, understood as the values that individuals assign to ideas, organizations, and their relationships to fellow leaders and activists, remain complicated yet unchanged. In today's Chile, for example, collective identities based on the working class, such as trade unions and working-class political parties, are no longer powerful features of Chilean political culture. Those whose cognitive orientations are intimately associated with such collective identities are on the margins of politics and policy making. In contrast, those whose cognitive frameworks have lent themselves to greater organizational and ideational adaptability, whose networks are based on ties with the universities, who have shed past political loyalties (and animosities) in the interests of producing winning political coalitions, have emerged as the leaders of today's Chile.

THE FORMATION OF INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL IDENTITY

It was psychologist Erik Erikson who held that the key to individuals' psychological development or breakdown rests in their continuing efforts through their lives to define themselves in relation to the collective.[31] For Erikson, who popularized the term *identity crisis*, the formation of an "ego identity" is a dynamic, ever-evolving process relating the self's inner drives to the external world, the other. "Indeed," Erikson wrote, "in the social jungle of human existence, there is no feeling of being alive without a sense of ego identity."[32] How that identity is formed depends on what Erikson sees as three interwoven aspects of the self: "the personal coherence of the individual and role integration in his group; his guiding images and the ideologies of his time; his life history—and the historical moment."[33] Individuals find self-fulfillment and meaning in their ability to identify with others, and individuals will hold fast to those identifications when their well-being is threatened.

The key to revealing the process of identity formation is uncovering those "external worlds," worlds that represent individuals' fundamental referents in the formation of their political identities. Such worlds shape both individuals' opportunity structures and their cognitive beliefs about politics and their political relationships. For the Chilean leaders of this study, the crucial worlds are class, education, and political party. In addition, the Chileans here are members of the sixties generation: their first experiences in the public arena took place in a period of powerful revolutionary ideologies, parties, and movements, infused with totalizing visions of a collective struggle for social transformation. Membership in the sixties generation forever distinguishes these leaders from those of other generations that preceded and follow them. They are passionate about politics, and they have been major players in politics of the most varied sort, from revolutionary political movements under democratic regimes, to their brutal defeat under dictatorship, to a far more guarded, cautious activism in the return to democratic rule.

Social network theorists have signaled the importance of framing individual action within varied types of social "embeddedness."[34] According to network theorists, this embeddedness in social networks, such as class, educational, and career networks, largely determines collective identities, which, in turn, mediate individual identity and action. Embeddedness within class, education, party, and generation is the striking definitional characteristic of the Chilean politicians interviewed for this study.

THE INFLUENCE OF CLASS ON POLITICAL IDENTITY

In what is now a classic critique of a classic examination of political culture and political socialization, theorist Carole Pateman challenges Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba to analyze a fundamental finding that they merely report—namely, that there is a link between class and political views.[35] Pateman reminds us that the relationships among socioeconomic status, political thinking, and political behavior are "one of the best-attested findings in political science."[36]

Class stratification has been a marked feature of Chilean society. According to Markos J. Mamalakis's seminal study of the Chilean economy, the Chilean income distribution pattern by the 1960s was best illustrated by the fact that "nine percent of the population controlled forty-three percent of the national income."[37] Moreover, within the Chilean working class, there were marked differences in income and opportunity between blue-collar and white-collar workers. White-collar workers, who composed roughly 10

percent of the Chilean labor force, earned 17.8 percent of the national income, while manual workers, who composed 56.9 percent of the labor force, earned only 23.8 percent of the national income.[38] As will be illustrated in subsequent chapters, inter- and intraclass disparities undergirded distinct social and political cultures, collective identities, and opportunity structures for their individual members.

Until the mid- to late 1960s, for example, political leaders from the Chilean working classes were concentrated in the Chilean Communist Party and to a lesser, but important, degree in the Chilean Socialist Party, as well as in their unions. Class embeddedness fundamentally shapes cognitive frameworks, structurally granting and limiting individual access to a range of networks and opportunities.

