10

To the Truman Doctrine: Implementing the New Policy

By stressing the importance of internal influences on Soviet diplomacy, Kennan's "long telegram" of February 22, 1946, provided Washington officials with a convincing rationale for the "get tough with Russia" policy toward which they had already been moving. Further concessions to Moscow would be futile, Kennan argued; the Stalinist regime would always remain hostile because it depended upon the existence of foreign threats to maintain its domestic authority. "Nothing short of complete disarmament, delivery of our air and naval forces to Russia and resigning of powers of government to American Communists" would come close to alleviating Russian distrust, and even then the Kremlin would probably "smell a trap and would continue to harbor the most baleful misgivings." Suspicion, Kennan noted in March, "is an integral part of [the] Soviet system, and will not yield entirely to any form of rational persuasion or assurance." [1]

The Truman Administration's handling of the Iranian crisis showed its acceptance of Kennan's analysis: throughout the rest of 1946 the United States made no concessions of significance to the Soviet Union.

[1] Kennan to Byrnes, March 20, 1946, *FR: 1946*, VI, 723. For the "long telegram," see chapter 9.

In the Mediterranean, Washington employed a vigorous demonstration of gunboat diplomacy to turn back an apparent Soviet bid for the Dardanelles. In Germany, United States officials began moving toward tacit dismemberment rather than see that country unified under Moscow's control. At the United Nations, American diplomats decided that the risk of a nuclear arms race was preferable to the adoption of a less-than-foolproof scheme for the international control of atomic energy. At the seemingly interminable meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris and New York, and at the larger but less important Paris Peace Conference, Byrnes, with Connally and Vandenberg at his side, stubbornly resisted Soviet demands. With the extension of a $3.75 billion loan to Great Britain, the Truman Administration committed itself to the principle of using American resources to rebuild Western Europe, not so much for the traditional objective of reviving world trade, though this goal remained important, but for the more urgent purpose of alleviating social and economic conditions which might breed communism.

But although most Americans supported the Administration's determination to take a firm stand, few seemed willing to make the sacrifices necessary to implement this policy. Pressure for instant demobilization continued, raising doubts as to whether the Pentagon could maintain the military strength necessary to back up a tougher diplomatic strategy. Popular demands for the abolition of wartime taxes and economic controls made it clear that the government would have difficulty in financing aid to nations threatened by communism. The hostile response to Churchill's Fulton address and the British loan revealed that a substantial number of Americans still indulged in old-fashioned Anglophobia, a luxury ill-suited to a nation seeking to rally the forces of the West against Soviet expansionism. "Getting tough with Russia" involved responsibilities as well as rhetoric, and government leaders could not hope to accomplish their objectives without educating the American people to that fact.

The Truman Doctrine, proclaimed in March, 1947, represented a deliberate effort by the Administration to do this. By portraying the Soviet-American conflict as a clash between two mutually irreconcilable ideologies, the President and his advisers managed to shock Congress and the public into providing the support necessary to implement a tough policy. But in the process they trapped themselves in a new

cycle of rhetoric and response which in years to come would significantly restrict the Administration's flexibility in dealing with Moscow.

I

After the events of February and March, 1946, it became increasingly difficult for American officials to continue viewing Soviet behavior solely in terms of a search for security. Kennan's emphasis on the ideological determinants of Kremlin policy, together with Stalin's February 9 speech and Russian belligerence in Iran, strongly reinforced the judgment of those who believed that Moscow sought to impose communism on as much of the world as possible. Those who had not previously held this view now began to find it more and more persuasive. Simultaneously, successful resolution of the Iranian crisis convinced virtually all Washington policy-makers that Byrnes's policy of "patience with firmness" offered the only sure means of countering the Soviet challenge without resort to war.

Members of the military establishment found Kennan's analysis especially persuasive. "We are dealing not only with Russia as a national entity," Forrestal told Winston Churchill on March 10, "but with the expanding power of Russia under Peter the Great plus the additional missionary force of a religion." In April, the Navy Secretary warned that "the Commies are working their heads off in France, the Balkans, Japan and anywhere else where they happen to have access." General Lucius D. Clay, military governor of the United States zone in Germany, admitted to Forrestal that Stalin's February speech had caused him to reassess his previous opinion that the Russians did not want a war. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of American forces in Korea, wrote Secretary of War Robert Patterson in November that "there can be no question but as to the world-wide push of Communism with the main all-out effort now directed against the United States." Patterson himself observed in the summer of 1947 that he had once thought the Russians had abandoned the idea of an inevitable struggle between capitalism and communism, "but apparently it is still part of the creed." [2]

[2] Forrestal Diary, March 10 and July 16, 1946, Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries,* pp. 144, 182; Forrestal to Clarence Dillon, April 11, 1946, *ibid.,* p. 153; Hodge to

American diplomats in the Soviet Union expressed similar views. Late in May, 1946, General Walter Bedell Smith, the new United States ambassador in Moscow, quoted with apparent approval a British Foreign Office analysis of Russian intentions which asserted that the Kremlin had set no limits to its objectives in Europe. Elbridge Durbrow, Kennan's replacement as chargé d'affaires in Moscow, reported in the fall of 1946 that the Russians were trying to accomplish what they had been unable to achieve after World War I: "namely, [to] extend their control and introduce their type of Marxian political and economic system as far as possible" while the Red Army was occupying Eastern Europe and the Balkans. "In [the] event of another world war, which according to their continually emphasized Marxian theory is inevitable, they hope to be strong enough to extend their system yet further." John Paton Davies, first secretary of the Moscow Embassy, wrote Ambassador Smith in November that "the political philosophy of the men who rule Russia, despite its confusing tactical flexibility, is as intolerant and dogmatic as that which motivated the zealots of Islam or the Inquisition in Spain." [3]

Members of the press quickly sensed the increasing emphasis policymakers were placing on ideology. Joseph and Stewart Alsop reported as early as February 28, 1946, that Washington now feared Soviet commitment "to a policy of unlimited expansion." In March, C. L. Sulzberger noted a consensus among diplomatic observers that most Kremlin officials now believed in the incompatibility of communism and capitalism, though some thought Stalin himself had not yet firmly embraced this doctrine. James Reston observed in May that, in the view of Washington officials, the Soviet Union was "using its economic, political and military power to support Communist elements all over Europe." By September, *Newsweek* was reporting flatly: "U.S. officials in the best position to judge fear they have confirmation that the Soviet Government has

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Patterson, November 5, 1946, Patterson MSS, Box 20; Patterson to Palmer Hoyt, June 23, 1947, *ibid.* Other expressions of concern over the ideological orientation of Soviet foreign policy can be found in a memorandum by Vice-Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, March 17, 1946, Forrestal MSS, Box 17; Forrestal's speech to the Pittsburgh Foreign Policy Association, April 29, 1946, quoted in Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries,* p. 155; and the Leahy Diary, May 7, 1946, Leahy MSS.

[3] Smith to Byrnes, May 31, 1946, *FR: 1946,* VI, 758; Durbrow to Byrnes, October 31, 1946, *ibid.,* p. 797; Davies to Smith, November 18, 1946, *ibid.,* p. 806.

made up its mind that capitalism must be destroyed if Communism is to live." [4]

Perhaps the most influential unofficial analysis of how communism influenced Soviet foreign policy came from John Foster Dulles, still the Republican Party's chief spokesman on international affairs. After brooding over the matter for some time, Dulles, by the spring of 1946, had become convinced that ideological influences governed Russian behavior. Accepting an invitation from Henry Luce to use *Life* magazine as a forum for his views, Dulles wrote a widely quoted article that argued:

> The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is world wide in scope. Its goal is to have governments everywhere which accept the basic doctrine of the Soviet Communist Party and which suppress political and religious thinking which runs counter to these doctrines. Thereby the Soviet Union would achieve world-wide harmony—a *Pax Sovietica.*

In Dulles' view, Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* was to communism what Hitler's *Mein Kampf* had been to fascism: a program for unlimited expansion which world statesmen could ignore only at their peril. Dulles accepted the Soviet threat optimistically, agreeing with Arnold Toynbee that without periodic challenges, civilizations decayed and passed away. Strong military power, together with an effective demonstration of American ideals in action, would, he felt, wean the world's uncommitted peoples away from the appeal of communism. Dulles' argument received wide attention and a generally favorable response.[5]

The growing tendency to view Moscow's actions as motivated chiefly by ideology soon had its effect on the public at large. Wartime opinion polls had indicated that most Americans, particularly those well in-

[4] *Washington Post,* March 1, 1946; *New York Times,* March 24 and May 6, 1946; *Newsweek,* XXVIII (September 9, 1946), 27.

