Cosmopolitan Capitalists: Hong Kong and the Chinese Diaspora at the End of the 20th Century, by Gary G. Hamilton (ed.)

 

9: From Colonial Rule to One Country, Two Systems

Rosanna Yick-Ming Wong

 

I am a Hongkonger, born and bred. Hong Kong is where my home is and where my heart is. My commitment is such that I have been actively involved in Hong Kong's political and public life since the mid-1980s, from around the time, in fact, of the Joint Declaration. It is on the basis of my personal observations and experience that I write this chapter on the politics of creating Hong Kong's future.

When I was a little girl, growing up in Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s, Hong Kong was in the throes of post-war recovery and renewal. In those years, the people of Hong Kong were concerned chiefly with improving their livelihood, repairing the damage done by the ravages of World War II, and coping with the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had fled from the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) and who would become so important in making Hong Kong an economic success. At that time, for Hongkongers, the demands of the immediate present far outweighed their concerns about the future. They were so preoccupied with modernizing the economy and building an infrastructure that they could hardly envision the time when China would reclaim Hong Kong. For my school friends and me, that day seemed impossibly far away. Yet now, as though in the mere blink of an eye, the time has come and gone.

On the mainland, many people were very excited that Hong Kong would become part of China again. In Beijing they literally counted the days until the handover occurred. The sale of books about Hong Kong was big business. There was even an extremely popular quiz program in the PRC that tested people's knowledge of Hong Kong.

In Hong Kong itself, where the atmosphere could never, at any time, be called dull, the place positively brimmed over with nervous excitement and anticipation in the period leading up to the transition. Everyone was asking what this unique and unprecedented handover would mean. We wondered what would occur during this transformation of Hong Kong, from its colonial status to a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. So many people were and, for that matter, still are longing to know, and predictions and opinions abound. It is too early to make a definitive pronouncement, and I will not attempt to do so here. All I can do is give my own interpretation of events, based on my own experience in public life in Hong Kong.

The 150 years of British colonial rule has formed the foundation of what Hong Kong is today. In this chapter I will discuss to what extent some of these characteristics of Hong Kong can or will be retained. The transfer from colonial rule to a type of sovereignty called "one country, two systems" is unique in the history of mankind. Therefore, our path to the future has not been cleared by the actions of earlier governments; it will have to be created. One thing is certain, though, it will be us, we Hong Kong belongers who have witnessed this extraordinary moment in history, who will now be involved in making this new type of sovereignty work.

 

The Colonial Background

The fact that Hong Kong has never been an independent state is central to its new political status. Under British constitutional law, Hong Kong was a crown colony. It was ruled by the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief under instructions signed by the sovereign in London, that is to say, under basic empowering Letters Patent together with Royal Instructions on detail and procedure. To a large extent, the political legitimacy of the Hong Kong government was derived from the sovereign. But day-to-day administration remained the responsibility of the local government. The legitimacy required to maintain an effective administration rested with the system's ability to win the trust and support of the people.

When Hong Kong was ceded to Britain and became a British colony on 26 June 1843, the British government believed that, as in the other colonies, a very limited administration would meet the needs of the inhabitants of Hong Kong. The structure of the colonial authority was executive-led. The Legislative Council was not a representative assembly. Power basically rested with the bureaucratic elite in the civil service, and decisions were made behind closed doors. Britain was too far away to police the colony adequately, and the local colonial administration took a lenient view of its own shortcomings (Hong Kong Annual Report 1955). Public expenditures were confined to the bare essentials. Even the small amounts spent on community upkeep proved too much for the merchants who dominated the life of the territory. Indeed, for most of the nineteenth century, the central question that concerned the merchants in their relationship with government was the location of power. The merchants wanted to see the government run to their benefit, and they wanted control over finance. As the economy grew, the merchants became so politically powerful that they could no longer be ignored. They regarded themselves as the legitimate guardian of the public purse. They argued for representatives in the legislature and urged the government to create political links with Chinese notables and indirectly with the Chinese community (Hong Kong: Report 1899).

