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## NOTES

### 1. INTRODUCTION: RACE REPRESENTATIVES OR “RESPONSIBLE LEGISLATORS”?

1. *Dred Scott v. Sanford*, 60 U.S. 393, 19 Howard 393 (1857).
2. See for example, Lucius Barker and Mack Jones, *African Americans and the American Political System*, 353–60; Charles V. Hamilton, “Deracialization: Examination of a Political Strategy,” 3–5; Joseph P. McCormick II and Charles E. Jones, “The Conceptualization of Deracialization,” 79; and Katherine Tate, *From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections*, ch. 1.
3. Norman Beckman, “U.S. Budget Shifts Costs to States,” 12–13; Charles A. Bowsher, “Federal Cutbacks Strengthen State Role,” 18–21; and Nathan and Doolittle, “The Evolution of Federal Aid.”
4. St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, *Black Metropolis*. For a succinct discussion of the race man concept, see Elijah Anderson’s “The Precarious Balance: Race Man or Sellout?” in Ellis Cose, ed., *The Darden Dilemma*, 114–32.
5. See Dymally (1971) for a similar view.
6. Friedman 1993:30. The group of legislators that Friedman alludes to includes women and African Americans.
7. Button and Scher (1984) discuss a related concept that they call “the problem of dual legitimacy.” The dilemma associated with dual legitimacy stems from the

fact that African American officials elected to local offices often run in at-large electoral systems. Button and Scher argue that, in this context, black candidates need “to appeal to whites as well as blacks in order to win and stay in office, and therefore they are less committed to serving blacks” (211).

8. This phenomenon is often referred to as “double-consciousness.”

9. The race representative and the deracialization strategies involved are akin to David Canon’s (1995, 1999) difference and commonality perspectives, respectively. According to Canon, difference representatives consider themselves first and foremost as advocates for African American constituents, while commonality representatives downplay the racial aspects of political issues. See Canon 1995:161–64, and 1999:34–46.

10. McCormick and Jones (1993) point out that deracialization can be used as an electoral as well as an agenda-setting strategy. As an electoral strategy, deracialization is “connected with attempts to capture office in majority white political jurisdictions,” and as an agenda-setting strategy, it is “connected with governance after elections have been won” (69).

11. Wilson 1987:162. It is important to note that Wilson’s advocacy for “universal” programs does not completely remove racial considerations from the policy process. It simply relegates to race a less prominent role. He writes, for example, “I emphasized that although this program would include targeted strategies—both means tested and race-specific—they would be considered secondary to the universal program so that the latter are seen as the most visible and dominant aspects in the eyes of the general public” (162).

12. The lone exception is the data used in chapter 5. A detailed discussion of these data may be found there.

13. The regional diversity accounted for here is the South (Arkansas and North Carolina), the Mid-Atlantic (Maryland), the Midwest (Illinois), and the Northeast (New Jersey).

## 2. AGENDA-SETTING AND THE REPRESENTATION OF BLACK INTERESTS

1. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, 209–211. Also see Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karpis, “The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2 (August): 3.

2. Blue quoted in Van Denton, “N.C. Blacks Stand to Make Big Political Gains,” *Raleigh News and Observer*, October 4, 1962, 1A. Representative Blue, a Democrat from Wake County, is the first and only African American to be selected speaker of the North Carolina General Assembly.

3. See Jewell (1983) for a detailed review of the major literature on legislative-constituency relations.

4. Seventy-six percent of the African American representatives included in this study were elected in majority black districts. Similarly, Button and Hedge (1993) found that 75 percent of black state legislators responding to their national survey represented majority black districts.

5. See Dawson 1994, esp. 10–11, 45–48.

6. See W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” in Max Black, ed. *The Importance of Language*.

7. Although table 2.3 only shows data for selected years between 1970 and 1990, U.S. census data confirms this assertion. See U.S. Department of Commerce 1991: table 717.

8. Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson’s (1989) finding that there is a general congruence between the policy preferences of African Americans of various social classes is consistent with the findings of an earlier, though less comprehensive, study by Ippolito, Donaldson, and Bowman (1968).

