Introduction

WHEN PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCED in early 2007 that the United States would become more strategically engaged in Africa, it was through the creation of a new military command—U.S. Africa Command—and not through increasing the activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs. Yet this new "combatant" command is not focused on combat at all; it is optimized for promoting international military partnerships through security assistance.[1] In fact, since the announcement was made, the word "combatant" has fallen away with an emphasis on the noncombat functions that this new unified command will fill.

Through the creation of Africa Command, President Bush moved far from his 2000 observation that the military should not do nation building and he continued the post–Cold War practice of using the military in non-warfighting ways. He concluded his eight years not obviating the military's role in noncombat missions but leaving enhanced capabilities and a new paradigm for President Barack Obama to continue the practice of using the military for state-building missions and foreign policy objectives beyond traditional warfare. This was formally acknowledged in the 2010 strategic defense review.

The new paradigm for the U.S. military is epitomized by Africa Command, which is designed to strengthen security cooperation efforts with African partner countries. Africa Command, like the other five geographic combatant commands, has embraced the notion that the military does much more than fight wars. The military trains, equips, and deploys peacekeepers; provides humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and supports other militaries to reduce the security deficits throughout Africa. With national security focused on weak and failing states, the U.S. military has been changing over the last twenty years from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The military has learned that partnership is better than clientism and is adapting its command structure once optimized for waging major combat to one that is focused on conflict prevention.

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These changes are reflected in the continued evolution of language to describe how to guarantee national security. President Roosevelt's War Department gave rise to President Truman's Department of Defense. While no formal name change is expected, it is better to think of today's Defense Department as the Cooperative Security Department to emphasize how much effort is now expended supporting other countries' militaries from Afghanistan to Yemen. Security assistance is now a key pillar of U.S. military strategy, which places American officers and noncommissioned officers in more than 150 countries to train, mentor, and professionalize other militaries. The impetus for the change is based on the beliefs that capacity building sets the conditions for conflict prevention and that there is a global need for capable military partners to serve in peacekeeping operations, control their own territory, and preserve regional stability. The military does so under direction of the U.S. ambassador where these programs occur.

New Missions for a New Era

Security assistance programs have broadened the mission set for the military. Some new missions for a new era include

- Providing training and equipment for partners to monitor and control air, land, and sea borders
- Training and equipping partners for peacekeeping operations
- Enabling partners to resolve local conflicts and addressing underlying conditions that spur violent extremism
- Developing bilateral and multilateral military relationships
- Promoting bilateral and multilateral information sharing and interoperability
- Providing training and educational opportunities for partners' officers and noncommissioned officers
- Planning and executing bilateral and multilateral exercises
- Enabling partner countries to provide good governance
- Enabling the success of integrated foreign assistance
- Alleviating human suffering after a natural disaster to counter anti–United States sentiment in regions such as the Middle East and Latin America
- Providing humanitarian assistance such as food, medical care, and veterinarian services
- Building civil infrastructure[2]

For example, soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division assessed hundreds of fish farms in Mahmudiya Qada, Iraq; Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa

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partnered with a Kenyan college to create a Maritime Center of Excellence; and Naval War College professors designed and ran a conference on building maritime safety and security in East Africa and the Southwest Indian Ocean. These examples illustrate that on any given day, U.S. military personnel are engaged in a wide variety of missions not associated with combat. Formerly the domain of Special Forces, general-purpose forces and civilian personnel regularly promote security. For some, these new missions are an anathema for a superpower, which prefers to be feared. However, the U.S. military wants to be feared and loved.[3]

With the most modern military in the world and the capability to deliver sustained attack against any target in the world, the United States is undoubtedly feared. The activist foreign policy of the Bush administration led many traditional allies to disassociate their countries with U.S. actions as evidenced in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War. The relative decline of favorable views of the United States during the 2000s is well documented and has prompted the United States government to be more proactive in shaping its image.[4] Using the military to respond to humanitarian crises, such as the 2005 tsunami in South Asia or the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, has improved public perceptions of the United States.[5] While short-lived, these lessons are institutionalized in national documents such as the U.S. Navy's 2007 maritime strategy, which upgraded humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as a core capability on par with power projection and sea control.[6] Consequently, many field commanders no longer request aircraft carriers as the hallmark of naval presence but prefer noncombatants such as hospital ships, auxiliary repair ships, and other unarmed support ships to train partners and provide humanitarian assistance. Through nonkinetic military activities such as building schools, providing medical assistance, and digging wells, the United States attempts to improve its international image while facilitating development in nearly three-quarters of the world's countries. At the same time, these same military personnel train partners to combat transnational threats, plan disaster relief operations, and impart basic soldiering skills to support peacekeeping operations.

