

### 1. *Linking Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*

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37. Cohen, *Public's Impact*; Graham, "Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy"; Powlick, "Attitudinal Bases."
38. Philip J. Powlick, "Attitudinal Bases," pp. 616, 637.
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42. Powlick, "Attitudinal Bases," p. 623.
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44. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 548.
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46. Pitkin, *Concept of Representation*, p. 147.
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48. Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 73, 93.
49. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner, 1993), p. 650; Powlick, "Attitudinal Bases," p. 627.
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52. Situations with low threats to important values are less likely to involve the president and instead should be handled in the foreign policy bureaucracy. See Hermann, "International Crises as a Situational Variable." For a discussion of how public opinion is considered below the presidential level, see Powlick, "American Foreign Policy Process."
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56. V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961), pp. 428–31; Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang, "The Future Study of Public Opinion: Symposium," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (1987): S181–S182; James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson, "Dynamic Representation," *American Political Science Review*, 89 (1995): 543–65; John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); John Zaller, "Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion," in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, eds., *Taken By Storm*, pp. 186–209 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
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75. This concept is a form of construct validity that refers to the idea that two measures of the same construct should reveal the same results. See Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, 7th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1995), pp. 127–28; Chava Frankfort-Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 168–69.

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78. For a discussion of this case selection technique, see Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

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80. Kernell, *Going Public*.

81. Morgan and Bickers, "Domestic Discontent."

82. It could be argued that decision makers may not verbalize their concern with public opinion. This situation would then (incorrectly) appear to support the no-impact view. This prospect can be accounted for in part by examining behavior before and after information about public opinion is considered. For example, an individual's policy positions can be compared both before and after an official was exposed to public opinion information to determine whether policy preferences changed. A policy change in the direction of the public's opinion would then show that the policymaker did react to public opinion.

83. In this analysis, the focus is on what decision makers try to do with their actions (e.g., attempting to lead public opinion). Whether they affected public opinion is not determined.

## ***2. Preserving Public Support: Eisenhower and Dulles as Pragmatists***

1. Memorandum of Conversation, March 20, 1956, March 1956 (2), Box 8, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

2. Eisenhower to Phillips, June 5, 1953, DDE Diary December 1952–July 1953 (2), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers. Italics in original.

3. Eisenhower to Chynoweth, July 13, 1954, DDE Diary July 1954 (2), Box 7, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

4. Memorandum of Discussion, 157th NSC Meeting, July 30, 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 2, pp. 184–85.

5. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Give the Public the Facts," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, June 1, 1950, pp. 584–86.

6. Eisenhower to Humphrey, Summerfield, Lodge, Adams, Hall, and Stephens, November 23, 1953, DDE Diary November 1953 (1), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

7. Eisenhower to Dillon, January 8, 1953, Clarence Dillon, Box 7, Name Series, DDE Papers.

8. Ibid.

9. Memorandum of Discussion, 146th NSC Meeting, May 27, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, p. 1173.

10. Eisenhower, "Give the Public the Facts."

11. Diary entry, June 19, 1954, June 1954, Box 1, James C. Hagerty Papers, Eisenhower Library.

12. Memorandum of Conversation, September 2, 1955, Sigurd Larmon (2), Box 20, Administration Series, DDE Papers.

13. Eisenhower to Hughes, December 10, 1953, DDE Diary December 1953 (2), Box 4, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

14. Notes by Minnich, May 22, 1953, Miscellaneous-O January 1953-January 1956, Box 1, L. Arthur Minnich Series, OSS.

15. Eisenhower, "Give the Public the Facts."

16. Memorandum of Discussion, 285th NSC Meeting, May 17, 1956, *FRUS: 1955-1957*, vol. 19, pp. 305-11; Memorandum of Discussion, 146th NSC Meeting, pp. 1169-74.

17. Memorandum of Discussion, 210th NSC Meeting, August 12, 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, DDE Papers.

18. Eisenhower to Robinson, March 12, 1954, DDE Diary March 1954 (3), Box 6, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

19. Notes, October 24, 1953, ACW Diary, August-September-October 1953 (1), Box 1, Ann Whitman Diary Series, DDE Papers.

20. Eisenhower to Phillips, June 5, 1953, DDE Diary December 1952-July 1953 (2), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

21. Notes, September 28, 1953, Whitman Diary, August-September-October 1953 (3), Box 1, Ann Whitman Diary Series, DDE Papers; Eisenhower to Robinson, August 4, 1954, William Robinson, 1952-1955 (3), Box 29, Name Series, DDE Papers.

22. Memorandum of Discussion, 285th NSC Meeting, 305-11; Notes by Minnich, May 22, 1953; Eisenhower to Larmon, February 1, 1954, DDE Diary February 1954 (2), Box 5, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers; Memorandum of Conversation, September 2, 1955.

23. Memorandum of Conversation, September 2, 1955.

24. Eisenhower to Hughes, December 10, 1953.

25. Eisenhower to Gruenther, February 1, 1955, *FRUS: 1955-1957*, vol. 2, p. 192. Italics in the original.

26. Memorandum by Dulles, May 23, 1947, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 31, Princeton University.

27. Extemporaneous Remarks by Dulles at Conference on U.S. Foreign Policy, June 4 and 5, 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 75, Princeton University.

28. Speech "On Unity," February 27, 1952, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 306, Princeton University; Statement, May 22, 1952, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 286, Princeton University.

29. Speech "A New Year Resolve," January 17, 1947, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 294, Princeton University.
30. John Foster Dulles, "Developing Bipartisan Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, May 8 1950, p. 721.
31. Speech "The State of the World," March 5, 1946, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 293, Princeton University.
32. Andrew H. Berding, *Dulles on Diplomacy* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 139.
33. Memorandum of Discussion, 312th NSC Meeting, February 7, 1957, *FRUS: 1955-1957*, vol. 19, pp. 413-19; see also Memorandum of Discussion, 195th NSC Meeting, May 6, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, p. 1425.
34. John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), p. 5.
35. Extemporaneous Remarks, March 2, 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 311, Princeton University; Meeting transcript, April 14, 1958, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 125, Princeton University.
36. Extemporaneous Remarks to American Association for the United Nations, March 2, 1953. See also Speech "Europe and the Atlantic Pact," March 23, 1949, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 297, Princeton University.
37. Berding, *Dulles*, p. 142. See also Dulles to Acheson, March 19, 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 47, Princeton University; Dulles, *War or Peace*, pp. 121-22; Speech "National Unity in Foreign Policy," September 16, 1952, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 308, Princeton University; Speech by Dulles, June 6, 1955, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 40, Princeton University.
38. Extemporaneous Remarks by Dulles, June 4 and 5, 1953.
39. Speech "The Balance of Power," March 10, 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 301, Princeton University; Speech, "Foreign Policy-Ideals not Deals."
40. Speech, "Foundations of Peace," August 18, 1958, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 366, Princeton University.
41. Dulles, *War or Peace*, p. 115; Berding, *Dulles*, p. 142; Impromptu remarks by Dulles, April 7, 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 79, Princeton University.
42. Dulles to Fuchs, December 5, 1949, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 40, Princeton University.
43. James Hagerty Oral History, April 16, 1968, OH 91, Eisenhower Library, p. 493.
44. Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *The Eisenhower Presidency: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 8-9.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 42, 44.
46. General Andrew Goodpaster Oral History, OH 378, Eisenhower Library, pp. 107-8.
47. Thompson, *Eisenhower Presidency*, pp. 82, 83.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
49. Richard M. Nixon, John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection, Princeton University (JFDOHC), p. 12.

50. Andrew Berding, JFDOHC, p. 4; Berding, *Dulles*, pp. 139–41.
51. William Butts Macomber Jr., JFDOHC, p. 38.
52. Robert Bowie, JFDOHC, p. 8.
53. Macomber, JFDOHC, p. 37.
54. Carl McCardle Oral History, August 29, 1967, OH 116, Eisenhower Library, P. 7.
55. Roderic O'Connor, JFDOHC, p. 18.

### 3. *The Crisis Context: Anticipating Domestic Opposition over the Offshore Islands*

1. In this chapter, the Communist Chinese are also referred to as the Communists, and the Nationalist Chinese are also referred to as the Nationalists. The lowercased word *communist* refers to the broader worldwide threat that American decision makers saw emanating from the Soviet Union. Quotations from documents, of course, preserve the capitalization from the source reference. References to Chinese names and places are consistent with the American source material from that period, which used the Wade-Giles system of romanization.