9. Also see Tate (1993) who reports similar findings regarding the policy preferences of African Americans.

10. See also Richard L. Hall, *Participation in Congress*, and Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees,” *American Political Science Review* 84:797–820, for similar discussions of the problems relative to the use of roll calls as reflections of legislative behavior.

11. The data used here are from an original data-set constructed by Kathleen A. Bratton and myself. Much of the analysis in this chapter is drawn from Bratton and Haynie (1992, 1999a).

12. Only “substantive” bill introductions are used in this analysis. Substantive bills are proposals for new laws or programs. Nonbinding resolutions and memorials are not counted as bill introductions for this study. For New Jersey, bills introduced in 1978 and 1988 were included rather than bills introduced in 1979 and 1989. Legislative elections were held in 1977 and 1987, and the following years were the ones in which newly elected representatives could reasonably be expected to have some impact in the legislature.

13. As used in this table, black interest bills include introductions concerning civil rights, education, health care, poverty/social welfare as well as children’s and women’s issues. The percentages are based on data pooled from each of the five states.

14. Dummy variables are included to control for state effects, omitting New Jersey as a reference category. Likewise, dummy variables were used to control for year effects, omitting 1969 as a reference category.

15. See, for example, Bratton and Haynie (1999a), who find that women are more likely than men to introduce black interest legislation.

16. The majority black district variable is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the district is majority black and 0 otherwise.

17. As with Herring (1990), the population of the largest city in the district logged is used to measure urbanness.

18. It should be noted that both the Swain and Whitby studies focused on the representation of African American interests at the congressional level, whereas this chapter examines black interest representation in state legislatures.

19. *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); *Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). For analysis and commentary on these and similar U.S. Supreme Court cases, see Canon 1999:60–92, and Reeves 1997.

20. This finding was first reported in Bratton and Haynie 1999a.

### 3. RACE, REPRESENTATION, AND COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

1. For example, see Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Job As He Sees It*; Richard Fenno, *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress and Congressmen in Committees*; Wayne L. Francis, *The Legislative Committee Game: A Comparative Analysis of Fifty States*; George Goodwin, *The Little Legislatures: Committees of Congress*; Kevin B. Grier and Michael C. Munger, “Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions”; Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Congressional Committee Assignments: An Optimization Model with Institutional Constraints” and “Representation and Governance: The Great Trade-off”; Steven Smith and Christopher Deering, *Committees in Congress*; and Charles Stewart, “Committee Hierarchies in the Modernizing House, 1875–1947.”

2. Francis (1989) cautions that we can only assume truthfulness in the survey respondents’ answers. He warns that “it is possible . . . that legislators tempered their committee assignment request to match their expectations of success in receiving those assignments” (26–27). Also see Shepsle 1978, chs. 3–5, for an in-depth discussion and treatment of this point.

3. See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion defining black interests.

4. In the mid-1960s, as the most blatant forms of racial discrimination begin to dissipate and African Americans begin to enjoy political enfranchisement, emphasis began to shift toward improving the conditions of the nation’s poor with President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society programs. Particular attention was given to the African American community as a result of studies like Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s *The Negro Family* (1965).

5. Eulau identifies Rhode and Shepsle (1973) as an example of a study with this particular flaw.

6. Canon (1999) has an excellent discussion and provides in-depth analyses of this general point (see esp. 34–59 and ch. 4).

7. The total number of African American committee assignments is arrived at by aggregating all the committee assignments held by each individual African American legislator in a legislative session.

8. The political incorporation of African Americans in state legislatures is dealt with more fully in chapter 4.

9. Such politicians are also referred to as representatives of the “new black politics.” For example, see Barker and Jones (1994:322).

10. In contrast to the commonality representatives are what Canon (1999) calls “difference” representatives. Difference representatives are quite similar to the race representatives described in this study. They “view politics through the lens of race and require representation of distinctive black interest by black representatives” (39).

11. This measure may, in many instances, underestimate the true influence potential of black legislators on standing committees. For example, African Americans are certain to have more influence on a committee when their party is in the majority than when it is not.

