Preface to the Paperback Edition

The broadest message of this book is that terrorism invites disproportionate fear and disproportionate demands for stern governmental responses, whether or not they are useful. As its subtitle indicates, the book is a call for the use of informed and thoughtful common sense. Nothing in the terrible losses—223 dead and 4,800 injured—from the almost simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania changes that prescription.

For more than a century, terrorism has relied almost exclusively on three by now familiar tactics. Since the invention of dynamite, it has used bombings and explosions. The car bombs used against the embassies, at the World Trade Center, and in Oklahoma City were conventional explosives with unusually great destructive capacities. Assassinations of political leaders have been a second major device. Finally, terrorists have taken hostages, often by hijacking planes. Still, the overall pattern is one of limited force used for its psychological and political impact. From the point of view of threatened governments there have been two tasks: first, to try to prevent the terrorist event from taking place; and, second, if prevention fails, to deal with the after-effects or consequences, including the remarkably large political effect of acts of terrorism.

If anything has changed in the two years since this book was first published, it is the heightening of concern that terrorism may move from a tactic causing relatively few deaths and relatively little other

destruction, despite immense public concern, to a phenomenon where weapons of mass destruction may become terrorist tools. The particular weapons that are feared are nuclear and biological. If actually used, the death toll on a single occasion could easily be thousands of times the annual deaths in recent years from terrorism in the United States.

No one can measure the risk of such a terrorist event. So far very few such events have been attempted, a fact that suggests either unusual practical difficulties in acquiring and using either type of weapon, or substantial moral and political inhibitions to such escalation by terrorist groups. In short, nuclear or biological terrorism would require both unusual technical capabilities and a desire to do damage that very few terrorists have yet displayed. (Even as to far-less-difficult terrorism with chemical weapons, the list of organizations that have developed that capability is short—perhaps including Aum Shinrikyo, Hamas, and the group led by Osama bin Laden.)

Obtaining the enriched uranium or plutonium necessary for a nuclear bomb is no easy task, despite our fears of weakened security arrangements in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The required delivery system for a biological weapon generally involves reducing anthrax or another organism to a size that allows it to operate as a floating aerosol and, in the case of anthrax, to reach the lungs. Accomplishing this is fortunately a substantial technological feat.

Still, the risk of terrorist use of nuclear or biological weapons, however small, has come to dominate the perceived dangers to the United States in a time without great foreign challenges. And the needed skills and will might both be provided by one of the small-to-medium-sized nations that are extremely hostile to the United States.

Implications for Deterrence, Prevention, and Consequence Management

Dealing with the possibility of terrorists using these weapons of mass destruction requires some adjustment and reconsideration of the prescriptions that remain applicable to more ordinary and tradi-

tional forms of terrorism. Several differences are particularly pertinent.

Deterrence

It is extremely difficult to gauge the efficacy of deterrence in any setting, and assessing its importance in discouraging terrorism is even more difficult. Analytically, deterrence of anything from street crime to biological terrorism may rely on fear of consequences such as prison or execution imposed by governments or on fear of social condemnation. We can say some things about our ability to affect these aspects of deterrence.

Although the harms from a terrorist's use of weapons of mass destruction may be thousands of times as great as those of traditional terrorism, there is no way that we can greatly increase the severity of the governmentally imposed consequences for individual terrorists; these are about as great as we can make them already. Perhaps we could increase the risk of detection by offering and publicizing very large rewards for reporting, and realistic sanctions for failing to report, information relevant to anyone's development or acquisition of a weapon of mass destruction.

On the other hand, the severity of sanctions will change in the case of state-sponsored terrorism. We can assume that any nation that considered the possibility of being caught sponsoring nuclear or biological terrorism against the United States would have to anticipate massive retaliation. Only in that sense does this aspect of deterrence change with the possibility of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

The other part of deterrence—the sense of widespread condemnation of the behavior—would, should, and must be very different for nuclear or biological weapons. Many relatively familiar forms of terrorism are applauded among the friends and supporters of the terrorists. The sense that this would not be true of a biological weapon may be one of the reasons we have been spared that horror. The use of biological weapons by a nation is forbidden by a treaty that almost every modern nation has signed, and the condemnation of use is not dependent on ideology or nationality.

One very important way to use the prospect of world outrage to discourage terrorism with weapons of mass destruction is to make clear how broadly the world community condemns their use. Professor Matthew Meselson of Harvard University has, for example, led in the drafting of a proposed international treaty to make it a crime *in every country* for someone to develop biological or chemical weapons *in any country*. The treaty would have intimidating effects in threatening prosecution and conviction, but it would also strengthen and broaden the barrier public rejection poses to any use of such weapons.

