

## **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN ALBANIA**

### **1.1 Assessment of the Armed Forces in the Framework of the Albanian Security Sector**

#### **1.1.1 Introduction**

Steady progress has been made over the past decade in reforming the Albanian Armed Forces and reorienting them towards NATO operational concepts. However, the most essential restructuring of the AAF still lies ahead. Faced with no immediate military threats, AAF can complete their internal transformation even with a constrained budget over the next ten years, and still meet Albania's National Security Strategy requirements. However, to meet those requirements successfully, no new equipment acquisitions can be made before the completion of the reform process.

Albania does not yet have the requisite planning and programming systems ready to define its minimum mission essential force requirements and operational capabilities. This is an imperative. Accurate decisions were made during the summer 2002 regarding the size and composition of Albania's active force needs in the near to mid future. Due to the reassessment of security threats and affordable resources, the Albanian Assembly downsized the current authorised active strength of its Armed Forces from 31,000 to an objective force of 16,500 in 2010. This conclusion was based on a mission analysis, the state of the AAF and fiscal realities, to purposely meet NATO criteria for membership.

Meanwhile, on 25 July 2002 the national *military strategy* was approved, which defines how Albania's military leaders will implement the MOD defence policy and fulfil its military missions. As a result, the gap in the

conceptual basis for planning system and the determination of force requirements has been filled.

Also, much progress has been made from 2001–02 with the assistance of the US team, called SAIC, though Albania is still missing the *multi-year planning, programming and budgeting process* to link defence priorities to resources over time. Without such a system the MOD will be unable to apply resources consistently to Albania's highest priorities. The MOD cannot track capabilities with investment and measure progress towards established objectives.

This aspect reflects a need to focus the efforts of expert formation programmes in the future, preparing proper teachers and specialists working in these spheres, as well as the parliamentarians, journalists and NGOs, concerning transparency, accountability and parliamentary oversight of defence spending.

Finally, and no less crucial to reform and restructuring, is the development and employment of a comprehensive personnel management system to assess, train and retain a quality force, including timely retirement for all grade levels. The AAF face an immediate and multidimensional personnel crisis that is not adequately addressed in current reform plans; however, efforts have been made to address it more satisfactorily in the new ten-year defence transformation plans.

Until these tools are in place and effective, reform will be stymied and the AAF will remain a force with only minimum capabilities to support Albania's NSS. Moreover, unless objectives are requirement-based and fiscally sound, it will be difficult to justify the defence budgets necessary to meet reform targets and later secure investment by modernisation of force.

### **1.1.2 Defence Policy and Planning**

Albania published a sound National Security Strategy and a supporting Defence Policy in early March 2000 and a Military Strategy in July 2002. These documents, and the new Inter-Ministerial Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration (ICI) that guide Albania towards its goal of integration with NATO and the EU, anchored Albania's defence policy and planning on a solid foundation. Even though the Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania had just recently been approved, it gave a new impetus towards implementing the country's defence policy and planning, to map out how the military implements national policy, and to provide guidance to subordinate commands within AAF. At the policy level, a formal inter-agency review process for all national security matters would infuse valuable perspectives and help create broad and crucial support for Albania's national security strategy and its attendant investments. For this purpose, two Military Conventions were conducted in Albania. The first one was founded last year, led by the strong determination of the Minister of Defence, Pandeli Majko, in seeking public and inter-governable support in Albania for AAF.

In addition, Albania is to be commended for establishing the ICI, a bold initiative that immerses all relevant ministries in interagency communications, cooperation and policy formulation. The Committee performs an important function in coordinating policies towards NATO and NATO member states with participation by all relevant ministries. Furthermore, the ICI represents an important committee for reviewing defence policies and planning within the context of overall national priorities. The ICI may be the beginning of a healthy interagency process that could broaden to consider all aspects of national security. Close cooperation among all ministries will be essential as Albania faces a host of challenging decisions regarding the future of Albanian Armed Forces.

However, this institutional body needs to be staffed with full time experts and a bureaucratic body which is currently missing. There is also a need to qualify participants.