[5] Louis L. Gerson, *John Foster Dulles,* pp. 44–51; John Foster Dulles, "Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do about It," *Life,* XX (June 3 and 10, 1946), 113–26, 118–30; Dulles to Joseph Barnes, January 31, 1947, Dulles MSS. See also Dulles' speech prepared for delivery at the College of the City of New York, June 19, 1946, *Vital Speeches,* XII (July 15, 1946), 593–95; *New York Times,* September 9, 1946; and Dulles to James P. Warburg, September 16, 1946, Dulles MSS. Luce in 1965 described his relationship with Dulles as follows: "I would say that between 1944 and 1953, when he became Secretary of State, my main connection with him was as an editor with a very special writer. We chose him to express. . . . Well, I won't put it quite that way. He had ideas that he wanted to give expression to, and they very much coincided with the general ideas that we had here." (Interview with Luce, July 28, 1965, Dulles Oral History Project.)

formed about Russia, regarded security from future attack as the main goal of Stalin's foreign policy. A *Fortune* poll taken as late as September, 1945, revealed that only 25 percent of the sample expected the Russians to try to spread communism into Eastern Europe. A similar survey made in July, 1946, however, showed that more than half of those polled now believed that the Kremlin wanted to dominate as much of the world as possible. Subsequent polls consistently demonstrated that approximately two out of three Americans held this view. Unlike the wartime situation, levels of information about Russia seemed to make no difference in determining attitudes on this point: most Americans now viewed the Soviet Union as a dictatorship irrevocably committed to the forcible imposition of communism wherever it did not already exist.[6]

In the summer of 1946, President Truman directed his special counsel, Clark M. Clifford, to compile a comprehensive report on American relations with the Soviet Union. The resulting hundred-thousand-word document, prepared after consultations with the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other top Administration officials, drew heavily on Kennan's analysis by stressing the influence of ideology on Russian diplomacy: "The key to an understanding of current Soviet foreign policy . . . is the realization that Soviet leaders adhere to the Marxian theory of ultimate destruction of capitalist states by communist states." Kremlin leaders did not want an immediate confrontation with the West, but they apparently did regard an eventual war with the United States and other capitalist countries as inevitable:

> They are increasing their military power and the sphere of Soviet influence in preparation for the "inevitable" conflict, and they are trying to weaken and subvert their potential opponents by every means at their disposal. So long as these men adhere to these beliefs, it is highly dangerous to conclude that hope of international peace lies only in "accord," "mutual understanding," or "solidarity" with the Soviet Union.

Concessions to the Russians would only have the effect "of raising Soviet hopes and increasing Soviet demands." If Moscow refused to cooperate with the United States, "we should be prepared to join with the British

[6] Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy,* pp. 94–95; M. Brewster Smith, "The Personal Setting of Public Opinions: A Study of Attitudes Toward Russia," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* XI (Winter, 1947–48), 514–15. For wartime attitudes on the relationship of ideology to Soviet foreign policy, see chapter 2.

and other Western countries in an attempt to build up a world of our own . . . recogniz[ing] the Soviet orbit as a distinct entity with which conflict is not predestined but with which we cannot pursue common aims."

Americans would have to face the fact, the memorandum continued, that Stalin might at any time provoke war in order to expand the territory under communist control or to weaken potential capitalist opponents. Washington should be prepared "to resist vigorously and successfully any efforts of the U.S.S.R. to expand into areas vital to American security." Only through maintenance of a strong military establishment could this be done:

> The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand. The United States must use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that our government is determined to uphold the interests of its citizens and the rights of small nations. Compromise and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidences of weakness and they are encouraged by our "retreats" to make new and greater demands.

If necessary, the United States should even be prepared "to wage atomic and biological warfare." The Clifford report concluded that the objective of American policy should be to convince leaders of the Soviet Union that war between communism and capitalism was not inevitable: "It is our hope that they will change their minds and work out with us a fair and equitable settlement when they realize that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be frightened." [7]

Ironically, Kennan himself did not believe that the Soviet Union sought world revolution. In his view, Marxist-Leninist ideology was simply a crude means of justifying a repressive regime, not a blueprint for unlimited expansion. A Soviet invasion of Western Europe seemed highly unlikely to Kennan; indeed, he felt that the Russians would have difficulty in retaining control of their East European satellites. In October, 1946, he wrote:

> I think it is a mistake to say that the Soviet leaders wish to establish a *Communist* form of government in the ring of states surrounding the Soviet

[7] "American Relations with the Soviet Union," a report prepared by Clark M. Clifford and submitted to Truman on September 24, 1946, printed in Arthur Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line,* Appendix A, pp. 431, 476–78, 482. Clifford's assistant, George M. Elsey, actually drafted most of the report. (Elsey memorandum on "L'Affaire Wallace," September 17, 1946, Elsey MSS, Box 105.)

Union on the west and south. What they do wish to do is to establish in those states governments *amenable to their own influence and authority.* The main thing is that these governments should follow Moscow's leadership. . . . In certain countries which are already extensively under Soviet influence, as for example Poland, there has been as yet no effort to establish what we might call a Communist form of government. There have indeed been efforts—and very important and successful ones—to carry out in those countries social and economic reforms designed to ease the maintenance there of permanent communist-inspired dictatorships. But this is not a Communist form of government. It should always be borne in mind that for the Communist leaders, power is the main thing. Form is a secondary consideration.

Kennan did not, however, make this distinction clear in his "long telegram" of February, 1946, or in a highly publicized elaboration of that dispatch, the famous "X" article which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in July, 1947.[8] His lack of clarity had the effect, therefore, of confirming the growing suspicion in Washington that Stalin, like Hitler, would not stop until he dominated the entire world.

II

The Administration's new policy of "patience with firmness," described in the Clifford memorandum, manifested itself clearly in relations with the Soviet Union during the rest of 1946. Secretary of State Byrnes exhibited ample reserves of both qualities during the long series of international conferences held throughout the summer and fall to write peace treaties for Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland. The Council of Foreign Ministers met in two sessions in Paris from April through July to draft the treaties. From July to October, representatives from all of the World War II allies gathered in the French capital to consider the drafts which the Big Four had agreed upon. Following this, the foreign ministers met again in New York in November to put the treaties in final form, a process completed early in December. Throughout the lengthy wrangle over the "minor" peace treaties, Byrnes adhered tena-

[8] Kennan, *Memoirs,* pp. 247–51; Kennan to Admiral Harry Hill, October 7, 1946, copy in Forrestal MSS, Box 70; Mr. "X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs,* XXV (July, 1947), 566–82. For an account of the circumstances surrounding publication of the "X" article, see Kennan, *Memoirs,* pp. 354–67.

ciously to the American position, forcing the Russians to make most of the concessions.[9]

The Secretary of State carefully sought bipartisan support at every stage of this process. Taking literally Senator Vandenberg's desire to be in on the "takeoffs" of American foreign policy as well as the "crash landings," Byrnes saw to it that he and Senator Connally were included in the American delegation to each of these conferences. This took the senators out of the country in a year when both faced reelection, but Connally had no significant opposition in Texas, and the Administration offered no encouragement to Vandenberg's weak Democratic opponent in Michigan. Vandenberg and Connally soon became bored with the proceedings since every speech had to be repeated in several different languages—Byrnes observed with amusement that both senators became experts at drawing "futuristic" doodles during these periods—but their presence was important to the Secretary of State in securing domestic backing for his policies. The two senators strongly reinforced Byrnes's determination to make no further compromises with the Russians. Byrnes also saw to it that his policy of toughness with Russia attracted wide attention. Beginning with the Iranian discussions in March, the Secretary of State kept correspondents informed on an off-the-record basis of the American position on all pending issues. He also continued to report frequently and at length to the American people by radio on his diplomatic activities, making no effort to conceal disagreements with Moscow.[10]

[9] The Council of Foreign Ministers' meetings in Paris and New York are covered in *FR: 1946,* Vol. II, *passim.* For the Paris Peace Conference, see *ibid.,* Vols. III, IV, *passim;* and Harold Nicolson's literate assessment, "Peacemaking at Paris: Success, Failure or Farce?" *Foreign Affairs,* XXV (January, 1947), 190–203. These negotiations are conveniently summarized in Curry, *Byrnes,* chapters 7–9. Byrnes did agree to two concessions on the Italian peace treaty: the Russians would be allowed to take $100 million in reparations from Italy, and Trieste would be placed under United Nations rather than Italian control. These arrangements in no way diminished Anglo-American predominance in Italy, however, and gave the Russians substantially less than what they had originally demanded. On this point, see Feis, *From Trust to Terror,* pp. 121–25.

[10] Vandenberg, ed., *Private Papers,* pp. 230, 309; Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly,* pp. 151, 236, 250–51. See also Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics,* pp. 213–14; and Byrnes's radio addresses of May 20, July 15, and October 19, 1946, *Department of State Bulletin,* XIV (June 2, 1946), 950–54, XV (July 28 and October 27, 1946), 167–72, 739–43.

But the tedious deliberations in Paris and New York were largely a sideshow: the important developments in Soviet-American relations during the remainder of 1946 took place in Germany, where efforts to implement the Potsdam Agreement had broken down; in the United Nations, where the American plan for the international control of atomic energy was under discussion; and in the Near East, where the Russians seemed to be launching a new expansionist campaign. The principle of "patience with firmness" governed the Administration's handling of each of these situations.