Before the Second World War, Hong Kong's economy was based largely on entrepôt trade. At the end of the war, by which time there was little left of the economy, local businessmen had to find new outlets for their activities. Increasingly, they moved into manufacturing, particularly textiles and garments. The Communist victory on the mainland produced unexpected bonuses for Hong Kong, mainly the influx of capital and entrepreneurs from Shanghai and cheap refugee labor. The values of hard work and frugality, and the willingness to change, experiment, and even gamble, values embodied by the refugees and the entrepreneurs, were all central to the process of industrialization and the establishment of a manufacturing base. The government at that time practiced a philosophy of laissez-faire. The Hong Kong government's own term is "positive non-intervention." This policy brought the British, other Western merchants, and a handful of local elites the advantages of a free port and a political regime that imposed few restrictions of any kind. The economic boom of the 1950s spawned a wealthy new elite that was absorbed into the system, but it also produced an exploited working class living and working in atrocious conditions.

Riots in 1966 and 1967 called the role of the government into question and provided the catalyst for change. A Commission of Inquiry was set up to investigate the causes of the unrest. The Commission Report addressed problems that were central to the social conditions and political structure of the territory and recommended many much-needed reforms. Even though the riots had posed a powerful threat to the legitimacy of the colonial state, many bureaucrats and traditional elites still opposed any radical new measures. The primary focus of reform in the period 1968–72, therefore, tended to be structural. Political reforms included the establishment of the City District Office, a local-level structure mediating between the government and the people; improvements in public relations within government departments; and an increased number of advisory committees and consultative forums. On the social and economic fronts, the major immediate change was labor legislation, particularly the promulgation of the Employment Act of 1968. The new order stressed "consultation" as the basis of its legitimacy, a more direct relationship with the population as its immediate goal, and improved social policies as its future objectives. Consultation meant the process by which the government, through advisory committees rather than democratic votes, arrived at a consensus on which it based its often predetermined decisions. While the structure of political authority was unaffected, the government responded to the crisis by developing a stronger relationship with the community and improving basic social services.

For over a hundred years, Hong Kong's progress has been substantially undisturbed by the kind of turmoil and violence that occurred elsewhere in Asia. Despite the 1966 and 1967 riots challenging the government and seeking change, the community has basically enjoyed peace and order for a long time. One wonders why this should be the case. Lucian Pye writes that a given political culture is the result not only of the life histories of individuals but also of the collective history of the system (Pye and Verba 1965). The Chinese community of Hong Kong is the descendant of two historical traditions, that of mainland China and that of a British colony. It can be assumed that both traditions have shaped attitudes towards government. Li Chien-ming (1966: 11) writes :

"The traditional Chinese view of the ideal relationship between government and people...is analogous to that which should exist between parents and children....This traditional concept does not contemplate the direct participation of the population in the organization or processes of government. The Chinese people had characteristically remained aloof...from party politics for the last several thousands years, refraining from political action except during their most distressing moments."

The history of China would not encourage a Chinese, particularly a refugee from mainland China fleeing political oppression, to take an active part in making decisions for his community if he valued his peace of mind, his property, or his life. The traumatic experiences refugees have undergone predispose most of them to political quietism. As a Chinese Legislative Councilor colorfully put it, "Hong Kong is a lifeboat; China is the sea. Those who have climbed into the lifeboat naturally do not want to rock it" (Hoadley 1973: 613).

The history of Hong Kong itself also provides clues to the political conservatism of the colony's residents during most of its history. The fact that only a tiny minority of the present population is descended from the original inhabitants means that most residents from China see themselves as immigrants rather than natives. Consequently they perceive themselves as willing subjects of a foreign government, not involuntary slaves of a conquering colonial regime.

The distinctive political culture that developed under colonial rule was the result of an amalgam of circumstances attributable partly to history and partly to the need to keep controversy for controversy's sake to a minimum. The political socialization of Hong Kong residents favored consensus as the most appropriate goal of politics. A consensus, says one writer (Graham 1984: 111), is a "state of agreement, which varies in intensity and scope over time, incorporating the goals for society, the procedures for decision-making, and the particular policies." In Hong Kong, such a consensus entailed a very careful political construction. In the period of reform after the 1966–67 riots, the British and Hong Kong governments wanted to create an institutional framework that would appear to simultaneously incorporate representatives of various sections of the community and maintain a strongly conservative bias preserving the executive powers of the colonial regime.

The resulting political reforms helped create the ensuing decade of growth and peaceful change. Political stability, economic prosperity, and greatly expanded social policy outputs in Hong Kong characterize this period. Targets were set for the construction of public housing and for an increased number of schools. Social welfare policies were drawn up, new towns were planned, medical facilities were improved, and an underground railway was built. Government centered its effort on reforming the civil service, improving the quality of life, and eliminating police corruption.