As the MOD and GS develop a defence resource planning process and the implementation of military strategy, the same emphasis on interagency consensus should be invoked, as was evident during the construction of the NSS. Developing these key documents through an interagency process will accomplish the four important goals stated below.

- It will ensure a broad national consensus on defence; both among leaders and voters, and it will ease the approval process (as well as the approval of individual programmes necessary to implement the strategy).
- It will ensure that all government ministries and agencies be included, that their interests and programmes have been considered, and that all subsequent national security-related programmes would be part of a comprehensive and coherent whole.
- It will create a broad-based approach for establishing the basis for national defence, one that will provide stability for national security planning and allow resource planners to achieve predictability for their programme requirements.
- It will develop national security strategy documents and a legal framework regarding security system reform based on the inclusion of all affected parties and agencies. In return, this will aid to convince foreign leaders that regardless of change in political leadership, Albania is committed to the strategy. Consequently, Albania will more likely be viewed as a viable candidate among Western security and economic institutions.

Albania, eager to achieve its national priority to join NATO around 2005, considers the understanding and proper implementation of military strategy and the defence resource planning process as a critical step. This will facilitate the matching process and provide the necessary means to preserve the proper balance. Without being able to understand and manage all of these changes, including a comprehensive personnel planning process, these documents will remain as merely written but not underpinning the NSS proposed reorganisation plans of objective Force in 2010. Consequently, Albania's national security requirements will not be successfully met.

Hopefully, DCAF will initiate the outlining of the appropriate concepts needed to conduct courses to effect the above mentioned objectives of the Albanian Security Sector, especially its Armed Forces.

(a) *Defence Policy Guidance*

The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the year 2000 is the strategic framework for executing the MOD's responsibilities at the leading ministry for the military defence of Albania. The NSS is well crafted and contains changes for Albania's strategic environment. It further provides adequate planning guidance for the next five years or longer. The NSS addresses all essential aspects of national security and provides a clear picture of Albania's perspectives on its environment, threats, risks and enduring national interests. Internal national security concerns are a major theme of the NSS, and one that will impact on the priorities of Albania's military forces. This concept will present a unique national priority for Albania's security situation for some years to come, and will have a significant influence on doctrine, training and readiness posture, although it should not impact on the actual force design.

Therefore, I strongly suggest the qualification of military and civilian security sector specialists be targeted on the fields of nation state and social development such as conflict and cooperation, security analysis, power and regime theory, as well as conflict resolution and transformation in the complex emergency situations.

The Albanian MOD has produced three authoritative documents that define the link between national securities, partially detailed defence requirements, and military strategy. The 2000 Defence Policy and 2002 Military Strategy define Albania's Defence Concept as Forward Defence as well as the concept of Rapid Reaction Force. They call for 'a standing presence of forward forces' especially in the central part of Albania, close to the national road net system. This is considered a non-threatened region, far from any bordering country, allowing for improvement of CBM, neighbourhood policy and cooperation. The Concept specifies a three-month mobilisation criterion for full defence against external threats, coupled with constant intelligence assessments. It also estimates that Albania will not stand alone in self-defence in case of the attack of potential aggressors. Most importantly, the Defence Policy enumerates missions and commands relationships for land, air, naval and Special Forces operations. The Defence Policy and Military Strategy are the most pivotal policy guidance documents for the AAF as it restructures, develops military doctrine, and formulates plans on how military forces will accomplish their missions. The third authoritative document for the AAF is Albania's NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), starting at the beginning of 2000. The MAP identifies near to mid-term objectives of the AAF in terms of both multilateral defence programmes and internal reforms. It also delineates the future force structure of the AAF in more detail than the Defence Policy. The MAP goals are ambitious and not likely to be achieved in their total number within the time specified. However, the MAP goals are appropriate and lay out a plan that should be achievable over time. They also have the merit of outlining in greater detail than one sees anywhere else a surrogate multi-year Defence Policy guidance. However, our MAP needs to be compared with the experience of other aspirant countries, because it lacks the comprehension and synchronisation efforts with other governmental departments, agencies and NGOs.