Washington's position on the postwar treatment of Germany had become clear by the time of the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945: the United States would support the demilitarization, denazification, and deindustrialization of the former Reich, but not to the point of causing an economic collapse which might impair prospects for European recovery and impose a heavy relief burden on American taxpayers. For this reason, Byrnes had adamantly opposed Soviet demands for a fixed amount of reparations, arguing that removals should be limited to whatever percentage of German resources was not needed to maintain a minimal standard of living. A compromise arrangement had finally been worked out whereby the Russians agreed to satisfy their reparations requirements by removals from their own zone, plus 10 percent of whatever capital equipment from other zones was "unnecessary for the German peace economy." In addition, the Soviet Union would get another 15 percent of such material from the West in return for an equivalent value of food, coal, or other commodities from the Russian zone. The four-power Allied Control Council, working under principles established by the Allied Reparations Commission, would decide how much capital equipment could be spared from the Western zones for reparations shipments, both to the Soviet Union and to other claimants, subject to the final approval of the zonal commander from whose territory the material was taken.[11]

American diplomats did not regard this agreement as sanctioning the dismemberment of Germany. The Potsdam protocol explicitly provided that, as long as the occupation lasted, that country would be treated as an economic unit. No German government would be formed for the pres-

[11] Potsdam Conference protocol, August 1, 1945, *FR: Potsdam,* II, 1481–87. For background on the Potsdam Agreement, see chapter 7.

ent, but "certain essential central German administrative departments" would be established to handle finance, transportation, communications, foreign trade, and industry on a nationwide basis. In addition, Washington officials interpreted the agreement to mean that the occupying powers would have to work out a uniform formula for reparations removals from all zones; otherwise, as Reparations Commissioner Pauley noted, discrepancies from zone to zone would create wide differences in standards of living, thus violating the principle of economic unity. State Department experts realized that in practice it might be easier to administer the three Western zones as a unit than to agree on common policies with the Russians, but they felt that the effort to achieve four-power control should at least be made.[12]

As it turned out, however, the chief opposition to treating Germany as an economic unit came not from the Russians but from the French. France's role in the occupation of Germany was anomalous: French representatives had taken no part in the Potsdam deliberations, but at Yalta five months earlier the Big Three had agreed to give France an occupation zone and a seat on the Allied Control Council. This placed the Paris government in a position to veto implementation of whatever parts of the Potsdam protocol it did not like. General de Gaulle, reflecting French fears of a resurgent Germany, very strongly disliked the agreement's emphasis on economic unity and called for detachment of the Rhineland and the Ruhr. If the Allies opposed him, de Gaulle let it be known, France would have to protect itself by vetoing restoration of the centralized German administrative agencies provided for in the Potsdam accord. "It is a matter of life and death for us," he told American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery; "for you, one interesting question among many others." [13]

Throughout the last half of 1945, American officials regarded France

[12] *FR: Potsdam,* II, 1483–84; Pauley to Clay, August 11, 1945, *FR: 1945,* III, 1251–53; Clayton and Collado to Willard Thorp, August 16, 1945, *FR: Potsdam,* II, 938–40.

[13] Caffery to Byrnes, November 3, 1945, *FR: 1945,* III, 890–91. See also *ibid.,* pp. 842–45, 869–71, 878; Eisenhower to Marshall, October 13, 1945, Eisenhower MSS, 1916–52, Box 73; Clay, *Decision in Germany,* p. 39; Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors,* p. 287; and McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia,* p. 627. John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949,* chapters 1–4, strongly emphasizes the importance of the French attitude.

as the major obstacle to a settlement of the German question, but by the end of February, 1946, growing concern over Russian intentions forced them to view the problem in broader terms. Robert Murphy, General Clay's political adviser in Germany, warned on February 24 that the Soviet Union might be using the delay in implementing the Potsdam Agreement to solidify its position in eastern Germany, with the idea of later calling for a unified Reich under Russian auspices. Continued French recalcitrance could well play into Moscow's hands. Murphy thought it odd that the German Communist Party was opposing internationalization of the Ruhr while French Communists were supporting it, and raised the possibility that both groups might be following orders from Moscow. Centralized German economic agencies would have at least partially broken down zonal boundaries, he pointed out, making it difficult for the Russians to continue running their zone on a unilateral basis. If the French continued to resist economic unification, Murphy suggested, Washington should consider temporarily withholding cooperation in other fields until a more favorable attitude developed.[14]

Murphy's analysis arrived in Washington three days after Kennan's "long telegram," just as United States officials were undertaking their fundamental reevaluation of policy toward the Soviet Union. H. Freeman Matthews, director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs, forwarded Murphy's dispatch to Byrnes, noting that it added to the economic reasons for establishing central German administrative agencies "a compelling political reason for overcoming French obstruction, viz., that the Soviet Government and the German Communist Party are making effective capital out of the present impasse by becoming the champions of German unity." The department also sent Murphy's message to Kennan in Moscow, asking for his observations.[15]

Kennan agreed that the Russians welcomed French resistance to central German agencies. There could be no doubt, he asserted, that Maurice Thorez, leader of the French Communist Party, was acting "as [a] Moscow stooge." But Kennan warned that German economic unity

[14] Murphy to Byrnes, February 24, 1946, *FR: 1946,* V, 505–7. See also Patterson to Byrnes, February 25, 1946, summarized in Byrnes to Murphy, March 12, 1946, *ibid.,* pp. 524–25; Murphy to Forrestal, March 18, 1946, Forrestal MSS, Box 101; and Murphy to Byrnes, March 19, 1946, *FR: 1946,* V, 527–28.

[15] Matthews to Byrnes, February 28, 1946, *FR: 1946,* V, 508; Byrnes to Kennan, February 27, 1946, cited *ibid.,* p. 516*n*.

would not necessarily weaken the Soviet position: the Russians would agree to central agencies only if they thought they could control them, and this could lead to the eventual communization of the entire country. The real problem in Germany, Kennan contended, was the economic chaos wrought by the Russians' amputation of territory east of the Oder-Neisse line. When the Americans and British agreed to this at Potsdam, they destroyed whatever possibility existed for a unified and sovereign Germany "fitted constructively into [the] pattern of western European life." Under the circumstances, there were only two alternatives:

> (1) to leave [the] remainder of Germany nominally united but extensively vulnerable to Soviet political penetration and influence or (2) to carry to its logical conclusion the process of partition which was begun in the east and to endeavor to rescue [the] western zones of Germany by walling them off against eastern penetration and integrating them into [the] international pattern of western Europe rather than into a united Germany.[16]

Kennan's analysis pinpointed the delicate and perplexing situation confronting American officials in Germany early in 1946. French opposition to German economic unity threatened not only to make the division of that country permanent but to place upon the United States the burden of supporting the food-deficient Western zones. But centralized German agencies, as Kennan pointed out, could fall under Russian control, giving Moscow an opportunity to dominate all Germany. Compared to this, a permanently divided Reich seemed the lesser of two evils. The United States could hardly commit itself to either centralization or dismemberment until Stalin's goals became clearer. But Washington did launch a series of diplomatic initiatives in the spring of 1946 designed to smoke out Russian intentions in Germany, while leaving open the possibility of moving in either direction.

On April 29, 1946, Byrnes proposed to the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in Paris, a four-power treaty guaranteeing the disarmament of Germany for the next twenty-five years. Senator Vandenberg had originally suggested such a pact in January, 1945, as a means of convincing the Russians that they did not have to take over Eastern Europe in order to gain security from future attack. Administration officials had

[16] Kennan to Byrnes, March 6, 1946, *FR: 1946,* V, 516–20. See also Kennan to Carmel Offie, May 10, 1946, *ibid.,* pp. 555–56.

considered the idea off and on during the summer of 1945, and Byrnes had casually mentioned it to the Russians at both London and Moscow. The Secretary of State decided to push the four-power accord at Paris as a test of Soviet objectives in Germany. He explained to Molotov that "frankly, there were many people in the United States who were unable to understand the exact aim of the Soviet Union—whether it was a search for security or expansionism. Such a treaty as had been proposed and also the similar treaty suggested for Japan he had felt would effectively take care of the question of security." Vandenberg, who was attending the Paris Conference as a member of the American delegation, put the matter more bluntly in his diary: "If and when Molotov finally refuses this offer, he will confess that he wants *expansion* and not 'security.' . . . Then moral conscience all around the globe can face and assess the realities—and prepare for the consequences." [17]

Four days after Byrnes made his proposal in Paris, General Clay announced the suspension of further reparations shipments from the American zone until the four occupying powers agreed to treat Germany as an economic unit. This action was aimed in part at the French, whose stubborn resistance to central German agencies had delayed economic unification. But American officials now viewed their difficulties with France in the larger context of deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union: Stalin, they felt, had been surreptitiously supporting the French stand all along because it allowed him to remain committed to the principle of a unified Germany while operating his zone on a unilateral basis. These suspicions seemed confirmed early in April when Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Council had proclaimed their unwillingness to implement a common import-export program for all of Ger-

