CHAPTER NINE

Deliberative Cases and Recent Presidents

Deliberative cases should provide more opportunities for public opinion to become integrated into the decision process than crisis cases do, either because the public might more easily assert itself or because its opinion might be more easily discernible by presidents. As discussed in chapter 1, even though realists expect presidents to lead the public, they also believe that an overly emotional public can perniciously constrain elite choices. Wilsonian liberals expect decision makers to follow public opinion. The beliefs model says that presidents react in a range of ways according to their views. In this chapter, I show that decision makers behave more in accordance with the beliefs model than with either the realist or the Wilsonian liberal model. The cases considered are (1) Jimmy Carter's decision to negotiate the Panama Canal treaties; (2) Ronald Reagan's origination of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); (3) George Bush's handling of German reunification; and (4) Bill Clinton's decisions on intervening in Bosnia.

Executor: Carter and the Panama Canal Treaties, 1977–1978

Given Carter's positive view toward public input and rejection of the necessity of public support, he would have considered public opinion but might have acted against it if certain conditions prevailed. If he

thought he had a better view of a problem than the public did, he would likely have made his decision based on other factors. Because of the long decision time, if a policy required congressional approval, he might have attempted to lead public opinion to his side to affect Congress (lead category). However, in his decision making and behavior, the target of these actions would have been Congress, and he would not have thought about generating the "necessary" public support. In this sense, he would have been treating public support instrumentally rather than as an end in itself. If he had only a weak preference on policy or thought the public had a better view, public opinion would probably have limited his actions (constrain category).

The 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty gave the United States the right to build and operate the Panama Canal, and from its inception, it was a source of Panamanian resentment, feelings that only grew stronger with the passage of time. As a result of these rising tensions, President Lyndon Johnson began negotiations in 1964 to replace the 1903 treaty. Discussions continued throughout the Nixon administration and into the Ford administration when, finally in 1974 the United States and Panama agreed to the Kissinger-Tack principles, named for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Tack, as a basis for an agreement. These principles foreshadowed the eventual agreement signed in 1977 and called for replacing the indefinite length of the 1903 treaty with a set end date, return of the canal to Panama, and an end to American jurisdiction. American public opposition became apparent during the 1976 election when the conservative Republican presidential primary candidate, Ronald Reagan, challenged President Gerald Ford regarding the issue, thereby stalling the negotiations until after the 1976 election. Carter, the Democratic presidential candidate, also announced, "I would not be in favor of relinquishing actual control of the Panama Canal or its use to any other nation, including Panama."[1] When Carter took office, the status of the canal thus remained a contentious domestic issue in the United States and a source of rising discontent in Panama.[2]

Problem Representation

Carter's position during the campaign had more to do with the pressures of a presidential campaign and a lack of familiarity with the issue than a firmly felt position. Sol Linowitz, Carter's negotiator for the treaties, reported that his campaign foreign policy adviser and eventual secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, assured him in October 1976 that despite the campaign rhetoric, Carter intended to move ahead with

negotiations and would "certainly want to do the right thing in connection with the Panama Canal situation." Linowitz himself rejected any shift in Carter's fundamental perspective on Panama: "Frankly, I don't think he had studied [the issue] in depth at the time he made his statement.[3] Soon after being elected president in 1976, Carter recognized in discussions with his foreign policy advisers that the United States needed to sign a new treaty with Panama quickly that would relinquish its total control over the canal and recognize Panamanian sovereignty.[4]

Option Generation

As Carter saw the situation, several factors indicated a need for expeditious action on the treaty, even in the face of "a terrible political fight in Congress" and public opposition. In his memoirs, he stressed the need to correct the injustice of the original treaty which had been presented to the Panamanian leadership as a fait accompli in 1903 and had continued to plague American-Panamanian relations. Given the volatility of the issue in Panamanian politics, the canal itself was coming under increasing threat of attack or sabotage, and Carter feared that radical groups opposed to American interests would use the issue to undermine the stability of the Panamanian government and economy. At a broader level, he saw the colonial overtones inherent in Panamanian–United States relations as undermining the American position with other Latin American countries.[5]

Policy Selection

The decision to move ahead on the treaty negotiations came shortly before the administration took office in January 1977. At an early January meeting of Carter's foreign policy advisers, the administration decided to accept the Kissinger-Tack principles as the basis for an agreement and to raise the priority of the negotiations. The National Security Council adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, reported their conclusion was "if the new Administration did not move rapidly on the Panama issue, capitalizing on the new President's mandate, the problem would become unmanageable and sour our relations with Latin America."[6] Vance indicated that Carter made this decision with full knowledge of the "deep emotions" and "political and foreign policy risks" that were implied by the difficult ratification debate that any treaty was sure to face in the Senate.[7]

In addition, the administration saw ratification of the treaty as an important element in establishing the tone of the new government's

foreign policy. According to this view, a canal treaty would highlight the administration's new approach to foreign policy by resolving a thorny problem through an equitable agreement with a lesser power. A quick success would also establish a momentum the administration hoped would transfer to other issues. They anticipated it would undermine the president's conservative opponents by exposing them as extremists and thus ease the achievement of subsequent foreign policy objectives such as the ratification of the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union and the normalization of relations with China. As a practical matter, some administration officials also saw the Panama treaty as an organizational "dry run" for these other issues, which they viewed as more contentious domestically.[8]

Carter decided that the foreign policy advantages outweighed potential difficulties with Congress and the public. In his memoirs, he notes,

> Despite the opposition of Congress and the public, I decided to plow ahead, believing that if the facts could be presented clearly, my advisers and I could complete action while my political popularity was still high and before we had to face the additional complication of the congressional election campaigns of 1978.[9]

Although Carter recognized that the public opposed his action, his main concern was with congressional opposition, especially in light of the need for a Senate vote on the treaty itself.