While the aforementioned plan has been approved by the Minister of Defence the Prime Minister has done no more than just appreciate it. This in turn leads to a lack of institutional responsibility and interagency cooperation, and in the meantime, a paucity of sufficiently assigned resources. This is another field requiring expertise and exchange.

Just like the NSS, both the Defence Policy and the MAP identify the priority of the AAF as maintaining ‘constitutional order’. In this regard, documents accurately reflect the NSS emphasis on addressing internal security.

Our conclusion is that *education, training and planning* for internal response missions will be more important for the AAF in the near future than is customary in other militaries, an unsurprising result of the upheaval in 1997. While this mission should diminish as Albania’s internal situation improves, it must be fully addressed in near-future policy, planning and programming decisions.

(b) *The Defence Planning System*

The MOD’s current annual planning and budgeting methods will not be successful in optimising scarce resources against the myriad of requirements that span the proposed ten-year defence reform project. A more deliberate and analytical system – one based on a multi-year timeline – is essential to achieve a genuine defence reform. All of the defence guidance and strategic planning documents Albania has published in recent years address multi-year planning on a broad, conceptual level. However, the actual planning and follow-up steps of programming and budgeting have yet to be put in place on a multi-year basis. Supporting plans will need to provide much more detail before defence reforms can be executed. Recently, the Albanian government published a medium term planning budget for the years 2002–04; however, this is insufficient for long-term planning of AAF.

Without an accepted well-understood multi-year planning process at all levels, reforms will be ineffective. Therefore, the expert formation initiative needs to be focused nation wide according to the framework of the EU.

(c) *Democratic Control of Armed Forces*

The democratic control of the military is considered an important prerequisite to carry out national security objectives. Democratically elected or appointed authorities are given the lawful responsibility to oversee defence policies and their implementation. Our institutions agreed that there exists not only one form, structure or strategy to implement democratic control of armed forces; but there are certain criteria to follow. Some of these criteria include: the establishment of a democratic constitutional framework, strict control of the armed forces by a legitimate elected government through the office of a civilian ministry of defence, a justified and transparent budgetary process, and a cadre of trained/informed civilian experts to address these issues in Parliament and the media. All the above contribute to the establishment of a national defence system where the military is institutionally subordinate to civilian control, and where political restraint/regulation is exerted from the governmental, presidential and parliamentary levels.

Therefore, one to two courses called 'Defence College' have been conducted in the Albanian Defence Academy every year, comprised of civilians, military experts, some MP and journalists. Programme details/instructions and syllabi are formulated in accordance with the German Hamburg Academy. The curricula of these courses, as well as the Officer General and lower level courses, emphasise several organisational principles of effective democratic oversight and management of the military:

- A clear division of authority between the President and the government contained in the Constitution and/or public laws. The laws should include a clear chain of command for the military in times of peace, crisis, or war, as well as specifics on control over the military (who promotes military officers in peacetime and who has the authority to mobilise the reserves).
- Legislative oversight of the military, control of the defence budget, as well as the role of legislature in deploying armed forces in peace, crisis and war. The inclusion of all minority and opposition parties in appropriate committees and the free and



routine flow of national defence related information are key issues to the legislative oversight of the military.

- Interagency coordination among the agencies mandated by the Constitution as responsible for national security (e.g. the President, legislature, prime minister, ministers of defence, foreign affairs and finance etc.). This coordination should be both formally – through a National Security Council – and informally conducted on a routine and systematic basis.
- A civilian defence minister, appointed by the elected head of government and accountable not only to the government but also to the legislature. The minister of defence, just like other governmental ministers, may be subject to the advice and consent of the legislature, depending on the specifics of the nation's constitutional process. In any case, the minister of defence should be obliged to appear before the legislature and to testify on defence-related matters.
- Peacetime oversight of the General Staff and military commanders by civilian defence ministers and staff. Education and experience are critical regarding the successful implementation of civilian oversight, ensuring that selected civilians are qualified to execute their roles and responsibilities. Because ex-military officers play an important role in the civilian defence bureaucracy, civilian leadership should be based on civilian personnel.
- Development of qualified civilian defence experts in the Government, the legislature and in public institutions (e.g. universities, think tanks, political parties etc.), as well as training military officers on the principles of civilian control. Senior military service academies offer excellent opportunities for future training and learning for civilian and military leaders together.
- Ensuring military prestige, trustworthiness, and accountability through an active outreach programme to the nation's citizenry. Such a programme must receive strong backup from political

leaders and should include local, as well as nation-wide initiatives.