[17] Bohlen memorandum, Byrnes-Molotov conversation, April 28, 1946, *FR: 1946,* II, 146–47; Vandenberg Diary, April 29, 1946, Vandenberg, ed., *Private Papers,* p. 268. For background on the four-power treaty, see Vandenberg's speech in the *Congressional Record,* January 10, 1945, pp. 164–67; Grenville Clark to Truman, June 2, 1945, copy in Hopkins MSS, Box 331; *FR: Potsdam,* I, 162–63, 450–52; *FR: 1945,* II, 267–68, III, 527–31; Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly,* pp. 171–76. The text of the proposed treaty is in *FR: 1946,* II, 190–93. An unidentified member of the American delegation at Paris—possibly Vandenberg—explained the strategy behind Byrnes's proposal as follows: "If they [the Russians] are sincere in their intentions toward the rest of the world, they must sign. If they are not and refuse to sign, it will make them appear an outlaw nation before the eyes of the world." (*New York Times,* April 30, 1946.)

many until reparations deliveries had been completed. Clay's order to halt removals from the American zone would, as Undersecretary of State Acheson explained, "put Soviet protestations of loyalty to Potsdam to [the] final test and fix blame for [the] breach of Potsdam on [the] Soviets in case they fail to meet this test." [18]

Moscow's response to these initiatives did nothing to relieve American suspicions. After a delay of two months, Molotov on July 9 rejected Byrnes's proposed treaty on the grounds that demilitarization could not be guaranteed until all reparations deliveries had been completed. The Soviet foreign minister then revived the original Russian demand for a fixed sum of $10 billion, to which, he claimed, Roosevelt had agreed at Yalta, and vigorously condemned the "unlawful" action of General Clay in halting removals from the American zone. On the following day Molotov came out against detachment of the Ruhr from Germany, blandly disclaiming any Russian intention to stand in the way of the "rightful aspirations" of the German people or to wreck their economy. American officials regarded this contradictory series of statements as a blatant attempt to extract maximum reparations while at the same time posing as a defender of German economic unity. Byrnes now became convinced that the Russians would never allow implementation of the Potsdam accords, and from this time on moved toward the concept of a divided Germany as the only alternative to a Russian-dominated Reich.[19]

After careful consultation with the President, congressional leaders, and military and diplomatic advisers, the Secretary of State announced a

[18] Acheson to Byrnes, May 9, 1946, *FR: 1946,* V, 549. For background on Clay's decision, see Murphy to Byrnes, April 4, 10, and May 6, 1946, *ibid.,* pp. 547–48. Clay himself, writing in retrospect, pictured it as a move designed to force the Russians to comply with the Potsdam Agreement (*Decision in Germany,* pp. 120–25), an interpretation subsequently stressed by William H. McNeill (*America, Britain, and Russia,* p. 726). John Gimbel, on the basis of American military government records, argues that Clay's decision at the time was directed primarily at the French, and came to be viewed as an anti-Russian move only after the Cold War had developed. (*The American Occupation of Germany,* pp. 56–61.) Department of State records unavailable when Gimbel was writing his book make it clear, however, that American officials at that time saw the move primarily as a means of testing Russian commitment to the principle of German economic unity, and that they viewed difficulties with France in the light of the emerging Soviet-American confrontation. (*FR: 1946,* V, 549–56.)

[19] Molotov statements of July 9 and 10, 1946, *FR: 1946,* II, 842–47, 869–73. See also Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly,* pp. 179–81.

new United States policy on Germany in a speech delivered at Stuttgart on September 6, 1946. Byrnes reiterated American support for the principle of economic unity, but added this significant qualification: "If complete unification cannot be secured, we shall do everything in our power to secure maximum possible unification." Repeating an offer made at the Paris Foreign Ministers' Conference in July, Byrnes expressed willingness to merge the American zone economically with any or all other zones. He also endorsed movement toward political unification by calling for establishment of a German provisional government. The Secretary of State made it clear, however, that Washington would not tolerate a unified Germany under Soviet control: "We do not want Germany to become the satellite of any power." Hence, "as long as there is an occupation army in Germany, American armed forces will be part of that occupation army." [20]

Byrnes's Stuttgart speech represented an important reversal of the American position on Germany. Since the early days of World War II, State Department planners had fought tenaciously for the principle of economic unity, defending it successfully against Morgenthau and other advocates of vengeance. But the reorientation of policy toward Russia early in 1946 threw new light on the German question: American diplomats gradually came to realize that unification could pose serious dangers if it brought about an expansion of Soviet power. Since the Russians had made it clear that they would permit a consolidation of zones only on their terms, Washington officials decided to accept the division of Germany as the least distasteful of several unpalatable alternatives. Byrnes had called the Russians' bluff in Germany, Truman explained to Joseph Davies several days after the Stuttgart address; now "Britain and the United States would have to go along without them." [21]

The President and his advisers also had to confront unpalatable alternatives in dealing with atomic energy. Policy-makers in this field hoped to devise a scientifically sound method for detecting clandestine rearmament which would be flexible enough to overcome Soviet suspicions, yet sufficiently rigorous to ward off congressional criticism. The task proved to be an impossible one. As distrust of Russia grew during 1946, the Ad-

[20] *Department of State Bulletin,* XV (September 15, 1946), 496–501.

[21] Davies memorandum of conversation with Truman, September 10, 1946, Davies MSS, Box 24.

ministration began to shape its policy, not according to what the Russians might accept, but in terms of what Congress would not condemn. Just as Washington had come to favor a divided Germany to the prospect of a unified Reich under Soviet control, so it came to prefer the risk of a nuclear arms race to the possibility that an imperfect control system might endanger American security.

Early in January, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes had appointed a committee headed by Undersecretary of State Acheson to draw up specific proposals on international control which the United States could place before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Acheson's group in turn recruited a board of consultants under the direction of David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, to sift workable recommendations from the masses of technical data available. The consultants' task, Lilienthal wrote in his journal, was "to develop a position, based on facts not now known by our political officers, that will 'work,' and have a good chance of being accepted, especially by Russia." [22]

The Acheson-Lilienthal report recommended establishment under the United Nations of an international "Atomic Development Authority" which would, after a worldwide survey of raw materials, assume control of all highly concentrated uranium and thorium deposits. The authority would make its resources available for peaceful purposes only. Any unapproved use of fissionable materials by a particular nation would be regarded as a danger signal, giving other countries sufficient time to prepare themselves for possible attack. Under the plan the United States reserved for itself the decision as to when or whether to stop manufacturing atomic bombs of its own. Byrnes submitted the report to President Truman on March 21, 1946, and, after a series of inadvertent leaks, formally released it to the public on March 28.[23]

In an effort to make the Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations more palatable to a skeptical Congress, Truman and Byrnes decided to entrust Bernard M. Baruch with the task of presenting the American proposal to the United Nations. Baruch, then seventy-six, was a native of South

[22] Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World,* pp. 531–34; Lilienthal Journal, January 24, 1946, *Lilienthal Journals,* II, 14.

[23] Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World,* pp. 540–58; Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* pp. 151–54.

Carolina who by the age of thirty had made himself a millionaire through cagey stock market investments. After serving as chairman of the War Industries Board in World War I, he devoted much of his energy to financing favorite politicians, an activity which understandably made him popular in Congress, and to nurturing carefully his public image as a park-bench philosopher and adviser to presidents. David Lilienthal described him in 1944 as "a shrewd, smart, and experienced old boy. . . . He likes to have his finger in all the pies, working by remote control, so that if things go wrong he doesn't have to take the responsibility. And about the vainest old man I have ever seen." Baruch's appointment astonished and disappointed the technical experts who had helped prepare the Acheson-Lilienthal report, but Truman and Byrnes clearly expected the septuagenarian's great prestige to enhance the plan's political acceptability.[24]

Baruch surprised Administration officials, however, by demanding the right to make changes in the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal before presenting it to the United Nations. The report was "pretty close" to government policy, he complained to Truman on March 26, yet he had had no hand in formulating it. When reporters outside the White House questioned him on the document, Baruch ostentatiously turned off his hearing aid. Both Truman and Byrnes went out of their way to assure him that the Acheson-Lilienthal recommendation was not the final United States position, and that Baruch and his own staff would have opportunities to make their views known. Baruch chose as his advisers not the scientists who had helped to prepare the report but a group of Wall Street bankers who knew little of the intricacies of atomic energy.[25]

Since the proposed international control agency would derive its authority from the Security Council, Baruch feared that any permanent member of the Council could veto its action. Therefore, he felt, use of the veto should be prohibited when the Security Council was considering

[24] "Bernard M. Baruch," *Current Biography, 1950,* pp. 14–17; Lilienthal Journal, February 13, 1944, *Lilienthal Journals,* I, 625. For the reaction to Baruch's appointment, see *ibid.,* II, 30; and Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* p. 154.

