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EU Security and Defence Policy

The first five years (1999-2004)

Edited by Nicole Gnesotto
Preface by Javier Solana

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Institute for Security Studies

European Union

Paris

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ISBN 92-9198-057-9

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Claire Mabille (Paris).

Contents

Javier Solana

I would like to start with a paradox: of all the prerogatives of states, security and defence policy is probably the one which least lends itself to a collective European approach; however, after the single currency, it is in this dimension that the Union has made the most rapid and spectacular progress over the last five years.

When I took up my post five years ago, no one would have dared to bet that the Union would soon have direct responsibility for crisis management, have a military committee and military staff, be responsible for military operations, have an armaments agency, a solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack and, above all, a common vision of the threats we face and appropriate responses to them – in other words a genuinely European security strategy. However, these are now tangible realities in the European Union.

What lies behind this progress? To begin with, my first answer requires clarification of the ESDP's vocabulary and ambitions: the aim of the 15 was to implement an effective policy for managing external crises. The Kosovo disaster played a major role here, as it triggered a common desire on the part of Europeans to act together to develop, within the Union framework, all the instruments necessary for defusing crises. The so-called 'Petersberg tasks' define perfectly these initial ambitions of the Union. We have therefore developed these instruments, defined capabilities, undertaken to achieve the goals we set ourselves, and accumulated experience in real crisis situations – in particular in Bosnia, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is on the basis of these acquis *that the ESDP has been able to move forward and broaden the scope of its action: the adoption, in December 2003, of the European Security Strategy which I had submitted to the 25 European Heads of State and Government, thus represents the logical outcome of pragmatic, and in the end successful, collective action.*

The second explanation is extremely simple: to paraphrase the classic distinction between 'wars of choice' and 'wars of necessity', I would say that the Union's security and defence policy is no longer a choice but a necessity – for at least three reasons. The first is the growing number of crises and situations of international instability that form the Union's strategic environment, both in its neighbourhood, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and in more distant parts of

the world like Afghanistan or the DRC. The second reason is directly linked to globalisation: in a globalised and *chaotic world, it is no longer possible to separate artificially prosperity and security. If we try to, we are deluding ourselves. The economic and commercial influence now achieved by the Union of 25 – a quarter of world GNP, 450 million inhabitants – the ever closer integration of their economies and their development mean that Europeans can no longer stand comfortably aside from the world's convulsions or evade their political responsibilities to assuage the effects of globalisation. The third reason, finally, is the multilateralism which is now unavoidable in the management of international crises: as no nation can do everything or deal with everything alone, the Europeans of the Union will have to accept a growing share of responsibility in stabilising crises, either on their own as in 2003 in the DRC, or with America and other partners when they feel it is necessary. For all these reasons, including the constant 'desire' for Europe voiced by European citizens when they are asked about their future security, European defence policy is not only in constant progression: it has now reached its threshold of irreversibility.*

But there must be no mistake: the ESDP is not a process of militarisation of European construction. My aim right from the start, at the head of this adventure, was to promote the Union as a global political player, capable of mobilising all the resources available – economic, commercial, humanitarian, diplomatic and, of course, military – to act in a coherent and above all effective manner over the whole of its international environment. Therefore it was necessary to start by developing what did not yet exist: a minimum of instruments and capabilities, both civilian and military, which were essential if the Union was to have any international credibility. These tools then had to be incorporated in a global strategic concept, a sort of general philosophy for the Union's action in the world: in my view this is the real merit of the European Security Strategy, which the Thessaloniki European Council placed in my hands. Adopted by the 25 Heads of State and Government in December 2003, the strategy is, in a way, the European Union's 'strategic identity card': a global security player, vigilant as regards both terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, and more traditional sources of instability – regional conflicts, the break-up of states, large-scale organised crime – especially as these different types of threat fuel one another in many parts of the world. A responsible security player, convinced that its security and the promotion of its values depend on the achievement of three strategic aims: facing up to the various threats, building security in the Union's immediate neighbour-

hood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. Finally, a credible security player, both more active in the management and above all the prevention of crises, more determined to develop the necessary military, diplomatic and industrial capabilities, and more coherent in implementing its various instruments of external action. Furthermore, beyond that vision of the world and of the Union's role in the world, the European Security Strategy has another virtue, of a more institutional kind: as it is a long-term project, it also acts as a general framework for the CFSP, within which the specific priorities of each European Union presidency must now be handled. It therefore enhances the continuity of the Union's security and defence policy, long before the provisions laid down in this area by the draft European Constitution are implemented.

I will not set out here a full list of what we have achieved, with my team and the determination of the member states, since the 1999 Cologne European Council. This book by the EU Institute for Security Studies aims to describe those achievements. From these five years spent at the head of the ESDP, I would prefer to highlight a number of lessons which I also feel are decisive for the future of the Union's international role.

◗ *First and above all, face up to complexity. Since the fall of the bipolar East-West system, the international environment has been exposed to multiple factors tending to generate crises and, at the same time, to promote unity. The world is more complex and also more unpredictable. Reducing the international system to a binary confrontation of one group with another, handling world crises on the basis of their military dimension alone or, conversely, relying on trade and economic aid above all to reduce sources of conflict and bring peace to the world are all blind alleys. The Union's added value lies precisely in its ability to bring together all possible facets of international action. In security matters, this principle of complexity means giving the Balkan agenda the same importance as the anti-terrorist agenda. At the beginning of my term of office in 1999, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the chief stimulus to setting a* headline goal *of 60,000 men and shaping the Union's military capabilities. Five years later, the lessons drawn from the various interventions in external crises have produced other military stimuli: the 'battle group' concept has thus become a requirement in the organisation of European capabilities. But does a choice have to be made between these two types of task: peacekeeping forces – massive, static and permanent – or rapid reaction forces – more mobile, light and flexible? Must we set aside the big battalions of* peace-

keepers *in favour of more rapid and more mobile intervention groups? The answer of course is no, if only because those two types of force can constitute the two stages of the same military intervention.*

At the same time, the threat of terrorist attacks has led the Union to define its security policy no longer solely as a policy of sending forces to theatres of operations outside its territory, but also as a policy for protecting the Union's own citizens. And although the fight against terrorism cannot be won by military means, it is an integral part of a global political approach to security whose relevance I have pleaded constantly.

In other words, the task of the planners responsible for security is today much more complex than it was when there was a massive, overriding and clearly identifiable threat. But if the ESDP is indeed a means and not an end, it must enable military and civilian capabilities to be developed with sufficient rigour and flexibility to extend, in the end, the range of political options available to Europe's decision-makers in dealing with each type of crisis.

◗ *Secondly, coherence is the key to all success. For a long time, this imperative of coherence has been one of the European Union's rhetorical clichés and, for many, it is identified above all with internal institutional matters: I have myself stressed, in the European Security Strategy, the urgency and necessity of strengthening the coherence between the civilian and military means of external action, between development policy and security policy, between the actions of the Commission, the Council and the member states, between diplomacy and defence, between the role of the Union and that of other competent international organisations in various conflicts. I would not deny for a moment the importance of this institutional challenge, to which the draft Constitutional Treaty tries to provide solutions. But I would also like to emphasise another aspect of coherence: its temporal dimension. Five years at the head of the CFSP have convinced me that the time factor must be better integrated into the development of the Union's policies. Five years after the intervention in Kosovo, the situation remains uncertain. One year after the Union's intervention in the DRC, the situation is still extremely precarious and volatile. And one could say more or less the same about the stabilisation of Afghanistan since 2001, not to mention the major challenge represented today by the future of Iraq. In other words, the strictly military sequence of crisis management is never as limited in time as one thinks; the sequence of stabilisation and reconstruction after a conflict is never as civilian as one wishes. Since their military and budgetary resources are finite, Euro-*

peans must integrate the time dimension better, both in the military planning of their operations and in the development of political solutions for each of the conflicts in which they are involved.

◗ *Third lesson, a fair balance must be found between European nations and institutions. In this globalised world in which we live, national sovereignties remain unavoidable players. Certainly, no regional crisis and none of the problems facing the world can now be dealt with by one nation acting alone. And what is true for American power is even truer for each of the European nations. Nevertheless, despite this continual erosion of their individual capacity for action, nations count; within the 25, differences in power or influence, historical heritage, or geographical situation, count. To be legitimate and effective, a common European Security and Defence Policy must therefore be based on a minimum of realism. Ignoring national differences in the name of the equality in principle of the member states (one country equals one veto) or, on the contrary, magnifying these differences in power in the name of a principle of relative effectiveness (the leadership of the 'big countries') can be frequent, but unrealistic, temptations. The more the Union enlarges and diversifies, the more it must increase its efforts and vigilance so that defence policy remains both common and effective, egalitarian and differentiated. The development of the European Security Strategy has already enabled new methods to be tested – neither majority, nor intergovernmental – for constructing a political consensus within the Union. The added value of the new institutions provided for by the Constitutional Treaty is also that they can help this European general interest to emerge: by virtue of his capacity to listen and take initiatives, the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will play a crucial role here, as will the provisions for flexibility and enhanced cooperation on defence.*

◗ *The fourth lesson that I would like to emphasise concerns transatlantic relations. Like the Union, the United States is evolving under the pressure of a large number of influences. American power in 2004 is very different from what it was in the 1999 context, after the victory in Kosovo. Similarly, the Atlantic Alliance of today is not the NATO of which I was Secretary-General five years ago. Although the transatlantic partnership remains, in its principle, essential and irreplaceable, the details of the Euro-American relationship must change in line with developments in the world and each of the partners. There is no doubt in my mind that, when they act together, America and the Union are the greatest force for international peace and stability. But the forms, frameworks and rules of their strategic partnership are not fixed*

once and for all. The transatlantic relationship thus has to adapt to the growing complexity of the international environment. Certainly, faced with more and more complex and differentiated crises, the identity of analyses and responses, the definition even of the priorities and frameworks of cooperation, are neither as immediate nor as automatic as during the unifying Cold War. But these are further reasons for deepening dialogue, comparing perceptions and priorities and defining common goals, whilst respecting the identity and specific nature of both partners.

I would like to conclude with an historical perspective. The European Union was conceived and constructed, fifty years ago, with the major political ambition of finally eradicating war and force in relations between the members of the European family. It grew out of deep trauma at the consequences of excessive and uncontrolled military power; it developed over the decades in the conviction that numerous integration processes, among the different European nations, were the best possible formula for guaranteeing the stability and security of each one of them. And it was crowned with success. It is today on the basis of that fundamental historical acquis *that the Union wishes to project to the outside world the stability that it has patiently constructed within, by adding a common security policy to its traditional competencies; this is why it now wishes to promote, in the international system, a European Security Strategy, based on values, norms and capabilities shared by the 25. In no way does this new Union responsibility move it away from the original European project based on the values of peace, law, justice and democracy. My conviction is entirely the opposite: it is these very values that the Union embodies and seeks to promote in its international action, whether in the Balkans, in the Middle East, in Africa, or with respect to Iraq. Develop a greater degree of international justice and respect for law, build patiently the minimum conditions for good governance and democracy, favour negotiation rather than conflict, but agree to intervene and coerce when coercion becomes necessary: these are the strategic principles on which the construction of the ESDP was founded five years ago. It is these that will guide its development in the years to come.*

Introduction
ESDP: results and prospects

Nicole Gnesotto

Five years after its ESDP was launched, the Union can boast really spectacular results: the legitimacy of its military powers is now solidly anchored in the Treaties. Its structures for taking decisions and conducting operations are now permanent and complete: Political Committee, Military Staff, Planning Unit, Armaments Agency, Military Committee, Situation Centre, etc., in all nearly 200 staff in the service of the ESDP. It has defined a European Security Strategy by consensus among the 25 member states, even though the very idea of a specifically European concept of security was still, five years ago, utterly taboo. The support and the expectations of European public opinion with regard to a common defence policy are constantly gaining ground. Above all, whereas there was no common defence policy at the time of the Kosovo crisis, the Union is now in charge of several military and police operations in the Balkans, not to mention the success of its first external military operation, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in spring 2003.

At the same time, these five years of ESDP still leave a lasting impression of permanent tensions and recurring political constraints: the progress made on defence did not prevent dramatic divisions opening up over the Iraq crisis in 2003; there are still profound differences of view on the ultimate political purpose of these elements of European integration on security and defence policy. Finally, with respect to the United States, a feeling of déjà vu still dominates the debate. The post 11 September world is profoundly different from the post-Kosovo world, Iraq is not the Balkans and the 25 do not have the same dynamic as the 15, but the constraints holding back the development of the Union as an international player remain. We must throw some light on this paradox as well.

Mainsprings and trends

The three mainsprings

Why, after 50 years without any military role, are the European member states now collectively engaged in constructing a Union defence policy? Since its inception, at the Franco-British summit in St-Malo in December 1998, two sets of factors have played a decisive role in the development of the ESDP: the first is external to European construction and is contingent on world events (a given state of risks and threats) and developments in American policy; the second arises directly from the European dynamic itself. In 1999, the Balkan crises and developments in the United States as regards European security were powerful external motives for greater integration; the change to the euro and the need to make the CFSP more credible were the major challenges within the 15. At St-Malo, the French and British agreed on the need for the Union to construct the military element, whose absence it had felt so keenly when former Yugoslavia collapsed, in order to complete the range of the Union's means of action and consolidate America's – now uncertain – commitment in the management of European crises. The incipient ESDP was thus entirely focused on stabilising external crises (the well-known 'Petersberg tasks'), the dominant model was that of the IFOR deployed by NATO in Bosnia since 1995 (a European corps of 60,000 men), and the aim was to fill the European military void, to base the Union's foreign policy on a minimum of military credibility, and to strengthen Europe in order to reinforce the Atlantic Alliance.

Five years later, in 2004, terrorism, a new American strategic approach and the situation created by the war in Iraq are the decisive external factors; within the Union, the success of enlargement and the negotiation of a new Constitutional Treaty are at the top of the 25's agenda. In addition to its tasks of bringing military force to bear in external crises, the ESDP is thus giving attention to the question of protecting European citizens (the Constitution's solidarity clause); it is seeking to link this with the other strategies of combating terrorism and the proliferation of WMD; the relationship with the new American strategic agenda is at the heart of the Union's foreign policy, and the discussions about the Minister for Foreign Affairs, leadership and flexibility on defence dominate the scene within the institutions.

World events, America, European ambition: these, therefore,

are the three mainsprings of the Union's security and defence policy. World events are outside the control of any of us, whether it is the collapse of states, the threat of genocide or the upsurge in international terrorism from 2001 onwards, and the other two factors – Euro-American relations and European integration – are themselves in a state of constant evolution. Depending on their historical heritage, their European objectives or their attitude to NATO and the United States, member states will emphasise these factors in varying degrees. The British, for example, tend to stress the aims of strengthening Europe's military effectiveness in crisis management and complementarity with the Atlantic Alliance; the French, on the other hand, place more emphasis on the credibility of political Europe and the consolidation of the Union's overall power. The former argue for a strengthening of capabilities and the latter for the setting up of specifically European political and military institutions. But these differences of emphasis or priority, between two countries which over five years have embodied the two extremes of European positions on the ESDP, have never been serious enough to threaten their objective interest in strengthening the military capabilities of the Union itself. The progress made on a common defence policy over the last five years has been achieved precisely because of the difference and complementary nature of these two approaches. St-Malo is seen as the founding act of ESDP because it reaffirms the European Union as the most appropriate framework for the simultaneous achievement of three objectives that are difficult to reconcile elsewhere: military effectiveness, transatlantic solidarity and a strengthening of Europe's political power.

Major trends

On the basis of this initial compromise, European defence policy has thus grown considerably in importance between 1999 and 2004. However, as the world of 2004 is very different from that of 1999, the ESDP as currently pursued by 25 member states is itself very different from the ESDP created five years ago by 15. In broad outline, eight major developments can be discerned:

- *From theory to practice*. 2003 marked a significant turning-point in these five years of the ESDP – it was the date of the first military operations conducted by the European Union. Not only were the deadlines met (the ESDP had been declared operational at Laeken

in 2002), but the missions were crowned with success. In the Balkans and Africa, Europe demonstrated, through operations that were modest in scope but clearly necessary, that the ESDP could make a real contribution to the stabilisation of crises or the prevention of humanitarian disasters.

- *From the Balkans to Africa.* The ESDP has not only extended the range of tasks it carries out but has also expanded rapidly the geographical area in which it operates. In June 2003, the Union undertook its first autonomous operation in Africa under United Nations mandate (Operation *Artemis* in the DRC). At the same time the European Union remained firmly committed in the Balkans, in particular in Bosnia (police operation), and in the FYROM (Operations *Concordia* and *Proxima*), whilst preparing to take over NATO's SFOR operation in Bosnia in the second half of 2004. The simultaneous existence of two theatres of foreign operations, one in Europe and the other outside Europe, has numerous implications in terms of the necessary military capacity (premium on flexibility), operational organisation (framework nation, NATO resources, autonomy) and in general political terms for the division of tasks between the Union and NATO.
- *From intervention to protection*. The extension of the tasks assigned to the European Union in security and defence matters has been very substantial. In 1999, European defence stopped where defence of the territorial integrity of the member states began: that remained either a national responsibility or the primary responsibility of NATO. Since the upsurge in international terrorism, the frontiers between external intervention and internal protection have opened up: the Seville European Council, in 2002, reaffirmed a role for European defence in combating terrorism. The Constitutional Treaty includes a mutual assistance clause which, while respecting the primacy of NATO and the national cultures of the neutral countries, opens the door to real existential solidarity among the 25: moreover, the bomb attacks in Madrid in March 2004 led the European Council to adopt a clause guaranteeing solidarity in the event of a terrorist attack against one of the member states, well before the official conclusion of the negotiations.
- *From military capabilities to industrial capabilities*. The Helsinki and Feira European Councils established the capability goals, both military and police, for implementation of the ESDP. Crisis management, in particular in the Balkans, was the urgent strategic priority of the time and the shortcomings of the Union in this respect were

total. Despite repeated declarations on the need for a European armaments market, the Union gave priority to reorganising existing military capabilities, not to restructuring the industrial base of the defence industry. It is only very recently that a second step has been taken, with the setting up, by the 25 member states, of an operational armaments agency as from 2004. As it takes the ESDP out of the emergency and event-driven context of crises and confronts it with the structural, technological, industrial and economic aspects of defence, this decision marks a turning point: for the possible harmonisation of the military requirements of the 25, the funding of research projects, the reorganisation of the European defence market, and the maintenance of competitiveness and European excellence in key sectors, the rules of the game will no doubt be different from those laid down for political and civilian crisis management.

- *From unanimity to flexibility*. From 15 to 25, the challenge for the Union is not so much the number as the diversity of the member states, regarding both their military capabilities and their strategic traditions or defence priorities. Certainly, no one is thinking at this stage of abandoning the intergovernmental framework that has managed the ESDP since its foundation: all decisions, whether on intervention, institutions or collective capabilities, are taken unanimously by the 25. However, the combined effect of the increase in the number of European players and the diversification of external challenges now makes it essential to introduce some flexibility into the functioning of the ESDP. The discussions in 2003 on hard cores, enhanced or structured cooperation, avant-gardes and other linguistic coinages, are merely the expression of these major challenges which are now on Europe's table: reconciling the diversity and equality of states, general consensus and individual initiatives, internal cohesion and external effectiveness of the Union.
- *From technical coherence to overall coherence*. At the start of the ESDP, the question of former Yugoslavia demonstrated to Europeans the necessity to link the civilian and military aspects of their crisis management policy more effectively: police resources proved to be as necessary as military deployment; reconstruction also required the Union to have the capability to instruct and train, and to rebuild local judicial or police structures. The Feira European Council thus strengthened the non military tools of European crisis management. Five years later, the essential issue is no longer coherence in the management of a crisis, but the overall coherence

of the Union's means of action: between internal and external security, between crisis management and combating terrorist networks, between development aid policies and the goal of security, and between the aims and resources of the Commission and those of the Council. This increasing complexity of the Union's security policy is probably one of the most notable features of the first five years of the ESDP.

- *From NATO to America*. The United States is without doubt the most decisive benchmark against which the progress and limits of ESDP, since its foundation, can be measured. However, as will be seen below, America is itself a variable that is changing quickly. In 1999 the American question was, for the Europeans, totally identified with the question of the role of NATO in the management of European crises, in particular in the Balkans. The priority was to define a relationship of complementarity, transparency and synergy between the Union and NATO that would enhance the Americans' involvement and interest in European security. In 2004, a split occurred: after 11 September and Iraq, American strategy and the defence of the national interests of the United States no longer pass necessarily, or as a matter of priority, via the intermediary of NATO. This growing separation between American policy on the one hand and the policy of the Alliance on the other is far from easy to admit for a majority of Europeans. Nevertheless, it is one of the major effects of 11 September and Iraq, and is now forcing the Union to make a distinction between its relationship with NATO and its relationship with the United States of America.
- *From defence to policy*. In 1999, the ESDP was initiated and implemented, not as a separate policy in a fourth pillar, but as one of the essential tools for the effectiveness of the Union's diplomatic activity. It was therefore supposed to be only one aspect of the common security policy. However, this founding principle has not prevented some decoupling arising in practice: progress on defence has been much more rapid and visible than progress on foreign and security policy. Defence has even acquired a sort of autonomy within the Union's common policies, in particular with respect to foreign policy. It was not until 2003, in order to ward off a major political crisis that had developed out of Euro American differences on Iraq, that the Union restored the primacy of politics over defence and for the first time, at the personal instigation of Javier Solana, produced a European Security Strategy: on the basis of a common analysis of the state of risks and threats, the text defines the Union's strategic

goals in the world, the founding principles of its international action and the tools necessary for its implementation. In a sort of return to square one, the ESDP becomes once again from this viewpoint one of the available instruments of a comprehensive security policy which is a precondition for all external action by the Union.

We must also draw attention to one final development, independent of the Union and its policies, but decisive for the future both of defence and of European construction as a whole: the international context. Between the world of 1999 and that of 2004, the main difference is the rise in importance of security issues among the national and international concern of all governments, as it is also a priority in the minds of European citizens. Terrorism demands it. What could at first be regarded as a technical matter – the form and scope of a European security and defence policy – has now become a major political challenge. The second difference is the growing awareness of the scale and repercussions of globalisation. A corollary of economic globalisation, the globalisation of security is in fact a major turning-point in the Union's international environment at the beginning of the twenty-first century: the upsurge in international terrorism is only the most visible symptom of an ever more complex interaction between the economic, demographic and political components of the international system. Whether it wants to or not, no member state can now stand aside from this dual constraint, economic and political, of globalisation. The myth of an increasingly prosperous Union in an increasingly peaceful and civilised world following the fall of communist totalitarianism is no doubt the first victim of this.

Structural constraints

These different developments have helped to make European defence one of the Union's success stories. In the light of the issues at stake and the impacts of the euro and enlargement on economic solidarity and pan-European integration, defence policy certainly remains limited in scale. Nevertheless, it generates a real political dynamic between the member states, and has profoundly modified the image, functioning and approach – in short the identity card – of European construction as a whole. However, this incursion of the Union into the sphere of military responsibility is not entirely free of constraints. Despite the undeniable achievements of the

past five years in defence matters, a twofold tension is still inherent in the Union as its political power grows. At each decisive stage, at each possible turning-point in political integration, the member states are always faced with the same two dilemmas: how can the continuation of an Atlantic Alliance dominated by the United States be reconciled with the emergence of a strategic and political Europe? How can respect for national sovereignty be combined with building a structure to share political power? America or Europe, the nation or integration, these are the two fundamental questions that have never been resolved and still divide the different partners of the Union.

All other obstacles and all other constraints are, in the end, of secondary importance in comparison with these two structural dilemmas: the number of member states, the difference between the 'large' and the 'small' states, the deficit in military capabilities, the inadequacy of funding for research or equipment lead of course to delays and set real limits to the development of the ESDP. However, these difficulties are only insurmountable when they interfere with the other two fundamental constraints: national sovereignty and the relationship with the Atlantic Alliance. In any case, these constraints are far from new: they have marked all the ups and downs of European defence since NATO and the six-member Common Market were set up. They have endured ever since, in different forms and various combinations, and lie behind all the ambiguities of the successive Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice when it comes to foreign and security policy. Hence the impression one has of a tedious repetition of the same discussions and the same constraints – that strange mixture of marking time and moving forward, progress and stagnation, which dominates the Union's foreign and security policy.

The constraint of sovereignty

One of the greatest obstacles to the strategic existence of the Union lies within Europe itself, in those old European nations which, historically, invented and then elevated national sovereignty to the status of a founding principle of political order, and which are hesitant, or reluctant, to transcend it. Since the origin of European construction, the aim of European political integration has repeatedly come up against the legitimacy and exclusive prerogatives of the nation-states involved in the adventure. The member states

have progressively delegated to the Communities, and then the Union, larger and larger slices of their economic, commercial and monetary powers, but their reluctance to share their political, diplomatic and military sovereignty in a similar way is still, apart from a few details, considerable. Political Europe, and military Europe even more, is still a sum of sovereign nations that wish to remain so.

Three examples are revealing in this respect. First is the persistent taboo on the very notion of a European army and the traditional chorus of denials each time this idea resurfaces in this or that public discussion. For very different reasons (preference for integration in the framework of NATO, neutrality or non-membership of military alliances, obsession with national sovereignty in diplomatic and military affairs), all the member countries agree that the aim of a 'common army' should be dismissed as lacking in political realism, even though opinion polls show the opposite: Europeans are, in fact, far from finding the idea absurd, dangerous or unacceptable. The second factor is the method for taking decisions on CFSP and defence, which is governed by an almost universal rule of unanimity among the 15 and now the 25 member states, and thus the possibility for each state to use its right of veto on any decision in this area. Finally, the institutional arrangement governing the implementation of the ESDP also demonstrates the burden of national constraints on the development of a European defence policy. The greatest obsession of the majority of member states is, in fact, to exclude from it any reference to, any borrowing from, or any concession to the Community method – in other words to keep the ESDP and the CFSP as a whole outside the scope of the powers of the Commission and the European Parliament.

There is of course no shortage of arguments to justify the stranglehold of national sovereignty on such areas of policy: defence policies can, in principle, involve the life and death of European citizens, member states' national interests do not disappear entirely in the sum of the collective interests of the Union, democratic legitimacy is still based on the political framework of nations, and so the transfer of military sovereignty to a supranational European body is simply not acceptable. No state in the world would agree to its citizens risking their lives as a result of a vote where it had been on the losing side. But is what is normal and legitimate for decisions on military intervention also normal and legitimate for all other areas of security and defence policy with

the same degree of credibility? Are 25 rights of veto essential to implement a common armaments policy and organise a more competitive European market; to define a European position on the final status of Kosovo; to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? In reality, all the discussions now in progress on flexibility in the area of security and defence, on developing permanent, structured cooperation between some of the member states, including the role and right of initiative of the future Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, reveal the same disquiet with regard to unanimity as a founding principle – because respect for national sovereignty and the collective effectiveness of the Union are two aims that do not necessarily go together. Flexibility, hard core, constructive abstention, leadership, enhanced cooperation, Foreign Minister: all are ways for states to try to equivocate, circumvent and accommodate the principle of the veto, while refusing categorically to take the plunge towards a merging of sovereignty that, in particular, introducing majority voting into Union foreign policy would represent.

This permanent tension between the primacy of national sovereignty and the increased need for European integration is without any doubt the distinguishing feature of the Union's security policy. Certainly, in the matter of defence policy, the member states have, under the leadership of Javier Solana, accomplished an enormous amount in five years. In 1999 no one would have reasonably bet that the Union would, in 2005, have a Minister for Foreign Affairs, a mutual solidarity clause and a common security strategy. However, in five years of developing and implementing a European defence policy, the burden and control of national sovereignty over that 'common' Union policy have remained more or less intact: none of the areas which have been successively brought within the scope of the ESDP – capability objectives, specific operations, military structures for planning or controlling operations, armaments – has led to any merging of sovereignty, neither on defence nor on foreign policy: the enormous divisions on the Iraq crisis are ample proof of this. And because each state remains sovereign, the whole undertaking can still be reversed.

This is the great paradox of European defence: since the origin of European construction, a certain idea of Europe, really of French origin, has made defence policy a necessary and essential condition for the emergence of a political Europe and an international role for the Union. This vision of the driving force of mili-

tary power in Europe's political existence is, moreover, at the basis of all transatlantic discussions, differences of view between France and Britain, and American distrust of the Union's defence policy. Fairly recently, in March 2003, the mini-crisis over the idea of an independent European military headquarters – then proposed by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg at the height of a transatlantic crisis over Iraq (the Tervuren affair) – arose out of the basic axiom that a common defence policy would lead automatically to a political Europe. From another point of view, however, the more European states introduce a military dimension into the Union's legitimate powers, the more they strengthen the role of national sovereignty in European construction. The more they militarise the Union, the more they set in stone its intergovernmental nature; the stronger they make the defence aspect, the more they emphasise the veto. Moreover, the enthusiasm of some member states for the ESDP sometimes springs from that anti-Community guarantee that a strengthening of the Union's military importance would bring about. Over the last five years, the struggle for influence between the Commission and the Council and the rise in importance of the Council vis-à-vis the Commission's powers are thus only the inevitable institutional result of this increased importance of defence and security in the range of Europe's powers. The recent division on Iraq, even though progress on the ESDP had never been so substantial, merely reflects this obvious fact: European military cooperation does not lead to political integration within the Union.

Is this burden of national sovereignty an unbreachable constraint? Not necessarily. This constraint is subject to two strong qualifications: the first arises out of the threat, the second from the evolution of the concept of integration itself. International terrorism, because it does not fit into the traditional framework of predictability and diplomatic negotiation, is disrupting the traditional balance between national sovereignty and shared sovereignty. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the new context of international security is restoring increased legitimacy and autonomy to nation-states: as the dividing line between internal and external security is becoming more indistinct, and as the lives and possibly the deaths of European citizens are at stake, it is essential to strengthen states' security and control services. To varying degrees, the terrorist threat strengthens people's feeling of belonging to a country, and the protection of their citizens puts

the national interest back at the top of the agenda of elected governments. The desire for state control is thus seen to be proportional to the growing level of international insecurity: the whole of American policy, since the attacks of 11 September, demonstrates this only too clearly. On the other hand, however, the globalisation of security repeatedly shows the limits inherent in national frameworks alone: just as the management of Iraq does not fall within the sovereign power of America alone, the fight against terrorism cannot be devised or won at the purely national level. What the UN and multilateralism gain in international legitimacy in the face of the structural complexity of crises, the Union and a certain form of integration also gain vis-à-vis the issue of terrorism. Whether they like it or not, European states are thus forced to move towards a minimum of European integration, in particular the sharing of intelligence, the control of capital flows identified with terrorism or serious crime and the harmonisation of judicial systems in the European area. Between national control and European integration, the terrorist threat is thus now introducing a new dynamic, a sort of integration trick which the reluctance of states will find it more and more difficult to resist.

The second qualifying factor resides in the evolution of the notion of integration. If the construction of European political power must choose between these two extremes – the Community model or the intergovernmental model – then the impasse is obvious, and the status quo will tend to favour the nation-states. With the European institutions and the parliamentary systems of the 25 as they are at present, it is indeed difficult to imagine states deciding to transfer their military and democratic sovereignty to a single European body. If, on the other hand, we look beyond this dilemma between the Community model and cooperation among nations, European political construction takes on a different dynamic and opens up new perspectives. What the first five years of European defence policy indeed demonstrate is the possibility of a third way towards integration, neither totally Community-based nor strictly intergovernmental, of which the function of High Representative, and soon the Foreign Minister, represents the most original embodiment. The European Security Strategy, proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by all the Heads of State and Government in December 2003, had already demonstrated the ability of the High Representative to establish a consensus, without passing through the formal mould of intergovernmental

negotiations or, conversely, an impossible vote by qualified majority. Tomorrow, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the establishment of a European Union diplomatic service, the setting up, under the leadership of Javier Solana, of an armaments agency involving states and also, inevitably, the Commission, will be a series of new instruments which will modify substantially the traditional balance between national sovereignty and the assertion of a European security interest.

The Atlantic Alliance and the role of the United States

In addition to the nation-states, the other major structural limit of the ESDP is its relationship to the Atlantic Alliance. Because NATO is identified, in Europe's history and perceptions, with America's protection of Europe, the United States has, since the origin of the ESDP, played a very decisive role in its development and functioning. Right from the start, this role was ambivalent: the American authorities encouraged the development of the ESDP when it meant modernising European military capabilities, but they also stated very clearly its limits, or even dangers, when it meant constructing a European political identity. Yes to the creation of effective and available European forces, no to the emergence of a strategic Europe autonomous from NATO: in broad outline, and regardless of the Administration in power in Washington, that has been the general approach of the United States towards the ESDP.

Before St-Malo, the discussions then in progress on establishing a European identity within NATO (ESDI) were already tracing a clear dividing line between the reorganisation of European military capabilities within NATO (desirable) and a possible political structure to reflect those military arrangements (unacceptable). Hence the constant refusal of the United States to envisage any 'European caucus' within NATO, and the formulation of the concept of 'separable but not separated' forces to govern possible developments in European capabilities. After the creation of the ESDP at the Cologne European Council, it was the 'three Ds' formula which was to become the official doctrine of the US administration on the primacy of NATO over the ESDP: no decoupling between the United States and Europe, no duplication of NATO's resources and those of the Union, no discrimination towards NATO's European allies who are not members of the Union, accompanied by a claim, also a constant in Washington, to a 'right of first refusal' for the Atlantic Alliance. Both on the military and

the political level, the United States therefore made its acceptance of the ESDP conditional on the Europeans not crossing a very clear red line, ruling out anything that might encourage the autonomy and, above all, the strategic independence of the Union. More recently, at the height of the sharp divisions over the Iraq crisis, the Tervuren affair – in other words the idea of a strictly European defence staff for the planning and conduct of the Union's military operations – reminded Europeans that this red line could not be crossed, whatever the Americans' own desires for emancipation vis-à-vis the Alliance.

With varying degrees of enthusiasm according to country and circumstances, the Europeans have been careful to maintain the development of the ESDP within these limits. The ESDP has therefore, since its origin, ruled out any Article 5 task, i.e. territorial defence of the member countries, as that remains NATO's prime function under the Washington Treaty. The Petersberg tasks have therefore been defined in such a way that, on this crucial aspect of the protection of the Europeans against threats of external aggression, there can be no ambiguity about the prime responsibility of NATO. Similarly, the Europeans have concluded with NATO – often after intense and difficult negotiations – the 'Berlin-plus' agreements governing relations between NATO and the Union in crisis management. The European Union will thus take over NATO's SFOR operation in Bosnia in the second half of 2004 under the terms of that agreement. The developments stimulated by the new international terrorism have also served to emphasise again the necessary synergy and complementarity between NATO and the Union. At no time, therefore, has Europe sought to create an integrated European army separated from the United States: attachment to national sovereignty and attachment to the Atlantic Alliance combined to rule out any idea of a solely European military integration.

Indeed, many reasons argue in favour of the greatest possible harmony between NATO and European defence: the vital role played by American protection in Europe since 1949, the Atlantic attachment and culture of most of the armed forces of the member countries, the military expertise and added value acquired by NATO over more than fifty years and the community of values between the American and European democracies are advantages that all the European partners, whether formally members of NATO or not, wish to preserve. It was indeed to consolidate that

established fact of a continuing investment by the United States in the defence of Europe that the ESDP was proposed by France and the United Kingdom at St-Malo after the first Balkan crises of the 1990s: because American involvement in crises that were not vital for America was no longer guaranteed, and because NATO no longer functioned as an automatic contract for US assistance, the Europeans had to organise themselves to assume their share of responsibility in crisis management and, in doing so, maintain or even enhance the United States's interest within the Alliance. More Europe would strengthen the Alliance, and similarly more Alliance would now presuppose a stronger Europe.

To what extent is this basic contract, which has governed relations between the Alliance and the Union since St-Malo, still appropriate in the new strategic situation created by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001? The question is open. On the American side, three trends can now be discerned: on the geographical level, terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq have shifted America's strategic priority towards the south, marginalising Europe to the advantage of the Greater Middle East; on the political level, America's choice of unilateralism and the greatest possible freedom of action are ill-adapted to the rules of collectivity and permanent negotiation which, conversely, govern the operation of the Alliance; finally, on the military level, the growing gap between American and European forces strengthens the unilateral options and leads the United States to some preference for ad hoc coalitions rather than proper alliances.

Does this mean that NATO is becoming unnecessary or marginal in American strategy? Certainly not. But it is clear that the new strategic situation alters significantly the relationship between the United States and the Atlantic organisation. The question of its use for American security, unthinkable before, has de facto been raised in Washington: if America's defence is played out in the South, on the basis of scenarios of intervention/coercion very different from traditional threats of aggression, what is NATO's added value? If the Atlantic contract assumes that the United States guarantee Europe's security, how does one maintain the reciprocity of Europe's usefulness for America's defence? Whatever one may think of the present US administration's policies, these questions are entirely legitimate. Hence the developments, sometimes contradictory, that the United States is experimenting with in relation to the Atlantic organisation. On the one

hand, it seeks maximum flexibility with regard to NATO's collective rules: in many theatres – Bosnia, Afghanistan, and of course Iraq – American forces are more and more separate and autonomous from NATO forces. On the other, it tries to use NATO as a framework for more rapid modernisation of European forces along American lines: the project for a rapid reaction force is exemplary in this respect. Finally, it expects the Alliance to provide political support, legitimisation of American strategy and military support for the post-conflict phases, particularly in Afghanistan and perhaps in Iraq as well.

Devised at top speed in response to events and international developments, these American trends disturb Europeans' traditional perceptions of NATO. How do we modernise Europe's capabilities on the model of American expeditionary forces and at the same time retain large peacekeeping contingents which are ever more necessary in the secondary stages of conflicts? How do we make NATO relevant for the theatres in the South if American defence policy becomes more and more autonomous with regard to the Organisation? All the more so as the nature of the threat itself – on which Europeans and Americans used to be totally united – is now a subject of discussion, and even of differences of view, between the allies, as the Iraq affair has amply demonstrated.

Over the last two years, the reassuring framework of the Alliance and the rules governing relations between NATO and the ESDP have thus become less and less secure. NATO's major affair at present is the stabilisation of Afghanistan, and perhaps tomorrow of Iraq. Repositioning of American forces in Europe, even reducing them in the Balkans, is on the agenda. The military strategy of the United States – the unchallenged leader of NATO during this last half-century – no longer has unanimous support. No one knows the long-term effects of these developments which, for the moment, are producing a strange mixture among most Europeans of unease and conservatism towards the United States and NATO alike. But the ESDP, which was intentionally developed in the reassuring shadow of the Alliance, cannot remain untouched by these developments.

In five years, under the pressure of the international context, in particular the repercussions of terrorism, the two major outer boundaries of the ESDP – national sovereignty and the Atlantic contract – have undergone a profound change. From structural constants shaping European defence, they have become variables,

fluctuating by definition. The outcome of this double evolution is not at all certain, but it is self-evident that the ESDP will, over the next five years, have to adjust to the changes under way both in the notion of sovereignty and in America's attitude towards Europe.

The challenges of the future

A period has come to an end: the Europe of 15, which invented the ESDP, has become a Europe of 25, whilst leaving the door wide open for other candidates, beginning with Turkey. A new Constitution has replaced the founding Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. Management of the crises in the Balkans, which was at the origin of the ESDP, must now co-exist with the fight against terrorism. The European Security Strategy serves in principle as a guide to the Union's external action, but Iraq, with all the differences of view engendered by the military intervention and all the uncertainties over the outcome of the crisis, represents a challenge of unprecedented dimensions for all the Western democracies. In this context of great uncertainty, Europe must, however, consolidate all the institutions and resources that will enable the Union to assume international security responsibilities that are increasingly unavoidable. A number of tensions are already apparent, and their resolution will influence the future of the Union's political role.

Between collective legitimacy and effectiveness of a few

With 25 – and soon 30 – members, the Union is the greatest potential force for action on the international environment, i.e. a group of nearly 450 million citizens, producing more than a quarter of world GNP and inspired by shared democratic values. Compared with the specific interventions of any state taken in isolation, action in the name of the European Union is therefore a formidable multiplier of power or influence: for some, the European label represents above all a gain in terms of democratic legitimacy, for others it is the condition for access to a degree of influence over international crises, and for others again it is a guarantee of participation in the collective management of crises. For very different reasons, therefore, it is in everyone's interest if the European Union framework complements or replaces purely national frameworks, or even ad hoc coalitions between a few member states. But, against this common background, the difficulty is twofold. How,

on the one hand, can the minimalist wishes of some be reconciled with the more interventionist wishes of others? In other words, how can a consensus be created for collective responsibility by the Union in the management of a crisis? How, on the other hand, can equality of all members in formulating the Union's foreign policy be reconciled with differences in resources and capabilities for implementing decisions? In the enlarged Union, questions of leadership and burden-sharing are inevitably going to become major issues when implementing security and defence policy.

Between global security and fragmentation of resources

Under the leadership of Javier Solana, the Union has developed a common strategic vision that treats security as a global concept, far beyond its purely technical and military dimensions. The European Security Strategy cannot be identified with a doctrine of intervention: in the context of globalisation, the threats and challenges to the Union's security result from a complex web of economic, social, political and ideological factors; tackling them implies simultaneously mobilising all available resources. This is especially true of international terrorism, the fight against proliferation of WMD and the management of traditional political conflicts, in the Middle East or in Africa. The clearer the need for coherence, the more the dissipated nature of the Union's resources and policies appears as a major handicap: among the member states, the Presidency, the Commission, the Council, the Brussels structures, the representatives on the spot and the military, around ten players are often involved in dealing with one single issue, each from its own perspective. However, it is less the number of players involved than their different aims, interests, and policies that jeopardise the Union's collective effectiveness. Therefore, it is not so much additional resources as a single authority that the Union needs: to define a policy, set common aims and ensure that all are working together to implement them. Just as much as between the member states, the question of political leadership is thus also raised – perhaps above all – at the heart of the Union itself.

Between the South and the East

A major effect of enlargement is to shift the Union's external frontier to the East, making it all the more important to define a common *Ostpolitik*, with its geographical aspect – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Caucasus – but also its thematic aspect – border

management, visas, migration, minorities and all the potential hotbeds of crisis in the wider Europe. Moreover, a majority of the new member states regard Russia as a priority issue for the Union's security policy. At the same time, the new strategic agenda is shifting the whole of the world security equation from the East to the South, in particular as regards terrorism, the risks of nuclear proliferation, major regional conflicts such as Iraq or the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the Union's energy dependence, the differences in economic development between the two shores of the Mediterranean, etc. The next decision of the European Council on Turkey's candidature, before the end of 2004, will, moreover, only accentuate that dual nature of European strategic concerns. How should the tension between the neighbourhood policy in the East and crisis management in the South be managed? How should political priorities be defined and according to what timetable? On the basis of what criteria and what common strategic vision should far from unlimited financial resources be allocated? These challenges will continue to influence the implementation of a common foreign policy with 25 members: here again, the responsibility of the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be crucial in ensuring a minimum of strategic coherence within the Union.

Between internal security and external security

The particular nature of the fight against terrorism is that it is played out on all fronts: within the member states for detecting networks and making arrests, protecting citizens and sensitive sites, aiding any victims; outside, by determined action to resolve crises liable to feed frustrations and violence of all kinds. Various links between traditional regional conflicts, the activities of large-scale organised crime and terrorism make traditional frontiers between defence and security policies more and more blurred and artificial. How can European citizens be convinced that stabilising external crises also affects their protection within the Union's borders? How can the necessary level of coordination be ensured between the activities of civilian authorities and those for which military bodies are responsible, between states' national prerogatives and action necessary at Union level? How can the ESDP be developed whilst strengthening the means for implementing a homeland defence policy at Union level? These challenges are now on the table of all European authorities; they make it more and more urgent to increase coherence in the Union's policies, to bring about a synergy

of resources and objectives, and to establish an agreed chain for planning, directing and implementing the Union's security policy.

Between Alliance and influence

A strong and coherent Union is as necessary for the legitimacy of American power as America is essential for the effectiveness of European power: there is no alternative, either for the Union or for the United States, to a solid Euro-American strategic partnership. But, in the new post Cold War international context, it has become easier to declaim the principle than to implement it. As the United States is one of the major determining factors of the future of European construction, how can a European foreign policy that backs up but is not necessarily similar to Washington's be constructed? How can American policy be influenced if necessary, bearing in mind that the United States no longer sees the Atlantic Alliance as the compulsory forum for their relationship with the European allies? In a way, most recent initiatives of the Union on the international stage – European Security Strategy, strategy to combat proliferation, policy towards Iran, dialogue with the Arab world – can be read as a common European attempt to respond to the challenges of influence and difference. To integrate America as a subject of the CFSP and to construct a common policy towards America will in future be one of the crucial challenges for the CFSP: just as the United States cannot rule the world alone, so the European nations can only have influence together, whatever the national ambition of each of them.

Between defence and policy

Whether for a state taken in isolation or for the collective framework of the European Union, the finest capabilities in the world serve no purpose if there is no political will to act and have influence on the international stage. Although the forming of military capabilities can be the subject of technical negotiations between 25 or 30 partners, establishing a common political will, an identical strategic vision, a common sense of the responsibilities and duties of the Union, involves a completely different dimension. As the Iraq crisis has shown, there is no causal relationship between the creation of tools, institutions or military capabilities on the one hand and the creation of a common foreign policy on the other. Between progressive militarisation of the Union – necessary and moreover very successful so far – and development of a real Union foreign

policy – paradoxically forgotten over the last five years – the gap is enormous. However, it is in that range of non-military means of external intervention – development aid, trade agreements, political dialogue with all the regions of the world, beginning with the Middle East, humanitarian aid, etc. – that the added value of the Union of the 25 is to be found. If, as the European Security Strategy rightly affirms, most crises do not have purely military solutions, then the true value of the ESDP must be restored: it is a means and not an end, a tool at the service of a policy and not a substitute for the policy itself.

I

Five years of ESDP (1999-2004): an assessment

An historical perspective

Jean-Yves Haine

1

Civilian by nature, the European integration process has led to a 'security-community' among European members in which the use of force for resolving disputes has became obsolete.[1] After the collapse of the EDC in August 1954, defence issues were essentially taboo among Europeans, NATO being the only organisation responsible for European security.

After more than fifty years of status quo, several factors may explain the progressive emergence of a genuine security and defence policy for the Union. The first change was systemic. With the end of the Cold War, Europe partly lost its strategic significance for the United States. The security guarantee provided by Washington remained, yet the end of the Soviet threat meant ultimately the end of European dependency in security and defence.[2] Moreover, armies in Western Europe were built on collective and territorial defence. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, collective security and intervention abroad became the new principles of European defence.

The second factor is related to the specific dynamic of the integration process. Once economic integration had nearly been completed, the political side of the European process became the next obvious area of integration. Of course, the two aspects were never separated. Monetary union was first and foremost a political endeavour. Yet, in foreign policy, the spillover effect was limited.[3] The first initiatives of the 1970s were fairly minimal; only the Maastricht Treaty was seen as a first breakthrough, however modest. Foreign policy, however, is not an area where the logic of integration can easily replace the logic of collective action. The intergovernmental nature of foreign policy cooperation remained the basic rule of the game. This basic reality explained the creation of a second pillar of the Union, dedicated to a common foreign policy, but at Maastricht, defence issues were postponed *sine die*.

Third, the deepening of the Union meant that the gap between Europe as an economic giant and a political dwarf became all too

1. The term was first coined by Karl Deutsch, 'Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement', *Foreign Policy Analysis Series*, Princeton University, no. 2, September 1953, pp. 1-25. It was subsequently developed in Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

2. On this point, see among others Christopher Layne, 'Continental Divide: Time to Disengage in Europe', *The National Interest*, no. 13, Fall 1988, pp. 13-27. Some have predicted the return of anarchy in Europe; see John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56, *et contra* Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, *After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

3. This dynamic was first identified by Ernst B. Haas, *The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economic forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968).

obvious after the end of the Cold War. With rising doubts about the persistence and extent of America's involvement in European affairs, this imbalance could not have lasted for ever. It seemed particularly odd that the Union could make its voice heard in international economic forums, but remained muted in international security discussions.

Ultimately, external events imposed their own significance. The driving factor behind the Union's security developments was the need to address the challenges of the Balkans wars that threatened the rationale and credibility of the whole integration process. As we shall see, the Bosnian crises first demonstrated that Europe's values had to be defended and actively promoted in its neighbourhood, where a humanitarian catastrophe was unfolding on European television screens. The impact of the Balkans tragedy was absolutely crucial to shifting public opinion throughout Europe in favour of a more coordinated approach among European countries. It seemed absurd, if not revolting, to multiply European directives addressing every detail of economic daily life of Europe while at the same time disregarding atrocities in Sarajevo. To put it differently, the conflicts in the Balkans forced Europe to rediscover 'the need for geopolitics'.[4] This crisis was also instrumental in bringing European governments together. The initial disagreements and the worsening of the conflict that these allowed demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the national alternative. Neither France nor the United Kingdom nor Germany could have successfully handled the crisis on its own. Collective action, including with other partners like Russia and the United States, became the condition for success. Following the coordinated approach in the Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States), the Europeanisation of this necessary collective action became the central institutional debate for the Union.

Lastly, there was a specific European willingness to learn from past mistakes which was consubstantial with the European project. For each failure, there has been a new ambition: the 1957 Treaty of Rome was partly a reaction to the collapse of the EDC; the European exchange rate mechanism was introduced after the oil shocks of the 1970s. After Bosnia and Kosovo came the first acknowledgment of EU military inadequacies and the launching of the St-Malo process; after Iraq, came a genuine European Security Strategy and a new activism in world affairs. Here lies the par-

4. The expression is from Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003) p. 25.

adox but also the strength of this process: learning by doing may be a frustrating way of moving forward, but progress has none the less been considerable during the last five years. Broadly put, ESDP developed in two different phases: the first was an answer to a security challenge that was first and foremost European; the second was an evolution demanded by the international context after 9/11.

Behind ESDP: responsibility in crisis management

The security landscape at the end of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War marked the victory of the Western alliance's deterrent strategy against the East, but it also implied a redefinition of the American commitment to Europe. After 40 years of American protection, Europe's emancipation was inevitable. The question was how to implement European responsibility without weakening the Atlantic partnership. The management of German reunification provided the first answer to this crucial issue. The integration of the unified Germany within NATO, an option actively advocated by Washington and accepted, against all expectations, by Moscow, made it possible not only to maintain cohesion between the Germans and Americans but also to consolidate the NATO monopoly on European security issues.[5] In a context that was both unexpected – the threat from the East had disappeared – and familiar – NATO was still in being in the West – discussion of European security was still characterised by historically based divergences between major members of the Union, while at the same time the first moves towards a single currency were being made. This ambivalence was seen during the Maastricht summit in December 1991. On the one hand, countries like Britain who were in favour of the Alliance's primacy, while acknowledging the need for greater coordination of foreign policy, were opposed to any transfer of competence in security matters to the Union. On the other, France, reasserting its desire to strengthen its relationship with Germany, suggested raising its military collaboration with Bonn to a European level. Setting up the Eurocorps was a first step in relaunching the idea of European defence, but from the outset it encountered major political difficulties.[6] The remainder of Europe was divided along traditional lines, between 'Atlanticists' and 'Europeanists'. If the Maastricht

5. See my second chapter, on ESDP and NATO.

6. 'The question of command and control of the Eurocorps has been whether this is all a French plot to winkle Germany out of NATO or a German plot to seduce France into NATO'. George Stein, 'The Eurocorps and Future European Security Architecture', *European Security*, vol. 2, no. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 214-15; and Jean-Yves Haine, *L'Eurocorps et les identités européennes de défense: du gage franco-allemand à la promesse européenne* (Paris : Centre d'Etudes de la Défense, January 2001).

summit saw the birth of the second pillar, – CFSP – the defence aspect was postponed *sine die*.[7]

At the beginning of the 1990s, the European security landscape thus had a somewhat schizophrenic appearance. On the one hand, the Union as a political entity was taking its first steps on the international scene but without its own defence capability; on the other, NATO remained the essential security instrument in Europe but now had a new political vocation vis-à-vis its former enemies in the East. These changed circumstances prevented the renationalisation of defence instruments in Europe, safeguarded the essential part of the transatlantic relationship and preserved American influence in Europe, but left unanswered several contradictions. On the European side, the concept of a European defence identity was at odds with the reduced budgets and peace dividends demanded by public opinion. Across the Atlantic, the end of the Cold War called for a redefinition of America's role in Europe and of Europe's place in American strategy, which in turn involved a review of NATO's mission and partnership. The limitations of this hybrid architecture became evident when tensions in the Balkans turned violent.