2. For other discussions of the offshore islands crisis, see Robert Accinelli, "Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954–55 Offshore Island Crisis," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 20 (1990):329–48; Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 1950–1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), esp. pp. 147–83; H. W. Brands, "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," *International Security* 12 (1988):124–51; Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," *International Security* 12 (1988):103–4; Leonard H. D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954–1962," *Journal of American History* 72 (1985):637–60; Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 205–11.

3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 462; Memorandum of Discussion, August 6, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 14, pp. 518–19; Memorandum by Robertson, August 25, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 14, pp. 548–50; "U.S. Expected to Stay Out," *New York Times*, August 27, 1954, p. 5; "Red Attack on Quemoy Expected as Test of Nationalist Strength," *New York Times*, September 9, 1954, pp. 1, 2; "Pentagon Doubts Formosa Invasion," *New York Times*, August 19, 1954, p. 2; Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador in Japan, August 20, 1954, JFD Chronological August 1954 (3), Box 9, JFD Chronological Series, JFD Papers; Offshore Islands Chronology of Events, June 3, 1955, Karl Rankin Papers, Box 7, Princeton University.

4. Robert Anderson to Eisenhower, September 3, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 14, p. 556; Acting Secretary of State Bedell Smith to Embassy in the Philippines, September 3, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 14, pp. 557–58; Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, vol. 5 of *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), p. 262.

5. Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador in Japan, August 20, 1954.

6. Harry Schwartz to Robert Bowie, August 20, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 543-44; William S. White, "Eisenhower Says Fleet Would Bar Formosa Invasion," *New York Times*, August 18, 1954, pp. 1, 2; Memorandum of Discussion, 211th NSC Meeting, August 18, 1954, NSC Series, Box 5, DDE Papers; "Transcript of New Conference Held by Secretary of State Dulles," *New York Times*, August 25, 1954, p. 8; Memorandum of Discussion, August 6, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 518-19; "Red Attack," *New York Times*.

7. Memorandum of Discussion, August 18, 1954.

8. Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History, John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection Princeton University; Memorandum of Discussion, 214th NSC Meeting, September 12, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14: pp. 613-24.

9. Eisenhower to Bedell Smith, September 8, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 577-79.

10. Memorandum of Discussion, August 18, 1954.

11. Eisenhower Telephone Conversation with Bedell Smith, September 4, 1954, Phone Calls June-December 1954 (2), Box 7, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

12. Memorandum of Discussion, August 18, 1954. A letter dated August 17 from Dulles to Wilson is referenced in Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wilson, September 2, 1954, 381 Far East (11-28-50), Geographic File 1954-1956, Record Group 218, National Archives; Memorandum for the Record, August 31, 1954, Reel 21, LM-152, Record Group 59, National Archives.

13. Dulles to Department of State, September 4, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 560; Bedell Smith to Philippine Embassy, September 4, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 560-61.

14. Eisenhower to Bedell Smith, September 8, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 577-79. Eisenhower's reference to public opinion is taken from an unsent letter he proposed to send to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Special Report on American Opinion, November 30, 1954, China 1954-1960, Box 33, OPPS.

15. Eisenhower Telephone Conversation with Bedell Smith, September 6, 1954, Phone Calls June-December 1954 (2), Box 7, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

16. Bedell Smith to Dulles, September 6, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 574; Eisenhower to Bedell Smith, September 8, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 577-79.

17. Dulles to Department of State, September 4, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 560; Radford to Wilson, September 11, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 598-610; Dulles to Bedell Smith, September 5, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 572; Memorandum of Discussion, 213th NSC Meeting, September 9, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 583-95.

18. Memorandum by Dulles, September 12, 1954, General Foreign Policy Matter (4), Box 8, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers, italics in original; Memorandum of Discussion, 214th NSC Meeting, September 12, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 620.

19. Dulles to Rankin, September 7, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 575; Rankin to McConaughy, September 13, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 624-25; Radford to Wilson, September 11, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 598-610.

20. Andrew Berding, John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection, Princeton University; China Telegram, September 2-8, 1954, Box 29, OPPS; China Telegram, September 9-15, 1954, Box 29, OPPS. I thank Professor Robert Accinelli for making available to me his notes regarding the China Telegram. Daily Opinion Summary, September 7, 1954, Daily Summary of Opinion Developments, Box 7, OPPS.

21. Radford to Wilson, September 11, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 598-610.

22. Memorandum of Discussion, 213th NSC Meeting, September 9, 1954, pp. 583-88; Radford to Wilson, September 11, 1954.

23. Memorandum of Discussion, 214th NSC Meeting, September 12, 1954, pp. 613-24. Eisenhower saw the NSC meetings as an important deliberative body from which he could gather information and then render an educated decision. Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), pp. 246-47; Anna Kasten Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," *Diplomatic History* 7 (1983):307-26.

24. NSC 146/2, November 6, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 308; Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE-100-4/1-54, September 10, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 595-97.

25. Memorandum entitled "Congressional Attitude to Formosa Defense," September 12, 1954, President's Papers 1954 (7), Box 2, Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, OSANSA.

26. Memorandum of Discussions, 214th NSC Meeting, pp. 617-19.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 619-20.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 620-21.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 621-22.

30. Special Report on American Opinion, November 30, 1954.

31. George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: 1949-1958* (New York: Random House, 1972), vol. 2, p. 1273.

32. "Eisenhower Says Council Affirmed Security Policies," *New York Times*, September 14, 1954, pp. 1, 4.

33. During this period, State Department analyses of public opinion based on newspapers continued to reveal that the public would be divided over an American commitment to defend the islands. See Daily Opinion Summary, September 13, 1954, Daily Summary of Opinion Developments, Box 7, OPPS; Daily Opinion Summary, September 14, 1954, Daily Summary of Opinion Developments, Box 7, OPPS; Daily Opinion Summary, September 16, 1954, Daily Summary of Opinion Developments, Box 7, OPPS; Merchant to O'Conner, September 19, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 649-51. For an example of the lack of press reporting about the administration's approach, see Drew Middleton, "Full German Role in NATO Approved by U.S. and Britain," *New York Times*, September 18, 1954, p. 1.

34. Smith to Dulles, September 30, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 669; Dulles to Smith, October 1, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 670.

35. Dulles to Eisenhower, October 4, 1954, White House Memoranda 1954—Formosa Straits (2), Box 2, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers; Memorandum of Discussion, 216th Meeting of NSC, October 6, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 689–701.

36. Dulles Telephone Conversation with Nixon, October 5, 1954, Telephone Memos, September 1, 1954–October 30, 1954, Box 3, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

37. Memorandum of Conversation, October 5, 1954, White House Memoranda 1954—Formosa Straits (2), Box 2, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers; Dulles Telephone Conversation with Eisenhower, October 5, 1954, JFD Chronological, October 1954 (1), Box 9, JFD Chronological Series, JFD Papers; DDE Dictation, October 5, 1954, DDE Diary, October 1954 (2), Box 8, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers; Eisenhower Telephone Conversation with Dulles, October 5, 1954, Phone Calls June–December 1954 (2), Box 7, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

38. Dulles Telephone Conversation with Lodge, October 5, 1954, Telephone Memos September 1, 1954–October 30, 1954 (2), Box 3, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

39. Rankin to Department of State, October 5, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 682.

40. Robertson to Dulles, October 7, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 706–7; Memorandum of Conversation, October 7, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 708; Dulles to Walter Robertson, Douglas MacArthur, Livingston Merchant, October 7, 1954, White House Memoranda 1954—Formosa Straits (2), Box 2, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers; Memorandum of Conversation, October 7, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 708.

41. Memorandum of Conversation, October 13, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 728–53; MacArthur to Dulles, October 14, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 755–56; Dulles to Rankin, October 18, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 775; Memorandum of Conversation, October 18, 1954, Meetings with the President 1954 (1), Box 1, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers; Dulles Telephone Conversation with Lodge, October 19, 1954, Telephone Memo September 1, 1954–October 30, 1954 (1), Box 3, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

42. Hoover to Dulles, October 23, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 790–92; Memorandum of Conversation, October 27, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 797–801; Dulles to Eisenhower, October 28, 1954, White House Memoranda 1954—Formosa Straits (1), Box 2, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers; Memorandum of Conversation, October 27, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 797–801; Memorandum by Dulles, October 28, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 809–12.

43. “U.S. Is Arranging Pact with Chiang,” *New York Times*, November 6, 1954, p. 1.

