Notes

1. Introduction

1. Although the "Chicago Boys" is a label used to describe the group of Chilean economists educated at the University of Chicago who orchestrated Chile's turn to neoliberalism, "the Boys" is a more general label that has been used to designate their counterparts in other Andean countries. See Conaghan, Malloy, and Abugatas (1990).

2. See, for example, Davidoff and Hall (1987) for a discussion of gender and religion in the formation of the British middle class.

3. A number of anthropological and historical studies within the Marxist tradition have not received the scholarly attention that they deserve. See, for example, Sider (1986) for an interesting theoretical discussion of the dynamics of class and culture and Steadman (1986) on class and gender. See also the debate between Patrick Joyce (1996) and Geoff Ely and Keith Nield (1996).

4. Cholo is an amorphous category that represents the vast social distance between two other salient racial divisions in Bolivian society: "indio," or Indian, and "blanco," or white. Because distinctions and boundaries between indios and cholos, and cholos and blancos, are so nebulous, Bolivians frequently contest these designations. All translations from the Spanish are my own.

5. See the collection of articles edited by Sider and Smith (1997) for more discussion of differentiation and class; see also Sider (1993).

6. Mendoza's classic novel describes social conditions in Llallagua, a major mining center, at the turn of the century.

7. See Conaghan and Malloy (1994) and Vilas (1997) for discussions of decentralization and political participation in the Andes and elsewhere.

8. Although the term *nongovernmental organization* could refer to the commercial private sector, scholars typically use the term to describe nonprofit, national, and international organizations.

9. There is considerable debate in the literature about what actually constitutes an NGO. See, for example, Arellano-López and Petras (1994) and Graham (1992).

10. See also "Imperialism," the 1993 special issue of *Radical History Review*, for scholarly debate about the contemporary relevance of imperialism as an analytic category.

11. For example, after Sánchez de Lozada became president in 1993, Bolivians often complimented me and other North Americans by observing that we spoke Spanish better than the president. These comments were less a reflection of our facility with the language than of Sánchez de Lozada's heavy accent and abysmal grammatical mistakes.

12. See Edelman (1997) for a comparative discussion of nineteenth-century liberalism and twentieth-century neoliberalism in Central America.

13. Current research on Latin America includes some important studies of processes of state formation. See, for example, Alonso (1995), Nugent (1997), Joseph and Nugent (1994), Smith (1990b), and Urban and Sherzer (1991).

14. Much of the discussion of coercion and consent draws on Antonio Gramsci's discussions of hegemony, a ongoing contested process that, for Gramsci, defined the limits of the possible at particular historical junctures (Gramsci 1971).

15. Much of the research on so-called new social movements, for example, overstates the autonomy of urban popular movements, frequently idealizes "civil society" as a realm of democratic popular organizing and identity formation separate from the state (e.g., Escóbar and Alvarez 1992; Jelin 1990), and separates "cultural politics" from material and historical processes (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escóbar 1998). Social movements, however, forge alliances with other actors, particularly states. These alliances shift over time and have enormous significance for how people understand their problems and act on them. Local leaders may also choose to participate in state projects, and their democratic intentions cannot always be assumed. For a critique of new social movement research, see Calhoun (1993) and Edelman (1999).

16. See Held (1991) for more discussion on the fate of democracy and the state in the increasingly interconnected global system.

17. See Roseberry (1994) for a critical discussion of some of Corrigan and Sayer's ideas and their relevance for understanding processes of state formation in Mexico.

18. See Wilson (1987) and Lewis (1966).

19. Bourgois's book won an award from the profession, and Nugent described it as an "impressive and important book" in the *American Ethnologist* (1996:687). It generated a certain amount of positive attention in the popular media, but prompted academic reviewers and journalists on both the Left and the Right to condemn the author. Lassalle and O'Dougherty (1997) accuse him of corroborating racist stereotypes, albeit inadvertently. Di Leonardo describes Bourgois's book as "yellow journalism" (1998:349), and Adam Schatz (1995:836–39) excoriates Bourgois for similar reasons in the *Nation*. Right-wing reviewer Richard Bernstein, however, chides Bourgois in the *New York Times* for worrying that "he might be seen as fostering prejudicial images of the poor" and dismisses Bourgois's attempts to discuss institutional racism in New York. According to Bernstein, Bourgois is unable to entertain the possibility that crack dealers "might simply be bad" (1995:C19).