The tragedy of Bosnia

With the first military confrontation in Slovenia in July 1991, the European Union, anxious to put its infant common foreign policy into practice, dispatched its 'Troika' to negotiate a cease-fire. This 'diplomatic rapid reaction force', as it was called by the then Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, demonstrated that the Balkans, unlike the Gulf, were Europe's responsibility.[8] The partly successful Carrington mission quickly handed the baton over to the UN's envoy Cyrus Vance, who managed to arrange a cease-fire that was essential for the deployment of UN 'blue helmet' peacekeepers. Their minimal and ambiguous mandate was, however, patently inadequate so long as peace had not been re-established. It was impossible to keep a peace that did not exist or impose one without becoming involved in the conflict. This classic conundrum of collective security led to paralysis in international institutions, which restricted themselves to following the conflict without resolving it. The limits of international law in cases of civil war, the inadequacy of traditional peacekeeping instruments and the outbreak of real violence in Europe following forty years of political but peaceful confrontation, all contributed to the Euro-

7. See Art. J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty.

8. On this, see James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 48-50.

peans' inability to judge the scale of the conflict.

At this early stage of the conflict, military capabilities were not the problem: Europeans could have acted decisively to stop the killings. Rather, the crucial disagreement dealt with the appropriateness and the objective of any military intervention. In short, divisions were political. Germany, for historical reasons, was keen to recognise the sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia, but at the same time it lacked the capacity to guarantee these new international frontiers. France for its part refused to acknowledge border changes triggered by force, while Britain was reluctant to intervene in a conflict where no obvious strategic interests were at stake.[9] Thus the lowest common denominator was management of the humanitarian aspect of the conflict. The presence of European forces under UN mandate had a considerable positive humanitarian impact but military intervention became even more difficult, with troops on the ground that were vulnerable to retaliation. Europeans were thus unable to put an end to the conflict, even when the horror of ethnic cleansing and the unacceptability of concentration camps gave the lie to the fundamental values of European construction.

Washington's support became a necessary condition for implementing a more interventionist policy and dealing with increasingly serious humanitarian emergencies. Yet America was extremely reluctant to intervene. The break-up of Yugoslavia seemed to it senseless and irresponsible, and the ethnic mix too complex for any intervention to be decisive. In the absence of clear strategic interests, Washington refused to become involved in the conflict. [10] After all, 'Europe's hour' had come. Whereas the Europeans were trying to work out a peace formula that could be implemented, Washington's rhetoric encouraged the Bosnians' hope for a military intervention that the United States was determined to avoid and Europe declined as long as its forces risked becoming hostages. In the grey area between American ambivalence and European impotence, Slobodan Milosevic pursued his destructive programme with an impunity that culminated in Srebrenica, the worst massacre in Europe since the Second World War.[11]

The lessons of the tragedy of Bosnia were harsh for the international community as a whole, but in particular for Europe, which best symbolised the contradictions thrown up by Bosnia. The first of these was one of ethics: faced with the return of barbarity to the European continent, the failure of the Europeans who were pres-

9. On the German position, see Carl C. Hodge, 'Botching the Balkans: Germany's Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia', *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 12, 1998, pp. 1-18; and Harald Müller, 'Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate', in Lawrence Freedman, *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) pp. 139 ff. On France and the United Kingdom, see Thierry Tardy, *La France et la gestion des conflits yougoslaves (1991-1995) : enjeux et leçons d'une opération de maintien de la paix de l'ONU* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1999) and Jane M. O. Sharp, *Bankrupt in the Balkans: British Policy in Bosnia* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1992).

10. On this see, among others, Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Times Book, 1999) pp. 215ff.

11. For a meticulous reconstruction of the Srebrenica massacre, see David Rhode, *Endgame. The betrayal and fall of Srebrenica: Europe's worst massacre since World War II* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997) and Jan Willem Honig and Norbeth Both, *Srebrenica: record of a war crime* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997).

ent but remained passive dealt a serious blow to the very essence of the European project, based as it was on democratic values that were being flouted on its doorstep. As the European partners had failed to produce a common strategy, former Yugoslavia should have been seen as a sufficiently serious democratic and moral issue for them to set aside specific national interests, their respective inhibitions and institutional shortcomings. The very credibility of the common European enterprise was affected, and the message received by the outside world became noticeably less pertinent, particularly in the countries of Eastern Europe who had only recently thrown off the yoke of communism and were looking to their security once again.[12] The first imperative for any European defence undertaking is to avoid such a massacre happening again in Europe. If the Union is prepared to tolerate war crimes again, its very foundations will suffer lasting damage.

The second lesson concerned the effective use of force, and here several factors should be stressed. The first of these was the evident inadequacy of defence institutions founded on a territorial defence system.[13] Given the institutional handicaps or historical legacies that reduced the room for manoeuvre of certain member states, and going beyond the inertia produced by forty years of deterrent confrontation, the requirement to be able to project lightly armed operational units contrasted with the fact that forces in Europe were tied to specific areas, and their numbers in reality reflected no more than their relative ineffectiveness. The defining by WEU of 'Petersberg tasks' was a first expression of the new strategic environment but the reorganisation of military forces, begun in June 1992 by WEU and in December of the same year by NATO, to focus on force projection and the management of far-off crises, was a slow business. The second factor was both specific – the need to have the means to carry out the peacemaking and peacekeeping tasks codified at Petersberg – and also more general: the requirement to acquire and develop a strategic culture and an organisation that can anticipate events. Without a credible threat to use force, there could be no effective collective security.

The third lesson was in a sense paradoxical. The reappearance of war in Europe demonstrated the gap between the reality of the effective power of a few large European countries and the European Community's decision-making framework. The security risks resulting from the disintegration of Yugoslavia were not strategic. Whereas European security had been a matter of neces-

12. 'The conclusion which the region drew from the Yugoslav war was not that the West was discredited but rather that the institutional approaches which the west was putting forward were pure confections. Those who still wonder why the East Europeans became so obsessed with NATO membership should search through the annals of the Yugoslav saga'. Jonathan Eyal, 'NATO's enlargement: anatomy of a decision', *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 4, October 1997, pp. 700-1.

13. Frédéric Bozo, 'Organisations de sécurité et insécurité en Europe', *Politique Etrangère*, no. 2, été 1993, pp. 447-58 and Catherine Guicherd, 'L'Heure de l'Europe : Premières leçons du conflit yougoslave', *Les Cahiers du Crest*, mars 1993.

sity during the Cold War, it was now a matter of voluntary choice. Taking account of that reality was to become a necessary condition for any common European defence policy, and at the same time it set its limits. What is more, the ultimate decision to use armed force and accept the attendant risks is basically a national prerogative. In times of crisis, international institutions matter less, sovereign power more. This renewed importance of national sovereignty marked the limits of the institutional changes ratified at Maastricht.[14] At the same time, no individual member state could hope to deal alone with this type of conflict: it called for a collective response. Efforts therefore had to be directed at cooperation on foreign policy while taking national prerogatives into account.

The final lesson concerned the transatlantic relationship. The conflict in Bosnia had underlined just how important, but also how fragile, this partnership was. Without American involvement, and without NATO's intervention, Milosevic would never have signed the Dayton peace accord. Also, the late involvement of the United States in the conflict was firstly a reflection of distinctly American strategic imperatives and political uncertainties. Transatlantic discord was such that NATO itself was weakened by it.[15] Moreover, the division of labour in the military intervention, whereby European ground forces incurred the greater part of the risks and US aircraft operated from a safe height, was unfavourable to the Europeans. This imbalance of risks and strategic divergence suggested a reform of the Atlantic Alliance that took into account this European specificity and identity.[16] The European difference within the Alliance was recognised; its effectiveness, however, depended on improved capabilities.

The conflict in Kosovo

The Kosovo conflict confirmed Europe's military shortcomings and the ambiguities of America's international position. While there had been no disagreement within the American administration over the use of NATO to resolve the crisis, in spring 1999 the White House made a strategic decision to launch 'political' strikes to force Milosevic to negotiate. This strategy of military 'compellence', that is to say the use of force for political rather than military ends, involved high altitude strikes with a minimum of risks for NATO forces. Yet such a strategy has no chance of succeeding unless the adversary considers that issues being disputed are of

14. On this point, see Philip H. Gordon, 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy', *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 3, Winter 1997/98, pp. 74-100; and Philip Zelikow, 'The Masque of Institutions', *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 6-18.

15. According to one of the most ardent critics of US foreign policy towards Bosnia, 'Three years and hundreds of thousands of dead later, G. Bush's successor had been forced to realize what was at stake in Bosnia: the Atlantic Alliance.' Mark Danner, 'Operation Storm', *New York Review of Books*, 22 October 1998, pp. 76-7.

16. On this, see my chapter on ESDP and NATO.

only secondary concern. Kosovo, however, was of vital importance to Milosevic.[17] This initial error in US appreciation of the situation was gradually rectified, but the consequences were important.

The conflict that was supposed to be short became protracted; it gave rise to major tensions within the Alliance by putting the Europeans in an ambiguous situation: on the one hand the inadequacy of their means made them dependent on the US effort; on the other, consensual political control within the Alliance gave them a *droit de regard* over 99 per cent of the targets selected for air strikes by Washington. Whereas the European allies carried out only about 40 per cent of the strikes, the latent crisis within the Alliance stemmed from the fact that while the Americans had great technological superiority in the air, political negotiations were necessary to obtain approval for most of the sorties carried out – 807 out of 976 – against targets in addition to those initially planned.[18] Without making an effort to improve its military capabilities, Europe's influence over US strategy would remain minimal and its responsibility would continue to be limited. An effort to improve Europe's military capability had become essential if the strategic decoupling of a Europe that was lagging behind technologically was to be avoided; yet doing so would raise fears of the political decoupling of a more autonomous Europe. In other words, fighting alongside America had become a difficult task. Yet, NATO's harmony was to be maintained. In Kosovo, the Alliance's unity was a precondition for its success.[19] European autonomy therefore meant not emancipation but improvement of European means of action inside the Alliance. This was the main basis of the St-Malo initiative between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac.

The St-Malo agreement in December 1998, which was the founding act of ESDP, represented the meeting point of two evolutions. On the one hand, the French position vis-à-vis NATO had evolved substantially after Bosnia. The close cooperation on the ground in Bosnia with British troops had cultivated a de facto solidarity between the military hierarchies. The French President, particularly sensitive to military affairs, initiated a noticeable rapprochement with NATO.[20] This initiative combined happily with the new British viewpoint. Britain was aware of the limitations of the exercise in rebalancing the Atlantic Alliance – the European Security and Defence Identity of January 1994 – so long as it was seen by the US Congress as merely a way of reducing US involve-

17. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly : NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC.: The Brookings Institution, 2000) and Layne Christopher, 'Blunder in the Balkans', *Policy Analysis*, no. 345, 20 May 1999, pp. 1-19.

18. These figures are from John E. Peters et al., *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001) p. 25.

19. According to one Serb official, 'We never thought NATO would stay united through 10 weeks of bombing and the killing of innocent civilians. We got it wrong'. Quoted by Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Conflict over Kosovo : Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001) p. 41.

20. On the French position, see Robert P. Grant, 'France's New Relationship with NATO', *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 1, Summer 1996, pp. 58-80 and Anand Menon, 'From Independence to cooperation: France, NATO and European Security', *International Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 1, January 1995, pp. 19-34.

ment in Europe. As part of a wider European policy, the Blair government's strategy considered that only through the Union could the Europeans' military means be enhanced. Even before the dramatic illustration provided by Kosovo, the British Prime Minister had concluded that if this imbalance continued it would imperil the very foundation of the Atlantic partnership. It was a matter of laying down a more balanced and therefore healthier basis for the relationship. The way to save the Alliance was via Europe. In the eyes of the British, European defence had now acquired real added value. London, in a dramatic departure from its previous policies, reconsidered its veto position on Europe's responsibility for its own security. If the search for influence was a recurring leitmotif in London, the choice of Europe as a way of attaining it was indeed a diplomatic revolution.

The language used at the St-Malo summit, which referred to a 'capacity for autonomous action', represented a compromise between these two developments: the St-Malo declaration should be read as a turning point in London's approach to Europe as much as a French concession to Atlantic legitimacy.[21] For one, Europe was becoming a way to exert influence, and for the other the Alliance was the designated framework of European autonomy. Between the means and the end, between the autonomy asserted and the assured conformity with the Atlantic Alliance, ESDP found a fragile but real area of *entente*. The core of the compromise lay in the effort made to improve the Europeans' military capabilities and their intention to take on crisis management operations in the framework of the Petersberg missions.

Implementing St-Malo

The Kosovo conflict opened the way to a rapid Europeanisation of the St-Malo agreement. The German presidency worked on transforming this bilateral initiative into a European reality and changing the European defence *identity* into a European security and defence *policy*. At the June 1999 European Council in Cologne, member states stated their determination 'that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence . . . The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in

21. The St-Malo declaration stated that: 'The European Union must have the capacity for *autonomous action*, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises . . . In strengthening the solidarity between the members states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while *acting in conformity* with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members' (emphasis added). For a good analysis of this agreement, see Jolyon Howorth, 'Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 33-55.

order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.'[22] To achieve this goal, several specific institutional changes were made: the nomination of Javier Solana to the post of High Representative for CFSP; the creation of a Political and Security Committee (PSC), consisting of ambassadors of each member state meeting twice a week in Brussels; the creation of an EU Military Committee (EUMC), officially made up of chiefs of defence staff of member countries but in practice attended by their military delegates, which is responsible for giving advice and recommendations to the PSC and the European Council; the creation of an EU Military Staff (EUMS) that provides expertise for the ESDP, in particular in the conduct of any Union military crisis management operation, and is responsible for early warning, evaluating situations and strategic planning for Petersberg missions. These institutional changes did not represent any difficulties, even if inside the European circle in Brussels the presence of men in uniforms was a real novelty.

The core of the St-Malo agreement dealt, however, with capabilities, and in this respect progress was more difficult. In December 1999, scarcely a year after St-Malo, the Helsinki summit set out the Headline Goal objectives. The aim was to put at the Union's disposal forces capable of carrying out all the Petersberg missions, including the most demanding, in operations up to army corps level, i.e. 50,000 to 60,000 troops. Member states undertook, by 2003, to deploy forces 'militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.' The missions assigned to this Rapid Reaction Force are those defined at Petersberg by WEU in 1992 and inscribed in Article 17.2 of the TEU, i.e. 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making'. However, there were a series of successive interpretations of this legal definition. At Cologne in June 1999, the Council had stated that these tasks included 'the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks'. At Helsinki, to fulfil these missions, particular attention was paid to the means necessary for effective crisis management: deployability, sustainability,

22. European Council, Helsinki, Annex 1, in Maartje Rutten (comp.), 'From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents', *Chaillot Papers* 47 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, May 2001), pp. 91-2.

interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control. At Laeken in December 2001, where ESDP was proclaimed operational, it was emphasised that the development of means and capabilities would allow the Union 'progressively to take on more demanding operations'. In reality, the Union's military capabilities will determine the scope of these missions in practice.

The first aspect of this endeavour concerned the reinforcement of the civilian component of European forces, i.e. police missions. With the experience of Bosnia, particularly the civil administration of Mostar by WEU, the European Multinational Protection Force (EMPF) in Albania and the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Operation *Alba*, also in Albania, the Union acquired considerable expertise in civilian crisis management. It was, therefore, logical to incorporate and develop that *acquis* in ESDP. The June 2000 Santa Maria da Feira European Council listed the four priority areas in which the Union intended to acquire concrete capabilities: the police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. Member states undertook to supply police for international missions. Rapid progress was made and member countries' contributions were greater than the number requested. On January 2003, the EU took over from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the meeting of European Union defence ministers in Rome on 3 October 2003, France proposed the formation of a European Military Police Force. The idea, which is based on the success achieved in the Balkans by the Multinational Specialised Units or MSUs, is to create a sort of European *Gendarmerie* to be employed on peace support operations.[23] It should be stressed that the Union has now developed a genuine know-how and a specific approach to peace-keeping which constitutes a real added value in international security.

The second part of the St-Malo process was more difficult. In order to fulfil the Helsinki Headline Goal, EU members have to commit forces to a catalogue. While there was no difficulty in providing the number of troops, qualitative shortfalls needed to be addressed. In November 2000, the Capabilities Commitment Conference drew up a catalogue of forces that member countries agreed to earmark to meet the overall objective. The EUMS concluded that, as from that date, the target number of troops had been met, but it underlined the inadequacies in terms of strategic

23. One of the first to suggest this European capability was former General Morillon in a report published in spring 2003. See Dana Spinant, 'French general calls for EU to develop "eurozone for defence"', *European Voice*, vol. 9, no. 12, 27 March 2003.

lift, deployable operation headquarter and C3I. In November 2001, the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was launched to address the shortfalls. The ECAP exercise, which began in February 2002, set up a series of panels headed by one or two member states responsible for coordinating work. Since then, a new Capabilities Conference was held in May 2003 in order to ask for more national commitments or launch specific programmes to address shortfalls.

Several specific panels under the supervision of one country have been set up to develop programmes designed to address those shortfalls.[24]

In a very short period of time, what was once taboo became a reality. Military officers are now part of the everyday landscape in Brussels. The European Union flag is now visible in the Balkans. The bulk of the peacekeeping missions are carried out by European soldiers, even if NATO remains the privileged framework. Yet, the Union has launched several operations on its own: a police mission in Bosnia, a peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, and most importantly, a UN bridging operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[25]

ESDP after 2001: a European security strategy

The fundamental handicap of the St-Malo process concerned the very definition of the Headline Goal. Designed on the basis of the Bosnian experience, and therefore corresponding to a strategic imperative of the 1990s, the military tool that is aimed at seems at once over-ambitious if it is to be used essentially for crisis management in the Balkans yet ill-tailored to cope with the rising strategic demands of the twenty-first century.[26] What was needed was a framework spelling out the strategic objectives of the Union in an international environment that has dramatically changed with the attacks of 11 September.

The international context after 9/11

The attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon constituted a world-changing event for America. For the Bush admin-

24. On this capability aspect, see Burkard Schmitt in this volume.

25. For more details about these operations, see Gustav Lindstrom in this volume.

26. 'It is in the interpretation and the implementation of the Petersberg tasks that the absence of a common European strategic vision becomes all too apparent . . . Current EU language (the Petersberg Tasks) does not provide even the roughest guideline as to the vision of the world in which European forces could be called upon to operate'. François Heisbourg, 'Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, p. 8.

istration, international terrorism became the new paradigm in international politics, effectively putting an end to the post-Cold War era. 11 September was clearly an historical moment, a period of 'tectonic shifts' as Condoleezza Rice put it, similar to the rise of the Soviet challenge at the end of the 1940s. President George W. Bush, like Harry S Truman, proceeded to a global analysis of the threat of international terrorism but, unlike his predecessor, George Bush favoured a unilateralist approach to the new challenge of international terrorism. To put it briefly, America was at war. Europe was not indifferent to this new threat of international terrorism. If there was one area that members of the Union were, if not accustomed to at least aware of, it was terrorism. However, hyperterrorism is quite different from the classical terrorist groups like ETA, IRA, Action Directe or the Red Army Faction which were active in Europe. Because of their need to win over the population, these groups were restrained in their willingness to use unlimited violence. As one expert has argued, these terrorists wanted 'many people watching, but not many people dead'.[27] As demonstrated by the Madrid terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004, with hyperterrorism, there is a readiness to resort to unrestricted violence and a willingness to inflict the widest possible damage. It comes from a conviction that the battle is absolute, even more so when it is waged in the name of a divine authority. Religious extremism reinforces a strictly Manichaean view in which the enemy is demonised and provides the justification for whatever level of violence is needed to destroy him. This radicalisation, along with the non-state nature of the threat, makes some terrorist strategy basically non-deterrable.

Following the events of 11 September, the extraordinary European Council of 21 September stated that it would fight terrorism in all its forms and that 'the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union'. ESDP could not ignore this new strategic context. At the June 2002 European Council in Seville, it was decided to increase the Union's involvement in the fight against terrorism through a coordinated, interdisciplinary approach 'embracing all Union policies, including by developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and by making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational.' It was recalled that 'the CFSP, including the EDSP,

27. Quoted in Harald Müller, 'Terrorism, proliferation: a European Assessment', *Chaillot Paper* 58 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, March 2003), p. 22.

can play an important role in countering this threat to our security.' The Petersberg missions were thus expanded. Moreover, a series of framework decisions were taken by the Council on a European arrest warrant, joint investigation teams, money laundering and the implementation of specific measures for police and judicial cooperation to combat terrorism. A genuine cooperation between the United States and Europe in this regard was put in place with successful results, as arrests in several European countries of al-Qaeda cells demonstrated. Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March, the Council declaration of 25 March 2004 included several important measures. The first was the creation of a post of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to coordinate the work of the Council and oversee all the instruments at the Union's disposal. The second was the commitment by members of the Union to endorse the Solidarity Clause of Article 42 of the draft Constitutional Treaty.[28]

After Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan, American foreign policy took a more revolutionary turn. An absolute confidence in US power, a blind faith in a democratic domino effect and a conviction in military solutions led the Bush administration to expand its initial reaction from Afghanistan to Iraq. The Bush's administration global interpretation of the threat and its ideological perspective in framing the answers, i.e. the strategy of preventive war it has endorsed and the regime change it wanted to implement, raised serious difficulties with Europe when Iraq became the next objective. Without entering into the details of this crisis, it should be noted that the prewar period saw one of the deepest NATO crises since Suez. But the divide was not limited to transatlantic relations. It cut deeply across Europe at a moment when delegates from member states were discussing a new draft constitution whose aim was to bring more coherence to European affairs, including foreign policy. On Iraq, the Union became irrelevant: if it had set out its own definition of 'material breach' of UNSC Resolution 1441, specified the conditions under which force might be used and laid down a precise timetable for action, it would have been able to foresee events and strengthen its position in Washington. Instead, EU foreign ministers decided to formally hand over the Iraqi affair to the UN, without addressing the strategic case at hand. By doing so, they in fact gave a free hand to the permanent European members of the UN Security Council, France and Britain, i.e., the two countries with the most contrary views

28. The provisional Article 42 states that: 'The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:(a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a disaster.' Quoted from Antonio Missiroli (comp.), 'From Copenhagen to Brussels. European defence: core documents, Volume IV', *Chaillot Paper* 67 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003), p. 404.

vis-à-vis the United States. Not very surprisingly, London and Paris decided to focus on UN legitimacy, while ignoring the European framework. In this configuration, the Union was thus irrelevant. Yet the capacity of the EU to bounce back from internal divisions must be underscored. Clearly, the Union has always advanced from crisis to crisis. But its ability to recover so quickly is worth noting. In particular, the Union made at least two major breakthroughs.

The first was the adoption of a common Action Plan, spelling out a genuine European strategy against proliferation. In June 2003, the Council set up basic principles against proliferation of WMD. It recognised that a broad approach was needed and that political and diplomatic preventive measures and resort to the competent international organisations formed 'the first line' of defence.[29] In this respect, the Union supports the establishment of additional verification instruments in the IAEA regime, including non-routine inspections, the strengthening of export control mechanisms and the pursuing of an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Union has called for a stronger partnership with the United States and Russia. Most importantly, it recognises that coercive measures, including the use of force as a last resort, in accordance with the UN Charter, could become necessary when political and diplomatic measures have failed. The Union also seems ready to apply more strictly rules on conditionality regarding nuclear and WMD proliferation with economic partners. A clear demonstration of Europe's new commitment in non-proliferation policy took form in its more assertive stance regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. It remains to be seen of course whether the agreement reached in October 2003 will bear fruit, but the display of unity among the 'Big Three' differed sharply from their ongoing disagreements over Iraq.[30] At the December 2003 European Council, the Union endorsed this new activism in an overall strategy against WMD proliferation, which is considered a global threat requiring a global approach. The declared intention is to render multilateralism more effective by actively promoting the universalisation of the main treaties, agreements and verification arrangements on disarmament and non-proliferation; fostering the role of UNSC on this issue, enhancing political, financial and technical support to verification regime and strengthening export control policies; enhancing the security of

29. The declaration added that: 'When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role'. Quoted from Antonio Missiroli, op. cit. in note 28, p. 107.

30. On this point, see Christopher de Bellaigue, 'Big Deal in Iran', *The New York Review of Books*, 26 February 2004, pp. 30-3; Gary Milhollin, 'The Mullahs and the Bomb', *The New York Times*, 23 October 2003, and Steven Everts, 'The EU Must Be Tougher And More Creative On Iran', *CER Bulletin*, Issue 32, October/November 2003.

proliferation-sensitive materials and strengthening identification, control and interception of illegal trafficking.

The second breakthough was the adoption of the Solana document framing a genuine security strategy for Europe. The Iraq crisis has produced a common awareness among Europe's leaders of the need for strategic thinking on international security issues. One of the major reasons why the EU was so divided in the case of Iraq was its lack of strategic reasoning. By contrast, a majority of member states addressed the issue through political motives, some internal, some external, which led to a merely reactive policy. There was also a general recognition that a divided Europe is powerless. At the same time, an enlarged Europe of 450 million people cannot escape its obligations and responsibilities in the world. This was the premise of the Solana document, 'A secure Europe in a better world', first produced in June for the Thessaloniki summit, and then endorsed by the Union in December 2003.

The European Security Strategy

A strategy document is always a tentative exercise by nature. It is more about a vision than about strategic interests, more about attitude than policies. This is even truer in the context of an organisation of 25 independent states. The document is thus historic. Several significant characteristics must be underlined.

First, it is a threat-driven document, a dimension never addressed as such by the Union. The document identifies five major threats: international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states, and organised crime. In such an environment, the Union has recognised that the traditional form of defence – a territorial line in Cold War fashion – is a thing of the past. The first line of defence now lies abroad. If this analysis may sound familiar in comparison with the US National Security Strategy of September 2002, the message to Washington is in fact seriously nuanced. First, Europe is at peace, not at war. Even if the possibility of an al-Qaeda attack against the territory of the Union is duly underlined, the document is not a call to arms or an appeal for homeland defence. Second, if the security threats are similar, their management is not. In the Union's view, addressing these threats cannot be limited to military force: while not excluding it, the Union intends to take a broader approach, combining the political and the economic, the civil and the military. Regarding terrorism, the only effective solution will be a global one. Regard-

ing WMD proliferation, strengthening international regimes and progressive conditionality remain the best way to counter proliferation. Without excluding the use of force, the Union clearly rejects a strategy of preventive strike. Lastly, while the Union recognises that 'failed' or failing states – not 'rogue', a category that does not exist in EU terminology – are a major source of instability, it advocates the extension of good governance rather than regime change. From a similar analysis of the post-9/11 environment, stems a more diversified and comprehensive strategy. Briefly put, for the Union, the world is indeed more dangerous but it is also more complex.

Second, the strategy builds on the Union's *acquis* and identity in security policy. It is based on three pillars – extending the zone of security around Europe, strengthening the international order and countering the above-mentioned threats – and two key concepts, 'preventive engagement' and 'effective multilateralism'. The first refers to the Union's approach to stability and nation-building, which is far more comprehensive than the military method favoured by Washington. It includes police personnel – the Union has a reserve of 5,000 police who could be sent abroad – civil administration and civil protection officials and civilian authorities and justice officers to strength the rule of law. This specific approach is now extended to new neighbouring countries like Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. This in turn demands a new strategic partnership with Russia, which remains an indispensable actor in the region, as the Kosovo conflict showed. The European Commission President, Romano Prodi, has set a vision of the EU offering its neighbours 'everything but institutions'. The aim is to promote the emergence of a 'ring of friends' around Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, bound together by shared values, open markets and borders, and enhanced cooperation in such areas as research, transport, energy, conflict prevention and law enforcement.[31] This strategy of 'preventive engagement' encapsulates the European way of dealing with instability that includes rapid deployment of troops, humanitarian assistance, policing operations, enhancement of the rule of law and economic aid. There lies the Union's added value and specific know-how, a dimension that is lacking in the US arsenal where, as Condoleezza Rice once said, 82nd Airborne soldiers are not supposed to help kids go to kindergarten. European troops do. This US weakness is Europe's strength.

31. See 'Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours', Commission Communication COM(2003), 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003.

The second concept – 'effective multilateralism' – captures the essence of the Union's rule-based security culture. The European Security Strategy stresses that 'the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.' Having suffered more than any continent from attempts at domination by one actor over the others, from what was called universal monarchy and balance of power politics, secret diplomacy and the major wars that followed, the Union is keen to stress the core fundamental values of the UN Charter, based on the sovereignty of its units and the legitimacy of collective action. Because the true meaning of international norms and rules lies in the definition of what is and what is not permissible in the international arena, the Union reaffirms that, as a matter of principle, the UN Security Council should remain the forum for legitimising the use of force. But it recognises that rules also need enforcement: 'We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.' The 'effectiveness' element implies that, in emergency situations, immediate actions are not always compatible with a formal application of international public law. The Kosovo precedent and the Iraqi preventive war are the unwritten references of what is allowed and what is not. Clearly, the Venus image of a Kantian Europe has been modified towards a more realist conception of the Union's security interests. Both concepts –'preventive' engagement and 'effective' multilateralism – are by nature elusive notions that will have a more precise significance in concrete situations. They none the less represent a significant departure from a civilian-only Union: the use of force, albeit as a last resort, is deemed necessary in specific circumstances. This message, 'soft power-plus', should be welcomed by Washington.[32]

Conclusion

Sharing more *global* responsibilities, enhancing an *effective* multilateralism, and taking on a *preventive* engagement are ambitious goals that will stay unfulfilled if the current gap between ends and

32. On this aspect, see Jean-Yves Haine, 'The EU Soft Power: Not Hard Enough?', *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol. V, no. 1, Winter 2003/Spring 2004, pp. 69-77, and François Heisbourg, 'EU Security Strategy is not a strategy', in *A European Way of War* (London: Cenre for European Reform, 2004).

means is allowed to persist. They call for rapidly deployable and sustainable forces; they require more effective use of and coherence between the Union's tools. The credibility of Europe's strategy will ultimately be based on its capacity to fulfil these ambitions.

The EU's European Security and Defence Policy has always contained a mixture of 'fear and hope', to quote the title of Escott Reid's account of the creation of the Atlantic Alliance.[33] After 2003, however, there is an obvious quietening down of rhetoric; a new pragmatism is now emerging that permits greater optimism. Defence is now one of the most promising areas for cooperation.

In the near future, ESDP operations are likely to increase in two different theatres. The first is a theatre of necessity in the Balkans. The immediate challenge in that respect will be the take-over from NATO in Bosnia. The tragedy of Sarajevo was the major reason behind ESDP. The peaceful reconstruction of Sarajevo will attest its credibility. The second is a theatre of choice. Building on the success of Operation *Artemis*, the Union is likely to become a more responsible and autonomous actor in Africa, but also in other parts of the world. Broadening the scope of ESDP will be a tangible sign of its maturity.

33. Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope, The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).

ESDP — How it works

Antonio Missiroli

2

There must have been a reason for the relatively late appearance of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on the Union's radar screen. In fact, after the failure of the European Defence Community in the early 1950s, the 'defence' option disappeared from the menu of European integration for a long time. While the six founding members decided to proceed along a different path, namely the Common Market and the EEC, NATO became the main actor and guarantor in security and defence policy, with the Western European Union (WEU) playing a marginal role. These two separate 'boxes' have remained in place for decades, in spite of occasional shifts such as France's leaving the Alliance's integrated military command in 1966, Britain's joining the Community in 1973 and successive waves of enlargement in both organisations. Recurrent attempts to revitalise the WEU hit the political wall represented by this clear-cut and ultimately effective division of labour and expectations.

As a result, after the end of the Cold War, the member states of the fledgling European Union (EU) still had very different, sometimes opposite views and visions of 'defence'. To some of them, the so-called 'Atlanticists' led by Britain, defence was an exclusively NATO business: within this framework, however, there was room for a stronger 'European pillar' to be built in cooperation, not in competition, with the United States. To some other EU countries, instead, European integration – especially since it was anchored in the project of a political 'union' – had also to include a defence component: yet within this 'Europeanist' front, traditionally led by France, differences could be spotted as to how autonomous from NATO such a component could be. Finally, since the mid-1990s, the Union also included a sizeable group of 'non-allied' countries that conceived of defence as a purely national prerogative, to be taken care of outside NATO or any other international organisation.

This has long been the main cleavage among Europeans, and also the main reason for the disappearance of 'defence' from the EC/EU menu. Yet it has not been the only one. An additional source of divergence has been, for instance, the actual propensity of member states to 'integrate' in foreign and defence policy, i.e. to make it part and parcel of a supranational/federalist structure: in this respect, France and Britain have long found themselves on the same side of the argument – possibly with the 'non-allied' countries – in opposing qualified majority voting (QMV) and/or a direct role for the Commission and the European Parliament in this domain.

Similarly, France and Britain could be found at the same end of the European spectrum concerning their readiness to act militarily and take casualties for reasons not related to territorial defence. A minority of such 'extrovert' countries (which could include the non-allied countries in so far as UN-mandated 'blue-helmet' operations were concerned) was outnumbered by a large majority of rather 'introvert' ones, although the degree of potential engagement varied according to the nature and location of each crisis.

At times, such cleavages could also cut across the same country and its political and bureaucratic structures. Most foreign ministries, for instance, were 'socialised' in the EC/EU environment and were mainly integrationist-minded, while most defence ministries were 'socialised' in NATO and were mainly Atlanticist. The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and to a lesser extent the Netherlands can be considered cases in point: their overall foreign policy orientations reflected the willingness to combine these two distinct cultures without pitting one against the other. As a result, the two 'boxes' had to remain separate.

Another major cleavage is that of the 'haves' and 'have-nots': those who are nuclear powers (France and Britain) and those who are not; those who are permanent members of the UN Security Council (France and Britain again), with the bearing that has on conduct over strategic issues, and those who are not; those who have a significant national defence industry (basically, the larger countries plus Sweden) and those who do not and, therefore,

depend on imports from abroad for defence procurement.

Over time, these internal cleavages have created differences in approaches and interests that have long undermined the possibility of overcoming the separation between the two 'boxes'. They also influenced the institutional birth and the first practical steps of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s, and conditioned the launch of ESDP at the end of the decade. To a large extent, the same separation has taken root in most of the countries that have recently joined both the Union and the Alliance. The two 'boxes', in other words, are still alive and kicking in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, their separation now looks much less rigid and, especially in the older member states, has given way to a certain amount of convergence on common policy goals and a narrowing of strategic divergences – of which ESDP is at the same time cause and effect.

Differences, however, still exist and affect its scope and modus operandi. ESDP is a purely intergovernmental policy based on consensus: unanimity is required, there are no margins whatsoever for QMV, member states cannot be outvoted nor compelled to field forces or pay for operations against their will. If there is no consensus, there is no common policy. If nobody wants or offers to contribute assets and capabilities, there is no operation. Special restrictions apply to all related areas, and the only form of flexibility – by default, so to speak – lies in the option of abstaining in a vote, not participating in an operation, and not paying for it. One country, Denmark, has even negotiated and obtained an explicit 'opt-in' (rather than 'opt-out') clause, whereby it is automatically exempt from participating in the implementation of the policy unless it decides to do so. On top of this, ESDP-related provisions are not legally binding nor are they firmly anchored in the existing treaties. There is no relevant *acquis*. Almost all the necessary resources remain under the control and authority of member states. There is no military 'integration' – even less than in NATO – and there is no Council of Defence Ministers either. The relevant decisions are taken by the foreign ministers, while the Commission plays only a minor role on the civilian side of ESDP.

Given such constraints, it is even surprising to note how much progress ESDP has made in only five years, and in the presence of recurrent political divisions among the 15/25. But what is it really all about, and how can it possibly work?

ESDP, CFSP and crisis management

Since its coinage in June 1999, the acronym ESDP has come to cover both a specific policy and a set of dedicated institutions.

The European security and defence *policy* is primarily identified with 'crisis management' as enshrined in Art. 17.2 and Art. 25 cons. TEU, in order also to avoid the semantic traps and political misunderstandings that the term 'common European defence' – as derived from WEU language – tended to create. Actually ESDP, too, originally included 'common' (CESDP) in its denomination, but that was dropped later for similar reasons. At any rate, EU 'crisis management' is not limited to the military dimension but also encompasses a specifically civilian one. In fact, formally starting in January 2003, ESDP has translated into a series of crisis management operations ranging from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (civilian) to *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo (military), and from *Concordia* in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (military) to *Proxima,* its civilian follow-up. For their part, military operations may be run with (*Concordia*) or without (*Artemis*) the support of NATO through the 'Berlin-plus' framework agreement. Finally, if and when the EU takes over from NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it will be running a military *and* a civilian operation at the same time in the same place.

ESDP remains, however, an integral part of CFSP. In turn, CFSP is a central element, but not the only one, of European 'external action' proper, which is broader in its functional scope and institutional framework. It is also endowed with a bigger toolbox, encompassing bodies, programmes and instruments: these lie mostly in the first EU 'pillar' (from DG RELEX to DG Trade and

other agencies) and are run by the European Commission. Finally, in much the same way as EU 'external action' at large is not limited to or by CFSP means and procedures, EU 'crisis management' is not carried out only through ESDP instruments. When it comes to tackling real international crises, other policy areas – entailing trade, aid, assistance, transport and communication, financial and political measures (positive and/or negative) – may equally be involved, which do not fall within the remit of CFSP/ESDP. The traded partition of EU policies into separate 'pillars', in other words, still holds in strictly institutional terms but is increasingly challenged – or just less relevant – in practice, thus raising thorny issues of cross-pillar coherence, consistency and coordination.

The key political decisions on ESDP are taken at the highest Council level, be it the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of EU foreign ministers or, whenever appropriate and necessary, the European Council itself. It is notably at the level of heads of state or government, in fact, that deliberations entailing first- or even third-pillar measures – which lie in the competence of the EU Finance (ECOFIN) or Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) ministers – are formally agreed and adopted. Generally speaking, crisis management decisions often imply the use of such EU programmes as ECHO, in the humanitarian domain, and those now regrouped under EuropeAid, let alone actions also related to trade (e.g. the Cotonou agreement for ACP countries, financed mainly through the European Development Fund). Yet they may also include freezing of financial assets, imposition of sanctions, specific border control or civilian defence measures, all of which require the involvement of other Council formations and, ultimately, the rubber stamp of the European Council. To date, however, no dedicated Council formation has been created for the EU ministers for defence, who can only meet either informally – i.e. without taking decisions – or in conjunction with the GAERC, which remains the main decision-making body for ESDP (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: EU pillars and policies



This said, the execution proper of the so-called 'Petersberg tasks', which constitute the essence of ESDP – they were originally formulated within WEU in June 1992, then incorporated in Art. 17 TEU at Amsterdam on the suggestion of non-allied Sweden and Finland[1] – is entrusted to a distinct set of bodies that are, in many ways, 'separable but not separate' from the other EU institutions.

The High Representative

First comes the High Representative (HR) for CFSP, a position currently held by Javier Solana. Initially proposed by France, the new function was created with the Amsterdam Treaty, in June 1997, and essentially added to that of Secretary-General (SG) of the Council, which already existed in the Maastricht Treaty. Until then, the SG had been a top EU bureaucrat who coordinated the various activities of the Council Secretariat, supporting the rotational presidency of the Union in its daily work. According to the Amsterdam Treaty, in fact, the presidency would be 'assisted' by the SG, who would also 'exercise the function of High Representative' for CFSP (Art.18.3). Such assistance would apply to 'matters coming within the scope of the CFSP, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions and, when appropriate . . . through conducting political dialogue with third parties' (Art. 26 TEU).

Between June 1997 and the entry into force of the revised Treaty in May 1999, however, the whole context changed.[2] Until then, the job description was such that it was commonly assumed a top diplomat from one of the bigger member states – a name frequently mentioned, for instance, was Sir (now Lord) David Hannay's – would take over from the retiring SG Jürgen Trumpf. Yet the little revolution generated by the Franco-British St-Malo Declaration of December 1998 and, along with that, the shock of the Kosovo war of spring 1999 – both essential to the birth of ESDP – immediately made the appointment much more relevant politically. In this new context, in which the CFSP remit was being broadened with the fledgling ESDP and the demand for a more active EU role in international crises grew significantly, the European Council in Cologne decided to combine the launch of the new policy with an explicit, visible upgrading of the HR post. As a

1. See Martin Ortega's contribution to this book.

2. See Jean-Yves Haine's contribution to this book (chapter 1).

result, the former Spanish Foreign Minister and outgoing Secretary-General of NATO (his mandate was due to expire in a few months), Javier Solana, was appointed to become the SG-HR for CFSP as from the following autumn.

As shown above, however, the new Treaty was not particularly generous in details concerning the precise functions and attributions of the SG-HR. For better or for worse, therefore, it was up to its first holder to interpret and shape the new role. And the way Solana opted to proceed decisively strengthened the 'HR' part, to the detriment of the 'SG'. For the primarily bureaucratic function, actually, the European Council decided to appoint a Deputy SG in the person of the former French Permanent Representative to the EU, Pierre de Boissieu. The Cologne summit therefore ended up de facto splitting again the two functions that the new Treaty had just tried to collate, at least in part. Also, Solana was called upon to combine his HR role with that of Secretary-General of WEU, to which he was appointed in November 1999 at the Marseilles WEU Council. Such personal union (or cross-organisational 'double-hatting') was meant to facilitate the partial integration of some WEU functions and bodies into the EU, as decided notably in Cologne.

Solana's work was to be supported by the creation of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), as envisaged in a Declaration attached to the Amsterdam Treaty. Yet again, the new context in which the HR was going to operate induced a partial transformation of the initial PPEWU into what came to be simply called the 'Policy Unit' which, in turn, came to resemble ever more an extended cabinet. Rather than looking to the future of CFSP, in other words, the PU – composed mainly of seconded officials from the member states – has become increasingly involved in shaping its present.

Finally, according to the Amsterdam Treaty (Art.18.5 TEU), the HR may appoint a 'special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues'. Solana has increasingly resorted to such a possibility in recent times, with particular emphasis on subregional crises. The mandate of such 'special representatives', however, tends to vary significantly in terms of duration, breadth and resources. It is obviously stronger wherever the EU runs major programmes and possibly also operations, as in the Western Balkans. In such areas as the Middle East, Afghanistan or the South Caucasus, instead, it is mainly political, comparable to a

sort of roving ambassador's. In some cases the mandate is rotational on a one-year basis, while in others it has no formal deadline.

On the whole, however, it is apparent that in the five years since the initial appointment, the role of the HR has evolved significantly. While it has remained minimal in those areas where there is no consensus (or there is even open dissent) among the member states, it has broadened its scope and visibility in others. Cases in point are the Middle East – where Javier Solana was first a tangible presence at the negotiating table (2000) then an accepted member of the 'Quartet' – and the Balkans, where he managed to act as a trouble-shooter on a couple of occasions. The HR has also gained some room for autonomous initiative in policy formulation, most notably with the European Security Strategy (2003). It is even arguable that the actual interpretation given to the HR role by its first holder has started to erode the rigid intergovernmental barriers that were originally set to it. In fact, by trying to formulate and express the common EU position on some foreign policy matters, 'Mr CFSP' – as the media have come to call him – has sometimes managed to give voice to more than the simple sum of the EU parts.

The ESDP bodies

In connection with the HR, over the subsequent years additional bodies and positions were established in order to cope with the increasing load of policy formulation and implementation that ESDP, in particular, imposed on the Council Secretariat. Such an expansion began when the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 finalised proposals already sketched in Cologne, and decided to set up three new bodies: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee and the Military Staff of the EU. They started operating, albeit in an 'interim' capacity, in March 2000.

The PSC (the French abbreviation COPS is frequently used) is composed of national representatives 'at senior/ambassadorial level', plus a representative of the European Commission, who is 'fully associated' with CFSP work. Its function is 'to monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the

Council'. It is also meant 'to exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations'. This, at least, is the job description that has been incorporated into the new Treaty approved at the Nice European Council in December 2000 (now in Art. 25 cons. TEU as entered into force in February 2003). The PSC, however, started operating on a fully legal basis already in early 2001, following a simple Council decision. To a large extent, it replaces the Political Committee (Po.Co.), created by the Maastricht Treaty (Art. J.15) and formed by the political directors of the national ministries of foreign affairs, which used to convene in Brussels on a monthly basis. The PSC, however, is a permanent body with a marginally narrower competence over policy. It plays a major role in decision-*shaping*, but not decision-making proper: for political/strategic decisions, in fact, it relies on the GAERC, while for the administrative and financial aspects of CFSP/ESDP the key instance is still the COREPER. This means that each member state has at least two distinct ambassadorial-level delegations to the EU – the COREPER, in turn, has at least two major sub-formations – with prerogatives that are not always clearly separate.

The Military Committee (EUMC) is composed by the Chiefs of Defence of all the EU countries or, whenever appropriate, their military delegates. It gives military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, while providing direction to the Military Staff. Its Chairman – the first holder was the Finnish General Gustav Hägglund – is elected for a period of three years and he attends Council meetings whenever decisions with defence implications are to be taken. A peculiarity of the EUMC is that some of its members also sit on the Military Committee of NATO and, therefore, are de facto 'double-hatted': this does not apply to all EU members of the Alliance, however, while the military representatives of some non-allied countries are also seconded to the Alliance bodies.

For its part, the Military Staff (EUMS, *Etat-Major* in French) is there to provide military expertise and support to ESDP, including the conduct of crisis management operations: this entails early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, and also identification of European national and multinational forces for possible operations. It currently consists of some 70 (mostly seconded) officers and is considered part of the Council Secretariat.

The specifically military bodies are also meant to cooperate with NATO's SHAPE according to modalities ('Berlin-plus') that were still being negotiated at the outset of ESDP. It is also worth noting that, in contrast to the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS were not included in the Nice Treaty and, therefore, are *not* treaty-based. This was mainly due to the reluctance of some member states – especially the non-allied ones – to have these mentioned in the TEU. Yet it is also fair to say that ESDP has moved forward by intergovernmental decisions first, with a 'codification' to follow only later on (if ever). The only exception is notably the creation of the HR, which preceded rather than followed ESDP.

Finally, a Situation Centre (SITCEN) was also created at the Council Secretariat to fulfil the 'monitoring' function assigned to the new politico-military bodies. In addition, the former CFSP Unit in the Council General Secretariat developed into a dedicated Directorate-General (DG E), expanding to cover also 'pol-mil' affairs and restructuring to absorb new officials with relevant experience from WEU, NATO and national ministries. It currently encompasses three main sub-directorates: (a) enlargement, development and multilateral economic affairs; (b) CFSP and regional affairs; and (c) ESDP and operations (both military and civilian). More recently, a Police Unit has also been created, while a Committee for Civilian Crisis Management has been set up for advisory purposes. On the whole, however, the Brussels-based ESDP staff amount to little more than 200 officials, which is nothing compared with national ministries or the Commission's relevant DGs. Last but not least, two former WEU organs – the Satellite Centre based in Madrid (SATCEN) and the Institute for Security Studies based in Paris (EUISS) – have been attached to the ESDP machinery as 'autonomous agencies' of the Council, with ad hoc budget and status.

Operating modalities and scope

Five years after its inception, ESDP is still a policy in the making and work in progress, with regard to its internal procedures and resources as much as to its ultimate goals. In part, this is due to the very nature of the policy: crisis situations are never identical to one another and demand, therefore, a high degree of flexibility and

adaptability. Moreover, most of the capabilities to be mobilised belong to the member states: this requires a peculiar combination of willingness and ability on their part to put such capabilities at the disposal of the Union, especially since there is no legal obligation to do so. In part, however, the evolving character of ESDP is also due to its relatively young age as compared to other EU common policies (or NATO itself). One has to bear in mind that: (a) EU-led operations only began in January 2003, on a small scale and with limited duration; (b) the EU's own training and exercise policy is still fledgling, at best; (c) procedures are still relatively untested; and (d) 'lessons-learned' evaluations have just started. It is therefore extremely difficult to draw up a reliable flow-chart for the launch and conduct of a 'typical' ESDP operation.

In the light of the limited experience so far, it is nevertheless possible to say that the initial assessment of the feasibility of an EU-led crisis management operation is made at a highly informal level, all the more so if and when it is an exclusively *military* one and located in the NATO 'area'. In the latter case, talks are held between the two organisations – at the political and military level – in order to set the main parameters of the operation and the possible division of labour and responsibilities. In the event of an autonomous EU operation, the same informal negotiations are likely to be held with the member state that is ready to offer its headquarters and thus become the 'framework nation', while force generation proper (i.e. the identification and commitment of specific national force elements for the final 'package') is carried out in collaboration with the EUMC and EUMS. In the event of an exclusively *civilian* operation the method is quite similar, only more centralised in the EU bodies and with a more prominent role for the European Commission. In this 'upstream' phase, the HR and the PSC are supposed to act, respectively, as facilitator (or even initiator) and 'clearing-house'.

Once the likely profile, desirable goals and available means of the operation have been assessed and agreed (with the Council Secretariat providing bureaucratic support and the COREPER administrative and financial back-up), a 'Joint Action' is drafted and finalised by the GAERC. The voting system for CFSP/ESDP is such that decisions are taken by consensus: this means the unanimity rule applies although, since Amsterdam, member states also have the possibility to abstain. Such abstention must be 'qualified' in a formal declaration: it does not oblige the member

state(s) in question to apply the decision and to pay for it, but only to accept that it 'commits the Union'. Such a 'qualified abstention' blocks the decision only if the number of member states who choose it amount to more than one-third of the weighted votes in the Council (Art. 23.1 TEU).

Finally, in a special Protocol attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, Denmark, as already mentioned above, obtained automatic exemption from all defence-related obligations. This does not apply, however, to civilian crisis management and other decisions of a merely institutional or procedural nature (including appointments). Denmark's exemption is coupled with the right to 'opt-in' should it so decide.

Whatever one may think of the desirability of QMV in the broader CFSP domain, it is a fact that, ever since the Maastricht Treaty was signed, decisions 'having defence implications' have always constituted an arena in which unanimity is required: member states cannot be outvoted (and even less obliged to commit forces) against their will. As a result, 'qualified abstention' arguably represents the most flexible mechanism that could be applied to ESDP decisions, although the automatic financial exemption it entails may open the door to voting behaviour dictated by sheer budgetary calculations. This said, it is also arguable that the whole upstream phase as described above is such that it is extremely unlikely that a member state would decide to block the decision in the GAERC, i.e. when the Joint Action had already gone through all the preliminary negotiations. This could go some way to explaining why, so far, neither formal vetoes nor qualified abstentions have ever been used.