Changing the face of the U.S. military has not been easy. Mixed results in Somalia, the Balkans, East Africa, and Central Asia led some to question the efficacy of these types of missions. In spite of lacking evidence of success, the United States has embarked on a program to illustrate that its superpower capabilities can be used for good. The same capability that can accurately drop a bomb on an adversary's barracks has been used to deliver food aid in the mountains of Afghanistan. The same capability used to disembark Marines from Navy ships to a foreign shore has been used to host nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that provide fisheries conservation in West Africa. And the same capability to track an enemy's submarines can detect changes in the migration of fish stocks in response to climate change. To be sure, swords have not been beaten

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into plowshares, but military capabilities once used for confrontation are now used for cooperation. And this is having an effect on military officers and the international assistance community.

Given the global nature of U.S. foreign policy and the emphasis on promoting security, senior military commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters providing expertise on security issues within the national security bureaucracy.[7] Officers routinely meet with heads of state and senior cabinet ministers, and are often the public face of the United States during security and humanitarian assistance programs. Officers frequently testify before Congress and work with U.S. ambassadors to develop programs to address security deficits evidenced by piracy, terrorism, illegally armed groups, illicit maritime trafficking, and failing states.

The military's emergence in once civilian-only domains is based on four interrelated ideas. First, weak states have largely supplanted peer competitors as the focus of strategic thinkers. The United States is more concerned that Pakistan will fail than it is that Russia will attack Western Europe. Second, routine diplomatic and development activity mainly occupies USAID and the Department of State, which delegates security assistance programs to the Defense Department. In spite of obvious security deficits around the world, no new bureaucracy was created to deal with health, maritime, and developmental insecurity. Third, the Defense Department has a distinct advantage over the foreign assistance agencies in both size and resources. This is most evident in staff size. For example, Africa Command headquarters is composed of about 1,200 military personnel whereas the State Department's Africa Bureau has about 80. Or, in East Africa, the U.S. military has more than 2,000 personnel, who are primarily noncombat personnel focused on engineering and construction projects, medical and veterinary care, and various forms of military training. In contrast, U.S. Foreign Service and development officers in the region only number in the hundreds. Finally, changes in the U.S. foreign assistance bureaucracy has turned development specialists into contract managers who rely on NGOs to deliver services. In addition to relying on NGOs, the U.S. government uses military personnel to provide international assistance.

While the Defense Department's capacity certainly explains why international assistance missions increasingly have a military face, it is also essential to understand that the new security landscape cannot be navigated by a single bureaucratic entity. The last twenty years illustrate that the changed nature of national security does not easily divide activities between war and peace. Instead, security issues encompass defense, development, and diplomacy. A problem such as Somali piracy is simultaneously military, economic, social, and political. Solutions require unity of effort among the U.S. government, industry, NGOs, and international partners.

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The military has been out front in adapting to the new security landscape. Its size and resources—National Guard and Reserve personnel, in particular—enable it to cut across the civil–military divide. Through its organic medical, construction, and logistics capabilities, military personnel perform development missions, which often occur alongside NGOs, USAID, and international partners. Given its size, the military often overwhelms the civilian agencies of government, but it has realized that it must coordinate its activities with USAID and it must support Department of State policy. Furthermore, the Defense Department has recognized that there are limits to what it can do; it understands that a superpower is not a superhero. It needs partners from across the government, allies, and private organizations. Military personnel can build a school, but it needs the Department of State to identify where the school should be built, USAID to train teachers, and NGOs to provide school supplies. The military also knows that it is better at achieving quick victories than it is at resolving underlying conditions that produce instability. Consequently, it builds relationships with partner governments to address sustainability.