20. See William Roseberry's discussion of the research on Latin American peasants (1993) for a useful summary of the definitions of and the debates surrounding the agrarian question.

21. See, for example, the four-volume work on La Paz by Xavier Albó, Tomás Greaves, and Godofredo Sandoval, *Chukiyawu: La cara Aymara de La Paz* (1981, 1982, 1983, 1987), as well as Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui's work on microcredit operations in La Paz and El Alto (1996). Recent research by North Americans on La Paz includes the Buechlers' work on small-scale manufacturing (Buechler and Buechler 1992) and my ethnography on female domestic service (Gill 1994).

22. Marc Edelman (1996:43) also makes this observation in his research on a transnational peasant movement.

2. City of the Future

1. In this regard, La Paz resembles other cities in North and South America. See, for example, Davis (1990) on Los Angeles and Caldeira (1996) on Rio de Janeiro. Yet La Paz has not reached the violent extremes that these authors describe.

2. A 1996 survey of urban dwellers that included residents of El Alto found that 87 percent of the nearly one thousand people questioned believed that common delinquency was on the rise ("La corrupción" 1996:1).

3. This is a marked contrast to the neighboring Brazilian cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, where the urban police forces engage in extrajudicial executions and forcibly "disappear" civilians (Human Rights Watch/Americas 1997). The use of *disappear* as an active verb came into use in Latin America during the era of military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s. "To disappear" refers to the way that people were kidnaped and murdered by military and paramilitary death squads, who subsequently denied any knowledge of the victims' whereabouts.

4. For more discussion of the growth of a transnational working class in several Asian cities, see Seabrook (1996).

5. See Gill (1987) for a discussion of the emergence of large-scale commercial agriculture in eastern Bolivia and its consequences for peasant migrants from the highland and valley regions of the country.

6. See Albó and Preiswerk (1986) for a detailed description of Gran Poder.

7. See Hansen (1994) for a discussion of the used clothing trade in Zambia.

3. Adjusting Poverty

1. This fear of hospitals is very common among poor Bolivians. See also Scheper-Hughes (1992:246–49) for a discussion of the "everyday violence" of hospital clinics in Northeast Brazil.

2. A large anthropological literature examines these monstrous beings. For Bolivia see Wachtel (1994), Rivera Cusicanqui (1990:113–14), Weismantel (1998), and Crandon-Malamud (1991). For accounts in other parts of the Andes, see Brown and Fernández (1991:143–63) on the Peruvian Amazon, Taussig (1987:221–41) on Colombia, and Ansión (1989) on the Peruvian highlands.

3. The municipal government provisionally recognized the claims of residents to their lots in Villa Pedro Domingo Murillo, and the developer was jailed on charges of tax fraud.

4. See Sider and Smith (1997) for a useful discussion of experience and silence.

4. Miners and the Politics of Revanchism

1. See Barrios de Chungara (1978) for an interesting discussion of gender relationships in the mining communities. Barrios de Chungara—the wife of a tin miner—describes how in 1961 miners' wives organized a housewives' committee to support the struggles of their husbands. Nevertheless, male workers jeered the women and told them to return to the kitchen.

2. June Nash's classic book on the San José mine (1979) demonstrates how solidarity was crafted by the rituals and practices that gave meaning to workers' experiences and collective oppression.

3. See Godoy (1990) for a discussion of the very different kinds of working conditions that prevailed in numerous small-scale mines scattered about the countryside of northern Potosí department.

4. For years successive governments—civilian and military—did not invest in modernized equipment or the exploration of new reserves. Governments alternately used mineral revenues to subsidize agroindustrial development in the eastern lowlands or to service the foreign debt, accumulated in the 1970s during the regime of General Hugo Banzer.

5. At this writing, the government has still refused to equalize redundancy payments to former miners.

6. See Arauco Lemaitre and Romero Bedregal (1987) for an analysis of the destinations of ex-miners.

7. I am using the term *classy* in much the same way that Steedman (1986:23) uses it to describe female weavers from northern England.

8. See Carolyn Steedman (1986) for an interesting discussion of children and class.

9. See Katherine Verdery (1996:168–203) for a discussion of pyramid investment schemes in postsocialist Romania. Verdery argues that these schemes arose in Romania and other postsocialist Eastern European societies in the wake of economic restructuring and the transition to capitalism. By enriching a few and impoverishing many, they became important new instruments of class formation.