One peculiarity of ESDP vis-à-vis CFSP at large, however, is that the new treaty provisions on 'enhanced cooperation' in the second EU 'pillar' – as approved at Nice and entered into force in February 2003 – are not applicable to 'matters having military or defence implications' (Art. 27b cons. TEU). Such a proviso was due mainly to last-minute reservations concerning the scope of 'enhanced cooperation' on defence policy in general. This may or may not be considered a major limitation for military crisis management. Yet the truth is that the current guidelines for mounting and conducting EU-led operations – as outlined in the Presidency Report on ESDP presented in December 2000 at Nice – already entail relatively flexible arrangements. The 'downstream' phase, in other words, leaves ample room for coalitions of the willing to run mis-

sions on behalf of and under the 'strategic control' of the whole EU.

First of all, as already mentioned above, there is no obligation to take part in any common operation. Secondly, all the participating countries constitute a 'Committee of Contributors' that becomes the instance of reference for the practical elements of the operation under way: it also includes, whenever this is the case, those non-member 'third' countries that provide a 'significant' military contribution to it (whatever that means in the given case). General provisions to this end were approved by the Nice European Council in December 2000, including procedures for consultation in the pre-operational phase. More specific ones – for Russia, Canada and Ukraine respectively – were approved by the Seville European Council in June 2002, including their involvement on an equal footing in the day-to-day management of operations. There is also the possibility, for member and non-member states alike, to leave or join a mission once its initial phase on the ground is completed.

Moreover, each operation has its own financial coverage through an ad hoc 'mechanism' that is normally included in the Joint Action. Its modalities vary according to whether the operation is military or civilian. In fact, Art. 28 TEU states that, while 'administrative' expenditure is to be charged to the common EU budget, 'operational' expenditure for military operations is to be charged to the member states according to the GDP scale or any other 'key' the Council decides to adopt unanimously. In practice, this means that civilian operations can be financed mainly though the EU budget (with some flexibility as to which line is to be charged), while military ones are paid for mainly by the participating states – members and non-members alike – according to the rule whereby 'costs lie where they fall' (normally used by NATO). The per-diems of the national personnel seconded to the operation are normally covered by their respective administrations.[3]

However, experience gained with the first EU-led operations in 2003-04, and the need to adopt rules more in line with the EU traditions and practice, seem to be leading to a partial review of these initial arrangements. As a result, a strengthening of the principle of direct EU funding ('as much as possible') for civilian crisis management operations has been proposed, along with a push for

3. See Gustav Lindstrom's contribution to this book.

better 'burden-sharing' for military ones, e.g. through a common 'start-up' fund for technical equipment and cost-sharing schemes for participating 'third' countries. More recently, an ad hoc mechanism called 'Athena' has been outlined to meet the specific demands of military missions.

During the whole downstream phase, operational control and tactical management on the ground lie with the relevant (military or civilian) head of mission, often supported by a 'special representative'. They are all answerable to the HR, while the PSC exercises its 'strategic control' through monitoring and political feedback.

However, as previously stated, EU crisis management is not limited to the planning and conduct of ground operations. Nor is ESDP proper geared only towards addressing international crisis situations, for that matter. ESDP is also about identifying and, hopefully, addressing capability shortfalls (of whatever nature) which could negatively affect EU crisis management. Among them is also the promotion of 'a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology', mentioned as early as 1998 in the Franco-British St-Malo Declaration and maintained ever since. Interestingly enough, this specific commitment was not incorporated into the Nice Treaty, and the only treaty-based provisions concerning the European defence industry lie in the first 'pillar' (Art. 296 TEC) and are of a restrictive rather than supportive nature. On top of that, all major policy developments in this domain so far have occurred outside of the EU-specific institutional framework.[4] Yet the decision taken by the Union, in late 2003, to create an 'Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments' within the EU may help rationalise and unify under its aegis all the relevant efforts and programmes currently under way.

Finally, ESDP is also about setting common principles and guidelines for policies that affect and engage (politically rather than legally) both the EU as a whole and its individual member states, externally and internally. Such was the case lately with the EU Strategy against WMD proliferation and the European Security Strategy, both approved by the European Council in December 2003.

4. See Burkard Schmitt's contribution to this book.

The next five years

If this is the way ESDP operates five years after its inception, what are the likely challenges awaiting it over the coming five? As has been seen, the policy is still in the making and liable to constant adjustment and adaptation. It is therefore extremely hazardous to try and predict its medium-term evolution. This said, at least four main institutional challenges already loom large on its horizon.

The first one concerns the Union's *enlargement.* With the accession of ten new partners in 2004, and maybe two or three more by 2007, all ESDP bodies are to be severely tested. Numbers matter, and managing international crises at 25-plus may prove very tricky indeed. Even shaping decisions may become much more complicated: it is not by accident that, in the run-up to the current enlargement, the PSC decided to set up a sort of informal subcommittee composed of deputies – the so-called 'Nikolaidis Group', inaugurated during Greece's presidency of the EU in early 2003 along the model of the 'Antici Group' of the COREPER. Its task is a preliminary drafting of the agenda for meetings while exploring the areas of convergence and/or divergence among the member states. And much as the 'socialisation' of the new partners started well before their actual accession (i.e. immediately after the signature of the relevant treaties in April 2003), achieving a common approach to policy-making may still require some time and encounter a few bumps along the road.

This is all the more true if one considers the differences in size, capabilities, external policy interests and perceptions of the EU-25. Much more than CFSP proper – for which, ultimately, effectiveness and credibility depend on the largest possible consensus on common foreign policy decisions and goals – ESDP relies on the resources that the member states are willing and able to commit and engage. And it is difficult to deny that, in this domain, there are major imbalances among EU partners: enlargement has not created them, of course, but it has made them more acute. In other words, while all EU members are formally equal in representation and decision-making, some are 'more equal' than others in terms of capabilities that may be needed to conduct an effective ESDP, be they military (forces, equipment, industrial base), commercial, civilian or diplomatic. It is not just a matter of geographical extension, population or GDP: some bigger member states could do much better in the light of their sheer size, while some

smaller ones do remarkably well given theirs. Yet it is clear that striking an acceptable and viable trade-off between the rights of all and the means of some is a precondition for making ESDP work at 25-plus, especially if the operational and strategic stakes are set to rise.

A second major challenge concerns policy and institutional *coherence*. This is not new either. But recent policy developments – especially regarding the fight against terrorism – and the parallel delay in enforcing decisive institutional reform have aggravated it further. Over the coming years, in fact, the 'dual' (or even 'triple') system of the Union's external action – dispersed as it is across and among its different 'pillars' – is likely to remain in place. This is true both horizontally and vertically, both at the political and the bureaucratic level: Council vs. Commission, EU vs. member states, at times even within each one of these. While the European Security Strategy approved in December 2003 has brought some clarity and broad convergence over the goals of CFSP/ESDP (and, more generally, of EU 'external action'), the recent inclusion of the fight against terrorism in the HRSG's remit – no matter how desirable and welcome it may be – undeniably increases the intricacy and segmentation of EU 'crisis management', internally as well as externally. The expectations and demands are higher now, and require adequate responses. EU institutions and leaders are therefore urged to rise to the occasion – well beyond the current legal provisions and political or bureaucratic realities.

A third major challenge for ESDP is its *accountability*. Often neglected in the public debate, the issue is none the less important. As compared with other EU common policies, in fact, ESDP seems to suffer from a specific accountability gap. On the one hand, national parliaments are largely responsible for the democratic control of ESDP, but are ill-equipped for the oversight of intergovernmental decisions. On the other hand, the European Parliament has few formal powers in this realm but has access to relevant information and expertise, and also has competence for the scrutiny of the Commission's implementation of ESDP-relevant activities. Finally, the WEU Assembly, still anchored in the WEU Treaty and based in Paris as an inter-parliamentary body specialising in European defence issues, now finds itself in an institutional and political vacuum: it does provide a forum for debating issues related to ESDP (and NATO) but it is powerless and looks increasingly like an odd left-over from the transfer of WEU functions to

the EU. As a result, ESDP lies in a sort of parliamentary grey area that hardly strengthens its overall legitimacy. Also, its transparency and accessibility for EU citizens are naturally limited by its confidential nature, especially regarding military matters, and cannot be measured by the same standards as other EU policies. Pragmatic solutions can and probably should be envisaged for the coming years, for instance regular joint sessions of national parliamentary representatives and MEPs, and hearings of ESDP officials in national parliaments. But it seems difficult to overcome entirely the current disconnect between national- and European-level policy debates and parliamentary competencies.

Finally, a special challenge for the next five years may turn out to be the *Constitutional Treaty*. Paradoxically, in fact, ESDP will operate in a legal context (Nice) that the new Treaty alters significantly. Such a paradox, of course, does not apply to ESDP only. But some of the most important innovations enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty apply notably to it: from the creation of the post of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs to the solidarity clause against terrorist attacks, up to the implementation of 'permanent structured cooperation' on defence.[5] On the one hand, therefore, the current institutional arrangements may be de facto weakened or delegitimised by the parallel virtual existence of new ones. On the other, these have to go through a lengthy and risky ratification process that may, in turn, cast shadows over their actual entry into force. This is why clear transitional arrangements may help prevent confusion and bridge this potential legal and functional gap. Some already agreed reforms, in other words, could be secured and put in place regardless of what may happen during the ratification process – while ESDP is likely to remain a constantly adapting and evolving policy.

5. See my other contribution to this book.

Beyond Petersberg: missions for the EU military forces

Martin Ortega

3

During five intense years, the EU has been creating a military capability of its own. However, until quite recently, the question of the missions for which the European forces were intended was put aside. The process of establishing a military dimension of EU since the Cologne European Council in June 1999 can thus be divided into two periods: the capability-building phase (until mid-2002) and the subsequent definition of this military capability's purpose.

It may seem that the logical sequence between these two phases was reversed, but this 'reversed order' was the result of the agreement reached in 1999 at the outset of the process. The United Kingdom, a key player in any European military development, insisted that a pragmatic approach should be followed, whereby capability-building should be tackled first. This approach, which was agreed by the other EU members, has eventually proved to be very useful, for 'philosophical' questions on the missions and purpose of the European forces were temporarily eschewed, in particular questions concerning their *raison d'être* vis-à-vis NATO. Consequently, the purpose of the EU forces can now be defined in a dynamic manner, taking into account past and more recent needs, as well as possible future requirements. Had the debate on the EU military forces started in 1999 from the missions and purpose point of departure, it would most probably have been sterile, or at least much more difficult.

From the Cologne European Council until mid-2002, the lack of a decision on the forces' purpose was mitigated by making use of the WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, whose text had been enshrined in the Treaty on European Union through the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. All EU members accepted this preliminary description of the EU forces' missions, because it was based on 'constructive ambiguity', which was acceptable to the 'Atlanticist', the 'pro-European autonomist' and the non-allied governments. From June 2002, the following developments have contributed to a better definition of those missions: (1) the

declaration on terrorism and ESDP made at the Seville European Council; (2) the debate in the Convention that introduced a new definition of the missions in the draft Constitution; (3) the European Security Strategy of December 2003; and (4) various EU operations on the ground, which have helped to clarify the theory through practical experience. In the absence of a European Constitution, the missions of the EU forces have not as yet been formally described in an authoritative legal text. Nevertheless, there are many pointers that indicate the kind of definition that will probably be retained in the Constitutional Treaty that it is expected will be adopted later in 2004.

Missions during the capability-building phase: the Petersberg tasks[1]

The missions assigned to EU military forces are currently described in Article 17.2 of the TEU. It must be remembered that this Article will remain the legal description until the entry into force of the future Constitutional Treaty, following its ratification process.

> *Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union*
> Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The words from 'humanitarian' to 'peacemaking' are taken from the WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. When the 15 EU members negotiated the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, they chose to retain the language adopted by the nine WEU states at Petersberg rather than work out a new description, as there was consensus on a text that allowed for various interpretations. The three types of missions envisaged at Petersberg cover a complete range of possible military measures, from the most modest to the most robust. For some time the EU member states debated whether to focus on the 'lower' or the 'higher spectrum' of the Petersberg missions, but the Helsinki Headline Goal made it clear that the capabilities that the EU was expected to acquire would be the 'appropriate capabilities . . . to be able to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks'. On the other hand, it was obvious to everyone that territorial defence was excluded from those tasks.

1. Capability-building is an ongoing process, as the new Headline Goal 2010 adopted by the European Council in June 2004 shows (see Burkard Schmitt's chapter in this book). However, from the Cologne European Council in 1999 until mid-2002 the EU member states put the accent on capability-building only, leaving aside the definition of missions.

From the Cologne summit in June 1999 until mid-2002, a number of European Councils helped to shape the EU military dimension, but none dared to go beyond the description of missions enshrined in the words of Article 17.2 quoted above. At the Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Laeken European Councils, member states' governments pursued their vision of a rapid reaction force for crisis management, and introduced the necessary institutional changes (notably the creation of the Political and Security Committee and the EU Military Staff), without becoming bogged down in endless debates on reform of the Treaty.[2] The conclusions of the European Councils define the nature and size of the force, establish the method by which decisions will be taken on its use and on the participation of member and non-member states, and provide for EU-NATO cooperation. It is of course true that the technical details that were defined, such as projection capability, viability, interoperability, flexibility and operational requirements, give a fairly good indication of the types of forces that the EU was setting up, and consequently the types of operations that they would be able to execute. However, on the missions the various presidential conclusions continually repeat the keyword 'Petersberg', and its content as given in Article 17 of the TEU. At the Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 20 November 2000, the 15 decided not to develop the possible content of the Petersberg tasks, despite some requests from the military side. At the time it was deemed sufficient to consider three scenarios that drew largely on WEU illustrative missions drawn up by NATO in 1998. Very roughly, those missions were: (1) the evacuation of a few hundred European citizens from an area of crisis situated far away from Brussels; (2) a conflict-prevention operation following a rise in tension on the border between two states; and (3) the imposition of a demilitarised zone to separate two warring factions somewhere in South-Eastern Europe. The possible scenarios of a Balkans peacekeeping operation and evacuation of civilians from sub-Saharan Africa were clearly in the minds of the military planners.

To complete the definition of EU military forces' missions during this period, two other elements must be taken into account. On the one hand, the stated principles guiding the EU's CFSP, contained in Article 11.1 of the Treaty, constitute the constitutional framework that any EU military operation should respect. Amongst the objectives of the CFSP, Article 11.1 of the TEU

2. The sole exception was Article 25 of the TEU, establishing the Political and Security Committee, which was introduced by the Nice Treaty of December 2000.

declares *inter alia* that the Union shall 'preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter' and 'develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'. On the other hand, the very substance of CFSP also provides an authoritative indication of how European forces should be used. In all documents on ESDP it was made clear that an EU military crisis management capability was intended to support the CFSP. Therefore, the use of European forces in a way that was counter to the spirit of the CFSP in general, and its realisation in the case of a particular region, was unthinkable. For instance, it was impossible to conceive of a military operation that was inconsistent with the principles and objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The debate on EU forces' missions since 2002

The fight against international terrorism

While EU members were disinclined to debate the purpose of EU military forces, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and their consequences led to such a debate during the first half of 2002. Following military action in Afghanistan, the Spanish presidency insisted that the fight against terrorism should be introduced into the Treaty on European Union along with the existing Petersberg missions. Indeed, the Spanish government was particularly sensitive towards international collaboration in the struggle against all types of terrorism. The inclusion of that new mission would have been, according to the Spaniards, a symbolic but strong signal as to the seriousness of the European engagement in that fight – a message aimed in particular at the United States government. Other EU member states, however, were not persuaded that inclusion of such a mission was the right move, either for practical reasons (the EU force was not yet prepared to make a useful contribution to the fight against terrorism), or for legal reasons (no treaty reform was envisaged at that time). As a result, a middle way was found, whereby a solemn declaration was adopted at the Seville European Council of June 2002. The declaration, quoted below, stressed the EU's determination to fight terrorism and indicated that both CFSP and ESDP means could be used to that end.

European Council Declaration on the contribution of CSFP, including ESDP, in the fight against terrorism (Seville, June 2002)

1. The European Council reaffirms that terrorism is a real challenge for Europe and the world and poses a threat to our security and our stability. To this end, the extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September 2001 decided to step up the action of the Union against terrorism through a coordinated and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all Union policies, including development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational.

2. The European Council has noted the significant achievements accomplished in the implementation of the Plan of Action to combat terrorism and reiterates that the fight against terrorism will continue to be a priority objective of the European Union and a key plank of its external relations policy. Solidarity and international cooperation constitute essential instruments in the fight against that scourge. The Union will continue to maintain the closest possible coordination with the United States and other partners. The Union will seek to contribute further to those international efforts, both internally and in its relations with third countries and international organisations, such as the UN, NATO and the OSCE.

3. The Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the European Security and Defence Policy, can play an important role in countering this threat to our security and in promoting peace and stability. Closer cooperation among the Member States is being put into practice to take account of the international situation created by the terrorist attacks of 11 September.

4. The European Council welcomes the progress achieved since 11 September on incorporating the fight against terrorism into all aspects of the Union's external relations policy. The fight against terrorism requires a global approach to strengthen the international coalition and to prevent and contain regional conflicts.

These principles have been reaffirmed on a number of occasions and, in particular, after the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, by the European Council Declaration of 25 March 2004. The same principles have led to the adoption of a 'solidarity clause' in the draft Constitutional Treaty, as will be discussed below. If there is one lesson to be drawn from the debate on the

missions during the Spanish presidency, however, it is that the obsolescence of the Petersberg framework was explicitly brought to the fore.

Towards a European Constitution

The adoption of the Seville Declaration on terrorism in June 2002 was only a small step in the reformulation of the description of the EU forces' missions. A thorough reform of the Petersberg text was only initiated later in 2002, with the discussion of a draft Constitutional Treaty in the European Convention. The Convention decided to create a working group to deal with defence issues, which started its proceedings in September 2002.[3]

The report of the working group (December 2002) was followed by the final text of a draft Constitutional Treaty adopted by the Convention (July 2003), which led to the Intergovernmental Conference (October-December 2003). In the resulting texts, four major issues are relevant to the definition of EU forces' missions: (a) a general description of ESDP; (b) a collective defence clause; (c) a solidarity clause in case of terrorist attacks; and (d) the listing of the CFSP's objectives and principles. It is to be expected that, once adopted, the future Constitutional Treaty will specify the final wording of all these clauses, but the current (May 2004) formulation already gives a fairly good idea of the norms that will be adopted eventually.

(a) Firstly, a new definition of the missions of EU military forces is contained in the draft article on ESDP.

> *Article I-40(1) of the draft Constitutional Treaty*[4]
> *Specific provisions relating to the common security and defence policy*
> The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

Arguably, this description of EU forces' missions is adequate for three reasons: it contains sufficiently broad terms (peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security)

3. The Convention, whose first plenary meeting took place on 26 February 2002, established working groups on external action and defence, *inter alia*. The mandate for the working group on defence, dated 10 September 2002, included the following question: 'Apart from the Petersberg tasks, what defence remit could be envisaged for the Union?'

4. Unless otherwise stated, in this chapter, all articles from the draft Constitutional Treaty are taken from the Intergovernmental Conference Document CIG 50/03, 25 November 2003, entitled 'Convention's draft Constitutional Treaty as re-elaborated by the group of legal experts'.

encompassing all possible operations; it does not refer to any particular geographical zone; and the description stresses respect for the principles of the UN Charter.

The general description quoted above is developed further in another article that draws from – and goes beyond – the Petersberg text:

> *Article III-210 (ex Article 17 TEU) of the draft Constitutional Treaty*
> 1. The tasks referred to in Article I-40(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

(b) Secondly, the introduction of a military assistance clause in the event of armed attack or aggression against EU members might involve another type of mission for EU forces in the future. The collective defence clause was drafted in the following terms during the last stages of the Intergovernmental Conference at the beginning of December 2003:

> *Article I-40(7) Closer cooperation on mutual defence*[5]
> If a Member State is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.
> Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

Given the high degree of political and economic integration attained in the European Union, it is understandable that member states are ready to defend other members in the event of armed attack against their territory if necessary. However, it is not clear

5. This text is taken from Document CIG 60/03 ADD 1, 9 December 2003. This drafting, which was proposed by the Italian presidency during the first days of December 2003 and accepted in principle by the other EU members, represents a departure from the previous text of Article I-40(7) in Document CIG 50/03, 25 November 2003, which circumscribed collective defence to EU member states participating in 'structured cooperation'. The text quoted above was not adopted formally and it remains to be seen whether it is consistent with draft Article I-40(2), which refers to the specific character of security and defence policy of certain member states.

from the quoted text what is expected in specific terms from individual states in such circumstances. Neither is it indicated what the role (if any) of an EU military force in that case would be. But the new clause is obviously a potential source of missions for EU forces.

(c) Thirdly, a solidarity clause in the event of terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters is also foreseen in the draft Constitutional Treaty:

> *Article I-42 Solidarity clause*
> 1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:
> (a) – prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
> – protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
> – assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack;
> (b) – assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.
> 2. The detailed arrangements for implementing this Article are at Article III-231.

The solidarity clause is a logical culmination of the Seville Declaration on terrorism and ESDP made in June 2002, for the clause foresees the utilisation of 'all instruments . . . , including the military resources'. Thus, individual member states can assist with military means in the event of terrorist attacks or natural and man-made disasters, but it can also be assumed that EU military forces might be utilised to those ends.

(d) Finally, the objectives and principles guiding the Union's external actions, as stated in the draft constitutional treaty, both inspire and constrain any possible EU military mission. The EU explicitly pledges to respect those principles. It is important to underline the essential role of the Union's principles in the definition of CFSP and ESDP because constitutions of nation-states do not normally establish such a link between international principles and external action. When introducing the Union's objec-

tives, Article I-3(4) of the draft Constitutional Treaty declares: 'In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular the rights of the child, as well as to strict observance and to development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.' This idea is developed at some length at the beginning of Title V of the same draft, in an article which is worth quoting in full.

> *Article III-193 (Article 3, second paragraph, and ex Article 11 TEU)*
> 1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
> The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations, which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.
> 2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:
> (a) safeguard its common values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
> (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and international law;
> (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
> (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
> (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world econ-

> omy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
> (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
> (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters;
> (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.
> 3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action covered by this Title and the external aspects of its other policies. The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.

European Security Strategy

In addition to the constitutional treaty, which will most probably be adopted in 2004 and ratified in the next few years, the European Security Strategy (ESS), drafted by Javier Solana and endorsed by the European Council in December 2003, is an important element in understanding the purpose and missions of EU military forces. The ESS outlines a comprehensive strategic framework which will surely inspire the formulation of any European foreign and security policy in the years to come. Therefore, specific military operations, which always are carried out in pursuance of CFSP, will also be based on the general vision of the EU's role in the world contained in the European Security Strategy.

Amongst the many references to the possible utilisation of EU military capabilities in the ESS, three important aspects can be pointed out in connection with the definition of EU missions. First, the ESS underlines the need to react rapidly to potential threats and challenges:

> Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new

> threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become even more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

By the same token, the ESS suggests that possible missions do not constitute a closed catalogue. If the European Union is ready to respond to new contingencies, it must adopt a flexible approach:

> As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

Second, the ESS points out that EU military operations will normally be carried out hand in hand with humanitarian and civilian missions.

> In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments … In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

Later on, however, the same document acknowledges that a greater degree of consistency and coordination between European civilian and military instruments is badly needed.[6]

Third, and last but not least, the ESS acknowledges that many of the EU forces' missions will be undertaken in cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance:

6. See also European Commission, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, 'Civilian instruments for EU crisis management', Brussels, April 2003.

> The EU-NATO permanent agreements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.

In this book, the chapter by Jean-Yves Haine on ESDP and NATO addresses the issue of EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management, and in particular the 'Berlin-plus' scheme.

EU military operations

Finally, EU military operations on the ground are without any doubt another element that helps to clarify the purpose of EU military forces. So far, the EU has launched and led just a small number of police and military operations (see the chapter by Gustav Lindstrom in this book). Being a newcomer in this regard, the EU is still immersed in a learning process. Nevertheless, operations conducted until now constitute significant precedents that give an idea of the type of missions in which EU military forces might be engaged in the future.[7]

Substantive issues

In this section, a number of key substantive issues concerning the missions that EU military forces can undertake will be discussed: geographical scope, mandate from the UN Security Council, and the instances in which the use of EU military forces would be preferred to other military options.

As regards the geographical scope of possible EU military tasks, it would be misleading to set limits. Even though it can be expected that EU forces will be utilised mainly in the European region and its neighbourhood, these forces could equally undertake operations in any part of the world. Indeed, Operation *Artemis* was conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo and, in the past, national peacekeeping forces of EU member states have been present in countries such as East Timor and El Salvador. The European Security Strategy quoted above points out: 'In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of

7. See, for instance, Fernanda Faria, 'Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the EU', *Occasional Paper* 51 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2004).

concern to Europe. Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide . . . Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts and humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.'

As far as the UN Charter is concerned, the EU and its member states have always stressed the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Operations undertaken by the EU force must in principle have a mandate from the UN Security Council. During the constitutional debate on a new definition of possible EU missions in late 2002 and 2003, some member states suggested that the Union should have prior authorisation from the UN Security Council before carrying out any military operation. Other members, while agreeing on the principle, thought that an explicit authorisation was not necessary. The mandate issue, however, should not be exaggerated. It was by and large solved in practice during the Kosovo crisis. Indeed, although all EU member states deem it necessary to have a UN mandate to validate the use of armed force (apart from self-defence), they all agreed that the circumstances prevailing in Kosovo in 1999 justified military intervention without a prior UNSC authorisation, as was recognised by the Berlin European Council of 25 March 1999. In Berlin, all EU members (even non-NATO EU members) endorsed the intervention. On the other hand, a number of EU members have undertaken unilateral interventions (for instance the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone in 2000), which have been generally considered humanitarian and legitimate, even though they were not conducted under a UNSC mandate.

This means that, in addition to operations authorised by the UNSC, an EU force might also undertake military action in the absence of such a mandate if needed. However, the situations in which this would be possible are quite limited: humanitarian (substantive aspect) interventions will be possible only when all member states agree (political aspect). If, for instance, there is a humanitarian catastrophe or an impending genocide, the EU (and European states, for that matter) could act even if a resolution from the Security Council had not been obtained. In any case, as the draft constitutional treaty discussed in December 2003 points out, EU military operations must always be conducted in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The multilateral character of any EU decision on the use of force, as well as the close

adherence of EU member states to principles such as peaceful resolution of disputes, democracy and human rights, constitute a guarantee that the EU force would never be used in a way incompatible with the principles of the UN Charter.[8]

Moreover, the EU has pledged to work in close coordination with the United Nations on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Many concrete examples of on-the-ground collaboration, in the Balkans, in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, are proof of that. In addition, the EU and the UN signed a joint declaration on cooperation in crisis management on 24 September 2003, in which they established 'a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility' in the fields of planning, training, communication and best practices.

Finally, the question 'in what circumstances would the European force be preferred to other military options?' must be addressed. Bearing in mind that individual EU member states have their own national forces, on the one hand, and that NATO is a successful alliance with remarkable political and military clout, on the other, what is the added value of an EU force? In other words, faced with a crisis situation, when will the EU member states decide to utilise the EU military force instead of other options? It is very difficult to give a simple answer to this question, as EU members will bear in mind numerous political, strategic, economic and legal considerations in each specific case before taking a decision on the use of EU forces. However, member states might be inclined to choose the EU military option for reasons connected with the idea of legitimacy, on the one hand, and with more practical considerations, on the other. A European force may be useful in certain circumstances, because the EU flag might confer a unique legitimacy to a given operation. Even though one or several EU member states had the means to undertake a mission, they might prefer to have EU backing and thus conduct it under the European flag. On the other hand, more practical considerations may play a part: for instance, when a joint EU operation is preferable for logistical or economic reasons.

The EU member states have four options for military action (all of them with or without a UNSC mandate): individual, ad hoc coalition, EU and NATO operations. When individual interests are at stake, a unilateral reaction is likely. A new attack (and/or

8. See Martin Ortega, 'Military intervention and the European Union', *Chaillot Paper* 45 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, March 2001).

occupation) on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, or on Spanish territory in Northern Africa (as in the Perejil/Leila Island incident in July 2002), for instance, would probably not lead to an automatic European (or allied) military response. Therefore, a national reaction seems the most probable option. Conversely, in cases where the general interest is concerned, such as crises in the Balkans or the Middle East, different situations may arise, depending on the degree of consensus regarding the underlying conflict and its possible resolution. Three preliminary assumptions may be advanced, however, drawing from recent experiences. First, when there is political disagreement, the tendency is to prefer ad hoc coalitions rather than institutional mechanisms. The case study here is the 2003 Iraq war. Second, if there is political consensus and both American and European interests are at risk, NATO will be the preferred option, as was the case in Kosovo in 1999. Third, when political consensus prevails but there is no American interest linked to a given operation, the tendency would be to utilise the EU military force, as Operation *Artemis* tends to suggest.

Conclusion: necessity creates the organ

The conclusion of this chapter can be borrowed from the science of biology: necessity creates the organ. The Kosovo crisis spurred the European Council gathered in Cologne in June 1999 into endorsing and developing the St-Malo bilateral initiative and establishing an EU military dimension. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, transatlantic and intra-European cooperation in the fight against terrorism was improved, and another step in that direction was taken after the Madrid attacks of 11 March 2004. Following the Iraq crisis, the European Security Strategy was adopted and a final agreement on military headquarters for the European force was reached. In the meantime, both a new definition of missions of the EU forces and a collective assistance clause in the event of armed attack against the territory of EU member states were discreetly introduced into the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference. The new definition of EU forces' missions contained in the draft Constitutional Treaty (which will most probably be adopted in 2004) (a) is much clearer than the Petersberg text, (b) encompasses new tasks, such as the fight against terrorism, and (c)

opens the door to collective defence. If the current draft is eventually adopted, it will be confirmed that, in the last five years, we have witnessed a substantial widening and deepening of possible EU military missions.

Consensus among all EU members has made possible such developments. The same consensus also allowed for the conduction of the first EU police and military operations on the ground in 2003. It must be assumed that EU member states have agreed to both widen and deepen the definition of missions in the draft Constitutional Treaty because they deemed it necessary to do that. In other words, across Europe a general need is felt that the EU military forces must be able to undertake various kinds of missions in order to advance the EU's interests, to enhance the security of both individual member states and the EU as a whole, and to attain the objectives of CFSP.

As they are described today, the missions of EU force have not been the result of a long-term planned design, but rather the result of various adaptations to meet the perceived needs of EU member states. It is to be expected that a similar process of adaptation will continue in the future. Following this 'Darwinian' approach, EU member states will be eager to reinforce their national defence if they think this is the best response to external threats and to their security needs. They will enhance their alliance with the United States, bilaterally or through NATO, if they believe this is the best way to react to threats and risks. And they will be ready to follow the European path if they reach the conclusion that this is the best way to improve their security and to react to the challenges of a complex world. In this author's view, the future is open, and the three ways might be utilised in a ratio that is difficult to predict, for it depends on unforeseeable variables. However, most probably, EU member states will still find a lot of added value in the European military option in the future, because it represents an indispensable instrument with which to implement their foreign and security policies, which are based on a fairly homogeneous world-view.

European capabilities: how many divisions?

Burkard Schmitt

4

The Helsinki Headline Goal

Throughout the 1990s, the wars in the Balkans demonstrated that CFSP would only be credible if it was backed up with the possibility to use military power. At the same time, NATO experience in Bosnia, and even more so in Kosovo, showed that European armed forces were ill-prepared for the military challenges of the post-Cold War era: built up to protect national territories against large-scale military aggression, they were neither adequately structured nor equipped for crisis management operations abroad. Moreover, they found it increasingly difficult to operate together with American troops. The latter, traditionally organised as expeditionary forces, started in the 1990s on a far-reaching transformation process to become more mobile, agile and flexible. This process has been driven to a large extent by the increasing use of modern information and communication technologies for warfare. Unmatched on the European side, the speed and scope of this 'Revolution in Military Affairs' have created major problems of interoperability, weakening the transatlantic link and Europe's ability to influence US policies.

As a consequence of all this, military capabilities have been at the centre of the development of ESDP since the very beginning. The devastating effects of Europe's military weakness on the transatlantic Alliance was one of the main arguments that caused the United Kingdom to overcome its traditional reluctance vis-à-vis a defence role for the EU. This new openness was matched on the French side by a greater flexibility vis-à-vis NATO and the recognition that the vision of *Europe puissance* needed to be underpinned by the means to act. This convergence led to the Franco-British St-Malo Declaration (3-4 December 1998), which stated that the European Union 'must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to inter-

national crises . . . In this regard, the EU will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities predesignated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)'.[1]

'The Kosovo conflict opened the way to a rapid Europeanisation of the St-Malo agreement. The German presidency successfully worked on transforming this bilateral initiative into a European reality.'[2] At the June 1999 European Council in Cologne, all member states agreed to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. To achieve this objective, they committed themselves 'to further develop more effective European military capabilities from the basis of existing national, bi-national and multi-national capabilities, to strengthen their own capabilities for that purpose, to maintain a sustained defence effort, and to reinforce their capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control'.[3] At the same time, member states limited the scope of ESDP to the so-called 'Petersberg tasks' (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking), confirming that NATO would remain 'the foundation of the collective defence of its Members'.[4]

Six months later, in December 1999, the Helsinki European Council underlined its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. To achieve this objective, member states set themselves the so-called 'Helsinki Headline Goal' to be able, by the year 2003, to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 troops). According to the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions, 'Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces'.[5] Moreover, they agreed to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport.

1. Maartje Rutten (comp.), 'From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents', *Chaillot Papers* 47 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, May 2001), p. 8.

2. See Jean-Yves Haine, 'ESDP: an overwiev', at http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf.

3. Op. cit. in note 1, p. 41.

4. Treaty of Nice, Art. 17.

5. Helsinki Presidency Conclusions.

At the same time, however, member states made it clear that this process would not imply the creation of a European army. The objective was – and still is – 'only' to set up a pool of national units on which the EU can, in principle, draw if the Council decided unanimously to use military force in response to an international crisis. Making these assets available in a concrete crisis situation requires, then, a further 'case-by-case' decision at national levels. The Headline Goal therefore does not imply the creation of a standing 'EU Force' or constitute a binding commitment in any future crisis.

Based on the decisions taken in Cologne and Helsinki, ESDP was further developed under the Portuguese and French presidencies: on 19-20 June 2000, the Santa Maria da Feira European Council encouraged EU candidate countries and the non-EU European members of NATO to contribute to improving Europe's capabilities and to EU military crisis management.

At the same time, the EU started to clarify ESDP's relationship with NATO. Close coordination between the two organisations has been important for political reasons, but also to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. To achieve this objective, member states tried in particular to find arrangements for the use of existing NATO planning and command capabilities rather than setting up new ones. An agreement on EU access to NATO assets, the so-called 'Berlin-plus' arrangement, was finally reached in December 2002. Another area of common interest was the improvement of military capabilities: even before the EU summit in Helsinki, NATO had launched its own Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). In order to keep the two processes complementary and mutually supportive, both organisations agreed to establish appropriate consultation and information mechanisms.

Last but not least, member states committed themselves at Feira to strengthening, as part of ESDP, the Union's civil crisis management capabilities. They agreed on an Action Plan in the areas of police cooperation, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. This Action Plan foresaw the creation, by 2003, of a pool of 5,000 police officers, 200 judges, prosecutors and other experts, assessment teams to be dispatched within 3-7 hours, as well as intervention teams consisting of up to 2,000 people for deployment at short notice, able to assist humanitarian actors through emergency operations.[6] In parallel, member states continued to elaborate the military Headline Goal. Under the

6. Feira Presidency Conclusions.

leadership of the so-called 'Headline Goal Task Force', national experts in defence planning established a generic capabilities list, transforming the political objective decided in Helsinki into a catalogue of forces and specific capabilities. This list was based on four basic scenarios (separation by force of the belligerent parties, prevention of conflicts, humanitarian aid, evacuation of nationals) and outlined 144 capabilities under seven categories.[7] In autumn 2000, the list was finalised and approved as the Helsinki Headline Catalogue.

Based on these findings, member states then specified the assets they were able to contribute to the Headline Goal Force. At the Capabilities Commitments Conference, held in Brussels on 20-21 November 2000, they committed themselves, on a voluntary basis, to making national contributions corresponding to the rapid reaction capabilities identified to attain the headline goal. These commitments have been set out in the so-called Helsinki Force Catalogue (see Annex 1). In quantitative terms, the contributions of member states constitute a pool of more than 100,000 persons, and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. In addition to this, EU candidate countries committed forces and capabilities to the so-called 'Headline Goal-plus' (see Annex 2).[8]

However, the Capabilities Commitment Conference constituted 'only' the first stage of an ongoing process of reinforcing military capabilities. Analysis of the Force Catalogue confirmed that the Union would match the quantitative Helsinki Goals, but that there was an urgent need for qualitative improvements in terms of availability, mobility, sustainability and interoperability. At the European Council in Nice (7-9 December 2000), member states therefore decided to set up a review mechanism, encompassing the following objectives:

- evaluation and, if necessary, revision of EU capability goals;
- monitoring of the force catalogue;
- identification and harmonisation of national contributions;
- quantitative and qualitative review of progress towards previously approved pledges in terms of interoperability and availability.[9]

Under subsequent presidencies, this work was taken forward. The so-called EU Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)

7. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I), Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), Deployability and Mobility, Effective Engagement, Protection and Survivability, Sustainability and Logistics, General Support.

8. See Declaration of the Capabilities Commitment Conference, op. cit. in note 1, doc. 31.

9. See Appendix to Annex VI to Presidency Conclusions, op. cit. in note 1, doc. 32.

was set up to ensure the review process, but also to define and accommodate potential interfaces with NATO planning mechanisms. A new version of the Helsinki Headline Catalogue was approved, and member states refined their contributions to the Helsinki Force Catalogue. Requirements for operational and strategic capabilities were further developed, and shortfalls in national commitments identified.

The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)

The comparative analysis of both the Headline Goal Catalogue and the Force Catalogue revealed considerable shortfalls in national commitments, varying widely in importance, nature, operational implications and the possible ways to rectify them. Among the 38 capability shortfalls identified in the so-called Helsinki Progress Catalogue, 21 were evaluated as 'significant'.

At the first Capability Improvement Conference in November 2001, EU defence ministers agreed on the so-called European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) to address these shortfalls.[10] From March 2002 onwards, 19 panels of national experts developed possible solutions (see Annex 3). The ECAP panels met independently and were composed of at least one 'lead nation' per panel, active participants and observers. The work of the panels was coordinated by the Headline Goal Task Force, which drew upon the support of the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

The ECAP process has been guided by four core principles: (1) the improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of European defence efforts, enhancing cooperation between member states or groups of member states; (2) a 'bottom-up' approach to European defence cooperation, relying on voluntary national commitments; (3) coordination between EU member states as well as coordination with NATO; (4) public support through ECAP's transparency and visibility.

The ECAP Panels presented their final reports on 1 March 2003, proposing options to rectify the identified shortfalls. For one category, it is sufficient for member states to revise their contributions and offer capabilities they already have but which, for different reasons, have not been offered before. A second category, however, consists of shortfalls for which capabilities do not exist in national inventories and which can only be rectified if member

10. See Annex I to the Presidency Report on ESDP, in Maartje Rutten (comp.), 'From Nice to Laaken. European defence: core documents, Volume II', *Chaillot Paper* 51 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2002), doc. 19.

states acquire the required capability. Some of these shortfalls can be temporarily addressed by short-term solutions such as leasing or upgrading. For a number of shortfalls, including some related to strategic capabilities, a long-term solution requires large-scale procurement projects. Some of these projects are already under way, others not.

Based on these findings, member states launched a second phase of the ECAP process, aimed at developing specific measures to tackle the shortfalls. At the second Capability Conference on 19 May 2003, they established project groups 'focused on the implementation of concrete projects, including solutions through acquisition or other solutions such as leasing, multinationalisation and considering possibilities for role specialisation'.[11] The

Project group	Lead nation
Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR)	Spain
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)	Germany
Headquarters (HQ)	United Kingdom
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection	Italy
Special Operations Forces (SOF)	Portugal
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD)	Netherlands
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)	France
Strategic airlift	Germany
Space assets	France
Interoperability issues for evacuation and humanitarian operations	Belgium
Strategic sealift	Greece
Medical	Netherlands
Attack helicopters	Italy
Support helicopters	Italy
ISTAR/ground surveillance	United Kingdom

11. See Declaration on EU military capabilities, 19 May 2003, p. 4.

following table outlines the existing project groups, each headed again by a 'lead nation'.

According to the bottom-up approach that is guiding the ECAP, member states themselves are responsible for the delivery of military capabilities by directing the work of the ECAP Project Groups as appropriate. In the past, this had led to a certain lack of leadership and coherence. At its meeting on 17 November 2003, the EU Council therefore agreed on the need to complement the ECAP with an approach capable of identifying objectives, drawing up timelines and reporting procedures. Therefore the EUMS was tasked to develop an ECAP 'road map' to monitor the ECAP progress. The objective of this road map is to bridge the gap between the voluntary basis on which ECAP Project Groups operate and the interest of the EU as a whole to acquire the military capabilities necessary to attain the Headline Goal. Accompanied by a Capability Improvement Chart, the ECAP 'road map' will be presented as an integral part of the Single Progress Report during each presidency.[12]

The current state of play

During the second conference on military capabilities held in Brussels in May 2003, defence ministers declared that, 'based on the Forces contributed to the Helsinki Force Catalogue 2003 . . . the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg Tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls. These limitations and/or constraints are on deployment time and high risk may arise at the upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity, in particular when conducting concurrent operations.'[13]

In other words, much has been achieved but a lot remains to be done, in particular if the EU is to fulfil its ambition of being able to conduct the most demanding Petersberg tasks. Shortfalls still persist in a number of key areas:

- **Deployability.** Although member states have approximately 1.8 million persons under arms, they can deploy only 10-15 per cent of these forces for missions abroad, because most of them rely primarily on conscripts and still focus on territorial defence (see Annex 4). Given the necessity to rotate forces in the course of an operation (1/3 on deployment, 1/3 training, 1/3 rest), this can

12. See ESDP Presidency report, 12 December 2003.

13. See Declaration on EU military capabilities, 19 May 2003, p. 2.

create problems for sustaining long-term and/or high-intensity operations.

- **Mobility**. Europe also lacks the means to transport its troops and their equipment to distant places. In recent years improvements have been made, in particular for strategic sealift capabilities, and several member states are engaged in acquisition programmes to boost their airlift capabilities (A400M). Commercial options such as leasing and chartering can also help to close this gap. However, it will take time and further investment to provide the transport means that a global role for the EU would imply.
- **Sustainability.** Once deployed abroad, troops need logistic support to stay there. Depending on the distance and the duration of the deployment, this can imply an enormous logistic challenge, requiring a broad spectrum of capabilities such as transport and medical support. On top of that, the limited number of deployable forces reduces the EU's ability to sustain military operations abroad (see above).
- **Effective engagement.** In particular in a hostile environment, a broad spectrum of capabilities is required to make military engagement on the ground effective. These capabilities include precision-guided weapons, offensive electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defences, etc. Again, European forces are short of most of these assets.
- **C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance).** C4ISR includes a broad set of key enabling capabilities for modern warfare and represents the core elements of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs'. At the same time, it constitutes a major shortfall in most member states. Some capabilities exist, in certain areas and to various degrees, at the national level and/or in NATO, but not in the collective framework of ESDP. Drawing on national assets can create severe problems of interoperability, and the use of NATO capabilities can imply time-consuming political negotiations, which would slow down any EU crisis management response. Even if there is no need to copy the US model of 'network centric warfare', European nations will have to make a considerable effort in this field, individually and collectively, if they are to increase the effectiveness of their armed forces and ensure a minimum of interoperability with US forces.

This list of European shortfalls is not exhaustive, but it gives an idea of the challenge ahead if member states want to stick to their declared intentions. Most of them are still struggling to overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Reforms are in hand, but they simply need time. Even if the political will exists, the complexity of the challenge slows down the speed of change.

The restructuring of armed forces is almost inevitably slow and cumbersome, because it requires important financial investment, runs against deeply rooted traditions and mentalities and may raise serious social and economic problems. At the same time, military equipment has extremely long procurement and life-cycles. Normally it takes years, if not decades, from the identification of a capability need until a weapon system that fulfils this need enters into service. It is therefore not astonishing that numerous shortfalls persist, even if in some cases procurement projects had been launched well before the Helsinki Process started.

Developing capabilities for ESDP is an even greater challenge. First, defence and security have traditionally been excluded from the European project. In consequence, the EU has had to develop its structures, procedures and mechanisms for ESDP from the scratch. Second, ESDP is organised on a purely intergovernmental basis, with 25 sovereign states taking all decisions by unanimity. In these circumstances, decision-making is by definition complex – in particular in the area of defence, where member states are traditionally reluctant to surrender national prerogatives.

All this needs to be taken into account when assessing the success of capability development in the EU. Given the complexity of the task, it is probably fair to say that the glass is half full rather than half empty. Considerable achievements have been made, and constant attempts are being made to make further improvements.

The way ahead: the Headline Goal 2010

The December 2003 European Council marked the end of the process begun in Helsinki, although further work will be necessary to meet the European force goals. At the same time, the Council adopted the European Security Strategy 'A secure Europe in a better world', which provides guidelines for the future development of CFSP and ESDP. Together, both elements set the scene for the preparation of a new Headline Goal 2010.

The challenge for the years to come will be to complete the Helsinki process and to adapt the development of European capabilities to the strategic environment outlined in the European Security Strategy. The first Headline Goal was to a large degree determined by the war in Kosovo; the second has to take into account new, unconventional threats.

So far, mainly the quantitative capability requirements have been taken into account. In the future, the focus will have to shift to qualitative aspects in order to improve availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of European armed forces. Several initiatives are already under way and indicate the direction of future developments.

The 'battle group' concept

One of the main shortfalls identified in the Headline Goal Process is the lack of highly mobile specialised forces at a high state of readiness and able to carry out missions in difficult terrain. Following a Franco-British initiative, in February 2004, France, Germany and the United Kingdom presented the so-called 'battle group' concept to tackle this shortfall. Two months later, in April 2004, EU defence ministers approved the trilateral proposal, turning it into a European initiative.

According to the concept, battle groups (or 'tactical groups') of 1,500 troops including appropriate supporting elements, should be ready for deployment within 15 days. They should be capable of higher-intensity operations, be it as stand-alone forces or as initial-entry forces for operations on a larger scale. In order to be deployed within 15 days, battle groups will need to be fully manned, equipped and trained. At the same time, member states offering battle groups must also identify and earmark sufficient strategic lift assets to ensure deployment within 15 days.

These forces will be designed specifically, but not exclusively, to be used in response to request from the UN. The aim is to establish 2-3 high-readiness battle groups by 2005, and 7-9 groups by 2007, providing the 'first-stop' option for EU rapid response in particular for crisis operations in failed and failing states.

Battle groups could be formed by one nation alone, by a lead nation with other nations contributing niche capabilities, or by a multinational solution if countries are unable to contribute a full battle group alone. In any case, they should meet the criteria of

military effectiveness, deployability and readiness.

If implemented, the battle group concept would improve the EU's rapid reaction capacity and fill one of the most important European capability gaps. At the same time, the reference to the UN and the explicit mention of failing states indicate the emerging influence of the new European Security Strategy on capability development in the EU.

The Planning Cell

At their meeting in Brussels on 29 April 2003, Heads of State or Government of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg proposed, *inter alia*, the setting up of an autonomous military headquarters for planning and conducting EU operations without recourse to NATO assets.[14] This proposal was criticised by some member states as a politically damaging and unnecessary duplication of national and NATO capabilities, which the EU could, at least in principle, use to conduct an operation. At the end of November 2003, a compromise was found between France, Germany and the United Kingdom that was then officially endorsed by the European Council in December.[15]

According to the new proposal, a small EU cell is being established at SHAPE to improve the preparation of EU operations having recourse to NATO assets under the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements. At the same time, NATO liaison arrangements with the EUMS will be defined to ensure transparency between the EU and NATO.

Moreover, another cell with civil-military components will be established within the EUMS in order to enhance the capacity of the latter to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning.

The main option for the conduct of autonomous EU military operations will remain national headquarters, which can be 'multinationalised' for that purpose. However, in certain circumstances, the Council may decide to draw on the collective capacity of the EUMS, in particular where a joint civil-military response is required and where no national HQ has been identified. In this case, the civil-military cell at the EUMS would have the responsibility for setting up a separate operations centre under a designated commander for this particular operation.

How these arrangements will work in practice remains to be

14. See Antonio Missiroli (comp.), 'From Copenhagen to Brussels. European defence: core documents, Volume IV', *Chaillot Paper* 67 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003), doc. 13.

15. Ibid., doc. 42

seen. However, they illustrate that the relationship with NATO and the question of autonomy remain politically sensitive issues.

The European Defence Agency

The creation of a European Armaments Agency has been on the European defence agenda for more than ten years. In the mid-1990s, the WEAO and OCCAR were set up outside the EU framework as potential precursors of a fully-fledged Agency. The work of the Convention on the Future of Europe gave new impetus to the project and shifted the debate towards the establishment of an Agency within the EU. This move is a logical consequence of the close link between capability development, as part of ESDP, and armaments.

In June 2003, the European Council at Thessaloniki tasked the appropriate bodies of the Council to undertake the necessary actions towards creating, in the course of 2004, an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments. Only a few weeks after the summit, the Council established an ad hoc Preparation Group to develop a basic concept for the Agency's organisation and missions. The Group presented its findings in mid-November in a report which the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) endorsed as the basis for the next steps.

According to the report, the Agency will aim at (a) developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, (b) promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, (c) contributing to identifying and, if necessary, implementing policies and measures aimed at strengthening the European Defence Industrial Base and (d) promoting, in liaison with the Commission where appropriate, research aimed at fulfilling future defence and security capabilities requirements.

In February 2004, an Agency Establishment Team (AET) was set up to prepare the conditions for the operational setting up and working of the Agency. In particular the AET took forward work on the financial, legal and administrative aspects of the Agency's creation and specified its missions. Based on the final report of the AET, RELEX counsellors and COREPER worked out a 'Joint Action on the establishment of a European Defence Agency (EDA)', which the GAERC adopted in mid-June.

Based on this founding document, the Agency will be established with a staff of 25 by the end of 2004 and then progressively be built up to the proposed initial total of around 80 in 2005. This will comprise a 'top team', a corporate services branch and four directorates (Capabilities, R&T, Armaments and Defence Industry/Market).

In its initial stage, the Agency will act as a coordinating focal point for the existing network of armaments bodies and support the Council in the ECAP process. Once fully operational, it will be responsible in particular 'for the integration between operational aspects of capabilities . . . and the capability acquisition and development ones'. At this stage, the Agency will 'incorporate or assimilate the principles and practices of the relevant elements of pre-existing arrangements (OCCAR, LoI, Framework Agreement, WEAG/WEAO).'[16]

Given the traditional divergences between member states on armaments issues, the setting up of such an Agency within less than two years is an impressive achievement. However, it will take time for the Agency to become operational and make its weight felt. Its potential benefits for the development of European capabilities are nevertheless considerable. It can in particular establish a link between military planning and the world of armaments, namely defence research and procurement. This is particularly important for harmonising capability requirements, fostering standardisation of equipment and translating common capability needs into common procurement projects. At the same time the creation of the Agency is an opportunity to rationalise Europe's armaments institutions, transforming the existing patchwork of bodies and arrangements into a more coherent whole. All this will be a major step towards more cost-effective capability development.

Conclusion

The creation of the Agency illustrates that member states will only be able to enhance their military capabilities if they improve their habits of cooperation. In this context, multilateralisation, role specialisation, pooling and armaments cooperation will be crucial, in particular since most member states will continue to face severe budget constraints.