44. American opinion remained fairly supportive of the administration's policy toward Formosa. An October poll asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of our

government's policy toward the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa headed by Chiang Kai-shek?" Forty-eight percent approved of the U.S. policy; 17 percent disapproved; and 35 percent gave no opinion. Special Report on American Opinion, November 30, 1954; Accinelli, "Eisenhower," p. 333; Memorandum of Conversation by Bond, November 30, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, pp. 961-66; Dulles to Department of State, December 17, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 14, p. 1035.

45. Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955-1956*, vol. 6 of *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 199-200.

#### **4. The Reflexive Context: Boxed in by Public Opinion at Dien Bien Phu**

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History, John Foster Dulles Oral Histories, Princeton University, p. 25.

2. Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History, July 20, 1967, OH 11, Eisenhower Library, pp. 64-65.

3. Although most analysts agree that Dulles always supported multilateral intervention, there is a significant debate in the secondary literature over Eisenhower's exact position regarding intervention. I agree with the several accounts that say he honestly supported multilateral intervention. See John Burke and Fred I. Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989); William J. Duiker, *U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994); William Conrad Gibbons, *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part 1, 1954-1961* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); Richard A. Immerman, "Between the Unattainable and the Unacceptable: Eisenhower and Dienbienphu," in Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, eds., *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s*, pp. 120-54 (Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987); John Prados, *The Sky Would Fall: Operation Vulture: The U.S. Bombing Mission in Indochina, 1954* (New York: Dial Press, 1983). Others have emphasized that multilateral intervention was more a bluff and a negotiating tactic to force communist concessions at the forthcoming Geneva Convention. See George C. Herring, "'A Good Stout Effort': John Foster Dulles and the Indochina Crisis, 1954-1955," in Richard Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, pp. 213-33 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: 'The Day We Didn't Go to War' Revisited," *Journal of American History* 71 (1984):343-63. Stephen Ambrose argued that Eisenhower opposed intervention for a number of reasons but mainly feared the domestic consequences of losing Indochina and set impossible standards for intervention so as to avoid domestic criticism of inaction. See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), vol. 2, pp. 173-85. Similarly, another finding stated that Eisenhower allowed others to erect barriers to intervention to achieve the same result. See Melanie



Billings-Yun, *Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

4. Memorandum of Conversation, March 24, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, p. 419.

5. Memorandum of Discussion, 179th NSC Meeting, January 8, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, p. 949.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 952.

7. Herring, "Good Stout Effort," p. 213; Billings-Yun, *Decision Against War*, p. 16; Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 173. Analogies can have a profound influence on the way decision makers interpret incoming information. See Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

8. Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report* (New York: Harpers, 1961), p. 118.

9. Herring, "Good Stout Effort," p. 213.

10. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 173.

11. NSC 5405, January 16, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 971-76.

12. Historical Division of the Joint Secretariat, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam: History of the Indochina Incident: 1940-1954* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1982), vol. 1, p. 353. On January 19, the French had requested four hundred maintenance technicians and twenty-five B-26 aircraft. Achilles to Department of State, January 19, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 983-85.

13. Senator John Stennis to Radford, February 1, 1954, 091 Indochina (February 1, 1954), Record Group 218 Records of the Chairman—Arthur Radford, National Archives; Senator John Stennis to Wilson, January 29, 1954, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, vol. 9, 1971, p. 239; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 226; Immerman, "Between the Unattainable," pp. 126-27; Telephone Calls, February 3, 1954, Phone Calls January-May 1954 (3), Box 5, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

14. *Public Papers, 1954*, pp. 247, 250.

15. Telephone Calls, February 8, 1954, Phone Calls January-May 1954 (3), Box 5, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers; Notes, February 8, 1954, Miscellaneous-I, Box 1, L. Arthur Minnich Series, OSS; Smith to Dulles, February 10, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1031-32; *Public Papers, 1954*, p. 306; Billings-Yun, *Decision Against War*, p. 26.

16. Burke and Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality*, pp. 105-6. Burke and Greenstein speculate that this passage and the continuation of it (quoted later) were excised from the final draft because Eisenhower wanted to avoid the perception of criticizing the Kennedy administration's policies.

17. Jackson to Eisenhower, July 11, 1953, C. D. Jackson 1953 (1), Box 21, Administration Series, DDE Papers.

18. George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll 1949-1958* (New York: Random House, 1972), vol. 2, p. 1146; Special Report on American Opinion, November 16, 1953, Foreign Policy 1953, Box 1, OPPS.

19. Prados, *Sky Would Fall*, p. 10; Immerman, "Between the Unattainable," p. 123.
20. Burke and Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality*, pp. 106–7.
21. Minutes of Meeting Between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister of France Mayer, March 26, 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, pp. 429–32.
22. Handwritten Notes of Legislative Meeting, January 5, 1954, Box 1, Legislative Meetings Series, OSS; Minutes of Bipartisan Legislative Meeting, January 5, 1954, Staff Notes January–December 1954, Box 4, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
23. Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, p. 154.
24. Memorandum of Conversation, February 24, 1954, *FRUS, Secretary of State's Memoranda of Conversation, Microfiche Supplement, November 1952–1954* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).
25. Memorandum of Discussion, 186th NSC Meeting, February 26, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1079–81.
26. Robert Griffith, ed., *Ike's Letters to a Friend* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984), p. 122.
27. Memorandum of Discussion, 189th NSC Meeting, March 18, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1132–33.
28. Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, pp. 137, 173.
29. Billings-Yun, *Decision Against War*, pp. 35–36; Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, p. 171; Stephen Jurika Jr., ed., *The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), p. 393; Memorandum for the President, March 23, 1954, microfiche supplement, p. 379; Memorandum of Conversation, March 23, 1954, microfiche supplement, p. 380.
30. Billings-Yun suggests that Radford was making an implicit threat of his possible testimony in order to persuade Dulles to support more immediate intervention. Billings-Yun, *Decision Against War*, pp. 41–42.
31. Telephone Conversation Between Radford and Dulles, March 24, 1954, Telephone Memos March 1954–April 1954 (2), Box 2, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.
32. *History of the Indochina Incident*, pp. 371–73; Radford to Eisenhower, March 24, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1158–59.
33. Editorial Note, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, p. 1134; Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, pp. 176–77.
34. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Diary of James C. Hagerty* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 32; Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, pp. 177–78.
35. Memorandum of Conversation, March 24, 1954, microfiche supplement, p. 382.
36. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 12, 1954, 092 Asia (6–25–48) S. 58, Record Group 218 Geographic File, National Archives; Memorandum for the Special Committee, March 17, 1953, *United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967*, vol. 9, 1971, pp. 271–75; Smith to Eisenhower, March 11, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1108–16.
37. Memorandum of Discussion, March 25, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, p. 1165.

38. Ibid., pp. 1167–68.

39. Ferrell, *Diary*, p. 35.

40. Handwritten Notes of Cabinet Discussion, March 26, 1954, Box 2, Cabinet Series, OSS; Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 26, 1954, Box 3, Cabinet Series, DDE Papers.

41. Immerman, “Between the Unattainable,” p. 132; Memorandum of Conversation, March 30, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, p. 1187; Memorandum of Conversation, March 24, 1954, microfiche supplement, p. 382; Telephone Conversation Between Judd and Dulles, March 29, 1954, Telephone Memos March 1954–April 1954 (2), Box 2, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers; Telephone Conversation Between Hagerty and Dulles, March 31, 1954, Telephone Memos January–June 1954 (2), Box 10, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers; Telephone Conversation Between McCardle and Dulles, March 27, 1954, Telephone Memos March 1954–April 1954 (2), Box 2, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers; Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: Harpers, 1956), p. 259.

42. Telephone Conversation Between McCardle and Dulles, March 27, 1954, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

43. This interpretation is consistent with Billings-Yun, *Decision Against War*, pp. 63–64, 77.

44. Burke and Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality*, p. 47; Speech by Dulles: “The Threat of a Red Asia,” March 29, 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 82, Princeton University. The reference to responding to aggression at “places and by means of free world choosing” was to his January 12, 1954, speech, entitled “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” discussed in reference to the New Look in chapter 6. See Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, p. 181; *Public Papers, 1954*, p. 366.

45. Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 151.

46. For a discussion of the JCS meetings, see Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, pp. 182–87; Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, vol. 5 of *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), pp. 253–54.

47. Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, p. 182; Memorandum of Discussion, 191st NSC Meeting, April 1, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1200–2.

48. Footnote, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, p. 1202; Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, pp. 183–84. Gibbons presents a similar analysis of these events.