10. Díaz turned to other economic pursuits to earn a living. She worked for a time in a civic action program dubbed "Food for Work," which provides surplus U.S. grain through the U.S. Agency for International Development. That program required her to work on road construction projects in exchange for payment in food. She also knitted sweaters on a part-time basis for export businesses and participated in various NGO programs designed to generate income among poor women.

11. See Steve Striffler (1999) for an interesting discussion of economic restructuring in the Ecuadorean banana industry. Striffler demonstrates how the shift from plantation-based production to contract farming undermined the ability of people to identify as workers.

12. See "Terminó conflicto" (1992).

5. School Discipline

1. These figures represent salaries paid in 1995.

2. See Luykx (1999) for an interesting discussion of a normal school in La Paz department and the education of rural schoolteachers.

3. For a discussion of the long-term consequences of similar educational reforms, see Collins and Lear's discussion of the Chilean reform, which was initiated fourteen years before the 1994 Bolivian Educational Reform Law (Collins and Lear 1995). The Chilean reform has generated many of the outcomes that Bolivian teachers fear.

4. Teacher resistance eventually forced the state to rescind this part of the law.

5. For years peasants in the coca-growing region of the Chapare have been waging a battle with the government and the United States over their right to grow coca leaf. Their protests were a major factor in the government's decision to impose martial law.

6. I visited one jailed leader in La Paz's filthy and overcrowded San Pedro prison. Shortly after his imprisonment, this individual began to experience acute facial paralysis, but despite his obviously serious condition, he was not given any medical assistance.

6. The Military and Daily Life

1. *Low-intensity democracy* is a term that I have borrowed from Robinson (1996:4).

2. This is similar to the process that Lovell and Stiehm (1989) describe for the U.S. military.

3. The allegedly civilizing influence of military service is less important in the predominantly mestizo lowlands. This may have some bearing on the higher rate of draft evasion in this part of the country.

4. Not surprisingly, the parallels between this aspect of the Bolivian military and that described for the U.S. military by Arkin and Dobrofsky (1990) are strong.

5. Although the resolution sent tremors through the military establishment, no widespread draft evasion occurred in 1990, and in subsequent years the CSUTCB did not press the antidraft campaign.

6. See, for example, "Valle" (1986), "Presupuesto de FF.AA." (1986), and "Reforma del presupuesto" (1986).

7. See "No habrá aumentos en FF.AA." (1989), "Si no se aumentaba" (1989), "El anterior gobierno" (1989).

8. See "Reservistas del altiplano" (1992).

9. Men have other legal ways to acquire a military book without actually serving in the armed forces. Physical disabilities and family situations in which the son is the sole supporter of elderly parents exempt men from service. University students are also allowed to postpone service until the completion of their studies, at which time they must enlist for one year at the rank of "honorary subofficer." They receive payment in accord with that rank and are employed as professionals. Engineers, for example, might teach; doctors provide medical services, and so forth. Student deferments are obviously not an option for poor men, who cannot afford the cost in time and money of a university education.

10. These tales of suffering also rarely acknowledge the considerable sacrifices made by their mothers and other family members, who bring food and clothing to them during their tour of duty.

11. See Sider (1993:203–207) for similar assertions by Native Americans in the United States.

12. The tradition of *Viernes de Soltero,* or Bachelor Fridays, among urban middle-

class bureaucrats and workers, both married and single, is part of a broader social and cultural arena in which sexual subordination and the reaffirmation of certain kinds of masculinity occur. Men typically gather to drink, talk, and bond with each other.

13. See Stern (1995:151–88) for additional discussion of the social construction of masculinity in colonial Mexico.

14. The official did so during a period of repressive military dictatorship, when, as a young man, he was part of the political opposition. Yet for partisan political purposes, right-wing politicians—who in many cases had also avoided military service, albeit, perhaps, in a legally recognized way—fanned the scandal surrounding his falsified military booklet. Ex-recruits know that political leaders of the Right and Left routinely use their class and ethnic privileges to avoid service and still manage to find gainful employment. They thus had little sympathy for the individual enveloped in the scandal.

15. See Linda Rennie Forcey (1987:117–35) for more discussion of how women in the United States encourage sons to enlist in the armed forces so that they can shift some of the enormous responsibility for the young men's welfare to the state.

16. See "Reforma del presupuesto" (1986). Numerous conscripts whom I interviewed about military service dispute Valle's assertions. The vast majority of these recruits did not learn how to read and write during their year of compulsory military service.