Potential difficulties with Congress also provided the main impetus for a major negotiating innovation. Linowitz thought the treaty's ratification rested on Panama's acceptance of an indefinite U.S. right to defend the canal's neutrality, an assessment that Carter shared.[10] To address this problem, the United States negotiated two treaties. One was called the neutrality treaty and concerned the permanent right of the United States to defend the canal. The other, called the Panama Canal treaty, transferred the canal to Panama. Negotiating and ratifying the neutrality treaty first, Vance believed, "would give us a clear answer to those who claimed that turning the canal over to Panama would threaten U.S. security," and both Carter and he "saw the political importance of this suggestion."[11]

Implementation

The administration faced a tough fight in the Senate to win the sixty-seven votes needed for the treaty's ratification, especially since

thirty-eight senators had voted in the fall of 1975 for a Senate resolution opposing any treaty with Panama. Despite this congressional opposition and public disapproval, as reflected in public opinion polls, Carter determined to make a full press case for the treaties and to put his prestige on the line in the battle.[12] He initially hoped for a quick ratification of the treaties after they were signed on September 7, 1977, but he refused to begin the ratification campaign before the negotiations ended, which allowed the antitreaty forces to mobilize public opposition. As a result, the Senate majority leader, Robert Byrd (D, W.Va.), predicted "total disaster" if the administration pursued their quick ratification plan. Carter had originally intended to rely only on direct appeals to uncommitted senators, but this situation persuaded him to delay ratification and to adopt a more extensive public relations effort, although the main focus remained on the Senate.[13]

From the outset, Carter was determined to follow a ratification strategy that focused on changing the votes of individual senators rather than on changing public opinion. The administration concentrated their public relations effort on gaining the support of important political leaders in the states of key undecided senators, in the hopes of obtaining proratification votes. As Carter recalled,

> During the fall of 1977, I spent a lot of my time planning carefully how to get Senate votes. The task force set up for this purpose developed a somewhat limited objective: not to build up an absolute majority of support among all citizens, but to convince an acceptable number of key political leaders in each important state to give their senators some "running room."

The administration hoped that they could generate enough support for the treaties to convince concerned senators that they did not have to fear for their political lives if they voted for the treaties.[14]

The administration's public relations effort reflected these concerns. Political aide Hamilton Jordan produced a ratification strategy designed to produce at least a divided public (as opposed to the then prevailing public view that overwhelmingly opposed the treaties) and an approving one if possible. In addition to the national public opinion, they targeted public opinion in the fifteen states with uncommitted senators. But this effort paled in comparison with the other aspects of the strategy. Instead of focusing on building mass-based grassroots support (which the administration ceded to conservative, antitreaty groups), the most extensive effort went into courting a carefully selected set of local

and national opinion leaders. By all accounts, this elite-focused effort was massive, with direct appeals to hundreds of opinion leaders who were flown into Washington for briefings with high-level officials, including the president. Administration officials also embarked on a public speaking campaign in support of the treaties. Intense lobbying of senators and a final televised appeal for support from the president capped this effort. Even though the administration undertook many different activities, their constant focus was on generating elite support to relieve pressure on potentially shaky Senate supporters.[15]

The premise of this strategy was that once information about the treaty became available, it would change the attitudes of opinion leaders and the public toward the treaty.[16] Although aided in the effort to generate Senate support by the perception of a late shift in public opinion, public opinion remained essentially unchanged.[17] Even so, after a seven-month ratification campaign and concessions to obtain the support of several senators, the administration achieved narrow victories in the Senate, with the neutrality treaty passing in March by a vote of sixty-eight to thirty-two and the Panama Canal treaty passing in April by the same count.[18]

Summary

Carter's reactions to public opinion were consistent with the conditional predictions based on his public opinion beliefs. When he had not thought through the issue, he deferred to the public's view and opposed the treaty. But when he devoted more attention to it, despite the public's opposition, he decided that now his view of the matter was correct and decided to act on it. Only when told that congressional support would not be forthcoming unless he relieved the pressure on uncommitted senators did he move to a public relations program. However, instead of concentrating on generating public support as an end in itself, Carter viewed public opinion instrumentally. He did not think public support was needed nor did he attempt to find it but instead tried to reduce the opposition so as to give Senate supporters room to maneuver and vote in favor of the treaties. As the evidence indicates, Carter directed his ratification efforts toward elites and senators in order to affect Senate votes without necessarily winning public support. His actions thus suggest a *supportive* influence of his beliefs, with his behavior *consistent* with his beliefs at the time of the problem representation and a *causal* influence at the other stages. The influence of public opinion on policy falls into a *lead category* influence.

Guardian: Reagan and the Origins of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1983

Reagan did not wish to consider the public's input and did not think its support was necessary. Thus, he would have made decisions based mostly on other interests rather than public opinion. Reagan might have used the extra time available to lead the people during the implementation stage to persuade them to support his decision after he had made it based on other factors (lead category). When Reagan asked on March 23, 1983, "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them?" and recommended that "we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive," he took the nation and most of his administration by surprise.[19] By proposing a defensive system, Reagan was challenging the foundations of the prevailing strategic thinking known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which held that as long as both the United States and the Soviet Union had a massive nuclear retaliation capability, neither side would launch a nuclear attack. Large-scale strategic defenses, the kind envisioned by Reagan, would dramatically undercut this "balance of terror" and were anathema to scores of arms control and strategic experts who thought that such defenses could be destabilizing if they undermined the effectiveness of one side's retaliatory force.

Reagan proposed the new research program, which he thought could render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," during a time of increased tension between the Soviet Union and United States. As both sides continued their massive defense buildup, this friction worsened when Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an "evil empire" a month before his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech. At this same time, U.S. Catholic bishops questioned the moral foundations of MAD, and a popular freeze movement took shape to protest the continued American nuclear buildup. In Europe, the deployment of American cruise and Pershing II missiles led to huge public demonstrations.

Problem Representation

Reagan claimed—uncharacteristically, in biographer Lou Cannon's view—sole credit for the idea for the program, asserting that "SDI was my idea"—a conclusion supported by other sources as well.[20] Reagan's proposal for strategic defenses originated a long time before his 1983 speech. In 1979, as a presidential candidate, Reagan visited the North American Aerospace Defense Command headquarters in Colorado,

from which the United States could track any incoming strategic nuclear attack, and was startled to find out that the nation had no defense against a missile attack. According to Martin Anderson, who accompanied him on the flight back to California, "It was obvious that Reagan was deeply concerned about what he had learned. . . . He slowly shook his head and said, 'We have spent all that money and have all that equipment, and there is nothing we can do to prevent a nuclear missile from hitting us.'"[21]

Reagan abhorred nuclear weapons in general and the MAD policy in particular, which he described to Cannon in 1989: "It's like you and me sitting here in a discussion where we were each pointing a loaded gun at each other and if you say anything wrong or I say anything wrong, we're going to pull the trigger. And I just thought this was ridiculous." He fundamentally disagreed with one principle of the MAD policy, embodied in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM), which prohibited strategic defenses. He compared this logic with the ban on chemical weapons: "We all got together in 1925 and banned the use of poison gas. But we all kept our gas masks." He dreamed that a technological breakthrough in strategic defenses would rescue the nation from relying on a strategic policy that he deemed fundamentally unsound and hoped it might advance his vision of a nuclear-free world.[22] By the time he became president in 1981, he was fully convinced of the need to move forward on strategic defenses. What remained was the opportunity to realize his vision.