While improvements in the quality of social policy outputs were gradually incorporated into the government's plans, political change came very slowly. The political mechanism of co-optation and consultation continued and was further expanded at both the central and local levels. By the 1980s, however, at which time the future of Hong Kong was becoming a topic of discussion at every level, there was a demand for more open political participation. The reforms of the district administration in 1982 had involved more local people than ever before. The Legislative Council elections of 1985 were the first elections in Hong Kong, in which 24 members were indirectly elected. In 1991, there were direct elections to the Council. At that time, elected members, 18 directly and 21 indirectly elected, became the majority.

Throughout the decade leading up to the handover, there was pressure from the local community for more democratic representation and more accountability. This drive was offset by pressure from the Chinese government urging caution and the continuation of the status quo. The resulting tension between the British and the Chinese governments over this issue is well known.

 

Hong Kong Into The Transition

China's official attitude on the future of Hong Kong was relatively simple and could be reduced to the proposition that the treaties had been unequal, Hong Kong was Chinese territory, and China would take back Hong Kong "sooner or later" when the time was ripe. Negotiations between the governments of the United Kingdom and the PRC over the future of Hong Kong started in Beijing in September 1982.

Representatives of the British and Chinese governments sat down to discuss the details of how Hong Kong could be administered by China, yet also preserve the distinctive features of the place. These included the successful free-market economy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the rule of law. The result was Deng Xiaoping's unique and imaginative "one country, two systems," a slogan enshrined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration, as it is known, is a unique arrangement. It contains more than 8,000 words and is perhaps the second largest international agreement ever concluded by the PRC. Under the Declaration, sovereignty over the whole territory–most of Kowloon Peninsula and the New Territories (whose lease expired in 1997), plus Hong Kong Island and part of Kowloon (which were ceded outright)–would revert to China on 1 July 1997. Thereafter, Hong Kong would be a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. As such, Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws in force at the time of the handover, except for those that contravene the Basic Law, would remain the same, and the legal system would remain unchanged in many important respects. The significant legal principles underpinning the system would also remain in effect. These include the right to be tried by a jury, the presumption of innocence, freedom of speech, and freedom of religious beliefs. Hong Kong's present social and economic systems would continue unchanged for 50 years. Its status as a free port and international financial center would not change. An impressive array of rights and freedoms, including respect for private property, ownership of enterprise, and legitimate right of inheritance, would be protected by the Special Administrative Region government (Joint Declaration, 1984). The Chinese government pledged that the above basic policies would be valid for 50 years after 1997.

By and large, there was general consensus that the agreement reached in 1984 was the best the British government could expect to obtain and there was optimism, at least in the business classes, that stability and economic prosperity were assured. However, the events of 4 June 1989 in Tiananmen Square forced some in the community to reappraise the guarantees promised in the Joint Declaration. A new wave of uncertainty arose at that time over the future of the Territory after 1997. Although emigration has been a feature of life in Hong Kong for over a hundred years, the number of people leaving increased dramatically from an average of 20,000 per year in the early 1980s to over 60,000 in 1990.

In his study of transitional politics in non-Western countries, Lucian Pye shows that a shared characteristic of most colonial transitions is the general lack of consensus about the legitimate ends and means of political action. The fundamental fact that transitional societies are engrossed in a process of discontinuous social change precludes the possibility of a widely shared agreement about what is and is not an appropriate political activity (Pye 1992). In the political realm, where conscious choice and rational strategies should vie in promoting alternative human values, it becomes difficult to discern the possible choices and the truly held values of the people. This is certainly the case for Hong Kong's transition from colonialism, too. Conflicting views abound about how to continue prosperity and stability after 1997.

Broadly speaking, in the period leading up to the handover, there were two camps trying to capture the political marketplace. The view of one camp was that reform of Hong Kong's present system was necessary and the only logical approach was to develop a representative form of government, with its legitimacy and power rooted in Hong Kong. The British government took this position, as did most of the politically motivated pressure groups and democratic coalitions. The other camp, which the PRC government supported, was of the opinion that there should be "no big change" to the current political structure. Most of the capitalists and economic elites were and continue to be staunch exponents and supporters of the status quo.