16. Ibid., doc. 37.

Combined defence budgets in the EU amount to a total of about €180 bn. This is much less than the US defence spending, but nevertheless a considerable amount of money. The problem is not the overall defence spending level, but how Europeans spend their money and on what. The bulk of defence investment is still on personnel and infrastructure rather than on new equipment and research. Even worse is the persisting duplication of effort among member states: in spite of budget problems, each country maintains its own command structures, headquarters, logistic organisations, training infrastructure, procurement agencies, etc. This situation is particularly difficult to justify, since the vast majority of EU member states have neither the means nor the ambition to launch military operations without their partners. In other words, even in defence, 'national sovereignty' is increasingly becoming a chimera. Acknowledging this and drawing the necessary conclusions would create plenty of room for rationalising European military capabilities. This, in turn, would help to allow Europeans to assume collectively their responsibilities in the world.

Annex 1: Multinational Cooperation in Europe

	Date	Strength	Countries	Observations
British-Dutch Amphibious Force	1973	5,000	NL, UK	NATO (and WEU)
French-German Brigade	1989	4,500	FR, GE	Integrated force
Multinational Division Centre	1991		GE, BE, NL, UK	ARRC: certified as operational by NATO
Eurocorps	1992	60,000	GE, BE, SP, LU, FR	Military staff in Strasbourg, Article V and Petersberg
German-Dutch Corps	1993	35,000	GE, NL	NATO, Military staff in Münster
Euroforce	1995	5,000-10,000	SP, FR, IT, PT (Associated)	Military staff in Florence, Rapid reaction capabilities
Euromarfor	1995	700	SP, FR, IT, PT (Associated)	Without military staff, Aero, naval and amphibious capabilities
French-British Air Group	1995		FR, UK	Permanent military staff at High Wycombe
European Air Group	1998		GE, BE, SP, IT, UK, FR, NL	Permanent military staff
Transport Coordination Cell	2002		GE, BE, SP, IT, UK, FR, NL	Permanent cell in NL
German-Polish-Danish Corps	1999	130	GE, PL, DK	NATO, HQ in Poland
Multinational Land Force (MLF)	1998		IT, Slovenia, Hungary	Highly operative infantry unit, Command in Undine, Italy
Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe	1998	3,000	IT, GR, TK, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, FYROM	Peacekeeping operations
Czech-Slovak-Polish Brigade	2002	2,481	CZ, Slovakia, PL	Operational in 2005
Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion (LITPOLBAT)	1999	800	Lithuania, PL	Rotating key staff positions
Polish-Ukrainian Peace Force Battalion (POLUKRBAT)	1999	754	PL, Ukraine	Rotating key staff positions, active in KFOR

Annex 2: Forces contributing to the Helsinki Force Catalogue (May 2002)

COUNTRY	LAND	AIR	NAVY
Austria	1 mechanised infantry battalion, 1 light infantry battalion, 1 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence unit, 1 "humanitarian civilian assistance package", 1 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) element, 1 helicopter transport squadron, 1 transport company, 100 observers/experts.		
Belgium	1 mechanised brigade, Smaller units (as part of humanitarian operation for up to 6 months).	24 F-16 fighters, 8 C-130, 2 Airbus transports.	2 frigates, Mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels.
Denmark	No contribution (opted out of ESDP at Maastricht in 1992).		
Finland	1 mechanised infantry battalion, 1 engineer battalion, 1 transport company, 1 CIMIC company.		1 MCM command and support ship, Joint: 15-30 experts/observers.
France	Mechanised, light, airborne (for a year), and amphibious brigades headquarters. The Eurocorps headquarters has also been offered for the force. => Total: 12,000 troops from a pool of 20,000.	Combined Air Operations Centre, 75 combat aircraft, 8 air-refuelling aircraft, 3 long-range transports, 24 medium-range transports, 2 Airborne Warning & Control System aircraft, combat search & rescue (CSAR) helicopters.	2 battle groups, each with one nuclear attack submarine (SSN), 4 frigates, 3 support ships, Maritime patrol aircraft (1 would include the nuclear powered aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle* with 22 aircraft aboard). Mine countermeasures vessels. Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters at Creil if required (others at operational and tactical levels), Satellite communications, Reconnaissance satellites and aircraft.

Annex 2 *continued*

COUNTRY	LAND	AIR	NAVY
Germany	Nucleus land component headquarters, Armoured, air assault, light infantry brigade headquarters, 7 combat battalions. => Total: up to 18,000 troops from a pool of 32,000.	Nucleus air component headquarters, 6 combat squadrons with 93 aircraft, 8 surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons, Air transport, support elements.	Maritime headquarters, 13 combat ships, support. Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters at Potsdam if required, nucleus operational headquarters.
Greece	1 operational headquarters, 1 mechanised or other brigade, 1 light infantry battalion, 1 attack and 1 transport helicopter company.	42 fighter aircraft, 4 transport aircraft, 1 *Patriot* SAM battalion, 1 short-range air defence (SHORAD) squadron.	Escorts, 1 submarine.
Ireland	1 light infantry battalion, 40-strong Army Ranger Wing Special Forces unit, Headquarters, Observer, Support elements => Total: 850.		
Italy	1 corps-level headquarters for six months, 1 division headquarters for a year, Airmobile brigade for up to six months and three other brigades, 1 railway-engineering battalion, special forces, 1 CIMIC group, 1 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence company. => Total: 12,500 troops from a 20,000 pool.	A Combined Air Operations Centre (air component headquarters), 26 *Tornado*, AMX combat aircraft, 6 CSAR helicopters, 4 C-130J transport aircraft (from 2003), 9 tactical transport aircraft, 2 air refuelling aircraft, 3 maritime patrol aircraft, 2 SHORAD units.	A sea- or shore-based maritime component headquarters, 1 task group with one aircraft carrier (*Giuseppe Garibaldi*), 1 destroyer, 3 frigates, 4 patrol ships, 1 submarine, 4 MCM ships, 2 amphibious ships, 1 oceanographic vessel, 8 helicopters.
Luxembourg	1 reconnaissance company => Total: 100.	1 A400M transport aircraft	
Netherlands	With Germany, Headquarters I German-Netherlands Corps, 1 mechanised Brigade, 11th Airmobile Brigade, 1 amphibious battalion.	1 to 2 F-16 fighter squadrons, transport aircraft, SAM squadrons.	Air defence and command frigates, Multipurpose frigates, Landing platform dock *Rotterdam*.

Annex 2 *continued*

COUNTRY	LAND	AIR	NAVY
Portugal	1 infantry brigade, including reconnaissance, armoured, artillery, engineer, signals, logistics, military police, and CIMIC elements, 2 teams of military observers. => Total: 4000.	Squadron with 12 F-16, 4 C-130 transports, 12 C212 tactical transports, 3 maritime patrol aircraft, 4 tactical air control parties, 4 medium transport helicopters.	1 frigate, 1 submarine, 1 survey ship, 1 support ship.
Spain	Division headquarters to coordinate humanitarian operations and a brigade HQ for other operations, 1 brigade, mountain unit, 1 light infantry battalion at high readiness available as an immediate reaction force.	1 *Mirage* F-1 squadron, 1 F/A-18 squadron each of 12 aircraft, 6 transport aircraft, 2 each surveillance, electronic warfare, and strategic transport aircraft (A400M).	1 carrier group including carrier *Principe de Asturias*, 2 frigates and support ships, 1 submarine, 1 MCM ship, Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF).
Sweden	1 mechanised infantry battalion (including intelligence, electronic warfare/signals, reconnaissance, engineer, and explosive ordinance disposal units).	Tactical reconnaissance element of 4 AJS 37 *Viggen* to be replaced in 2004 by 4 JAS 39 *Gripen* multirole fighters, 1 airbase unit (225 personnel), 4 C-130 transport aircraft.	2 corvettes, 1 support ship.
United Kingdom	Either an armoured or a mechanised brigade, each of which could be sustained for at least a year, or 16 Air Assault Brigade, which could be deployed for up to six months. Combat support forces such as artillery, air defence, and attack helicopters could also be deployed, supported by logistics forces. => Total: 12,500.	Joint: Permanent Joint HQ (Northwood) if required, at least one mobile joint headquarters, including a Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC). Up to 72 combat aircraft, including naval fighters, with 58 associated support aircraft including 15 tankers, strategic transport aircraft, and *Chinook* and *Merlin* transport helicopters. This total would be available for an initial six months to cover initial theatre entry (for a longer term commitment the number would reduce).	1 aircraft carrier, 2 SSNs, Up to 4 destroyers or frigates, and support vessels. An amphibious task group including 1 helicopter carrier and 3 Commando Brigade could also be made available. The aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier, and submarines could not necessarily be sustained continuously for a whole year.

Source: Colin Robinson, Military Reform Project, The European Union's Headline Goal, Current Status, 23 May 2002; http://www.cdi.org/mrp/eu.cfm.

Annex 3: Voluntary contributions to Headline Goal-plus (unofficial figures from 2001/02)

COUNTRY	LAND	AIR	NAVY
Estonia	1 light infantry battalion (from 2005) 1 military police unit 1 mine-clearing platoon		2 naval vessels
Latvia	1 infantry battalion 1 military police unit 1 explosive ordnance disposal unit 1 military medical unit		2 minesweepers 1 fast patrol boat
Lithuania	2 training grounds 3 mechanised battalions 1 engineering unit 1 medical support unit	2 helicopters 2 military cargo aircraft	2 minesweepers
Poland	1 framework brigade (rapid reaction + air cavalry battalion) 1 brigade of highland riflemen (might include Ukrainian battalion) 1 military police section	1 airborne search & rescue group	1 naval support group
Czech Republic	1 mechanised infantry battalion 1 special force company 1 centre for humanitarian & rescue operations 1 field hospital/medical battalion 1 chemical/ radioactive recon company	1 helicopter unit	
Slovakia	1 mechanised company (+support) 1 military police unit 1 multi-purpose field hospital 1 engineering mine-clearance unit	4 transport helicopters	
Hungary	1 mechanised infantry battalion 1 air defence unit		
Slovenia	Officers/NCOs for command structures 1 infantry company 1 military police squad 1 medical unit	1 transport helicopter/air force unit	

Annex 3 *continued*

COUNTRY	LAND	AIR	NAVY
Romania	5 infantry battalions 1 infantry company 1 engineering company 1 mountain troop company 1 military police company 1 mine-clearing detachment 1 reconnaissance platoon 1 transport platoon	1 paratroop company 4 combat aircraft 1 air carrier	6 naval vessels (incl. 2 rescue tugs, 1 minesweeper, 1 frigate)
Bulgaria	1 mechanised infantry battalion 1 engineering battalion 1 chemical/ radioactivity recon brigade	2 cargo helicopters 4 combat helicopters	1 sea-based rocket launcher

Source: Antonio Missiroli (2003), 'EU Enlargement and CFSP/ESDP', in *European Integration 25*, p. 5.

Annex 4: ECAP Panels

Attack Helicopters/Support Helicopters
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Units
Medical Role 3/Medical Collective Protection Role 3
Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Carrier Based Air Power
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)
Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR)
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)
Cruise Missiles/Precision Guided Munitions
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
Deployable Communication Modules
Headquarters (Operational HQ, Force HQ, Command and Control HQs)
Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Air Picture
Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance and reconnaissance/Imagery Collection
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (HALE, MALE and tactical UAVs)
Early Warning and Distant Detection Strategic Level
Strategic Air Mobility/Outsized Transport Aircraft, General Cargo Aircraft
Roll-On Roll-Off Vessels (RO-RO)/General Cargo Shipping

Annex 5: Armed Forces in the European Union (October 2003)

Country	Active Armed Forces	Conscripts	Deployed*
Austria	34,600	17,200	933
Belgium	40,800	-	683
Cyprus	10,000	8,700	-
Czech Republic	57,050	20,400	1,226
Denmark	22,880	5,700	1,619
Estonia	5,510	1,310	3
Finland	27,000	18,500	917
France	259,050	-	34,729
Germany	284,500	94,500	7,186
Greece	177,600	98,321	3,241
Hungary	33,400	22,900	1,039
Ireland	10,460	-	443
Italy	200,000	20,100	9,690
Latvia	4,880	1,600	165
Lithuania	12,700	4,700	174
Luxembourg	900	-	60
Malta	2,140	-	-
Netherlands	53,130	-	5,518
Poland	163,000	81,000	3,956
Portugal	44,900	9,100	1,443
Slovakia	22,000	3,500	854
Slovenia	6,550	1,200	85
Spain	150,700	-	4,158
Sweden	27,600	12,300	779
UK	212,600	-	48,501
Total	1,863,950	421,031	127,402

*Forces based abroad permanently and forces on operational deployments. Numbers may include some double counting, e.g. UK forces from bases in Germany being deployed to Iraq.

Source: *The Military Balance 2003•2004* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003).

On the ground: ESDP operations

Gustav Lindstrom

5

Background

If we exclude monitoring missions and crisis exercises, 2003 marks the year that ESDP became operational. It did so in a surprising fashion, engaging in a total of four distinct operations – a number probably few policy-makers would have predicted at the beginning of the year (Table 1). In 2003, over 2,000 police and military personnel were involved in operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In each case, the EU assumed responsibilities from forces already on the ground.

Table 1: ESDP missions 2003-04

Operation name	Location	Operation type
EUPM	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Police mission
Concordia	FYROM	Crisis management - military
Artemis	Democratic Republic of Congo	Crisis management - military
Proxima	FYROM	Police mission

The EU followed a 'gradualistic' approach as it engaged in these operations. It commenced with a police mission (EUPM) in a stable operational environment, working alongside a number of non-EU participating states. While ongoing, EUPM was followed up with a military crisis management mission in nearby FYROM, increasing the operational challenge. Known as Operation *Concordia*, it was carried out in a less permissive environment and involved the use of both EU and NATO assets through the 'Berlin-plus' agreement. The next mission, Operation *Artemis*, marked the first truly autonomous EU military crisis management with no reliance on NATO assets. Although the mission was small in scope and few EU countries provided actual troops, it was carried out in a non-permissive environment. With *Proxima*, the fourth ESDP

mission in 2003, the EU underscored its ability to adjust to the operational needs on the ground. Specifically, it showed the EU's capacity to change mission parameters from a military to a police mission. This chapter is organised in two sections. Part one provides an in-depth examination of the four ESDP missions carried out to date. Part two examines the crosscutting issues challenging the execution of these missions. It will be important for EU policy planners to address these challenges as the EU plans future ESDP missions – commencing with the potential takeover of NATO's SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

ESDP missions

EUPM (European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina), 2003-05

Established:	Decision by the Council of the EU on 11 March 2002 (Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP).[1]
Endorsements:	The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board and the UN Security Council Resolution 1396 of 5 March 2002.

Background

War erupted in Bosnia following the breakdown of the Yugoslav state in 1992. It was brought to an end three years later with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995. From that point forward, the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) maintained local stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For its first civilian crisis management operation under ESDP, the European Union stepped in on 1 January 2003 to relieve the UN/IPTF and assume control of local stability up until 31 December 2005. While the mission officially began in 2003, the EUPM Planning Team had been in the region for more than eight months to plan the transition from the IPTF which had been deployed there for seven years.

In total 495 police officers and 59 additional staff are currently assigned to establish local law enforcement capabilities and contribute to stability in the region through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities. Approximately 80 per cent of the police officers come from EU member states and 20 per cent from other countries participating in the mission.

1. Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002 on the European Union Police Mission. *Official Journal of the European Union*, 13 March 2002.

Table 2: Personnel participating in the EUPM, as of January 2004

	The European Union				Third states		
	Police	Civilians	Total		Police	Civilians	Total
Austria	5	3	8	Bulgaria	3	2	5
Belgium	6	5	11	Canada	7	0	7
Denmark	13	0	13	Cyprus	6	0	6
Finland	13	5	18	Czech Republic	6	0	6
France	85	3	88	Estonia	2	0	2
Germany	76	6	82	Hungary	5	0	5
Greece	12	0	12	Iceland	1	1	2
Ireland	3	3	6	Latvia	4	0	4
Italy	51	6	57	Lithuania	2	0	2
Luxembourg	2	1	3	Norway	6	1	7
Netherlands	32	3	35	Poland	12	0	12
Portugal	8	2	10	Romania	9	0	9
Spain	20	6	26	Russia	3	0	3
Sweden	15	1	16	Slovakia	6	0	6
United Kingdom	55	9	64	Slovenia	4	0	4
				Switzerland	4	0	4
				Turkey	14	2	16
				Ukraine	5	0	5
Total	396	53	449	Total	76	4	80

Source: 'Weekly Establishment of EUPM Personnel by Countries (Member States)'. The European Union Police Mission, 30 January 2004. 'Weekly Establishment of EUPM Personnel by Countries (Non-Member States)'. The European Union Police Mission, 30 January 2004.

The headquarters of the European Police Mission is located in Sarajevo, where operations are managed by Kevin Carty, Police Commissioner for the operation. An additional twenty-four monitoring units are collocated in various Bosnia and Herzegovina police structures. All EUPM activities (Operations, Planning and Development, and Administration and Support Services) are managed in close coordination with the EU/UN Special Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lord Ashdown.

Objectives

The specific EUPM mission objectives are to:

- develop police independence and accountability by:
  - depoliticising the police;
  - strengthening the Directors of Police/Police Commissioners;
  - monitoring performance of these officials;
  - promoting transparency;

- fight organised crime and corruption by:
  - carrying out a joint strategy with the Office of the High Representative;
  - supporting the local police in operational capacities;
  - strengthening the investigative capacity of the local police;
  - supporting the establishment of a state level police agency;

- ensure financial viability and sustainability of the local police by:
  - supporting their efficiency and effectiveness;
  - auditing local police, with a focus on affordability;
  - supporting preparations for salary increases for police officers;

- create institutions and help to build capacity by:
  - generating management capacity;
  - supervising the creation of local recruitment and promotion procedures;
  - consolidating the State Border Service and the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA).

To achieve these missions, the EUPM engages in seven key programmes.

1. *The Crime Police Programme*. The goal of this programme is to improve the current standard of policing through reform and restructuring of the local police agencies. Specifically, the aim is to develop a modern, sustainable, professional, and multiethnic police force that is trained, equipped and able to assume full responsibility and to independently uphold law enforcement.

2. *The Criminal Justice Programme*. The goal of this programme is to establish a modern, equipped, self-sustaining, professional and multiethnic Court Police. In particular the Court Police should be able to establish a coordinated relationship between the police and the judiciary. One aspect of this relationship is training local police on reporting criminal matters and presenting these to the prosecutor.
3. *The Internal Affairs Programme*. The goal of this programme is to generate a reliable and transparent internal control system for

all law enforcement agencies based on best international practice. Efforts include bringing law enforcement agencies in line with international human rights standards and democratic policing principles, as well as establishing disciplinary mechanisms to strengthen public confidence.

4. *The Police Administration Programme*. The goal of this programme is to establish a properly functioning police administration, providing police forces with the support they require. The aim is to leave behind a sustainable multiethnic police administration that fulfils the basic European standards for democratic administration, financial credibility and transparent practices.

5. *The Public Order and Security Programme*. The goal of this programme is to strengthen police capacities to prevent and address escalating civil disorders.

6. *The State Border Service (SBS) Programme.* The goal of this programme is to consolidate the SBS with SIPA as part of an integrated law enforcement system with responsibility over state borders, able to independently uphold law within its jurisdiction according to international democratic standards.

7. *The State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA) Programme*. The goal of this programme is to build capacity within SIPA, which will be the primary state-level agency in charge of facilitating cooperation and coordination between police services.

Financing

In total, EUPM is expected to last three years. According to the authorising Joint Action, the anticipated costs of the operation included €14 million for start-up costs in 2002 and €1.7 million for start-up in 2003, to be financed out of the general budget of the European Union ('Community budget'). An additional €38 million for annual operations is shared by participating member states (approx. €18 million) and the overall Community budget (approx. €20 million).

Table 3: Costs of the EUPM, 2003-05 (€ million)

Financed through the EU budget		Shared costs	
Start-up 2002	14.0	Per diems	17.0
Start-up 2003	1.7	Travel costs	1.0
		Operational running costs	11.0
		Local staff	4.0
		International civilian staff	5.0
		Per diems	17.0
		Travel costs	1.0
		Operational running costs	11.0
Total	15.7	Total	38.0
		Community budget	20.0
		Participating states	18.0

Source: Antonio Missiroli, '€uros for ESDP: financing EU operations', *Occasional Paper* 45 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2003).

On 8 December 2003, the Council set aside €17.5 million for operational costs in 2004 to be financed from the general budget of the European Union.

Operation *Concordia* (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), 2003

Established: Decision by the Council of the EU on 27 January 2003 (Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP).[2]
Endorsements: Request by President Trajkovski and UN Security Council Resolution 1317.

Background

Following the police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU launched its first military operation, *Concordia*. On 18 March 2003, at the invitation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), EU forces took over NATO's Operation *Allied Harmony*, with the goal of ensuring a secure environment to facilitate the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (the accord

2. Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. *Official Journal of the European Union*, 11 February 2002.

which settled the 2001 conflict in Macedonia). Twenty-six countries including all EU member states except Ireland and Denmark, contributed approximately 350 lightly armed military personnel to the mission.[3] With France acting as the framework nation, the EU force patrolled the ethnic Albanian-populated regions of Macedonia that border Albania, Serbia and Kosovo. On 30 September, the framework nation responsibilities were transferred from France to EUROFOR. This arrangement was maintained until the termination of the mission on 15 December 2003.

Unlike the police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, *Concordia* relied not only on EU member states' assets, but also on planning and logistical support from NATO, which includes the United States. Thus, in addition to being the EU's first military operation, *Concordia* also represented the first use of a strategic EU-NATO arrangement called 'Berlin-plus', a mechanism for collaboration established in 2002.[4]

Table 4: Personnel participating in *Concordia* in FYROM, 2003

The European Union		Third states	
Austria	11	Bulgaria	2
Belgium	26	Canada	1
Finland	9	Czech Republic	2
France	145	Estonia	1
Germany	26	Hungary	2
Greece	21	Iceland	1
Italy	27	Latvia	2
Luxembourg	1	Lithuania	1
Netherlands	3	Norway	5
Portugal	6	Poland	17
Spain	16	Romania	3
Sweden	14	Slovakia	1
United Kingdom	3	Slovenia	1
		Turkey	10
Total	308	Total	49

Source: Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, 'ESDP operations.' EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003; available at http://www.iss-eu.org.

3. The 13 EU nations were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. At the time of writing (prior to EU enlargement on 1 May 2004), the six NATO non-EU nations are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey; the seven non-EU non-NATO countries are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

4. The 'Berlin-plus' agreement was established at the 2002 NATO Prague summit and provides for mutual support between NATO and the EU in their missions and operations. It is a short title for a comprehensive set of agreements between NATO and EU. The separate agreements are tied together through a 'Framework Agreement' dated 17 March 2003.

Concordia's headquarters was located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, with three regional headquarters in Skopje, Kumanovo and Tetovo. The mission was managed by German Admiral Rainer Feist (*Concordia* Operation Commander and NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe), French General Pierre Maral (Force Commander through 1 October), and Portuguese Major-General Luis Nelson Ferreira Dos Santos (Force Commander until 15 December). All worked in close coordination with the EU's Special Representative in FYROM, Alexis Brouhns of Belgium.

Objectives

In the field, soldiers were organised into 22 light field liaison teams travelling in non-armoured vehicles. Their tasks included patrolling, reconnaissance, surveillance, situational awareness reporting and liaison activities. Troop support was provided through eight heavy field liaison teams with access to wheeled armoured vehicles and helicopters. Additional support for *Concordia* forces included a helicopter detachment with light reconnaissance and MEDEVAC helicopters, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capability and a medical evacuation team.

Financing

Concordia was initially expected to last six months with common costs of €4.7 million and other expenditures to be financed by participating countries. The six-month budget was later raised to €6.2 million. Unlike the EUPM, participating states were asked to pay for both their individual operational costs, as well as a percentage of the common costs. Specifically, participating EU member states bore 84.5 per cent of the common costs, according to the size of their GDP. Non-EU participants bore the remaining 15.5 per cent of the common costs.

After a request from Macedonian authorities, a Council decision on 21 July 2003 extended the *Concordia* mandate until 15 December 2003. The mission was immediately succeeded by a new EU police operation in the region called *Proxima*.

5. Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Official Journal of the European Union*, 11 June 2003.

Operation *Artemis* (Democratic Republic of Congo), 2003

Established: Decision by the Council of the EU of 5 June 2003 (Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP).[5]

Endorsements: EU Council Decision of 12 June 2003 on the launching of the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); UN Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003.

Background

In June 2003, in a test of its military capabilities, the European Union dispatched approximately 2,000 peacekeeping troops to Ituri, an unstable region in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since May, fighting between ethnic Hema and Lendu militias had resulted in widespread instability, hundreds of deaths, and thousands of displaced persons. In the previous 10 years, over 50,000 people had been killed and over 500,000 displaced in the region. The unrest threatened to derail the country's peace process and destabilise the wider region. Dubbed *Artemis*, the mission was the EU's first military deployment outside Europe and without NATO assistance.

The force, under French command, included forces or force elements from a number of European countries (see Table 5). The major part of the forces, roughly 1,700 troops, was provided by France. The second largest personnel contributor, Sweden, provided about 70 troops. Three non-European countries – Brazil, Canada and South Africa – provided temporary assistance until 5 July. With respect to the force elements, contributions varied from logistics and other support (United Kingdom) to the provision of air transport and medical aid (Belgium). As with previous missions, EU forces replaced existing troops on the ground. In this case, the EU responded to an appeal by the United Nations Secretary General to temporarily relieve approximately 750 UN peacekeepers from Uruguay until 1 September, when a larger UN force led by Bangladesh would be in place.

Table 5: Countries contributing to *Artemis* in the DRC

Country	Provision of forces or force elements	Provision of personnel to OHQ* and/or FHQ*
Austria		X
Belgium	X	X
France	X	X
Germany	X	X
Greece	X	X
Hungary		X
Ireland		X
Italy		X
Netherlands		X
Portugal		X
Spain		X
Sweden	X	X
United Kingdom	X	X
Brazil**	X	X
Canada**	X	
South Africa**	X	

Note: *OHQ stands for Operation Headquarters, FHQ stands for Force Headquarters.
**These countries provided assistance until 5 July 2003.
Source: Fact sheet on *Artemis*, July 2003. Council of the European Union.

The operation was managed by French Major-General Neveux (Operation Commander) and French Brigadier-General Thonier (Force Commander), working in close coordination with the EU's Special Representative in the region, the Italian Aldo Ajello. With France acting as the framework nation, the OHQ was located at the *Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations* (CPCO) near Paris, with an FHQ in Entebbe (400 people stationed there), Uganda, and an operational outpost in Bunia.

Objectives

Artemis aimed to stabilise security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the Ituri capital. Specifically, UN Security Council Resolution 1484 mandated that the military force protect refugee camps, secure Bunia airport, and ensure the safety of civilians, UN staff and humanitarian aid workers. The operation ended in early September 2003, after transferring responsibility back to UN peacekeepers, who now had a wider mandate, more robust rules of engagement, and a larger force.

Financing

According to the authorising Joint Action, a financial reference amount of €7 million was projected as common costs. Under the financial arrangement of the operation, this sum was to be charged to member states and managed through a financial mechanism. Costs related to personnel and equipment, including those arising from transportation and accommodation of forces, were to be met by contributing states on a 'costs lie were they fall' basis.

Operation *Proxima* (FYROM), 2004

Established:	Decision by the Council of the EU on 29 September 2003 (Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP).[6]
Endorsements:	UN Security Council Resolution 1371 adopted on 26 September 2001.

Background

The EU's fourth and most recent ESDP activity is *Proxima*, a follow-on mission to Concordia in FYROM. Launched on 15 December 2003, *Proxima* is not a military mission, but rather a year-long police mission in which 200 EU police experts will monitor, mentor and advise the country's police to help fight organised crime and promote European policing standards.[7] As a police mission, it no longer operates under 'Berlin-plus'. The HQ of *Proxima* is in Skopje, where operations are managed by Belgian Chief Commissioner Bart d'Hooge and closely coordinated with the EU Special Representative in the region, Søren Jessen-Petersen. The mission is coordinated from one central location within the Ministry of the Interior, with other units collocated elsewhere.

Objectives

The broad objective of *Proxima* is to maintain an environment that facilitates implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Specifically, the police force is charged with:

- consolidating law and order, including the fight against organised crime;

6. Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003 on the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL 'Proxima'). *Official Journal of the European Union*, 1 October 2003.

7. In addition to the contributions of the EU-15, invitations were extended to the then ascending EU member states, the candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey), non-European NATO members and potential partners such as Canada, Russia, Ukraine, Switzerland and the United States.

- implementing comprehensive reform of the Ministry of the Interior, including the police;
- promoting integrated border management, including the creation of a border police;
- building confidence within the population for local police efforts;
- enhancing cooperation with neighbouring states in the area of policing.

Financing

The member states that contribute police officers and other staff bear related costs, including salaries, benefits, and travel expenses to and from the region. Other costs, financed out of the Community budget, include:

- up to €7.3 million for start-up costs in 2003;
- up to €650,000 for operations in 2003;
- up to €7.056 million for operations in 2004.

EU police officers, wearing their national uniforms with EU armbands, are currently deployed in the capital Skopje and in areas where ethnic Albanians live, such as Tetovo, Kumanovo, Gostivar and Ohrid.

The crosscutting challenges

While the operations described above represent a confidence booster to ESDP, they have also validated a number of challenges that previously remained at the 'hypothetical' level. A number of these challenges are crosscutting, i.e. affecting dimensions in all missions to varying degrees. Among the more notable crosscutting issues are operational, financial, and planning constraints. The following section analyses these issues in greater detail.

Operational challenges

Ever since the European Council in Helsinki set out the Headline Goal, debates have flourished concerning the operational capabilities of the rapid reaction elements assigned by EU member states to fulfil the Petersberg tasks. Speculation has intensified as new force models and alternative 'operationalisation' dates have surfaced.

Examples range from the recent 'battle group' formations suggested by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and the Headline Goal 2010 objectives. The continued work of the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) panels reinforces the notion that certain niche capabilities are currently not available.

1. *Reach*. With a full year of ESDP missions behind us, it is clear that some of these concerns were justified – especially concerning requirements for high-intensity operations far from the European continent. Not surprisingly, the mission in the DRC underscored the limitations of certain military capabilities. With a theatre of operations some 6,500 km from Brussels, EU military transport assets faced a substantial logistical challenge. As noted by the then director general of the EU military staff, 'deploying forces over such distances and particularly sustaining them over such distances reiterates the requirement for transport.'8 This challenge was intensified by the need to use sturdier installations in Entebbe, some 300 km away from Bunia, to ensure adequate infrastructure capable of accommodating large transport aircraft.

2. *Communications*. As an autonomous EU operation carried out in a high-intensity environment, *Artemis* tested other limits as well. In the area of transmission and communications facilities, it was a challenge to ensure adequate C4ISR. The situation was mitigated by the fact that the largest contingent of troops was French and could therefore rely on national standards to ensure adequate communications. Finding a similar solution in the future could be complicated if a greater number of EU member states were involved on the ground. It should be underlined that adequate communications capabilities are critical for all operations, be they police missions or high-intensity military missions. For example, during the EUPM in Sarajevo, limited communications capabilities were identified as a significant drawback. During the first months of the operation, there was a lack of secure communications within the chain of command. At one point, communications along the chain of command was limited to one e-mail connection and one GSM line.[9]

3. *Sustainability*. While engaging in non-permissive environments, sustainability often becomes a critical factor. In the case of

8. David Cronin, 'Congo Operation underlined airlift shortcomings', *European Voice*, 18 September 2003.

9. 'Lessons from the planning of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM, Autumn 2001 – December 2002', Council of the European Union, 11206/03, 14 July 2003.

Artemis, EU capabilities in this area were limited. This is one of the principal reasons why *Artemis* had to be short in duration. It also needed to have a very specific mandate and limited area of operations. Since it was clear that the EU forces would be replaced by a reinforced MONUC contingent at the end of the summer, EU planners were able to go ahead with the operation. The question remains how long the EU can sustain a long-term operation in a theatre far from Europe. Sustainability includes many dimensions, ranging from 'simpler' tasks such as ensuring adequate purified water supplies to the more complex – such as adequate force protection capabilities.

On the positive side, it must be said that the operational/military challenges are likely to diminish over time. New platforms such as the A400M transport aircraft and *Galileo* satellite navigation system will serve to ease certain logistical difficulties. Likewise, military gaps will continue to be plugged through the ECAP panels. Several member states having made the transition to professional armies, deployability capabilities should be enhanced as legal barriers limiting the availability of conscripts are lifted. Lessons learned from current and future operations will also reduce some of the more common pitfalls, be it language barriers among multinational troop formations or relationships with the media.

Financing challenges

As the EU engaged in a number of missions throughout 2003, the issue of mission financing rose high on the political agenda.[10] With a modest €52.6 million CFSP budget for 2004, the need to come up with a streamlined process gained added momentum. The drawbacks raised during the initial ESDP operations can be summarised as follows.

1. ***Ad hoc mechanisms.*** In particular, the use of different funding mechanisms complicated the 'efficient conduct of ESDP military operations, with all the consequences involved (duplication of management, staffing, responsibilities).'[11] Important details, such as financial contingency measures to deal with potential litigations brought forth by personnel participating in a mission after the end of an operation were likewise not properly addressed. With each financing mechanism targeted to serve a particular mis-

10. Costs are typically classified as common costs or individual/national costs.

11. Presidency's suggestions for remedying shortcomings and preparing for the financing of common costs of any future EU military operation. Council of the European Union, 11154/1/03 REV 1, 15 September 2003.

sion, no economies of scale or synergies were achieved in terms of management and efficiency.

2. ***Mission cost estimates.*** As noted in Joint Actions or terms of reference, funding levels were often nice round figures that tended to underestimate the true costs of an operation. For example, *Concordia* showed that the deployment phase of an operation usually represents a significant proportion of its overall cost. In the case of EUPM, cost calculations relied heavily on calculations made during short-term fact-finding missions. These estimates were based on the UN's IPTF experience and did not take into account the implications of a different mandate, size and organisation of the EUPM mission. Given these and other underestimates, calls have been made to increase first calls for contributions by 30 per cent of the reference amount.[12]

3. ***Coordination with third countries.*** The financial mechanisms used in 2003 tenqded to involve participating third countries late in the decision-making process, complicating the timely coverage of mission costs. In one instance, the late notification process led to Canada's withdrawal from *Concordia*. From a different angle, with few provisions to cover preparatory costs, the lead nation for an operation often ended up carrying the brunt of those costs. For example, during *Concordia*, France ended up contributing an additional €600,000 to cover mission preparatory costs.[13]

The issue of financing took a big step forward on 22 September 2003, when the Council decided that the EU needed a mechanism for managing the common costs of military operations of any scale, complexity or urgency. As of 1 March 2004, the EU has a permanent mechanism for handling the common costs of the EU's missions. Known as Athena, it will facilitate future financing of missions by increasing the flexibility and speed in managing the financing of joint costs, regardless of the urgency or complexity of the mission at hand.

Athena will be managed by a Special Committee composed of representatives from each of the *participating* member states (all EU members except Denmark). This Special Committee will approve all budgets to finance the common costs of an operation. Its decisions will be binding and have to be unanimous. Among the common costs to be covered by Athena are:

12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

- incremental costs for deployable or fixed headquarters for EU-led operations;
- transport costs to and from theatres of operation; transport costs within area of operations with the exception of *per diems*;
- administrative costs, including communications, locally hired personnel, maintenance costs, public information, representation and hospitality;
- accommodation and infrastructure costs;
- incremental costs incurred to support the force as a whole;
- incremental costs associated with the use of NATO common assets and capabilities made available for EU-led operations.

Other costs associated with an operation – such as common costs relative to the preparatory phase of an operation – may also be borne by Athena, which will be financed primarily from contributions payable by the participating and contributing states. When appropriate, funds could also come from contributing third states. A smaller revenue stream will come from other sources such as interest revenue. The contributions by member states are calculated in accordance with a GNP scale.

While Athena provides an improvement over the former ad hoc system, it may still have some shortcomings. The unanimous decision-making process within the Special Committee may slow or hinder the financing process should a participating state decide to block a decision. From a different angle, if the allotted deployment time for troops is gradually reduced, the call for contributions at a later stage of the operation may prove inappropriate.[14] This latter factor may be mitigated by Athena's requirement that the force commander produce pre-mission estimates of mission costs.

Planning challenges

The planning phases prior to an operation are critical for success. While many tend to associate planning with operational requirements (e.g. headquarters), the planning process is ongoing and has a number of dimensions. Successful mission planning requires adequate preparation in areas such as mission objectives, assets requirements, financial planning, procurement, collaboration with third countries and contingency planning. The planning within these categories is often as important as the more visible

14. Five to ten days was envisaged in the GAERC conclusions on 19 November 2002 and 19 May 2003.

operational planning. In the recent EU operations, a number of weaknesses stand out.

1. *Procurement.* In the area of procurement, recent EU missions have shown difficulties in forming efficient procurement procedures. Better planning procedures could in many instances have made a difference. For example, during the EUPM, delays in setting up the EUPM Planning Team meant that the application of the standard procurement rules had to be modified. In this particular case, the European Commission made a decision to simplify procedures as much as possible – including the tripling of applicable thresholds and reduction of time periods for submitting tenders by over a half. Additional challenges mounted, as only two procurement experts were seconded to the EUPM. Arriving in June, one had to leave to take up a different post five months later, leaving several million euros worth of procurement requirements with one officer.[15] As the EU continues to tackle missions, it will be important to ensure adequate procurement capabilities. Secondment of procurement experts in a timely fashion should ensure that future operations are not hampered by a lack of equipment or infrastructure.

2. *Planning support.* Using EUPM again as the example, the General Secretariat lacked the capacity to provide the Planning Team in Sarajevo with sufficient backup and support. Specific gaps within the Secretariat included small police planning capability, lack of specialised expertise, limited secure communications channels and limited personnel resources.[16] In this area, the establishment of an EU planning cell collocated with the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) in Brussels should mitigate the situation. Concerning military planning, seconding national headquarters has proven to be a successful formula. With headquarters available for multinational purposes in a number of EU countries (for example in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom), the military planning requirements are satisfactorily covered.

3. *Media relations.* Another dimension requiring attention is the relationship with the media during the execution of an EU mission. This is especially critical in instances when the EU is involved in a high-intensity mission where the situation can develop rapidly.

15. Op. cit. in note 9.
16. Ibid.

A number of EU missions have shown the need for more media experts to be part of the mission. In the case of EUPM, a lack of advance planning concerning a media strategy hampered the EUPM's press and public information office in the beginning of the mission.[17] For future missions, these experts will need to be trained in media relations and have adequate access to policy-makers in Brussels to ensure consistent messages and adequate information flow.

4. ***Collaboration with third countries.*** The challenge associated with seamlessly integrating third countries into EU missions is not new. Shortly after the launch of the initial missions EUPM and *Concordia*, early lessons learned indicated that a significant weakness was the lack of guidance in the EUPM joint action concerning the integration of third states' participation in the mission.[18] Besides the lack of initial guidance in planning documents, policy-makers have also pointed at the barriers raised by lengthy procedures such as those provided under Article 24.[19] With two Council resolutions required, negotiations carried out simultaneously with several parties can be drawn out. Experience has shown that multiple negotiations guided by rigid processes do not 'encourage a flexible EU approach to meet the constraints of interlocutors' (e.g. experiences with Canada, Poland, Russia).[20]

5. ***Collaboration with international organisations.*** The challenges highlighted above are not limited to third countries. A similar concern exists vis-à-vis relations with international organisations. In the case of EUPM, when the EUPM Planning Team collocated in the UNMIBH HQ in Sarajevo, pressures mounted on the relationship with the UN when the Planning Team increased in size. At the time, a lack of formal negotiated arrangements between the EU and the UN on the terms of reference of their relationship meant that there was no mechanism for addressing problems of this nature. It should be noted that the UN-EU Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management, signed on 24 September 2003, specifically strengthens collaboration elements between the UN and EU.[21]

By standardising several of these planning procedures, be they financial, administrative or media-related, should ensure that

17. 'A review of the 100 days of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Council of the European Union, 11760/03, 23 July 2003.

18. Ibid.

19. TEU Article 24 is currently the only base for the negotiation of agreements between the EU and third parties.

20. Ibid., p. 9.

future EU operations are planned in a shorter time horizon. Improvements in these areas are critical as the EU looks forward to taking over the SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With a mandate expected to last three years and carried out under the auspices of 'Berlin-plus', the mission will require a significant number of personnel – approximately 7,000. Current challenges include ensuring an effective sharing of responsibility once the EU forces join remaining NATO and US forces already on the ground, and establishing a clear chain of command. Should the European Force become a reality towards the end of 2004, it will represent a serious litmus test for ESDP.

21. 'Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management', New York, September 2003.

ESDP and NATO

Jean-Yves Haine

6

During the Cold War, European defence was synonymous with Atlantic defence. The United States provided the ultimate guarantee against the Soviet threat. NATO, based on collective defence among its members and deterrence of its enemy, was the cornerstone of European security, even if some European countries relied more on their national defence than on the collective framework. Under this umbrella, European integration grew from single market to monetary union. With the end of the Soviet threat, NATO lost this fundamental rationale, while the Union had to become more responsible for its security in a rapidly changing world. However, even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Atlantic Alliance remained the essential security framework in Europe. Neither the United States nor a majority of Europeans was ready to bring to a close the Atlantic partnership. Yet if NATO was to remain a relevant defence organisation, it had to make fundamental adjustments to address the new security environment. Modifying the EU-NATO relationship, especially after the wars in Yugoslavia, was the most significant among these necessary changes.

Before reviewing the main issues related to ESDP and NATO, it should be noted that the Union and NATO are two different institutions, with specific rules, functions and, most importantly, cultures. NATO is above all a military organisation whose main tasks are to conduct military operations decided by its members. The Union is far more than that: over the years, it has built a wide range of competencies and policies, from economics to judiciary. In its external relations, the Union is the world's most important contributor in aid and economic assistance to developing countries. Since the transfer of competence from the Western European Union into the EU in 2001, the Union is a more recent security actor, yet it encompasses a wide range of tools to address security issues, from crisis management to long-term stabilisation, from rapid armed intervention to police operations. These differences are crucial to understanding recent issues and debates. One must

not forget, however, that European membership is largely similar. Hence, as far as the two organisations are concerned, one should not overstress disputes and misunderstandings. More often than not, what is at stake is US policy, not NATO policy. Especially after 11 September, EU-NATO relations are part of a broader transatlantic debate, which in 2003 witnessed a serious divide over the war in Iraq. In this context, both organisations suffered: NATO was split over assistance to Turkey; the Union was equally divided over the war in Iraq. Yet, as we shall see, during these times of crisis, both organisations finalised their relations by signing the 'Berlin-plus' agreement.

The question of European defence and security has always been a matter of contention in transatlantic as well as in European debates. Since St-Malo, the core of the EU-NATO relationship has concerned the degree of European autonomy on the one hand and Atlantic primacy on the other. In the last decade, these issues have received several answers, evolving in a wider debate about the US role in Europe and the changing nature of international security. This chapter will first review the changing structure of NATO; second, it will assess the current state of play between ESDP and NATO; finally, it will outline the remaining problems and issues regarding the interaction between the two organisations.

The European dimension of NATO

After 1989, it was unclear whether the Atlantic Alliance could survive the disappearance of the Soviet threat that was supposed to be its main rationale and the cement that bound its members together. The first adaptation concerned the unification of Germany. It was by no means obvious that Germany could be reunited yet remain inside NATO: a status similar to France's for Germany inside NATO, a neutral eastern part of Germany, a Germany belonging both to the Warsaw Pact and the NATO alliances, the collapse of the Alliance, or an American disengagement from Europe were options seriously considered by experts and officials at the time. The integration of the unified Germany within NATO, an option actively advocated by Washington and accepted, against all expectations, by Moscow, made it possible to consolidate the Atlantic monopoly on European security issues.[1] The reunification of the European continent implied a transformation of

1. On this crucial episode, see among others William C. Wohlforth (ed.), *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Karl Kaiser, *Deutschland Vereinigung: Die Internationale Aspekte* (Bergische Gladbach: Bastei-Lübbe, 1991; Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall, Germany's Road to Unification* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); Zelikow Philip and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).

NATO that began politically by the opening of its institutions to East Europeans through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992, and militarily by the adoption of the Partnership for Peace programme. A new founding act with Russia and a Charter with Ukraine that allowed for the enlargement of the Alliance itself, first in 1997 and then in 2004, eventually concluded this process.

Among these transformations, the most important aspect concerned the relationship between NATO and WEU, then the Union after 2001. At the beginning of the 1990s, the European security landscape had a somewhat schizophrenic appearance. On the one hand, at Maastricht the Union as a political entity took its first steps towards a common foreign and security policy but without its own defence capability; on the other, NATO remained the essential security instrument in Europe but now had a new political vocation vis-à-vis its former enemies in the East. The limitations of this hybrid architecture became evident with the first signs of tension in the Balkans. NATO intervened belatedly in the conflict. Reluctant to use NATO in Bosnia, Washington eventually accepted its involvement when the credibility of the Alliance was at stake. Moreover, the division of labour in the military intervention, whereby European ground forces ran the greater part of the risks and US aircraft operated from a safe height, was unfavourable to the Europeans. This imbalance of risks and strategic divergence suggested a reform of the Atlantic Alliance that took into account this European specificity.

The Clinton administration, determined to keep US involvement in the Balkans to a minimum in accordance with its 'zero casualties' doctrine but generally supportive of European integration efforts, endorsed the idea of a specific European security and defence identity (ESDI) inside the Alliance. Following the crisis in Bosnia, the United States recognised that there could be crises in Europe in which Washington would not want to intervene. At the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, a compromise was reached whereby WEU could act independently but making use of NATO assets and capabilities. The proposed solution, finalised at the Berlin ministerial summit in June 1996, was centred on 'separable but not separate' forces that WEU could use for its own operations. The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces offered an instrument by which WEU could rapidly become operational without having to duplicate headquarters and staffs. With the

Berlin agreement, the European identity within the Alliance, which was first recognised in NATO's 1991 new Strategic Concept, received operational substance. The conditions were laid down for a genuine WEU defence role whereby it would be able to fulfil at least some of the Petersberg missions defined in 1992. Briefly put, NATO was increasingly 'Europeanised'.[2] But the European side of the Atlantic coin was still a matter of debate inside Europe: ambiguities about WEU legitimacy, uncertainties about the Union's defence role and arguments about relevant memberships and organisations' respective functions, all led to a relative paralysis that was eventually cured at St-Malo.

As noted in a previous chapter, the St-Malo agreement was the founding act of ESDP. Its significance resides *inter alia* in the fact that through it the Union became the legitimate institution for European defence. Because its emphasis on Europe's capacity for autonomous action with its own appropriate structures 'when NATO as a whole is not engaged', and despite a recognition that this endeavour was to be conducted 'without unnecessary duplication', the St-Malo Declaration revived the debate about the degree of European autonomy inside or indeed outside the alliance.[3] This agreement caught US officials by surprise and Washington became increasingly worry by a potential weakening of the Alliance, especially because Britain had dropped its decade-long opposition to the merger of WEU into the Union.

The Clinton administration supported this adaptation towards a European defence with several caveats however. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright summed them up in formula known as the 'three Ds': no decoupling, no discriminating, no duplicating. The first element was essentially political, since the capacity of the Europeans to fulfil the Petersberg tasks was militarily limited, hence in practice the risk of decoupled security between Europe and Washington was small. The second dealt with the non-EU European members of NATO, especially because the possibility of an autonomous action, i.e. outside NATO, had been promoted in St-Malo. The key question here was whether and on what conditions these countries could be party to the discussions and the decisions for ESDP operations. In that respect, the Cologne European summit in June 1999 seemed more conditional than the Maastricht declaration: while reaffirming the possibility of participation 'fully and on an equal footing' in EU operations, it stressed, however, the 'principle of the EU decision

2. The expression is from Philip H. Gordon, 'The Western European Union and NATO's "Europeanisation" ', in Philip H. Gordon (ed.), *NATO's Transformation* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 257-70.

3. Quotations are from the St-Malo Declaration.

making autonomy'.[4] As we shall see in the next section, this non-discriminating element became critical in the case of Turkey. Lastly, there was the non-duplication issue. Here, Washington was keen to encourage the best possible use of falling European defence budgets by promoting investment in capabilities that NATO was lacking, not in items that the Alliance could provide. This implicitly presupposed NATO primacy.

Despite these caveats, the negotiating process between Brussels and Washington was overall constructive. The United States considered that it was in its interests to see a more responsible Europe in peacekeeping operations, especially in the Balkans, and a more capable Europe in its capacity to act.[5] In reality, Washington was engaged in another initiative that was launched just after the Brussels summit of 1994: enlargement of the Alliance to the East. This effort came mainly from Washington, some European members of NATO being less enthusiastic about such a development. The NATO enlargement process gave rise to an intense debate in the United States about the Alliance, its nature, its role and its future. Originated by a RAND Corporation study, subsequently endorsed by the White House, the enlargement process essentially transformed NATO from a collective defence organisation into a collective security institution based on common democratic values.[6] This process did not decrease American support for greater European autonomy but it placed Russia at the core of the US administration's diplomacy in the second part of the 1990s.[7]

At the Washington summit in 1999, the enlarged NATO was supposed to celebrate its 50th anniversary with an enlarged Atlantic family. Yet at the same time, the Kosovo conflict was not a cause for celebration. What was supposed to be a Wilsonian dream nearly turned out to be a nightmare for NATO. Eventually NATO did prevail against Milosevic, but the strains put on Alliance cohesion were serious. The strategy of coercive diplomacy gave rise to major tensions within the Alliance by putting the Europeans in an ambiguous situation: on the one hand the technological inadequacy of their means made them dependent on the US effort; on the other, consensual political control within the Alliance gave them a *droit de regard* over the targets selected for the most part by the planners within the US European Command. Whereas the European allies carried out only about 40 per cent of the air strikes, the latent crisis within the Alliance stemmed from the fact that while the Americans had great technological superiority in the air,

4. The quotations are from the Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusion, June 3/4 1999. At Maastricht, it was agreed that 'Non-EU member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities of the WEU.'

5. Kori Schake, 'Managing Divergence', in Charles Grant, Kori Schake and Dimitry Danilov, 'The EU's Rapid Reaction Capability', CEPS-IISS, *ESF Working Paper*, October 2001, pp. 12-18.

6. For a summary of the RAND study, see Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler and Stephen Larrabee, 'Building a New NATO', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 4, September-October 1993, pp. 28-40. For a detailed account of this process, see among others, James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999); Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door : How the Alliance Remade Itself For a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); and Jean-Yves Haine, *Les Etats-Unis ont-ils besoin d'alliés ?* (Paris: Payot, 2004).

7. On this, see Strobe Talbott, *The Russian Hand, A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy* (New York: Random House, 2002).

political negotiations were necessary to obtain approval for most (807 out of 976) of the sorties carried out against targets in addition to those initially planned.[8] Arguments over 'war by committee' – a term that implied excessive restrictions on American room for manoeuvre but was in fact entirely in line with the fundamentals of the Atlantic organisation – became widespread in the American media. Officials at the Pentagon, but also advisers inside presidential candidate Bush's circle, reassessed the fundamental value of NATO. Their conclusion was unambiguous: for them, Kosovo was the first NATO war, and it should also be its last.[9] The biggest change in US policy vis-à-vis NATO did not stem from the institutional arrangements of ESDI nor its enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, but from military operations in Kosovo. In that respect, the Kosovo conflict represented a decisive point in the history of NATO as significant as the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. By the end of 1999, the Europeanisation of NATO was an accepted and so far welcome change, but from a Washington point of view the Alliance has lost part of its added value. This meant a shift in the transatlantic equation: initiatives and adjustments in the European defence debate came firstly from the Union.