Option Generation

Toward the end of 1981, a small group in the White House and a select group of outside advisers considered a renewed effort to develop a missile defense program. The group presented their findings to Reagan on January 8, 1982. After a meeting that Anderson points to as a "critical turning point," Reagan concluded that the strategic defense option would be workable.[23] However, the momentum for strategic defenses soon abated amid other pressing issues. Though firmly committed to strategic defense, Reagan lacked the scientific knowledge and military backing to inaugurate a new program in 1982. Instead, much of the administration's energy on defenses centered on building congressional support for funding the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. The House rejection of the "dense pack" MX-basing mode (in which the missiles would be placed in many silos located close together) on December 8, 1982, provided a new impetus to several proponents of

strategic defense. Upset about what he perceived as the Pentagon's bungling of the MX issue, the deputy NSC adviser, Robert McFarlane, moved to provide the spark for the March 1983 speech.[24]

Unlike Reagan, McFarlane preferred to use research on strategic defenses as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets to push them for significant cuts in their missile forces. After the MX defeat cast doubt on the prospects for future American land-based strategic systems, the chief of naval operations, Admiral James Watkins, expressed his dismay over MAD and support for missile defenses to offset the Soviet land-based missile advantage to Admiral John Poindexter, who was the military assistant to the national security adviser, William Clark. Poindexter related these views to McFarlane, who saw an opportunity to push ahead on strategic defenses, and a meeting with the JCS on the subject was arranged. Reagan met with the JCS in December 1982 and asked them: "What if we began to move away from our total reliance on offense to deter a nuclear attack and moved toward a relatively greater reliance on defense?"[25] After the meeting, much to his surprise, Watkins found the other JCS members receptive to strategic defenses. Unlike Reagan, however, the JCS viewed strategic defenses as a system that would complement the present U.S. strategy rather than replace it and believed it provided a useful "middle ground" between threatening a preemptive American strike and accepting a Soviet first strike.[26]

The defeat of the MX basing mode also drove home to Reagan the difficulty of the American strategic position. His science adviser, George Keyworth, later remembered that Reagan saw "the problem . . . [as] a serious military problem: erosion in stability."[27] Like his military advisers, he thought the Soviets would continue to build their land-based forces while the United States would face continued controversy over any land-based system. The December 1982 House vote made Reagan realize that any American effort to match the Soviets in land-based missiles would encounter stumbling blocks.[28]

Policy Selection

The JCS met again with Reagan on February 11, 1983, to discuss the American strategic position. As part of the discussion, the JCS recommended reexamining strategic defense possibilities. In a phrase that Reagan later used in his March speech, Watkins asked, "Would it not be better if we could develop a system that would protect, rather than avenge, our people?" To which, Reagan replied, "Exactly."[29] Despite later controversy over the priority the JCS gave it, they all agreed that

strategic defenses merited a deeper examination. Reagan seized on their recommendation: "Let's go back and look at this and get ready to push it hard."[30] Because at the meeting the JCS discussed strategic defenses only generally, they left untouched several critical issues such as the extent of the defense (e.g., All nuclear weapons? Just missiles? Military targets only? Cities?), its effect on the ABM treaty, the cost, the reactions of allies, and potential congressional views. Given these uncertainties, the JCS left the meeting thinking that the proposal would be considered further at the highest levels before a new policy was launched.[31]

However, Clark, McFarlane, and the NSC staff moved ahead rapidly and secretly on the new policy, even incorporating it into a forthcoming speech. Whereas the JCS saw strategic defenses as a means to support and improve the current strategy, Reagan had moved beyond this view and pushed for a vision in which all nuclear weapons would be rendered ineffective. When the JCS eventually found out about the planned announcement, they were shocked, and the JCS chair, General John Vessey, recommended that the speech not be given. Indeed, both Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger were deliberately cut out of the preparations for the speech because Clark feared they would oppose the announcement.[32]

Implementation

Reagan agreed with the quick and secretive approach. He was enamored with the idea of dramatically announcing his new vision and was determined to do so despite possible concerns about administration, congressional, or allied support. Poindexter later explained, "We didn't tell anyone else what we were doing. . . . The chiefs didn't know. Defense didn't know. State didn't know. After we developed the insert, we talked to the president about it. And he agreed; that's what he wanted to do."[33] In fact, Reagan rejected McFarlane's suggestion that the administration seek congressional and allied support before the speech because he wanted to surprise everyone.[34] According to McFarlane, Reagan favored making the announcement as soon as possible, since "he was so swept away by his ability to stand up and announce a program that would defend Americans from nuclear war [that] he couldn't wait."[35] Reagan later stated that after the JCS "returned to me their collective judgment that development of a shield against nuclear missiles might be feasible, I decided to make public my dream and move ahead with the Strategic Defense Initiative by laying down a challenge to our scientists to solve the formidable technological problems it posed."[36]

Reagan also saw the value of making a big public relations splash with his speech. McFarlane recalled that

> Reagan's view of the political payoff was sufficient rationale as far as he was concerned. . . . By that I mean, providing the American people with an appealing answer to their fears—the intrinsic value of being able to tell Americans, "For the first time in the nuclear age, I'm doing something to save your lives. I'm telling you that we can get rid of nuclear weapons."[37]

Reagan sensed that the public would support his views and thought he could lead the people to actively support his proposed policy. Although this potential support did not affect either the choice of policy or its timing, it did reinforce his preference to move quickly on announcing it.