Prevention

Forms of prevention other than the ingredients of deterrence—adverse consequences and social condemnation—have always been important because of the huge political and psychological impact of terrorism. But these non-deterrent forms of prevention become vastly more important when the question is preventing use of a weapon of mass destruction. We know of three such additional methods of prevention. First, a nation can monitor groups suspected of planning terrorism in order to prevent their actions or to arrest and incapacitate them. Second, a state can seek to deny such groups what they need in the way of knowledge, materials, financial and other support, and access to carry out acts of terrorism. For example, access into the United States or to targets within the United States can be carefully controlled; financial assistance can be forbidden; and activities necessary for particular forms of terrorism, such as the purchase of equipment needed for a biological weapon, can be forbidden or regulated.

The final form of prevention is a variation of the first two: monitoring the acquisition of the various supplies or information or access that terrorists need and then using that information to detect groups more likely to be contemplating acts of terrorism so that the groups may be watched. Professor Richard Falkenrath of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government has suggested one way to do this: develop a computer-based capacity to identify combinations of common actions, including purchases, which are unusual

enough as combinations to suggest the purpose of building a weapon. Reliance on monitoring may be critical when the identity of those contemplating political violence is likely to be unknown, and especially when the outright prohibition of selling certain forms of knowledge or materials would be too burdensome on those who would use the knowledge or materials for perfectly legitimate purposes.

Consequence Management

Finally, just as certain types of prevention become far more important and take on different forms when dealing with weapons of mass destruction, the same is true with regard to the other broad aim of governments facing terrorist threats. Consequence management to deal with the after-effects of terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction would require the availability of unusual resources or resources in unusual quantities. The capacities for consequence management that are needed for ordinary forms of terrorism—relatively limited rescue and health resources and the ability to deal with psychological and political consequences by, among other things, capturing the perpetrators—are far from adequate for dealing with the after-effects of a weapon of mass destruction.

The Dilemmas of Preparation

The heart of preparation for prevention or consequence management to deal with terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction is getting into place the committed human and physical resources, skills, and advance training, plans, and legal authority that we would want if and when a threat or actual use took place. The rational calculation is straightforward even if difficult. To list those resources and capacities we must imagine a variety of terrorist scenarios and the needs of different stages of each. To determine how much attention we would give to each different scenario and every stage of each, we have to guess at probabilities and try to develop information to enlighten the guesses. To decide what total cost and inconvenience should be borne to get all the needed capacities in place, we must use the

estimates of the likelihood that they would eventually be needed and the amount by which their availability could reduce the resulting damage.

But more than an extremely difficult investment calculation is involved. Political leaders are not particularly good at encouraging present expenditures for remote and somewhat unlikely contingencies; nor are they good at insisting that constituents think about ugly matters that they would rather not think about. Not just foresight but also remarkable leadership will be required to incur expenses now for stockpiling the human skills, the organizational capacities and arrangements, and the scarce physical resources we would need in the unlikely event of a terrorist attack with nuclear or biological weapons. Also, providing the legal authority we would want on that occasion poses threats to civil liberties that no one wants to assume needlessly.

These political problems lie at the core of the issue of preparing for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. A large part of the answer lies in a wise use of political and psychological realities. Take first the issue of physical and human resources. The physical resources and the trained human resources are far more likely to be made available and to be maintained in operating condition if they serve dual purposes. Equipment and manpower that are also useful for a natural catastrophe would be such "dual purpose" assets. Organizational structures that are also needed in other situations—for example to coordinate the activities of different agencies and political jurisdictions in fighting forest fires—are more likely to be maintained.

Some physical resources will have to be specially acquired; some individuals, specially trained; some plans, designed for the particular event. But the ability to obtain and maintain these assets will depend significantly on whether other uses can be found for them simultaneously. Epidemics have characteristics similar to biological terrorism. Earthquakes have characteristics not unlike a vast explosion. The British have recognized this in building their own capacities. We will have to do so as well.

Second, careful planning can also help with regard to obtaining the necessary legal authority to prevent, or deal with the aftermath of, attacks by organizations planning nuclear or biological terrorism: to discover their plans and membership in advance; to monitor their activities; to interfere with their capacity to obtain crucial ingredients or knowledge; to be alerted when they have sought to obtain these assets; to assess the validity of a threat; to locate a weapon before it goes off; and to manage the consequences of use of a nuclear or biological weapon. These authorities to regulate, prohibit, search, arrest, and more—which are dangerous to the normal functioning of a democracy but may be necessary in extraordinary circumstances—must be designed for protection against misuse in ordinary times as well as for use in extraordinary times.