The Atlantic dimension of ESDP.

As we have noted in the historical overview, Kosovo constituted a wake-up call for the Europeans. If they did not make an effort to improve their military capabilities, their influence and responsibility would continue to be limited. At the same time, NATO unity was a key element in the victory against Milosevic. European autonomy therefore meant not alienation but responsibility. The Kosovo crisis thus gave further justification for establishing an ESDP as conceived at St-Malo. In April 1999, the NATO summit noted this new development and modified the 1996 Berlin agreement in order to meet the new willingness of the Union, instead of WEU, to become an autonomous actor in conducting the Petersberg tasks. In particular, agreements were reached to make provisions for 'assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations' and the principle of 'the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led opera-

8. The figures are quoted from John E. Peters et al., *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 25.

9. On this see Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat* (Oxford: PublicAffairs Ltd, 2001); Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly : NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); and Jean-Yves Haine, 'L'Alliance superflue ?', *Esprit*, Août-Septembre 2003, pp. 5-21.

tions' was recognised. This modified bargain, the so-called 'Berlin-plus' agreement, prepared the ground for cooperation between NATO and the EU. A month later, at Cologne, the St-Malo agreement was endorsed by the Union, and in December 1999 the Helsinki Headline Goal was identified.

In order to implement the Helsinki Headline Goal, several institutions were created: the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, the Military Staff, a High Representative for CFSP etc.[10] This new European structure gave the United States the impression that ESDP would become a rival that would eventually have its own military infrastructure. In fact, at Helsinki, the commitment by the Union to 'full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO' was reaffirmed. Moreover, the emphasis on autonomous action was underlined 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged' and it was repeated that the ESDP process would avoid unnecessary duplication.[11] In Santa Maria da Feria, the European Council proposed four working groups to enhance cooperation with NATO on security issues, notably the sharing of information and capabilities; the relationship between the Helsinki Headline Goal and NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative; modalities of EU access to NATO assets – the core of the 'Berlin-plus' agreement; and the definition of permanent arrangements between the two organisations.

Overall, there was nothing substantially new to upset Washington. Yet, in 2000, Washington began to focus on two issues that mutual efforts would be needed to overcome. The first was the question of NATO primacy versus EU autonomy. The United States made clear at the time that it would not allow a separate planning infrastructure in the EU: as a coordinator, DSACEUR would cover operations decided by the EU, even if they did not use NATO assets. US Defence Secretary William Cohen, in December 2000, seemed to harden the US position. He warned that 'if the capabilities identified as being needed are not filled . . . if we have competing headquarters . . . then NATO could become a relic of the past.'[12] At Nice however, the Council made the clear distinction between autonomous operations for which a European country would provide the strategic headquarters and an operation where NATO assets and capabilities would be used and DSACEUR would be responsible. Washington would have preferred this distinction to be a NATO decision, not a European one, in order to keep the primacy of the Alliance that would delegate to the Union

10. For more details, see the historical overview in this volume.

11. Quotations are from the Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusion.

12. Secretary Cohen, 5 December 2000, quoted by Robert Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy, NATO's Companion or Competitor* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2002), p. 106.

operations where NATO decided not to be engaged. For the United States, the responsibility for planning would depend on the nature of the operation and consequently there had to be firstly joint planning followed by a decision on the organisation in charge of the operation – NATO or the EU. But for a European point of view, this distinction was clearly part of its capacity if the Union decided to act autonomously. The definition of the Union's autonomy cannot belong to another organisation. Behind this debate lay the issue of NATO's right of first refusal, i.e. in what circumstances it would decide that the Alliance would not be engaged as a whole in a specific operation. This right was never explicitly recognised and it still remains a controversial issue.

The second problem was related to the non-EU European members of NATO and the question of discrimination. This was not an American concern per se, but it was linked to Turkey. Because the 'Berlin-plus' agreement had been put on hold until everything was agreed, this question in fact paralysed the final normalisation of relations between the Union and NATO. For Turkey, the difficulty lay in the formulation chosen at Cologne, according to which the Union would take the measures necessary to guarantee that all participants in an EU-led operation had equal rights in the conduct of an operation 'without prejudice to the principle of the EU's decision-making autonomy, notably the right of the Council to discuss and decide matters of principle and policy'. In plain language, all participants had the same rights, but they would only become participants following a Council decision. At Helsinki, the principle of the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with non-EU European members of NATO was reaffirmed. At Santa Maria da Feira, in June 2000, the details of such consultation were spelt out. Outside periods of crisis, periodic meetings would be held of the Union's 15 members and the 15 countries concerned, i.e. the non-EU European members of NATO and candidates for membership, 'at' 15+15, and within this structure at least two meetings of the non-EU European NATO members at 15+6. Two phases were distinguished during periods of crisis: in the pre-operational phase, dialogue and consultation would be intensified at all levels, including ministerial, during the period preceding the Council's decision. If an option entailing the use of NATO assets and capabilities was being considered, particular attention would be paid to consultation with the six non-EU European members of NATO. During the

operational phase, the latter could participate in the operation if they wished if it was one making use of NATO assets and capabilities. When those assets and capabilities were not involved they would be invited, on a Council decision, to participate. Confirmed at Nice, these provisions reaffirmed EU control over ESDP while allowing for the participation of non-EU European NATO members. As Turkey's application for Union membership had been agreed in principle at Helsinki, these arrangements should have constituted adequate guarantees for Turkey. Nevertheless, Ankara, considering itself excluded from the decision-making process, indicated at the NATO ministerial meeting on 14-15 December 2000 that it would block 'Berlin-plus'.

The obstacle of Turkey was all the more damaging since official meetings between the NAC and PSC were initiated in April 2001 and progress was real on the technical aspects of 'Berlin-plus' between NATO and the Union. On the military side, consultation between the headquarters of the two organisations began the process of identifying NATO capabilities to be used 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged', in the words used at Helsinki, and began working on the mechanism for accessing planning and capabilities. At the May 2001 Atlantic summit in Budapest, considerable progress was made, in particular on the operational level and on the role of DSACEUR. The constructive atmosphere between the two organisations was symbolised by the joint mission of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and EU High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana to FYROM.

In so far as certain European governments wanted all European crisis management operations to be subject to a final agreement on 'Berlin-plus', ESDP de facto became dependent on the Turkish exception. On the principle that nothing is decided until everything has been decided, however, overall agreement was not possible. The British-inspired Ankara text of December 2001 was a further attempt to break the deadlock. Without specifically mentioning Turkey – at the request of Greece – that document confirmed that ESDP, irrespective of the type of crisis, would not be directed against an ally, and that it would respect Union member states' obligations regarding members of NATO. The reinforcement of consultations between the EU and the NATO 6 was to permit the latter to be 'associated' with decisions, to become 'permanent interlocutors' of the PSC and to appoint 'representatives' to the EU Military Committee. The document specified,

moreover, that concerning EU operations in which they were invited to participate, the committee of contributors would be the main forum for the conduct of operations, and that decisions would be taken by consensus even though the PSC would maintain political control if necessary. Lastly, if crises arose in their 'geographic proximity' that could affect their 'national security', the European Council undertook to establish a dialogue and consultations, and take their positions into account, while at the same time respecting the terms of Article 17 of the TEU.[13] This compromise proposed at Ankara was rejected by Turkey, whose military considered the concessions too limited. The text was, however, to serve as the basis for the final compromise that was signed in 13 December 2002 between Javier Solana and Lord Robertson.[14] Pressure from America, the Copenhagen decision on enlargement and above all Tayyip Erdogan's party's coming to power permitted, after three years of negotiation, the ratification of the Nice provisions regarding 'Berlin-plus'. The Brussels agreement of 16 December 2002 thus opened the way to a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO on crisis management. Completed on 11 March 2003, implementation of permanent arrangements, notably the agreement on classified information, allowed the EU to take over Operation *Allied Harmony* in FYROM on 31 March 2003. The Atlantic dimension of ESDP was finally settled.

Towards the right balance between ESDP and NATO

Yet, the debate about EU autonomy and NATO primacy was reopened in dramatic fashion at the April 2003 summit between Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg, where a European headquarters, to be located in Tervuren near Brussels, was proposed to enhance ESDP operation.[15] As noted earlier, in the 'Berlin-plus' framework, it was agreed that national headquarters could be in charge for autonomous European operations. The idea of developing, in that respect, a European headquarters, seemed to Washington an obvious and unnecessary duplication that was contrary to the spirit of the 'Berlin-plus' agreement and called into question what had been signed a month earlier. If the timing of the Brussels summit was clearly unfortunate, the reaction of Washington was on the other hand excessive. On the one hand, the meeting was depicted as a dismissive 'praline' summit,

13. On the Ankara text, see Antonio Missiroli, 'Turkey and EU-NATO Cooperation', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 33, no. 1, March 2002, pp. 9-26.

14. The detailed agreement covering all the aspects of NATO-ESDP is classified. For a detailed study of the legality of the 'Berlin-plus' agreement, see Martin Reichard, 'Some Legal Issues Concerning the EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreement', *Nordic Journal of International Law*, vol. 73, 2004, pp. 37-67.

15. See point 7 of the declaration of the 29 April 2003 summit, in Antonio Missiroli (comp.), 'From Copenhagen to Brussels. European defence: core documents, Volume IV', *Chaillot Paper* 67 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003), p. 80.

on the other, the suggestion of a European headquarters was deemed to be 'the symbol of competition between EU and NATO' and as such 'the most serious threat' to NATO.[16] This new controversy was of course part of a larger dispute about Iraq between those countries and the United States, but its effects could have weakened even more the trust that had been built up over the previous two years between ESDP and NATO.

The issue was, however, resolved in a balanced way. Following intense British diplomacy of reassurance vis-à-vis Washington, an accord on this issue was reached between Paris, London and Berlin at the Naples meeting at the end of November 2003 that opened the way for a common European position. The solution followed a political rather than a military logic. It was agreed that the EU Military Staff would receive a small team of planners. In parallel, a European planning cell within NATO would be set up at SHAPE. Institutionally, there are now three different ways for Europeans to act. The first is as part of a NATO operation, the second under the 'Berlin-plus' agreement, and the third an autonomous operation with either a lead-nation framework involving a national headquarters or a European headquarters. All these options are now agreed.

Behind institutional agreements, the real basis of cooperation between NATO and the Union will remain a question of trust. When in May 2003 the Union launched its first autonomous military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, some inside NATO considered that the principle of consultation had not really been implemented, and that Operation *Artemis* was more a *fait accompli* than the result of a due process of consultation. Again, this frustration had more to do with the dispute over Iraq than with the practical implications of the European operation in a region where NATO would not have decided to intervene. If confidence about partners' good intentions is lacking, then institutional agreements will not be sufficient to bridge differences. This is especially relevant for an organisation that resorts to the collective use of force

Another element lies at the core of a healthy relationship between the two organisations: their respective capacity to act and to address the security challenges of the twenty-first century. In that respect, the two organisations have initiated important reforms. At the NATO level, the Prague summit of November 2002 proposed the creation of a 'NATO Response Force' for the most

16. On this, see 'A lull between the storms', *The Economist*, 25 September 2003. The American reaction was similar to the Eurocorps initiative at the beginning of the 1990s, yet the Eurocorps is about to take charge of ISAF in Afghanistan.

challenging missions, consisting of an air component capable of carrying out 200 combat air sorties a day, a brigade-sized land force component and a maritime component up to the level of NATO's standing naval forces. The force would consist of up to 21,000 personnel drawn from the pool of European high-readiness forces. They would be capable of fighting together at 7-30 days' notice anywhere in the world. Since the original proposal, the plan actually envisaged is to have three response forces, which would rotate and be at different level of readiness. Only the stand-by forces would be deployable. So, the NRF in fact requires a total of 63,000 troops, i.e. almost exactly the same number of forces required to fulfil the Helsinki Headline Goal. The NRF represents a precious opportunity to introduce new doctrinal concepts and techniques into European forces. However, since both the NRF and the European Union Rapid Reaction Force draw from the same, limited pool of deployable forces, it is clear that most of the Union's most capable troops will be 'double-hatted'. Consequently, controversy about the organisation responsible for running an operation could arise. If one operation had priority over another, there would be a problem as to whether NATO or the EU was in charge of it. There is thus the political risk of a division within the Union over the respective priority of one organisation over the other. Moreover, if the stand-by forces were placed under the authority of a NATO joint force commander, this would deprive the Europeans of their most capable forces for independent actions. The solution to this potential conflict is to make the NRF answerable to the Union, since it is made up entirely of European forces.

At the European level, a new impetus has been initiated for improving capabilities. Within the context of the next target, Headline Goal 2010, the focus is now clearly on the qualitative rather than the quantitative. With initiatives such as the 'battle group' concept, the 'permanent structured cooperation' framework and a more coherent use of European defence budgets through the Agency in the field of defence capabilities, development, research, acquisitions and armaments, the direction is now firmly established for a European capability to deploy armed forces rapidly in remote theatres. This development should be welcomed by NATO officials who have repeatedly complained about the lack of effort by Europeans to enhance their capabilities. The congruence between the European capabilities reforms and the

NRF is obvious. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Union has developed a comprehensive approach to security, including the civilian aspects of peacekeeping operations. This EU added value, compared with the military nature of NATO, means that ultimately evocations of a competition between the two organisations are in fact misleading. Equally misplaced are suggestions of a division of labour between a peacekeeping Europe and a war-waging America. International stability demands both.

Lastly, whether NATO continues to be relevant depends largely on the US attitude to the Alliance. Without going into the details of the evolution of US foreign policy in 2003, it is clear that the new unilateralism and the emphasis on coalitions of the willing, as opposed to institutionalised alliances such as NATO, have demonstrated that, in the eyes of the Bush administration, the Alliance, and more broadly Europe, has partly lost the particular significance it had acquired over the previous 50 years. Despite Lord Robertson's invocation of Article 5 the day after the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon – the first time ever since the creation of NATO – the United States has decided to wage its 'war on terror' mainly alone. From Europe's point of view, it is therefore strategically sound and politically legitimate to enhance and deepen its security autonomy. This does not mean the end of NATO but a better, because more balanced, relationship.[17] After all, nearly 90 per cent of NATO peacekeeping forces from Kosovo to Afghanistan are European.

Since ESDP has become a reality, the main differences between the two organisations have evolved around the notions of European autonomy and Atlantic primacy. Since early 2003, the debate about decoupling has turned out to be essentially different: it is not about the fear of Europeans 'decoupled' from NATO, but rather the reality of Washington estranged from NATO. It remains to be seen whether the United States is ready to be engaged in a more consistent manner in Atlantic affairs.

17. For a development of that argument, see Rob de Wijk, 'The reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Co-operation', *Internationale Spectator,* vol. 39, no. 1, January-March 2004, pp. 71-82.

Mind the steps: the Constitutional Treaty and beyond

Antonio Missiroli

7

Adjustments and reforms are seen as necessary not only in the EU at large but also in the CFSP/ESDP domain. This was already clear in the text of the so-called 'Laeken Declaration' of December 2001 that set in motion the Convention on the Future of Europe and the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).

In fact, the Declaration argues that EU citizens 'want to see Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security and defence, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with trouble spots in and around Europe and in the rest of the world.' Moreover, among the 'basic challenges' facing the Union, 'how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new, multi-polar world' was mentioned. Finally, while asking how 'the efficiency of decision-making and the workings of the institutions in a Union of some thirty member states' could be improved, the text raised such questions as, *inter alia*: 'how should the coherence of European foreign policy be enhanced? How is synergy between the High Representative and the competent Commissioner to be reinforced? Should the external representation of the Union in international fora be extended further?'[1]

The Laeken Declaration represented a virtual menu and working programme for the European Convention, which convened in late February 2002 and concluded its activity in mid-July 2003. After an initial phase of opening up to civil society and setting procedures and objectives, the Convention broke down into a cluster of more focused Working Groups: among them, Working Group VII (chaired by Jean-Luc Dehaene) was devoted to 'External Action', and Working Group VIII (chaired by Michel Barnier) to 'Defence'. A few inevitable overlaps notwithstanding, the two groups operated independently and quite effectively, delivering their Final Reports in mid-December 2002.[2] Most of the recommendations enshrined in those reports found their way into the final draft of the Constitutional Treaty, finalised in mid-July 2003.[3]

1. 'Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union', in Maartje Rutten (comp.), 'From Nice to Laeken. European Defence: core documents', Volume II, *Chaillot Paper* 51 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2002), pp.112-19.

2. Both Reports can be found in Jean-Yves Haine (comp.), 'From Laeken to Copenhagen – European Defence: core documents', Volume III, *Chaillot Paper* 57 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, February 2003), pp. 226-64.

3. For in-depth accounts of the internal workings of the European Convention see Peter Norman, *The Accidental Constitution: The Story of the European Convention* (Brussels: EuroComment, 2003); and Alain Dauvergne, *L'Europe en otage? Histoire secrète de la Convention* (Paris: Saint-Simon, 2004). See also http://www.european-convention.eu.int.

The draft Treaty, in turn, became the object of further discussion at the IGC opened by the Italian EU presidency on 4 October 2003. After two months of formal negotiations, the IGC failed to reach a consensual conclusion at the Brussels European Council of December 2003. None the less, talks on the Treaty resumed under the Irish presidency in March 2004 and were brought to a successful end at the Brussels European Council on 18 June 2004, a few days after the EU-wide elections for the European Parliament. As a result, the enlarged Union now has a Constitutional Treaty that simplifies and replaces the previous treaties: before entering into force (a tentative date could be 2007), however, it has to undergo a complex ratification process in all 25 member states. This chapter, therefore, limits itself to highlighting the main institutional innovations that the Convention and the IGC have introduced concerning the domain of CFSP/ESDP, and assessing their potential implications.

The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs

On the institutional side, this is arguably the most important innovation proposed by the European Convention. Hitherto floated mainly by experts and academics, the idea of trying to combine the roles, attributions and resources of the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations was broadly embraced by Working Group VII, while Working Group VIII insisted on the need for concentration of authority and unity of command in crisis management. All this culminated in Art. I-27 of the draft Constitutional Treaty released by the Convention, which established the 'Union Minister for Foreign Affairs'. The IGC revisited some aspects of the mandate and role of the Minister, but without any major change to the overall picture. As a result, the Minister will be appointed by the European Council acting by qualified majority, and will also become one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission and a fully-fledged member of the college, subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament. Further elements of her/his portfolio – coordination of existing EU programmes and bodies, policy initiative, implementation of crisis management, external representation, chairmanship of the Council of Foreign Ministers and, through a representative, of the Political and Security Committee – are loosely mentioned in

Arts. I-39/40, III-197, III-200/03, III-205/06 and III-210/11.[4] Interestingly, a limited measure of qualified majority voting (QMV) – with all the qualifications and brakes now enshrined in the final version of Art. I-24[5] – has been introduced into CFSP, *inter alia* whenever decisions are taken on the basis of proposals put forward by the Minister following a direct European Council request (Art. III-201), though not on 'matters having military or defence implications'.

On the whole, rather than a full 'merger' of the two roles, what the articles portray is a personal union: a 'double-hatting', in ESDP-speak, and an elaborate operation, in mathematical terms, encompassing both an addition (the HR and RELEX functions, plus their combined effect) and a subtraction (the SG function, to be carried out in the future by an ad hoc appointed official) of roles. The relative lack of detail in the design of the new post is due as much to necessity as to expediency, given the persisting divergences among the member states on the relative importance of the Commission and the Council in running CFSP. Preserving a certain measure of fuzziness, however, allowed a consensus to be built while leaving the door open for unforeseeable future developments. As in the case of the High Representative, much will depend on the individual chosen to become the first incumbent: background, style and personality play a major role in such circumstances. Crucial to shaping the role of the 'Foreign Minister', for instance, will be the way in which s/he wears both 'hats': there are major potential advantages in such double accountability, but there is also the paradoxical risk of being considered mainly a Commissioner by the Council, and primarily a Council figure by the rest of the Commission. And, in addition to well-tailored hats, the first Minister for Foreign Affairs will need a robust umbrella, as the working relationship and division of labour with the new President of the European Council foreseen by the Convention [Art. I-21] will be of some relevance to the nature and image of the post. Finally, the way in which the 'European External Action Service' now envisaged in Art. III-197 of the Constitutional Treaty will be set up could also tip the balance in favour of a more effective and coherent CFSP/ESDP. This 'service' will include officials from the Council and the Commission as well as seconded national diplomats. Interestingly, the 'preparatory work' to establish it was to begin 'as soon as the Constitutional Treaty is signed', rather than await ratification.

4. Generally speaking, part I of the draft Constitutional Treaty defines the objectives of the Union, part III its policies and functioning. All the ESDP-related articles released by the European Convention and those provisionally redrafted by the IGC between October and December 2003 can be found in Antonio Missiroli (comp.), 'From Copenhagen to Brussels. European Defence: core documents', Volume IV, *Chaillot Paper* 67 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003).

5. The initial definition proposed by the Convention set the threshold for QMV at 50 per cent of the member states and 60 per cent of the overall EU population. After months of negotiations, the IGC eventually agreed to set such 'double majority' at 55 per cent of the member states (comprising at least 15 countries) and 65 per cent of the population. In turn, a 'blocking minority' must include at least four member states. The threshold for QMV rises, however, when the Council does not vote on a proposal from the Commission or the Minister for Foreign Affairs (72 and 65 per cent, respectively). All the relevant texts and annexes can be found on the Website of the Irish presidency (CIG 81/04 and 85/04).

Mutual defence and solidarity

The European Convention also introduced two new clauses intended to strengthen internal cohesion and the member states' determination to integrate further.

The first one picked up on previous efforts to insert a mutual defence clause into the EU system. In the run-up to the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), this translated into the proposal gradually to incorporate the WEU arrangements into those of the EU. However, this was eventually rejected. This time, the Convention suggested that such a clause – referring to the case of a state being 'the victim of an armed aggression against its territory' – could be subscribed to on a voluntary basis and represent a specific form of 'closer cooperation' open to all. Accordingly, the 'participating' states would give the one under attack 'aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other', in accordance with Art. 51 of the UN Charter and in 'close cooperation' with NATO (Arts. I-40 (7) and III-214).

The new clause, however, soon raised old and new doubts over its possible strategic implications, from its decoupling potential (across the Atlantic as well as within Europe) to the status of the non-allied, and became part and parcel of the controversy sparked by the initiative launched by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg in the spring of 2003 to set up an autonomous military headquarters for EU operations at Tervuren, near Brussels. In the subsequent IGC, all this led to a partial rewriting of the relevant articles, whereby the mutual defence clause would become binding for all – thus suppressing its voluntary character and the 'closer cooperation' format – while contemplating explicit provisos for both NATO members and non-allied countries. Somewhat 'neutralised' in its impact, the revised clause eventually remained in Art. I-40 – as an objective of the Union – but disappeared from part III of the Constitutional Treaty, where policies are spelt out in more detail.

The Convention introduced another new clause, whereby the EU and its member states would 'act jointly in a spirit of solidarity' in the event of a member state being 'the victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster'. Accordingly, the Union would 'mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the member states', to prevent the terrorist threat and assist a member state 'in its territory'. The imple-

mentation of the new clause would be entrusted to the Council of Ministers and the Political and Security Committee (Arts. I-42 and III-231). This new solidarity clause did not trigger any major controversy inside or outside the IGC, perhaps in part because its scope is limited to the 'territory' of the member state concerned. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the European Council reiterated the mutual solidarity commitment in a common declaration that reproduced almost literally the text of Art. I-42.

On closer inspection, however, both articles display a lack of specifics as to their actual implementation, institutionally as well as operationally. They entail general commitments but no specific enforcement modalities. Also, the dividing line between mutual *defence* against an armed aggression and mutual solidarity against a terrorist attack may prove very thin indeed. Yet both clauses provide legitimacy to any future development in this domain. In particular, Art. I-42 could be compared to NATO's Art. 5 when it was first drafted and approved in 1949: in fact, the relevant permanent military structures were put in place some time after the political commitment was subscribed to.

A similar consideration can apply to the 'European Armaments, Research, and Military Capabilities Agency' envisaged in Art. III-212 of the draft Constitutional Treaty. Floated also in the Final Report of Working Group VIII, the proposal to set up the 'Defence Agency' – as it is now more succinctly called – has already been set in motion on the policy side: the first relevant decision was taken by the European Council in June 2003 and an Agency Establishment Team appointed a few months later. Actually, the Agency will materialise long before the Constitutional Treaty enters into force. Yet having its broad goals anchored in the text adds to its legitimacy – all the more so as this is a policy area in which many developments have taken place outside any treaty framework.

Enhanced and structured cooperation

Last but not least, the European Convention substantially modified the existing Treaty by openly introducing 'enhanced cooperation' in defence matters.

To start with, Art. I-43 of the draft Constitutional Treaty redefines the scope and modalities of '*enhanced* cooperation' (emphasis

added in this and subsequent quotations) in general – i.e. 'within the framework of the Union's non-exclusive competencies' – without mentioning any of the restrictions still enshrined in Art. 27 of the Nice Treaty. In principle, therefore, it applies also to CFSP and ESDP in their entirety, although with specific procedures (as in the final version of Art. III-325 (2)). In fact, the IGC eventually explained that, in the CFSP domain, 'enhanced cooperation' could be launched only unanimously – and most strictly so, once again, when it comes to 'matters having military or defence implications' – even when it comes to deciding how to take decisions (which may or may not be unanimous, except for military/defence matters, where it must) *within* such a framework. Such 'enhanced cooperation' is open to all member states at any time but only as a 'last resort', namely, 'when it has been established within the Council of Ministers that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union *as a whole*'. It also has to bring together at least one third of the member states and, even after the launch, it must 'promote' the successive inclusion of 'as many member states as possible'. Finally, acts adopted in the context of 'enhanced cooperation' are only binding on the participating countries and cannot be regarded as part of the *acquis*.

In short, Art. I-43 enables the member states to launch 'enhanced cooperation' in any policy field, albeit on certain conditions as laid out in detail in Arts. III-322/29. As such, it also constitutes a potential institutional deterrent against political deadlock and the repeated boycott of policy initiatives, especially in the absence of any significant shift towards majority voting in the CFSP/ESDP domain.

Moreover, Arts. I-40 and III-213 of the Convention's draft Constitutional Treaty spoke of '*structured* cooperation' in the field of defence for those member states that 'fulfil higher military capability criteria and wish to enter into more binding commitments in this matter with a view to the most demanding tasks'. The relevant criteria and commitments were to be set out in a specific 'Protocol' which, unfortunately, the Convention did not provide. The combination of this omission, the intrinsically exclusive character of the scheme and the parallel controversies over the Tervuren initiative triggered a negative reaction by some member states – from both the 'Atlanticist' and the non-allied camps – that translated into a partial rewriting of Art. III-213 in the IGC.

As a result, what is now called '*permanent* structured cooperation' looks a much more inclusive and transparent undertaking, fully in tune with current policy developments, and related to a concrete Protocol that mentions the basic criteria for participation. These are the following: achievement of high military operational readiness through national and/or multinational force packages, and through pooling and/or specialising of means and capabilities; participation in the development of 'major joint or European equipment programmes' and in the activities of the Defence Agency; and increased cooperation with a view to meeting agreed objectives concerning 'the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment'. The first criterion has subsequently been linked to the so-called 'battle groups' concept, developed from early 2004, and the second to the Defence Agency and the planned Headline Goal for 2010. Finally, the procedures for launching the scheme and opening it up to potential new adherents have been made more acceptable to all member states, mainly by setting out ad hoc rules: indeed, in the final version of Art. III-213, 'permanent structured cooperation' is established through QMV as defined in Art. I-24; further accessions to (or suspensions from) the scheme are also to be decided by QMV. By contrast, decisions and recommendations adopted within the framework of such 'permanent structured cooperation' are to be taken by unanimity. Finally, it is also worth noting that no threshold for the minimum level of participants has been set.

In other words, 'permanent structured cooperation' now looks essentially different both from other possible forms of 'enhanced cooperation' – it is predetermined in its scope rather than generically enabling, and has specific procedures – and from previous steps in the field of ESDP, which were based almost exclusively on voluntary contributions and peer pressure. Now, the commitment is 'permanent', its nature is 'structured' and the capability assessment is based on certification, following NATO's example. Furthermore, the taboo over the unanimity rule on 'matters having military or defence implications' – reiterated elsewhere in the same text of the Constitutional Treaty – is explicitly broken here in order to meet functional goals and overcome potential vetoes, although it resurfaces (a bit surprisingly) as an internal procedure.

What still looks a bit fuzzy is the extent to which participation is determined by political will and/or functional ability. As com-

pared with the convergence criteria for joining monetary union enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, for instance, the criteria listed in Art. III-213 and the Protocol are less specific and leave more room for interpretation. Also, it is not clear which criterion matters most, although there is a tendency to emphasise high military readiness. Yet again, such fuzziness may end up representing an asset rather than a liability, especially in light of the unpredictability of strategic scenarios and political developments. And it is debatable whether a *Constitutional* Treaty, whose duration is indeterminate almost by nature, should enshrine detailed norms and figures regarding the short-term implementation of a policy.

A fundamental question remains to be answered, though: what is 'permanent structured cooperation' ultimately for? With the new Art. III-213, the draft Constitutional Treaty seems to be aiming at two main objectives: the first is the general improvement of existing European military capabilities, to be pursued through explicit functional benchmarks and implicit political incentives (being 'in' or 'out') set in common. This is something the EU has proved to be good at, as both Monetary Union and Schengen have shown, while NATO has not. Yet it needs to be stressed that, in this domain, the challenge for the Europeans is particularly demanding.

The second main objective is less evident but no less important: those member states that participate in the 'permanent structured cooperation' will also constitute the first obvious addressees for any future major EU-led military operation. They may not come to represent an 'avant-garde' or a 'pioneer group' in the traditional sense of these terms but, if successful, they will certainly become the most credible (and most interoperable) candidates for managing joint and combined crisis management operations on behalf of the EU.

The next steps

On the whole, the proposals and provisions that have emerged from the European Convention and the IGC may not have answered all the questions raised in the Laeken Declaration. However, they have certainly changed the institutional context within which ESDP is carried out in at least one essential aspect: the Constitutional Treaty now contains much-needed *enabling* clauses and

does away with almost all the traditional constraining and limiting clauses of the previous Treaties. Much as some provisions still entail restrictions on 'matters having military or defence implications' and so-called 'emergency brakes' against QMV, these seem to be mostly symbolic, a sort of preliminary reassurance for member states that their ultimate sovereignty will not be dented. As the case of 'permanent structured cooperation' proves, however, when it comes to specific schemes that are already accepted by all, such restrictions tend to be set aside. Far from being fully or perfectly elaborated, in other words, the new articles nevertheless provide the necessary legal and political preconditions for a more flexible and effective common security and defence policy.

At this stage, however, what is likely to be crucial for ESDP is the way in which such enabling provisions are put in place. To a large extent, of course, this depends on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty itself, with all its current unknowns. Even in the event of an early and smooth ratification, though, some provisions are likely to enter into force immediately and others (especially those related to the voting system and the Commission) much later, thus generating gaps and asymmetries in the system. In the event of a lengthy and difficult ratification process, the gaps and the overall uncertainty may grow even bigger. Finally, as already mentioned, some provisions enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty (the Defence Agency, the 'battle groups' concept, the solidarity clause against terrorism) are already being implemented and will therefore be in place before – and arguably even regardless of – its entry into force.

It is therefore fair to say that it is essential to adopt appropriate transitional arrangements for a step-by-step implementation of the spirit and substance of the Constitutional Treaty for as long as its letter and form remain in limbo. This is especially true for the Union 'Minister for Foreign Affairs', the European External Action Service and 'permanent structured cooperation'.

A final question deserves to be raised, namely: does it matter? Does it make a difference for ESDP whether the Constitutional Treaty is ratified and enters into force or not?

On the one hand, in fact, ESDP has so far developed mainly outside the EU treaty framework: Presidency Reports, simple Council decisions and Joint Actions have driven a policy whose 'constitutional' underpinning has always been, at best, minimal. In a way, ESDP has come to cover policy areas that were simply not

explicitly *forbidden* by the treaties, and only in so far as they were not. In principle, with the possible partial exception of the EU 'Minister for Foreign Affairs', it could well continue to do so, with the additional advantage of not raising delicate questions of *finalité* and *souveraineté* that could backfire on it.

On the other hand, however, the debates in the European Convention and the IGC helped shape a consensus on options that, since, have been not only accepted but also gradually put in place. The whole 'constitutional' exercise, therefore, has proved useful and effective, freeing new initiatives and, in a sense, legitimising them in advance. It would thus be a pity for the credibility of the EU in general, and for the legitimacy of ESDP in particular, if the remarkable efforts of the past two years were wasted for reasons that may turn out to have little to do with the contents and scope of the Constitutional Treaty.

II

II

Actors and witnesses

8

Martti Ahtisaari

In the early 1990s, Europe was divided on how to deal with the deepening crises in the Balkans. European unwillingness to send troops in the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia made UN involvement essential. Europe, redefining its post-Cold War *raison d'être* was incapable of coping with a situation where Yugoslavia as a society was too weak to prevent a government-initiated civil war between ethnic groups, and it watched from the sidelines as Yugoslavia slid towards its bloody demise.

Only a few years later, the outbreak of war in Kosovo demonstrated Europe's continued dependency on US military capabilities. However, NATO's European allies had learned from their failure to act early on in Bosnia and made a major contribution to the effort in Kosovo.

I was involved in the international effort to find peace in the region on two different occasions, first in the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia in 1992-93 and secondly in the Kosovo peace negotiations in 1999. As a European, I felt very strongly the need for Europe to have a common policy and the ability to act when conflicts break out in its neighbourhood.

Five years after the war in Kosovo, for Europe the challenge of the Balkans is far from over. The unresolved status of Kosovo, the future of the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro and the fact that both Kosovo and Bosnia remain subject to international supervision can all bring a new wave of instability to Europe's South. As the recent upsurge of ethnic violence in Kosovo demonstrated, the international community is struggling to form a clear vision as to how self-sustaining domestic structures can be established. The Balkans has become a test case for ESDP and a mirror of Europe's capability to put the ESDP concepts into practice.

The European Union was born as an initiative for conflict prevention and crisis management. Starting in the 1940s, significant efforts were made to create a lasting security, economic and political infrastructure in Western Europe. Institutions that were

created at that time – from the OECD to the Council of Europe, from NATO to the European Coal and Steel Community leading to today's European Union – now form an indispensable framework for stability.

The EU Council Decision taken in Cologne in June 1999 to launch the European Security and Defence Policy, just at the end of the Kosovo campaign, was a direct response to the rude awakening that the Balkans had brought to Europe, to the United States and to the rest of the world. Already the Maastricht Treaty had recognised the need for coordination in security and defence policy. Given the many faces of national defence policies and differing expectations of the 15 member states, however, the inception of ESDP in Cologne was a historical landmark. Despite the obstacles, the approach adopted in Cologne and the subsequent decisions taken in Helsinki have steadily taken EU towards concrete measures for the promotion of stability, conflict prevention and crisis management, making the Union an increasingly influential actor and a significant partner for the UN, OSCE and NATO. When chairing the Helsinki European Council in 1999, I felt there was a determination among the Heads of State or Government to deliver something concrete. But I could not have imagined how far those decisions would take ESDP in five short years.

When assessing the merits of ESDP, it must be borne in mind that a variety of differing national security and defence policies have been able to come together in the ESDP framework. One of the Cologne conclusions established that effective European security and defence policy requires that European NATO Allies and the European neutral and non-aligned member states have equal rights of full participation in EU operations. Through the so-called 'Berlin-plus' agreement, which became a sensitive and testing matter for ESDP, the two European security structures have formed a functioning cooperation, something that is vital to the successful conduct of ESDP. Along with its Irish, Swedish and Austrian colleagues, Finland, a nation that has throughout its independent history depended solely on its own military means to defend its territory, suddenly found itself in a new defence and security policy circle.

If the NATO member nations have worried that ESDP is a wasteful duplication of NATO efforts and undermines its core business, the non-aligned, in part, have had to re-evaluate and, as is the case of Finland, forgo the policy of neutrality. The pains that

the Union went through in agreeing on the mutual defence guarantees and the other defence provisions of the proposed Constitution for the EU was a further demonstration of the great determination that is driving ESDP forward. As in many other policy areas within the Union, the ESDP has been skilfully able to merge the security and defence policy options that often underpin the very existence of any nation.

Yet though many strong forces draw ESDP together, much still drives it apart, one such example being the differing threat perceptions among member states. Perhaps as a result of the varying views on the wide array of issues that lie within the field of defence and security, demands for an exclusive defence circle that could act in the name of the EU in a more effective, robust and capable manner have intensified among certain member states. In my opinion, this development would be counter-productive to the European idea. We must allow each member state committed to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union a say in the conduct of ESDP. To succeed, the process must remain genuinely pan-European. For historical, geographical and economic reasons the capabilities of member states vary, but each nation certainly has something valuable to contribute.

I see that the differing traditions of the participating nations have given the European Union a chance to become a different kind of global actor and crisis manager from those that already exist. The Nordic nations, for example, have brought to the forefront the civilian aspects of crisis management as an integral and inseparable part of successful crisis management, which in my opinion is the niche capability that operational ESDP must exploit.

From the early days of their membership of the Union, Finland and Sweden have actively contributed to the development of ESDP. It was the joint proposal of Finland and Sweden in 1996 that led to the incorporation of the 'Petersberg tasks' in the Treaty on European Union, thus providing a framework for operational ESDP. Mandated by the Cologne decisions, the Finnish presidency and the Helsinki Council gave some of the comprehensive crisis management tools concrete form by establishing the politico-military structures and the civilian crisis management mechanism, which have become an inherent part of coherent and comprehensive EU crisis management policy. The Helsinki decisions thus paved the way to a new approach to harness member states' efforts in crisis situations.

Delivering the niche

Thanks to the political momentum, ESDP became operational much faster than many had imagined. As a novel endeavour, the EU's crisis management is better able to establish rapid deployment, information sharing, interoperability, and sustainability in peace operations. The design of the crisis management toolbox of the Union is flexible, in that it can widen and deepen an intervention and apply a comprehensive approach to crisis management. Despite certain significant gaps in military capability, the Union was able to declare itself operational and able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks by 2003, the scheduled time. The year 2003 marked a breakthrough for ESDP, as four EU operations were launched. Nevertheless, five years after Cologne, Europe has for the first time in its history proactively engaged in security affairs, covering tasks that range from policing to military intervention.

If the Union can claim early merits for its military ability to respond to crises, the same is not as yet true of its civilian crisis management capability. The true establishment of 'mixed operations', compassing military and civilian components involving both EU as well as member state resources, is still a largely unfinished concept, and will need some serious work and commitment to become more than a mere promise. State-building is an awkward business for the military, but the Union has not yet 'operationalised' the full range of civilian crisis management capacities envisaged, other than police.

The ability to offer a full and comprehensive range of means for crisis management is crucial in today's crisis scenarios. Recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans demonstrate the necessity to involve rule of law, civil administration and civil protection experts in the early stages of planning. There is no quick route to state-building, but the slow mobilisation of civil elements can cost the international community the small window of opportunity that often exists in the immediate aftermath of a crisis situation. Appropriate planning and support structures for operations must match the European Union's ambitions and commitments of crisis management personnel in all three priority areas – rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. The professional conduct of civilian operations will require expert resources for strategic and operational planning in all three priority areas, as well as for mission support tasks.

The European Union, together with the rest of the international community, must recognise that there are more and more countries that fail to govern and are unwilling to provide security and basic government services for their citizens. There are an increasing number of situations where difficulties persist in efforts to set up national governments and functioning local civil administrations that are able to provide even the basic social services and internal security. Failing states are a fundamental challenge. The international community must finally begin to reconsider its state-building strategies through the development of standard response packages, expanding its tools and making better use of contemporary technologies to help it win the civilian battle for peace and stability.

The wisdom of multilateralism

The development of ESDP coincides with the evolution and reorganisation of UN peace operations that has taken place over the past decade. The post-Cold War environment obliged us to redefine the supply and demand for peace and security. Compared with the United Nations, the EU has from the very beginning had a number of advantages as a political actor and crisis manager. One of the demonstrated advantages in its neighbourhood has been the prospect of EU membership, which has helped to create stability and incentives for democratic change. Through the integration processes of the European Union and NATO, governments of Central European countries have had the means to create a desire for change. The progress made during the past ten years has produced a brighter outlook and provided examples for the Balkan countries struggling with the parallel processes of transition from war to peace and from the communist system to the market economy.

The EU has made clear that it is not seeking to make others in the business of crisis management redundant and that, while duplication of effort is wasteful in a world of scarce resources, it is perhaps better to have a slight overlap than have uncovered gaps in peace building and crisis management. Nevertheless, sharing roles and combining the competences of different actors would free each organisation to do jobs for which it is best suited.

The pre-enlargement 15 EU member states provide more than 40 per cent of the UN peacekeeping budget; it is therefore not

surprising that they have found it in their interest to create a working relationship between the two organisations. The Joint EU-UN declaration of September 2003 on cooperation in crisis management and the ongoing discussions about further formalising their crisis management relations constitute a welcome development in the establishment of a real continuum of differing roles and responsibilities in crisis management. Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrated Europe's capability for rapid reaction, and its value for the United Nations, which often falls short of such a capability. I believe that the formal creation of an EU rapid response capability and the so-called 'battle groups' concept by the year 2007 will become a significant asset for UN peacekeeping, which in the coming years will have to cope with a surge in large-scale peacekeeping operations on the African continent. We also have an example of reverse role-sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EU has been able to relinquish UN for other, more pressing policing missions.

The effectiveness of any multilateral system depends on the political will to cooperate and intervene. Europe must be prepared to summon up the political will to use the capabilities it has developed. The first EU operations have already shown that not all member states will always be keen to engage within the EU framework. While the decision to engage should remain a national one, having developed the capability, the EU must be committed to using it to answer to the demands and needs of the world. It will have to take on operations flexibly and be able to deal with unplanned exigencies and situations that may not neatly fit preplanned timetables. This holds true in particular of operations that may have to be carried out on the European continent in the post-11 September era.

In the current security environment we are reminded of the urgent need for effective multilateralism all too frequently. While some may argue that unilateral action – be it state-building or outright war – is a less complex and time-consuming venture, it will as an approach quickly become an expensive way of acting and can lose the local and global credibility that are crucial to the success of reconciliation. The recent past has taught us the effectiveness of broad participation and extensive burden-sharing in peace operations. The only way to avoid previous mistakes and wasted effort is systematically to conduct lessons-learned processes within the Union and share them with the organisations with which the EU

cooperates in peace operations. Furthermore, the EU should focus its activities by carrying out a risk analysis so as to set a limited list of priorities of the most urgent conflicts to tackle, based on a division of labour with the UN, OSCE and NATO. Each organisation should concentrate on areas where they can bring added value to the international effort. In the case of the EU it could be in developing cooperation, peacekeeping and peace building activities.

From theory to practice

The presence and efforts of the international community to build sustainable peace and reconstruct states in the Balkans – or in any other crisis area – requires long-term commitment. We have seen that the effectiveness of international efforts suffers when responsibility is divided between several organisations. In both Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the presence of a multitude of international administrators, monitors and coordinators from different organisations has led to both duplication of effort and gaps in coverage. At their worst, institutional rivalries can damage the overall effort of conflict management. It is therefore time for the EU to take a leading and uniting role in the area.

The shift in world politics has caused a transfer of leadership in the Balkans: it is the European Union that is to set the agenda for the future. The common European perspective dramatically increases not only the EU's influence on the region but also its responsibilities there. The EU's political agenda of integrating the Balkan countries into transatlantic structures is vital. Both the United States and Russia are scaling down their presence in the Balkans, which will probably lead to a greater EU share of the Balkans burden, presumably with assured access to NATO assets.

I consider that it is necessary to strengthen the EU's political competence and its ability to manage crises in its neighbourhood. An enhanced defence capability is also a prerequisite for a functioning transatlantic relationship. However, we should remember that the further development of the Union is for the common purposes of the member states, which are neither aimed against the United States nor pursued for it. The EU has to be able to demonstrate in practice that it is willing and able to solve security problems. Institutional reforms cannot go far in solving problems unless the member states have a genuine desire and political will to

develop common policies. The current situation, where the High Representative for CFSP lacks the necessary resources to implement policies approved by the European Council, is simply unacceptable. We cannot afford to wait for the ratification of the Constitution; we should correct the situation without delay.

Becoming a serious actor in foreign and security policy requires a functioning decision-making structure in which member states have delegated genuine foreign and security political authority to the Union. It also requires military power and the readiness to use that power, but only as a last resort and based on common rules.

ESDP is a work in progress but the European Union is ready to take over its first joint operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Balkan countries are in the EU's immediate geographic proximity, and its member states have sometimes strong but differing interests in the region. As the EU takes over the Bosnia operation, it is clear that it will become one of the most important test cases for cooperation between Europe and the United States. I also recognise that the Europeans have to take on the lion's share of the burden. Despite this, it is evident that successful post-conflict rehabilitation in the region requires a strong EU-US partnership and common engagement until the goal of the operation has been comprehensively achieved. The EU and the United States must have a common strategy on how best to support the new leadership of the governments in the democratic transition and how to apportion and prioritise international donor funds. In addition, it is of vital importance that this common strategy must also be shared by Russia.

The European Union is a newcomer to the business of peace support operations. But its member states have for decades been involved in the whole variety of peace operations in various parts of the world. The Union should therefore not make excuses but demand professionalism and coherence from its missions. After all, it is not disappointment in others that may drive ESDP to despair but disappointment in our own actions that can have detrimental effects on the future of the process. The experience and the building blocks of ESDP now exist; we must now undertake to carefully combine the two and put the theory into practice.

9

Michel Barnier

N.B.
This paper was written before Michel Barnier was appointed France's Minister for Foreign Affairs. It relates his experience as a member of the European Commission, a Commission representative to the Convention on the Future of the Union and Chairman of the Convention Working Group on Defence.

Europeans today are more keenly aware of the dangers that threaten not only their own continent but, more widely, peace and security throughout the world. Many have come to understand the limitations of purely national responses and want to see Europe equip itself with the means to defend peace and democracy when the need arises. For that purpose, they are ready to contribute to forms of diplomatic and military intervention that are effective, within the law and mindful of the role of the United Nations. The Convention on the Future of the Union was conscious of that trend, as I saw when I chaired the Working Group on Defence in the autumn of 2002.

After more than fifteen months of discussions, the Convention adopted a draft Constitution for Europe, containing provisions on security and defence that largely mirror the Working Group's proposals. In formulating those proposals, we were very attentive to the new international geopolitical context and conscious of the fact that today Europe is required to face new threats and challenges. With the determination being shown by a number of European countries, balances are altering and the introduction of a real European defence is now possible.

The main point I wish to make is that, at a time of new threats to international stability, Europe has an essential role to play in the field of foreign policy and cannot content itself with the status quo.

An era of new threats

When the Berlin Wall fell and brought the Cold War to an end, *the balance of terror* that characterised that period of high international tension ceased to exist. A *world order* based on a precarious, but genuine, balance between the nuclear deterrents and the might of the two superpowers gave way to a *world disorder*, where 'hyperpower' America's defence of its own interests does not suffice to ensure international peace and stability.

As confrontations multiply, the threats that they represent are complicated by the fact that they stem from many different factors – the struggle for control of natural resources, territorial claims, ethnic crimes, organised crime, etc.

After years of warfare, the Balkans region is still a focus of attention. Beyond Europe, the example of Africa underlines the instability of the international situation and the need for the European Union to be able to intervene if necessary in distant theatres of operation. The expansion of international terrorism also calls for increased vigilance and concerted policies to combat a phenomenon that knows no frontiers.

Europe – danger zone

Europe is not a haven of peace and prosperity in a dangerous world. Wars and conflicts continue in Europe – witness the triple crisis in the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia). And if Europe is often the target of terrorist plots, it is also where they are hatched, as the attacks of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004 have shown. Europe's borders are now closer to danger zones such as the Balkans, the Middle East or the Caucasus. And the interplay of economies and interests is such that conflicts outside European territory affect European interests.

One factor of uncertainty to be reckoned with is that Europe is no longer central to the United States' priorities – 92 per cent of US forces have now been withdrawn from NATO. The transatlantic link is under severe strain: the United States now seems undecided whether to regard NATO as a basic expression of political solidarity between the two sides of the Atlantic or an alliance à la carte, depending on US priorities.

A strategic responsibility for Europe

Europe is a leading economic power: with 25 member states and 450 million inhabitants it accounts for a quarter of world GNP.

But Europe also has political ambitions, affirmed by the member states over ten years ago in the Treaty of Maastricht. Now it needs to develop a capacity for political influence commensurate with its economic capacities.

The Union must see itself as a continental power, exist as a global economic force and affirm its role as a guarantor of security. It must help to safeguard populations, fight famine, epidemics and natural disasters, and combat organised crime. It must also play an active part in strategic security, in fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in settling internal or regional conflicts.

Doing nothing is not an option. Europe must play its part in the emergence of a new international order based on law and cooperation between the centres of power that are the United States, Europe and Asia, and the emergent China. It is important to understand that multipolarity is not a slogan or a political programme, but a fact, a reality that we must learn to deal with in terms of the concepts of today's world, not the reflexes of a bygone era. In developing new ways of ordering matters, Europe's role will be vital.

What needs to be done, and how? In addition to the progress accomplished in the last five years, the draft Constitution for Europe reinforces the legal and political framework required to develop a European defence, in terms of military capabilities and institutional organisation.

The need for a more credible defence policy

First observation: the tasks carried out by EU member states' armed forces are in the main crisis management operations in external theatres. The tasks of maintaining and restoring peace, i.e. the 'Petersberg tasks', must also extend to the fight against terrorism.

Second observation: the European Union has no genuine capacity for political reaction in the event of external attack on one or more of its member states. While the military response is primarily a

matter for NATO, the gulf between that organisation's capabilities and the range of powers and resources at the Union's disposal is huge.

Third observation: such measures will have no effect unless Europeans decide on a decisive strengthening of their military capabilities, which trail further and further behind those of the United States, particularly in the field of research and development, where the ratio is 1 to 5. And military research has a positive spin-off for civil industries, so that failure to keep up investment in that sector severely penalises the economy as a whole.

In this respect, the recent approaches of some European countries to military equipment are unquestionably counter-productive. Military aeronautical research is an area of European technological and scientific excellence, but there is a danger that it could largely slip through Europe's fingers.

Last observation: the member states of the Union, present and future, do not all share the same ambitions with regard to European security and defence. The political will differs widely from state to state, some primarily committed to NATO and the transatlantic link, others with a long tradition of neutrality.

A favourable political context

The development of a European defence policy is stated as a long-term goal in the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. But many member states are also members of NATO, and security and defence issues are a natural part of their foreign policy. Some, such as France and the United Kingdom, also have global capabilities for action and global interests.

The Union cannot build a genuine foreign policy without creating its own capabilities for military action. As Chairman of the Convention Working Group on Defence, I therefore hailed the positive trend that had emerged since the meeting between France and the United Kingdom in St-Malo. Thanks to the process begun there and continued by the Union, genuine politico-military structures have been set up under the auspices of the Union's Council of Ministers, with a Military Staff, a Military Committee and a Political and Security Committee. The member states have approved significant capability objectives (the Helsinki Headline Goal) for crisis management tasks.