Following Reagan's speech and after receiving the recommendations of several advisory panels, the "Strategic Defense Initiative" was established on January 6, 1984, by presidential directive. Lieutenant General James Abrahamson was named to direct the new SDI Office in April 1984, and by 1985, SDI had become the Defense Department's largest research and development program. The program also immediately became the center of controversy in both Congress and elite circles, especially among advocates of traditional deterrence. In the face of this opposition, Reagan and Abrahamson made a concerted public relations effort to generate support for SDI. According to most public opinion polls between 1983 and 1985, the public agreed with Reagan's policy, with between one-half and three-fourths supporting the idea of strategic defenses, depending on the exact wording of the question.[38] In the end, this leadership effort and the consistent public support led Congress to grant 90 percent of the funds that Reagan requested for SDI.[39]

Summary

Throughout this case, Reagan acted consistently with his beliefs—which opposed the public's input and thought its support was unnecessary. He had long been a proponent of strategic defenses, which he saw as both morally superior to MAD and practically appealing to him because of his profound dislike of nuclear weapons. Upon hearing advice that the program was technically feasible and finding support among the JCS, Reagan saw the opportunity to pursue his vision of a nuclear-free world. As with the Lebanon case, even though Reagan's advisers appeared somewhat responsive to public opinion in their choice to support strategic defenses, Reagan's own views and choices were unaffected by public

opinion. When he did consider public opinion, he did so only to generate support for the policy he preferred. Reagan's behavior was *consistent* with his beliefs in problem representation, option generation, and policy selection, and a *causal* influence was found at implementation. These codings suggest a *supportive* influence of beliefs. The connection between public opinion and policy occurred as defined under the *lead category*.

Pragmatist: Bush and German Reunification, 1989–1990

Bush's beliefs rejected public input and saw public support as a necessary but largely automatic component of a successful foreign policy. These views suggest he would have based his decisions on other interests and led the public to build support only if he perceived opposition (no-impact and lead categories).

At the end of World War II, the Allied nations of France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union each occupied one of four sectors of Germany and also Berlin. France, Britain, and the United States later combined their sectors into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which joined the Western NATO alliance, and the Soviet Union created the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which joined the Warsaw Pact. Each of the Allied nations retained legal rights resulting from the peace settlement at the end of World War II regarding the final disposition of the German state. Throughout the Cold War, the division of Germany remained a focal point of tension between the two alliances, with both the United States and Soviet Union maintaining significant numbers of troops on the territory of their German ally. During this period, American policy favored German reunification through peaceful means, but on the assumption that it would be best to occur later rather than sooner. However, most European nations and the Soviet Union feared a resurgent and aggressive united Germany and preferred that it remain divided.

Problem Representation

As the Cold War thawed in the late 1980s as a result of Soviet leader Mikail Gorbachev's less aggressive foreign policies, Bush, upon entering office in early 1989, saw an opportunity to achieve dramatic American objectives in Europe and exhorted his advisers to "dream big dreams." While they tried to convert Gorbachev's change in demeanor into substantive policy outcomes, they still thought German unification

would take place over a number of years following political and economic reforms in the GDR.[40] Since Bush thought that the presidents who had encountered difficulties in the Soviet-American relationship had done so because they had moved too quickly, he determined to err on the side of caution. For this reason, in early 1989, Bush approved a wide-ranging review of American objectives and policy toward the Soviet Union in the hopes that the review would both provide policy guidance and insulate him from pressure from public opinion and events to act as he pondered the direction of American policy. However, the review achieved neither of these goals, as Bush found its conclusions too cautious, and domestic criticism of administration inaction in response to Soviet pronouncements mounted.[41]

The administration informally began thinking about German reunification in the spring of 1989. The issue received some attention during the policy review, but given German disinterest and the hostility of other Europeans, the State Department's review recommended not pushing the issue. In a March 1989 memorandum to Bush, however, the NSC recommended a much stronger position in favor of unification: "Today the top priority for American foreign policy in Europe should be the fate of the Federal Republic of Germany." The memo advised using the spread of democratic values as the basis for European unity within a "commonwealth of free nations" and as an alternative vision to Gorbachev's "common European home" (which assumed that the political and economic systems in Eastern Europe would remain fundamentally unchanged).[42]

Throughout the spring, the administration endured both criticism from domestic media and politicians as well as international complaints from West Europeans about a lack of ideas and action. Even though the attacks stung, Bush remained determined to move cautiously, given the stakes involved. In late spring, he complained that he was "sick and tired of getting beat up day after day for having no vision and letting Gorbachev run the show. This is not just public relations we're involved in. There's real danger in jumping ahead. Can't people *see* that?" He believed that the real opportunities afforded by Gorbachev's policies would remain, regardless of the pace of the American reaction. But if these chances evaporated, then "we'll end up realizing we were lucky—and smart—that we didn't move faster."[43] As part of the administration's response to this criticism, however, they decided to use a series of speeches in May and June to announce policy concepts to confront the evolving European situation.[44]

Option Generation

German reunification became one part of this policy process. On May 17, Bush met with Secretary of State James Baker, who stressed that the reunification issue provided one opportunity to "get ahead of the curve and exceed expectations." He advised, "There's no doubt the topic is coming back. The real question is whether Gorbachev will grab it first." Baker reported that Bush's "instinct was to emphasize the issue, building on Ronald Reagan's eloquent call" in 1987 for Gorbachev to "tear down this wall!" in reference to the Berlin Wall, which divided the city's Western and Soviet sectors. After this discussion, Bush decided to emphasize the issue on his European trip at the end of May.[45]

Moving forward on reunification squared with Bush's views. He saw himself as "less of a Europeanist, not dominated by history" and viewed Germany as a fully reformed, democratic nation, and "at some point you should let a guy up." He publicly expressed this viewpoint in May when he told an interviewer he would "love to see" unification.[46] On September 18, he commented optimistically,

> I think there has been a dramatic change in post–World War II Germany. And so, I don't fear it. . . . There is in some quarters a feeling—well, a reunified Germany would be detrimental to the peace of Europe, of Western Europe, some way; and I don't accept that at all, simply don't.[47]

The situation in Eastern Europe became more volatile during the summer as thousands of GDR citizens traveled to Hungary in hopes of crossing the border into Austria to escape communism. In August, to relieve the refugee crisis, Hungary announced that it would open its border with Austria. When the GDR cut off travel to Hungary, the flow then shifted to Czechoslovakia. Although the GDR eventually resolved this refugee problem by allowing those who made it to Czechoslovakia to emigrate and then closing the Czechoslovak border, the refugee crisis and the cutoff of travel only fueled domestic discontent.

By October 20, a three-pronged American policy emphasized a cautious approach to control developments in the GDR and still saw the possibilities for eventual unification as remote. First, the administration would encourage an evolutionary process of change in the GDR toward a more democratic and free market structure. Second, the administration would publicly begin to outline the conditions for eventual reunification, which included that unification would be voluntary and the

united Germany would have an anchor in the West. Third, the United States would work with the FRG to prevent the total collapse of the GDR regime, for fear of uncontrollable instability.[48]

In an interview on October 24, Bush underscored his support for a slow and orderly reunification and gave a nod to the concerns of America's allies. He also expressed exasperation with domestic pressure to react more dramatically to the changes in Eastern Europe: "These changes we're seeing in Eastern Europe are absolutely extraordinary, but I'm not going to be stampeded into overreacting to any of this." He observed, "Democrats on Capital Hill have been calling me 'timid.' I have other, better words, like 'caution,' 'diplomatic,' 'prudent.' "[49] The pressure to react only grew stronger in the following weeks, but Bush remained steadfast in his determination to move slowly.