[25] Baruch to Truman, March 26, 1946, printed in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope,* pp. 8–9; Byrnes to Baruch, April 19, 1946, *ibid.,* pp. 9–10; Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World,* pp. 556–58. Truman charged in his memoirs that Baruch's main concern was to see that he received sufficient public recognition.

atomic energy matters. Defenders of the Acheson-Lilienthal report replied that this suggestion could only lessen the chances of Soviet acceptance, while contributing nothing to American security. Any nation which tried to veto Security Council action in this field, they argued, would automatically be presumed guilty of secretly building atomic bombs. By threatening to resign, however, Baruch forced Truman and Byrnes to accept his point of view. Having employed Baruch in order to take advantage of his personal prestige, the Administration felt it could not dismiss him without undermining the credibility of the whole "get tough with Russia" campaign. Baruch's appointment was "the worst mistake I have ever made," Byrnes confided to Acheson, "but we can't fire him now, not with all the other trouble." [26]

On June 14, 1946, Baruch presented the American proposal on international control to the United Nations in characteristically apocalyptic language ("We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead"). The plan followed the main outlines of the Acheson-Lilienthal report except for Baruch's insistence on exempting the Atomic Development Authority from the Security Council veto. The Russian delegate, Andrei Gromyko, immediately attacked Baruch's proposal as an attempt to undermine big-power unity in the Security Council, and suggested instead the immediate destruction of all atomic weapons. The United States rejected the Russian plan because of its failure to provide safeguards. Debate dragged on until December 30, 1946, when the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission adopted the Baruch Plan by a 10–0 vote, with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. This merely transferred the dispute to the Security Council, where the Russian veto prevented adoption of the United States proposal.[27]

The Soviet Union's rejection of the Baruch Plan came as no great surprise to American officials. Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith had warned from Moscow as early as April, 1946, that the Russians had no interest in a workable international control system and were counting

[26] Draft by Fred Searls of Baruch letter to Byrnes, March 31, 1946, Baruch MSS, United Nations Atomic Energy Commission file, section 1; Baruch memoranda of conversations with Byrnes and Truman, June 7, 1946, *ibid.;* Baruch, *The Public Years,* pp. 346–47; Lilienthal Journal, June 13, December 29, 1946, *Lilienthal Journals,* II, 59, 124–25.

[27] For an extended summary of the United Nations debate on atomic energy, see Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World,* pp. 576–618.

on producing their own bombs, relying in the meantime on domestic political constraints within the United States to keep the Truman Administration from employing "atomic blackmail." The only control system which Moscow would accept, Smith argued, would be one which furnished Soviet scientists with full technical data on the making of bombs, with no restrictions as to the use of such information.[28] Neither the Acheson-Lilienthal report nor the final proposal which Baruch made to the United Nations came anywhere close to meeting this requirement; both provided that until the control plan went into effect, the United States would retain its monopoly over nuclear weapons. Hence, Baruch's insistence on abolishing the veto almost certainly did not, in itself, wreck prospects for international control.

The real problem was that American leaders, by the summer of 1946, simply were no longer willing to trust the Russians. "We should not under any circumstances throw away our gun," Truman told Baruch, "until we are sure that the rest of the world can't arm against us." Even former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who had originally proposed seeking a control agreement with the Soviet Union, had by this time changed his mind. "The time has passed for handling the bomb in the way I suggested to the President last summer," he wrote to Baruch in June. By September, Stimson was telling Forrestal that the United States should not delay in making as many "atomic missiles" as possible. Baruch himself showed little disappointment over the Russian attitude. "If we have made every effort to reach an agreement," he commented in August, "we can then face a break with a clear conscience." Above all, there could be no compromise: "This problem [is] far too important to do any trading about."[29] As in the case of Germany, the United States would still seek a settlement with the Russians on the international control of atomic energy, but only on American terms. If the Russians failed to accept these, Washington was prepared to face with equanimity the prospect of a divided world.

[28] Smith to Byrnes, April 28, 1946, *FR: 1946*, VI, 749.

[29] Truman to Baruch, July 10, 1946, quoted in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 11; Stimson to Baruch, June 18, 1946, Stimson MSS, Box 432; Forrestal Diary, September 11, 1946, Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 199–200; Baruch comments at a meeting of the United States and Canadian delegations to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, August 1, 1946, Baruch MSS, United Nations Atomic Energy Commission file, section 1.

The outbreak of a new crisis in the eastern Mediterranean in August, 1946, made clear the extent of Washington's commitment to an uncompromising policy. On August 7, the Russians requested a revision of the Montreux Convention to allow for joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the Dardanelles. American officials viewed this move as the culmination of a long effort by Moscow to establish naval bases in Turkey, a development which they feared might make that country a Soviet satellite. Edwin C. Wilson, the United States ambassador in Ankara, warned the State Department that if Turkey fell under Russian control, the way would be open for a Soviet advance into the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal area. "Once this happens [the] fat is in the fire again." [30]

Washington officials agreed. Truman's top military and diplomatic advisers concluded that the Soviet note clearly reflected a desire to dominate Turkey, and that if Moscow succeeded, it would be "extremely difficult, if not impossible" for the United States to keep the Russians from gaining control of Greece and all of the Near and Middle East. Only the conviction that the United States was prepared to use force would deter the Kremlin: "The time has come when we must decide that we shall resist with all means at our disposal any Soviet aggression." At a meeting on August 15, Truman endorsed this conclusion with such alacrity that General Eisenhower, then Army Chief of Staff, politely asked whether the Chief Executive realized that this position could lead to war if the Russians did not back down. Truman surprised Eisenhower by delivering a brief but impressive lecture on the strategic significance of the Black Sea straits, leaving no doubt that he understood fully the ominous implications of the memorandum he had just approved. The Administration strongly encouraged the Turks to resist the Russian demands and, to back them up, dispatched units of the American fleet to the eastern Mediterranean. One month later Secretary Forrestal announced that the Navy would henceforth maintain a permanent presence in that part of the world.[31]

[30] Wilson to Byrnes, August 12, 1946, *FR: 1946,* VII, 837. For the Russian note of August 7, 1946, see *ibid.,* pp. 827–29. For background on the growing American concern about the Soviet ambitions in the Near East, see the comprehensive memorandum by Loy W. Henderson, head of the State Department's Office of Near Eastern Affairs, dated December 28, 1945, *ibid.,* pp. 1–6.

[31] Acheson to Byrnes, August 15, 1946, *FR: 1946,* VII, 840–42. See also the Forrestal Diary, August 15 and September 30, 1946, Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries,*

In face of these maneuvers, the Russians dropped their demands for bases in the Dardanelles, thus averting a major confrontation. The episode was significant, though, for it showed that the Truman Administration was now willing to risk war if necessary in order to block further Soviet expansion. Washington officials now agreed, for the most part, on the need for a firm policy. Whether the American people were prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to carry out such a policy, however, was another question. Forrestal worried that the nation's armed forces lacked the strength to sustain the President's position, and called for a campaign to arouse an apathetic public to the dangers of the situation. Clark Clifford's September, 1946, memorandum made the same point: "Only a well-informed public will support the stern policies which Soviet activities make imperative and which the United States government must adopt." [32] Implementation of the strategy of "containment" had already begun, but the Truman Administration still faced the task of persuading the American people to bear the burdens which this course of action would entail.

III

The Truman Administration's new policy of toughness toward Russia underwent two internal challenges during the summer and fall of 1946, both launched by groups which had not yet accommodated themselves fully to the realities of the postwar international environment. A dwindling band of popular front liberals, convinced that Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union still offered the best hope for world peace, vigorously condemned Truman's uncompromising stand. A far larger group of Americans, though they favored firmness with Moscow, threatened to deprive the Administration of the means to carry out such a policy by calling for a return to the military and economic practices of

pp. 192, 211; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope,* p. 97; Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* pp. 195–96; and Phillips, *The Truman Presidency,* pp. 170–71. In a conversation on August 20, 1946, Acheson assured Lord Inverchapel, the British ambassador, that the Administration regarded the Turkish crisis with the utmost seriousness and was prepared to go to war if necessary to defend the Turks. (*FR: 1946,* VII, 849–50.)

[32] Forrestal Diary, August 15 and 23, 1946, Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries,* pp. 192, 196–97; Clifford memorandum quoted in Krock, *Memoirs,* p. 482.

pre-World War II isolationism. Both challenges had to be overcome before the Administration could begin to devise long-range plans to counteract what it saw as the Soviet "menace."