Since then, the Franco-German declaration of 22 January 2003 and the Franco-British declaration made at Le Touquet on 4 February 2003, as the Iraqi crisis was entering a very difficult phase, have confirmed that there is genuine political will on the part of the most committed states. In that favourable context, the proposals which I made and which were taken up by the Convention were designed to strengthen Europe's capacity for decision-making and action on security and defence in compliance with the commitments entered into in the Atlantic Alliance.

The draft Constitution updates the provisions on crisis management outside European territory, by *adapting the Petersberg tasks* (of maintaining and restoring peace) to include combating terrorism and *improving crisis management procedures*.

In the event of an attack on the territory of a member state, the Union must be able to respond appropriately – hence my proposal for a *solidarity clause* enabling member states to avert terrorist threats and, if necessary, respond to an attack. And for those willing and able to go further, solidarity could extend to *collective self-defence*, for which provision already exists in the modified Brussels Treaty.

Strengthening the Union's military capabilities is a vital prerequisite for the pursuit of a credible, influential foreign policy. The creation of an *Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments* will enable the member states to carry out collaborative programmes among themselves and help ensure that capability commitments are met. The need for such action rapidly became so apparent that when the European Council met in Thessaloniki in June 2003 it took forward that initiative without waiting for the Constitutional Treaty to be ratified.

Finally, these proposals set great store by flexibility, for not all member states are willing or able to cooperate in this area. For the most demanding tasks, the draft Constitution therefore allows for *structured cooperation between those member states* that are willing and able to engage in it. This form of capacity-linked select cooperation, set out in the Protocol negotiated at the Intergovernmental Conference in the autumn of 2003, opens up new prospects for a European defence.

All these proposals were well received by the representatives of the governments of the member states whose task it was to finalise the draft Constitution. True, the European Council did not reach agreement on the Constitution when it met in Brussels in

December 2003, but the impetus given to defence issues brought fresh progress, with the decision to set up new operational military structures under the Union's auspices. That is clearly a very positive sign, and confirmation that the Convention has taken the right road. Solutions to difficult issues can be found where there is sufficient political will.

In this way we will succeed in building a political Europe in which member states are convinced of the need to act together, because it is in their interests to do so.

Carl Bildt

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Five years is a fairly short time when it comes to major political evolutions such as the emergence of a European common security and defence policy. When we look at the evolution of the security policies of even large states, qualitative changes normally take far longer to come to fruition.

That being so, it is easy to describe the evolution of European security and defence policy during the last year as a rather impressive achievement. The Union has gone from something that was fairly close to nothing to a situation that is beginning to resemble something. To do this in a dialogue of 15 nation-states that are busy safeguarding their core independence in these areas is an achievement that is far from negligible.

That is one way of looking at these five years. Another, which leads to a somewhat different assessment, is to compare this development with the changes we are seeing in the wider strategic environment that is influencing Europe, and which Europe has every interest in trying to influence.

With the demise of the Soviet empire, Europe finally emerged from the long dark night that started in the summer of 1914. Finally, all of Europe was able to emerge from the shadows of Hitler and Stalin.

The necessary strategic solution to the fundamentally new situation then created was to build, step by step, a federation of nation-states, eventually covering all of Europe to the west of Russia, stretching from the Arctic Sea down to the Mediterranean, and eventually also bridging the Bosporus. With no overt enemy to deter using military instruments, Europe had to confront the enemy that is its own history of conflicts and rivalry, and there was and is no other way of doing that than through the slow process of building structures of integration that gradually bring the nations and peoples of Europe closer and closer together.

During the past decade, that process has been by far the most important contribution of the European Union to peace and sta-

bility in a part of the world that for nearly half a century was a powder keg ready to explode, and during the preceding half century had dragged much of the world into two devastating military conflicts. The entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 more or less completed the process of enlargement in Western Europe, while that of 2004 brought in the entire Baltic and Central European area.

In parallel with the process of enlargement, the development of the ESDP was meant to contribute to conflict resolution, stability and peace in the somewhat wider areas around or near the periphery of the expanding Union. In particular, the conflict-ridden Balkans have been the focus.

In the coming years the process of enlargement will move ever more decisively into the mosaic of the post-Ottoman area – already having Greece and a divided Cyprus as members – and will accordingly have to confront more difficult issues.

It is sometimes said that the success of ESDP should be measured by its achievements in the area of the Balkans. While being too limited a view of the tasks of ESDP – with the European Security Strategy a far more ambitious agenda has been set – it is nevertheless true that a policy that is seen as failing here will have a hard time making itself a success elsewhere. It is also in this region that we have seen the first rudimentary operational missions of ESDP.

The 1990s saw a succession of wars in this area that painfully illustrated the shortcomings not only of Europe but also of the entire international system. From the brief war in Slovenia in 1991 to the open conflict in FYROM in 2001, the guns roared, houses were torched and millions fled across this entire region.

The rhetoric and the reality of these conflicts and the efforts to solve them diverge considerably. According to the prevailing mythology, it was all a failure of Europe, and things could only be sorted out by the intervention of the United States.

But the reality is more complex. While both Europeans and Americans certainly failed, it can well be argued that the European approach of trying to seek long-term political solutions to the complex issues of the region was a more appropriate one that the somewhat more quick-action and military oriented one originating in the United States.

The essential lesson of the Balkans, however, is that issues like these cannot be solved if there is seen to be dissonance in the international community, notably across the Atlantic.

The United States de facto blocked the political efforts to seek a compromise settlement of the Bosnian conflict during 1992, 1993 and 1994, rendering the efforts of the European Union and the United Nations during those years nearly completely ineffective. It was only when, in the summer of 1995, the United States had to stare into the abyss itself that it suddenly embraced compromise principles it had previously rejected and thus facilitated a settlement no better than what would have been possible some years earlier. It was not primarily military intervention, but political compromise, that ended the war in Bosnia.

This crucial lesson of Bosnia was forgotten when it came to the handling of the Kosovo issue several years later. A compromise has yet to materialise when it comes to the solution to that great outstanding issue of the region. Five years after the three-month war that ended without a peace, the province is boiling with dissatisfaction, frustration and animosity, and neither the European Union nor the United States has shown much willingness to tackle the fundamental political issues at the root of the conflict.

After the end of the Kosovo war, much of the discussion in Europe was centred on the discrepancy, in terms of air power, between the Europeans and the United States. The United States had demonstrated that it could fly stealth bombers non-stop from Missouri and back and bomb buildings in Belgrade, although not always the right ones, while the Europeans were struggling to find aircraft or munitions that were of any relevance in the campaign.

But that was not the fundamental lesson of the Kosovo war. Analysis afterwards showed that the air campaign had been almost totally useless in stopping the ethnic conflict in Kosovo. It can, in fact, be argued that it made things worse on the ground. At the end of the day, it is likely that it was the political intervention of Russia, and the return of the issue back into the United Nations, that paved the way for the ending of the war.

Nevertheless, the war forced a withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, and it was agreed to put the province under the administration of the United Nations, with the European Union taking on the responsibility for its economic rehabilitation and development. But this was little more than sweeping the difficult issues under the carpet while a short-term victory was proclaimed.

If there is a lesson of Kosovo so far, building on the lessons of Bosnia, it is that conflict resolution must always be seen as a primarily political process that concentrates on forging the necessary

compromises between the different parties to a conflict. In Bosnia, it took far too long until the United States, too, was prepared to see this, and over the Kosovo issue neither the European Union nor the United States has of yet been fully ready to do so.

After the conflict in Kosovo, it did not take long for southern Serbia and FYROM to come into the line of fire. Here, it can be argued that much too little was done to avert these conflicts, and that the attempts to deal with them as they exploded were initially much too feeble. Faced with the prospect of another regional catastrophe, however, it was possible for the European Union and NATO, and thus the United States, to come together on a strategy that led to a reasonable solution in southern Serbia and to the Ohrid Agreement in FYROM. But it was reactive conflict management rather than proactive conflict resolution that dominated these relative success stories.

The essential issue in the region remains the conflict between the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration, and this is reflected more brutally in Kosovo than anywhere else.

Western action made it possible for more than a million ethnic Albanians who had fled the country during the conflict to return, but could not prevent up to a quarter of a million ethnic minorities having to flee or being expelled after the United Nations and NATO had taken over responsibility. Whereas the Albanians were a repressed minority in Serbia before 1999, since then Serbs and others have been a repressed minority in Kosovo.

While it should be argued that Bosnia is a relative although much delayed success story, it is very difficult to portrait Kosovo in that light. We did not end ethnic cleansing – we simply reversed the tables in a century-long conflict over supremacy over this area. We did not solve the conflict – we swept it under the carpet in the hope that it would disappear.

This was amply demonstrated during the outbreak of violence in March this year. Out of 32 historic sites – Orthodox churches and monasteries – that the international forces of KFOR had to protect, no fewer than 28 were partially or wholly destroyed within a matter of hours. And to this should be added the economic dimension. Unemployment in Kosovo, difficult to measure as it is, is probably well over 50 per cent, with young men having few options but to go into other types of activities.

With pressures for independence increasing, a policy more by drift than design moving in this direction, we should be aware of

the risks of setting up a state destined for failure. That failure would, in that case, be ours as much as theirs.

While an essential lesson of the Balkans is that the European Union and the United States have to be in agreement to be able to show results, another lesson is that it is better if the European Union tries to exercise leadership over the necessary political processes. But during the first five years of ESDP, more effort seems to have gone into the building of the military and other instruments for conflict control than into the development of the political instruments necessary for true conflict resolution.

While the June 2003 European Council in Thessaloniki declared that all countries of the region – whichever they might one day be – had the option of membership in the European Union, it is much less clear how the road from here to there, which is likely to be long and difficult, should be built. As a Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Balkans, I tried to arouse interest in a dialogue on how to move the Kosovo issue forward towards some sort of self-sustaining stability, but was met with as little interest in Brussels as in Washington. The price for that might yet have to be paid.

The different issues facing us in the Balkans are little different from the ones we are confronting in other parts of the post-Ottoman area. And in looking at lessons to be learnt from the past five years, one cannot avoid mentioning the painful failure to bring about a peaceful reunification of Cyprus. Here, all of the instruments of the European Union, in harmony with the United States, and using the authority and skill of the United Nations, should have succeeded. Still, failure is a fact, and lessons must be drawn.

The failure of Cyprus was the failure to adopt a sufficiently balanced package of incentives and disincentives for both parts of the island. While there was a substantial package of both for Turkish-run Northern Cyprus as well as for Turkey itself, there was not anything similar for the Greek-run part of the island. The vocal nationalist forces among the Greeks were then able to safely attack all the compromises necessarily inherent in any effort to settle a conflict like this, while having to fear no negative consequences for their refusal to accept a settlement heavily endorsed by both the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the European Union.

Now, the future of the Cyprus conflict is up in the air. So far, the painful failure and its consequences have not been faced, nor have

we seen much debate on how to carry the issue forward. It seems likely that we will see a gradual normalisation of relations with the recently more integration-inclined Turkish part of Cyprus, but whether this will be accepted as the logical consequence of refusal to compromise by the Greek parties, and whether the Union has imported a failure that will plague it for years to come, will remain open questions.

The failures so far of Kosovo and Cyprus could well have consequences for the entire region between Bihac in the north-west and Basra in the south-east. The issue of the position of the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq in the future constitutional arrangement of the country have not been fully resolved, but must be if Iraq is to survive the critical year of 2005. And one would be unwise to ignore the risk that what is done with Kosovo will have consequences, over time, for both FYROM and Bosnia. Memories are often long in regions where history is so obviously present.

Much of the attention in Brussels during these years has been devoted to setting up institutional structures and managing the first limited operations. And it is not unnatural that the first High Representative/Secretary-General has had to concentrate a large amount of his energies on just establishing the function and getting it accepted by both the member countries and the outside world.

But the lesson of these years is clearly that far more attention needs to be given to proactive political conflict resolution if we are to avoid further failures in the EU's 'near abroad'. It is certainly necessary to build up both the institutions and the instruments substantially, and I guess other contributions will focus primarily on these needs. But the hardware of institutions and instruments will achieve little without the 'software' of proper policies, and it is in these areas that I see the largest cause for concern when looking ahead.

The entire post-Ottoman area is simmering with issues that are only partly resolved. And on the periphery of Russia, which is also the 'near abroad' of the European Union, we will be confronting challenges in Moldova as well as in the Caucasus. Beyond these, of course, lie all the unresolved issues of the old Fertile Crescent of Mesopotamia and Palestine.

The European Security Strategy focused attention on a number of the so-called 'new security threats', and sought to develop a more coherent approach to them. But as this process is carried for-

ward, it is important not to neglect the numerous 'old' issues that are to be found in the areas on the periphery of Europe.

If we are not successful here, we are unlikely to be taken seriously elsewhere. And this will require increased attention to the policy issues.

We have seen the beta version of the software of ESDP. As expected, there are bugs and deficiencies to be fixed. If they are not, the hardware will not produce what we expect it to.

11

Elmar Brok & Norbert Gresch

The period of time from when the ESDP was first conceived at the European Council summits in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 to its first stabilisation operations in crisis regions in the Balkans and Africa in 2003/04 coincides almost exactly with the fifth legislative term of the European Parliament (EP).

After five years of involvement by Parliament with this new policy area, the appearance of military uniforms in the corridors of the European institutions in Brussels still creates a somewhat odd impression, rather than being seen as normal. However, the uncertainty of the early years, reflecting the prevailing political culture, has given way to an increasingly assured approach when dealing with the security policy dimension of the EU. The EU is not NATO, and Brussels is not the Pentagon. However, as the fifth term of the EP draws to a close, it is starting to become clear what role, involving global responsibilities, the EU has the potential to play on the international stage in 2010, with its own security policy strategy and its own military capabilities. What is emerging is a Union that is primarily concerned with conflict prevention and negotiated solutions but is also in a position to solve conflicts by military means, where authorised to do so by the UN.

The EP has adopted two key reports setting out its position on the development of the ESDP, and has sought to ensure that the policy has the necessary democratic legitimacy.

The report by Catherine Lalumière adopted at the end of 2000[1] was first and foremost intended to achieve a consensus that military issues should in future be a subject for parliamentary debate, and that the EP should support the headline goal set in Helsinki of the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men.

Such consensus could not be taken for granted. The issue of the use of military force was a very sensitive one for some political groups, firstly because the enlargement of the Union to include the neutral countries Austria, Finland and Sweden complicated the debate, and also because, whilst the war in Kosovo had helped

1. Lalumière report of 21 November 2000 on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy after Cologne and Helsinki, A5-0339/2000.

give birth to the ESDP, it could not be regarded as providing a guide for the future use of military force in view of the absence of a UN mandate.

Within the context of these efforts to reach a consensus on the ESDP within the EP in 1999/2000, it should be borne in mind that it was also at that time that Javier Solana assumed the newly created office of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Chris Patten became the new Commissioner responsible for external relations.

Whilst Javier Solana managed the setting-up of the new institutional security structures (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, Military Staff, Policy Unit, Situation Centre), Chris Patten introduced extensive reforms within the Commission in order to restructure its external policy instruments, implementing measures long called for by the EP in the light of the experience with reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina (more clearly structured aid programmes from a budgetary perspective, creation of an agency for reconstruction, establishment of Europe Aid, creation of the 'Rapid Reaction Mechanism' to provide accelerated financing, introduction of conditionality into association and cooperation agreements with the Balkan countries).

During this period, not least thanks to intensive exchanges of views with Mr Patten and Mr Solana in the EP, the concept of 'conflict prevention' evolved from a mere theoretical concept into an action-oriented approach of European foreign and security policy.

When one looks today at the many EU instruments which exist for conflict prevention, civilian crisis management, reconstruction and nation-building, it is all too easy to forget that these instruments were only created in the light of the post-Dayton experience with reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the basis of conflictive-constructive interplay between the Parliament and the Commission. Today they need to be made more efficient, simple and coherent.

It was only the parallelism between the development of civilian instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management, and the goal of establishing a rapid military intervention force to be used in Petersberg-type operations, which provided the necessary basis within the EP for achieving a broad consensus on the Lalumière report.

The EP made it clear in that report that the ESDP was subject to the primacy of the CFSP, but that Parliament did not rule out the

use of military force in international crisis management when all diplomatic means had been exhausted and where there was an appropriate mandate from the UN Security Council. Taking these principles as its basis, Parliament went on to point out the shortcomings in EU member states' military equipment highlighted by the war in Kosovo, and the lack of interoperability of their forces with those of the United States as well as amongst themselves.

The report by Philippe Morillon adopted in March 2003, which already had the object of assimilating the new insights into the changed security situation post-11 September 2001, had to address the question of Europe's capacity to operate as part of a military coalition with the United States in the light of the experience in Afghanistan, and was strongly influenced by the war in Iraq.

In this report, Parliament reaffirmed its view that 'only a Union which has available a whole range of crisis prevention and management tools and clearly defined foreign policy objectives and interests, including efficient, interoperable military capabilities, will be able to become an independent actor in world affairs and remain a reliable partner within the transatlantic relationship' (para. 5).[2]

The political objective of the report was to maintain the consensus achieved thus far within Parliament on the ESDP in the face of the deep divisions between member states on the pre-emptive war waged by the United States on Iraq.

The report was accordingly also intended to influence the discussion taking place at the same time within the European Convention's Barnier Working Group on Defence, and it supported the proposals to adjust the Petersberg tasks to the new threats, such as failing states and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to create a European armaments agency, to make possible enhanced cooperation between member states in the area of security and defence policy, to introduce a solidarity clause to protect the civilian population in the event of terrorist attack and to create the office of European foreign minister.

However, the main message of the Morillon report was that if Europe was to be seen as a credible actor on the international stage and to be treated as an equal partner by the United States, it needed modern military capabilities which would maintain its capacity to form part of a coalition within NATO in the area of combat operations and ensure that the Europeans' role was not

2. Morillon report of 27 March 2003 on the new European security and defence architecture – priorities and deficiencies, A5-0111/2003.

reduced to that of performing 'peacekeeping' or 'clear-up' operations.

Such capabilities do not come free of charge. However, like the Council of Ministers, the Parliament was unable to agree on a percentage of GNP, but rather spoke of 'adequate' financing of military expenditure. There was, however, a consensus that what was even more important was to rationalise procurement through greater cooperation between states and multinational pooling of armed forces. EU member states have collectively the second biggest military budget (some €160 billion) in the world after the United States. If the money was spent in a cost-effective and forward-looking way, and if the member states avoided duplication and abandoned outdated armed forces concepts, this sum should be sufficient both for the territorial defence of the European population and for the establishment of an efficient, interoperable and standardised European intervention force for international crisis management.

However, the latest terrorist threats and the fact that regions of crisis and conflict are in increasingly close proximity to the external borders of the enlarged EU illustrate that the peace dividend hoped for at the end of the Cold War has long vanished, and that Europe's defence policy would need around 2 per cent of GNP to provide a solid financing basis.

Possibly one of the most important stages in the development of the ESDP was the agreement reached between the EU and NATO in the 'Berlin-plus' agreement of December 2002 on guaranteed access for the EU to NATO's planning and command infrastructure in SHAPE. An interesting anecdote may be given in this connection regarding correspondence between the EP Foreign Affairs Committee and DSACEUR, Admiral Feist, in August 2003. The latter's reply bore the letterhead 'EU-Operation Headquarters'– SHAPE, Mons, stressing his role as commander of EU military operations in FYROM (Macedonia).

Since the positive experience with Operation *Concordia*, suspicion and mistrust between NATO and the EU appear to have been gradually removed and replaced by normal working relations. The joint meetings of the military committees of the two organisations contribute to this, as do the exchanges of officers which take place between the respective staffs.

With regard to planning and command capabilities, it is important not to lose sight of the difference in the scale of the two

organisations: whilst some 3,000 officers are employed at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, around 200 personnel carry out command and planning duties within the EU's military staff in the Cortenbergh building in Brussels. At a joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP and three committees of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on 17 February 2004 in Brussels, DSACEUR and Major-General Herreweghe of the EU military staff were able to state that the military were ready to cooperate closely, and that 50 years of joint NATO practice was shaping their working relations; at the same time, all modernisation of European armed forces is also helping to develop the ESDP and to strengthen the European pillar within NATO.

In addition, the complementary function of NATO and the EU in international crisis management is becoming increasingly clear. This is most apparent in the Balkans, where to date the work has been divided up in the following way: NATO provides security by military means (SFOR, KFOR) and the EU organises civilian reconstruction, assumes policing duties and opens the way to political and economic development. The replacement of SFOR by a EUFOR from 2005 is merely the next logical step for the EU, bringing together in its hands all instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management in its geographically closest and politically most important neighbouring region. This not only represents an important step in the coming of age of the ESDP; it will also help shape the future of the EU in terms of playing a comprehensive role on the international stage.

The second theatre which provides a positive example of NATO and the EU working together in ways which complement each other is Afghanistan.[3] With the transformation of the ISAF[4] into a NATO operation under European command, comprising mainly European soldiers, and with the EU as the biggest contributor to economic and state reconstruction, the mutually reinforcing complementary role of NATO and the EU is clearly emerging.

In Iraq, too, it is becoming increasingly clear that war is more than just a one-off shooting exercise; without military stabilisation missions and nation-building, there is a danger of failure to achieve the political goal for which war was waged.

Whilst operations on the 'Berlin-plus' model are the most likely option for future action – not least because they are favoured by Britain, as was recently confirmed by Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon, speaking before the EP Foreign Affairs

3. See Brok/Gresch 'Afghanistan – Lehren für ein komplementäres Zusammenwirken von NATO und EU im internationalen Krisenmanagement – Der ISAF-Einsatz der Bundeswehr aus europäischer Sicht' (Afghanistan – Lessons in mutually complementing cooperation between NATO and the EU in international crisis management – ISAF operations by the Bundeswehr from a European perspective'): *German Defense Mirror*, 2004.

4. International Security Assistance Force.

Committee[5] – EU operations conducted autonomously, like *Artemis* in the summer of 2003 in the DRC, remain perfectly valid options.

With Operation *Artemis*, in the Ituri region, the EU demonstrated that it was entirely capable of conducting military crisis management operations independently, at the request of the UN, operating from national headquarters organised on a multilateral basis – in this particular instance, France was the lead nation. The aim was also to give a political signal that Africa could no longer be left on its own as the 'forgotten continent', and must in future again be included within the sphere of responsibility of European policy. The planned police support operation in Kinshasa is intended to give a further signal that failing states and terrorism in Africa are also of importance to Europe's security.

Already at an early stage, the EP highlighted the importance for the ESDP of a rationalised, competitive European armaments industry. The Commission Communication, presented in 2003, 'European defence – industrial and market issues'[6] referred back to an initiative by the EP.[7] In its report of December 2003 on this subject,[8] Parliament supported the setting up of a European armaments agency and called for the progressive establishment of a European armaments market. Parliament sees this as a good opportunity to improve the equipping and arming of European forces for crisis operations. Standardisation of equipment and procedures, which would reduce costs and provide greater interoperability between forces, is needed. In the face of tight public budgets, the discussion which has already begun on role-specialisation and pooling of resources in the military field should be pursued, and extended to other security forces such as the police, paramilitary forces and border police.

One of the tasks of the ESDP for the next five years will include not only optimising military capabilities and increasing the number of soldiers available to be deployed for crisis operations – within the NATO context, this currently amounts to only 55,000, out of a total 1.4 million European soldiers – but also stepping up the interlinking of military and civilian capabilities. Europe could lead the way in this area, just as the United States has in the area of network-centric warfare.

A civilian component was already incorporated into the original ESDP concept, concerning the areas of policing, the rule of law, modernisation of administration and civilian protection. It is not

5. Geoffrey Hoon before the EP Foreign Affairs Committee on 30 March 2004 in Strasbourg.

6. Commission report of 11 March 2003 on European defence – industrial and market issues – Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy (COM(2003) 113).

7. Resolution of 10 April 2002 on European defence industries, P5 TA((2002)0172.

8. Queiró report of 6 November 2003 on European defence – industrial and market issues – Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy, A5-0370/2003.

by chance that the first ESDP operations were police missions (in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia).

However, in the wake of 11 September 2001, and following on from the European Security Strategy (ESS) drawn up after the war in Iraq, which identifies five key threats –terrorism, illegal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime – it will be necessary in future to significantly restructure the whole of the security sector and those playing a part in it (military, police, border police, civil defence, intelligence services, paramilitary units).

The attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 demonstrated that it is not only in the Hindu Kush that the security of our citizens must be defended, but that it is also necessary to ensure their protection in our own cities. The connection occurs where the terrorist threat is imported from the training camps of failing states into our cities.

The European Security Strategy presented by Javier Solana and adopted by the EU heads of state or government in December 2003 highlighted this link. The ESS is probably the most important EU document on foreign, security and defence policy since Helsinki 1999.

In conjunction with the proposals put forward by the European Convention regarding institutional aspects, it provides a good basis for mobilising the political will needed to translate political concepts into concrete action. The British-French initiative on the establishment of multinational 'battle groups' of respectively 1,500 men represents such a step, designed to ensure that the EU has the necessary capability to react to crises in order to be a credible international player.

The issue of the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP is, of course, of particular importance to the EP. Even following the adoption of a new Constitution, Parliament's formal rights will be limited to being informed and consulted on basic developments, and to budgetary powers in respect of the civilian element of the ESDP, for example the appropriation for the joint costs of police missions.

This situation is unsatisfactory – all the more so, given that decisions on arms procurement and equipping of armed forces, as well as the sending of soldiers to take part in European operations, fall within the competence of the national parliaments. This divided responsibility between the national parliaments and the

EP, which has responsibility in particular for all expenditure programmes from the Community budget and for the CFSP budget, entails the risk of inadequate parliamentary control.

The EP has sought to minimise this risk by actively requesting to be informed pursuant to Article 21 of the TEU, and by making its Foreign Affairs Committee, which has responsibility for security and defence policy, a central parliamentary point of contact between the Council, the Commission and the military. It is important for Parliament to develop its own competence in security policy matters. In the next legislative term its Foreign Affairs Committee will therefore be supported by a subcommittee on security and defence.

Traditionally, the Foreign Affairs Committee is kept regularly informed by the Commission (Patten on 22 occasions) and the Presidency (its Foreign Minister on 19 occasions, Minister of State for European Affairs on 14 occasions). Since the French presidency in 2000, defence ministers have also regularly given information to the Parliament (on a total of 9 occasions). The High Representative Javier Solana has appeared 10 times before the Committee and has often spoken and answered questions in plenary at times of crisis (Middle East, Iran, Iraq, terrorism – 11 times). On the military side, information has been provided by the Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General Hägglund, the chief of the Military Staff, Lieutenant-General Schuwirth, and his deputy, Major-General Herreweghe, and on the NATO side by its Secretary-General (Lord Robertson and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer) and by DSACEUR, Admiral Rainer Feist.

The setting-up of a permanent delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in December 2001 has proved particularly useful[9]. The EP, which is an associate member of the NATO PA, participates with 10 members in the latter's spring and autumn sessions, and each February the Foreign Affairs Committee invites three NATO PA committees to a joint meeting in Brussels in order to exchange views on ESDP issues. The work of this delegation, which is also regarded by the political groups as very productive, has brought a breath of security culture into the EP, which should undoubtedly be enhanced by the new subcommittee on security and defence.

An interesting recent development has been that the Council, which for a long time was more of a mysterious metaphorical 'black box' than a political partner for the Parliament in the area of

9. Previously, the EP had only been represented on an ad hoc basis at NATO PA sessions, with respectively three members.

the CFSP, is increasingly opening up to the Parliament. Director-General Robert Cooper and the staff responsible for ESDP operations, heads of operations and special representatives are increasingly at the disposal of the Committee. In addition, since the 2003 budget procedure, regular information is being provided to the bureaux of the Foreign Affairs and Budget Committees on current issues relating to CFSP financing. The trigger for this was the issue of financing of the joint costs of the police mission in Macedonia, when Parliament linked the release of funds to being better informed in advance on future operations. This is important, as it allows Parliament to deliver an opinion on planned ESDP missions on the basis of solid information and in its own right, given that it is not formally consulted on joint actions by the Council, a situation which it has repeatedly criticised.

The setting up of a special committee for access by Parliament to intelligence information pursuant to the Interinstitutional Agreement between the Council and Parliament of 20 November 2002[10] completes Parliament's improved access to information.

The special committee comprises the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and four other members. It meets approximately every six weeks with the High Representative or his representative to discuss confidential information.

The ESDP requires wide parliamentary legitimation. War operations cannot be conducted against the wishes of the people. Plausible reasons must be given for spending money on weapons, and security measures must be in accordance with people's need to be protected. It is the task of parliaments to conduct this debate.

The EP therefore takes an extremely critical view of the establishment of an additional budget to finance the joint costs of EU military operations by the member states. The 'Athena' fund does not come within the parliamentary scrutiny of either national parliaments or the EP. Different financing mechanisms of this kind for the joint costs of civilian and military operations do nothing for the coherence and transparency of European crisis management.

Directly after the events of 11 September 2001, the EP Foreign Affairs Committee invited representatives of foreign affairs and defence committees of national parliaments to take part in a joint meeting with Javier Solana and Chris Patten, and Louis Michel on behalf of the Belgian Presidency, in order to discuss the European position on the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

10. Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy, OJ C 298, 30.11.2002, pp. 1-3.

Carrying the joint parliamentary opinion of the EP and the national parliaments with them in their hand luggage, the Troika travelled the next day to Washington and, the following weekend, at an extraordinary European Council summit in Brussels on 21 September, a joint declaration by the Council, Commission and Parliament on behalf of the EU on the fight against international terrorism was issued.[11] Since then, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP has invited the foreign affairs and defence committees of national parliaments at least twice a year to joint meetings in Brussels in order to discuss current CFSP and ESDP issues with Mr Patten, Mr Solana, the Presidency or senior military officers with functions within the EU or NATO. This practice has proved valuable. It should be further stepped up in the new legislative term, with quarterly joint meetings between the EP and national parliaments, along with an annual meeting between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly under the chairmanship of the latter's president.

Foreign and security policy is the last major 'construction site' in the building of the European Union. Javier Solana writes that a Union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's gross national product has responsibility for global security. Above all, however, this means that it must also assume responsibility for the protection of its own population. If it is true that international terrorism has blurred the dividing line between internal and external, this necessarily also has implications for the orientation of the ESDP.

For the EP, as well as for the Union, it is essential to maintain and strengthen the consensus on the ESDP achieved to date following enlargement on 1 May 2004, and to ensure that by 2010 the construction site has been transformed into a solid building.

11. See Brok annual report of 11 September 2002 on the CFSP, A5-0296/2002.

12

Robert Cooper

Five years is a short period for security and defence policy: the time horizons of defence planners usually run into decades. This time is all the shorter when one bears in mind that ESDP started from nothing and that everything had to be agreed, first at 15, later at 25. Moreover, there is no member state for which ESDP is central to its defence or security policy – at least not for the time being. Where member states are in the military structure of NATO that is likely to be their first priority in international terms. Thus, although it forms an important element in the long-term vision of the European Union for many member states, ESDP began as a marginal existence in the minds of some defence ministries and defence planners. Nor was ESDP created to deal with a specific, visible threat, as was the case with NATO: a threat would have had a galvanising effect. Instead ESDP belongs to the post-Cold War world, where forces have to be created against possible contingencies rather than concrete threats. In the long term this may be a strength, but for an organisation starting from nothing it is not an advantage.

In addition to these structural difficulties, ESDP had to contend with a number of conjunctural problems. For instance, its birth came at a difficult moment in relations between the EU and Turkey. It was only as these problems were resolved that a sound EU-NATO relationship could be established. Given that the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements are part of the basic construction of ESDP, this was essential for ESDP to go forward. The five years since its birth have also seen the usual ups and downs of the transatlantic relationship, including an especially difficult period in connection with the war in Iraq. This too has meant potential problems for ESDP, for which some degree of US support is a necessity.

The third set of difficulties that ESDP had to face arises from the nature of the EU itself. The EU was never designed as a foreign policy organisation in the traditional sense. Although its objec-

tives have always been political, the EU was created to do away with foreign policy in its traditional sense of alliances and conflicts. Whereas almost every other long-standing association of states has had external or military policy as its main objective, the EU's focus is deliberately centred on internal policy issues. Even the common commercial policy is in some sense no more than the external consequence of the single internal market. The EU has played a vital strategic role in establishing a new sort of relationship among the countries of Europe but in its external dealings it has frequently lacked strategic focus. For example, policy towards Yugoslavia was for years a matter of tariff quotas and subsidies for projects in Yugoslavia, leaving Europe badly unprepared for the political crises of the 1990s. 'European Political Cooperation' existed alongside community policy but seemed often only distantly connected – except occasionally when member states imposed sanctions – and was in any case a relatively anaemic existence. Within the EU machinery in Brussels there was little or no strategic culture.

Against this unpromising background ESDP has made astonishing progress. The creation of the post of High Representative for CFSP gave a focus to foreign policy (though there are sufficient competing voices to ensure that the focus is still not as sharp as it should be). With the High Representative came the Policy Unit, and out of the Policy Unit grew the Situation Centre and intelligence collaboration. Military staff and civilian staff have grown, so that there are perhaps some 200 more people in the Council Secretariat working on military and security issues than was the case five years ago. In addition, the Political and Security Committee and its supporting committees have also been established. All of this has required additional personnel and organisation on the part of each of the EU member states (not to mention the Commission).

It has also been remarkable to see how, when the basis for an agreement with NATO was finally achieved, in a period of a few weeks the EU reached seven separate agreements with NATO to enable the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements to function. Agreements between two multilateral organisations, one with 19 and the other with 15 (now 25) members, each with its own staff, are normally likely to take years to negotiate.

The relationship between the EU and NATO has not yet fully worked itself out – not a surprise, since both organisations are in

transition. But striking progress is being made, notably in the context of a possible operation in Bosnia. As always, the practice is proving easier than the theory.

In the two-and-a-half years since that agreement, the EU has launched two military operations and two civilian operations (both of the latter are ongoing). And there is more in the pipeline. This level of activity is impressive in the light both of the short time since ESDP started and of the relatively limited resources available.

Each of these operations has brought its own particular value and its own lessons. Operation *Concordia* in FYROM was mounted rapidly while the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements were being negotiated. It taught a number of lessons both about working with NATO and about EU coordination. Some of these should be valuable in the context of an operation in Bosnia. In Operation *Artemis* we surprised ourselves with the speed with which it proved possible to respond to a request from the UN. We learned a lot about the pros and cons of autonomous operations using an EU national headquarters (it would be interesting to know whether a 'Berlin-plus' operation could be mounted so quickly), and something also of the political impact that an EU military presence on the ground can make.

Both of the military operations had one somewhat unusual feature: that they came to an end. Other operations in the Balkans and elsewhere which are conceived as short deployments often in fact last for years. Terminating operations is not always easy. Operation *Artemis* is the only military operation of which I have had direct experience that ended exactly on time.

The two police operations have also taught us both positive and negative lessons. I am impressed by the EUPM's emphasis on quality: police officers have been selected according to specific job descriptions in a far more rigorous fashion than has usually happened with UN police missions. This operation, involving approximately 500 police officers for a duration of three years, is a striking example of something that the EU can do which probably no member state could sustain on its own. Both EUPM in Bosnia and Operation *Proxima* in FYROM have also demonstrated the difficulties of operating within a system (for example on procurement) which was not originally designed for crisis management.

There are still some who feel that civilian operations by the EU are a duplication of work already done by the Commission.

Without wishing to enter into this argument, it is at least worth underlining that missions set up by the Council using manpower directly generated by member states produce – in cooperation with the Commission – a higher degree of commitment and ownership than do the more arms-length programmes that the Commission organises. It seems likely that they also make a greater impact on the ground.

In the European Security Strategy – before ESDP was it ever thinkable that there would have been such a document? – the EU has committed itself to being more active, more capable and more coherent. How does it measure against these tests?

The record of the last five years, and especially of the last two-and-a-half, is remarkable for its activity. What matters is not just the quantity of activity but its quality. There is no doubt that the EU has become a more political and, in a sense, a more serious organisation. If a foreign policy is going to be serious, it must have at the back of its mind the possibility of force, the *ultima ratio*. When a country or an organisation contemplates the deployment of forces, the atmosphere changes, ambiguity ceases to be an option, decisions go up to the highest levels: the risks, costs and commitment are of a different order from those involved in other actions – making statements or giving aid. So, correspondingly is the impact on the ground where the forces are deployed – in a positive or a negative sense. The process of building the dimension of force into EU foreign policy has only just begun but its impact is already visible. In areas such as non-proliferation, the EU is more active than before; at the UN it is taken more seriously. But there is still some way to go.

How far the EU goes will depend on capabilities. Progress here has been less obvious. Many important elements in the Headline Goal remain unfulfilled and plans to fulfil them are not clear. Nevertheless progress is being made in designing and equipping forces for rapid deployment, notably through the 'battle group' concept – a series of small force packages designed specifically for fast deployment on, for example, peacekeeeping missions. The (forthcoming) establishment of a Capabilities Agency is a further major step. But this also represents a promise rather than an achievement. Delivering results in this area will be the most important test for ESDP.

No less important than military capabilities are diplomatic capabilities. Here the reference in the Constitution to an External Action Service has excited a good deal of interest. Again, it remains to be seen how far and how fast this project can go. It is only against the background of a more unified foreign policy that ESDP can make any sense.

In coherence, too, there is still a long way to go among the Council, Commission and member states. Some of the answers may lie in the Constitutional Treaty. The creation of a civilian-military planning cell is also potentially important. But as always we shall have to see how much of the potential is delivered.

So there is a long way to go. But we should be proud of the first steps. All in all it is difficult to imagine a better start.

Judy Dempsey

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During the late 1980s, despite the pending implosion of the Balkans and the collapse of the communist system in the Soviet Union, European Union ambassadors shunned the 'D' word. Whenever the mere mention of 'defence' was raised, some ambassadors would simply walk out of the discussion. The 'D' word was taboo. Its language belonged to the capitals, not to Brussels EU-speak.

The EU's security and defence policy has come a long way since then. Defence and security are now the vernacular of the EU. The EU, which started to build its defence institutions from scratch after the Nice summit in December 2000, has almost 200 officers and other military personnel at its headquarters in Brussels. It also has the go-ahead from the member states to establish its own planning unit in the city. It is trying to put meat onto the new defence agency which will have the unenviable task of trying to coordinate defence spending and actually produce capabilities for Europe that are interoperable. In other words, the defence agency will be saddled with the task of cutting out duplication.

Europe's defence ambitions are visible on the ground too: an EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a small military mission in Macedonia, last summer's Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo and, later this year, the EU will take over the large NATO-led mission in Bosnia. EU diplomats insist these examples show that Europe's security and defence policy is taking shape.

The aim of this short paper is not, however, to praise such progress. It is rather to highlight the contradictions and tensions in trying to push forward a security and defence policy for Europe. Indeed, Javier Solana's European Security Strategy will only have any lasting impact if member states agree over what they mean by security, what they mean by defence and above all, what they mean by the EU being a 'global actor'.

This is where a new constitutional treaty for Europe, once agreed and ratified, could have enormous significance for defence. There is already agreement among member states to have 'enhanced cooperation' in defence matters. This would allow a group of countries to take the lead on certain initiatives, as happened with monetary union and the Schengen system that abolished border controls among most EU member states.

The war in Iraq, too, has played a part in concentrating the EU's mind, at least over defence issues. Eurobarometer polls consistently show how EU citizens want a stronger defence identity for the EU and not to be completely dependent on the United States, but not to compete with it either. The problem arises when it comes to spending more on defence: the usual response is 'no'.

Curiously, despite this it has been defence and security issues that have made far more progress than EU foreign policy. The Commission, the executive arm of the EU (for some matters) and the Council that represents the member states, have repeatedly clashed or protected their 'fiefdoms' on Russia, China, the 'wider Europe' or even *Galileo*, the EU's satellite navigation system. Both institutions waste resources and time in drawing up separate reports and strategy papers on issues that should be common. The result is that decisions are either delayed or watered down in order to reach consensus. There is a real hope that if the posts of Javier Solana and Chris Patten, the outgoing Commissioner for External Relations, are merged, decision-making will be speeded up and the endless institutional in-fighting will be reduced.

The fact, is that no matter what happens in Iraq, or indeed whether President George W. Bush is re-elected in the autumn, Europe's foreign policy will remain weak for some time until national governments bequeath real powers to any future European foreign minister – assuming that the Constitution is ratified.

The big impetus for Europe to have a strong security and defence policy came from Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, and Jacques Chirac, French President. At their landmark meeting at St-Malo, in December 1998, they spelt out the need for Europe to have its own 'rapid reaction force'. The appalling inability of Europe to act during the Balkans wars reinforced the view in London and Paris that the EU had to have a defence capability of its own.

Backed by the member states, the EU then agreed to create a 60,000-strong force, capable of being deployed within 60 days. The idea was lauded at the time, as if this was the panacea to all of Europe's weaknesses on security and defence issues. The past few years have shown how those targets have been too unrealistic to reach.

The EU, for example, was not talking about only 60,000 troops, since that would mean at least 180,000, given the need for rotation. One has only to look at the difficulties the United States is experiencing in trying to have a three-monthly or even six-monthly rotation for just one pair of boots on the ground in Iraq. Soldiers have to be backed up by forces that feed them, protect them, transport them, heal them and allow them to sleep.

Second, and this continues to be one of the biggest problems dogging ESDP, there is a serious shortfall on capabilities, leaving aside the number of sufficiently trained troops needed for military or peacekeeping missions.

Europe lacks capabilities, particularly concerning strategic airlift, communications and logistics. When Germany agreed to send troops to Afghanistan as part of the UN-backed International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), command of which NATO took over in August 2003, it did not even have airlift for the troops. They were sent by train from Turkey, and bad weather held up their arrival. In other words, one of the big obstacles that have hampered Europe's security and defence policy has been unrealistically high expectations, inexperience and, in most cases, armed forces that have not been thoroughly restructured since the days of the Cold War. After years of haggling, the Europeans will by the end of this decade have their A400M airlift. In the meantime, they will have to continue to lease, or rely on NATO assets. If the EU is serious about becoming a global actor, its big priority should be restructuring its defence industry and armed forces. Without that, ESDP will have limited value.

Diplomats over at NATO headquarters on the other side of Brussels have little reason to rub their hands in glee, thinking that, just because the EU does not have capabilities, this can only be good news for the US-led military alliance. After all, the Alliance still regards Europe's future defence and security policy as a competitor or threat. Yet, the EU and NATO's defence capabilities are very

much two sides of the same coin. Following the two recent enlargements of the Alliance and the EU, 19 of the EU's 25 member states are members of NATO and 19 of NATO's 26 countries belong to the EU. Capability improvements on one side affect the other.

Another issue that still continues to dog ESDP is the ambiguities between London and Paris over the exact role of a security and defence policy. St-Malo was remarkable in the sense that it showed how Europe's two most important military powers could work together so as to develop a defence policy for the EU. Yet as soon as both leaders returned to their capitals, the then Clinton administration was on the telephone to Mr Blair demanding clarification of the precise role of ESDP. Madeleine Albright, at that time the US Secretary of State, ruled against any duplication of assets or any genuine independent defence policy for the EU. Any European defence project was not to compete with NATO.

This was one of the reasons why several member states, led by Britain, insisted that ESDP should have recourse to NATO's assets if the Alliance did not want to lead a mission and if Europe's defence ambitions were not seen to be competing with NATO. This was not, however, just about having access to much-needed capabilities. It was also about NATO keeping some kind of watch over any EU missions that choose to opt for what are known as 'Berlin-plus' arrangements. After all, under such rules, NATO would provide the planning in the person of the deputy head of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).

The EU rallied around the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements, and had it not been for the long and bitter rows between Greece and Turkey over what role Turkey would have in allowing the EU access to NATO assets, ESDP might have got off the ground sooner rather than later. The essence of Turkey's objection was the following. Like all NATO members, it has a veto power. It threatened to use its veto if the EU wanted access to NATO's assets unless Ankara had some say over how those assets would be used. The issue was finally resolved in 2002, paving the way for the EU and NATO to work together.

As for the United States, its attitude towards European defence has shifted a little. But in general it has been inconsistent, largely because NATO became a tug-of-war between the Pentagon and the State Department once the Bush administration was ensconced in the White House in early 2001. The problem with the

Administration is that it cannot make up its mind whether it supports a stronger and more robust European defence policy or a weak one. After all, the United States has insisted that Europe take over more of the burden-sharing, particularly in the Balkans. Yet until recently, when the EU made a big push to take over the NATO-led mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Pentagon baulked. On the one hand, the Pentagon wants to maintain political control over NATO; on the other, it has weakened the sense of NATO as a collective defence organisation by opting for coalitions of the willing.

These swings have repercussions for the EU's own defence policy, and particularly how Britain and France will cooperate in the future. On the former, the more the United States uses NATO as a mere toolbox, the more Alliance members may well start directing their resources to the EU. At the moment, the EU and NATO face a bizarre situation. Countries that are members of both organisations are being asked to contribute to both.

From an ideological point of view, Britain still views ESDP as the way to improve Europe's military capabilities, which will in turn strengthen the transatlantic link. France, however, believes that in the long term Europe should and could have its own independent defence capability.

Indeed, last year's EU Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was under French command, showed that the Europeans could conduct such a mission, rapidly and without making use of NATO assets. The United States was far from thrilled at the idea of the EU acting independently. On the other hand, it was not willing to intervene in any way in the DRC. The DRC operation showed that burden-sharing was possible and, given French and British experience in Africa, the United States accepted that NATO had little reason to be in that particular part of Africa.

Since the DRC mission, London and Paris have increasingly worked together over EU defence. The latest idea is to create 'battle groups' that would consist of small, highly mobile and flexible combat units. These would be capable of being deployed within several days and be trained to carry out highly specialised missions. Several EU countries have said they would be willing to contribute troops to these 'battle groups', which would operate under a United Nations mandate.

The 'battle group' concept shows just how far London and Paris have moved away from the top-heavy 60,000 troops idea in which the EU placed so much store during 2001 and 2002. That idea has been quietly dropped as Javier Solana, influenced by the new thinking emerging in London and Paris, focuses on smaller units and capabilities. Above all, Britain, as if returning to its original St-Malo roots, agreed at last December's EU summit that the Union should have its own independent military planning unit. Washington, to put it mildly, was surprised by Mr Blair's decision.

So after five years of ESDP, Europe is taking a hard look at past progress and future challenges. First, there is now consensus that EU defence will have limited success and influence if Europe's armed forces are not restructured. Europeans inside both the EU and NATO agree that the EU – and NATO – has only limited capacity to operate outside Europe. If the Solana doctrine is to be taken seriously, then it is time it was explained to the public that the EU must have the means and capabilities to intervene, for example, in Dafur, Sudan, where hundreds of thousands have become homeless and victims of ethnic violence and power politics over oil.

Second, the EU is still weak at delivering. One of the components of ESDP is literally providing security. In this area, the EU launched its first ever police mission in Bosnia a year ago. The aim was to train a Bosnian police force, yet to date only around 75 per cent of the committed police forces have been put on the ground. At the same time, the member states are still at odds over the role and mandate of the officers. One reason is that some police forces in Europe are under the interior ministry while others come under the defence ministry. Some are armed, others not. These differences make coordination and interoperability very difficult. They also show the need for the EU to have a much larger and dedicated police training centre if, again, the EU believes that it would follow up war and conflict with institution- and state-building.

This brings me to my other point; the EU is quick to criticise the United States for its failures in state-building, but in post-conflict periods the EU has not been very good at it either.

Undoubtedly, the EU enlargement process that brought in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could be cited as a tremendous success for state- and institution-building on the part of those countries themselves, with help from the EU. It is true that these countries emerged from 50 years of one-party rule, with

weak civil societies and independent institutions. But they did not emerge from war, unlike the Balkans.

The EU's CFSP and ESDP have been very slow to address institution-building, for which the CFSP's budgets are far too low. And while the EU rightly focused on rebuilding the infrastructure of the Balkans after the wars – and infrastructures are visible and good publicity for the donor – that is no substitute for institution-building, as the Balkans and Afghanistan show.

This is why the Solana security strategy is actually very important. It is all very well, as it implies, to intervene in a conflict, but if the EU is not ready to remain in the region and stay the course in building impartial police and judiciary institutions, then its philosophy of conflict prevention and crisis management will run into the sand. It will make a mockery of the EU's attempts to set a precedent in combining the 'hard' and 'soft' tools that are defence and diplomacy.

Lamberto Dini

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Security and defence policy enriches the European Union with new goals, even if the definition of its conceptual foundations and operational instruments is far from complete. The process is going ahead in the shadow of two major crises, in Afghanistan and Iraq, which, although far from Europe's borders, none the less project new threats. At the same time, opinion polls in every European country confirm that this is the test-bed for a new legitimacy for the European Union and the formation of a consensus among its citizens with regard to its objectives and ambitions.

International developments have already produced a significant narrowing of the once wide gaps within the Union between positions and political cultures, between nuclear and non-nuclear countries, between neutral countries and members of a military alliance, and between countries with conscript and professional armies. The convergence between the two major powers, France and the United Kingdom, has given new impetus to a change that had already been under way since the Treaty of Amsterdam; a change that presages an almost inevitable point of arrival: the integration of the mechanisms of defence against the new threats, in contrast with the evident limitations of purely national responses and their increasing inadequacy.

The assessment of the progress made so far touches on various aspects of the common action in defence of shared values, centred on the primacy of democracy and the market economy. The Constitution being negotiated is not the end of the journey but it is undoubtedly an important intermediate stage, the maturation of a long endeavour that has made it possible to narrow the differences between such fundamentally different positions. The differences that remain in the ideas of the individual member states and the means available to them make it essential in the security and defence field to enhance the decision-making capability of the European Union (the way the Council works), its credibility (the

European Armaments Agency) and its flexibility (strengthened cooperation), by means of institutional solutions that have so far remained incomplete, most recently in the Treaty of Nice.

When looking at the whole process, the aspects that stand out are those of an institutional nature and the political willingness of the member states to make a qualitative leap in pooling sovereign prerogatives that are considered as pertaining more than any others exclusively to the nation-state. In my opinion, however, there are two essential factors that will determine the success or failure of this key element of the process of integration: cohesion within the Union and transatlantic solidarity.

European defence has advanced in a context of new threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the breakdown of multiethnic states) compared with the traditional safeguarding of the member states' sovereignty and national borders, which was the very essence of security during the Cold War.

Terrorism, which some European countries had known and combated as a purely national phenomenon, has gone global, acquired popular support in not a few parts of the world, become capable of perpetrating mass killings, and is rich in resources and politically lucid. Even when terrorism remains within its traditional political and geographical boundaries, it is useless to ask for whom the bell tolls – it tolls for all of us. Terrorism threatens open societies, such as those of Europe, which, moreover, have created vast areas for the free movement of persons and goods. The Union has less scope than other countries, certainly less than the United States, to turn inwards on itself and reduce its exposure to risks whose nerve centres are just beyond its borders in a chain of crises stretching from the Gulf to the western limits of the Mediterranean.

The war of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004 is simultaneously anti-Western and inter-Islamic. The intention is not only to strike a blow against the democratic model but also to break its links with a part of the Arab world. The aims include nuclear proliferation and the control of oil resources. Islam, a religion whose desert origins nourish it with sudden storms and mirages, is used as a fulcrum.

Closer to home, in the Balkans, there is a mixture of fanatic independence fighters and hardened criminals. And if we took to dividing up states once more, all the areas could be redrawn:

Macedonia, for example, where the different ethnic groups live together precariously, or Bosnia, a federation with little cohesion, with exchanges of land as in the Balkan wars at the beginning of the twentieth century. The absence of a clear and viable prospect, which can only be regional integration, anchorage to the European Union and the Europeanisation of the Balkans, would reopen the door to nationalisms that fight each other and NATO as well, to force it to withdraw.