Perhaps the most dramatic of these events erupted onto international headlines and television screens when the GDR opened the Berlin Wall on the night of November 9, 1989. After this astounding development, Bush decided to react publicly in a way that Baker later described as "diplomatically, almost clinically—and try as best we could not to be overly emotional" in order to prevent the Soviets from feeling that in Bush's words, "we were sticking our thumb in their eye."[50] In a press conference the next day, Bush appeared subdued, which struck many observers as odd given the achievement of a major long-term American policy goal. His restrained reaction reinforced the perception of Bush as lacking "vision," and journalists and legislators alike were highly critical of his handling of the opening of the wall. These attacks frustrated Bush, who thought that the situation required a more circumspect approach and privately insisted, "I won't beat on my chest and dance on the wall."[51]

Policy Selection

Bush recognized he could have used the opening of the Berlin Wall for short-term political advantage, but he nonetheless pursued the policy he thought best for long-term American interests, regardless of the political benefits. His fears centered on two distasteful consequences that he thought might result from an overreaction. First, Bush presumed that Gorbachev was under pressure from the Soviet military and conservatives to reverse the changes in Eastern Germany and worried that a less restrained response could force Gorbachev to backtrack on the progress in Eastern Europe. Bush also believed that American exu-

berance could undermine Gorbachev's position in the Soviet Union, which might end possible future reforms. Second, afraid of a repeat of 1956 in Hungary during which American statements encouraged an uprising that the Soviets brutally put down, he was worried that such statements might incite other East European revolts that might force the Soviets into hostile action. He therefore opted to move carefully in the hope that reform would continue, instead of taking action that might cause a reversal in policy. To achieve this goal as smoothly as possible, the administration concluded that unity would occur regardless of American action, and so they decided to pursue a policy favoring German self-determination that moved no faster than the FRG did and was presented in a subdued manner so as not to threaten the Soviets.[52]

The American policy was met with opposition from France, Britain, other American allies, the Soviet Union, and domestic editorial opinion. Nevertheless, Bush refused to relent. In order to reassure the British and the French and to introduce American influence into the process, Baker advocated principles for unification that emphasized the need for German self-determination in NATO and the European Community, gradualism, and the inviolability of existing borders. For the remainder of 1989, the administration hoped their policy of gradualism would succeed in easing toward German unification as the basis for a stable Europe.[53]

By late 1989, polling data on the public's view of German reunification and Bush's policy toward it indicated approval of both. Polls in November and December 1989 and January 1990 all showed wide public support for German reunification. For example, a November 21 poll indicated that 64 percent of the public "would like to see Germany reunified," with only 10 percent opposed.[54] In early December, Bush's pollster Robert Teeter noted that even though Bush had been criticized as being too timid, "the public doesn't buy that criticism."[55] Despite previous concern about public opposition to his slow action, these polling results gave Bush no reason to question his gradual approach.

Events soon forced another adjustment in Bush's policy after the GDR moved elections up to mid-March from July after being pressured by the continuing flow of its citizens to the FRG. The prounification forces were expected to win the March GDR elections, making it clear that unification would now come rather quickly.[56] With the GDR collapsing before his eyes, Bush decided to abandon his policy of gradualism and move as fast as possible to achieve unification in order to avoid instability. Believing that a united Germany would remember who had

supported unification, Bush wanted to stay at the forefront of the process.[57]

Implementation

Although Bush now favored moving quickly on reunification, the problem was how to do so. The Soviets favored a Four Powers conference to resolve the issue, and the British and French viewed this option somewhat favorably. The Germans preferred a solution in which the two German states would separately work out unification. The administration rejected the Soviet option as incompatible with German self-determination and the FRG's commitment to NATO and feared that the German option would lead to a policy disaster. Instead, the administration settled on another position called "Two-Plus-Four," which combined the other parties' preferred solutions. Under this process, the Germans would agree on the internal aspects of unification, and the Four Powers would be involved in its external arrangements. Although the Germans would decide most of the outlines of unification, the administration hoped the Four-Powers aspect would give the Soviets sufficient involvement to provide domestic cover for Gorbachev against attacks by his political opponents. By the end of January, the Bush administration policy had evolved into favoring fast reunification through the Two-Plus-Four process, with the goal of a united Germany in NATO.[58]

After detailed and arduous negotiations, the Soviets finally accepted the American conditions for German reunification. The Four Powers and Germans expressed their joint support for the Two-Plus-Four negotiation track on February 13. At a summit meeting in Washington with Bush on May 31, Gorbachev agreed that the Germans could decide whether they wanted to join NATO, and on July 14, Gorbachev accepted that a united Germany would become a member of NATO. With this, the final stumbling block to unification had been surmounted.[59] On September 12, 1990, the Four Powers officially surrendered their legal rights to determine Germany's fate and accepted German reunification.

Throughout this process, Bush pursued a quiet, elite-focused approach to the issue. Even though the general public's support for his policy direction allowed him to adopt this stance, it opened him to criticism for lacking vision and acting as a bystander to the unfolding events. While Bush eschewed the role of public persuader to build support for his effort, the German reunification treaty was approved by the Senate, ninety-eight to zero.[60]

Summary

Bush's behavior was consistent with predictions based on his beliefs that he would make his decision based only on national security factors and lead the public only if the support that he took for granted was not forthcoming. He approached each of his choices from the standpoint of American national security interests and focused almost exclusively on the elite's negotiations and the implications of his actions on current and future Soviet behavior. As events created domestic pressure for more dramatic action, Bush still insisted on moving slowly, without excessive emotion, because he thought this approach best served American interests. Even though his policy had broad public support, if he had found public opposition to his policy direction, he probably would have made minor efforts to create public support without changing his policy. While keeping an eye on public support, he directed most of his deliberations to other interests, used diplomacy to achieve his goals, did little to lead the people, but assumed they would support him if he made the correct decisions. Bush's beliefs influenced his behavior at the *causal* level at all stages and for the entire case, and public opinion influenced his decisions as in the *no-impact category.*

Delegate: Clinton and the Intervention in Bosnia, June–December 1995

Clinton favored the public's input and saw its support as necessary. If he anticipates opposition to a policy direction, then he will likely pull back and either avoid the policy if possible or select the alternative that will cause the fewest problems with the public (constrain category). If the public favors a particular policy direction, Clinton is likely to tailor his policy accordingly (follow category).