- Clarification of the role of the judiciary in the military justice system. Among the roles to be considered for the judiciary are appeals and review of military court decisions, incorporation of applicable international agreements and norms (e.g. laws of land warfare), and adjudication of constitutional issues concerning national security laws and policies.

However, there are only two or three teachers that/who (are qualified to) teach on these subjects. In addition, as of now, there are no NGO's devoted to research in this domain.. There is thus a need to educate and qualify experts in short-term courses relating to DEMCON of AF as well as CMR. If these fields are seriously considered, there are some six to seven military officers qualified in USA, UK, Germany, who could join the team of CMR, SSR or DEMCON after attending some short seminar courses.

Since 1998, Albania has done an excellent job of creating a firm legal foundation for civilian control of the military. Albania's 1998 Constitution lays out clear criteria for the civilian and democratic control of Armed Forces. These criteria have been put in place and are reflected in later documents – the NSS and the Defence Policy – as well as in the restructuring of the MOD and General Staff. Nonetheless, the Constitution and Defence Policy provides for the President, as commander-in-chief, to bypass the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence when exercising control of armed forces during wartime. In addition to creating command and control problems (discussed in the paragraphs below) this provision dilutes civilian oversight of the military at the moment when it becomes most crucial.

The relationship between MOD Staff and General Staff needs to be better balanced than it is now. Suspicion and lack of cooperation exacerbate natural organisational tensions between the two Staffs. Their structures are not organically integrated, neither horizontally nor vertically. There is only one possible point of contact between the Minister of Defence, an elected civilian, and the Armed Forces, which

only consists of the Chief of General Staff. Military officers perceive a lack of experience among civilian defence experts and seek to broaden their roles and responsibilities into what are traditional civilian policy areas. Civilian defence specialists react with suspicion to military advice and attempt to extend civilian control into operational military arenas.

The presence of a mature defence bureaucracy would help alleviate many difficulties as ministerial officials attempt to grasp the intricacies of Defence Policy making, planning and force development. Trained and experienced defence specialists, supported by military professionals experienced in working with civilians, would provide the institutional knowledge and continuity to ensure smooth transitions during changes in senior leadership. Equally significant for civilian oversight is the expansion of the nascent interagency process of the ICI to all defence policy-making and planning to include coordination of the national military strategy.

In the formative stages of creating effective civilian control, civilians in the MOD, other national security agencies, and the Albanian National Assembly would benefit from international educational opportunities to help them become more knowledgeable in defence-related matters. Educating military personnel on teaming up with civilians towards common goals is no less important for the AAF. Achieving this objective will take time, and the process will be enhanced through a combination of published roles and responsibilities documents and focused education courses. To accelerate and consolidate this process, our Defence Academy plans to start a new 18-month-long course, called 'Master of Defence Administration'. This course intends to target both civilians and military experts in managing the defence matters in MOD system and other state civilian agencies, media and NGOs. However, it needs to be underlined that Albania still lacks numerous NGOs dealing with security sector reform and MCR.