17. See "Empieza plan de alfabetización" (1991).

18. See Emily Martin (1987). The comparison between the violent imagery used to instruct troops and the benign ways that nuclear scientists talk about making bombs is also noteworthy. See, for example, Gusterson (1998) and Cohn (1987).

19. The actual sums spent by the U.S. Defense Department on civic actions programs in Bolivia are:

1996	$21,300
1997	$148,849
1998	$159,900

These figures appear small because the Defense Department considers them "incidental" to the much greater expense associated with troop and equipment deployment, which are not factored into the costs of civic action initiatives (Latin American Working Group 1998).

7. Power Lines

1. "Ruidosa marcha de cacerolas" (1995).

2. Those NGOs that operated during the dictatorships typically adopted a low public profile. One organization, for example, changed its name to a more technocratic-sounding appellation and did not post a sign on its offices. Similarly, its programs, which were primarily centered in the countryside, deemphasized consciousness-raising activities and concentrated on protecting a popular political base during a time of extreme political and economic hardship.

3. The career of former vice president Víctor Hugo Cárdenas (1993–1997) embodied this shift. During the 1970s and 1980s Cárdenas was a participant and then a leader of an Aymara peasant movement known as Katarismo. He was simultaneously affiliated with a church-based NGO, which provided him with political cover to a con-

siderable extent. With the return of civilian rule he left the NGO and dedicated himself to more open political organizing.

4. Castañeda (1993:237–66) discusses the fragmentation of the Left's basic paradigm throughout Latin America during the 1980s.

5. International organizations established similar funds in other Latin American countries for the same reasons.

6. Castañeda (1993) describes similar processes in other parts of Latin America. Paradoxically, little evidence existed to support such an assumption in Bolivia, where private enterprise has long counted on state subsidies and protection.

7. See Laura MacDonald (1997) for a discussion of a similar USAID strategy in Costa Rica, where it promoted NGOs as a private sector alternative to so-called state paternalism.

8. Elson (1992:41) points out that men are freer than women to migrate in search of work. She also suggests that the increase of female-headed households in much of the Third World shows that migration can be a cover for desertion, which further depletes the resources available to women. Also, see her article for a general discussion of the importance of unpaid female labor for structural adjustment programs.

The P.L. 480 program is a long-standing U.S. government program that distributes surplus produce to Third World countries. Although the program is ostensibly a form of "development aid," it undermines independent wheat producers in many parts of Latin America and props up prices for U.S. farmers.

9. When they spoke of empowerment, these individuals frequently used the English word *empower* or the Spanish *potenciar.*

10. Although 63 percent of the borrowers were women, they received only 56 percent of the total amount that Procrédito disbursed.

11. Wahl (1997) argues that NGOs take on only those responsibilities that are insufficiently lucrative to attract the commercial sector, such as social and environmental concerns. He believes that, because NGOs do not contend with the private sector, they risk becoming politically irrelevant on the world stage and being excluded from key arenas of decision making. In Bolivia the move from nonprofit NGO to for-profit banking institutions suggests that some NGOs are quite willing to advocate capitalist policies and that they are less adverse to the commercial private sector than Wahl implies.

12. Bancosol president Fernando Romero was in a good position to lead this effort. Born in the lowland city of Santa Cruz in 1941, Romero received a master's degree in industrial administration from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He subsequently became a leading agroindustrialist in the department of Santa Cruz. He was the president of the state-operated sugar mill UNAGRO and led the cattle ranchers' association (Unión Agrícola Ganadera). He was also the director of the conservative La Paz daily *La Razón* and headed the World Bank–sponsored Social Emergency Fund from 1985 to 1988.

13. This was at a time when interest rates worldwide were declining.

14. The decision to adopt the label "IPDS" emerged in a context of growing confusion within the government, Bolivian society, and among NGOs about what an NGO actually was. The debate surrounding labels and definitions was, and is, interesting, because of the way it illustrates processes of association and distancing among these organizations and the state. It is important to note, however, that the decision to

call themselves "instituciones *privadas*" (private institutions) was a considered one. "Private institutions" appealed to the political agendas of international funding agencies, and the designation had no associations with the oppositional politics of the past associated with the label "nongovernmental organization." Yet, because most received funding from government agencies, they were at best only nominally private organizations.