Related to, though distinct from, the influence of class identification is identification within "political families." This study reveals that the family has had a central significance for many. Indeed, for one of the interviewees family is the defining feature of her role in Chilean politics today—Congresswoman Isabel Allende, the daughter of Salvador Allende.[39] Chilean ambassador to Austria Osvaldo Puccio, whose father was Salvador Allende's chief aide, does not remember a family discussion that was not political:

> In terms of my family there was a great deal of stability with a good deal of economic instability. I would say that our family biography went from Allende campaign to Allende campaign and that in the campaign year my father dedicated himself exclusively to politics based on whatever resources he had, which inevitably ran out. . . . We were a family quite open to social life, all kinds of people passed through our home. I remember well, we are three brothers and sisters, when we celebrated a night when only the five of us ate together and we realized it was the first time in more than a year that the five of us ate at home alone. . . . This was basically my family life, with a *high* level of politicization, a family that *lived* for politics.

Political families do carry important weight in terms of identity formation and structures of opportunities afforded members of those families.

EDUCATION AS AN INDICATOR OF IDENTITY

Also related to, but distinct from, class embeddedness is the importance of educational opportunities and networks. Until the 1973 coup, which

marked an end to many traditional forms of entry into national politics, high schools and universities represented crucial loci of political as well as educational training.[40] The most well-known centers included the National Institute (the leading public high school of the 1960s), the Catholic University, and the University of Chile (particularly their law schools). High school and university leadership in the nation's top public and private educational institutions launched several prominent national political careers.

It was primarily in school where the individuals of this study were first exposed to serious ideological debate, and it was the network of school companions that most influenced their decisions to join a particular political party. Individual—and, at times, collective—decisions to enter the Radical, Christian Democratic, Communist, or Socialist Party, or later the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), the United Popular Action Movement (MAPU), or the Christian Left (IC) were made on the basis of the parties' direct influence and strength among high school and university friendship circles. The latter New Left parties were, in large part, products of a 1960s radicalized elite university climate.

Moreover, the interparty alliances and battles of the Federation of Students of the University of Chile (FECH) mirrored those at the national party level. As former Communist Raúl Oliva describes, elections to determine the FECH leadership also served as bellwethers for upcoming national elections:

> In 1969 we won the FECH elections. We achieved the unity of the PSCH with the MAPU as well. I was the First Political Commissioner of the Federation. . . . The victory of the FECH in '69 was seen as the antecedent of what was going to happen in '70. It was such that when Allende won, they called us at the UP student headquarters announcing that Allende wanted to give his first speech from the FECH balcony. It was a symbol. He had lived his young political life in the FECH.

University training through degree completion in the 1960s and early 1970s separates the distinct cognitive types of this study. Along with the elitism that upper-class status allows, the university afforded its students access to a range of professional, political, and intellectual networks that were unavailable to the less privileged and less educated.

THE POWER OF THE PARTY IN POLITICAL IDENTITY FORMATION

There is no greater organizational referent for Chilean political activists than their political parties. The party constitutes the central institutional network in which individual political actors are embedded. In the words of several participants in this study, the party is like "a second family," "a stepfamily," "*the* family." The texts of interviews for this study recount distinct political party cultures, as well as dynamic individual-party relationships.

According to Ernesto Galaz, the son of a military commander, joining the New Left (MAPU) at sixteen was one of the most important decisions of his life:

> [MAPU] was tremendously religious, mystical, with a heavy dose of messianism. Politics were understood as the sublimation of man, of soul and society, it was everything. As a militant, politics weren't merely a segment of your life, no, it affected your entire life, your family relations and everything else. . . .
>
> [Together with being from a military family,] entering the MAPU was the most important formative influence on my life.