The task with regard to legal authority is the opposite of the task with regard to other resources. For new legal powers, we must avoid "dual purpose" authority in order to prevent the use of dangerous legal authority except in the most demanding of circumstances. We must and should devise ways to be sure that extraordinary powers are only available in extraordinary circumstances, perhaps circumstances ratified by a court at the President's personal request on the basis of a factual determination (for example, that 10,000 or more lives are at risk). We must find ways to make sure that extraordinary powers are limited in time as well as space, perhaps automatically expiring after a few weeks.

All this is the work of the future. It is obviously beginning already with vast expenditures of federal funds. Much of the task of common sense in battling the terrorist threats of the twenty-first century will remain as I have described in this volume. But some of the task is to discover sensible ways of investing and preparing now to be ready to address unlikely threats of immense harms by nuclear or biological weapons in the future.

Preface

The simple message of this book is that we can and must deal intelligently and dispassionately with a resurgent phenomenon, terrorism, that is designed to replace reason with fear and anger. It is about the use of violence for political purposes within a country—an area where crime meets politics. It is also about the use of this tactic for affecting politics by one nation against another—an area where crime meets low-level war and foreign policy. Above all, the book is a broad prescription of calm common sense, documented by more detailed applications of that prescription, as the remedy for any great democracy. Without denying that sometimes terrorist acts are the result of pure irrational rage or frustration, I focus on the more calculating forms of political violence and the responses that the United States can adopt that do not threaten its institutions.

The Case for Common Sense

For democratic nations, the primary concerns in dealing with terrorism are to maintain and protect life, the liberties necessary to a vibrant democracy, and the unity of the society, the loss of which can turn a healthy and diverse nation into a seriously divided and violent one. The message of this book is, quite simply, that preserving these three values—and not simply destroying each manifestation of terrorism as it arises—is the real goal of a democratic society, and that accomplishing this goal requires a full survey of the strange and complicated borderland where terrorism exists. What is needed most is common sense.

In this regard, my essay is a response to those like Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who see the goal of those dealing with terrorism as unitary—the destruction of a deeply evil activity and of those who practice it—and who see the primary means to that destruction as simply unleashing the security forces of a powerful state. I will spell out how we can preserve life without losing liberty or unity and without setting aside law.

I work from the assumption that our stability, our security, and our capacity to meet terrorist threats effectively are all very great compared to the dangers we have faced and are likely to face. That will remain so as long as terrorism does not shift into a new dimension we have not faced: the use of weapons of mass destruction. So we can afford—we must afford—to preserve our liberties and our unity at the same time as we deal with threats to our security. For a great democratic nation, what is needed is a strategy, not unbridled anger.

The anger is hardly surprising. A recitation of the terrorist events in our recent history is a reminder of high drama and often tragedy that have seized the attention and fanned the fears of Americans in a way that little else can. In that sense, at least, terrorism is a central feature of contemporary history and contemporary awareness.

To a surprising extent, the concerns of Americans about their safety have involved the activities of the Unabomber, who sent mail bombs to those he believed were threatening the environment; the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City resulting in hundreds of dead and injured, apparently in protest of the federal government's actions during the standoff at the Branch Davidian complex in Waco, Texas that followed a failed attempt to seize illegal firearms and resulted in a catastrophic fire killing over 70 people; the bombing of the World Trade Center and the threatened bombing of the Holland Tunnel and other sites in New York City by militant Muslim fundamentalists protesting America's cultural and political role in the world; the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by radical Jews in Israel, followed by the suicide bombings of Israeli buses by Hamas radicals, which led to a new government and a probable defeat for a cherished American foreign policy; the 1993 U.S. attack on Baghdad in retaliation for an attempt to murder former

President Bush in Kuwait; the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; the seizure of the *Achille Lauro* off Egypt and the killing of Leon Klinghoffer; the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 to Beirut and the murder of a navy diver; the bombing of American soldiers in a Berlin disco and the U.S. bombing of Libya in response; the shooting of American tourists in the airports of Vienna and Rome; the suicide bombings of the U.S. Marine barracks and Embassy in Beirut and the U.S. Air Force complex in Riyadh a decade later; and more. The list goes on and on without even adding the events abroad that have also jarred our consciousness: poison gas distributed by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan, continual bombings by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in England and Northern Ireland, the suicide bombings in Jerusalem in 1997, the campaign of bombs in Paris in the mid-1980s and again in the mid-1990s, etc.