The European Union can defend itself, if necessary by means of war, in the extreme case of preventive war. This strategy must guide the restructuring of its military forces and decisions on the personnel and weapons needed. But there is no justification for the systematic theorising of preventive war and its corollary, the exporting of democracy through force. Even when recourse is made to military means, we cannot ignore the criteria that Chancellor Schröder also recalled recently: proportionality, legitimacy and multilateralism.

The European Union and its individual member states cannot find a solution to the new threats in separate peace agreements. Nor can an excessively acute memory of wars, of repulsion for an imperial tradition that led to so much mourning and oppression justify failing to accept responsibility for a role. Establishing the roots of democracy is the best guarantee of security. It should be attempted even where the plant will have to grow in very differently sedimented soils, in societies that see the Koran as the source of law and clerics as judges and did not develop around the market economy. But it would be unreasonable to think that it is enough to impose foreign occupation for a representative democracy to emerge from the ballot boxes.

The underlying problem in the Muslim world is modernity, which neither the socialism of Nasser's colonels, nor the authoritarian reformism of the Shah of Persia, nor the wealth of the sheiks of Saudi Arabia has succeeded in resolving. Creating the conditions for the autonomous development of democracy requires the revival of a multilateralism capable of reconciling America's undeniable supremacy with the re-establishment of an effective and independent role for Europe.

It would not be politically advantageous for European security to undo the web of agreements, protocols and accords that have led step by step to the transfer to the supranational domain of

powers and responsibilities that member states recognised could no longer be exercised effectively at the national level. The fabric created in this way is still fragile, yet it is capable of establishing the rules of a future world order. One part consists of the constituent activity of the European Union, which will necessarily influence international equilibria.

Without a Constitution, Europe will never become a political actor at the global level. It will remain a jumble of countries of different wealth, size and image. By contrast, the Constitution is a response to the limitations of national sovereignty and expresses the needs of a world that has changed profoundly. A proper dose of political realism requires that this document be given substantial support during its negotiation and subsequent implementation. The new Constitution will enable the Union to act in the field of security and defence, within a unitary institutional framework, and allow countries wishing to do so to proceed immediately, through structured cooperation, which is on the contrary explicitly prohibited by the Treaty of Nice.

Especially after the tragic events in Madrid on 11 March 2004, European countries have succeeded in mobilising their common commitment to the fight against terrorism, through the search for the channels by which it is financed, the exchange of intelligence and more effective surveillance that, without sacrificing individual liberties, is based on a single political and military strategy embracing all the countries at risk. Nothing is to be gained from mutual recriminations or accusations that individual countries are deserting the cause, something that will not happen if Europeans succeed in giving a new legitimacy to their common action.

This, then, is the second requirement of European security: not the drifting apart of the Union and the United States, but their drawing together to combat the common enemy in a setting of international legitimacy. On the European side, no more shortsighted, blinkered domestic disputes; on the American side a progressive return, which is already under way, to closer relations with the Union and renouncement of the extremist positions of a conservative ideology in favour of a pragmatism that is more in line with that country's tradition. This for two reasons: first, the risk of international isolation, which in the end would weigh heavily; second, the cost in terms of human lives and financial expense of

open-ended occupations. In a setting marked by the revival of the role of the United Nations, together with the European Union there is an alternative to the abyss facing the two Western partners: the road of international legitimacy instead of imposed constitutions.

Key to European security is thus the abandoning of 'coalitions of the willing' and a return to the primacy of the institutions, as the condition for victory against a common enemy and the growth of democracy, above all in the Arab and Muslim world. Let America and Europe start to reason together again and this will mark the strategic defeat of terrorism. It is the West that must first re-establish its nature, rediscover the combined strength of force and reason, without detracting in any way from the preponderant role of the only remaining superpower – a strategy without recriminations about the past or doubts about the future.

In the absence of such a change of course, if the will and the political intelligence of the West do not overcome the primacy of national egoisms, no institutional order, not even the new Constitution of the European Union, can bring peace and stability or remove the arrogant unilateralisms that prevent us from converging on a lucid and shared strategy.

Iraq has shown that the power to act does not necessarily coincide with the power to persuade, and that the costs of unilateralism arise from failure to achieve consensus. The United States must support the military strengthening of the European Union, and Europe must recognise the sterility of an unnatural opposition. For its part, the Alliance must be able to intervene with a wide range of military actions and should be the locus for the formulation of common strategy. All things considered, the gap between the US administration's document (National Security Strategy) of September 2002 and that approved by the European Council in December (European Security Strategy) is not so wide that it cannot be bridged. No less than the European Union, the Alliance should perhaps increase its flexibility through instruments such as abstention, opting out and even specific coalitions, but always within the setting provided by its institutional framework.

Democracy must defend its values with every means at its disposal, including the most extreme and inherently unnatural one of war if no others exist. But it must defend itself while preserving its character and not jettison rights and their protection,

especially now that they are an integral part of a European Constitution. We are duty-bound to ensure that the means are proportional to the ends, the results to the reasons for acting. The new threats are directed towards a system of shared guarantees, the true secular religion of the West, a single democratic culture, and the Union cannot act by way of a permanent mandate given to the hegemonic sovereignty of another country.

To conclude, there is a need for both more Europe and a united West. This is the only road that European security and defence can follow in the new century.

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Jean-Louis Gergorin
& Jean Bétermier

Taking stock of the last five years from the point of view of European defence industries, it must first be acknowledged that the idea of a European security and defence policy has made headway in institutional terms, but that there is still some way to go before the European Union has the capabilities necessary to secure its strategic autonomy. A defence industry exists in order to provide national armed forces, in this case those of the EU's members, with material and technical means that leave them free to make their own political choices and able to protect their citizens and their interests.

Undeniable achievements

Faced with the dual challenge of the reduction in defence budgets following the end of the Cold War and the ever-increasing cost of new systems, European defence industries have been focusing on Europe for a long time now. Aware of their responsibilities in the defence and security of their countries, and convinced that there can be no European defence without a solid industrial and technological base, the leaders of these industries have chosen to join forces. This is especially true of aeronautics, missiles, space and information technologies. Measures to coordinate EU member states' defence efforts are thus extremely welcome.

The Franco-British summit in St-Malo in 1998 and the European Council in Cologne in 1999 launched European defence and took the issue to the heart of the European political debate. This positive development is in line with the expectations of the peoples of Europe, who are worried at the threat to global peace and security, and also want to see the European Union playing a more active role on the world stage. Anyone who needs convincing need only look at the latest poll findings, whether of the Eurobarometer survey or the Ipsos poll carried out for EADS in Europe's five

main military powers: in the latter poll, 78 per cent of those questioned thought that Europe should be able to conduct an operation on its own, without US support.

The decisions taken at the European Councils in Cologne and Helsinki and the intergovernmental conferences which followed have certainly helped to clarify the future by identifying the military capabilities needed if the European Union is to be able to play its part in managing crises which could jeopardise its security or compromise its interests, on the understanding that, for NATO members, common defence against a major risk would still be covered by the Atlantic Alliance, in line with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Lastly, a common political platform has been defined with the adoption, in December 2003, of the European Security Strategy proposed by Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is now up and running, although it does not yet possess all the capabilities it considers necessary. The EU has thus carried out its first military missions in FYROM and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As regards programmes, given the recent launch of the A400M strategic transport aircraft project, a decision of the utmost importance, it might be assumed that the structures essential for forming a common industrial and technological base were progressing at the same pace. Unfortunately, it has to be conceded that there is still a considerable gap between the European institutional framework and those defence industries which have undertaken to work together on a European basis.

The designation of 'pilot' countries for the development of new systems, a move adopted in the capability acquisition process, provides an outline division of labour and, in the absence of European programmes based on common operational requirements, prepares the ground for harmonising effort in order to avoid any needless duplication. And yet, positive though this move may be, it does not measure up to declared intentions.

European arms manufacturers, in particular those in aeronautics and space, missiles and information technologies, have traditions of cooperation dating back forty years or so. It was therefore quite natural that, in the 1990s, when cuts in defence spending forced them to restructure, some of them looked to their European partners. The new situation caused them to make major changes in their cooperative relations, setting up joint companies,

not merely single-project consortiums. This move was also necessitated by the merging of US manufacturers into five giant corporations. Since arms industries, more than any other, are dependent on political authorities, this could not happen without involving the states themselves. Thus in July 1998, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed a Letter of Intent (LoI), an industry-driven agreement, to facilitate arms trade between them. Although it cannot be denied that this agreement, which became the Framework Agreement at Farnborough in July 2000, was a major step towards consolidating European defence industries (undertakings in these six countries account for 90 per cent of European capabilities in the sector) it was not in itself enough to create the conditions necessary for a genuinely European defence industry.

Still a long way to go

The time has therefore come to bring this major project within the structural framework of the European Union, with the aim of developing a common industrial and technological base. The decision taken by the European Council in November 2003, which confirmed the Thessaloniki decision and set up the European Defence Agency, without waiting for the draft European Constitution to be adopted, is thus particularly timely. Under the chairmanship of Javier Solana, a working party is studying the definition of its remit and how it will function. The working party's initial findings were approved in June 2004. The Agency should therefore be in a position gradually to begin its activities before the end of the year. Not all member states have the same vision, but it is to be hoped that governments will agree on a specific, ambitious project, rather than simply adding a new tier to the plethora of existing structures. In the long term, the Agency should be able to take on the responsibilities, in the armaments (including research) field, currently held by the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) and the LoI. It is legitimate to suppose that the transfer of the WEAG to the Agency, and thus to the European Union, would give it a stronger political basis and enable it to receive multi-annual finance, always a guarantee of efficiency where research is involved. However, it seems that it will take a number of years before in-depth restruc-

turing of this type can be completed, because of the statutes of the various organisations – the OCCAR and the LoI are the subject of international treaties – and also because these various organisations might lend themselves to enhanced cooperation, should that prove necessary.

As regards armaments, taken in the broadest sense, priority should be given to defence Research and Technology (R&T), to prevent the investment differences between Europe and the United States, currently at a ratio of one to five, from leading to unacceptable levels of dependence. Given that member states are unable to make any significant increase in financial resources, they should be allowed to pool their efforts, without any further delay, to a greater extent than they do at present in the WEAG, and show willingness to step up cooperation with the European Commission. The Commission, which is already in charge of the framework programme for research and development, is seeing a rapid increase in its security activities owing to the increased terrorist threat.

The R&T effort should be supported by exploration or demonstration developments open to as many partners as possible, with the aim of offering the prospect of cooperation to the smallest countries. If countries work together upstream, it helps to create a momentum enabling them both to take advantage of existing EU expertise and to make shared choices. In addition, a development of this type would probably encourage the emergence of centres of excellence within the Union, which could be networked to supply our industries.

As regards defence industries, the process of consolidation is far from over. This is especially true of land- and sea-based systems, where firms need to move quickly to form European groupings.

More generally, if consolidation is to result in transnational European companies able to meet member states' needs, certain conditions must be met, including:

(a) a supply guarantee for member states;
(b) a suitable legal framework for the transfer of technology and equipment within the EU;
(c) freedom of export, within the constraints of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct and in the spirit of the Debré-Schmidt agreements;
(d) consultation procedures, so that industrial capabilities result-

ing from European consolidation or rationalisation are not lost to the Union;
(e) acceptance of single companies which bring together industrial capabilities where the European market is too small;
(f) when placing contracts, the need to consider transnational European companies on the same footing as companies which have retained their national identity;
(g) binding procedures to deter participating states from unilaterally withdrawing from collaborative programmes once a certain stage of development has been reached.

It should be stressed that the first three conditions were adopted, in principle, in the LoI, but that six years after its adoption, administrative measures governing internal trade, even trade within the same European industrial group, are still to be harmonised.

A large European armaments market is obviously a highly desirable goal. However, it is unrealistic to imagine that such a market can be brought about by measures establishing a policy of European preference. It should be easier to open up European defence markets once states are no longer acting as both judge and judged in certain areas. In this regard, we must acknowledge the openness shown by the United Kingdom, which regularly puts its national equipment programmes out to competitive tender: hence EADS has been chosen for the Skynet 5 contract to supply the British Ministry of Defence with secure satellite communications services, while the Air Tanker consortium has been selected to provide in-flight refuelling for the Royal Air Force; in the same way, Thales is to help to build two British aircraft carriers, working under the prime contractor, BAE Systems.

The legitimate desire to build up a genuine European defence industry, capable of supporting the ESDP, does not mean taking a 'fortress Europe' approach, as is so often alleged across the Atlantic. On the contrary, forming large European groups will put them in a better position to cooperate with their American counterparts, in particular in areas where it is no longer possible to maintain healthy competition on a national basis. The European arms market is much more accessible than the American market; opening up the US market would gradually create the conditions for genuine transatlantic cooperation, at the same time as preparing the ground for interoperable forces.

The headway made by the idea of defence has undoubtedly left its mark on the political debate in the European Union. Following the discussions on defence at the Convention, under the aegis of Michel Barnier, then a European Commissioner, the conditions now seem to be right for taking tangible measures, regarding both institutions and programmes. It is important that the European Defence Agency should be given real power, and that its creation is taken as an opportunity to rationalise and simplify existing organisations.

Looking to the future, it is essential that the Agency should have strong political support, plus the resources it needs to assert its authority over R&T activities straight away and to create a climate conducive to the development of a European arms market that is competitive and capable of meeting the needs of the EU's armed forces.

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Philip H. Gordon

Since the European Security and Defence Policy was launched five years ago, how much has been accomplished? From an American perspective, the recognition of the need for more effective European military capabilities – even if developed independently from NATO – has been welcome, but the progress toward developing those capabilities exceedingly slow. Over the past five years, enormous amounts of European leaders' and officials' time and energy have been devoted to developing the institutions and guidelines for European defence and for coordinating those efforts with national and other multinational organisations. Given the very disparate defence capabilities and traditions of the EU's 25 members, such an emphasis on institutional development is probably inevitable – especially in these early stages of the project. But it has also meant that, from an American perspective, ESDP has so far appeared to be far more about process than it has been about results.

Many Americans are rightly frustrated with the imbalance between the EU's focus on institutions and its development of capabilities. They also worry that ESDP will unnecessarily duplicate NATO's efforts and complicate decision-making without actually adding much military value. Some are reluctant to encourage the creation of a military, and therefore political, power that has the theoretical potential to rival the United States. Ultimately, however, the United States has a strong interest in a more effective ESDP. Indeed, with such a significant proportion of American military forces now involved in Iraq, the US interest in a more capable – and potentially autonomous – EU defence capability is today greater than ever. There are risks involved in EU defence autonomy, but nothing that cannot be managed with a modicum of goodwill and pragmatism on both sides (characteristics that have admittedly been lacking in recent years). But as it considers the vast military and strategic challenges it faces in the world today, as well as the enduring common interests of Europe and the United States, Washington should be far more concerned about

the EU's military weakness than about its potential strength.

ESDP's first five years have not been about process alone, of course. During this period, in fact, the EU undertook its first actual operations: police actions in Macedonia and Bosnia; a NATO-supported military mission in FYROM; and an autonomous EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These were all small-scale missions and all could have been easily been done without involving the EU, either by a coalition of the willing within NATO or under an EU 'lead nation'. The Congo operation, in fact, was really a French mission supported by a handful of other Europeans, onto which an EU role was grafted. But these Balkans and Africa missions were none the less good indicators of the kind of contributions the EU could make if it continues to develop the will and capability to act militarily. The EU's role in both FYROM and Congo was an important symbol of the Union's common security and humanitarian interests. Both also provided useful lessons in identifying what the EU would need both institutionally and militarily for future missions of this type. At the end of 2004, the EU will also take over the ongoing peacekeeping operation in Bosnia from NATO. That mission will be another important step in proving both that the EU can act and that it can act alongside NATO's Kosovo mission without causing competition or confusion in political authority or military command. The EU is still far from ready to take on major military deployments without extensive logistical, planning and intelligence support from NATO or the United States, but it has begun to take the first steps in that direction.

In terms of developing military capabilities, the EU has also made some progress over the past five years, but there is still a long way to go. The political focus on capability development is itself already significant, even if it has not yet translated into increased resources for European military forces, except in rare cases like that of France. National defence reforms – sometimes modelled on the British Strategic Defence Review of the late 1990s – are moving forward. France has already professionalised its armed forces, while Italy and Spain are in the process of doing the same. Germany conducted a major defence review in 2003 and now plans to develop a 35,000-strong combat intervention force and a 70,000-strong peacekeeping force by the end of the decade. Collectively, EU members have committed themselves to the development of a European Rapid Reaction Force that would enable them

to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days and sustain itself for up to a year. That force was declared operational in May 2003, though it cannot yet achieve its stated goals. European members of NATO have also made important commitments to the development, by 2006, of a NATO Response Force, which would consist of some 21,000 troops that could be deployed within one to three weeks and sustain itself for 30 days. The idea behind the NRF was to challenge Europeans to enhance their military capabilities and to show that they continued to believe in NATO as a military organisation even as they sought to develop ESDP – and the plan seems to be working. Even France, which has been outside of NATO's integrated military command structure since 1966, has committed 1,700 troops to the NRF, and senior French officers will have command positions within the new force structure. Not all of the European deployment plans are just plans, moreover – actual overseas deployments are increasing. Britain, France and Germany all have more than 10,000 of their soldiers deployed abroad, and EU member states collectively have deployed over 60,000 troops beyond Europe's borders.

Progress is thus being made, but much more remains to be done. The rhetorical commitment to developing military capabilities has been admirable and consistent, but nearly all European defence budgets are stagnant or falling – and there is little prospect of a reversal any time soon. In any case, the main issue is neither defence spending on high-end military capabilities nor overall troop numbers but effective deployability even for stability operations. EU countries maintain some 1.2 million ground troops but only around 80,000 can be deployed abroad. That must change if the notion of EU military autonomy is to have any real meaning. It is no secret what the deficiencies in capabilities are – they include airlift and sealift, precision-guided munitions and interoperable communications and intelligence. ESDP processes such as the European Capabilities Action Plan have been very good at identifying these gaps, but less effective at filling them.

Much progress could be made, however, even in the absence of politically difficult defence spending increases. Already, EU members collectively spend over $200bn on defence yearly. That is only about half of what the United States spends, but it is still quite a lot of money, and the EU does not have anywhere near as many defence commitments as the United States does. The problem is that the money is spent badly, and disproportionately on large,

outmoded, standing military forces. Brookings Institution defence analyst Michael O'Hanlon believes that, even without major increases in defence spending, EU members could in the near future develop the capacity to deploy some 200,000 troops abroad if they made the right procurement and organisational decisions. That would not only be a major contribution to Western security but it would also represent a capability that American decision-makers would have to take seriously.

On institutions – a necessary if insufficient part of ESDP – progress has been considerable, though once again not without problems. The institutions decided by the Cologne summit – the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and an EU Military Staff – are all now up and running. In addition, a number of member states have set up a joint armaments cooperation agency (OCCAR) and the EU has plans to set up a defence capabilities agency that would seek to hold member states to their commitments on military spending and procurement. These new institutions, however, are untested, and perhaps inevitably still seeking to define their proper roles. Certainly the small operations undertaken so far have yet to demonstrate that the EU has the political will or the capability to plan and conduct a large military operation.

One of most controversial issues has been the desire of some European countries to endow the EU with an autonomous operational planning capability. In spring 2003, during the transatlantic crisis over Iraq, a plan proposed by France and Germany to set up such a capability provoked a harsh reaction from both London and Washington. The Bush administration probably overreacted, but the irritation with the Franco-German proposal was understandable. From the American perspective, that proposal violated the painstaking compromise reached in 1999, whereby the EU agreed only to undertake autonomous military operations 'where NATO as a whole was not engaged' and to rely on 'assured access' to NATO planning capabilities to avoid political disagreements and wasteful duplication of resources.

It would have been one thing if Europeans had the logistical, intelligence and military assets, and political will, to undertake new military missions and lacked only an operational planning capability, but that was far from the case. Nor was it likely that the United States would refuse to allow assured access to NATO planning in the event of a crisis, since that would certainly drive the EU

to set up its own institutions. The timing of the proposal, moreover – in the midst of the biggest transatlantic crisis in decades – seemed driven more by a desire to take advantage of European anger at America to push the agenda for a separate European defence than by any genuine need. In December 2003, with Britain keen to repair relations with France and Germany, the parties agreed a compromise on the planning issue. The EU would send some of its own operational planners to NATO's headquarters at SHAPE, while adding another small unit of planners to the already existing EU military staff in Brussels. The initial capability of the new unit would be extremely limited, but for proponents of a genuinely autonomous EU defence it was at least a start. In deference to the British government, the United States did not publicly express its opposition to this plan, but American concerns about the necessity and consequences of the EU planning cell remained.

The development of an autonomous European operational planning capability is a greater threat to scarce European defence resources than to NATO or the United States. In fact, if the EU ever does make real progress in terms of military capabilities (as well as in developing a truly common foreign and security policy), an EU with the ability to plan its own missions could even be good for the United States. Contrary to some American fears, the problem with European defence today is not that the Europeans are likely to deploy their growing military power in ways inimical to American interests, but that they are unlikely to have enough military power to respond effectively to common US and European concerns. Crises in many areas of the world have cried out for outside intervention, and the EU still lacks the means to act. The recent European (if not EU) military interventions in Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and the DRC, none of which the United States had any interest in joining, have saved many lives and supported American interests in a troubled part of the world. Americans, with their own plate full in Iraq, Afghanistan, and potentially elsewhere, should want to see more such actions, and if acting under an EU rather than a NATO banner inspires greater European support, then it should be welcomed rather than condemned. Ultimately, whatever the risks and frustrations, a more coherent and capable European partner is in America's interest.

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Alberto Navarro

Europe currently faces the exciting challenge of unification and institution-building. This venture, embarked upon over half a century ago to bring peace through sectoral economic cooperation, has now developed into a legally constituted union, comprising twenty five states, which is constantly growing in membership and in political, economic and social stature.

The traditional objectives set by the Treaties: the single market, economic and social cohesion and economic and monetary union, are now giving way to new priorities set by the Lisbon agenda and by the European Council meeting in Göteborg, such as sustainable development, European citizenship or the projection of Europe as a 'global partner', designed to strengthen the Union's influence in the international political and economic arena, as a factor for stability, progress and solidarity.

Today's European Union, which has achieved remarkable successes, such as the introduction of the euro in twelve countries or the Constitutional Treaty, has to rise to the challenges of the twenty-first century. For this purpose, then, it was essential to devise joint action on defence, reflecting solidarity between its member states and unifying their response to the challenges of the modern day world. In so doing, the European Union is enhancing its external dimension as a key part of any integration system, and radiating European civic values into the contemporary world.

The European security and defence policy (ESDP), stemming from the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999, was designed to bolster the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), into which it slotted. The aim was to equip the European Union with the necessary capabilities and with suitable structures for conflict prevention and crisis management under the threefold Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks involving use of combat forces, including peacemaking. For this purpose, the European Union decided to

build up a capability of its own, enabling it to lead such operations, with personnel voluntarily supplied by member states.

Over the last five years, the ESDP has taken great strides forward. It has put in place the necessary political and military structures, built up its capabilities and, as of 2003, conducted its first crisis management operations, both military and civilian.

Institutionally, the main management bodies have now been established, including the Secretary General/CFSP High Representative and specific ESDP bodies such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee, the Military Staff and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).

Back in December 1999, in Helsinki, the European Council set a target for 2003 for the Union's military capabilities. It required member states to be able to deploy, within 60 days, for at least a year, 50-60,000 strong military forces for EU-led operations. Considerable progress has been made in this area, even though gaps still remain.

Alongside the deployment of such military personnel for crisis management and peacekeeping purposes, there was also a need for civilian capabilities in priority areas such as policing, strengthening of the rule of law, administration or civil protection. Here, the targets set in Feira in 2000 have in some cases been exceeded and there is even a plan for a military cum civilian European *gendarmerie*.

All of this progress has gone hand in hand with the wish to step up relations and cooperation with non member countries and international organisations. Transatlantic relations have, of course, assumed particular importance on account of their political significance. Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union requires the CFSP to respect obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty for those member states that see their common defence lying within NATO. This means that the Alliance remains the basis for the Union's collective defence. That is why the European Union proposes to carry out the Petersberg tasks in consultation with its NATO partners. For it is our firm belief that the ESDP will help to strengthen transatlantic ties. The Union and the Alliance should be mutually reinforcing, while avoiding any rivalry or duplication. That is why the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements were concluded in March 2003, enabling the European Union to make use of the Alliance's resources and capabilities for its own operations.

However, ESDP cooperation also involves other partners. A relationship has already been entered into with the non EU European NATO members. Bases have been established for cooperation with countries such as Canada, Russia and Ukraine. Progress has also been made in the security dialogue with Mediterranean partners under the Barcelona process. Lastly, relations with the United Nations Security Council have been clarified as regards peacekeeping and maintaining international security, and the importance of the work of the Council of Europe or the OSCE in this area is acknowledged.

This paved the way for the EU to launch its first crisis management operations, in 2003. The first was a civilian one: the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was followed, from March to December, by the military Operation *Concordia* in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), during which the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements were first successfully applied. The third, the military Operation *Artemis*, took place from June to August in Bunia (Democratic Republic of Congo). This was the first operation carried out by the Union on its own, at the United Nations' request. Since December, lastly, the *Proxima* police mission has also been under way in FYROM. In the light of that favourable experience, in December 2003 the European Council now raised a fresh challenge, announcing that the Union was ready to take over from the NATO military force, SFOR, in Bosnia at the end of 2004, under the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements, on terms currently being negotiated.

The conclusion of the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements and the implementation of those first crisis management operations have seen the ESDP move on from its start up phase to become fully operational.

At its most recent meetings, the European Council has accordingly taken major decisions for the development of the ESDP, such as approval of the European Security Strategy paper submitted by the Secretary General/High Representative, Javier Solana, the defence articles in the Constitutional Treaty, the establishment of a European Defence Agency or the Brussels planning unit.

The European Security Strategy paper, entitled 'A secure Europe in a better world', depicts the new security environment brought about by globalisation and pinpoints the main threats faced by the European Union. Those threats include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts,

failed states and organised crime. In response to those threats, the European Union must help bring stability and good governance to potentially conflictual regions and lend its support to a new international order based on effective multilateralism. For this purpose, the EU relies on an active, coherent ESDP, better equipped with resources and capabilities.

On 18 June 2004 agreement was reached on the Constitutional Treaty, with particular implications for the ESDP. The articles dealing with the ESDP include components which should result in a solid common European defence. Among those provisions, mention should be made of the following: updating of the list of Petersberg tasks, now to include disarmament, anti terrorist action and reform of non member countries' security apparatus; a structured cooperation option for states wishing to take on greater commitments in military capabilities and in more ambitious missions; closer cooperation in mutual defence in the event of an armed attack against a member state; and, extending beyond the ESDP, a very important solidarity clause involving a commitment to provide assistance between member states, including by military means, in response to terrorist attacks or natural disasters.

From the outset of this phase, Spain has encouraged the development of a genuine defence policy within the Union and played a full part in efforts to strengthen it and improve capabilities as well as in the crisis management operations carried out, whether in cooperation with NATO or separately.

The ESDP needs to prepare the Union for the new security challenges mentioned above. The ESDP's role in combating terrorism, in particular, is of the essence here. It is our belief that united action will prove extremely valuable in such a sensitive area. The declaration issued by the European Council in Seville in June 2002 on the contribution of the CFSP, including the ESDP, here opens the way for significant progress on matters such as joint terrorist threat assessment, intelligence cooperation, listing of military capabilities and resources available to protect the civilian population and Union forces from the effects of terrorist attacks, or cooperation with NATO in compiling a list of civil protection resources and capabilities.

The Spanish representatives at the Convention on the future of Europe put forward many proposals for driving forward the future development of the ESDP, and Spain would even have liked to go further in this area. In our view, structured defence coopera-

tion should be open to all member states willing and able to join in on mutually agreed bases. Spain also supports the mutual defence clause as a further expression of solidarity between member states within an increasingly political union.

Spain firmly intends to take an active hand in moves under way, and its government will continue to put its weight behind plans for the following:

- building up European military capabilities for rapid reaction operations, since this is a key aspect of the ESDP. Without such capabilities, the ESDP would be just empty words;
- playing a full part in the establishment and work of the new European Defence Agency. That agency, operating under the Council's authority, will be open to all member states, with due regard for ESDP needs, for dovetailing with NATO and for domestic and European defence industry interests. Spain is also at present completing procedures for its membership of the European Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), which will initially operate in tandem with the agency;
- working for a greater contribution to anti terrorist action under the ESDP, by coming up with efforts and resources for full implementation of the measures called for in the European Council's Seville declaration and in the EU declaration on terrorism, issued following the attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004;
- building on the Constitutional Treaty's defence provisions. These most notably include a broader definition of ESDP tasks as well as commitments taken on by way of structured cooperation, the mutual defence clause and the member state solidarity clause. Such progress in the ESDP will be entirely compatible with NATO's role in collective defence;
- further strengthening relations between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance and establishing a real strategic partnership in crisis management and in other areas, such as combating terrorism. Spain strongly believes in the need for further strengthening of that transatlantic link as part of a sounder, more balanced security relationship;
- fully implementing the Union's civilian military unit for planning and possible leadership of military and civilian operations, while also stepping up liaison with NATO. Spain would like to improve the Union's military effectiveness and political profile in conducting such operations, whether on its own or with the use of

NATO resources, without duplicating NATO structures.

The European Union has made considerable headway in many areas over the last few years, but all of this political, economic and social reality has a duty to perform in meeting the need for a genuine Common Foreign and Security Policy and, within it, as its defence component, the ESDP. The duty is twofold: towards the Union itself, to cope with the threats of the modern day world, and towards the international community, by which the Union wishes to be seen as a paragon of coexistence in peace, freedom, justice and progress. None of that will be possible if we shirk our security responsibilities. That is the challenge facing us all, and Spain will make every effort to rise to it.

Ferdinando Riccardi

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In a brief summary of world history, the United Kingdom's political history in the twentieth century would probably be summed up in a couple of sentences something like these: 'In the twentieth century, British civilisation founded on freedom and democracy was twice under threat of armed attack. On both occasions the threat came from continental Europe and on both occasions was repulsed mainly with the help of the United States.'

There, in the proverbial nutshell, are the deep-seated reasons why British public opinion is lukewarm in its support for European integration and why it is reluctant, indeed refuses, to see any whittling away of its sovereignty in the areas of foreign and defence policy. Clearly this is not a rational reaction. As in other countries, were public opinion in the United Kingdom to apply cool reason, it would conclude that the European Union, which encompasses the former victims and their attackers under common institutions, is precisely the most efficient guarantee against the past repeating itself. With it, the possibility of war is ruled out and a single foreign and defence policy is gradually being put in place. However, a people's unconscious mind, which is slow to forget and reacts instinctively, works otherwise.

EU politicians should bear this in mind, just as each EU member state should take account of its partners' sensitivities. No one can be asked to abandon his convictions or renege on his ambitions, merely not to ignore the facts. In a recent opinion survey the British public were asked who they thought would help them if their freedom were threatened. Most still saw that help coming first from the United States. That is the way things are. Moreover, the situation is very much the same in some Central and East European countries, notably Poland. I remember with the utmost clarity a conference in Brussels, attended by Jacques Delors and Etienne Davignon among others, in which there had been a lively discussion of the defence aspects of the draft Constitution for Europe. Poland's Jacek Saryusz-Wolski was scathing, ferocious, in

his denunciation of what he described as the half-heartedness of the EU's ambitions. He swept aside the proposed mutual defence clause as insubstantial: for Poland (and for its neighbours) the only clause affording solid guarantees was the mutual defence clause in the North Atlantic Treaty; time would tell whether Europe's guarantee was credible or not, but for the time being it was merely empty posturing. In an interview given earlier, Bronislaw Geremek, Poland's former Foreign Minister, had explained this attitude by the weight of history. Poles remember how Poland, pincered between Stalin and Hitler, was abandoned to its fate by the Western countries. In the collective subconscious, Russia continues to be a potential threat, and Western Europe does not yet offer sufficient safeguards. That safeguard lies in NATO membership, because of the United States.

Here, too, the logical conclusion would be that EU membership gives even greater reassurances, not just because it ensures solidarity in the event of an attack but because it makes the whole idea of attack absurd and impracticable. However, it is again necessary to heed a deeply felt reaction on the part of a nation whose pride, identity and very existence have been repeatedly put to the test over the centuries.

Understanding must be mutual

I have dwelt somewhat heavily on this point because I feel that the tendency to divide member states into 'good' and 'bad' Europeans is inappropriate. Countries differ for reasons of history and character, and those differences must be understood and respected, provided that understanding is mutual. We can accept the United Kingdom's special ties with the United States, for example, or Poland's passing scepticism about the effectiveness of European defence plans, while hoping that current attitudes will change. Even the position of neutral countries – whose citizens maintain that they were partly tricked because the political implications of joining the EU were not clearly spelled out at the beginning – is understandable. But we are then entitled to expect the specific characteristics of fellow countries to be treated with equal respect.

Ask Belgium, for example, to give the essence of its political history in the twentieth century in a few lines, and the result would roughly be this: 'Belgium never declared war and had no intention

of taking part in armed conflict, but it was invaded twice because the armed forces of a neighbouring country, at war with another of Belgium's neighbours, saw fit to avoid direct attack on the enemy's lines of defence by passing through Belgian territory.' It is not surprising that the unswerving aim of Belgian foreign policy should have been to bring about reconciliation between the two countries in question, France and Germany. It must be clear to everyone why Belgium wants European integration, including military integration, to develop as fully as possible and to have strong, independent supranational institutions.

Franco-German reconciliation has been at the heart of the European project from the outset and the emotional investment in reconciliation should not surprise us. Receiving the draft Schuman Plan, Konrad Adenauer said to Jean Monnet, 'If this plan succeeds, I won't have lived in vain'. Helmut Schmidt supported the single currency against the tide of German public opinion and the wishes of German industry and even the German Central Bank, because he did not want the DM, which was too strong at the time, to crush the other European currencies, arousing fears and frustration in the process; (if the City of London now wants the United Kingdom to enter the eurozone, it is for slightly different reasons). Coal and steel were chosen for the first European Community (the ECSC) and placed under a supranational High Authority because, for contemporaries, coal and steel were the sinews of war, and the second great project, the European Defence Community (EDC), predated the European Economic Community (EEC). The idea of developing Franco-German ties into a fully-fledged union between the two countries has been formulated by eminent figures like Pascal Lamy and Günter Verheugen, to cite but the most recent plan.

Those who feel it necessary to integrate more fully should therefore be permitted to implement their projects in the Community framework, to be joined by others who so wish (an option always open at a later stage). There is of course the opposite school of thought, which argues that those wishing to advance faster must be stopped, because they are splitting Europe apart. This was the argument against the introduction of the single currency used by Ralf Dahrendorf, who maintained that the plan should be dropped because, without the support of the United Kingdom, it would split the Community. According to this reasoning, Europe's enemies were the very people endeavouring to build

monetary union and not those who rejected it. It goes without saying that I find the theory preposterous, the more so as the proponent is a former European Commissioner.

The European reflex: the habit of consultation

It will have become apparent that I am not an enthusiast of the 'relentless pursuit' strategy either, and that I consider it neither wise nor feasible *for the moment* to extend majority decision-taking to matters of foreign and defence policy. Very prominent figures, particularly in the European Parliament, have urged this step in the sincere belief that it will hasten the progress of European integration. The wisdom of Jacques Delors and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in this respect carries more conviction: neither considers that the time is ripe for sudden acceleration. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has said that a majority vote – whatever the outcome – on participation in the Iraq war would have wrecked the future prospects of the CFSP and the ESDP. He is right. The United Kingdom, Spain and a few other countries would never have bowed to a vote against participation, whereas France, Germany and a few others would never have accepted a vote in favour. Before they can take majority decisions on matters of war and peace, which imply sending young Europeans into combat, the member states must learn the habit of consulting each other, studying together the most sensitive issues and coordinating their response This may seem little at first glance, but it is the only way of acquiring what Michel Barnier, now France's Foreign Minister, has called the 'European reflex'. The office of High Representative for the CFSP and the manner in which Javier Solana has fulfilled that difficult role have already done much for the common foreign policy; the results would have been even more impressive if the European reflex had been more in evidence among member states. Viscount Davignon, eminent diplomat and inveterate genius of compromise, having carefully read through the famous 'letter of eight' and the reaction of the other governments and seen the fundamental similarities in the ideas on the Atlantic Alliance and relations between Europe and the United States, uttered the lapidary judgment: 'any young diplomat could have worked these two into a single text'. The task might have proved difficult for a *young* diplomat, but Etienne Davignon could have done the job without much trouble. This would have

provided the EU with a common text even if there had been no immediate impact as to participation in the war. The forthcoming promotion of the High Representative to a fully-fledged Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will further enhance the European reflex.

A tribute to the defence provisions of the draft Constitution

The defence provisions of the draft European Constitution represent, in the final analysis, what is desirable and feasible in today's circumstances. It must not be forgotten that they are the outcome of far-reaching discussion involving not just national governments but European institutions (Commission and Parliament) and members of national parliaments, that the defence clauses were drawn up under Michel Barnier's chairmanship and that certain points were finalised by the three member states most directly concerned: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The Constitution's defence clauses fall into five points:

(a) strengthening and broadening of the Union's existing Petersberg peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks in third countries;
(b) 'solidarity clause' binding member states in the event of terrorist attack (and natural disaster);
(c) establishment of an Armaments Agency – a key component, on which work has started;
(d) 'structured cooperation' between member states willing and able to take military cooperation further. Member states unable to participate immediately are guaranteed a chance of joining in at a later stage. This point is the key to future development;
(e) mutual defence clause (for some odd reason officially dubbed 'closer cooperation'), which reproduces the existing Western European Union (WEU) commitment and has no effect on the corresponding NATO article.

This draft has aroused reservations and criticism in various quarters, including the French Senate, for not going far enough. Those concerns have been partly allayed by additional explanation, and, as I have argued, it seems neither possible nor expedient at present for all member states to forge ahead together, provided

that we accept that those wishing and able to move ahead have the *right* to do so. It is a right they will certainly exercise. The main point is that this should be possible within the EU framework and not on an intergovernmental basis. Recent events have demonstrated the vulnerability of arrangements based on personal relations between a few heads of government. The parliamentary majority in one country has only to change and the whole picture changes with it: recent developments in Spain are the latest example. Without agreed texts and institutions, nothing is certain. At the same time, we must respect national identities and sensitivities and heed the lessons of history.

My hypothetical third war

I have learnt how difficult it is to persuade young people today of the meaning and the historical importance of having established an area of stability and peace that covers most of the continent of Europe. What is a milestone in European history is simply the status quo for the next generations, the world they were born into, and it cannot, by definition, represent an ideal; each generation, however, needs an ideal to strive for. Some years ago I tried to explain to my son's best friend, who was Dutch, that fifty years earlier they could have been enemies. Far from welcoming the miracle worked by the European Union, he dismissed my remark coldly, saying: 'More fool you for fighting each other'. In Europe we have tried to put a stop to that folly. Helmut Kohl was surprised to find that the European idea could no longer be 'sold' with the peace argument. However, we need only cross the Union's border to see the conflicts outside the EU, in Kosovo for example, or to cross the Mediterranean to observe the situation between Israel and Palestine. Jacques Delors once remarked that throughout European history war had broken out approximately every twenty years. At my age, had it not been for European integration I would already have seen three.

Alexander Rondos

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It is one of the paradoxes of the European Union that, in providing an unparalleled degree of security to the citizens of its expanding membership, it is so timid in developing a strategy to protect that security. The expansion of the European Union may well be the most important contribution to contemporary international security, but the sustained vitality of the Union calls for a strategy of how Europe will project itself in the years ahead in order to protect what it gains for its citizens. It will have to expand further to consolidate the Union and also clarify which countries will become neighbours with special relationships. And it will be necessary to establish with what means and where Europe will make its presence felt in order to prevent threats reaching Europe's frontiers.

The example of how the EU has handled the question of the Balkans will, later in this paper, serve to illustrate the costs to Europe of not mustering the political will to project Europe confidently into areas where it must not fear to tread.

These are matters of European security, and they constitute the central and still unresolved question in European politics: where, when, how and with what permanence will we project Europe to ensure our protection? It has yet to be presented starkly to the majority of Europe's citizens. Political leaders are still willing to substitute prolixity for effective policy and to obfuscate the tough economic and political choices that Europe must make in a world of new threats that require new forms of defence and at a time when Europe can and should no longer expect sacrifices by the United States to guarantee its security. Moreover, Europe is at an historical juncture where it has to decide the extent to which its interests coincide with those of the United States, even if those interests may prove not always to be identical. As a consequence, the first five years of the European Security and Defence Policy have been a valiant attempt by a few to give relevance to a policy in the absence of strategy.

When Europe has acted, it has tended to be reactive and its institutions uncoordinated. Security has been narrowly defined to reflect 'hard' security, and thus opportunities have been missed to synchronise and weld together the disparate instruments so as to have the effective leverage commensurate with both Europe's potential and the expectation of it. Member states, meanwhile, carry out their own foreign policies, sending mixed signals to those very regions whose fate is of vital interest to the European Union. Europe's words create expectations that all too often lead to disappointment.

Strategy presumes that the most disparate of elements in international affairs can and should be synthesised into a single approach with the appropriate creation or modification of instruments to implement a strategy. Security in this context is about poverty and its consequences; the growing inability of states to act as providers of last resort to populations; the shift of popular loyalties to new ideologies or beliefs and the institutions that represent them; and the declining effectiveness of frontiers. The tools of this disorder are technology, terror and the rampant liberalisation of the marketplace. Those who feel dispossessed move towards havens of security – like Europe – or become prey to those who exploit their grievance. Money now moves with more ease than ever before and a growing proportion of global GDP is in the hands of the grey economy. In this world, where access to wealth or security is available only to some, the others reframe their identity to seek security. This is where the role of belief plays so important a role.

Europe's security dilemma, in short, is about a Union constructed on a shared belief in rules confronting a world where deregulation is writ large. The challenge is whether The European Union has sufficient faith in itself to project these values, intensely in its immediate neighbourhood and with studied decisiveness beyond. The choice, in practical terms, has been presented as one between a well fortified Europe with its final boundaries clearly – for many culturally – defined and impregnable, and a Europe of concentric circles of societies that may gradually attach themselves as they choose to adhere to the rules of this club called Europe. It is a choice between a Europe which wishes to avoid infection from outside and one that chooses to infect others by its example and openness to participation. The former is quixotic and a failure of political and conceptual nerve.

The latter summons Europe to shift its gaze to horizons more distant than its own navel. The former is a security failure in the making, the latter is the foundation of a security strategy waiting to be developed.

In the meantime, the last five years have presented unprecedented challenges in which the environment for an ESDP has been dramatically shaped by the need for a European policy in the Balkans, the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the war in Iraq. They have fed both those who want to establish stronger barriers around Europe and those who feel that Europe should reach beyond its own frontiers to protect itself. We should not underestimate the momentum of achievements if we want to understand where the potential for European security lies. The Balkan countries were offered a path towards the Union in 1999. In the subsequent period, the Union has contributed over €5 billion to the region. It has been the catalyst in preventing an escalation of the conflict in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and has been forceful in the imposition of a provisional constitutional union between Serbia and Montenegro. Also, in December 1999 Turkey was offered candidacy to the Union. The countries of the Middle East, including a wary Israel, were persuaded that the Quartet's 'road map' offered the only route to some resolution in the Arab-Israeli conflict and much of the content of the 'road map' was developed by the EU and its special envoy. In the meantime, the official budget of the Palestinian Authority was vitally supported by the European Commission. When the tragedy of 11 September 2001 occurred, European countries were spontaneous in both emotion and gesture. European members of NATO supported the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Many countries contributed to the intervention in Afghanistan and some broke with their own historical antecedents to do so. The EU moved swiftly to review its internal security measures and to find ways to cooperate in the international efforts against terrorism. By 2003, the EU also had a military mission in the Congo. And, in spite of the divisions created by the war in Iraq, in 2003 the EU was prepared to adopt, for the first time, a document that outlined a security strategy.

At an institutional level, the European Council began to put together the organisation to back a High Representative, albeit in a manner so miserly as to be shameful. That office has developed

the embryo of an intelligence reporting system, though the most sensitive of information is retained at the national level and the investment needed for the degree of analysis argued for in these paragraphs is insufficient. It has established the shell of a military planning unit and hammered out a relationship with NATO for the use of NATO assets. The burden of responsibility has fallen on the shoulders of the High Representative, Javier Solana, who with great personal energy has had, in corporate parlance, to put Europe on the map, define his own job description (given that there is also a Commissioner for External Relations), find the resources to do his work, while answering to his Board of Directors (the foreign ministers) and managing the individual and collective whims of his shareholders. The Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, has shared the burden of responsibilities both geographically and functionally, while the Commission retains control of the budget for assistance. The Commission, thus, contributes to the economic component of any external strategy of the Union and is central to any negotiations on budget support and joint strategies with the international financial institutions.

Compared with what had preceded, this is an impressive record for Europe. And yet, there is this feeling of under-achievement; that Europe has struggled to keep abreast of the developments that have a direct impact on its security. The answer lies partly in perception and partly in substance. By creating an impression of cohesion, the EU raised expectations as to what Europe was actually willing to do. When confronted by issues of power, Europe was found wanting. Viewed from outside the Union, this dichotomy becomes much clearer. We have allowed, or encouraged, expectations to be raised. When we do not meet those expectations confidence diminishes and the incentive to comply with Europe's requirements diminish.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Balkans, where reality collides with rhetoric. And much of what is in the preceding paragraphs is informed by experience with the Balkans. In the last five years, the EU has been very active in the region. It has contributed over €5 billion. In doing so, it set up a special fund with quick-disbursing mechanisms. The European Commission worked closely with the World Bank to develop macroeconomic policies. On the security side, the High Representative played an essential role in

defusing the crisis in FYROM. An equal amount of energy was spent on building the Union between Serbia and Montenegro. Each discrete initiative is impressive.

However, there is a larger issue at stake. Europe's security will only be guaranteed when the Balkan countries are members of the European Union. Meanwhile, the Western Balkans remain a security problem for the European Union, and this is as much due to the EU's failure to have the confidence in itself and the region to offer candidacy and a timetable for accession. Some twenty million inhabitants of the Western Balkans presume that they should be citizens of the European Union. There is every reason to believe that if they were given a clear deadline by which to be ready and told what standards they must meet, they would be willing not only to suffer through the dramatic reforms required for entry to Europe, but they would be willing to accept a fairly heavy hand of European intrusion. This, after all, is what the accession process to Europe is about. The resolution of the region's outstanding political problems would become a European responsibility and the more this occurs the greater the incentive for security tensions to diminish. Predictability, of which the EU is the only guarantor, would become the clue to more rapid change. Politicians who want the reforms and seek a future in Europe for their nations would enjoy considerable support in spite of the pain of those reforms. Investors would be encouraged to enter the Balkan fray. Youth would opt for a future in the region. Organised crime would find it a lot more difficult to buy its way into politics. Unscrupulous politicians who want to use nationalism as a prop for their own advance would find it that much more difficult.

Considering that the region is on European soil, and that its eventual membership is inevitable, Europe's security concerns alone should have been politically persuasive enough to have already offered a clear path to membership to the region with an explicit end date. In the absence of an exclusively European framework to guide the process in the region, security threats to Europe fester. International criminal networks see the region as a beachhead into Europe. The de-industrialisation of the economy in the last decade has left swathes of population unemployed. The majority of youth want to emigrate to EU countries. One country and one province are international protectorates. Reformers who had pinned their hopes on the promise of Europe find this a less persuasive case to make to voters. If Europe had a policy of man-

aging migration to enhance its own productivity and to offset the inevitable demographic need for migrants, it would have been possible to make arrangements with Balkan countries to regularise the option of temporary visas to enable citizens of the Balkans to take up specific jobs in Europe.

The strategic hinge to the political resolution of the Balkan issue centres on Serbia. Trust between Serbia and Croatia will eventually eliminate irredentism in Bosnia. Confidence in Belgrade will allow it to entertain, politically, the concessions that are inevitable in its dealings with Pristina. A parallel effort to allow the inhabitants of Kosovo to assume responsibility for governing themselves and for the consequences of their actions – not least with regard to minorities and crime – would introduce a healthy measure of realism to the hyperbole that infuses the demands of Kosovar politicians and incites the public. In this process, the security of neighbours such as FYROM would be less threatened by the uncertain future of Kosovo.

It is difficult to imagine any alternative other than the European option – a robust European option – to create the confidence for an accelerated momentum towards membership of the European Union. It would have needed the political will of European leaders and a modest capacity not to be diverted by other global events. Europe's best answer to the Iraq crisis would have been to demonstrate that it could at least deliver regional solutions on Europe's own soil. Instead, at the Thessalonika summit of June 2003, the European Union dived into the underbrush of half-measures and mangled 'Eurospeak'. Serbia has to continue to submit to the EU imposed union with Montenegro – an exercise that has seriously delayed its preparations for negotiating with Brussels. The fate of Kosovo remains hostage to interests outside of Europe and is still not the responsibility of its own inhabitants. This could otherwise be described as managing a state of limbo.

If the Balkans offer any lesson, it is that the European Union's security and defence policies need to have a strategic framework that provides the guidelines and the means by which Europe can reach well beyond its own frontiers. That this should start with the Balkans is not special pleading for the region. Rather, it is a case for the necessary discipline to set priorities, muster the political will and achieve results that will begin to set the foundations for a true European security strategy – one that will give coherence and mus-

cle to Europe's capacity to deal at once with Turkey's candidacy, the fate of the Middle East and such issues as migration, organised crime, management of technology and the spillover from societies where the state has abdicated its essential role. It is only on that basis that one will begin to move with confidence towards the very large issues suggested earlier in this paper.

Rainer Schuwirth

20

Background

The decision by the Cologne European Council in June 1999 'to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a Common European Policy on Security and Defence' attracted considerable attention. For many, this step was a logical follow-on to the process of European integration, for some it came as a surprise, others were afraid of damage to transatlantic relations, and there were those who saw it as just another proclamation of European intentions to add to those already made over a number of years but never really accomplished.

But, starting in 1999 the cornerstones and objectives of a future European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) were defined, goals for structures as well as for capabilities were established, and the former tasks of the Western European Union (WEU) were absorbed. The EU was to become the European institution that embraced all the instruments necessary for conducting crisis prevention and crisis management or response if so required. Political intentions need to be backed up by credible capabilities, and this is what the objectives of ESDP are really about.

Developments – some observations

Five years later there is good reason to say that there is a European Security and Defence Policy within the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). There is the work of new Committees and new elements of the General Secretariat of the Council, there is a sound basis of commonly agreed procedures and concepts for crisis management operations, there is the permanent arrangement between EU and NATO, there have been several crisis

management exercises, and in particular since 2003 there have been four real operations under EU responsibility, two police and two military ones. Undoubtedly, this development has been astonishingly rapid, all the more so if one considers that work on ESDP started more or less on a blank sheet within the EU, while there was certainly earlier experience from cooperation in NATO and WEU.

There was the initial build-up period in 2000 and 2001. The necessary committees, such as the Political and Security Committee or the Military Committee, called the 'Interim Military Body' until spring 2001, had to be formed. Representing the member states, they had to develop expertise and experience, define their agendas and working methodologies and establish their mutual relations and understandings. The same was true for the new elements in the General Secretariat of the Council, some new Directorates on the civilian side, the EU Military Staff and the civil-military Joint Situation Centre. As just one example, the full establishment of the Military Staff took around one year and included complex internal activities like designing and solving infrastructure and information technology, managing the influx of personnel, their working conditions and their internal training, clarifying their status within the EU and establishing the necessary budgetary conditions.