The Chinese preference for preserving the political status quo in the wake of the transfer of sovereignty is publicly very clear. The Chinese want to see continued prosperity in Hong Kong after 1997. They estimate that their formula of "no big change" will bring Hong Kong the same "quality" and "quantity" of prosperity. If there are changes, they reason, Hong Kong might not be as they want it to be. Ji Peng-fei, the former head of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs for the Chinese government, openly expressed the view that the proposition of "prosperity plus reforms" is unacceptable and that "only those elements that run counter to the transfer of sovereignty, that exhibit colonial characteristics and that damage the honor of the Chinese people need to be changed while all others should remain unchanged" (Kuan and Lau 1987).

The transition has occurred. Stability, order, and prosperity remain intact for the moment, although the latter is a bit battered by the Asian financial crisis. To predict what will happen in the future, however, is no easy task. Throughout this decade, things have been changing very quickly, and things will continue to change in the future. Like it or not, the PRC government is observing these changes and is aware of their momentum. The first of these changes is the continuing quest for democracy. The emergence of a political market enables politicians representing different sectors of the population to be involved in the decision-making arena. The first direct election to the legislature in 1991 clearly demonstrated this change of atmosphere.

Another change resulted from the problem of the so-called brain drain. Ever since the negotiations began in 1982, Hong Kong has been losing a considerable number of managers and professionals every year. They are the elites and the middle class on which the colonial administration relied heavily for legitimacy in the past. Many stayed behind, and recent trends show that some are returning to Hong Kong to secure opportunities created by the brain drain. Nonetheless, it is a fact that the new government still needs to nurture new leaders who can provide a vision for the future; it must also cultivate political efficacy and self-identity among the expectant public. In order to do this, Hong Kong after 1997 must be a place where the public believes it has a secure future in a free and fair society with an accountable government and an independent judiciary.

The third change is the gradual development of an economic realism that acknowledges that Hong Kong's economy cannot operate under the international free-market system unless it has relatively free-market politics. Hong Kong is crucial to China's own development, particularly in terms of direct trade and inward investment, acting as a link with the world economic community. Any move by China that would damage Hong Kong's prosperity must, therefore, take account of the effect on the development of China and prospects for internal, regional, and international stability in the short-and long-term. The more China develops, the greater the need to fine-tune the relationship between the polity and the socioeconomic system in Hong Kong.

Finally, the change of sovereignty, which entails a change of ideology, means a new relationship must be developed with the Chinese government. Hong Kong will become an "internal" problem for Beijing's political leaders. The question of how to meet the challenge of "one country, two systems" for the future development of Hong Kong will continue to be on their minds for some time to come. The struggle between what is called "interference" by the sovereign and "participation" by the people of Hong Kong will require new political engineering.

 

The Key Challenges

So, what is the future for Hong Kong? Will the "Pearl of the Orient" continue to remain an open and fair society, as well as a dynamic economy, as we move into a new millennium? Or will we see a decline in personal freedom, an erosion of the Hong Kong government's autonomy, the reemergence of corruption, and a general whittling away of those qualities that give Hong Kong its distinct, international identity?

In his book Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time, the veteran journalist Richard Hughes wrote: "Hong Kong is China. That was, is and remains the abiding corner-stone of survival for the unique territory." At midnight on 30 June 1977, this statement became literally true.

But is Hong Kong just another Chinese city? Certainly its people are predominantly Chinese, and profoundly proud to be so as I think all those of Chinese descent are, in whatever corner of the world they were born or dwell. Yet for us there is a dichotomy, one that I suspect those of you who are Chinese Americans feel as well. We are Chinese, but we are also Hong Kong people, and that, we feel, makes us a bit different. There are aspects to our culture, to our experience, that set us apart from the mainland. We have grown up, above all, in a "climate of freedom." That may sound odd to the ears of citizens of the country that was the first to cast off the "yoke" of British colonialism, but it is a fact that George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and the other patriots might actually find quite a lot they approve of in Hong Kong today! We have grown used to the rule of law, to free speech, to a free press, to freedom of movement, and to a liberal education system. It is, of course, true that independence has never been in the cards for us, and that, until the 1980s, there wasn't much that could justly be described as democracy. Yet the colonial government was generally responsive to the wishes of the people, and this responsiveness grew in the last decade of the colony.

It is the "climate of freedom" that has allowed the Chinese citizens of Hong Kong to develop their talents and energies to the maximum extent. Our post war record is particularly remarkable. In 1945, when Hong Kong was liberated at the end of the Second World War, the city was a ruin and the population had fallen to 600,000. Today, Hong Kong is one of the world's leading commercial and financial centers, with a thriving population of 6 million.