The need for common sense is based on something less apparent than the amount of concern these events have generated and the vividness of the memories they leave. They are not instances of random violence. Behind them there is purpose. Terrorism is generally a calculated move in a political game. When the targets of one player, the terrorist group, are American citizens, it is generally because the terrorists intend to force the United States government into becoming the other player. The drama, the tragedy, the startling vividness of the memories—in short, the terror—are generally the calculated results of carefully selected steps intended to affect domestic or international politics. The effort may be to reduce the credibility of a government or to change particular policies or to strengthen a rival movement. In each case, the objective is political.

From the point of view of our government—of any democratic government—there are always two objectives: to save the lives of citizens and, at the same time, not to lose credibility or independence or stability. The task is harder than it seems. The government must act in a context of intense domestic political pressure to "do something"; must avoid directing anger against any sizeable segment of the population, a step that in the long run creates instability and encourages support for violent opposition; and must deal with the fears that its responses are sure to create among any people wise

enough to know that government is most dangerous when it claims to be fighting dangerous enemies. Often, it must at the same time worry about its international relations with both enemies and allies. Its decisions are influenced by bureaucratic competition among law enforcement and intelligence agencies at federal and local levels, each of whom may think it knows best how to prevent further violence and how to bring the perpetrators to justice.

In such a complicated game, even a government that plays its cards perfectly may not have a winning hand. For example, when in the spring of 1996 suicide bombers from Hamas killed scores of Israeli citizens in an effort to create fear on the part of Jews—and thereby to generate a repression of Palestinian Arabs that would increase hatred on their side—the apparent objective of slowing or stopping the peace process between Israel and the PLO was attainable. Hamas had the cards and played them well. There was probably no way that Israel's Prime Minister Shimon Peres could, all at the same time, satisfy the domestic pressures so as to be able to hold office with an election pending, support Arafat's tenuous hold on Palestinian loyalties, and deal with the dangers to any peace process posed by spreading fear and anger in both populations. The election of a new prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the slowing of the peace process that resulted, reflected new currents of public opinion that had been created intentionally by acts of political violence. So did a new wave of Hamas suicide bombings in 1997.

This book is about the "political" aspect of political violence. It is about what the government of the United States can do and what we can learn from the experience of other countries, as well as our own, about how to handle both the physical and political dangers of terrorism. It is about what can be done, what actions will do more harm than good, what makes the situation difficult to handle, and how to distinguish what is extremely dangerous from what is merely dangerous. It is about common sense, about putting out fires with water rather than gasoline.

In the final analysis, the message of this book is that reason is essential to dealing with a tactic that, in most cases, only appears to be senseless. Terrorism is in fact generally calculated, and sometimes

successful. Minimizing that success is very much in the interest of democracies, but to do so requires intelligence more than passion, and calculation more than anger. In this book I try to explain the political context of terrorism in the plainest of terms, with a minimum of footnotes or other references, so that a non-expert reader can understand a complicated area of passionate concern in a few hours of reading.

Advocates and Performers of Political Violence

Although this essay is about governmental responses to terrorism, not about terrorist groups, and although it is the tactics of terrorists and their intended effect on us, more than the great diversity of their motivations, that form the setting for our responses, it is important to have at least a rough sense of the types of people behind the tactics. So let me briefly introduce two of the characters who have emerged from anonymity to capture the attention of a great nation: Mahmud Abouhalima, who helped make and test the bomb that blew up at the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, killing six people and injuring thousands; and Timothy McVeigh, convicted of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City shortly after 9:00 A.M. on April 19, 1995, killing 169.

Born in Egypt, Mahmud Abouhalima grew up poor but graduated from Cairo University.[1] Eventually, he emigrated to America, using a fraudulently obtained "green card." He then went to Afghanistan to fight for the Mujahedeen forces supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Injured, he returned to the United States with many other Islamic militants and continued his work at a center designed to coordinate volunteers to fight in the Afghan war. The volunteers called it "The Service for Jihad Office."

What brought Abouhalima together with a sizeable number of others in mosques and other centers in New Jersey and New York was a shared set of beliefs with a long history. They believed passionately that religious duty required taking radical action to bring the institutions of society more in line with the commands of their scripture.

As such, they were on the radical fringe of Islamic beliefs. Virtually all believing Muslims consider their scripture (the Qur' n) the literal word of God; they thus qualify as "fundamentalists" according to the most common idea of fundamentalism among Americans. Indeed, most Muslims consider the Qur' n to be not only God's word but also in main part God's commands, which all Muslims are obligated to obey.