While Chilean political parties are still highly institutionalized, intra-party dynamics have changed in important ways. From the years of repression, when entire directorates were physically eliminated, to the contemporary period, Chilean New Left party networks have created much more fluid and somewhat uncertain forms of individual embeddedness. This is best symbolized by the close and often uneasy relationship between the historic Chilean Socialist Party (PSCH) and the instrumentalist party it created during the final year of the dictatorship, the Party for Democracy (PPD). For Vice President of the House of Representatives Adriana Muñoz, for example, the PPD served as a successful alternative for leadership in a 1997 run for the Congress after her defeat as an incumbent PSCH congresswoman. The intensities of the relationships between individual party members and their parties have changed considerably, as have their understandings of the role of the party in society. In addition, several participants in this study have changed parties or were in the process of deciding upon a new party. For many, political ideologies and political parties, inextricably linked in the minds of individuals in their early activism, have gradually become unlinked and reformulated. Nevertheless, the notion of political party embeddedness remains central to individual political identi-

ty because of the historic dominance of parties and the party system as the country's supreme vehicle for political expression.

THE EXPLOSIVE SIXTIES GENERATION

As many studies of the sixties generation have emphasized, and as my study has found, the influence of the ideologically charged sixties era on the identities of young people coming of political age cannot be overemphasized.[41] The "revolutionary sixties generation" represents the period of the Cuban Revolution as a catalyst for revolutionary movements throughout Latin America, of Vatican Council II and the rise of liberation theology, of international attention and protest against imperialism, triggered in large part by the Vietnam War, and of mass student protest and countercultural movements in Europe and the United States. For the subjects of this study, memories of coming of political age in this generation prove to be constant referents, gauges for measuring their perceptions of the current political moment.

Theoretical debates within generational analyses center on whether to view a generation as a biologically conceived group of individuals whose commonality is primarily age-determined, or as a sociopolitically conceived group that shares a common location in the historical process. American generationalists have tended toward the former, positivistic orientation, while the latter tendency, a view with German Romantic-historicist origins, has predominated among European and Latin American generationalists.[42] Nevertheless, contemporary generationalists such as Robert Laufer, Verna Bengston, Michael Delli Carpini, and others have attempted to couple the two approaches, examining the combination of social forces and life-cycle stages to explain the emergence of a more or less clearly defined generation.

While formulations of generational concepts continue to be murky, this study contends that the generational question is well worth pursuing in studies of identity and ideology, particularly in such cases as Chile, where major social or political events so characterize a given period or era. This study defines a generation as starting from a dramatic political period rather than as a clearly demarcated age group. The sixties generation is thus meant to capture individuals whose early political activism takes place during the ideologically charged period of the 1960s and early 1970s, in Chile, under the political administrations of Eduardo Frei and Salvador Allende.

There is a fifteen-year span in age between the youngest and the oldest individual interviewed for this study. Nevertheless, 1960s generational ref-

erents are vivid in the texts of all those interviewed—from those who were student leaders to those who were cabinet ministers during that period. The dominant international referent is the Cuban Revolution, symbolizing both ideological and strategic inspiration and challenge. Expressing the sentiments of several of the young revolutionary activists of the time, one interviewee stated, "We all wanted to be Che Guevara." Other international referents include Vietnam and the Prague Spring. National referents are chiefly the struggles over university reform and, of course, the 1963 and 1969 campaigns and the 1970 victory of Salvador Allende.

In his reflections on political society of the preauthoritarian period, Chilean senator José Antonio Viera-Gallo places the 1960s generation, of which he was a part, within the social-historical context of the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War, and, in a less direct way, the Algerian independence movement. For Viera-Gallo, these political struggles inspired a "liberation ideal" with enormous and long-lasting ideological repercussions for his generation. This ideal, he claimed, consisted of three elements: "domination of natural forces by man's technology; conquest over individualism; and the struggle against social injustice."[43] Viera-Gallo writes of the student movement as the generational expression of civil society's insistence on radical social change:

> To the question, was it possible to construct a non-repressive civilization, the response was affirmative. It would be enough if the people became conscious of the possibilities of freedom that technical progress had engendered in society, and acted as a result to change profoundly the oppressive structures. Revolution was an insignia shared by all. Imagination could take us to power.[44]

In addition, it was this revolutionary sixties generation that experienced a set of particularly traumatic political events. Social psychologists, sociologists, and a handful of political scientists have studied the influences of traumatic life experiences on political socialization. These include studies of Holocaust victims, Vietnam veterans, and others who were indelibly stamped by a particular traumatic life experience and whose subsequent political beliefs and behavior reflected this.[45] Moreover, a group of Latin American social psychologists, in a search for appropriate therapeutic methods, has explored the impact of traumatic experiences like the Salvadoran civil war and the Chilean military coup on political activists.[46]

For some members of my study, memories of the experience of political victory, namely, the 1970 victory of the Popular Unity (UP) government, represented as crucial a transformative experience as that of subsequent defeat. According to UP education minister and current ambassador to Colombia Aníbal Palma, being in power was the most profound and difficult experience in his life:

> Before the UP government, I had never held a government position. In September of 1972 Allende appointed me undersecretary of foreign affairs, and shortly thereafter minister of education in an extremely conflictive period. . . . It was extremely hard, because in addition I was a young minister, I was thirty-five years old, and I had been both a high school and a university student leader, so when I had to confront student conflicts, and I saw them marching in the streets, screaming slogans against the government exactly as I had done before, I felt as if I were living a dual personality. I remember several times receiving dispatches to go and see student demonstrations which attacked the ministry, and I had done exactly the same thing. . . . The roles had simply changed. And for the first time in Chilean history, just as there were students marching against the government, there were also students marching in support of the minister, in favor of the government. I had never imagined students breaking strikes in support of the government, we were living the world in reverse! . . . I tell you all this frankly, I believe that I have never lived more bitter moments in my entire life than in the moment that the opposition students took to the streets, and there were fights, making it necessary for the police to intervene. I always lived with the fear that at some point a student would be killed or terribly injured, and I felt responsible for whatever might happen, and each protest gave me an enormous sense of tension, and it felt so out of my hands.

I would argue that Palma's sense of role reversal in power, his sense that he had lost control of the moment, marked him in profound ways, causing him to identify all the more closely with Salvador Allende as the heroic figure of Palma's life. Palma is guarded in his hopes for change in Chile. Within his party discourse on social equality and change, Palma places strong emphasis on patience and gradualism, on compromise over confrontation. Palma is a personal loyalist who has tightly linked his identity

with Allende, whom Palma holds as a defender of Chile's democratic institutions in the struggle for the peaceful road to socialism.

Thus, class, education, political party, and generational membership represent chief variables in political identity formation, reflecting both the importance of location within the social structure and the vital role of political institutions and experiences that shape identity. They relate what C. Wright Mills termed "individual milieus" to the larger "public issues" and realities, allowing us to explore the sociological imagination through the biographies and types of cognitive orientations that emerge in this interplay.

POLITICAL PARTY LOYALISTS

For those whose core political identities are rooted in their orientations as political party loyalists, activism within the political party is the all-encompassing dimension of their lives. Party loyalists believe that the key to politics and to any possibility of social transformation lies with the strength of their political parties. They possess a strong sense of organization and hierarchy, and they value internal party discipline and order. Their political discourse is collectivist in its orientation, emphasizing solidarity with what loyalists perceive as their historic bases. Party loyalists are wary of Chile's new politics of consensus, and there is a nostalgic tone in their ideological discourse. They tend to possess a subjective image of their parties that may contrast dramatically with the parties' popular image or the images held by many of the parties' most visible leaders.

In terms of roles, party loyalists tend to be keepers of the flame, those whose political behavior is inseparable from their representation of past traditions and symbols. They derive political self-worth and meaning from their identities as effective organizers and recruiters, roles that were far more valued in the 1960s, a period of mass mobilization.