American liberals found themselves torn between conflicting impulses in reacting to the new "get tough with Russia" policy. Many of them still operated under the assumption that fascism represented the only significant threat to American democracy, and found it difficult to criticize a nation like the Soviet Union which had fought Hitler so effectively. While few liberals tried to defend Russian behavior in Eastern Europe and the Near East, they detected little difference between these actions and the British imperialism which Truman had apparently endorsed by joining Churchill at Fulton. Molotov's refusal to sign Byrnes's twenty-five-year German disarmament pact puzzled liberals, however, as did Moscow's rejection of the Baruch Plan. Moreover, a few influential liberals had begun to worry that American communists might try to infiltrate their movement in order to promote the Kremlin's interests. As a result, liberal opinion regarding Russia was in a state of flux in the summer of 1946.[33]

Since the death of Roosevelt, Henry A. Wallace, formerly secretary of agriculture and vice-president, now secretary of commerce, had emerged as the most influential single leader of the liberal community. Despite his position in the cabinet, Wallace did not hesitate to speak out on foreign policy. In a series of public statements during the spring of 1946, he criticized Churchill's Fulton address, warned of the dangers of an atomic armaments race, and, to the extreme irritation of Secretary of State Byrnes, called for dismantling an American military base in Iceland. The Secretary of Commerce also sent two confidential letters to Truman, one of them twelve pages long, arguing that the Russians had justifiable reasons for fearing the United States and advocating new approaches to Moscow by liberalizing the Baruch Plan and extending a loan to promote Soviet-American trade. Truman ignored the first letter

[33] Alonzo L. Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace, the Liberals, and Soviet-American Relations," *Review of Politics,* XXX (April, 1968), 154–57; Hamby, "Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism, 1945–1948" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1965), pp. 85–87, 107–8; James Reston in the *New York Times,* May 6, 1946; Alfred Baker Lewis to James Loeb, Jr., and Reinhold Niebuhr, April 16, 1946, Niebuhr MSS, Box 12; Loeb letter to the editor, *New Republic,* CXIV (May 13, 1946), 699.

and sent only a perfunctory reply to the second one. At this point, late in the summer of 1946, Wallace resolved to resign from the cabinet following the November election, but in the meantime he agreed to campaign for the Democratic Party. His first speech, on foreign policy, was scheduled before a joint meeting of the National Citizens Political Action Committee and the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions at Madison Square Garden on the night of September 12, 1946.[34]

Stripped of its rhetoric, Wallace's address was an uncharacteristically realistic plea for recognition that the world was now divided into political spheres of influence: "We should recognize that we have no more business in the *political* affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the *political* affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the United States." Wallace did express the hope that there could still be an open door for trade throughout the world, including Eastern Europe. Economic contacts, in his view, could lessen tensions which political divisions had created. The Secretary of Commerce sternly lectured both the British and the Russians: London should give up its "imperialistic" policies, while Moscow "should stop teaching that [its] form of communism must, by force if necessary, ultimately triumph over democratic capitalism." Both countries, he argued, could learn a lesson from Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy. Ironically, in view of subsequent events, Wallace's predominantly left-wing audience hissed and booed his critical comments about Russia, and the *Daily Worker* at first strongly condemned his position.[35]

The rhetoric in Wallace's speech attracted more attention than its substance, however, for in what seemed to be a direct slap at Administration policy, he proclaimed: "We are reckoning with a force which cannot be handled successfully by a 'Get tough with Russia' policy. 'Getting tough' never bought anything real and lasting—whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or world powers. The tougher we get,

[34] Hamby, "Harry S. Truman," pp. 19–21; Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace," pp. 157–59; Truman, *Year of Decisions,* pp. 555–57. For Byrnes's irritation regarding Wallace's statements, see Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries,* pp. 154–55; and Vandenberg, ed., *Private Papers,* p. 266.

[35] The text of Wallace's speech is in *Vital Speeches,* XII (October 1, 1946), 738–41. On reaction to the speech, see the *New York Times,* September 13, 1946; and Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace," p. 160.

the tougher the Russians will get." Then came the shocker: "Just two days ago, when President Truman read these words, he said that they represented the policy of his administration." Reaction was sharp and instantaneous. The next day Arthur Krock listed at least six points on which Wallace's speech conflicted with Truman's foreign policy. *New York Times* correspondent Harold Callendar reported from the Paris Peace Conference that Wallace's address had "cut the ground from under the foreign policy that Mr. Byrnes had labored for a year to develop." Senator Vandenberg rumbled ominously that Republicans could only cooperate "with one Secretary of State at a time." [36]

Truman's efforts to explain the situation only compounded the confusion. Wallace had shown the President a copy of his speech on September 10, emphasizing its critical remarks about Russia. Truman, after a cursory scanning of the text, had made no objections. In a press conference on the 12th, the President had told reporters who had seen Wallace's prepared text that the policies advocated by the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State were "exactly in line." Two days after the Madison Square Garden address, Truman tried to quiet growing criticism by issuing a "clarifying" statement maintaining that he had approved Wallace's right to give the speech, but not the content of it. On September 16, Wallace proclaimed his intention to make further statements on foreign policy. This provoked Secretary of State Byrnes, still in Paris, into threatening immediate resignation unless Truman muzzled Wallace. After further hesitation, the President on September 20 announced that he had asked the Secretary of Commerce to resign.[37]

The Truman-Wallace-Byrnes imbroglio was an important test of the Administration's commitment to its new policy of toughness with Russia. Still the leader of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, Wallace was no ordinary cabinet member. By firing him, Truman cut the last of his tenuous ties to the liberals less than two months before the congres-

[36] *Vital Speeches,* XII (October 1, 1946), 739; *New York Times,* September 13, 15, 1946.

[37] A full account of the events of September 12–20, 1946, is in Curry, *Byrnes,* pp. 253–72, but see also Schapsmeier, *Prophet in Politics,* chapter 10; Truman, *Year of Decisions,* pp. 557–60; Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime,* pp. 370–76; Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries,* pp. 206–10; Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* pp. 190–92; and Phillips, *The Truman Presidency,* pp. 148–52.

sional elections. But the alternative would have been not simply the resignation of Byrnes as secretary of state. Keeping Wallace on would have alienated Vandenberg and brought about the collapse of bipartisan unity on foreign policy. It would have given Republicans a magnificent opportunity to base their fall campaign on the charge that Democrats were "soft" on communism. It would also have meant repudiating a course of action which Truman himself strongly believed to be right. Angering liberals by removing Wallace was the lesser evil, hence it is not surprising that the President acted as he did.

The other major internal challenge to Truman's diplomatic strategy grew out of a surprisingly tenacious strain of isolationism which still affected the thinking of a large number of Americans and their representatives in Congress. These people believed, or at least hoped, that the United States could return to the small military establishment and low taxes of the prewar period without significantly endangering national security. Unlike the Wallace situation, the threat which this attitude posed to the Administration's "get tough with Russia" policy was much too deeply rooted to be blunted by the simple expedient of firing a member of the cabinet.

Demands for immediate demobilization had continued to intensify throughout the first part of 1946. Top civilian and military officials tried to counteract this pressure by launching a public campaign for retention of the draft and universal military training. President Truman told the nation in April that it would be "a tragic breach of national duty and international faith" if the American people failed to accept the responsibilities of leadership which went with their position as the strongest country in the world. The Administration did manage to secure an extension of the Selective Service Act in June, but one year later Congress allowed the draft to expire completely. Meanwhile, a potent combination of religious, pacifist, educational, farm, and labor organizations kept the proposal for universal military training from ever receiving serious consideration. "It looks as if Congress is determined to disarm us," Elmer Davis wrote to Bernard Baruch, "whether anybody else disarms or not." Not until Americans had suffered the repeated shocks of the Czechoslovak coup, the Berlin blockade, the Soviet atomic bomb, the fall of China, and the Korean War would they bring themselves to accept a

large peacetime military establishment as a normal state of affairs.[38]

The Administration also had to overcome isolationist tendencies in the field of economics before it could implement a policy of containment. The war had left vast areas of the world devastated. Government leaders knew that the economies of these regions could not revive without outside help, which only the United States could provide. Failure to furnish this assistance would not only damage the American economy by leaving the United States with few foreign markets; it would also breed conditions in those countries which would promote the spread of communism. President Truman summarized the arguments for American foreign economic aid as follows:

> We shall help because we know that we ourselves cannot enjoy prosperity in a world of economic stagnation. We shall help because economic distress, anywhere in the world, is a fertile breeding ground for violent political upheaval. And we shall help because we feel it is right to lend a hand to our friends and allies who are recovering from wounds inflicted by our common enemy.[39]

Whether the American people would be willing to provide such assistance, however, was very much in doubt. Traditional distrust of foreigners still existed, compounded by the memory that only Finland among America's former allies had not defaulted on its World War I debts. Having generously furnished lend-lease to fight the common enemy in World War II, Americans, yearning for normalcy, found it difficult to see why they should do more.

The Administration's lengthy fight to secure congressional approval of a $3.75 billion loan to Great Britain during the first half of 1946 made this attitude painfully obvious. Opposition to the loan stemmed from a variety of sources: old-fashioned Anglophobia, fear that the loan would support socialism or imperialism, doubt as to whether the British would repay the loan, Zionist opposition to British policy in Palestine, suspicion that the loan would set a precedent for assistance to other countries, especially Russia. In a series of public speeches Undersecretary of State

[38] Truman Army Day speech, April 6, 1946, *Truman Public Papers: 1946,* p. 186; Davis to Baruch, May 20, 1946, Baruch MSS, UNAEC file, section 1: "Atomic Energy: Miscellaneous Suggestions" folder. See also Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics,* pp. 33–64.

[39] Truman speech of April 6, 1946, *Truman Public Papers: 1946,* p. 189.