Unfortunately, these lessons learned in the military have not moved into the broader policy community. For critics, U.S. military activities in permissive environments bring old memories of invasion or coup. For them, U.S. foreign policy is on a dangerous militarization path. While that part of U.S. military history is real and still resonates in many parts of the world, it is wrong to overlook the changes that have occurred over the last two decades. The United States does not operate an Imperial Office or a Foreign Legion as past dominant powers did. Instead, it offers mentors to create security forces that obviate U.S. presence. In fact, the short-term focus might be the fatal flaw in U.S. security assistance programs because it takes generations for countries to develop. Biannual military personnel rotations and annual budgets inhibit the long-term investments required to build sustainable programs. The military is trying to adapt to the new security landscape not dominated by threatening states.

Civil–Military Space

America's military commands, with their forward presence, large planning staffs, and various engagement tools, are equipping for the new civil–military space that is characterized by the absence of major war. Today, they routinely pursue regional-level engagement by playing host to international-security conferences, promoting military-to-military contacts, and providing American military presence, training, and equipment to nearly every country in the world. In practice, this means that pilots from Singapore train in Nevada, sailors from Ghana ride on U.S. Navy ships off the coast of Nigeria, and officers

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from more than sixty countries study at America's defense colleges. While the breadth of these activities is new, the military's role in this civil–military space is not.

When he conducted engagement operations in the 1980s, Adm. William J. Crowe, then commander in chief of Pacific Command, said that national leaders frequently told him that without American military presence, their achievements in democracy and development would not have been possible.[8] Security assistance can help democracies consolidate, fragile states avoid failure, and authoritarian states liberalize.[9] This is evidenced in the liberalization of countries such as South Korea or the Philippines. Contemporary lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate that security is essential for economic and social development. Violence and instability chase out intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and private individuals and companies. Without security, educated professionals emigrate, foreign direct investment disappears, and economic development stalls. Outside of these anecdotes, there is empirical evidence to support this claim. Carol Atkinson found that U.S. military engagement activities are "positively and systematically associated with liberalizing trends, and provide evidence that these programs play an important role in U.S. national security."[10] Her findings reinforce the civil–military space where what constitutes civilian or military is blurred.

While some argued in the 1990s that military activism is a logical product of a more stable international order and a way to avoid distributing the "peace dividend" by finding a new rationale for militaries, this overlooks both a military's natural predisposition to eschew non-warfighting activities, the current high operational counterinsurgency tempo, and the military's role as a tool of national power that is increasingly used in noncoercive ways. Given the very real combat demands of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, one would expect to see a decline in security assistance activities, yet the creation of Africa Command and the transformation of Southern Command illustrate the opposite. If warfighting were the sole function of the military, then the thousands of military personnel in east Africa should be in Afghanistan confronting today's challenges instead of implementing programs designed to prevent future challenges.

British general Sir Rupert Smith captured the change that the Defense Department is responding to, "war as cognitively known to most noncombatants, war as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs; such war no longer exists."[11] Given the importance of this change, there is increasing demand to understand how militaries are adapting their strategies and capabilities to fulfill noncombat roles. This book seeks to analyze the strategic rationale for these activities and explore how these activities take place to analyze the shift from coercive diplomacy to military engagement.

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Overview of the Book

In chapters 1 and 2, I explore the tendency to use the military in other than warfare missions and discuss the rationale for these security assistance activities. What many thought was a peculiarity to the Clinton administration turned out to be the hallmark of the Bush administration. President Obama inherited a military focused on security assistance, and he will continue to use it to further his aims of promoting multilateralism and aiding countries in need. No matter a politicians' political stripes, the military will continue to be used in noncombat ways; allies demand it and emerging partners expect it. In a world characterized by increased levels of connectivity, the United States cannot heed the calls by some to disengage.[12] Transnational actors and weak states are increasingly bringing the world's powers together in an unprecedented nonwartime fashion. In 2009, for example, the United States, Europe, Russia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea coordinated actions to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Similar counterterrorism coalitions exist.