Fighting over the status of Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia began in 1992 as the Bosnian Serbs, consisting of 31 percent of the prewar Bosnian population, decided to unite with Serbia. The Bosnian Muslims, who made up 44 percent of the population, feared domination by a Serbian majority in the reconstituted nation (minus Croatia and Slovenia, which had declared their independence in 1991) and so sought to establish a united and independent Bosnia that included the Bosnian Serbs. In 1991, the UN imposed an arms embargo on all territories of the former Yugoslavia. Then in April and May 1993, in response to the Bosnian Serbs' military advances, the UN declared the Bosnian cities of Saraje-

vo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bhihac, and Srebrenca to be "safe areas," presumably free from attack.[61] In December 1994, in order to bolster the staying power of American allies—who were supplying UN peacekeeping troops on the ground in Bosnia—Clinton expanded his previous pledge of twenty thousand American troops to implement a peace treaty to include the evacuation of UN peacekeepers if it became necessary. In May 1995 after the failure of another cease-fire and further attacks on UN safe areas, NATO air forces bombed Serbian positions. In response, the Bosnian Serbs took several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage and chained them to potential targets. Although the peacekeepers were eventually released, the action provided the impetus for a rethinking of American policy in the summer of 1995.[62]

Domestic opinion at that time was mixed regarding American involvement in Bosnia. Polling results in June indicated the public would support American troops under certain circumstances. For example, 61 percent supported sending American troops to protect UN peacekeepers, and 78 percent supported rescuing them with American forces. However, public opinion was less supportive of more sustained aggressive action. Whereas 40 percent supported using American troops to take part in NATO efforts to punish Serbian aggression, only 37 percent supported the use of troops to enforce a cease-fire. Although 67 percent of the public supported sending troops if no Americans were killed, the number dropped to 31 percent if the question included that 100 Americans might be killed.[63]

Problem Representation

NATO's inability to respond effectively to the May Serb hostage taking began to move Clinton to search for alternative policy options. One official reported, "He saw that this was having real costs for us." The adviser reported that Clinton complained, "I want for us to be more on top of this thing, more shaping of it. If we were going to be blamed for the failures, it should at least be for concrete decisions that we had taken."[64]

At an Oval Office meeting on June 14, Clinton expressed his frustration with the continuing problem of Bosnia, which now threatened the NATO alliance, given the appearance of weakness after the Bosnian Serbs took the UN peacekeepers hostage: "We need to get the policy straight . . . or we're just going to be kicking the can down the road again. Right now we've got a situation, we've got no clear mission, no one's in control of events." As later events proved, in Clinton's mind,

putting off the decision would eventually cause it to become entangled with the 1996 presidential election. Referring to efforts by Republicans in Congress, led by the future 1996 Republican presidential candidate Senator Robert Dole (R, Kans.), to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, Vice President Albert Gore observed that continued inaction by the United States was "driving us into a brick wall with Congress."[65]

That night Clinton discovered in a conversation with his top advisers that he did not have the flexibility he thought he did. In a discussion with Secretary of State Warren Christopher, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, Clinton learned that his previous commitments had locked him into sending troops to Bosnia. Beforehand, Clinton thought he still could refuse to carry out a previously agreed-to (in December 1994) NATO plan to insert twenty thousand Americans to cover the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia. However, his advisers informed him otherwise. After Clinton raised the subject, Holbrooke told him, "I'm afraid that we may not have as much flexibility and options left." Clinton responded, "What do you mean? . . . I'll decide that [whether to use American troops to cover the UN withdrawal] when the time comes." Holbrooke replied, "It's been decided." When Clinton turned to Christopher to confirm Holbrooke's assertion, Christopher indicated, "That's right. . . . This is serious stuff." Clinton knew the insertion of American forces to protect the removal of the UN peacekeepers would likely be done under hostile conditions and would surely mean casualties. But reversing his commitment could cause NATO's dissolution.[66] And if Clinton did nothing, he risked his worst-case scenario: the involvement of American troops in combat as the 1996 presidential election campaign began.

Option Generation

Given the steep costs of inaction, Clinton decided in June that he needed to act to avoid the potential foreign policy debacle. Whereas he had previously allowed the Europeans to lead on the Bosnia policy, he concluded that only firm U.S. action could regain control of the situation. Several factors led him to realize that he needed to shift American policy. As the war dragged on, he began to worry that Western ineffectiveness in dealing with the issue was beginning to reflect poorly on his administration, and he watched the events of the spring and early summer with an increasing sense of foreboding. According to an official,

"We were moving from debacle to disaster in the fall or winter. . . . Desperation has a way of concentrating the mind." With the election campaign to start early the next year, Clinton knew he had to act. As a senior official put it, "The president wanted this dealt with. It was not acceptable to go into another winter as a hostage to fortune."[67]

In addition, the new French president, Jacques Chirac, was pressuring Clinton to deal more strongly with the Serbs. Thus even though the administration believed that Chirac's policy recommendations were unwise, it did provide an additional reason to act. Clinton knew what he needed to avoid [a UN pullout, humanitarian atrocities, an endless war, and congressional action to lift the arms embargo], he did not know what he should do. A senior official recalled, "We sat and watched [the situation in Bosnia] drift slowly away and the debacle of the hostage-taking . . . and Clinton got this sort of 'never-again' attitude and said to his guys, 'I need some options. I need a better way.'"[68]

One option Clinton clearly rejected because of public opinion was a permanent commitment of American troops to Bosnia. Because of public opposition to American involvement in any fighting in Bosnia, he decided that U.S. troops could play only a limited role in any potential deployment. Accordingly, the administration continued to favor the use of air strikes to respond to Serbian attacks rather than to resort to threats of ground forces.[69]

In response to Clinton's request, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake developed an approach he called the "Endgame Strategy." Lake cautioned Clinton about the risks of both failure (damage to their reputation) and success (committing American troops to enforce either the peace or a UN pullout). Clinton worried about the risks associated with a Balkan troop deployment, likened it to the beginning of Vietnam, and wondered whether the public or Congress would support such a risk. Despite the risks, he viewed the status quo as unacceptable and approved examining Lake's approach. After working on the project, Lake proposed to Clinton that he act as a messenger and communicate to the American allies that the president had reached a final decision on the United States' Bosnia policy and was prepared to implement it unilaterally. The policy promised carrots and sticks to both sides in the conflict. Lake proposed extensively bombing the Bosnian Serbs if they did not negotiate, but lifting Western economic sanctions against Serbia if it recognized Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia. In addition, the United States would lift the arms embargo against the Muslims if they cooperated but would withdraw from the region if they did not negotiate.[70]