12. There were no African Americans in the Arkansas House in 1969.

13. Urban affairs issues fell within the jurisdiction of the Cities and Villages Committee in 1979.

14. In Maryland, the Ways and Means Committee is categorized as a black interest committee rather than a prestige committee because it handles education, health, and social welfare matters.

15. Specifically, Bratton and Haynie (1999b) found that “in Illinois, blacks are significantly more likely than whites to serve on all three types of committees; in North Carolina, blacks are significantly more likely to serve on education and welfare committees; and in New Jersey blacks are significantly more likely than whites to serve on welfare committees” (13). They report similar findings for women legislators.

#### 4. AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL INCORPORATION: A VIEW FROM THE STATES

1. See, for example, Barker and Jones, *African Americans and the American Political System*, 321–30; Hamilton, “Deracialization: Examination of a Political Strate-

gy,” 3–5; McCormick and Jones, “The Conceptualization of Deracialization,” 79; and Tate, *From Protest to Politics*, ch. 1.

2. Although Bobo and Gilliam (1990) use the term “political empowerment” rather than political incorporation, they are characterizing a set of processes and conditions almost identical to the ones described here and by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984.

3. Prestige or power committees are the Appropriations, Budget, Finance/Taxation, and Rules committees (see Smith and Deering 1980:84). Leadership positions include assistant majority/minority leader, party whips, assistant party whips, and committee chairs. The Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader positions are counted separately.

4. For examples of studies that examine variables or characteristics that contribute to power and influence in legislatures, see Heinz Eulaum “Bases of Authority in Legislative Bodies: A Comparative Analysis”; Stephen Frantzich, “Who Makes Our Laws? The Legislative Effectiveness of Members of the U.S. Congress”; Keith E. Hamm, Robert Harmel, and Robert Thompson, “Ethnic and Partisan Minorities in Two Southern Legislatures”; Kerry L. Haynie, “The Color of Their Skin or the Content of Their Behavior?”; Malcom E. Jewell, *The State Legislature*; Katherine Meyer, “Legislative Influence: Toward Theory Development Through Causal Analysis”; David M. Olson and Cynthia T. Nonidez, “Measures of Legislative Performance in the U.S. House of Representatives”; and Carol S. Weissert, “Determinants and Dynamics of Perceived Legislative Effectiveness in the North Carolina State Legislature, 1977–1987.”

5. African Americans’ presence in state legislatures dates back to Reconstruction, but my usage of “new” here refers to the reemergence of African American representation in state legislatures in the post-1950s and during the civil rights movement of the 1960s.

6. The fifteen legislative sessions (five states, three time points) were divided into quartiles for the purposes of the analyses that follow. Because fifteen does not divide evenly by four, the “highest” quartile contains just three sessions.

7. Frantzich 1979:411. See Dahl (1956, 1961) for similar and related arguments.

8. For examples of alternative explanations for legislative decision-making, see R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action*; Morris Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*; Kingdon 1981; and David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*.

9. The result for African American political incorporation is particularly surprising given how the concept is measured. Recall that the incorporation scale includes measures for seniority, leadership positions, majority party status, and prestige committee assignments. These characteristics have often been found to be positively related to legislators’ ability to successfully guide bills through the legisla-

tive labyrinth (e.g., Bratton and Haynie 1999a, 1999b; Frantzich 1979; Haynie 1999; Hibbing 1991, 1993; Jacobson 1992). For example, Bratton and Haynie (1999a), in a study that includes all the states and each of the legislative sessions examined here, found that being in the majority party and holding leadership positions contributed to a legislator's success at passing bills.

10. This finding is similar to the findings of the 45-state study of political incorporation conducted by Nelson (1991:14).

11. The claim regarding African American citizens' desire for more government spending for education is supported by several studies of African American public opinion. See, for example, Dawson 1994; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; and Keene et al. 1993.

12. Ideally, a time-series approach should be used, but such an analysis is not possible with the present data set.

13. For an in-depth discussion of each of these variables' (and others') potential impact on state spending decisions, see Paul E. Peterson, *The Price of Federalism*, 89–103.

14. It should be noted, however, that my incorporation index differs significantly from Nelson's in that it measures political incorporation using a broader perspective.