Within the Muslim religion, a large subset of adherents support action to implement religion and religious law as the blueprint for life and society here and now. In other words, these "fundamentalists" oppose secularism as practiced in the West. A smaller subset of these believe in using politics toward that end. These we might describe as adherents to "political Islam" or as "Islamists." Finally, a radical fringe of this smallest group believe in using violence to the same end. Abouhalima and his associates would place themselves among this radical fringe as supporters of "Islamic" political violence.

To those like Abouhalima, Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman was a spiritual leader in the wars against secular and corrupt governments in the Arab states, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and Israel, as well as against the United States, the leader of what they perceive to be the corrupt and godless forces of the West. Sheik Abdel-Rahman had also been born in Egypt, where he became blind at the age of ten. He pursued a deeply religious education, studying at Al-Azar University, the Islamic world's most prestigious institution of higher learning and the oldest university in the world. There he adopted the violent strands of Islamic thought, which originated in the fourteenth century as a defense against the inroads of the Mongols.

Soon after graduating from Al-Azar, Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman began preaching in earnest against the secular governments of Abdul Gamal al-Nasser and Anwar Sadat, ending up in prison on several occasions. In his 1985 autobiography, he explains his opposition to successive Egyptian governments:

The state allows adultery and creates the opportunity for it, the state organized night clubs and prepared special police to protect adulterers

and prostitutes. Liquor factories are built by the state. Doesn't this deny God's laws?[2]

During the 1980s, the Egyptian state became more and more repressive of Islamists, many of whom were, like the Sheik, providing the ideological underpinnings of a terrorist campaign. Tapes of the Sheik's talks were circulating throughout the poor neighborhoods of Egypt urging followers to, for example, "hit hard and kill the enemies of God in every spot to rid [the state] of the descendants of apes and pigs fed at the tables of Zionism, Communism, and Imperialism."[3]

The Sheik was also coming to play a religious role in sanctioning specific violent acts by fundamentalists. In the traditional Islamic legal system, laws derive from the Qur' n, understood as the word of God as revealed by the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet Mohammed in seventh-century Arabia. Since the Qur' n is often cryptic and does not offer a complete system of rules for society, it must be supplemented. The Hadith, second-hand stories of the Prophet, illustrate various moral precepts, or *sunna*, that Mohammed established by word or example. Since even orthodox Islam recognizes the danger that some Hadith are apocryphal, a scholar is needed to weigh the authenticity of the Hadith and to apply both sources of Islamic law to any situation. When serving as an authority on religions, this scholar, known as *atim* or *mufti*, will issue a legal and moral opinion (there is no distinction in traditional Islamic law) to guide believers. This opinion is known as a *fatwa*. However, since a secular state does not grant a mufti's opinions any legally binding force, a *fatwa*'s authority is unclear. If, on due reflection, a believer accepts a particular scholar as a pious and fully qualified interpreter of the law, then he may follow the *fatwas* of that scholar with a clear conscience.

Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman's opinions derived from his particularly radical interpretation of Islam, and were often interpreted by his followers as *fatwas* justifying particular actions. In 1980, Sheik Abdel-Rahman was tried twice for allegedly issuing a *fatwa* that justified the assassination of Anwar Sadat; in both cases, he was acquitted. Later in the 1980s, Sheik Abdel-Rahman was accused of issuing a *fatwa* that justified the killing of Christians in Fayoum,

where he preached. Again, he was acquitted. In both cases, Sheik Abdel-Rahman defended his actions as an exercise of his own freedom of thought and religion, denying that his religious opinions ever advocated specific acts of violence. His lawyer argued that the Jihad Organization, which assassinated Sadat, "asked for a religious stand about a ruler who is ruling against Islamic law. [Sheik Abdel-Rahman] did not specify Sadat and the members of the Jihad Organization did not specify Sadat for him."[4] Yet, regardless of the specificity of his advice, his followers thought it was clear. His trial became a platform for his religious and political criticisms of the Egyptian government. "Our duty to God is more binding than our duty to the President of the Republic. We owe God obedience and no obedience is owed to him who disobeys God," he declared.[5] He was acquitted.

Near the end of the 1980s, Sheik Abdel-Rahman became involved in the religious war against the Soviet regime in Afghanistan. He inspired thousands of volunteers from the Arab world—financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency—to fight with the Mujahedeen against the atheist invaders and to create a true Islamic republic in an independent Afghanistan. The CIA distributed over $3 billion to arm the Afghan rebels, including vehemently anti-American factions.