The situation worsened on July 12 when Srebrenca, a safe haven, fell to the Serbs. Since NATO and the United States had promised to protect the safe havens, the Serb action seriously threatened American and NATO credibility.[71] When the Serbs killed thousands of Muslims and forced many more to flee, a senior official remarked, "We were failing, the West was failing and the Bosnian Serbs were on the march." Clinton saw the shortcomings of the Western policy and surmised the feeble response was harming American prestige. He became increasingly frustrated by his lack of options and the worsening situation.[72]

On July 14, while putting on the White House green, Clinton became even more agitated as he foresaw in the near future the likely withdrawal of UN forces and the attendant commitment of American troops. "The status quo is not acceptable. We've got to really dig in and think about this."[73] Perhaps in reference to the mounting congressional pressure for action, he insisted, "We have to seize control of this," and exclaimed, "I'm getting creamed!"[74] Some of his domestic advisers recommended a clean break from Bosnia and a UN pullout, but his foreign policy advisers pointed out that the extraction of the UN peacekeepers under fire was much more dangerous than enforcing a peace plan.[75] Though neither alternative was attractive, Clinton feared the UN extraction plan more because of its electoral implications. If he waited, he knew he would be forced to use troops to extract the peacekeepers, either on the eve of or during the 1996 election. The necessity of avoiding this potentially costly action thus spurred him to seek a diplomatic solution.[76]

Policy Selection

In addition to Clinton's concern about future problems, the immediate threat from the Serbs weighed on his mind. On July 17, he complained,

> I don't like where we are now. . . . This policy is doing enormous damage to the United States and to our standing in the world. We look weak. . . . And it can only get worse down the road. The only time we've ever made any progress is when we geared up NATO to pose a real threat to the Serbs. . . . Our position is unsustainable, it's killing the U.S. position of strength in the world.

On July 18 in a meeting in the Oval Office, Vice President Al Gore raised the issue of public opinion. In reference to Srebrenca, he referred to a front-page picture in the *Washington Post* of a woman refugee who had hanged herself. Gore stated, "My 21-year-old daughter asked about

that picture. . . . What am I supposed to tell her? Why is this happening and we're not doing anything? . . . My daughter is surprised the world is allowing this to happen . . . I am too." Gore alluded to the future judgment of public opinion: "The cost of this is going to cascade over several decades. It goes to what kind of people we are. Acquiescence is the worst alternative." Clinton responded, "I've been thinking along similar lines. . . . So we all agree the status quo is untenable."[77]

On July 26, the day after the safe area of Zepa fell, the Senate passed Senator Bob Dole's resolution, which unilaterally lifted the arms embargo. On August 1, the House approved the Senate resolution lifting the arms embargo by a veto-proof margin. If the administration were not able to implement some solution to head off the embargo removal, Clinton now faced the worst-case scenario of the collapse of the UN peacekeeping mission and its extraction under fire by American troops. Although he could veto the congressional legislation, he guessed that Congress might override it. Given this situation, he instructed Lake to move ahead briskly in his execution of the Endgame Strategy. Lake warned that they were "rolling the dice." Clinton answered, "I'm risking my presidency."[78]

But Clinton knew that the domestic risks of doing nothing were greater. Relying on polling conducted by his political consultant Dick Morris, Clinton believed that the public would support military action if it were directed at halting the killing of women and children and stopping the genocide. Nonetheless, even though the public would support peacekeeping, it remained steadfastly opposed to military involvement in any combat in Bosnia.[79] In addition to forcing the United States to intervene under fire, doing nothing implied that not only would Clinton lose control of the policy to the Republican Congress but that he also would hand his opponents an issue that they could use to attack him in the next year's presidential election. Admitting that congressional pressure influenced Clinton's desire to move quickly on the issue, administration officials still denied that the change in policy was designed to remove the issue from the 1996 election. But this position is belied by statements such as that by political consultant Dick Morris (who had the president's ear and was advising the president on foreign policy), who warned other officials, "You guys ought to take care of Bosnia before 1996 so it does not screw us up."[80]

In late summer, the Croatians launched a successful attack on the Bosnian Serbs that, by highlighting the Serbs' vulnerability and completing the almost total ethnic segregation of Bosnia and Croatia, pro-

vided a window of opportunity for an American policy initiative.[81] In this increasingly fluid situation, Clinton met on August 7 with his top advisers to discuss policy and approved the Endgame Strategy. Reflecting a desire to resolve the issue before the 1996 campaign, he emphasized, "We should bust our ass to get a settlement in the next few months. . . . We've got to exhaust every alternative, roll every die, take risks."[82]

In addition to the congressional resolutions and Croatian successes, the negative consequences of inaction on the 1996 election were increasingly coloring his decisions. The administration saw the Bosnia issue as a "political time bomb" that would go off during the 1996 election and become the primary determinant of the public's assessment of Clinton's foreign policy record. After concluding that he would be forced into deploying troops in Bosnia in the next year, regardless of his actions, and fearing that the UN mission would survive the winter only to ask to be relieved in the spring, in the middle of the 1996 campaign, Clinton chose to act on his own terms. As a senior official put it, "I don't think the President relishes going into the 1996 election hostage to fortune in the Balkans, with the Bosnian Serbs able to bring us deeper into a war."[83]

Implementation

On his trip to Europe, Lake persuaded the Europeans to support the new American policy, and negotiators were dispatched to the Balkans. On August 28, in a direct challenge to the negotiation efforts, the Bosnian Serbs launched a mortar shell attack on Sarajevo, killing thirty-seven civilians. With American and NATO credibility on the line, NATO then launched a massive air campaign—3,400 sorties—against the Bosnian Serbs that lasted until mid-September. On September 8, American negotiators used the leverage of the air attacks to get the Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian foreign ministers to agree to several principles as the basis of negotiations. Negotiators achieved a cease-fire on October 5, and talks on a final settlement began on November 1, with a final agreement initialed on November 21.[84]