Acheson repeatedly tried to picture the loan as part of a larger situation—the necessity to revive world trade—but without much success. In the end Congress approved the loan chiefly because the Administration said it was necessary to fight communism.[40]

Acheson described the dilemma facing American policy-makers in a little-noticed speech to the Associated Harvard Clubs in Boston on June 4, 1946. The most important task in conducting American foreign policy, he maintained, was "focusing the will of 140,000,000 people on problems beyond our shores . . . [when] people are focusing on 140,000,000 other things." This problem had greatly contributed to American difficulties in asserting moral, military, and economic leadership in the postwar world:

> [It lies] at the root of the hysteria which has wrought such havoc with our armed services, and continues to do so. [It lies] at the root, also, of the difficulty which we have in using our great economic power, in our own interest, to hasten recovery in other countries along lines which are essential to our own system. . . . The slogans "Bring the boys home!" and "Don't be Santa Claus!" are not among our more gifted or thoughtful contributions to the creation of a free and tranquil world.

Americans were not well prepared for world leadership: "We believe that any problem can be solved with a little ingenuity and without inconvenience to the folks at large." The problems of the postwar world were not like this. "[For] all our lives the danger, the uncertainty, the need for alertness, for effort, for discipline will be upon us. . . . We are in for it and the only real question is whether we shall know it soon enough." [41]

The outcome of the November, 1946, congressional elections further discouraged those who had hoped for a more cooperative attitude toward foreign policy questions on Capitol Hill. Taking advantage of a combi-

[40] *Newsweek,* XXVII (February 11, 1946), 20; Vandenberg, ed., *Private Papers,* pp. 230–31; *Department of State Bulletin,* XIV (March 31, May 5, 26, 1946), 511–14, 759–60, 893–94, 914; Frank McNaughton to *Time* home office, July 13, 1946, McNaughton MSS; *Congressional Record,* July 13, 1946, p. 8915. The fight over the British loan killed whatever slim chances still remained that the Administration might grant a loan to the Soviet Union. On this point see George F. Luthringer to Clayton, May 23, 1946, *FR: 1946,* VI, 842–43; John H. Crider in the *New York Times,* July 21, 1946; and Herring, "Aid to Russia, 1941–1946," chapter 9.

[41] *Department of State Bulletin,* XIV (June 16, 1946), 1045–47.

nation of circumstances—accumulated grievances after thirteen years of Democratic rule, the trauma of reconversion to a peacetime economy, lack of firm leadership from the White House, recurrent labor troubles, the meat shortage, the Wallace affair—Republicans gained control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives for the first time since 1930. The G.O.P. victory initially did not seem to threaten the bipartisan foreign policy which Truman and Byrnes had worked out with Vandenberg. The Michigan senator, who now became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and president *pro tempore* of the Senate, continued to speak for Republicans on foreign affairs while Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, whose inclinations lay in a more isolationist direction than Vandenberg's, deliberately concentrated on domestic matters. It quickly became clear, however, that external and internal problems could not be so neatly divided: the conservative domestic program of Taft and Speaker of the House Joseph W. Martin posed a clear threat to the internationalist foreign policy which Vandenberg and the Administration supported.[42]

Republican candidates had campaigned in 1946 on a platform pledging to reduce income taxes by 20 percent, cut government spending, and raise tariffs. When the Eightieth Congress convened in January, 1947, G.O.P. leaders made it clear that they intended to fulfill these promises. But across-the-board tax cuts, spending reductions, and tariff increases seemed likely to undermine the foundations of Administration foreign policy, now based on the principles of maintaining sufficient military force to counter overt Soviet aggression, while at the same time extending economic aid to nations threatened by communism from within. Republican pledges, if implemented, would limit the Administration's ability to put its new Russian policy into effect.[43]

President Truman asked the Eightieth Congress on January 10, 1947, for $37.7 billion to finance government operations for the fiscal year beginning July 1, of which $11.2 billion was to go for national defense. But on February 14, the Joint Congressional Committee on the Legislative Budget recommended a budget ceiling of $31.5 billion. This involved cutting appropriations for the Army by $1 billion, the Navy by

[42] Vandenberg, ed., *Private Papers,* pp. 318–19; Ernest K. Lindley, "Republican Dividing Line," *Newsweek,* XXIX (March 3, 1947), 26.

[43] Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* pp. 90–91, 96–97.

$750 million, and the Army's overseas relief program for occupied countries by $500 million. General George C. Marshall, who had recently replaced Byrnes as secretary of state, warned that conditions in occupied countries would become "impossible" if Congress approved these budget cuts. Navy Secretary Forrestal thought that they would make the Navy "practically immobile and impotent." Secretary of War Patterson wrote former Secretary of State Byrnes that the proposed Republican action would mean "that we will travel again the same old road, disarming while the other major powers remain armed." [44]

The House of Representatives accepted the Joint Committee's recommendation for a budget slash of $6 billion, but in the Senate, largely through the influence of Vandenberg, the reduction was kept to $4.5 billion. In the resulting conference committee, the Senate's wishes prevailed, and a budget of $34.7 billion was approved. Vandenberg also succeeded in staving off Republican efforts to raise tariffs, but only in return for a concession from the State Department allowing the United States to withdraw from any reciprocal trade agreement which threatened to harm a domestic industry.[45]

The determination of conservative Republicans to cut the budget regardless of what effect this might have on Administration foreign policy worried many Washington observers. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge compared the approach of his G.O.P. colleagues to that of "a man wielding a meat ax in a dark room [who] might cut off his own head." Vandenberg suggested that Republican behavior might present to the world a picture of "Uncle Sam with a chip on each shoulder and both arms in a sling." Ernest K. Lindley charged in *Newsweek* that through "myopia, ignorance, and indifference" conservative Republicans, many of them vociferous critics of Russia, were "lending the Kremlin the greatest aid and comfort." Columnist Joseph Alsop put the matter even more bluntly: "The world is about to blow up in our faces, and the damned fools in Congress behave as though there was nothing worse to worry about than their richer constituents' difficulty in paying their taxes." [46]

[44] *Newsweek,* XXIX (February 24, 1947), 26; Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* pp. 90–91; Patterson to Byrnes, February 11, 1947, Patterson MSS, Box 18.

[45] Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* pp. 91, 96–99; *Newsweek,* XXIX (February 17, 1947), 26.

[46] Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* p. 91; *Newsweek,* XXIX (March 3, 1947), 25–26; Alsop to Martin Sommers, February 25, 1947, Alsop MSS, Box 1.

But in their push for economy at all costs, Republicans in Congress reflected the wishes of a substantial number of Americans who hoped that peace would bring a return to small government, low taxes, and noninvolvement in events overseas. The depth of this feeling indicated that the Truman Administration still had far to go in educating the American people to the responsibilities of world leadership. No one was more aware of this than Joseph M. Jones, of the State Department's Office of Public Affairs. Late in February he sent a memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State William Benton emphasizing how the concessions Congress had extracted from the Administration would increase the difficulty of dealing with the constantly-worsening world economic crisis:

> I think we must admit the conclusion that Congress and the people of this country are not sufficiently aware of the character and dimensions of the crisis that impends, and of the measures that must be taken in terms of relief, loans, gifts, constructive development programs and liberal trade policies—all of these on a scale hitherto unimagined—if disaster is to be avoided. . . . The State Department knows. Congress and the people do not know.

Jones called for an immediate program "to inform the people and convince the Congress adequately with respect to today's crisis." Such a program should involve a "grave, frank, statesmanlike appeal to the people" in which "the danger should be described fully and the cost of both action and inaction estimated." [47] During the next two weeks, to Jones's astonishment and pleasure, a combination of unexpected developments caused the Administration to embark on precisely the kind of campaign which he had recommended.

IV

Despite gloomy developments on the domestic and international fronts, morale in the Truman Administration and the Department of State was surprisingly high early in 1947. The Republican victory had a

[47] Jones to Benton, February 26, 1947, Jones MSS. Interestingly enough, Jones at this time felt that Secretary of State Marshall, not President Truman, should make the appeal to the country because Marshall "is the only one in the Government with the prestige to make a deep impression." Jones favored having Marshall make a personal appearance before Congress "with tremendous advance build-up."

strangely invigorating effect on Truman, who later told Jonathan Daniels that "the Eightieth Congress was the luckiest thing that ever happened to me." Shortly after the elections, Truman had won a major victory by forcing the capitulation of John L. Lewis in an acrimonious labor dispute. By February, 1947, Joseph Alsop perceived "a complete change of atmosphere at the White House." He noted that "ever since the Lewis crisis, the President has grown surer and surer of himself. He no longer moans to every visitor that he doesn't want the job and never did. On the contrary, he spent two hours with Bob Hannegan yesterday planning on how to get it again." Alsop also observed that Truman now greatly enjoyed "diplomatic receptions and other such occasions of unalloyed horror, taking the utmost delight in the odd spectacle of himself in a White Tie and Tails pumphandling the great—or at any rate the conspicuous." [48]

Morale had also greatly improved in the Department of State with the resignation of Byrnes as secretary of state in January, 1947, and the appointment of General Marshall to replace him. Byrnes's reluctance to consult subordinates, together with his lax administrative methods and his long absences from the country, had kept him from forming close working relationships with career officers in the department. As one department malcontent complained: "The State Department fiddles while Byrnes roams." Marshall, on the other hand, insisted on orderly staff procedures and placed far more responsibility for policy-making on subordinates than Byrnes or previous secretaries had done. Undersecretary of State Acheson was particularly pleased with the change, as David Lilienthal observed in March, 1947:

> Dean spent a good deal of time bubbling over with his enthusiasm, rapture almost, about General Marshall. . . . To work with him is such a joy that he can hardly talk about anything else. I am delighted with this, for Jimmy Byrnes' erratic and often thoughtless (as well as sometimes just plain inept) administrative and other ideas had about driven Dean crazy. Marshall . . . has made a new man of Dean, and this is a good thing for the country right now.