PERSONAL LOYALISTS

The second primary cognitive orientation is that of personal loyalist, represented by those who define their political images by tightly aligning themselves with an individual political leader. In contrast to party loyalists, the identifications of personal loyalists with a political leader outweigh any loyalty or affinity they possess toward a political party or organization. Personal loyalists believe that social transformation must be effected by an

outstanding political leader or hero. The most striking example of this in my study was the identification of personal loyalists with Salvador Allende. In recounting their associations with Allende and Allendismo, individual personal loyalists have struggled to preserve their own identities in the face of painful individual and political party setbacks and the difficult reconstruction of their political lives. Loyalists to Allende define their ideologies in terms of "Allendismo," which they interpret as progressive nationalist sentiment and a commitment to formal democratic institutions. They see themselves as preservers of Allende's vision, which they attempt to champion in their political parties. Personal loyalists to Allende rely on memories of their prominence and activism during the Popular Unity period to bolster their presence in contemporary politics. It must be noted here that while the personal loyalists among my subjects are Allende loyalists, personal loyalists as a cognitive type would not be restricted to those loyal to Allende. They can be loyal to any individual leader. In fact, as Chile engages in a new and decidedly heated contest over the next Chilean presidency, I would argue that personal loyalists play increasingly prominent political roles as spokespersons for a range of rival candidates.

POLITICAL THINKERS

The third cognitive type, the thinkers of this study, represents those who have focused on ideas and intellectual debates throughout the course of their political lives.[47] Thinkers show a tendency to privilege ideas over what might be seen as the good of the political party or their own self-interest. They believe that political vision must be the foundation for social transformation. Thinkers are capable of changing political direction as they deem historical conditions merit. Nevertheless, they consistently reveal their deliberations and struggles with the political and institutional parameters that they face in public office. The thinkers of this study have undergone varied ideological transformations and are to be found in the Chilean cabinet and legislature, and among the leaders of intellectual currents within both traditional and New Left groupings. Political thinkers now draft and defend increasingly differentiated party positions within the left, particularly with regard to such questions as political participation and citizen empowerment in the era of modernization.

POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS

The fourth cognitive orientation, that of political entrepreneur, most closely fits rational-choice explanations of political behavior. They represent those who are "born organizers" and dealmakers, who are responsive to changing political winds, and who rise to leadership positions as a result of adept training within and use of networks outside their political parties. Political entrepreneurs believe that ideas for social transformation must be crafted within powerful organizational vehicles. The emphasis in their discourse today is on pragmatism, consensus- and coalition-building, stability, and gradualism. Compared to past ideological visions for society, their visions of "the possible" tend to be modified in tone, focused on peace and on classic liberal notions of individual freedoms and the private sphere. They tend to be wary of the very notion of "ideology." The political entrepreneurs of this study are located today in high elected and appointed public offices in the Chilean cabinet and legislature and/or are in the top groupings within the Chilean Socialist Party and the Party for Democracy.

COGNITIVE ORIENTATIONS COMPARED

Cognitive orientations are understood here as the reasoned, deliberative approaches that individuals use to process and interpret the political moment and their behavioral responses to the moment. These orientations form early in life as individuals first act in politics. The crucial variables shaping early political identity are class, education, and political party. In addition, the individuals of this study first acted politically during the turbulent 1960s; their experiences of victory and defeat during the late 1960s and 1970s represent the fourth important dimension of their political identities.

It is no small coincidence that at least half of those whom I term the personal and political party loyalists of this study are from the Chilean working class. The identification of the political party and personal loyalists of this study with the Popular Unity period links them with a period in which there is at least the perception that the Chilean working class experienced greater social and political mobility than at any time in Chilean history.