As the negotiations continued, the administration increasingly focused on winning the home front's approval of the peacekeeping troop deployment. Although Clinton found that the public disapproved of the planned troop deployment by 38 to 55 percent, he thought he had to follow through on his commitment and tried to convince the public of the appropriateness of his approach. Based on his White House

polls, he decided that if he framed the issue in terms of peacekeeping, as opposed to combat, he could build public support.[85] Much of Clinton's effort to create support for his policy was thus aimed at framing the issue in these terms. Clinton realized he would have to explain his policy to the public, expected his arguments to be convincing, and used his polling as the basis to achieve public support. He told reporters, "If we can get a peace agreement, I'll go before the American people and explain it and make my argument and go before Congress and explain it and make my argument." He believed that if the public understood the limited risk and duration of the mission, he would gain "sufficient support" for the peace plan.[86]

Throughout the plan's implementation, Clinton kept the 1996 election in mind. In organizing the deployment, administration officials planned on a six- to eight-month mission, which would mean the troops would begin returning in the summer of 1996 and thus allow Clinton to talk about troop departures during the election. Since this was, in the words of a senior official, "abundantly preferable" to moving slowly on negotiations, the administration pressed for a quick end to them so as to complete the deployment as soon as possible. Although officials publicly denied that the upcoming election had any influence, an official did note privately that they "are certainly aware of the election, and I don't think it has escaped the president's attention."[87]

Following the initialing of the peace agreement, Clinton began an intense drive to gain public and congressional support for his policy and emphasized the necessity of American troops to provide peace and prevent further killing. Speaking on November 22, he announced, "The parties have chosen peace. America must choose peace as well" and stressed the need for American action because of the "senseless slaughter of so many innocent people that our fellow citizens had to watch night after night for four long years on their television screens."[88] In an address to the nation from the Oval Office on November 27, Clinton again returned to these themes, emphasizing the narrow objectives, clear exit strategy, and necessity of the mission for peace.[89] Although Congress remained divided, the deployment took place as planned.

After he took action, Clinton was amazed at the public support. Whereas 60 percent of the public had opposed the deployment of troops beforehand, its approval of his foreign policy climbed after he acted. Although Clinton thought this resulted from the lack of casualties, he also attributed it to the public's agreement with his policy. He surmised that the public responded favorably to his strong action, and

he compared the public's support of sending troops to that of parents sending their children to a dentist. Even though the children might not want to go, they knew it was the right thing.[90]

Summary

Clinton's actions were consistent with his orientation toward public opinion, of doing what the public would want him to do if it had all the information. Throughout this case, Clinton's anticipation of the public's reaction in the next election affected his choices. At times, he adhered to public opinion, such as after the fall of Srebrenca, when he felt the public pressure to "do something." At the same time, he saw the constraints imposed by public opinion, especially on involvement in the ground war and on the conditions under which the public would approve of using troops. The Bosnia issue rose in importance in the summer largely because of Clinton's fear that he would have to send in American troops to cover a UN withdrawal during the presidential election. In addition to the domestic considerations, he also perceived a threat to NATO's and the United States' credibility and Europe's increasing reluctance to keep its forces in Bosnia. Given the choice between using troops to evacuate the UN force or using them in a peacekeeping role, he turned toward the peacekeeping mission. Fully recognizing that his solution might endanger his presidency, he saw the consequences of inaction as guaranteeing his failure. With this knowledge in mind, he opted for the risky option that might succeed in eliminating the issue from the 1996 campaign. When implementing the policy, Clinton used the information he had gathered from polling reports to frame his campaign to generate public support. Even though he perceived public opposition to his action, he thought he was acting as the public "really" wanted him to, given the situation, and he attempted to communicate this to the public.

Clinton's beliefs had a *causal* influence on his behavior here. The influence of public opinion on his policy in this case is coded as a *strong constrain category* influence, with lesser *follow* (strong) and *lead category* influences. He followed public opinion on the need to act in the summer of 1995, was constrained by the public as he developed his policy options, and led public opinion when implementing his policy to show the people how his actions conformed to their preferences.

This chapter's findings show solid support for the beliefs model of public opinion's influence (see table 9.1). The presidents reacted in a range

TABLE 9.1 **Deliberative Cases and Recent Presidents**

	Predicted Public Influence Based on Beliefs	Actual Public Influence	Influence of Beliefs
Carter: Executor, Panama Canal	Lead *or* Constrain	Lead	Supportive
Reagan: Guardian, SDI	Lead	Lead	Supportive
Bush: Pragmatist, German Reunification	No impact/ *Lead*	No impact	Causal
Clinton: Delegate, Bosnia	Constrain/ Follow	Constrain (strong)/ with lesser Follow (strong) and Lead	Causal

Note: Italics indicate conditional predictions.

of ways to public opinion, from largely ignoring it, as Reagan did, to being severely limited by it, as Clinton was. The realist perspective finds some support in these cases, especially in the manner in which Carter, Reagan, and Bush reacted. It does less well in accounting for Clinton's behavior. The Wilsonian liberal model does not accurately predict the choices of any of the decision makers, except for a small part of Clinton's approach to the Bosnian situation, which was driven in part by public opinion.

These cases best support the beliefs model, since it accounts not only for the influence of public opinion but also for the place of public opinion in the decision process. For example, even though Carter implemented a leadership program, he focused more on elites than the public in an effort to generate support for his favored policy alternative. Reagan largely ignored public opinion in his rush to shift American strategic policy. Bush dismissed public pressure for faster action on Gorbachev's initiatives and assumed that the public would support his measured approach to German reunification. Clinton responded strongly to how he thought the public would react in the next election. Each of these presidents reacted to the public in the manner expected, given their public opinion beliefs.

These decision makers also approached leading public opinion in accordance with their beliefs. Clinton (delegate) thought about and attempted to show the public how his policies conformed to public

preferences as they were represented in his polling information. Carter (executor) tried to lead public opinion only when he needed to reduce public opposition in order to win undecided Senate votes. As a result, he directed his leadership efforts at influencing elite opinion, in the hopes that it would change votes. Bush (pragmatist) found the public largely in support of his policy direction and chose not to extensively lead it. Reagan (guardian) turned to leading the public once he had decided on his policy direction and focused on outlining how the policy served the national interest. As with the crisis cases, although each of these presidents considered leading the public and did so (with the exception of Bush), they varied in how they conceived of and pursued this task according to their public opinion beliefs.

Public opinion tended to enter the decision process mostly through anticipated reactions. Each president expected that his policies would be approved by the public, even though they all reacted differently to these anticipated reactions. As with the crisis case, polling information was used as a basis to project future public stances and to frame policies rather than as a basis for a particular decision at a particular time. This response to public opinion supports the trend in the influence of public opinion found in many of the cases examined across several presidents.