The effect of Marshall's appointment, Joseph Jones later recalled, "was felt from top to bottom and called forth a great surge of ideas and con-

[48] Phillips, *The Truman Presidency,* pp. 121–25, 161; Daniels, *The Man of Independence,* p. 294; Alsop to Martin Sommers, February 3, 1947, Alsop MSS, Box 1.

structive effort." [49] The new sense of purpose which invigorated both the White House and the State Department contributed significantly to the speed and decisiveness with which these institutions responded to the crisis, late in February, 1947, caused by the abrupt British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey.

The British government officially informed the State Department on February 21, 1947, that because of internal economic difficulties it would have to suspend economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey as of March 31. The situation in Turkey posed no immediate danger, but in Greece a communist-led guerrilla movement, supplied from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania and feeding on the economic distress wrought by years of war and government ineptitude, threatened to move into the power vacuum left by the British withdrawal. The State Department regarded these guerrillas as "an instrument of Soviet policy," and worried that if they came to power in Greece a "domino" effect would propel Turkey, Iran, and possibly even Italy and France into a Russian sphere of influence. The only alternative seemed to be immediate and massive American economic and military aid to prop up the sagging Greek regime. By February 26, the President and the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy had all agreed that such aid should be given. Their problem now was to convince an increasingly economy-minded Congress to undertake this new and expensive commitment.[50]

On February 27, President Truman invited a bipartisan group of congressional leaders to the White House for a briefing on the Greek crisis. Secretary of State Marshall described the reasons why the British had withdrawn aid from Greece and Turkey, the danger that these areas might fall under Soviet domination, and the decision which the executive branch had reached on the necessity for American assistance. Mar-

[49] Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* pp. 105–7; Graham H. Stuart, *The Department of State,* pp. 425, 440; Lilienthal Journal, March 9, 1947, *Lilienthal Journals,* II, 158–59. On Marshall's working methods, see Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* pp. 106–10; Acheson, *Sketches from Life,* pp. 147–66; Kennan, *Memoirs,* pp. 345–47; and Robert H. Ferrell, *George C. Marshall,* pp. 17–20, 49–54.

[50] Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* pp. 3–8, 129–38; "Background Memorandum on Greece," March 3, 1947, Jones MSS; Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* pp. 217–19. See also the "Memorandum Regarding Greece" prepared by the State Department's Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, October 21, 1946, *FR: 1946,* VII, 240–45. For background on the Greek civil war, see Stephen G. Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944–1947;* and Edgar O'Ballance, *The Greek Civil War, 1944–1949.*

shall's dry, laconic presentation failed to impress the suspicious congressmen, who began muttering darkly about "pulling British chestnuts out of the fire." At this point, Dean Acheson asked for permission to speak. The Undersecretary of State painted a vivid picture of a world divided between irreconcilable ideologies, a situation unparalleled since the days of Rome and Carthage. The Soviet Union, he asserted, was trying to impose its ideology on as much of the world as possible. A victory for communism in Greece, Turkey, Iran, or any of the other countries of the Near East and Mediterranean region could lead rapidly to the collapse of pro-Western governments throughout Europe. Russian control over two-thirds of the world's surface and three-fourths of its population would make American security precarious indeed. Therefore, aid to Greece and Turkey was not simply a matter of rescuing British chestnuts, it was a sober and realistic effort to protect the security of the United States by strengthening the ability of free people to resist communist aggression and subversion.

Acheson's speech understandably left the congressmen somewhat awed. After a brief period of silence, Vandenberg announced that since the country clearly faced a serious crisis, he would support the Administration's request for aid to Greece and Turkey provided the President personally put the situation before Congress and the people in the same terms which Acheson had just employed. The other congressmen present registered no objections, and the meeting broke up with the tacit understanding that congressional leaders would support aid to Greece and Turkey if the Administration explained clearly that this aid was necessary to prevent the further expansion of communism.[51]

With Vandenberg's injunction clearly in mind, Marshall and Acheson set the State Department to work to draft a speech for Truman to give to Congress. The chief information officers of the State, War, and Navy departments met on February 28 to consider the most effective manner in which to present the decision to aid Greece and Turkey. Out of this meeting came a working paper which defined the problem confronting the Administration as follows:

[51] The most complete account of the February 27, 1947, meeting is in Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* pp. 138–42, but see also Vandenberg, ed., *Private Papers,* pp. 338–39; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope,* pp. 103–4; Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* p. 219; and Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers,* pp. 478–80.

1. To make possible the formulation of intelligent opinions by the American people on the problems created by the present situation in Greece through the furnishing of full and frank information by the government.
2. To portray the world conflict between free and totalitarian or imposed forms of government.
3. To bring about an understanding by the American people of the world strategic situation.

The paper recommended that Truman proclaim it to be "basic United States policy" to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." It concluded with an extensive set of suggestions for off-the-record press conferences, written material, radio discussions, magazine and feature articles, and public speaking programs through which the department's new policy could be presented to the people.[52]

A few officials objected to having the President make such a sweeping commitment. White House administrative assistant George Elsey noted that "there has been no overt action in the immediate past by the U.S.S.R. which serves as an adequate pretext for [an] 'All-out' speech. The situation in Greece is relatively 'abstract'; there have been other instances—Iran, for example—where the occasion more adequately justified such a speech." The heavy ideological emphasis of the State Department's draft appalled George Kennan, whose "long telegram" of February, 1946, had done so much to make the Administration think in ideological terms. Although Kennan supported aid to Greece and Turkey, he objected to placing it "in the framework of a universal policy rather than in that of a specific decision addressed to a specific set of circumstances." Kennan had always perceived keenly the limitations which domestic considerations imposed on the conduct of foreign relations, but he was surprisingly blind to the difficulties of overriding these limitations in order to implement an unpopular policy. The Truman speech was, in fact, aimed more toward the American public than toward the world; it was, as Clark Clifford put it, "the opening gun in a campaign to bring people up to [the] realization that the war isn't over by any means." The domestic situation had made it clear, in the words of one of the information officers present at the February 28 meeting, that "the

[52] Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* pp. 150–53; State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Information Paper, "Information Program on United States Aid to Greece," submitted to Acheson on March 4, 1947, Jones MSS.

only way we can sell the public on our new policy is by emphasizing the necessity of holding the line: communism vs. democracy should be the major theme." [53]

It was. When Truman came before Congress on March 12, 1947, to ask for aid to Greece and Turkey, he made the ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States the central focus of his remarks:

> At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.
>
> One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.
>
> The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.
>
> I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.[54]

The Truman Doctrine constituted a form of shock therapy: it was a last-ditch effort by the Administration to prod Congress and the American people into accepting the responsibilities of the world leadership which one year earlier, largely in response to public opinion, Washington officials had assumed by deciding to "get tough with Russia."

Kennan's fears to the contrary notwithstanding, the Truman Administration never intended to commit itself to help victims of communist aggression anywhere in the world. Acheson explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, 1947, that aid to Greece and Turkey would not set a precedent for subsequent American policy, and that all requests for assistance in the future would be evaluated individually in terms of "whether the country in question really needs assistance, whether its request is consistent with American foreign policy, whether the request for assistance is sincere, and whether assistance by the United States would be effective in meeting the problems of that

[53] Elsey to Clifford, March 8, 1947, Elsey MSS, Box 17; Kennan, *Memoirs,* pp. 314–15, 319–20; Clifford statement quoted by Elsey in a handwritten memorandum dated March 9, 1947, Elsey MSS, Box 17; Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* pp. 151, 154–55.

[54] *Truman Public Papers: 1947,* pp. 178–79.

country." [55] The Administration's reluctance to support Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communists showed that it took Acheson's qualification seriously, as did Washington's failure to contest the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948.[56]

But the fall of China and the Korean War, together with the domestic onslaught of McCarthyism, would make it politically impossible for Truman and his successors to continue making such fine distinctions in formulating American policy. By presenting aid to Greece and Turkey in terms of an ideological conflict between two ways of life, Washington officials encouraged a simplistic view of the Cold War which was, in time, to imprison American diplomacy in an ideological straitjacket almost as confining as that which restricted Soviet foreign policy. Trapped in their own rhetoric, leaders of the United States found it difficult to respond to the conciliatory gestures which emanated from the Kremlin following Stalin's death and, through their inflexibility, may well have contributed to the perpetuation of the Cold War.

[55] Statement of March 24, 1947, quoted in Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks,* p. 190. See also the State Department Policy Planning Staff memorandum of May 23, 1947, quoted *ibid.,* pp. 251–52.

[56] On this point, see Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power,* p. 17.