(d) *Command and Control*

The Defence Policy and Law of Commanding Strategic Authorities describe a civilian chain of command over the military during wartime that is different from the chain of command practised during peacetime. During war, the President as Commander-in-Chief, exercises command through the Commander of the Armed Forces, whereas in peacetime, the President exercises control through the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. This constellation contains the potential for a disaster and at best will create certain confusion in times of crisis. It is an imperative of command and control over any military structure that the chain of command remains consistent, irrespective of the national security situation of the nation – peace, crisis or war. Albania's civilian chain of command for the AAF does not adhere to this norm. Until now, a law has not been established concerning wartime in regard to the separation of powers, the roles and the chain of command of the Military Commander in Chief in wartime and the Minister of Defence, the Prime Minister and the President. It looks as if the functions and authority of Minister of Defence in wartime is avoided or skipped. At this point, a legal gap still exists which requires proper expertise to be filled. Regarding this issue, some difficulties have emerged in arranging the command and control concepts in the joint doctrinal level, which will bring Albania's decision-making process and tactical procedures close to NATO standards. As a consequence, the professional military education will develop along the same lines.

The reorganisation of the MOD and General Staff realigns the diverse staff according to NATO principles and therefore provides sound staff structures at the level of Albania's defence organisation. Key shortcomings of the AAF's structure are being addressed by organising the AAF into five command units, including Army, Air Force and Navy Commands. An emphasis is placed on training and logistics by creating the Joint Logistics and Training/Doctrine Command. This underscores the AAF's intent to concentrate on these essential though critically deficient areas.

However, the MOD and AAF will have to check closely on the total required organisations and layers of command to establish a military

structure of modest size. For example, it might be advisable to consolidate all service components directly under the General Staff, similar to the concept of other nations (e.g. the Canadian model). The AAF should also consider whether the critical need to focus on training and logistics could be achieved without creating two wholly separate commands.

Further reform of the AAF's command arrangements for special units may be warranted as well. The subordination of several operational units directly to the Chief of the General Staff is inconsistent with the General Staff's primary responsibility to provide strategic planning, direction and management to the AAF. The special operation units are subordinate to the General Staff. Those exclusive land force units would receive better training, administration, planning and resource advocacy if they were under the army command. The Chief of the General Staff could still retain tasking authority. Principally, the General Staff is not the best place for effective operational control.

However, the AAF optimise their command structure. The current yet antiquated insecure voice communications system is unreliable and incapable of providing effective support without extensive redesign and modernisation. This is a matter of high priority.

Therefore, it is suggested C4ISSR programmes be conducted, to teach experts how to protect and manage the information, as well as how to conduct the whole spectrum of information operations.

(e) *Education for the Security and Defence Institutions*

The importance of education has been raised to top priority level, not only in current defence transformation plans, but also with regard to security and defence institutions throughout the country. The strategy aims to provide those institutions with well-educated people who are trained to understand and adapt to processes, changes and challenges of the new security environment. Education, training and self-education are crucial factors concerning the evaluation of personnel qualification and should help to create a basis for further improvement. The ability to

apply and transfer acquired knowledge should also be evaluated, because it benefits the environment and the entire national security system.

Skills and knowledge must be recognised by principles, head of departments, or the commanders and be adequately praised. One of the key elements of permanent success and continuous upgrading of the management structures is the ability to assess the skills and knowledge of their inferiors and find the best way of implementation.

The national security education system, which is developed in our newly created Defence University, comprises three military service faculties – Land Forces, Navy and Air Force – one Defence Academy, one NCO Academy, one Internal Order Police Academy, as well as one State Intelligence Service Academy. They aim to provide highly skilled staff who will contribute maximum effort to the system as long as represented by them. The system provides education and training of its staff to maintain efficient functioning, self-initiative and exchange of knowledge and ideas. Another task of the system lies in providing a chance to all those leaving the environment for employment in civil organisations where their experience, knowledge and skills will be fully recognised.

Apart from civil education, the system provides training at regular intervals for its employees. The areas include: workshops, training courses, upgrading seminars and others. This improves knowledge and skills necessary to accomplish work and tasks within the national security system. The institutions of the Republic of Albania should be fully aware that high-quality personnel are a key element for the successful performance of tasks. Supervisors and other officials of the national security system should be given the necessary instruments to accomplish this goal.