49. Footnote, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, p. 1202.

50. Memorandum of Phone Conversations, April 1, 1954, Phone Calls January–May 1954 (2), Box 5, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

51. Telephone Conversation Between Radford and Dulles, April 1, 1954, Telephone Memos March 1954–April 1954 (2), Box 2, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

52. Ferrell, *Diary*, p. 39.

53. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, April 2, 1954, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1210–11; Draft Resolution Prepared by Department of State,

April 2, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1211-12. The substantive part of the Joint Resolution held "that the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized, in the event he determines that such action is required to protect and defend the safety and security of the United States, to employ the Naval and Air Forces of the United States to assist the forces which are resisting aggression in Southeast Asia, to prevent the extension and expansion of that aggression, and to protect and defend the safety and security of the United States."

54. Although it is not clear why Radford now opposed intervention, Gibbons concluded that Radford changed his mind after seeing Eisenhower's and Dulles's opposition to overt intervention and the continued opposition of the JCS. Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, pp. 185-86.

55. Memorandum for the File of the Secretary of State, April 5, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1224-25.

56. Telephone Conversation Between Eisenhower and Dulles, April 3, 1954, Telephone Memos January-June 1954 (2), Box 10, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers; Telephone Conversation Between Senator Knowland and Dulles, April 3, 1954, Telephone Memos March 1954-April 1954 (1), Box 2, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

57. The effect of congressional sentiment on the administration's decisions continues to generate much discussion. Scholars argue that (1) Eisenhower's insistence on congressional approval was part of an intentional and determined effort to construct roadblocks to intervention (see Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, pp. 177-78); (2) congressional sentiment was sufficiently ambivalent to dictate no specific course of action (see Burke and Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality*, p. 66); (3) the congressional meeting was an attempt to co-opt the leadership in order to isolate proponents of unilateral intervention and to build support for multilateral action (see Leslie H. Gelb, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* [Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979]; Gibbons, *U.S. Government*, pp. 195-203); (4) it was an attempt to gain a "blank check" from Congress, which instead served to tie the administration's hands by preventing unilateral action and thereby requiring any action to be multilateral (see Herring and Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu," pp. 343-63); and (5) Eisenhower purposely required congressional authorization (which he knew he would not get) to prevent intervention and insulate the administration from criticism for the "loss" of another nation to communism (see Billings-Yun, *Decision Against War*, pp. 75-79). This use of the "hidden hand" by Eisenhower has been criticized as an "imperfectly documented conclusion." See Fred I. Greenstein, "The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader: A 1994 Perspective," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24 (1994):233-41.

58. Editorial Note, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, p. 1236; Adams, *Firsthand Report*, p. 122.

59. Burke and Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality*, pp. 66-68.

60. Memorandum of Discussion, 192nd NSC Meeting, April 6, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1250-65; NSC Action 1074-a, Possible U.S. Intervention in

Indo-China, April 5, 1954, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, vol. 9, 1971, esp. pp. 310, 320, 325.

61. Memorandum of Discussion, 192nd NSC Meeting, pp. 1253-55.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., pp. 1257, 1259.

64. Ibid., p. 1259.

65. Ibid., pp. 1261-62.

66. Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 151.

67. Dillon to Department of State, April 5, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1236-38; Telephone Conversation Between Eisenhower and Dulles, April 5, 1954, Telephone Memos January-June 1954 (2), Box 10, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

68. Memorandum of Telephone Calls, April 5, 1954, Phone Calls January-May 1954 (2), Box 5, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

69. Dulles to Embassy in France, April 5, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, p. 1242.

70. Dulles to Embassy of France, April 6, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1268-69.

71. Impromptu Remarks by Dulles, April 7, 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 79, Princeton University; *Public Papers, 1954*, pp. 382-84, 389.

72. Richard H. Rovere, *Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Cudahy, 1956), p. 193.

73. Handwritten Notes of Cabinet Meeting, April 9, 1954, Box 2, Cabinet Series, OSS.

74. Statement by Dulles, April 15, 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 82, Princeton University; Joint Statement by Dulles and Eden, April 13, 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 326, Princeton University. For details of these events, see Billings-Yun, *Decision Against War*, pp. 123-46; Herring and Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu," pp. 355-61.

75. Press Conference by Dulles, April 13, 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 79, Princeton University; Dulles to Department of State, April 13, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1319-20.

76. Godley to Department of State, April 21, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1328-34.

77. Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 152-53.

78. Billings-Yun, *Decision Against War*, pp. 130-35.

79. Memorandum of Conversations, April 18, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1349-50; Herring and Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu," p. 357.

80. Telephone Conversation Between Nixon and Dulles, April 19, 1954, Telephone Memos March 1954-April 1954 (1), Box 2, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers; Burke and Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality*, pp. 105-6.

81. Special Report on American Opinion, April 19, 1954, South East Asia 1953-1961, Box 42, OPDS.

82. Dulles to Department of State, April 22, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1361-62.
83. Telegram from Dulles, April 23, 1954, April 1954 (1), Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, DDE Papers.
84. Dulles to State Department, April 24, 1954, DDE Diary April 1954 (1), Box 6, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
85. Telephone Calls, April 24, 1954, Phone Calls January-May 1954 (1), Box 5, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
86. Dulles to State Department, April 24, 1954, Indochina, Box 80, Lot 65 D101, Record Group 59 Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1954, National Archives.
87. Dulles to Smith, April 25, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1404-5.
88. Notes, February 8, 1954 (of meeting on April 26, 1954), Miscellaneous-I, Box 1, L. Arthur Minnich Series, OSS.
89. Burke and Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality*, p. 82.
90. Hagerty Diary Entry, April 26, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1410-12; *Public Papers, 1954*, pp. 427-28, 433, 436; Eisenhower to Gruenther, April 26, 1954, DDE Personal Diary January-November 1954 (2), Box 4, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers; Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 279-80.
91. Memorandum of Discussion, 194th NSC Meeting, April 29, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1431-45; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 354-55; Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 153-54.
92. Memorandum of Discussion, 194th NSC Meeting, pp. 1431-32, 1435, 1438-42.
93. *Ibid.*, pp. 1442-45.
94. Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 154.
95. Smith to Dulles, April 29, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 16, pp. 616.
96. Conference with Eisenhower, Dulles, MacArthur, and Cutler, May 5, 1954, Foreign Policy—Miscellaneous, Box 2, Miscellaneous Series, DDE Papers.
97. Record of Dulles's Briefing of Members of Congress, May 5, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 13, pp. 1471-77.
98. Burke and Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality*, p. 89-97; Herring, "Good Stout Effort," p. 227; Immerman, "Between the Unattainable," p. 45.

### 5. *The Innovative Context: Standing Firm, Pushing Forward, and Giving Way After Sputnik*

1. General historical treatments of the *Sputnik* issue include Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), vol. 2; Robert A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Walter A. McDougall, . . . *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Rodger A. Payne, "Public Opinion and Foreign Threats: Eisenhower's Response to *Sputnik*," *Armed Forces and*

*Society* 21 (1994):89–111. Discussions of specific issues include Giles Alston, “Eisenhower: Leadership in Space Policy,” in Shirley Anne Warshaw, ed., *Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency*, pp. 103–20 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993); Barbara Barksdale Clowse, *Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and National Defense Education Act of 1958* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981); Brian R. Duchin, “‘The Most Spectacular Legislative Battle of that Year’: President Eisenhower and the 1958 Reorganization of the Department of Defense,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24 (1994):243–62; Iwan W. Morgan, *Eisenhower Versus ‘The Spenders’: The Eisenhower Administration, the Democrats, and the Budget, 1953–60* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Iwan W. Morgan, “Eisenhower and the Balanced Budget,” in Shirley Anne Warshaw, ed., *Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency*, pp. 121–32 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993); Peter J. Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Paul B. Stares, *The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945–1984* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).

2. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 8, 32–33; Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, pp. 1, 31–35.

3. Memorandum of Discussion, 339th NSC Meeting, *FRUS: 1955–1957*, vol. 11, p. 759.

4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 205.

5. The approval rating control was not met for one month during the case study when the March/April 1958 Gallup poll had Eisenhower at 48 percent approval and 36 percent disapproval. Gallup Opinion Index October–November, no. 182, 1980. The March/April approval rating (the low point of the Eisenhower administration) is most likely attributable to the ongoing economic recession. See Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 460. In any event, most of the critical decisions in reference to this case were made between October 1957 and March 1958. Memorandum of Discussion, 339th NSC Meeting, October 10, 1957, Box 9, NSC Series, DDE Papers; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 206; Chester J. Pach Jr. and Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, rev. ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), p. 170.

6. NSC 5520: Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program, May 20, 1955, *FRUS: 1955–1957*, vol. 11, pp. 723–32; Memorandum of Discussion, 250th NSC Meeting, May 26, 1955, *FRUS: 1955–1957*, vol. 11, pp. 732–33. For discussions of the early American space and missile programs, see Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 18–42; McDougall, *Heavens*, pp. 74–140.