Hong Kong's Trade and Development Council lists a lot of "facts" about what Hong Kong has become in the last 50 years: "the world's freest economy," "the world's eighth largest trading economy in the world," "the world's second most competitive economy," "the world's busiest container port," to repeat only a few. As a result of this amazing expansion, Hong Kong enjoyed an average real GDP growth of 6.5 percent each year during the 10 years preceding the Asian business crisis. In 1997, Hong Kong's per capita GDP was US$23,200 , higher than many western countries, including Britain, Canada, and Australia.

But Hong Kong's story has not only been one of economic success. Our growing prosperity has also enabled us to finance ever-improving services for our community. Let me give some examples. In the midst of an economy that is labeled the world's freest, over half the population lives in subsidized public housing that they either rent or own. We aim to produce some 316,000 additional housing units in the public sector by the year 2001. Since 1978, nine years of free education have been provided for all our children. In addition, over 90 percent of Hong Kong's children now complete highly subsidized upper secondary education or the equivalent technical education, and there are first-year first-degree places in our universities for 18 percent of the relevant age group. We have comprehensive medical and health services that are provided either free or at very low charge. Our infant mortality is lower, and our life expectancy is longer, than that of the United States or the United Kingdom. And, finally, we have both a means tested Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme, and non means tested allowances for people who are aged 70 and above or who have a disability. As rags-to-riches stories go, Hong Kong's isn't bad.

But will it, can it, go on beyond 1997? I say it can and will, but I do not say this out of a spirit of blind optimism. There are challenges, there will be problems, and we shall have to struggle. We shall have to use all our energies and determination if we are to retain our essential autonomy and identity and our place in the international community, while at the same time lending our weight (as we have lent it these last 15 years and more) to China's drive toward modernization and prosperity.

What basis is there for believing that Hong Kong will continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, our present lifestyle, and our social, legal, and economic systems–for at least 50 years after 1997?

There is, firstly, a legal basis, laid down in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which was signed in 1984 and subsequently registered at the United Nations by both Britain and China. Annex I to the Joint Declaration sets out in detail the basic policies of the People's Republic of China toward the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). It states that the SAR will be vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial powers, including that of final adjudication. The government and legislature of the SAR will be composed of local inhabitants, in other words, not people sent from mainland China. The legislature will be constituted by elections, and the executive authorities will be accountable to it. Common law will continue to be practiced. In addition to Chinese, English may continue to be used by the government and in the courts.

The provisions of the Joint Declaration have been further enshrined in the Basic Law, the constitution that China has drafted, in consultation with Hong Kong people, for the Special Administrative Region. Together, the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law embody Deng Xiaoping's twin precepts of "one country, two systems" and "Hong Kong people to run Hong Kong." But what other reasons are there for confidence beyond these two "scraps of paper"?

You will often hear people say that Hong Kong will continue to prosper because it is in China's interest that it should. This is true. But I would go much further. It is in everyone's interest that it should–China, Britain, the international community, and, above all, the people of Hong Kong themselves. No one stands to gain anything from Hong Kong's collapse or slow disintegration.

However, there is debate as to what constitutes the fundamentals of Hong Kong's continuing stability and prosperity. There is a school of thought that says that Hong Kong people care about nothing but money, that when you land at Hong Kong's airport the first aroma that greets you is the smell of money, that life in Hong Kong revolves around boardroom battles and stockmarket wheeling and dealing, and that Hong Kong people have no use for democracy and liberty. I often hear this view put forward, sometimes by people I know pretty well. I always wonder whether they are talking about the place in which I have lived all my life and the many selfless, civilized, public spirited citizens of all ranks who have many, many, priorities in life beyond making a fortune. Prosperity is crucial, certainly–no one would deny it. But freedom is the foundation of our economic success, not the other way around.

I fear that one sad proof of what freedom means to Hong Kong people has been the recent large efflux of emigrants heading for America, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere, particularly since the events of June 4, 1989. These people have not left Hong Kong to find fame and fortune. In most cases, they have left their fortunes behind and have had to settle for lower paid jobs, or no jobs at all, in the countries where they have settled. They have left in search of a guarantee of freedom. This diaspora of Hong Kong talent is a tragedy. We should not minimize its significance. However, I do not believe that it will do Hong Kong fatal harm, and I am hopeful that many of the émigrés will return. Indeed, some of them already have, their confidence in the future restored.