Defence Studies are not yet organised within the structure of Tirana University, a civilian higher education institution in Albania. The goal has been set up for this University to start courses in managing defence in democratic societies, to provide education in the field of defence for citizens who should be able to use that knowledge, and to participate in various defence system activities. For instance, experts needed by the active forces of the AAF; civil servants who will be employed by the

Ministry of Defence; Joint Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania or Defence Departments; civil experts for production and maintenance of arms and military equipment; experts who will work in R&D institutes that deal with defence or in defence oriented industry; journalists and defence correspondents; advisors in state administration bodies; government institutions etc.

Therefore, National Security Studies should be added as part of the structure of civilian university education. An interfaculty multidisciplinary postgraduate course should be set up and provide the possibility to obtain scientific degrees in the field of National Security, in accordance with regulations applicable to higher education and scientific research as mentioned above.

Additionally, postgraduate institutions should organise short courses lasting several weeks and one specific academic year that deal with issues covered by strategy and security studies. Short courses will be available to all interested staff members of civil institutions and their primary goal will be to educate members of the political elite and management structures. One-year courses will be mandatory for promising brigadiers and generals, before they reach eligibility to be appointed for a major general position.

An inter-university multidisciplinary national security study should be established, including civilian universities, to provide education and training for highest-ranking positions in the management and commanding structure. Recent efforts focus on the enhancement of compatibility concerning the structure and quality of military education institutions with other Albanian university studies. The approach also deals with the standardisation of the transfer credits based on the European system. Currently, the process only includes bachelor degree level, whereas later the master's degree will be added. As a result, 18 months of education in national security should be mandatory for highest military and civil functions in the national security system. This course is planned to be carried out at the Defence Academy, mainly MBA focused in public and security business administration in the democratic systems.

The study should be organised to create later possibilities for acquiring scientific degrees at PhD level. Additionally, courses and seminars lasting from 10–15 days to three months should be organised within the study programmes. Political officials should be encouraged to attend short-term courses and acquire knowledge to maintain their political and other functions within the national security system. This approach requires an open door policy by our Defence Academy towards a wide range of students within civil society, to turn itself into a backbone education institution for the whole Albanian bureaucracy and NGOs for security matters. This is the declared intention in reorganising our Defence Academy. Courses should be as open as possible to public workers, journalists, politicians, military commentators and others. Through organised and systematic training they will be able to develop skills for efficient monitoring and understanding of security issues crucial for the entire society.

### **1.1.3 Quality of Personnel as the Force Multiplier**

Quality personnel are one of the most important elements that differentiate among various armed forces; a point that was emphasised in the last report by NATO at the Prague Summit. Regardless of their organisational and technological refinement, systems that rely on human resources – particularly the security and defence structures – cannot avoid difficulties in their everyday activities. High-quality professional education and training of the members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania are the main preconditions for its functioning as a coherent and cohesive system. Both during regular daily activities and throughout times of change, well-educated and trained staff will have a better understanding of social and political changes occurring in the world. They will find it easier to keep up with technological advancements and will not impede or deter to the evolution and progress of Armed Forces and the national security system. The adoption of appropriate standards in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania makes every member of the Armed Forces a possible “force multiplier” benefitting the entire system.



The quality of military and civil personnel is one of the key elements in attempts to reach the level of readiness the AAF need to carry out their tasks and respond to possible threats. Over the past ten years, personnel presented the key factor of the country's defence mechanism since the equipment was mainly obsolete. The ongoing development of the military's capabilities and the comprehensive development of the Armed Forces causes personnel to be an essential factor that must secure the necessary level of readiness of the Armed Forces for operations under the circumstances of estimated threats from the security environment.

Moreover, with technical modernisation after 2006, restructuring and education, the AAF personnel will gain an even more important role in performing their military assignments. However, the quality level will be very different. The system of national security and defence defines the necessity to come up with systematic solutions and organisational preconditions that will make it easier for the military staff to achieve desired results that will benefit the entire Albanian society.

In the future, civilian servants – government employees and staff members – should be provided with a significant functional role in the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces of the Republic of Albania. This category of employees was systematically neglected and unappreciated in the past, or employed based on political party affiliation and without proper expertise. However, today, there is greater appreciation of the role and importance for efficient functioning of the armed forces. Many positions and duties do not require a professional military individual, but rather a civilian with his or her special expertise, and technical, managerial or administrative competencies.