Educational and professional networks are also important sources of political identity. For example, political party and personal loyalists have relied on their parties and individual party leaders for their political education and opportunities. In contrast, those whom I term the political thinkers and entrepreneurs use their political parties as only one important source of political education, while university training and other net-

works often afforded by their class status weigh just as heavily in their political socialization.

The political party loyalists and personal loyalists of this study draw their strongest political roots from the left parties—the Chilean Communist (PCCH) and Socialist (PSCH) parties—historically based in the working class. The PCCH and the PSCH can be viewed as the loyalists' chief political educators, molders, and sources of their political identities. In addition, the political thinkers and entrepreneurs tended to abandon Chile's traditional political parties to found parties of the Chilean New Left, such as the MAPU, Izquierda Cristiana (IC), and MIR. While small in membership, these New Left parties proved explosive in the ideologically turbulent 1960s and 1970s, and they represented important sources for the renovated left thinking that took place in the 1980s. This study has found that while political party and ideology are inextricably linked during the process of political identity formation, over the course of time this linkage relaxes. Nevertheless, political parties remain the central political institution that shapes individuals' political roles.

Generational embeddedness has a strong impact on political identity as well. Political party loyalists, for example, tend to employ a discourse and to long for the political and cultural movements that were characteristic of the 1960s generation. Political thinkers tend to seek intellectual inspiration from the "imaginative power" a totalizing framework could provide, while they struggle to reframe their visions for new political generations and contexts. Political entrepreneurs tend to be publicly dismissive of the 1960s generation, self-consciously repackaging their discourse and action toward more "attainable" goals and away from ideological projects.

The early and particularly traumatic political experiences of individuals themselves represent an essential explanatory force in the fine-tuning of cognitive frameworks. Such experiences include major political victories as well as major political defeats. In the course of traumatic political experiences, such as the 1973 military coup d'état, entire networks, including political party, university, and even family networks, were severely restructured or eliminated. Traumatic political experiences can challenge the very core of individual political identity. They represent the transforming dimension of individual political ideology for thinkers and entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, although individual core identities, their cognitive frameworks, are threatened by traumatic political experiences, this study has found that individual cognitive frameworks remain basically intact—even affirmed—in the face of trauma. Political trauma works to transform the

larger political identities for political thinkers and entrepreneurs, while it freezes those identities for political party and personal loyalists.

I argue herein that political party loyalists, when confronted with traumatic political experiences, have sought refuge in their revolutionary ideological convictions and political roles. This has manifested itself in their dedication to sustaining the preauthoritarian images of their political parties, images from a period when those parties were at the height of their visibility and prominence. In contrast, for political entrepreneurs, traumatic political experiences proved to be catalysts for dramatic ideological transformations. Entrepreneurs have consistently adapted their political discourse and programs to the tenor of the political moment.

The types represent a model that can be used to hypothesize about political leadership in larger political processes. There are two basic dimensions upon which the four ideal-types of this study vary. The first is their preoccupation with organization, and the second is their preoccupation with ideas. The party as organization is the central concern of political party loyalists, who seldom draw upon other formal networks for their political sustenance or mobility. Preoccupation with political ideas or visions tends to be much less of a daily focus for this group.

For personal loyalists, party organization is also central, but not so central as identification with an individual. Regarding ideas, personal loyalists tend to associate themselves with the ideas of the leader to whom they link themselves. For the political thinkers, of course, ideas are the central focus, while the organizational expression of those ideas is less of a concern.

Finally, it is the political entrepreneurs who are preoccupied with both organization and ideas. For political entrepreneurs, a dialectic exists between political visions as projects and the political organizations necessary to realize those projects. Political entrepreneurs are constantly anticipating the organizational networking that they perceive must encapsulate their political views.

Consequently, this study will explore several dimensions of the factors that shape individual political identity. First and foremost, it will address individual political identity formation and develop an ideal-type model of individual cognitive frameworks, that is, how individuals perceive the political world and their places in it, particularly with regard to others. Cognitive orientations, which remain relatively fixed, condition individual ideologies and roles under a variety of contexts and experiences.