So Hong Kong's future depends on more than prosperity. It rests on making a reality out of the terms of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. We cannot continue to have a free and vigorous economy unless we continue to enjoy the other fundamental facets of our traditional "climate of freedom."

I would stress in particular the importance of maintaining the rule of law overseen by an independent judiciary. In Hong Kong today, no one is above the law. Anyone can take the government to court, and in many cases he or she will receive legal aid with which to do so. The law-making process is open and transparent. And the government does not always get its own way in this process. All legislative proposals put forward by the government have to be approved by the Legislative Council, in which the government has no vote. The law is enforced impartially and fairly. The continuation of this system is underwritten by the Basic Law.

I would place the public accountability of the government next in importance, for this embraces both essential human freedoms and the need for a clean and efficient civil service. The people of Hong Kong have never been loath to criticize their government whenever its services failed to meet their expectations. Our press has been one of the most vigorous and outspoken in the world, although I would not deny that there is now some evidence of "self-censorship" over matters relating to China, which is a worrisome development. The Legislative Council, meanwhile, makes full use of its right to question the government on its policies, to examine draft legislation, and to scrutinize proposals for public expenditure. Again, the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law guarantee the continuation of this system.

Although international treaty and by the constitution of the Special Administrative Region guarantee Hong Kong freedom and a high degree of autonomy beyond 1997, we cannot simply sit back and wait for these good things to drop into our hands. When have such things ever come that easily?

Ensuring that we do enjoy freedom and autonomy after 1997 is both the challenge and the opportunity. I am confident that we have what it takes to face that challenge and seize that opportunity. The fundamentals of Hong Kong's past and present successes are so sound and so all-pervasive that, whatever debates and controversies may have raged, Hong Kong has come through the transition as Hong Kong.

Struggle and crisis have forged the robust qualities of the place and its people. The post-war success story that I outlined earlier was achieved in the face of many obstacles. But Hong Kong has always been good at making a virtue out of necessity. For example, the hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled to Hong Kong to escape political turmoil in China, and whose arrival created gigantic social challenges in housing, education, and health care, were the very people whose energy and enterprise helped create the wealth that overcame the social challenges. There were other obstacles: civil disturbance (most notably in 1967 when the Cultural Revolution spilled past the mainland Chinese border), periodic economic recessions (including the current one), and natural disasters, too—typhoons and landslides. Hong Kong survived and flourished in this post-war atmosphere of challenge. And it is this historical background that strengthens my confidence that we shall be equal to whatever challenges the future may throw out, and ready to grab whatever opportunities the future will certainly offer.

Working with young people has given me a deep faith in the power of youth. Hong Kong has a great reservoir of youthful talent and energy, young people who are proud to belong to Hong Kong, young people who want no other home and would live nowhere else, young people who will also be proud to contribute to the resurgence of the Chinese nation as a whole.

Hong Kong has gone back to China. In some spiritual sense it never left. Its political return has been an event of great historical significance. But what is even more significant is that the Hong Kong of 1 July was essentially the Hong Kong of 30 June. The continuum of political, social, and economic progress has and will be maintained. With a high degree of autonomy and its "climate of freedom," Hong Kong, a city of China, will remain a unique place, a place that exemplifies the triumph of the Chinese spirit better than any other, but that is also an international vortex welcoming people of all races who wish to work and live and drink deep of its vivid, vigorous, and varied atmosphere.

I can offer you no proof that all that I have written here will come true. But of this I am certain. The truths of which historians will someday write are the truths that we must now create. The people of Hong Kong can and must grasp their own future today and every day to come.

 

References

Graham, George J. 1984. "Consensus," in Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis, edited by Giovanni Sartori. Beverly Hills, Cali.: Sage Publications.

Hoadley, John S. 1973. "Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese: Patterns and Trends," Asia Survey 13: 604–616.

Hong Kong Annual Report 1955. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer.

Hong Kong: Report 1899. 1901. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office.

Hughes, Richard. 1968. Hong Kong: Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time. New York: F. A. Praeger.

Kuan H.C., and Lau S.K. 1987. "Hong Kong's Search for a Consensus: Barriers and Prospects," in The Future of Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond, edited by Jungdah Chiu, Y.C. Jao, and Yuan-li Wu. New York: Quorum Books.

Li Chien-ming. 1966. Report of the Working Party on Local Administration. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer.

Pye, Lucian. 1992. Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Pye, Lucian, and Sidney Verba, eds. 1965. Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.