## 5. RACE AND PEER EVALUATIONS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATORS: A CASE STUDY

1. In the extant literature, this category has not included race, class, or gender. Instead, it has been a proxy for such characteristics as party affiliation, educational level, and occupational background.

2. Meyer (1980) and Weissert (1989) present a more detailed discussion of this literature and its uses of these variables. See Hall (1992) for a general critique of these studies.

3. It should be noted that some studies (e.g., Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990; Sigelman et al. 1995) argue that there are certain conditions under which race is not a critical factor in how black political candidates are evaluated.

4. See Charles Mahtesian, "Best and Dimmest," for a more detailed review and evaluation of these and other effectiveness studies.

5. For a similar use of this method and approach in a one-state study using NCCPPR's effectiveness data, see Carol S. Weissert, "Issue Salience and State Legislative Effectiveness" (1991).

6. In two respects, the North Carolina legislature was somewhat atypical for the period studied. North Carolina's legislature had more standing committees than

any other state, and it experienced one-party dominance. The limited party competition was typical of some Southern states, but not the nation as a whole (Weisert 1989).

7. The pooled data structure is unusual in that it includes many legislators multiple times, but is not generally a panel design. A representative could appear one, two, three, four, or five times in the pooling, depending on the number of sessions in which he or she served. In fact, all these possibilities are present in the data, with just thirty-eight legislators (two African Americans) appearing in all five sessions. The repeat appearance of legislators introduces serial correlation. In general, OLS is unbiased, though inefficient, in the face of either serial correlation or heteroskedasticity. With the number of units in each cross section considerably larger than the number of time points, there should be no serious loss in efficiency in the estimates. OLS standard errors are, however, suspect and will be underestimated.

For the pooled analyses in regression tables, I report robust standard errors with an additional correction for multiple observations per legislator (Rogers 1993; White 1980). Thus both individual legislator effects, to account for serial correlation, and any heteroskedastic effects are incorporated in the estimated standard errors.

8. The specific interactive variables created and assessed are: African American  $\times$  Seniority, African American  $\times$  Leadership, African American  $\times$  Lawyer, African American  $\times$  Rules Committee, African American  $\times$  Appropriations Committee, and African American  $\times$  Bill Introductions.

9. Because the results of these additional regression models are not significantly different from what is reported above, I do not include them in the text.

## 6. CONCLUSION

1. Although it is true that women legislators sometimes face similar dilemmas, the pressures to focus on women's issues seems not to be as great for them as the pressures for African Americans to focus on black interests. This may be due to the fact that there tend to be more women than African Americans in legislatures, and the fact that, in any given legislature, women legislators as a group are more diverse ideologically and are less cohesive than African Americans. See, for example, Carroll 1991:3.

2. Also see Barker and Jones (1994:353–60) for a similar view.

3. There was a total of fifteen legislative sessions examined in this book (five states and three sessions each), but there were no African Americans in the Arkansas legislature in 1969; thus only fourteen of the legislative sessions are considered here.

4. Canon (1995, 1999) and Whitby (1997) offer three studies on race and repre-



sentation in the U.S. Congress that reach conclusions similar to the ones I reach here regarding the link between descriptive and substantive representation. For a brief summary of their conclusions, see the discussion of Whitby's *The Color of Representation* and Canon's *Race, Redistricting, and Representation* at the end of chapter 2 of the present volume.

5. There is much debate about what exactly constitutes "significant numbers." Mansbridge (1999) makes a persuasive argument in favor of proportional representation. She writes, "In practice, . . . disadvantaged groups often need the full representation that proportionality allows in order to achieve several goals: deliberative synergy, critical mass, dispersion of influence, and a range of views within the group" (636). She goes on to say that "the demand for proportionality is accentuated by the fact that, in practice, almost all democratic assemblies are aggregative as well as deliberative, and achieving the full normative legitimacy of the aggregative function requires that the members of the representative body cast votes for each affected conflicting interest in proportion to the numbers of such interest bearers in the population" (637).

6. Mansbridge 1999:650. See Guinier 1994 for a similar argument.