15. Unlike the MBL, CONDEPA has never developed a political strategy based on the use of NGOs to mobilize a constituency; rather, CONDEPA's charismatic leader, Carlos Palenque, specialized in using radio and television to gain a following. Palenque owned a radio and television station in La Paz and used his enormously popular program, *Tribuna libre del pueblo*, to maintain a national political presence (see chapter 2).

16. This was a reversal of the usual process of downsizing state functionaries into the NGO sector. See Arellano-López and Petras (1994).

8. Global Connections

1. *Aid* is the adjective used in the United States to describe the activities of development organizations, whereas European funders prefer the less paternalistic *cooperation.*

2. Martin Scurrah (1995) develops this point in a useful article on Peru. See also Ferguson (1994) for an interesting discussion of the depoliticization associated with a World Bank development project in Lesotho.

3. Ayllus are extended kin groups.

4. After the 1952 revolution the Bolivian state sought to downplay racial and ethnic differences in order to construct a national identity, one in which people identified as Bolivians, rather than as whites, "Indians," and so forth. To this end, it touted the mixed racial and cultural heritage of the population. The notion of racial mixing is referred to as mestizaje.

5. Judith Adler Hellman (1994) makes a similar point about the political participation of poor Mexican women who are also being buffeted by free-market reforms.

6. It is important to remember that this openness to NGOs is constantly manufactured through the everyday violence of state policy, for example, the unemployment and dislocations generated by structural adjustment. Local people have few other choices.

7. See Brysk (1996), Conklin (1997), and Jackson (1995).

8. The Vatican has increasingly spoken out against the progressive church in Latin America and, together with conservative local clergy, has rolled back or dismantled the base community movement. Pope John Paul II has sought to keep the poor and disenfranchised within the Catholic fold by making an unprecedented number of trips to the Third World and by sanctifying more individuals from poor communities. See Sheehan (1997) for a discussion of this papal practice.

9. See Page-Reeves (1998) for a discussion of the world market for hand-knit alpaca sweaters and the difficulties posed for cooperative knitting groups in Cochabamba, Bolivia.

10. The women's worries were not unwarranted. Fining people who fail to participate in marches, or withholding largesse, such as food handouts, are typical practices of political parties and some unions.

11. One federation leader is actually the former employee of an NGO director and describes the woman as one of the worst employers that she ever had.

12. This point was driven home to me during the reception for the Spanish version of my book *Precarious Dependencies*. The reception was organized by the domestic workers' union and coincided with the inauguration of its new center. The union leader hand-delivered an invitation to the charismatic founder and long-time leader of the COB, Juan Lechín Oquendo. She was met at the door by Lechín's maid, who promised to give the invitation to "Don Juan," but at the appointed time nobody was particularly surprised that Don Juan was not able to make it, although his maid did.

13. Aymara anthropologist Estéban Ticona (1996) notes the problems that professional "advisers" pose for a Bolivian peasant confederation—the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). He also writes that "it is noteworthy that indigenous professionals and peasants are not advisors. The only exception is Constantino Lima [an indigenous leader] . . . when the CSUTCB was born" (Ticona 1996:48).

14. For example, I became a confidant of two leaders after the publication in Bolivia of my book *Precarious Dependencies*. A seemingly powerful gringa who was clearly sympathetic with their cause but neither an NGO staff member nor a disinterested COB functionary, I was sought out by these leaders on several occasions. They not only complained to me about the problems that they faced with NGOs but also sought my advice on several issues. In one instance they had hired a professional to analyze the data from a questionnaire about domestic service that the union had distributed among its membership. The leaders were not satisfied with the individual's work but had already paid her half of a fairly substantial fee for her services. They worried that the study would never be completed and that the rank-and-file would accuse them of embezzling the money.

15. Morales was one of several labor leaders imprisoned after the enactment of the state of siege.

16. See Aguirre Ledezma 1995a, 1995b.

9. El Alto, the State, and the Capitalist Imperium

1. See Striffler (1998) for an interesting consideration of these issues in Ecuador.

2. The large amount of money channeled to NGOs in the late 1980s and early 1990s is unlikely to continue. Cutbacks are likely as European and North American governments turn their attention to East Europe and the former Soviet republics. By the mid-1990s the NGO boom in Bolivia did appear to be leveling off.

3. Other postmodernist discourse-centered analyses that seek to "deconstruct" development suffer from similar shortcomings. See, for example, Escobar (1995).