However, the civilian role in the military is not limited. They further provide an important contribution to the existence of civilian perspectives of military issues, their status and activities. The level of integration of soldiers and civilians in performing everyday military duties should be considered an indicator of the degree of development of civil-military relations. The general education system, as well as education and training in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, should be adjusted to serve the requirements for the development of civil personnel who will have the necessary knowledge and capability to

apply it to the Armed Forces. This presents another gap demanding foreign help.

Considering all issues related to personnel quality, attention should always be paid to several important facts:

- Organisational solutions and behaviour themselves are never sufficient. They just facilitate functional activity.
- Well-developed plans only help for the planning and preparation of activities, but they only present the first element of operational activity. Experience shows that those plans often diverge from their original direction.
- Theories of large system management and commanding hierarchies offer support and security, but are no major accomplishments themselves.
- Operational activities succeed or fail because of the people preparing or executing them. Only by selecting the best people and by developing the system's ability to select can we achieve relative certainty that the activities will be logical and systematic and will lead to desired consequences.

#### **1.1.4 Education and Training**

Development of high-quality education and training programmes will create preconditions for improved quality of personnel. Programmes that intend to improve the quality of life of members of the military and their families should advance military tasks to a level where worries and frustration – resulting from the separation of their families, families inadequate health or social/employment status – can be reduced to the greatest extent possible.

The educational and training structure of the active members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania should provide a starting point for further personnel training and improvement of abilities. The modern soldier must possess knowledge on how to understand his cultural environment including diverse forms of interactions and in extreme

cases to know how to survive on the battlefield. The officer of today, depending on the progress of his career, has to be a capable operational officer, precise administrative clerk, and successful manager and leader too. Therefore, the military education system should be improved to satisfy the needs for additional, supplementary and permanent training of soldiers for the execution of their tasks in the complex emergency environment.

The civil-military education system must be able to respond to the needs of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania and to the tasks its members encounter during their careers. Lower ranked officers tend to perform tactical tasks, which require the system to provide them with executive abilities. A change occurs among higher ranked officers because the officers switch from tactical and operational missions to conceptual thinking processes, which demand the system provide them with continuous training in the field of managerial skills and creative as well as critical thinking. For these reasons we intend to provide our junior officers with a BSc or BA degree in management and the possibility of electives in technology, telecommunication, navigation or political science. The military education system should provide for the acquisition of complementary civilian and military competencies and should design and respect educational programmes that will be verifiable and recognised by the civilian sector as well. Therefore, in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence, institutions of higher education of the Republic of Albania are to develop programmes, curricula and courses in the field of defence systems, related sciences and technologies. The military profession and career should become an attractive choice for young generations who have to make decisions about their future life. Furthermore, members of the military will have better chances of employment in the civilian sector if they decide to terminate their military career.

However, in organising and starting the new curricula for cadets in September 2004, we lack the right and well qualified teachers in the fields of management, anthropology, security studies, conflict studies, research methodology, social and development studies and political studies.

In comparison with the present-day situation which is characterised by a lack of meaningful and systematic activities, the military profession will undergo a major change to be reflected in intensive training and new obligations brought about by the undergoing military transformation programmes. This new tendency mainly came to life because of a feeling of hopelessness and frustration among many members of the Armed Forces who are fed up with being passive. In 2010, activities should be aimed towards the better understanding of relations between the civil society and armed forces and the imposed requirements by society to their members. The enhanced military professionalism will lead to the exposure of members of the AAF to an increased number of activities and requirements. This process needs to advance slowly and can only be successful if every individual has been trained and prepared for the new level of duties. At the same time the utmost care should be taken in relation to the living standard of the members of the Armed Forces and their families.

Personnel management should ensure such a system of appointment and promotion that will encourage professional attitude and will push forward the best and most qualified people, giving equal opportunity to each member of the Albanian Armed Forces. It should increase the authority and responsibility of commanders and members of civilian management. Furthermore, achievements should be rewarded, human potential recognised and challenged and provide them with appropriate duties. In doing so, it should equally treat all members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, regardless of their gender, race, nationality, religion and local or social affiliation. The system should also be immune towards any outside (including political) interference.