After the sheik returned to Egypt, he found it necessary to escape to Sudan, and from there fled to the United States, taking advantage of a mistake by U.S. immigration authorities supposed to be checking a terrorist "watch" list. In the United States, he soon became the spiritual leader of a politically violent fringe of Islamists who had gathered there and organized around support for the war in Afghanistan. Abouhalima, who had first become attracted to the sheik's ideas in Egypt, became his driver and one of his followers. He later took part in the murder of the radical Jewish extremist Rabbi Meir Kahane.

On September 1, 1992, the technical mastermind for the first major Islamic terrorist campaign in the United States arrived at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport: Ramzi Yousef, a highly trained, sophisticated, and well-financed terrorist from Pakistan and the Afghan jihad. He slipped through immigration by presenting a valid Iraqi passport and applied for asylum, swearing he would face

persecution by Iraqi guards if he returned to Iraq. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, unable to interview him on the spot, paroled him into the country over the advice of a line official. Abouhalima promptly helped Yousef get a professional driver's license for identification. Within six months, they had completed their preparations and, on February 26, 1993, they mounted the explosion that ripped through level B-2 of the underground parking garage of the World Trade Center. Yousef escaped to Pakistan that evening and, as I will later discuss, continued to plot and execute terrorist acts around the globe. Abouhalima, after a federal trial in New York, is now serving out a 240-year prison sentence for his role in the bombing.

Timothy McVeigh, the central player in the Oklahoma City bombing, was born in Pendleton, New York in 1968.[6] McVeigh and one of his two sisters were left with his father when his parents were divorced and his mother moved to Florida. He was quiet, average, and unmemorable during his high school years. He briefly became a survivalist, stockpiling food and weapons. Both the preparations for an apocalyptic future and the love of collecting and using weapons remained with him.

He was unable to find a good job after graduating from high school and complained that he was going nowhere. Some of his behavior during this period seems bizarre. A co-worker in a security firm said McVeigh gave him a ride home driving at 70 miles per hour, yelling at slower drivers, and grabbing at a shotgun "like he was going to blow them away." The co-worker said that "sometimes when I was driving, he'd put his face right next to mine and scream that the cars were going too slow, and then just keep his face there and stare at me."[7]

At the suggestion of friends, McVeigh enlisted in the Army, where his love of guns and explosives combined with a sense of belonging. He showed some real promise as a soldier, fought in Iraq, and then applied for the Green Berets. His failure to make that elite group seems to have been a personal disaster. He took an early discharge, then drifted from job to job and state to state. He lost weight and appeared unstable.

During this period in his early twenties, acquaintances described him as having a growing obsessive belief that the federal government was conspiring to enslave the American people, and that it would have to be stopped, at any cost, by the few patriots with clear vision. By early 1992, Timothy McVeigh was writing letters to newspapers, complaining of crime, taxes, and political corruption, and warning:

> Do we have to shed blood to reform the current system? I hope it doesn't come to that, but it might.[8]

McVeigh's anger and distrust for the government were nourished by two events. First was the standoff between separatist Randy Weaver and federal law enforcement officials at Ruby Ridge, Idaho in August, 1992. Weaver, wanted on firearms charges, was unwilling to appear for trial. The U.S. Marshal Service tried to capture him. After Weaver's son Samuel and a federal marshal were killed in a gunfight, an FBI sniper, Lon Horiuchi, accidentally shot and killed Weaver's wife, Vicki, while she held her ten-month-old daughter inside the cabin. Many criticized the federal government's decision to relax its shooting rules during the standoff, blaming overly zealous law enforcement for the death of Weaver's wife.

Less than a year later, McVeigh's suspicion of the federal government was sealed by the federal raid on the compound of the Branch Davidian religious sect in Waco, Texas. Officials from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) were prevented by armed force from arresting David Koresh and others. After a 51-day standoff, federal officials stormed the Branch Davidian compound. The ensuing fire, apparently set by the Davidians, took the lives of over 70 people. To McVeigh, Waco was simply another example of the government's willingness to trample the rights of American citizens. In symbolic retaliation, McVeigh bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City on the anniversary of the Waco disaster.

