Introduction

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Peace operations have undergone several evolutions in the last decade and a half, both in terms of the type of operations launched and in the way they are perceived. In recent years, the demand for peace operations has grown significantly, leading to a steady rise in the number conducted annually since 2002. Along with this rise is an explosive growth in the number of troops required for them and in the number of countries participating in them. In 2006, about 60 percent of the world's countries contributed nearly 150,000 troops to peace operations. The number of operations with mission strengths of over 5,000 personnel in 2006 was twice the number of missions of this size in 2000.¹ The large-scale deployments are, among other things, a reflection of heightened international political appreciation of the value of peace operations and a reaffirmation by many states of the United Nations (UN) Security Council's commitment to "a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."²

The current trend toward expanded peace operations is rooted in the experiences of the 1990s.³ Developments in that period have been extensively documented and analyzed in published literature, much of which has underscored the more problematic nature of operations.⁴ Numerous studies have diagnosed the problems and suggested changes in practice for institutions and nations authorizing and carrying out missions. Their focus has been predominantly on operations mandated by and executed through the UN, even though regional organizations—with the UN's encouragement—and ad hoc coalitions have come to account for half of the operations on a yearly basis.

Particularly since 2000, published attention has been increasingly directed to how these non–UN entities have supplemented or supplanted "UN coverage." Much of this more recent literature concentrates particularly on European (including NATO) and African developments, since these regions have been the most active in addressing their respective institutional and national needs. Still rare are studies that systematically look at other regions. Rarer yet are those that compare troop contributors and noncontributors within and across regions to determine either what they have in common or how they differ across a range of characteristics and capabilities.

This volume goes beyond the published literature by concentrating on trends in and prospects for regional and national capacities to undertake peace operations. It does not ignore the UN—probably the most oft-mentioned organization in the volume—but considers it against the backdrop of what

regional institutions and ad hoc coalitions are doing to carry out their own missions. It breaks relatively new ground with some of the questions it raises, some of the information and conclusions it offers, and in the evidence and methodologies employed in some of the chapters. While the book updates trends and developments identified in earlier works, it also addresses long-standing shortfalls in the literature.

The book is divided into two sections. Part I focuses on global trends and prospects *across* regions and nations; part II addresses trends and prospects *within* regions and nations. The conclusion draws together various findings and assesses the prospects for peace operations in light of both positive and negative trends.

Part I answers relatively basic questions that have not yet been addressed comprehensively due to a lack of detailed time-series data about national contributions to missions, especially those conducted by non—UN entities. Tabulating UN statistics poses the lesser challenge, since the data can be found on the UN's website and in paper records at the New York headquarters. While sorting through paper files is tedious, the records at least are accessible at one location and relatively complete. Such is not the case with data for operations undertaken by regional institutions and coalitions of the willing. Collecting these statistics is a time-consuming, labor-intensive slow march across thousands of sources from institutional internet sites (most of which remain hit or miss in what they provide) to scholarly analyses and news articles. The level of effort needed to generate a comprehensive and cross-checked database is enormous.⁸

A unique feature of this volume is that it brings together the results of major data-gathering projects undertaken at Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA). While aggregated SIPRI data have been available through its yearbooks for nearly fifteen years, it was only two years ago that the institute began to provide disaggregated yearly national data. It was at about the same time that both the CPASS and the FBA projects had accumulated and vetted enough data to allow for initial use in published research. Each effort is conducted independently with its own operational definitions, criteria, and counting rules. The respective databases should be viewed as complementary rather than competitive.

A second relatively unique feature of this volume is that it attends not only to regions that have an established institutional track record in peace operations but also to regions that do not. Much has been written about Europe and Africa because there is much to say about what their institutions have done and are doing; the chapters devoted to them in this volume do a superb job of updating their developments. Far less has yet been published about other regions precisely because their institutions have done less. However, this volume examines them to answer two fundamental questions rarely addressed elsewhere: If little or nothing has been done institutionally in a region, why not? And what should be expected?

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The five chapters in part I address a variety of fundamental questions about trends in and prospects for peace operations worldwide, the breakdown between two basic mission types (interstate and intrastate), the number of troops deployed overall, the number deployed by basic mission type, the regional distribution of operations, the characteristics of troop contributors, the factors that affect troop availability, the division of labor between UN and non–UN entities, and finally some generic capabilities that have become or are becoming more important for success in complex peacekeeping and hazardous operations.