Furthermore, I argue that the pre-1973 and immediate post-coup years favored the party loyalist cognitive orientation, which tends to emphasize party

continuity and survival. The political thinkers of this study assumed prominence in the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, as parties reflected upon and debated new identities. Finally, the political entrepreneur orientations emerged visibly during the 1970–1973 Popular Unity years but did not come to dominate until the years of transition and postauthoritarian rule from the late 1980s through the 1990s.

Cognitive types are in and of themselves influenced by both social and political embeddedness. Family, class, and generation represent extremely important formative networks in individuals' young lives, while political parties serve as central networks as individuals define themselves politically in more specific ways.

Thus, involvement in a range of structures, institutions, and networks actively shapes distinct cognitive frameworks. Yet the relationship is a dynamic one, for many of the individuals of this study also influence the shape and character of the central networks in their lives, particularly their political parties. Political party loyalists, for example, tend to fuel their parties' militants in ways that challenge the "consensus politics" style that characterizes contemporary Chile. Political thinkers tend to push their parties to greater programmatic content and vision. In addition, these visions were mediated by individuals' cognitive identities, which altered little in the face of traumatic political experiences, including the defeat of the 1970–1973 Popular Unity project. Those who had always been adaptive strategically and ideologically simply adapted their ideologies and roles in response to new political moments. In contrast, those who placed tremendous value on particular ideologies and their political structures tended to hold fast to those loyalties, even as their own well-being was jeopardized. For many subjects of my study, traumatic political experiences affirmed their convictions.

Finally, in case after case, this study reveals that particular life experiences serve as reference points, as explanations for both freezing and transforming thinking. This study focuses particularly on the experiences of individuals in top political positions and offices during the rise and fall of the Allende government, their exile experiences, and their return to Chile to play leading roles in the transition from military rule.

While analytically distinct, these dimensions must be intertwined and, in some senses, bound together. Traumatic experiences often mean the disintegration or collapse of important networks, including family and party. Individual needs for securing identities in the face of traumatic experiences can lead either to a freezing of ideologies or to ideological transfor-

mations, depending, in large part, on their cognitive frameworks. Together, cognitive type, embeddedness, and experience allow us to conceptualize about individual political identity formation and transformation, which contributes significantly to our understanding of larger political processes.

Individual and collective memories of a turbulent, traumatic past play a crucial and undertheorized role in postauthoritarian politics. The arrest of Augusto Pinochet laid bare the ways in which authoritarian legacies can dramatically jolt as well as doggedly plague democratic regimes. In spite of the attempts of the Chilean political class to put the painful past behind, such "irruptions" as resistance to imprisonment by convicted human rights violators, protests and counterprotests on the anniversary of the military coup, and Pinochet's detention serve to unravel the efforts of the political elite to "move on."[48]

In this period of postauthoritarian transition, Latin American thinkers and political strategists are wrestling with situations in which neopopulist, authoritarian politicians have emerged in formal democratic regimes. An uneasy tension continues to shadow civil-military relations. In the wake of dramatic economic austerity programs, Latin Americans face greater social inequality than the region has ever known. The region calls out for a new period of long-term vision, tempered by past experiences yet not without a bit of utopia. In the words of Karl Mannheim:

> The disappearance of utopia brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than a thing. . . . Without utopia humanity would lose its will to create history, sinking into either self-pity or complacency. . . . [We] have a responsibility to defend ideals against two corrupting forces: relativism and complacency engendered by the matter-of-factness of everyday relations.[49]

In order to tease out the remnants of and the transformations in political ideology, I argue, it is necessary to unearth processes of individual political identity formation for the sixties generation of Latin America's left political elites. Such exploration has revealed a world of internal struggle and deliberation as individuals seek to mesh their past and present ideologies and roles in order to give meaning to their political practices and self-perceptions.