Because the changing face of the military is controversial, chapter 3 explores various forms of resistance to security assistance and explains why the military now embraces this as a core function. To be sure, there is a deep skepticism of these new roles and missions coming from Congress, the Department of State, development NGOs, and from some in the military itself. They fear that traditional aid and diplomacy agencies will be marginalized by the military and that government money will be directed away from the NGO development community. And critics within the military fear it will lose its capacity and ethos for major combat operations and it will be ill suited for an uncertain future characterized by the rise of China. Conflict prevention is a shared goal, but critics of the military's security assistance roles claim that the costs are too great, the operations never end, and partners are too slow to develop.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine how the U.S. military has changed through the process of demilitarizing combatant commands and supporting other countries' militaries. The analysis suggests that security assistance is conducted in a tailored way that takes into account differing U.S. interests and local conditions. For example, the United States provides weapons in the Middle East, medical assistance in Africa, and training and education in Latin America. Chapter 6 offers the specific case of how the U.S. Navy is promoting maritime security around the world. These chapters reveal that the military is filling a void in the U.S. foreign assistance community by adapting its command structure to include nonmilitary personnel and private organizations to promote security and stability. Foreign Service officers, development specialists, and other U.S. government civilians now work at military commands attempting to formulate comprehensive policy solutions. In the field, military officers embedded at U.S. embassies

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have expanded their portfolios to include development and diplomacy working with various ministries to plan medical assistance and civil engineering projects. Given the expanded roles of military officers, language training and cultural studies are obvious deficits to be filled.

With U.S. presidents increasingly relying on the military as a ready foreign policy tool, chapter 7 explores the implications for the military's force structure. While it is relatively easy to determine what capabilities the U.S. military needs to defeat an adversary's submarine, determining what capabilities are necessary to professionalize a partner's military or improve stability is not. This chapter offers a sketch of the force planning implications when designing a military that emphasizes cooperation. Finally, in chapter 8, I highlight the risks of ceding civilian responsibilities to military agencies and the risks of weakening the secretary of state's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries. The implications of these findings are also important for civil–military relations theory.

Conclusion

The changed nature of security no longer allows for an easy divide between war and peace. As General Petraeus told his troops in 2008, "you have contributed significantly to the communities in which you have operated. Indeed, you have been builders and diplomats, as well as guardians and warriors."[13] While his statement was made in a counterinsurgency context, his point is equally applicable to security assistance operations where conflict prevention is the goal.

This has profound implications for how militaries train and equip for future operations. Advanced aircraft, ships, and tanks will not be the main systems to secure political objectives. Rather, the human skills that General Petraeus promoted and tested in Iraq will be the key. Success is not contingent on being warriors alone; instead, military personnel must also be builders, diplomats, and guardians. It is my hope that this book makes a contribution to seeing the military as an instrument for cooperation and informs how militaries should train and equip for the future.

Notes

1. "Africa Command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa." George W. Bush, "President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa,"

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The White House website, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070206-3.html.

2. Derek S. Reveron and Kathleen Mahoney-Norris, ""Military-Political" Relations: The Need for Officer Education," *Joint Force Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (2009): 61–66.

3. In chapter 17 of *The Prince*, Machiavelli wrote, "Upon this a question arises: whether it is better to be loved than feared or feared than loved. It many be answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with."

4. See Pew Global Attitudes Project at http://pewglobal.org.

5. Dennis Lynn, "Strategic Communication and the Diplomacy of Deeds," in *Shaping the Security Environment*, ed. Derek S. Reveron (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007).

6. Department of the Navy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," October 2007, www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf. See page 15: "Human suffering moves us to act, and the expeditionary character of maritime forces uniquely positions them [naval assets] to provide assistance."

7. See Derek S. Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm, eds., *Inside Defense: Understanding the 21st Century Military* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

8. William J. Crowe Jr. "U.S. Pacific Command: A Warrior-Diplomat Speaks," in Derek S. Reveron, ed., *America's Viceroys: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 74.

9. "Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives." Programs include: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and the Economic Support Fund. See U.S. Department of Defense, "Joint Operations," Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 17, 2006), VII-7.

10. Carol Atkinson, "Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972–2000," *International Studies Quarterly*, 50 (2006): 509–37.

11. Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage, 2007), 3.

12. Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 5–48.

13. David Petraeus, "Farewell Letter," Multi-National Force Iraq, September 15, 2008. Available at *New York Times* website, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/09/15/world/20080915petraeus-letter.pdf.

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