7. Memorandum of Discussion, December 1, 1955, 268th NSC Meeting, *FRUS: 1955–1957*, vol. 19, pp. 166–70.

8. Daily Opinion Summary, October 7, 1957, Daily Opinion Summary, Box 42, OPPS; Daily Opinion Summary, October 8, 1957, Daily Opinion Summary, Box 42, OPPS; Daily Opinion Summary, October 9, 1957, Daily Opinion Summary, Box 42, OPPS; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. xv.

9. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. xiv–xv, 3.
10. Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report* (New York: Harpers, 1961), p. 415.
11. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 205.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
13. Memorandum of Discussion, 339th NSC Meeting, October 10, 1957, *FRUS: 1955–1957*, vol. 11, pp. 761, 763.
14. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, October 11, 1957, October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
15. Memorandum for the President from Secretary of Defense, October 7, 1954, Earth Satellites (1), Box 7, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, OSANSA.
16. Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 9, 1957 (of meeting on October 8, 1957), October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
17. Telephone Call from Hagerty to Dulles, October 8, 1957, Telephone Memos September–December 1957 (3), Box 12, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.
18. Memorandum for Quarles and Cutler from Goodpaster, October 8, 1957, Earth Satellites (1), Box 7, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, OSANSA; Telephone Call to Allen Dulles from John Foster Dulles, October 8, 1957, Telephone Memos September–October 1957 (2), Box 7, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers; Memorandum of Conversation with Nixon, October 9, 1957, Vice President Nixon (2), Box 6, Subject Series, JFD Papers; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 63.
19. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, October 9, 1957 (of meeting on October 8, 1957), October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
20. Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 8, 1957, October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
21. Dulles to Hagerty, October 8, 1957, Satellite Announcement, Box 9, James Hagerty Papers, Eisenhower Library.
22. Memorandum of Conference with President, October 9, 1957, October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
23. Pre-Press Conference, October 9, 1957, Box 6, Press Conference Series, DDE Papers.
24. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 429.
25. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 719–35.
26. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 8.
27. George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: 1949–1958* (New York: Random House, 1972), vol. 2, pp. 1514–15, 1523.
28. Samuel Lubell, “*Sputnik* and American Public Opinion,” *Columbia University Forum* 1 (1957):15–21.
29. *Gallup Poll*, pp. 1519–21.
30. McDougall, *Heavens*, p. 145.



31. Memorandum of Discussion, 339th NSC Meeting, October 10, 1957, *FRUS: 1955-1957*, vol. 11, pp. 761-62.

32. Memorandum of Discussion, 339th NSC Meeting, October 10, 1957, *FRUS: 1955-1957*, vol. 19, pp. 602-3. The notes do not mention whether Eisenhower was thinking of the domestic or international consequences.

33. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, October 11, 1957, October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers; Handwritten Notes of Cabinet Meeting, October 11, 1957, Box 4, Cabinet Series, OSS.

34. Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 14, 1957, October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

35. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 12.

36. Citations to this meeting come from Handwritten Notes of the Office of Defense Mobilization Science Advisory Committee, October 15, 1957, Science Advisory Committee (3), Box 7, Special Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, OSANSA; Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 16, 1957 (of meeting on October 15, 1957), October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

37. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 15.

38. Dulles Press Conference, October 16, 1957, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 113, Princeton University.

39. Dulles to Eisenhower, no date, White House Correspondence—General 1957 (3), Box 5, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers.

40. Statements By Eisenhower on Unification, no date, Reorganization of Defense Department, Reorganization of, Bryce Harlow Records, Eisenhower Library; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 85; Duchin, "Most Spectacular," pp. 244-45; Robert Griffith, ed., *Ike's Letters to a Friend* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984), pp. 27-31.

41. Arthur Kimball Oral History, OH 66, Eisenhower Library, p. 58.

42. Eisenhower to McChesney, October 24, 1957, October 1957 DDE Dictation, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

43. Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 26, 1957 (of meeting on October 23, 1957), Budget-Military-Chronology 1957-59, Box 2, Subject Series, DOD Subseries, OSS.

44. Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 16, 1957 (of meeting on October 15, 1957), October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers; Clowse, *Brainpower*, pp. 11, 25.

45. Clowse, *Brainpower*, pp. 49-50, 55.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

47. Eisenhower to Neel, November 1, 1957, November 1957 DDE Dictation, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

48. *Public Papers, 1957*, pp. 776-77.

49. Handwritten Notes of the Office of Defense Mobilization Science Advisory Committee, October 15, 1957, Science Advisory Committee (3), Box 7, Special

Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, OSANSA; Cutler to McElroy, October 17, 1957, *FRUS: 1955-1957*, vol. II, pp. 764-65.

50. Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 8, 1957, October 1957 Staff Notes (2), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers; Eisenhower to McElroy, October 17, 1957, October 1957 DDE Dictation, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

51. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 35.

52. Telephone Call Between Dulles and Quarles, November 4, 1957, Telephone Memos November-December 1957 (4), Box 7, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

53. Cutler to McElroy, October 17, 1957, *FRUS: 1955-1957*, vol. II, pp. 764-65.

54. Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 31, 1957 (of meeting on October 30, 1957), October 1957 Staff Notes (1), Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

55. Eisenhower to Altschul, October 25, 1957, DDE Diary October 1957, Box 27, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

56. *Public Papers, 1957*, p. 784.

57. Dulles to Eisenhower, October 31, 1957, November 1957 (2), Box 9, Dulles-Herter Series, DDE Papers.

58. Memorandum, October 23, 1957, Guided Missiles, Box 16, Name Series, DDE Papers.

59. James R. Killian Jr., *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 20-30.

60. Daily Opinion Summary, November 4, 1957, Box 42, OPSPS.

61. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 43-45.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

63. Clowse, *Brainpower*, p. II.

64. Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 6, 1957 (of meeting on November 4, 1957), November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

65. Eisenhower to Larson, November 5, 1957, November 1957 Diary, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers, italics in original.

66. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 41-42.

67. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, November 7, 1957, Meetings with the President 1957 (2), Box 5, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers.

68. Griffith, *Letters*, p. 90.

69. *Public Papers, 1957*, pp. 789-99.

70. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 46.

71. *Public Papers, 1957*, pp. 807-17.

72. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 55.

73. Eisenhower to Hotchkis November 15, 1957, DDE Dictation November 1957, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

74. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, pp. 436–41.

75. Gallup, *Gallup Poll*, p. 1526.

76. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 61–68.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72.

78. Telephone Conversation Between Nixon and Dulles, December 6, 1957, Telephone Memos 1957 (1), Box 7, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

79. Notes of Legislative Leaders' Meeting, January 7, 1958, Legislative Minutes 1958 (1), Box 3, Legislative Meetings Series, DDE Papers.

80. Memorandum of Conference with the President, January 22, 1958 (of meeting on January 21, 1958), Staff Notes January 1958, Box 30, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

81. NSC 5724 Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee on Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, November 7, 1958, *FRUS: 1955–1957*, vol. 19, pp. 638–61.

82. Handwritten Notes, November 7, 1957, Military Planning 1958–61 (3), Box 6, Subject Series, DOD Subseries, OSS; Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 7, 1957, November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers; Memorandum of Conversation with the President, November 7, 1957, Meetings with the President 1957 (2), Box 5, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers.

83. Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 6, 1957 (of meeting on November 4, 1957), November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

84. Memorandum of Discussion, 343d NSC Meeting, November 7, 1957, *FRUS: 1955–1957*, vol. 19, pp. 630–37.

85. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, December 26, 1957, Meetings with the President 1957 (1), Box 5, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers; Telephone Conversation Between Dulles and Anderson, December 27, 1957, Telephone Memos November–December 1957 (1), Box 7, Telephone Calls Series, JFD Papers.

86. Gaddis, *Strategies*, pp. 184–88.

87. Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 16, 1957 (of meeting on November 11, 1957), November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

88. Memorandum of Discussion, 345th NSC Meeting, November 14, 1957, *FRUS: 1955–1957*, vol. 19, pp. 677–86; National Intelligence Estimate 11–4–57 Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957–1962, November 12, 1957, *FRUS: 1955–1957*, vol. 19, pp. 665–73; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 33.

89. Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 23, 1957 (of meeting on November 22, 1957), November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

90. Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 16, 1957 (of meeting on November 11, 1957), November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary

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91. Memorandum of Discussion, 346th NSC Meeting, November 22, 1957, *FRUS: 1955-1957*, vol. 19, pp. 689-95.