Part I appropriately begins with a chapter by FBA professor Birger Heldt that challenges widely held views about the relation between UN and non-UN entities. Its focus on that relation, and its lengthy time perspective, 1948 through 2005, provides a solid foundation for better informed reading of the volume's later chapters. In chapter 2, Georgetown professor Donald C. F. Daniel and research assistants Katrin Heuel and Benjamin Margo employ data from 2001 through 2005 for a broader and more in-depth look at an issue introduced by Heldt: the characteristics of nations that contribute troops to missions. In chapter 3, Daniel adds data through 2006 to help explain why such small percentages of national ground forces deploy to peace operations. Chapter 4 builds on the expertise and peace operations experience of a retired Marine colonel, Gary Anderson, to spotlight a concern rarely addressed outside of specialized military publications: the types of combat and associated support capabilities that must be made available to deployed forces if hazardous missions are to remain on the peace operations to-do list. Chapter 5, written by FFP's Patricia Taft, parallels Anderson's article. It builds on Taft's wide-ranging travels as a policy-oriented analyst to spotlight trends and prospects in the niche capabilities needed to conduct complex "nationbuilding" operations.

Part II deals with trends and prospects within regions and nations. Specifically, this section looks at how regional mechanisms and institutions respond to the circumstances that call for peacekeeping both within and outside of their own region. A particular strength of the book is that the chapter authors for part II either are natives or have long-standing experience working in or on the region. Each chapter provides an overview of the institutional capacity to conduct peace operations and seeks to assess its degree of maturity and sophistication. Among the factors addressed are the level of institutional capacity, the existence of a common peacekeeping doctrine, the availability of peacekeeping training centers, and the extent of intraregional military cooperation, training, and exercises. Consistent with the ongoing debate on these issues, particular attention is given to the relationship between individual regional organizations and the UN and to the relative advantages and disadvantages of burden-sharing between them.

The chapters also explore regional political dynamics as well as cultural and ideational characteristics, such as regional views on the use of force or the proper role of the UN vis-à-vis peace operations. Specific attention is given to

factors that drive countries to contribute troops to peace operations, or that constrain them from making such contributions. These may include concerns about regional or subregional stability, global power distributions, regional and subregional competition or cooperation, past experiences with peace-keeping, ideational frameworks, national interests concerns, and preferences for working through the UN, regional institutions, or ad hoc coalitions.

In chapter 6, Mark Malan examines ongoing work to build institutional mechanisms in Africa to make political decisions about operations, along with the serious challenges to building capabilities needed to train peacekeepers, plan missions, and sustain deployments. He delves into the relationship between the continentwide African Union and the region's relatively well-developed subregional organizations—a unique feature of the African continent. He considers the significant roles that external actors play in supporting national and institutional capacity-building.

Bastian Giegerich addresses European-based institutions in chapter 7. The chapter looks at the ongoing development of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and at their unique capabilities to operate out of area. While Anderson, in chapter 4, argues that European nations can contribute more to "hazardous" operations, Giegerich offers reasons for the restrictions they impose.

In chapter 8, on peacekeeping operations in the new independent states (NIS), Alexander Nikitin and Mark Loucas explore the roles that Russia played both individually and through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The chapter also examines the potential role of other emerging regional bodies, such as the intraregional Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) group.

In chapter 9, John Fishel recounts the history of peace operations in Latin America and examines the apparent revival of the willingness of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to play major roles. At the institutional or collective level, Fishel points particularly to the potential that exists in the Central American, Andes, and Caribbean subregions.

The slow normative shift toward peace operations in Southeast and Northeast Asia and the emergence of actors such as China and Japan are critically examined by Mely Caballero-Anthony in chapter 10. She suggests that the motivating factor driving these changes may be more a matter of *realpolitik* than internalization of any "responsibility to protect" norm.

In his chapter on South Asia, Dipankar Banerjee focuses on the long-standing experience of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan in peace operations as well as the more recent efforts of Sri Lanka. He contrasts the large role that South Asian states have traditionally played in UN peace operations around the globe with their inability to develop institutions to serve their own regional needs or collectivize their efforts.

Paul Pillar's chapter on the Greater Middle East explains the decline in the role of regional organizations (such as the Arab League) in peace operations and why, notable exceptions aside, most countries there (including those with

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large militaries) are not major contributors to peacekeeping efforts. He looks at these trends in the context of the domestic and regional political problems that dominate the agendas and decisions of the governments in the area.

Finally, the volume's editors did not attempt to impose a uniform definition of peace operations on the authors, nor did they even impose the requirement that all authors use the same term. Strapping an international group of independent thinkers down to such Procrustean beds would have been pointless. In several chapters the authors explicitly define the term they use; in others the definition can be derived from the context. The mushrooming of terms in the 1990s to replace "peacekeeping" reflects the mushrooming of activities that "peacekeepers" were asked to undertake. One reason for a general lack of uniformity in the broader literature on this subject is disagreement over whether all such activities properly fall under the rubric of whatever it is that succeeded peacekeeping as traditionally understood. A major feature of the NIS chapter in this volume speaks directly to this last point. At the end, each reader may have to settle for the position taken by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart in the obscenity case Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964). Admitting an inability to offer a generally agreed upon operational definition of hard core pornography, the Justice nevertheless declared, "I know when I see it." He then moved on to render his judgment.