Until now, a long-term planning for education – especially for qualifications based on independent needs of every service of AAF – has not been in existence. The majority of courses that have been offered by foreign institutions so far did not specifically focus on future jobs of personnel or to fill the gaps of expertise evident in certain functions and institutions. Therefore, it is recommended that the Chief of the General Staff should propose to the Minister of Defence, on an annual basis, a list of specialties that are in high demand in each service and support command of AAF. This need should not be met by imposing an

excessive workload on personnel, which would currently affect 30 per cent of our Armed Forces personal strength. Therefore, we should consider distance learning and the recruitment of people who have appropriate qualifications from all available sources in accordance with the criteria and to the levels determined necessary. However, we still lack the infrastructure and resources to develop proper distance learning. It should be anticipated what the needs might be three to five years ahead in order to adjust training programmes in time, getting the proper qualified personnel before too much time elapses. Members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, might face interruption of their current military job due to the reformation process, are considered for retraining programmes to fit the standards of a civilian life. However, we lack expertise in that field, which could be fulfilled by different NGOs.

Therefore, my recommendation is to focus expert formation efforts in that field as well.

At the same time, the recognised excellence of the military profession and knowledge accumulated in the course of engaging in such a profession should become a stimulus for civilian organisations and institutions to offer jobs to people who have spent 20 or 30 years in the Armed Forces. At the age of 50–55, many former members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania still have the strength, will, health and capacity to continue to work in the civilian sector at least for a while. Continuous and systematic care concerning their career and professional development in the Armed Forces should enable them to follow a previously described idea.

All future candidates for commissioning in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania should have a university diploma. If they fulfil all other requirements and demonstrate adequate psychological and physical readiness, they should be commissioned by the Armed Forces once they graduate from Officers' School. However, the Armed Forces should enable young people to join even with a high school diploma and possibly pursue a military career after their university studies. This requires at least three different combinations of university education with military academy courses, which also forms the precondition for

commissioning an officer and his first appointment in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania.

Those who decide to join the Armed Forces after graduating from university should be obliged to attend a training course at the military academy for a duration of at least eleven months. During this time, they will acquire basic military knowledge and will complete the process of integration of their civil education with the military system.

University students who decide during the course of their studies that they might commence a military career in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania upon their graduation should be able to select desired courses at the faculties that provide expert education required by the Armed Forces. Those courses would be optional after the second year of studying. Following their graduation, they should also attend a course at the Military Academy over a shorter period of time (only six months). It is expected that during the final years of their studies the military-oriented optional courses should have provided them with knowledge regarding the seamless integration of their original and military profession. The three-months course at the military academy should further enable them to acquire some basic military knowledge necessary for a successful beginning of their military career.

The Armed Forces provide accommodation and appropriate four year scholarships for young people who opt for a military career. They receive the opportunity by participating in diverse Armed Forces activities in order to gain more effectively a practical impression of work and life in the military. Once they obtain their university degree, having attended the same curriculum as the previous group, they will immediately be commissioned to the active forces and will receive their first appointment in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania. Meanwhile, they are obliged to pursue their officer basic training courses in the weapon schools, specialising in the different branches of AAF services.

While attending courses at the defence academy in the level of Staff College, War College or the National Security Studies, members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania are not allowed to carry out

any other duties. They devote all their energy to successfully mastering their educational programmes, since they are not yet able to apply distance learning programmes. The Defence and National Security Studies should hold the key position in the structure of civil education for the needs of defence and national security. The Defence College as part of the Albanian Defence Academy remains the highest military education institution for civilian and military personnel.

Regarding all new developments in our professional military education, expert formation initiatives taken by DCAF are essentially beneficial to AAFs and civil society. This concerns the total spectrum of Security Sector Reform in Albania. Based on possible interest, I may recommend proper individuals available to follow and conduct further responsibilities in the field of SSR in Albania and in the different working groups of DCAF.