92. Dulles to Eisenhower, November 25, 1957, Leadership Meeting (1), Box 12, Bryce Harlow Records, Eisenhower Library.

93. Memorandum for the Record, December 2, 1957 (of meeting on November 26, 1957), Missiles and Satellites V.1 (3), Box 6, Subject Series, DOD Subseries, OSS.

94. Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, *Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs*, 85th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., November 27, 1958, p. 194.

95. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 73-74.

96. Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 5, 1957, Staff Notes December 1957, Box 29, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

97. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 127.

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

99. Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 4, 1957, November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

100. Memorandum for the Record, November 6, 1957 (of meeting on November 4, 1957), November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

101. Memorandum for the Record, January 15, 1958 (of meeting on January 2, 1958), Staff Notes January 1958, Box 30, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

102. Handwritten Notes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, January 7, 1958, Box 4, Legislative Meeting Series, OSS.

103. Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 6, 1957, November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

104. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, November 15, 1957, November 1957 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

105. Clowse, *Brainpower*, pp. 57, 64-65, 78.

106. Alston, *Eisenhower*; Pach and Richardson, *President Eisenhower*, p. 180.

107. Stares, *Militarization*, p. 41.

108. Legislative Leadership Meeting Notes, February 4, 1958, Legislative Minutes 1958 (1), Box 3, Legislative Meetings Series, DDE Papers.

109. Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 5, 1958, Staff Notes March 1958 (2), Box 31, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

110. Memorandum for the President, March 5, 1958, NASA (3), Box 4, U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee, Eisenhower Library.

111. Memorandum for the Record, February 6, 1958, Missiles and Satellites vol. 2 (1), Box 6, Subject Series, DOD Subseries, OSS; Memorandum of Discussion, 357th NSC Meeting, March 6, 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, DDE Papers; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 97-112.

112. Gaither Report as Reported by Chalmers Roberts, no date, Gaither Report (1), Box 13, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, OSS.

113. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 74–78.
114. Gallup, *Gallup Poll*, pp. 1539, 1545–46.
115. Paul O’Neil, “U.S. Change of Mind,” *Life*, March 3, 1958, pp. 91–100.
116. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, January 3, 1958, Staff Notes January 1958, Box 30, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
117. Notes of Legislative Leaders Meeting, January 7, 1958, Legislative Minutes 1958 (1), Box 3, Legislative Meetings Series, DDE Papers.
118. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 240.
119. *Public Papers*, 1958, pp. 2–15.
120. Divine, *Sputnik*, pp. 79–80.
121. Address by Dulles to the National Press Club, January 16, 1958, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 125, Princeton University.
122. Memorandum for the Record, January 30, 1958 (of meeting on January 27, 1958), Staff Notes January 1958, Box 30, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.
123. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 121–24.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
126. Eisenhower to Dulles, March 26, 1958, White House General Correspondence 1958 (5), Box 6, White House Memoranda Series, JFD Papers.
127. Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 21, 1958 (of meeting on March 20, 1958), Staff Notes March 1958 (1), Box 31, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.
128. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 124–26.
129. Memorandum of Discussion, 363d NSC Meeting, April 24, 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, DDE Papers.
130. Divine, *Sputnik*, p. 127.
131. Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 23, 1958, June 1958 Staff Notes (2), Box 33, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers; Legislative Leadership Meeting Notes, June 24, 1958, Legislative Minutes 1958 (3), Box 3, Legislative Meeting Series, DDE Papers.
132. Legislative Leadership Meeting Notes, July 22, 1958, Staff Memos July 1958 (1), Box 35, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.
133. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 171; *Public Papers*, 1958, p. 635.
134. Legislative Leadership Meeting, January 14, 1958, Legislative Minutes 1958 (1), Box 3, Legislative Meetings Series, DDE Papers; Legislative Leadership Meeting Notes, January 28, 1958, Staff Notes January 1958, Box 30, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.
135. Memorandum for the President, January 16, 1958, Defense Reorganization (2), Box 1, Miscellaneous Series, DDE Papers; Goodpaster to Brundage, January 16, 1958, Department of Defense (1957) (2), Box 6, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology: Records 1957–61, Eisenhower Library; Handwritten Notes of Cabinet Meeting, January 17, 1958, Box 5, Cabinet Series, OSS.

136. Telephone Calls, January 20, 1958, Staff Notes January 1958, Box 30, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.
137. Arthur Kimball Oral History, OH 66, Eisenhower Library, p. 59.
138. Duchin, "Most Spectacular," p. 247; Arthur Kimball Oral History, OH 66, Eisenhower Library, pp. 60–61.
139. Memorandum for the Record, January 30, 1958 (of meeting on January 25, 1958), Staff Notes January 1958, Box 30, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.
140. Memorandum of Discussion, 360th NSC Meeting, March 27, 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, DDE Papers.
141. Eisenhower to Larmon, January 27, 1958, Larmon, Sigurd (1), Box 20, Administration Series, DDE Papers.
142. *Public Papers, 1958*, pp. 325–34, 363–66, 378–80.
143. Memorandum of Conference with the President, April 24, 1958 (of meeting on April 21, 1958), Staff Notes April 1958 (1), Box 32, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.
144. Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 12, 1958, Staff Notes May 1958 (2), Box 32, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers; Eisenhower *Waging Peace*, p. 251; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 135. For a discussion of the details of this bargaining, see Duchin, "Most Spectacular"; and Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 123–48.
145. Handwritten Notes of Cabinet Meeting, January 17, 1958, Box 5, Cabinet Series, OSS. For a discussion of the administration's dealings with Congress and congressional handling of this bill, see Clowse, *Brainpower*, pp. 78–151.
146. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 111–12, 144–56; McDougall, *Heavens*, pp. 157–76.
147. Legislative Leadership Meeting, March 18, 1958, Staff Notes March 1958 (1), Box 31, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers; Handwritten Notes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, March 18, 1958, Box 5, Legislative Meeting Series, OSS.
148. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 109–10.
149. Killian, *Sputnik*, pp. 123–25, 288–99.
150. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, p. 107.
151. *Public Papers, 1958*, p. 573; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, pp. 147–48.
152. Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 183.

## 6. *The Deliberative Context: Leadership and Limitations in the Formulation of the New Look*

1. National strategy or grand strategy refers to a state's policy to bring to bear all its domestic and international resources—economic, military, political, and psychological—to provide security during peace and war. See Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, "Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy," in Rosecrance and Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 4.
2. Secondary sources on the New Look include Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol. 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); H. W. Brands,

"The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," *American Historical Review* 94 (1989):963–89; Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977); Iwan W. Morgan, *Eisenhower Versus "The Spenders": The Eisenhower Administration, the Democrats, and the Budget, 1953–60* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, eds., *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*, pp. 379–524 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, vol. 5 of *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, JCS, 1986); Samuel F. Wells Jr., "The Origins of Massive Retaliation," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (1981):31–52.

3. Wells, "Origins," pp. 40–41.

4. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 209–14.

5. Iwan W. Morgan, *Eisenhower Versus "The Spenders,"* p. 50; Snyder, "New Look," pp. 389–90.

6. Watson, *Joint Chiefs*, pp. 3–4. Even though Eisenhower stressed the issue, defense spending remained a minor aspect of the public's 1952 choice in a campaign dominated by Korea and Eisenhower's personal appeal. Charges of corruption, the internal threat of communism, the policy of liberation, high prices, and high taxes played a somewhat lesser role. See Herbert Asher, *Presidential Elections and American Politics: Voters, Candidates, and Campaigns Since 1952* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1976), p. 137; Barton J. Bernstein, "Election of 1952," in Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., ed., *History of American Presidential Elections 1789–1968* (New York: Chelsea House, 1971), vol. 4, pp. 3260–61; John Robert Greene, *The Crusade: The Presidential Election of 1952* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985), p. 226; Eugene H. Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections* (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 519–23.

7. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, pp. 32–33; Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: Harpers, 1956), pp. 17–18; Snyder, "New Look," pp. 17–18.

8. Notes by Dulles, December 11, 1952, SS *Helena* Notes, Box 8, Subject Series, JFD Papers; Donovan, *Eisenhower*, pp. 17–18.

9. Memorandum for Discussion, December 29, 1952, Legislative Leaders 12/29/52, Box 1, Legislative Meetings Series, DDE Papers.

10. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 17.

11. Memorandum of Discussion, 133d NSC Meeting, February 24, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, DDE Papers.

12. Memorandum of Discussion, 134th NSC Meeting, February 25, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, DDE Papers.