But the objectives of ESDP did not allow activities to concentrate solely on the internal build-up. Necessary procedures and concepts had to be developed to have a common basis for EU-led crisis management operations, and agreement on these had to be obtained from member states. The EU Crisis Management Procedures, documents on civil-military cooperation and a broad range of concepts for various aspects of military or police operations emerged, and the preparation of Crisis Management Exercises was initiated. Important work concentrated on making available European military and civilian capabilities for achieving the goals set earlier by the European Council. Detailed requirements for possible missions were defined on the basis of generic scenarios, inventories of the offers by member states and partners were established, and those capabilities were analysed against the requirements. The first Capability Improvement Conference took place in November 2001 and the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) and the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) were launched to fulfil the necessary capabilities and remedy identified shortfalls.

This build-up period is well reflected in the ESDP reports to the Council or the military reports to the semi-annual meeting of Chiefs of Defence throughout 2001 and even until the middle of 2002. The primary issues in these are related to the development of structures, concepts, procedures and capabilities. The development of relations to others took second place. For political reasons a solution to the permanent EU-NATO relationship, the so-called 'Berlin-plus' package, including a security agreement, was only arrived at in late 2002 and finalised in March 2003. This did not help coordination and cooperation in the area of conceptual and capability development.

However, in the light of overall progress achieved, the European Council in Laeken at the end of 2001 declared that the EU would now be able to conduct some crisis management operations and would progressively be able to shoulder more demanding ones. This provided an incentive not to leave things at the level of statements only: ESDP had to show its seriousness and needed justification to keep it vivid. While further work on the conceptual basis continued, from 2002 onward the time had come to enter the next step of ESDP development, a test in the first EU crisis management exercise and the preparation of real operations.

2003 saw four operations being launched: the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia, the nine-month military Operation *Concordia* in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the roughly three-month EU military Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a second police mission, *Proxima* in FYROM.

Most importantly, the missions have accomplished their objectives and assisted the countries concerned towards further stability. They also demonstrated that the conceptual basis for ESDP operations had been developed such that the decision-makers and the staff support were able to master these first real-life challenges, including participation of non-EU states. *Concordia* offered the first possibility to exploit the 'Berlin-plus' agreements, including all necessary consultations between EU and NATO and recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, in particular with the EU Operation Headquarters at SHAPE and DSACEUR as Operation Commander – an environment which was again the setting for the first EU-NATO crisis management exercise in late 2003. By contrast, *Artemis* was the first autonomous military EU operation in support of the United Nations, using the 'framework nation' prin-

ciple, the nation in this case being France. And the process of preparing and deciding this operation also showed the ability to respond rapidly, an objective which had so far given rise to numerous theoretical conceptual papers only. Thus, confidence was gained that in due time the EU would also be in a position to shoulder broader responsibility in Bosnia, including a military mission, again in cooperation and coordination with NATO.

Progress and future – some reflections

The establishment of an ESDP has proven once again that common or shared interests are best maintained and promoted in a common institution, in this case the EU, which has now been enlarged, leading naturally to even more weight and profile. For old member states and the new ones, previously active observers, ESDP has contributed to a common understanding of realities, of necessary progress as well as of appropriate adaptations. The regular meetings of the Council and Committees, Presidency programmes, reports to the Council and Council conclusions call for the continuous attention of member states to CFSP and ESDP topics that also affect their individual positions. The principle of unanimity assists in finding common denominators or compromise, it promotes solidarity, and especially for operational issues it also adds to their legitimacy. The draft Constitution includes important new provisions. There is broad public support for CFSP and ESDP, and EU partners, both individual countries and international organisations have high expectations of it. Important for transatlantic and European security, EU and NATO share the same principal objectives, a good basis for strategic cooperation and complementarities, although there is still potential to further deepen the mutual relationship.

However, challenges remain. The current ESDP mission spectrum, the capability goals and the requirements are primarily oriented towards situations such as those experienced in the Balkans. Practical ESDP operations so far have dealt mainly with post-conflict stabilisation outside the territories of EU member states, greater robustness being used only during *Artemis*, but always with the formal consent of the host authorities. Those ESDP operations were conducted for good reasons, but so far no operation has had to be launched in reaction to imminent direct threats or

aggression. There was even time to discuss various aspects including the chain of command for particular operations for a number of weeks. Now, there is the permanent threat posed by global terrorism, along with other well-known transnational risk factors, and EU enlargement will bring several areas of instability and crisis closer. Maintaining and safeguarding security in all its facets will be a central task. Therefore, within the enlarged EU it is now vital that member states translate the implications of the European Security Strategy – 'more active, more coherent, more capable, and more cooperative with others' – along with relevant provisions of the draft Constitution, into reality for CFSP and ESDP.

Of course this requires the essential common political will to further develop the EU into a globally respected and credible actor. Taking this as a given, here are just a few fairly practical things which would assist.

The new strategic challenges need an appropriate common answer on future ESDP intentions, the level of ambition and the consequent civilian and military goals. This is one precondition to further developing the instruments and preparing their employment in a coherent way. Also, the application of means and capabilities in operations has to follow clear objectives and clear guidance to exploit the EU's advantages to the full. Identifying and setting ambitious yet feasible intentions and objectives, and giving guidance, are anything but easy tasks. Special bodies have been created to provide support with proper advice and staff work on the basis of their particular expertise and experience, and these need to be fully exploited. In addition, improving civil-military cooperation has rightly accompanied ESDP almost since its inception and the equally important civil-civil coordination across and inside the various EU pillars has not been forgotten. The new civil-military planning cell proposed at the European Council in December 2003 will be of added value, once internal organisational questions have been resolved and, together with existing staffs, the cell will be in a position to concentrate on its comprehensive tasks, backed by the necessary personnel and with contributions of other resources.

Preparing and taking decisions requires situation awareness and a concise basis of good intelligence. There has been considerable progress through the establishment of the Joint Situation Centre and the Intelligence Division of the Military Staff, which both receive and fuse intelligence from national civilian and mili-

tary sources. The quality of the product, which is of benefit to all, is highly dependent on those who have such information and are prepared to deliver it. Significant potential remains to widen cooperation, both between member states and the EU and inside its various departments, including the necessary technical support, and to bring together relevant information on developments, risks and threats to build up a common analytical picture.

As already stated, civilian and military capability goals have been reached in principle. Nevertheless, for both the EU and NATO it is clear that important shortfalls continue to exist among European armed forces. They lie in areas typical for crisis management operations outside EU territory: availability, deployability, sustainability, interoperability, standardisation of command and control, effectiveness and survivability of combined and joint forces. The European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), launched in late 2001 as a 'bottom-up' approach, has initiated a number of Project Groups with varying voluntary participation. With few exceptions, neither those Project Groups nor the Capability Development Mechanism including EU-NATO coordination have yet delivered enough fresh and advanced capabilities to provide the assurance needed to conduct all types of crisis management operations envisaged so far or necessary in future. This is not to neglect ongoing restructuring efforts in European armies and a variety of projects and initiatives. The recent 'battle group' concept is one prominent and practical proposal, aimed at fostering a real military rapid response capability. This topic has accompanied ESDP for more than two years now because of its complexity: implications for preparing and taking decisions in Brussels and in capitals, availability of military and other assets and capabilities, their readiness, command and control, communications or financing. There is now a good chance to go forward.

Once delivered, the results of these projects and initiatives will certainly improve the situation. But much more active harmonisation, coordination and cooperation in European defence efforts continues to be necessary to achieve an even better output. The new 'Agency' may become instrumental in promoting such a process, provided that future projects and decisions are driven by 'European' rather than by national positions. It might also be helpful to consider whether the current principles of voluntary contributions and a 'bottom-up' approach should not be complemented by stronger 'top-down' guidance. If it is correct to say that

the core of ESDP is credible capabilities, further efforts and true progress are required. The strategic security environment has changed, the challenges are becoming increasingly complex, they are present, and they may not permit hesitation or delay.

And finally

Within only five years, in practical terms even less, ESDP has achieved much more than one might have expected. Although not yet perfect, it has become successful not only in theory but in its application. The transatlantic and global challenges are demanding. The main challenges are credible answers to the present and future security environment. These will require a concentrated and cohesive strategic focus, which should also include even deeper coordination and cooperation with NATO and other multinational organisations. Security and the necessary instruments to safeguard it and face all possible risks or threats remain precious for all involved.

The instruments may vary – what counts is achieving the objective of peace, security and stability.

Theo Sommer

21

During the past five years, Europe has been preoccupied with three complex projects: introducing the euro, enlarging the Brussels community towards the East and negotiating the details of a constitution for the Union of 25. In the process, a highly significant development has gone largely unnoticed: the progressive evolution of a common foreign and security policy. An institutional skeleton has taken shape, and it is gradually putting on some military muscle too. As Javier Solana has put it, in this field the habitually slow-moving Union has advanced with the speed of light since the establishment of ESDP in 1999.

Indeed, notwithstanding last year's divisions over America and its war in Iraq, the EU has taken a quantum leap. It has set up political and military as well as crisis management structures, notably a military headquarters and an armaments agency. It has adopted, for the first time ever, a European Security Strategy. After absorbing the erstwhile Western European Union, it conducted its first independent military operations and police missions under the blue twelve-star flag: in the Congo (*Artemis*), in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), Macedonia (*Concordia* and Europol's *Proxima*). Yet the EU has made headway not only on the operational level. At the same time, it has acquired a strategic dimension with the adoption of Solana's European Security Strategy. In this context it is noteworthy that in the draft Constitutional Treaty that failed last December, all the clauses related to ESDP were unanimously approved. Europe is finally getting its act together. It has endowed itself with a panoply of instruments, including the Capacity Development Mechanism to deal with specific shortcomings and the European armaments agency for coordinating research, procurement and production. All in all, the year 2003 saw a remarkably rapid implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy. The spadework for transforming the EU into a major strategic actor on the world scene has been done.

Even now the Union does not have to hide its light under a bushel. European defence is in longer an empty slogan. 'Despite all their deficits, the Europeans are not militarily toothless', says General Rainer Schuwirth, the first Director-General of the EU Military Staff. The facts bear him out.

Europeans are not irrelevant; quite the opposite. They have taken over practically all the Balkan hot spots: Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania. With 30,000 soldiers from EU states, they have more troops in the Balkans than the United States. By the end of 2004 the EU will take over completely in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Afghanistan, too, Europeans, deploying around 7,000 soldiers, outnumber American troops, and EU members will continue to make a significant contribution through NATO.

A German general has been in command in Kabul. German and Spanish ships patrol the Indian Ocean around the Horn of Africa. Danish special forces, amongst other Europeans, are on duty in southern Afghanistan, and Swedish rangers have served under a French commander in the Congo.

The Europeans have come to realise that they cannot pursue an effective foreign policy without some credible military underpinning. They recognise – witness the European Security Strategy – that their first line of defence in today's unruly world will often be abroad. The old inhibitions about deploying troops outside the NATO area have been overcome. Advocating early, rapid and if necessary robust intervention, they do not even rule out preventive action, although they consider the use of armed force only a last resort – one of a wide spectrum of diplomatic, economic and development policy instruments.

There are more and more European 'boots on the ground'. The Eurocorps, composed of Belgian, French, German and Spanish units, was the model for both the German-Dutch Corps and the German-Danish-Polish Corps. The process of setting up a Rapid Reaction Force capable of deploying 60,000 men within 60 days for a whole year may be excruciatingly slow. But it is going ahead and will considerably expand the framework of cooperation, structured or otherwise.

More importantly, the Europeans have seriously and with great determination set about correcting the deficiencies of their armed forces. Most of them have switched, or are on the verge of switching, from conscription to all-professional armies. Under various

labels – 'Berlin-plus' or 'Helsinki Headline Goals' – they are strengthening their capabilities. A number of projects are in the pipeline: a long-range air transport fleet (A400M), an autonomous satellite reconnaissance system (*Galileo*), hundreds of light transport helicopters, new precision-guided weapons. Cooperation between the defence industries of EU nations has been intensified, the most egregious example being the merger': resulting in EADS, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company. We are beginning to focus our efforts. There is definitely going to be more Europe in NATO – something the Americans have always professed to want.

The disparities, asymmetries and gaps between America and Europe, which were lamented even before the end of the Cold War, were the natural result of the strategic requirements imposed on the Europeans during the East-West conflict. They were oriented towards the defence of Western Europe along the Iron Curtain against the overwhelming conventional power of the Soviet Union. The problem for 40 years was getting troops to the Iron Curtain as quickly as possible rather than power projection over long distances. Reshaping military instruments to fit the new post-Cold War security environment was bound to be a laborious and protracted process even in the best of circumstances. Developing new technologies, new force structures and new procurement and production systems takes time. The Europeans might have been less slow-footed, but they have now shifted into high gear.

Inevitably, the Union will continue to have 25 foreign ministers, 25 defence ministers and 25 armies. Yet there will be more and more coherence and cohesion. The lessons drawn from recent experience in far-flung peacekeeping operations have not been lost on the Europeans. Given budget constraints, UN requirements and the necessity to ward off the new threats, further integration is imperative. A European Security and Defence Union should be the logical next step in the evolution of the EU.

Ineluctably, the European Union will also continue to have 25 finance ministers and, consequently, 25 defence budgets. There will be overlap, duplication, even some waste. These phenomena exist elsewhere as well; thus the Pentagon budget is frequently determined by pork barrel considerations rather than by the needs of the military. But on the whole there is no denying the fact that

the capability of our combined military establishments amounts to much less than what more integrated structures would yield or field.

As a matter of fact, except for the United States, no other country is on a par with the European Union's collective forces. The EU 25 have 1.9 million men and women in uniform, more than the United States (1.4 million). In 2002, Britain, France and Germany spent $90 billion on defence, and the defence outlay of the EU 25 amounted to $175 billion. This may seem parsimonious compared with America's $350 billion in that year (nearer to $500 billion in the current fiscal year), but it was more than Russia, China and Japan together spent on their military. The challenge facing the Europeans does not lie in spending more but rather in spending more wisely and efficiently. That, however, can have only one meaning: spending together.

There is no need for the Europeans to match the Americans – that would make no sense, given the prodigal waste of the US arms effort. Europe is globalist, yet it will not turn hegemonist. It will promote democracy around the world, but will not export it by military means. It eschews wars of choice: democratisation wars, disarmament wars, wars to eradicate evil. It has no territorial ambitions. It will not impose its own beliefs and values on others, knowing full well that it is impossible to guarantee order and good governance everywhere. Progress can only spring from the confrontation of ideas, not from the clash of arms. While 'hard power' is indispensable in a world threatened by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states and cross-border organised crime, 'soft power', too, has its uses and its place. Diplomatic persuasion, compromise and conciliation, international treaty regimes and economic blandishments must not be denigrated. As in the Cold War, containment will in most cases be preferable to the use of excessive force. Whichever kind of power is brought to bear, hard or soft – what counts, at the end of the day, is that it is smart power.

Europe should also shun the hi-tech hype that surrounded so much of the American 'Revolution in Military Affairs'. A hi-tech blitz can win an asymmetric war, but it cannot win the peace. It can topple tyrants, but cannot by itself produce a new order – that is the lesson learnt once again in Iraq. The American armed forces were able to bring down Saddam Hussein, but they are having a

hard time in overcoming a few hundred insurgents fighting in the Iraqi town of Fallujah.

The ESDP is only five years old. That is not a long time. We know from other efforts at integration that togetherness does not grow overnight. In the military field, integration and innovation will be even harder to attain, as member states cling to this last symbol of national sovereignty. That was the case during the formative period of the United States: first it agreed on matters of interstate commerce, subsequently it introduced the dollar as its common currency; only in the very end, having fought its early wars with state militias, did it create a federal army. No doubt Europe will have to follow the same path.

The European Security and Defence Policy is a formidable beginning, though only a beginning. We will have to build on it without hesitation and delay. We must endow ourselves with flexible, mobile and modern forces capable of reaching beyond the Cold War borders. A European headquarters, perhaps a European Defence Minister, should not be too far down the road. In the chaotic world of the early twenty-first century, force is not the only currency. But without a respectable military establishment Europe will not be in a position to negotiate a new transatlantic bargain, nor will it be able to shoulder its responsibilities in a world in which multilateralism is an effective method of confronting current and future threats rather than just an empty claim.

Such military body-building does not in any way amount to a 'militarisation' of the European Union, as some critics have it. It is a matter of self-esteem, of being able to pull our weight on the global scene and of necessity, if we are to deal with the new dangers that have replaced the former Soviet threat.

Laurent Zecchini

22

European defence was long seen as something that divided the Fifteen, but finally it has brought them together. A long-neglected strand of the European undertaking, it was a sort of vague project which regularly cropped up in discussion, only to be quickly dismissed because, no indeed, the time was not ripe and in any case too much sovereignty would have to be surrendered for consensus to be possible. But in the end, thanks to a favourable set of circumstances, defence has come into its own – so much so that it seems to be the only political breakthrough made at the summit of Heads of State or Government of the 25 in December 2003. That dominated the international headlines, not least because no one still had any illusions as to the chances of agreement on the European Constitution and the reform that was supposed to prepare the Community institutions for the arrival of ten new member states.

Until then, the only defence meetings to attract any media attention were those of the Atlantic Alliance. Not any more, for circumstances changed with the end of the Cold War, heightening the sense that NATO had somehow outlived its purpose (before it was 'born again' outside the Euro-Atlantic area), the increased responsibilities of European troops in the Balkans revealing serious military shortcomings and making it necessary to remedy them; also America's desire for partial disengagement from a region that in the nature of things should be a European responsibility and, finally, 11 September 2001 and its aftermath, with first and foremost the absolute priority given to the fight against terrorism.

The media attention now accorded meetings of European defence ministers is one sign of the revolution taking place in a strategic landscape unchanged for decades, from which is now slowly emerging a determination that Europe should take charge of its own defence and play a part in resolving global conflicts. The fact remains, of course, that there is a vast gulf between this political will, the strength of which varies from country to country, and

the funds put up to implement it. The constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact are sometimes a convenient excuse for certain national governments, which know that spending taxpayers' money on weapons systems is not the best recipe for electoral success.

Yet that judgment should perhaps be revised in the light of the growing public support for the European Security and Defence Policy, which now stands at 74 per cent, according to a recent Eurobarometer poll. The agreement sealed by Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder at the Berlin summit in November 2003 (and subsequently confirmed by the European Council) thus reflects a growing awareness. This is fundamental on three counts. Firstly for the European defence project, since setting up a European military 'capability for planning and conducting operations', in other words an embryonic 'European HQ', is the much sought-after symbol of Europe's 'autonomy' in matters of defence, or at least its beginnings. With the establishment of the 'mutual defence clause' and 'structured cooperation', those forerunners of European defence, it is no exaggeration to say that the project has taken a leap forward, even if failure on the institutional front means waiting a little for these last two.

Secondly, in political terms, it being European defence that allowed Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder to mend their fences with Tony Blair following the sharp deterioration in their relations when the British Prime Minister unhesitatingly threw in his lot with George W. Bush in Iraq. Paradoxically, although European defence was instrumental in exacerbating relations between 'old Europe' and Washington, it has now helped to heal the rift in transatlantic relations, at least temporarily.

Lastly, at the European level, since this episode shows that when France, Germany and Britain pull together, the force of their momentum and their powers of persuasion over their European partners are all but irresistible. In a Europe of 25, where consensus will be more and more difficult to achieve, this is a lesson worth remembering: it is probably the forerunner of the type of alliance – 'enhanced cooperation' or 'pioneer groups' – which will enable the enlarged Europe to press ahead with its construction in future.

The sequence of events whereby European defence came of age is instructive in more than one respect, but primarily because in underlines the strength and the ambiguity of the transatlantic link. Since the Franco-British meeting in St-Malo in December

1998, European defence policy has evolved in much the same way as the Atlantic Alliance. The two organisations have become closely interdependent. They have followed an identical strategy, taken in broadly the same new members, and demanded strangely similar reforms as a condition for joining their 'club'.

For four years they watched each other, sometimes copied each other (for example, by creating rapid reaction forces, followed by even more rapid units, as if each were trying to outdo the other) and in the end learned to live with each other. Time will tell whether some sort of division of labour will be possible. If so, it would be more geographical than political, since the extended Petersberg tasks cover practically the whole range of conflict-prevention or peacekeeping missions that the European Union might wish to undertake in order to protect its interests.

If bringing European defence policy up to speed has been an uphill struggle, it is partly due to faint-hearted political leadership, fragile consensus and tight budgetary constraints, but also to the obstacles which the American administration, long obsessed with the risk of 'duplication', i.e. competition that might weaken NATO, and hence US influence in Europe, has done its best to strew in its path. European defence policy has had to struggle to find its way in the face of prejudice and mistrust, not to say outright opposition, from most American leaders, starting with Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and the 'number 2' at the Pentagon, Paul Wolfowitz.

Washington found a fervent supporter of its instinctive dislike of the European defence project in the NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, yet it was another Briton, Tony Blair, who helped the project get off the ground. He has been the prime mover in a Euro-American relationship that has gone from conflict to consensus. It was the British Prime Minister, who has always presented Britain's 'special relationship' with Washington to his European counterparts as a means of building bridges between the old continent and the new, who in fact instigated the 'spirit of St-Malo', even if he was later to distance himself, when called to order by Washington.

The Treaty of Amsterdam (in 1997) gave the go-ahead for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but implementation failed to materialise. Inasmuch as it showed that Europeans, acting alone, did not have the strategic resources to restore secu-

rity in their own backyard, the Kosovo crisis brought a first, salutary, step forward. The second impulse, more decisive although indirect, came from the impending launch of the European single currency on 1 January 1999.

Tony Blair realises that defence can be the means of ending his increasing isolation and return to 'the heart of Europe' to take a share in its leadership. In any case, the euro has been launched, enlargement is on track and it takes no feat of genius to see that framing a common foreign and security policy is the only grand design still left for Europe. The St-Malo declaration said it all, or nearly: The Union 'must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so . . . In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures.'

That said it all. And yet there followed four years of trench warfare – political, conceptual and sometimes semantic – between the Alliance and the Union (all those analyses of the term 'autonomy', of whether or not the phrase 'where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged' implied a 'right of first refusal'!) These tensions were exacerbated by the Iraq conflict and each European country's relationship with America, as was seen during the NATO crisis of January/February 2003. Despite the major impetus given at the summits in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999), which made it possible to outline the 'headline goal' of 60,000 men, the public perception was often that European defence was going nowhere.

Paradoxically, it was the Iraq conflict that moved things a decisive stage forward. As America and its British ally gradually became more and more bogged down, militarily and diplomatically, in Iraq and increasingly embarrassing revelations came to light (the David Kelly affair, the heated argument over weapons of mass destruction), Tony Blair's toeing of the American line was beginning to cost him dear in political terms. Dubbed George Bush's poodle by the popular press, the British Prime Minister alienated many sympathisers in Europe, squandering much of the goodwill gained from his reputation as the most Europhile British Prime Minister since the end of the Second World War.

As in St-Malo in 1998, the British Prime Minister realised that a grand gesture was needed to counter the harmful effects of the United Kingdom's militant pro-Americanism and make his European 'comeback'.

To highlight Tony Blair's part in taking European defence policy forward is not to deny the fundamental role played by the four-country summit between France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in Tervuren in April 2003. For without that initiative – which some were too quick to criticise as having been held in haste and at an unfortunate time (in a transatlantic climate exacerbated by the Iraq crisis) that could only make it seem like a red rag to Washington and London – there would have been no basis for Tony Blair's endorsement of the Chirac/Schröder proposals.

The Four pointed out that the Union could not have genuine common foreign policy without a credible defence capability. Possessing such a capability, which presupposed agreement on how it would be used, would speed up formation of a European consensus on the state of the world. This approach was consistent with the decision of the Fifteen to draw up a 'European Security Strategy', which, fuelled by the fears of 11 September, was quickly seen to lay too much emphasis on 'preventive action', if not 'preventive war'.

The proposals of 29 April seem novel, but in fact they follow the broad thrust of the Convention on the Future of Europe (which was to engender the European Constitution), the Franco-German paper of November 2002, and the Franco-British summit in Toulouse in February 2003. The controversial aspect of the Tervuren summit was of course its intended establishment of a 'nucleus collective capability for planning and conducting operations' which caused fears in Washington and, to a lesser extent, London, that the aim was to set up a European version of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).

In an intense bout of diplomatic arm-wrestling America piled on the pressure for Blair to withdraw from the commitments he made at the Berlin summit. However, the United Kingdom's partners helped London make Washington give way, partly by bringing the media into play. By prematurely revealing that the United Kingdom had joined in a compromise on European defence, France and Germany created a *fait accompli*: the agreement, announced in *Le Monde*, made it impossible for the British to go back on their word. In the end, the Americans acquiesced and threw in the towel.

The beginnings of a 'European HQ', the possibility of 'pioneer groups' of countries pressing ahead more quickly with European defence ('structured cooperation'), the 'mutual defence clause', the creation of the 'European Defence Agency' and, in the long term, of a European command for strategic transport in conjunction with the Airbus A400M programme, and the putting into orbit of the *Galileo* satellite constellation, Europe's satellite positioning system are just some of the instruments which should make for credible European defence in the long term.

The debate on whether European defence should be content to be the 'European pillar' of NATO or acquire its own 'autonomy' is a theoretical one that has already been outstripped by events. The presence of European troops in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan and especially the Congo is an answer in itself, assuming that European governments do in fact come up with the necessary funding. From this point of view, the lack of action on the part of certain countries does not augur well. However, this will merely slow the pace of the European defence project, not bring it to a halt. There will still be friction aplenty with America and NATO, but the European defence project now has the institutional and political structures to go forward.

Chronology

9-10 December 1991

Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU)

The 12 member states establish the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Art. J.4 states that 'the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.' The union also requests the Western European Union (WEU) 'to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications'. The TEU enters into force in November 1993.

19 June 1992

Petersberg Declaration

WEU Ministerial Council at Petersberg, near Bonn, defines the so-called 'Petersberg tasks', which include 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'.

3 June 1996

NATO Berlin Council

NATO foreign ministers meeting in Berlin agreed that a European Security and Defence Identity will be created within NATO, allowing European officers in the NATO structure to occupy command positions in the parallel WEU structure. They also agreed that NATO structures and assets can be made available for future WEU-led military missions.

16-17 June 1997

Amsterdam Treaty

The treaty incorporates the so-called 'Petersberg tasks' into the CFSP and opens up the possibility of WEU's full integration into the EU (Art. 17). It also creates the position of the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union/High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR). The revised Treaty enters into force in May 1999.

1998
Austrian presidency

6 July

Letter of Intent (LoI)
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom sign a Letter of Intent aimed at facilitating cross-border restructuring of defence industries.

9 September

OCCAR Convention
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom sign a treaty establishing the 'Organisation Conjointe de Co-opération en matièere d'Armaments' (Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation) to improve the management of cooperative armaments projects.

24-25 October

Informal European Council at Pörtschach
The United Kingdom drops its objections to EU defence for the first time.

4 November

Informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Vienna
Defence ministers discuss defence within EU framework for the first time.

3-4 December

Anglo-French summit at St-Malo
British Prime Minister and French President issue a 'joint Declaration on European Defence' that calls for the establishment of 'autonomous' capacities, backed by credible military force.

1999
German presidency

6-23 February

Rambouillet Negotiations
Kosovo peace negotiations between Serb and Kosovo Albanian representatives in Rambouillet, France.

12 March

NATO Enlargement

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland become members of NATO, as a result of the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council in July 1997.

13-14 March

Informal EU foreign ministers' meeting

German proposal for a Common Policy on Security and Defence.

18-19 March

Rambouillet accord signed

The Kosovo Albanian representatives sign an Interim Peace Agreement. The refusal by the FRY representative to do the same leads to suspension of the negotiations.

24 March

War in Kosovo

NATO initiates air operations against military targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

23-25 April

NATO Washington summit

On the fiftieth anniversary summit of NATO, officials approve a new Strategic Concept and a Defence Capabilities Initiative. Tentative support is also given for EU-led missions on the 'Berlin-plus' basis and the principle of 'separable, but not separate' forces is formulated.

29 May

Franco-German summit in Toulouse

Franco-German proposal to place the Eurocorps at the disposal of the European Union for crisis response operations.

3-4 June

Cologne European Council

At the Council meeting, Javier Solana is appointed the first SG/HR and leaders agree to limit the defence capacity of the EU to the so-called 'Petersberg tasks'. Transfer of WEU 'assets' to EU. WEU as an organisation is considered to have 'completed its mandatory function'.

10 June

End of the Kosovo war

NATO suspends its air operations following President Milosevic's agreement to withdraw his troops from Kosovo after 78 days of air strikes.

11 June

KFOR troops enter Kosovo

21 June

EU-US summit in Bonn

The European Union and the United States issue the New Transatlantic Agenda, to strengthen their partnership and to prevent and resolve international crises.

Finnish presidency

July

Report of ad hoc working groups on the restructuring of the EU defence industry

Six ad hoc working groups, established on the basis of the 1998 Letter of Intent (LoI), present their results. An executive committee is established to produce a final framework agreement.

20 July

Anglo-Italian summit in Rome

Launching of the European Defence Capabilities Initiative (EDCI).

14 October

Creation of EADS

In Strasbourg, Gerhard Schröder, Jacques Chirac, Jean-Luc Lagardère and Jürgen Schrempp announce the merger of DASA and Matra-Aérospatiale, creating the European Aeronautic, Defence and Space company (EADS).

18 October

Javier Solana takes up post as first EU SG/HR

15 November

First joint meeting between EU defence ministers and EU foreign ministers in Brussels

19 November

Javier Solana appointed Secretary-General of WEU

22-23 November

WEU Ministerial Council in Luxembourg

Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European-Led Crisis Management Missions.

25 November

Anglo-French Summit in London

Joint Declaration on European Defence, foreshadowing Helsinki.

2 December

CASA joins EADS

Signing of an agreement to integrate the Spanish Aerospace and Defence Company CASA into EADS.

10-11 December

Helsinki European Council

EU leaders agree on the Headline Goal (60,000 troops by 2003, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year), the modalities for full cooperation between the EU and NATO and the conditions for consultation with accession candidates and non-EU European NATO and WEU partners. A new institutional structure is to be set up that includes the creation of an Interim Political and Security Committee (COPS), an Interim Military Committee (MC) and a Military Staff (MS), including a Situation Centre (SITCEN). Furthermore, regular and ad hoc meetings of the General Affairs Council (GAC) will from now on include, as appropriate, defence ministers.

2000
Portuguese presidency

28 February

EU defence ministers' meeting in Sintra

The meeting lays the groundwork for the Capabilities Commitment Conference.

March

Interim committees start work

23-24 March

Informal European Council in Lisbon

Decision to establish a committee for Civilian Crisis Management at EU level.

27 March

Vladimir Putin is elected President of Russia

18 April

Eurocorps assumes command of KFOR for six months

22 May

EU sets up its Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

19-20 June

European Council at Santa Maria da Feira

EU leaders agree to set up four ad hoc EU/NATO committees on: security, capability goals, modalities for the use of NATO assets and permanent consultation mechanisms. They also set a Headline Goal of up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and propose the establishment of a committee for the civilian aspects of crisis management.

French Presidency

27 July

Framework Agreement on the European defence industry

Following the work of an executive committee on the restructuring of the EU defence industry, set up in 1998, a framework agreement is signed at the Farnborough Air Show. Signatories include France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

19 September

First joint meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the interim Political and Security Committee

13 November

WEU Marseilles Council

Transfer of WEU's crisis management functions to the EU.

20 November

Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels

EU member states pledge contributions to a planned corps-sized rapid reaction defence force, including: 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels.

6-12 December

Nice European Council

EU leaders redefine the headline goals, establish permanent political and military structures and consultation arrangements and discuss the definition and implementation of EU capabilities. A further revision of the TEU is finalised. Of the new ESDP bodies, the Political and Security Council (PSC) is inserted in a new Art. 25. Enhanced cooperation is allowed in foreign policy, but not on defence (Art. 27) and guidelines for setting up military operations are agreed. Treaty enters into force in February 2003.

14-15 December

North Atlantic Council in Brussels

Turkey vetoes EU access to NATO planning structures.

2001

Swedish presidency

20 January

George W. Bush takes office as 43rd President of the United States

28 January

The Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) attains legal status

31 January

First meeting between the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee

1 March

German General Rainer Schuwirth is nominated first

Director-General of the EU Military Staff

9 April

Finnish General Gustav Hägglund is appointed first head of the EU Military Committee

14 May

Memorandum of Understanding

German-Netherlands Memorandum of Understanding on mutual cooperation to reinforce European Air Transport Capacities.

15 May

18 WEAG member states sign a Memorandum of Understanding (EUROPA MOU)

29-30 May

EU-NATO Budapest summit

First-ever joint meeting of EU and NATO foreign ministers.

12 June

Franco-German Defence and Security Council in Freiburg

France and Germany make a commitment to achieve progress on European Security and Defence Policy.

12 June

First Meeting of EU and NATO Military Committees

15-16 June

Göteborg European Council

EU leaders agree on new targets for the civilian aspects of crisis management and adopt the 'EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts'.

28 June

WEU assumes a reconfigured, residual status in Brussels

Belgian presidency

17-20 August

NATO launches Operation Essential Harvest *in FYROM*

NATO deploys 400 troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to disarm ethnic Albanian rebels.

11 September

Terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC

The next day, NATO invokes Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time. A special General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting expresses solidarity with the United States.

21 September

Extraordinary European Council in Brussels

EU leaders express their solidarity with the United States and establish an Action Plan for the fight against terrorism.

7 October

US launches air strikes in Afghanistan

Together with the United Kingdom, the United States launches air operations against targets in Afghanistan. Australia, Canada, France and Germany contribute to the US-led military effort.

19 October

Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government in Ghent

Publication of a 'road map' of all measures and initiatives to be taken in the fight against terrorism.

19 November

Capability Improvement Conference

Member states identify 55 capability shortfalls and make proposals for a new capability review system.

14-15 December

Laeken European Council

EU leaders appoint Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as chairman of a Convention on the Future of Europe to review institutional changes. They also launch the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and declare that the EU is now capable of conducting some crisis management operations. A pre-summit agreement between the EU and Turkey on the final modalities of EU-NATO relations is

stopped by Greece.

18-19 December

Revised Memorandum of Understanding for purchase of A400M

Seven European nations sign a Memorandum of Understanding to purchase 196 A400M military transport aircraft, scaled back from the originally planned 225.

2002

Spanish presidency

1 January

EU Satellite Centre at Torrejon, near Madrid, is established

1 January

EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris is established

10 January

The United Kingdom assumes command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF-1) in Kabul

11 March

Council Joint Action on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)

Following the meeting of the General Affairs Council in Brussels on 18-19 February 2002, the EU decidesd to take over the International Police Task Force's mission in Bosnia from the UN. It is the first ever such operation undertaken by the EU.

15-16 March

Barcelona European Council

European Council announces that it is willing to take over NATO's operations in FYROM.

22-28 May

First EU Crisis Management Exercise (CME 02)

17 June

General Affairs Council in Luxembourg

EU foreign ministers agree on a framework for financing operations having military or defence implications.

20 June

Turkey takes over command of ISAF-2

21-22 June

Seville European Council

EU leaders broaden the scope of ESDP to include the fight against terrorism and pass a Joint Declaration on the commitment of capabilities in the area of the rule of law.

Danish Presidency

16 July

Presentation of 'STAR 21' to President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi

The European Advisory Group on Aerospace presents a report entitled the 'Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century' (STAR 21) to Romano Prodi.

10 September

A Convention Working Group, chaired by Michel Barnier, is mandated to work on defence

17 September

The US publishes a new National Security Strategy

30 September

Guidelines on International Criminal Court

The GAERC agrees on a set of guidelines for member states regarding the International Criminal Court.

24-25 October

European Council in Brussels

The 'Brussels Text' allows for the setting up of an agreement with Turkey, notably on Cyprus's EU membership.

8 November

UN Security Council Resolution 1441

The UNSC adopts a resolution that strengthens the weapons inspection regime for Iraq and gives Baghdad 'a final opportunity to comply'.

19 November

EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference

21-22 November

NATO Prague summit

Seven former communist countries are accepted to join the Alliance by May 2004. NATO members also make specific commitments on operational capabilities and agree to set up a 21,000 strong NATO Response Force (NRF).

12-13 December

Copenhagen European Council

Ten new members are accepted to join the Union by May 2004. Final agreement between EU and Turkey, which allows the Union to have access to NATO's planning, logistics and intelligence for operations in which NATO is not involved.

16 December

EU-NATO declaration on ESDP – 'Berlin-plus'

Following the agreement with Turkey at the Copenhagen summit, NATO and the EU conclude an agreement that gives the EU access to NATO assets for crisis management. In its turn, the EU agrees to the 'fullest possible involvement' of non-EU members of NATO with ESDP.

16 December

Final report of Working Group VIII (on defence) of the European Convention

31 December

Launch of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The EU's first-ever civilian crisis management operation under ESDP, it involves 531 police officers and 400 civilian staff and has a mandate of three years (until 31 December 2005).

2003

Greek presidency

22-23 January

40th Anniversary of the Elysée Treaty

Germany and France agree to closer coordination of their

policies in several areas and take a common position on the use of force in Iraq.

27 January

EU foreign ministers approve the first EU military mission in FYROM

30 January

Joint 'letter of eight' in support of the United States on Iraq

Eight European heads of state or government sign a joint letter to express solidarity with the US position on Iraq.

4 February

Franco-British summit in Le Touquet

The Joint Declaration on 'Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence' sets out several objectives for ESDP and gives a strong emphasis to capabilities.

5 February

The 'Vilnius Ten' statement

In a joint statement, the ten countries that are candidates to join NATO (7 are to be admitted as from April 2004) express their support for the US position on Iraq.

6 February

Extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC)

France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands oppose US requests for NATO support to Turkey on the basis that the UN process should be given more time.

10 February

Joint declaration by Russia, Germany and France on Iraq

10 February

A Dutch-German force takes command of ISAF-3

For their role as 'lead nation' in ISAF, Dutch-German forces draw on support from NATO planning and logistical structures.

16 February

NATO's Defence Planning Committee (DPC) agrees on a military support package for Turkey

In order to circumvent a French veto, the issue of NATO

support for Turkey is passed from the NAC to the DPC.

17 February

Extraordinary European Council in Brussels

European leaders affirm their commitment for the ongoing work of the UN weapons inspectors in Iraq and reiterate that 'war is not inevitable'.

21 February

Anglo-Italian summit

Declaration on defence and security.

1 March

ECAP panels present their final report

14 March

EU and NATO agreement on command structure for EU operations

An agreement is negotiated which allows the EU to use the NATO command structure for its operations.

20 March

US air strikes on Baghdad mark beginning of war

21 March

Beginning of the ground war in Iraq

31 March

Launch of Operation *Concordia* in FYROM

First EU operation that draws on NATO assets and capabilities under the 'Berlin-plus' arrangement. It involves 350 lightly armed military personnel and is expected to last six months.

16 April

Athens Declaration

Signing of the Accession Treaty for Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

16 April

NATO takes over ISAF mission in Afghanistan

29 April

'Tervuren summit'

Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg agree to cooperate more closely on defence matters. The most con-

troversial proposal concerns the establishment of an independent EU military headquarters in Tervuren.

19 May

Capability Conference

EU declares that it has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, but that this capability remains limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls.

12 June

Launch of Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo

First EU military operation outside Europe without NATO assistance. It involves 1,800 military personnel, mostly French, deployed to stabilise the security situation in Bunia, the capital of the Ituri province.

16 June

Council discusses European response to WMD proliferation

At the GAERC meeting in Luxembourg, foreign ministers discuss the outline of the 'Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD' and an 'Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles'.

19-20 June

Thessaloniki European Council

High Representative Javier Solana presents a draft paper for a European Security Strategy. The Council also adopts a 'Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' that includes the 'Basic Principles' and the 'Joint Action Plan', and tasks the Italian presidency with drawing up plans for the establishment of an EU agency in the field of armaments.

Italian presidency

27 July

Ratification of the LoI Framework Agreement

The last LoI country to do so, Italy ratifies the Framework Agreement. The accomplishment of the ratification

process opens the door for its actual implementation.

10 July

The European Convention concludes its work

18 July

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing presents the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

21 July

The General Affairs Council extends the mandate of Operation *Concordia* until 15 December 2003

1 September

End of EU Operation *Artemis* in the DRC

EU hands full responsibility back to the MONUC.

20 September

Informal British-Franco-German summit in Berlin

The United Kingdom backs Franco-German Plan for an EU Planning Cell, but a common position on Iraq is not found.

25 September

Joint declaration on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management

29 September

Council Joint Action on police mission *Proxima* in FYROM

The GAERC decides on a police operation to succeed Operation *Concordia* in FYROM on 15 December 2003.

3-4 October

Informal meeting of EU defence ministers

EU defence ministers search for a compromise on an EU military HQ. They also agree that the Union should take over peacekeeping duties in Bosnia from NATO in 2004.

21 October

Iran agrees to nuclear inspections

The foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom broker a deal on Iran's full cooperation with the IAEA.

17 November

Council agreement on a European Armaments Agency

GAERC agrees on the principles establishing an agency in

the field of defence capabilities development, research and acquisition. It also decides to develop a 'road map' to monitor the ECAP progress.

19-29 November

First EU/NATO joint crisis management exercise (CMX/CME 03)

29 November

Naples conclave of EU foreign ministers

A proposal from the Italian EU presidency on the future of European defence prepares the ground for a wide-ranging agreement on defence issues in the European Constitution.

12-13 December

Brussels European Council

The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Brussels collapses over an impasse concerning voting weights in the Council. Final adoption of the revised European Security Strategy, based on Javier Solana's paper 'A secure Europe in a better world'.

12 December

EU member states approve plan to create Civilian-Military Planning Cell

Based on a compromise between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, EU leaders approved a plan to create an autonomous EU civilian-military planning cell in early 2004.

15 December

Launch of *Proxima* in FYROM

This 200-strong police mission in FYROM aims to help FYROM authorities develop their police forces.

2004

Irish presidency

28 January 2004

Nomination of the head of the Agency Establishment Team (AET)

Javier Solana nominates Nick Witney as head of the AET.

The AET starts to work on a comprehensive plan for the establishment of the Agency, including elements for a draft Joint Action.

18 February

Franco-British-German proposal on 'battle groups'

At a summit in Berlin, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, propose the creation of up to nine 'battle groups' of 1,500 soldiers capable of being deployed quickly to trouble spots beyond the EU's borders at the request of the UN.

23 February

Council approves new financial mechanism

New 'Athena' system approved for organising the common costs of EU military and defence-related missions.

11 March

Terrorist attacks in Madrid

15 March

Presentation of the report 'Research for a Secure Europe'

A group of high-ranking personalities presents a report entitled 'Research for a Secure Europe' to the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi. The report, presented to the President of the European Commission by a group of high-ranking personalities, advocates the development ofing a Community-funded programme for research projects that are useful, in particular, for internal security and CFSP/ESDP missions.

25-26 March

European Council on Terrorism

The European Council creates a post of EU anti-terrorism coordinator inside the EU Council. The 'anti-terror tsar' will feed information to Europe's justice and home affairs ministers and will coordinate the work of the member states in combating terrorism. The Dutchman Gijs de Vries is appointed.

29 March

NATO enlargement

Seven new countries formally join the Alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. This is the fifth, and the largest, round of enlargement in the Alliance's history.

5-6 April

Informal meeting of EU defence ministers

The 'battle groups' concept is approved.

24 April

Cyprus referendum

Greek Cypriots reject the UN plan for reunification; Cyprus will therefore enter the EU as a divided island.

1 May

EU enlargement

The European Union welcomes ten new members: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

17 May

GAERC meeting

Approval of Headline Goal 2010 - setting the key parameters for EU military capabilities by 2010. Critical ambitions are qualitative, i.e. the combination of rapid decision-making and planning with the rapid deployability, interoperability and sustainability of high-readiness force packages largely based on the EU 'battle groups' concept.

Approval of the ECAP 'road map' and Capability Improvement Chart 2004.

At the same meeting a general concept is discussed for a future EU mission in Bosnia to replace NATO's SFOR.

18 -27 May

Third EU Crisis Management Exercise (CME 04)

8 June

UN Security Council unanimously approves Resolution 1546 endorsing a 'sovereign interim government' in Iraq

13 June

Elections to the European Parliament in the 25 EU countries

17-18 June

Brussels European Council

The Council approves the draft European Constitution.

28-29 June

NATO Istanbul summit

NATO decides to terminate its SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for which the European Union will take over responsibility.

29 June

Extraordinary meeting of the European Council

Javier Solana is confirmed as Secretary-General/High Representative for a further five years. He is to be appointed EU Minister for Foreign Affairs on the day the Constitution Treaty enters into force.

José Manuel Durao Barroso is appointed President of the European Commission.

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Abbreviations

AAR	Air-to-Air Refuelling
ACP	Africa(n), Caribbean and Pacific
AET	Agency Establishment Team
BE	Belgium
C3I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CAOC	Combined Air Operations Centre
CDM	Capability Development Mechanism
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
COPS	French abbreviation for PSC (q.v.)
COREPER	Comité des Représentants permanents/Permanent Representatives Committee
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CZ	Czech Republic
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
DG	Directorate-General
DK	Denmark
DM	Deutsche Mark
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EADS	European Aeronautic, Defence and Space company
EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOFIN	Council of Economics and Finance Ministers of the EU
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EDCI	European Defence Capabilities Initiative
EEC	European Economic Community
EMPF	European Multinational Police Force
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EP	European Parliament
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy

ETA	Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (Basque: 'Basque Homeland and Liberty')
EU	European Union
EUISS	EU Institute for Security Studies
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUPM	EU Police Mission
EUPOL	EU Police
EUROFOR	European (Rapid Deployment) Force
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FR	France
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAC	General Affairs Council
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Germany
GNP	Gross National Product
GR	Greece
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications
HALE	High Altitude Long Endurance
HQ	Headquarters
HR	High Representative
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IPTF	International Police Task Force
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
IT	Italy
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
JHAC	Justice and Home Affairs Council
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LoI	Letter of Intent
LU	Luxembourg
MALE	Medium Altitude Long Endurance
MAPE	Multinational Advisory Police Element
MCM	Mine Countermeasures
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEP	Member of the European Parliament

MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPF	Multinational Protection Force
MSU	Multinational Specialised Unit
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NL	Netherlands
NRF	NATO Response Force
OCCAR	French abbreviation used for Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHQ	Operation Headquarters
PIC	Peace Implementation Council (Bosnia Dayton accords)
PL	Poland
POLUKRBAT	Polish-Ukrainian Peace Force Battalion
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC	Political and Security Committee (COPS in French)
PT	Portugal
PU	Policy Unit
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
R&T	Research and Technology
RELEX	Relations Extérieures (External Relations, a Commission Directorate-General)
Ro-Ro	Roll-on Roll-off
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SATCEN	Satellite Centre
SBS	State Border Service
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SG	Secretary-General
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHORAD	Short Range Air Defence
SIPA	State Information and Protection Agency
SITCEN	Situation Centre
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SP	Spain
SSN	Subsurface, attack, Nuclear (nuclear-powered attack submarine)
STAR 21	Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st century (European Advisory Group on Aerospace)
TBMD	Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence

TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TK	Turkey
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNSC	UN Security Council
US	United States
WEAG	Western European Armaments Group
WEAO	Western European Armaments Organisation
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Martin Ortega is a research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris. He has lectured in international law and international relations at various Spanish universities. He is the author of 'Military intervention and the European Union', *Chaillot Paper* 45 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 2001) and 'Iraq: a European point of view', *Occasional Paper* 40 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2002), and editor of 'The EU and the crisis in the Middle East', *Chaillot Paper* 62 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003).

Ferdinando Riccardi has pursued only one profession, journalism, throughout his life. Furthermore, his professional activity has been concentrated almost exclusively on one theme: the construction of a united Europe. Indeed, he began work for **Agence EUROPE** (the press agency specialising in European affairs) in 1958 with the opening of the agency's Brussels bureau. At this point the agency was based in Luxembourg, along with the headquarters of the first European Community, the ECSC. Initially, he also collaborated with a number of Italian, French and Belgian journals and reviews but progressively devoted more and more time to the Agency. At first he directed the Brussels bureau, then when Brussels became the principal centre of activity for European institutions he became chief writer. He is currently the leader-writer, publishing on average four commentaries devoted to European news per week, which he has done, along with other responsibilities, for nearly half a century.

Alexander Rondos was an adviser to George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of Greece until the March 2004 elections. During that time he served as an Ambassador-at-large, undertaking missions as an envoy of the Foreign Minister in the Balkans, Middle East and in humanitarian emergencies. Prior to joining the government he worked at the World Bank and had devoted most of his career to international relief and development work. In 1992 he formed the first relief agency for the Orthodox Christian churches, the International Orthodox Christian Charities and before that worked with Catholic Relief Services in Ethiopia, the Middle East and in various humanitarian emergencies. Alex Rondos is Greek, born in Tanzania and studied at Oxford University.

Burkard Schmitt has a Doctorate in contemporary history from the Friedrich Alexander University Erlangen/Nürnberg, and a Master's degree from the University of Bordeaux. From 1995 to 1998, he worked as an independent researcher, consultant and journalist. From 1998 to 2001, he was research fellow at the WEU Institute for Security Studies. **Since 2002, he has acted as Assistant Director at the EUISS**. His main research areas are defence industries and armaments cooperation.

Lieutenant General **Rainer Schuwirth** was born in 1945 and joined the German Federal Armed Forces in 1964. He commanded a missile artillery battery and battalion, Armoured Brigade 8 in Lüneburg and IV (GE) Corps in Potsdam. He served in various national and NATO staff assignments as intelligence and

operations officer, as military assistant to the German Minister of Defence, as branch chief in and later as head of the military-politico division in the Federal Armed Forces Staff and as Defence Adviser in the German Permanent Representation to NATO. **From 2001 to 2004 he was the first Director General of the EU Military Staff**.

Theo Sommer was born 1930 in Constance, Germany. He studied history, political science and international relations in Sweden, at Tübingen University and the University of Chicago; wrote his Ph.D. thesis on 'Germany and Japan between the Powers 1935-1940'. In 1960 he participated in Henry Kissinger's International Summer Seminar at Harvard University. **He joined *Die Zeit* in 1958, became Editor-in-Chief 1973, Publisher in 1992 and Editor-at-Large in 2000**. In 1969-70 he served as Chief of Planning Staff at the German Ministry of Defence. He has published several books of foreign affairs and served on a number of commissions and boards, amongst others the International Commission on the Balkans (Tindemanns Commission, (1995-96), the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (Goldstone Commission, 1999-2000). He was Deputy Chairman of the Commission on the Future of the Bundeswehr (Weizsäcker Commission, 1999-2000. For 25 years he was a Council member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Laurent Zecchini is currently based in Brussels in the European bureau of *Le Monde*. He is diplomatic correspondent but will be dealing with defence matters as from September. After working as a political correspondent for *Le Figaro*, he joined *Le Monde* in 1978 in the same role, before transferring to the foreign desk in 1983. After following African issues he was a correspondent in South Asia, London, Washington and Brussels, successively.

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Edited by Nicole Gnesotto
Preface by Javier Solana

published by
the European Union
Institute for Security Studies
43 avenue du
Président Wilson
F-75775 Paris cedex 16
phone: +33 (0) 1 56 89 19 30
fax: +33 (0) 1 56 89 19 31
e-mail: institute@iss-eu.org
www.iss-eu.org
€ 10