Like those involved in the bombing of the World Trade Center, McVeigh's willingness and capacity to act was inspired by others holding similar beliefs. While McVeigh did not formally belong to any organized group as Abouhalima did, he read the same literature,

watched the same motion pictures, subscribed to the same magazines, and at least occasionally attended the same meetings as the members of various right-wing militias across America.[9] *Time* magazine wrote of McVeigh's attachment to Andrew Macdonald's *The Turner Diaries*, which was published in 1978 and tells the story of a group of white supremacists who blow up FBI headquarters in Washington.[10] The book is heavily racist and anti-Semitic. McVeigh was so devoted to the book that he handed it out to friends and sold it at gun shows, even at a loss. A photocopy of a passage from the *Turner Diaries* explaining that the purpose of the fictional bombing was "to wake up America" was in McVeigh's car when he was arrested shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing.

The militias appear relevant to the Oklahoma City bombing mainly for indicating how many Americans there are with views like McVeigh's. The total membership of the various militias across the United States is estimated by the Southern Poverty Law Center to be between ten and fifteen million. As many as a hundred thousand may be quite active members. United by an extreme libertarian philosophy and a deep suspicion of government and the establishment press, the movement has roots in all regions of the country. Its concerns are not only the right to bear arms but also the enjoyment of property rights free of any governmental regulation, freedom of movement without the licensing requirements that accompany automobile use, a right to deny the use of taxes to fund programs that they consider unethical or immoral, a concern about the place of religion in American life, and an acute sense of the loss of allegiance to what is distinctly "American" as a definable set of views and experiences.

Obviously, most of the subscribers to these views are not violent, but many do believe that the government and the press have become tools of an enemy agenda. Trusting in books like Gary Allen's *None Dare Call It Conspiracy* and Pat Robertson's *The New World Order*, people within the militias fear a conspiratorial organization of "One Worlders" who are using their considerable influence to create an environment where a world government can take control of the United States. For some of these, the "one world" government is identified with the Antichrist, whom they expect will stand in oppo-

sition to Christ in the last days before the Second Coming. The identification creates a mixture of patriotism and Christianity in support of their program.

Concluding that the government has abdicated its role as guarantor of the liberties outlined in the Constitution's Bill of Rights, many members of the militia believe that it is time to arm themselves in defense of their liberties. They reason that the Declaration of Independence itself says that "whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends [life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness], it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it." They believe that their liberties are being steadily eroded by a corrupt and deceptive government and press that may be trying to usher in the age of the Antichrist in the form of United Nations control of our country. Therefore, they argue, it may be time to heed Thomas Jefferson's advice that the tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of patriots and tyrants. This advice was printed on Timothy McVeigh's favorite t-shirt.

Both the similarities between McVeigh and Abouhalima and the differences between them are worth noting.

Both bombers were part of wider social networks that supported their fundamental beliefs, even if not their willingness to carry them into violent action. They were the radical fringe of groups that were themselves outside the political spectrum that feels it has influence and respect in the United States. (In Europe, the broader groups would thus be called "extra-parliamentary.") Their actions were addressed to this supportive audience as well as to the American people at large.

The perpetrators shared the same knowledge of technology and access to needed ingredients of bombs. Both had even received military training by the United States. The two groups of bombers had ready access to a target that would carry their message to the American people—in one case, the World Trade Center as a symbol of materialism, in the other, the Oklahoma City federal building as a symbol of governmental overreaching that threatened individual freedoms.

For acts of massive violence, conscience needs a solvent. Both McVeigh and Abouhalima lived in an atmosphere of frenzied speech, where a violent response to government was urged or justified by leaders within the broader group. Each had elaborate and persuasive explanations of why the normal rules of civilized behavior did not apply to him.

In most of these characteristics, the bombers of the World Trade Center and the bombers of the federal building in Oklahoma City also resemble the terrorists of the left and the nationalist terrorists who have operated in Italy, Germany, France, Northern Ireland, and Israel. For example, the profile fits, almost perfectly, the group involved in the successful plot to assassinate Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel in 1995.

From the point of view of counter-terrorist policy, however, there are also extremely important differences. Abouhalima was a member of a fairly well-structured group, closely related to supporters abroad that might even include foreign governments. The movement of which Abouhalima's group was a part had a history. The foreign connections and the continuity made the group more dangerous. Because of its roots and branches abroad, rounding up the suspects would require rare international cooperation of the sort that eventually led to the arrest of Yousef in Pakistan. (See Chapter 4.)

But the size and history of the group also created vulnerabilities. The United States could have prevented several leading conspirators from coming into the country: their records were well known. A number of them even appear to have been involved in other forms of violence in the United States—particularly, the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane. Aware of such violent activities, the FBI placed an informant within the group. Perhaps the explosion could have been prevented. In any event, once it had occurred the chances of identifying likely suspects were great, and this is the hardest step in a terrorist investigation.