13. Memorandum by Lay, February 24, 1953, President's Meeting with Civilian Consultants (2), Box 8, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, OSANSA; Memorandum of Discussion, 135th NSC Meeting, March 5, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, DDE Papers; Memorandum by Lay, March 5, 1953, President's Meeting with Civilian Consultants, March 31, 1953 (2), Box 8, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, OSANSA.

14. Diary Entry, March 6, 1953, Emmet Hughes Papers, Box 1, Princeton University.

15. Joint Chiefs to Wilson, March 19, 1953, President's Meeting with Civilian Consultants, March 31, 1953 (8), Box 8, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, OSANSA.

16. Memorandum of Discussion, 138th NSC Meeting, March 25, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 258-64.

17. Statement, March 31, 1953, Documents Pertaining to Special NSC Meeting, Box 4, NSC Series, DDE Papers.

18. Memorandum of Discussion, Special Meeting of the National Security Council, March 31, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 269, 279; Draft Memorandum re Consensus at March 31, 1953 Meeting, no date, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 281-87.

19. Report to the National Security Council, April 29, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 305-16. New obligational authority represents the funds appropriated by Congress in a fiscal year. Expenditures represent all spending in a fiscal year from funds previously appropriated in past years and newly appropriated funds.

20. Minutes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, April 30, 1953, Staff Notes January-December 1953, Box 4, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

21. Ferrell, *Diaries*, pp. 235-36.

22. Handwritten Minutes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, April 30, 1953, Box 1, Legislative Leadership Meetings Series, OSS.

23. Diary Entry, May 1, 1953, Emmet Hughes Papers, Box 1, Princeton University.

24. Diary Entry, May 16, 1953, Emmet Hughes Papers, Box 1, Eisenhower Library; Minutes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, May 12, 1953, Staff Notes January-December 1953, Box 4, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers; Handwritten Notes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, May 12, 1953, Box 1, Legislative Meetings Series, OSS; Diary Entry, May 15, 1953, Emmet Hughes Papers, Box 1, Princeton University.

25. The date of this Saturday meeting comes from Diary Entry, May 2, 1953, Log 1953 (1), Box 56, C. D. Jackson Papers, Eisenhower Library. Reports of discussions at this meeting come from Robert Cutler, *No Time for Rest* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 307-9. These accounts verify that the specific instigation for a broad survey of basic national security policy came from Dulles. But historian Richard Immerman rejects Cutler's account and claims that Eisenhower originated the idea. See Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of An Eisenhower Revisionist," *Diplomatic History* 14 (1990):319-42. However, Jackson's diary entry of the subsequent May 8 meeting (at which the decision to begin the strategic review was



made) between Eisenhower and the participants of the May 2 meeting indicates that the May 8 meeting was to present Dulles's May 2 idea to Eisenhower. Log Entry, May 8, 1953, Log 1953 (1), Box 56, C.D. Jackson Papers, Eisenhower Library.

26. The third alternative represented the policy of liberation or rollback that Dulles had earlier advocated and Eisenhower tacitly endorsed during the presidential campaign. See John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," *Life*, May 19, 1952, pp. 146–60.

27. Memorandum, May 8, 1953, Project Solarium (3), Box 15, Executive Secretary's Subject File Series, White House Office: National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Eisenhower Library.

28. Handwritten Minutes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, May 25, 1953, Box 1, Legislative Meetings Series, OSS.

29. Eisenhower to Gruenther, May 4, 1953, DDE Diary, December 1952–July 1953 (3), Box 3, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

30. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 22, 1953, Box 2, Cabinet Series, DDE Papers.

31. *Ibid.*

32. Handwritten Minutes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, May 25, 1953.

33. Ferrell, *Diaries*, pp. 240–42.

34. George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: 1949–1958* (New York: Random House, 1972), vol. 2, pp. 1131, 1170.

35. Memorandum, May 8, 1953, Project Solarium (3), Box 15, Executive Secretary's Subject File Series, White House Office: National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Eisenhower Library. The labels for the three alternatives comes from Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 146.

36. NSC 153/1, June 10, 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 2, pp. 378–86.

37. Memorandum by Lay, July 22, 1953, Project Solarium, Report to the NSC by Task Force "A" (1), Box 9, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, OSANSA.

38. Memorandum by Cutler, July 16, 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 2, pp. 397–98.

39. Memorandum of Discussion, 157th NSC Meeting, July 30, 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 2, pp. 435–40.

40. Memorandum by Cutler, July 31, 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 2, pp. 440–41.

41. Watson, *Joint Chiefs*, p. 15.

42. Telephone Call, May 11, 1953, Phone Calls February–June 1953 (1), Box 4, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers; Handwritten Notes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, May 12, 1953, Box 1, Legislative Meetings Series, OSS; Eisenhower, *Public Papers, 1953*, pp. 293–94; W. Barton Leach, *The New Look* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1954), p. 25.

43. Joint Chiefs to Wilson, August 8, 1953, NSC 162/2, Box 12, Disaster File Series, White House Office: National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Eisenhower Library.

44. Memorandum of Discussion, 160th NSC Meeting, August 27, 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 2, pp. 443–55.

45. Memorandum from Cutler to Dulles, September 3, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 455-57; Memorandum by Cutler on August 27/53 NSC Meeting, September 1, 1953, NSC 162/2, Box 12, Disaster File Series, White House Office: National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-61, Eisenhower Library.

46. Eisenhower to Caffey, July 27, 1953, DDE Diaries December 1952-July 1953 (1), Box 3, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

47. Memorandum by Dulles, September 6, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 457-60.

48. Eisenhower to Dulles, September 8, 1953, DDE Diary August-September 1953 (2), Box 3, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers, italics in original.

49. Eisenhower to Dulles, April 15, 1952, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 60, Princeton University.

50. Eisenhower to Dulles, June 20, 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 60, Princeton University.

51. Diary Entry, March 6, 1953, Emmet Hughes Papers, Box 1, Princeton University.

52. Minutes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, April 30, 1953, Staff Notes January-December 1953, Box 4, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

53. Eisenhower, *Public Papers*, 1953, p. 293.

54. Memorandum of Discussion, 163d NSC Meeting, September 24, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 464-75.

55. Memorandum of Discussion, 164th NSC Meeting, October 1, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, DDE Papers.

56. Jackson to Eisenhower, October 2, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 1224-26.

57. Memorandum of Discussion at the NSC Planning Board, October 19, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 1227-32.

58. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians," in Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, pp. 47-77 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

59. Memorandum of Discussion, 165th NSC Meeting, October 7, 1954, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 514-34. Comparisons in wording derive from the initial draft (Draft Statement of Policy, September 30, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 491-514) and the final version of the paper (Report to the National Security Council, NSC 162/2, October 30, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 577-97).

60. Radford to Wilson, October 2, 1953, CD III (1955), Box 19, Defense-Executive Office Central Decimal Files, 1953, Record Group 330, National Archives.

61. Memorandum of Discussion, 166th NSC Meeting, October 13, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 534-49.

62. Memorandum of Discussion, 168th NSC Meeting, October 29, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 567-76.

63. Report to the National Security Council, NSC 162/2, October 30, 1953, pp. 577-97.

64. JCS to Wilson, October 27, 1953, *FRUS: 1952-1954*, vol. 2, pp. 562-64.

65. Memorandum of Conversation, October 21, 1953, ACW Diary August–September–October 1953 (1), Box 1, Ann Whitman Diary Series, DDE Papers.

66. Dwight Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, November 6, 1953, DDE Diary November 1953 (2), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, DDE Papers.

67. Memorandum for the Record by Eisenhower, November 11, 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, vol. 2, pp. 597–98.

68. Eisenhower Telephone Conversation with Wilson, December 2, 1953, Phone Calls July–December 1953 (1), Box 5, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

69. Memorandum of Discussion, 176th NSC Meeting, December 16, 1953, Box 5, NSC Series, DDE Papers; Watson, *Joint Chiefs*, p. 82.

70. Radford to Wilson, December 9, 1953, Charles E. Wilson 1953 (2), Box 39, Administration Series, DDE Papers.

71. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 82.

72. Eisenhower, *Public Papers, 1953*, p. 720.

73. “Wilson Hints End of Arms Balance,” *New York Times*, November 11, 1953, p. A17.

74. “Wilson Cites Gains in Defense Program,” *New York Times*, November 21, 1953, p. A9.

75. Leach, *New Look*, pp. 90–99; Speech by Radford, December 14, 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 74, Princeton University.