When one considers prevention or prosecution, the Oklahoma City bombing looks very different indeed. McVeigh's personal history made him a candidate for some form of explosive violence. He

gravitated to the intellectual world of the militias, pulling with him two army friends. The federal assaults at Waco and Ruby Ridge on loners who believed, like McVeigh, that guns were a necessary protection against government helped unhinge him. But there is nothing in his background or in these events that would have suggested that his activities should have been monitored for terrorist activity. In this he differed significantly from the bombers of the World Trade Center. In many ways, McVeigh may be closer to loners like Roland Smith, Jr., a New York man who in December 1995 responded to an atmosphere of racial hatred by setting fire to a Harlem clothing store and gunning down those attempting to flee; or John Salvi, who in 1994 emerged from the fringes of the anti-abortion movement to kill a receptionist at each of two abortion clinics in Brookline, Massachusetts. One might even compare McVeigh to Theodore Kaczynski, convicted in 1998 as the Unabomber who sent letter bombs to a number of people he believed were destroying the environment.

There is no organization that can be infiltrated to prevent such acts. Although the perpetrators may not be protected by the assistance or silence of a sympathetic segment of the population, they are also far less likely to be known than other terrorists. Indeed, a highly intelligent bomber working alone and pursuing an unknown cause, or a cause shared by too many for all to be treated as suspects, can carry on a course of political violence for years, as Theodore Kaczynski demonstrated.

What Lies Ahead

Chapter 1 examines the differences in definitions of terrorism and the difficulties of placing it within more familiar contexts of crime, warfare, or politics. It introduces the extraordinary impact on democratic politics that terrorism can have and examines the consequences of that impact. It explores the mechanisms through which terrorism may work to affect democratic politics, focusing on the audiences to which it may be addressed.

The chapters that follow are broadly organized around a central distinction between international and domestic terrorism. The prob-

lems are different and so are the powers of the government in dealing with them. Moreover, the prevalence of international terrorism contrasts dramatically with the rarity of domestic terrorism.

In this last respect, the dramatic and frightening attacks by terrorists on the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City federal building are, fortunately, relatively rare cases of terrorism within the United States. In 1994, there were no domestic terrorist incidents on U.S. soil, while there were 66 attacks on U.S. citizens abroad. So, international terrorism is not only a different problem from domestic terrorism and not only a problem that must be addressed with different powers. It is also a problem the prevalence of which suggests special attention.

The line between international and domestic terrorism is not generally drawn on the basis of the location of an attack but rather on the basis of the involvement of more than one country. The U.S. Department of State has long defined international terrorism as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country." That includes the situation in which Americans are most subject to terrorism: attacks on Americans or U.S. diplomatic missions or American-owned property abroad. But it would also include an attack within the United States by citizens of another country or by terrorists using the assistance or territory of another country, such as the World Trade Center bombing.

The United States has generally been the leading target of international terrorism taking place outside our borders because it is the world's greatest power and its foreign policy is influential throughout the world. Inevitably, this influence is contrary to the interests of various groups that are prepared to use violence. American targets are particularly attractive when they are outside our borders. The attack creates an international sensation. Moreover, the location can be chosen in a place where U.S. intelligence and prevention are least effective and, perhaps most important of all, where the chance of arrest and punishment are minimized.

Because of the importance and relative prevalence of international terrorism, the four chapters that follow the introduction focus on this issue, beginning with the role of intelligence in Chapter 2,

then turning in Chapter 3 to the choices presented when a hostage situation or an ongoing terrorist campaign must be addressed. Chapter 4 examines the possibilities of international cooperation as a remedy, and Chapter 5 looks at military retaliation and its prospects when terrorism is supported by another state.

The risks and the possibilities are very different when the terrorism takes place at home. Far more significant efforts at prevention can be undertaken. Law enforcement can operate without the cooperation of foreign governments, although terrorism places unusual strains on a criminal justice system. Intelligence gathering is subject to more careful rules at home than abroad, but many more sources are likely to be available. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 turn to these issues of domestic terrorism.

Chapter 6 explores the logic of preventive steps to make terrorist activities more difficult or riskier. Chapter 7 turns to investigation and prosecution of terrorism when prevention has failed. Chapter 8 examines the critical role of intelligence gathering and processing—and the special dangers of this activity—in a context of U.S. citizens contemplating violent politics. The concluding chapter, Chapter 9, summarizes what common sense can tell us about dealing with politically motivated violence.