76. Leach, *New Look*, p. 143.

77. Handwritten Minutes of Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, January 5, 1954, Box 1, Legislative Meetings Series, OSS; Minutes of Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, January 5, 1954, Staff Notes January–December 1954, Box 4, DDE Diaries Series, DDE Papers.

78. Eisenhower, *Public Papers, 1954*, p. 11.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

80. Eisenhower to Howard, February 2, 1954, Roy W. Howard (3), Box 20, Administration Series, DDE Papers. Eisenhower also asked that his connection with the questions be avoided.

81. Howard to Editors, February 5, 1954, Roy W. Howard (3), Box 20, Administration Series, DDE Papers.

82. Memorandum, n.d., Roy W. Howard (3), Box 20, Administration Series, DDE Papers.

83. Diary Entry, March 17, 1954, Box 1, James C. Hagerty Papers, Eisenhower Library.

84. Eisenhower, *Public Papers, 1954*, pp. 330–31.

85. Anthony Leviero, “Eisenhower Speaks, Asks Unity—Declares Soviet Courts Ruin If It Ventures War,” *New York Times*, April 6, 1954, pp. A1, A17.

86. Speech by Dulles, January 12, 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 322, Princeton University.

87. Eisenhower, *Public Papers, 1954*, p. 58.

88. John Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, no date, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 78, Princeton University; Memorandum of Conversation, February 24, 1954, *FRUS: Secretary of State's Memoranda of Conversation*, Microfiche Supplement, November, 1952–1954 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).

89. Nixon Speech, February 11, 1954, Vice President Nixon (5), Box 6, Subject Series, JFD Papers.

90. Leach, *New Look*, pp. 283–90.

91. Kinnard, *President Eisenhower*, p. 35. E. Bruce Geelhoed, *Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979), pp. 106–7; Leach, *New Look*, pp. 313, 405. For a summary of the content of both the Senate and House hearings, see Snyder, “New Look,” pp. 457–91.

92. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, vol. 10 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1954), pp. 153–56.

93. FY55 Eisenhower budget requests are from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, pp. 153–56. Congress’s new obligational authority and the FY55 actual expenditures are from Watson, *Joint Chiefs*, p. 86.

94. James D. Savage, *Balanced Budgets and American Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 290.

### 7. *Presidential Beliefs Orientations Since World War II*

1. Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 119.

2. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), vol. 2, p. 196.

3. Ken Hechler, *Working with Truman: A Personal Memoir of the White House Years* (New York: Putnam, 1982), pp. 219–20. See also Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 192.

4. Truman, *Memoirs*, p. 196.

5. Louis Harris, *The Anguish of Change* (New York: Norton, 1973), p. 18.

6. Theodore C. Sorensen, ed., “*Let the Word Go Forth*”: *The Speeches, Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1988), p. 22.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

8. John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 377.

9. Harris, *Anguish of Change*, pp. 18–19. Italics in original.

10. Lyndon Baines Johnson, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1967*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 674, 1046.

11. Lyndon Baines Johnson, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1966*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 708.

12. Lyndon Baines Johnson, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1966*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 632; Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 531; Harris, *Anguish of Change*, p. 24.

13. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, p. 28.

14. Other analyses also suggest that Johnson was a guardian. See Bruce E. Altschuler, *LBJ and the Polls* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1990); Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realists’ Theory of Leadership,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 14–16, 1994.

15. Richard Nixon, *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 999; Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 753.

16. Richard Nixon, *Leaders* (New York: Warner Books, 1982), p. 234. See also Richard Nixon, *In the Arena* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 265.

17. Nixon, *Public Papers, 1972*, p. 999; Nixon, *Public Papers, 1972*, p. 1000. See also Nixon, *In the Arena*, p. 331.

18. Richard Nixon, *The Nixon Presidential Press Conferences* (New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1978), p. 28. See also Nixon, *In the Arena*, p. 284; Nixon, *Leaders*, p. 333.

19. Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (New York: Arbor House, 1985), pp. 79, 224.

20. Nixon, *Leaders*, p. 324.

21. Gerald Ford, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford, 1976–77*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 11, 780; Robert T. Hartmann, *Palace Politics: An Inside Account of the Ford Years* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), pp. 420–21.

22. Ford, *Public Papers, 1976–77*, vol. 1, p. 7.

23. Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 1174.

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25. Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980–81*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 740.
26. Carter, *Public Papers, 1979*, vol. 2, pp. 1712, 1918–19. See also Carter, *Public Papers, 1978*, vol. 2, p. 1474.
27. Carter, *Public Papers, 1978* vol. 2, pp. 1655–56. See also Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, p. 66.
28. Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 162. For a similar comment, see also “Talking with David Frost—Five Presidents,” *Journal Graphics*, Transcript 59, 1996, p. 13; Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 111, 114.
29. Leslie H. Gelb, “The Mind of the President,” *New York Times Magazine*, October 6, 1985, p. 32. The former U.S. ambassador to the UN Jeanne Kirkpatrick stated that Reagan never based his decisions on public opinion or “short-range political popularity.” See Ben Wattenberg, “The Consequences of Ideas: The Reagan Revolution and Beyond,” *Public Opinion* 9 (Summer 1986):60.
30. Reagan, *Public Papers, 1984*, vol. 1, p. 433; “An Interview with President Reagan: Reflections on Summitry and the Soviet Challenge,” *Time*, June 7, 1982, p. 11.
31. Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1988–89*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 1019. See also George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner, 1993), p. 1135.
32. Reagan, *American Life*, pp. 451, 466. Biographer Lou Cannon found that based on the experience in Vietnam, Reagan “knew that it was realistically impossible for any president to commit U.S. troops to a protracted war that lacked the support of the American people.” Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 336.
33. George Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1990*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 354.
34. George Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1991*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 941. See also Bush, *Public Papers, 1990*, vol. 1, p. 355; George Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1992–93*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 1328–29.
35. George Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 1733.
36. George Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1990*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 1382.
37. David Mervin, *George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 212, 213.

38. George C. Edwards III, "Frustration and Folly: Bill Clinton and the Public Presidency," in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals*, p. 255 (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1996).
39. Jack Nelson and Robert J. Donovan, "The Education of a President," *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, August 1, 1993, p. 16.
40. William Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton, 1993* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 1765.
41. Stanley A. Renshon, *High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 81.
42. William Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton, 1995* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 1428.
43. Richard Burke, "Gore's Bandwagon Gets Big Push as Clinton Shows Enthusiasm," *New York Times*, July 14, 1997, p. A1; Jim Hoaglund, "Cabinet Politics," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, July 13, 1998, p. 5.
44. Press Conference by the President, December 16, 1997, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., <http://library.whitehouse.gov> (cited May 24, 1998).
45. Richard Reeves, "Government by the Polls," *Greensboro News & Record*, December 21, 1994, p. A15. See also Dick Morris, *Behind the Oval Office* (New York: Random House, 1997), p. 11; Dick Morris, "Report on Launch of Morris Book," interviewed by Mara Liasson, January 16 1997, *Morning Edition*, National Public Radio, available from <http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/archives/nb7j16.html>.
46. Jack Nelson and Doyle McManus, "Clinton Rejects Foreign Policy Team Shake-Up," *Los Angeles Times*, May 28, 1994, p. A20.
47. William Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton, 1994* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 1576.
48. Morris, *Behind the Oval Office*, p. 257.
49. "Blending Force with Diplomacy," *Time*, October 31, 1994, p. 35.
50. Burke, "Gore's Bandwagon"; Hoaglund, "Cabinet Politics."
51. Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992):439-66.

## 8. Crises and Recent Presidents

1. Because the invasion of Afghanistan best exemplified the crisis context of Carter's presidency, the requirement that the case occur at least one year before the next presidential election was relaxed.
2. Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 471-73. Although these perceptions influenced Carter's view, the Soviets had not used troops in 1948 to overthrow the Czechoslovak government, and the Soviets saw the Afghanistan invasion as necessary to preserve a client state rather than to expand their influence. See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 1042-46, 1057-58.
3. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 472.

4. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, pp. 1058–60; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Afghanistan, Carter, and Foreign Policy Change: The Limits of Cognitive Models,” in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., *Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 110–12.

5. Gabriella Grasselli, *British and American Responses to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan* (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 130, 148–49, 174–75; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, pp. 1067–68; David Skidmore, *Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996), pp. 98, 101. Lebow and Stein, “Afghanistan,” p. 106, dispute that domestic factors in any way influenced Carter’s decision.

6. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, p. 1060; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 473.

7. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 476, 544.

8. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), p. 431.

9. Hamilton Jordan, *Crisis* (New York: Putnam, 1982), p. 100.

10. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 474; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 431.

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## 10. *Conclusions and Implications for Theory and Practice*

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