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The Dynamics of New Thinking in the Era of Stagnation

> Formulated without regard for real interests and opportunities, and based on the prejudices, ambitions and illusions [of members of the Politburo] . . . foreign policy increasingly lost touch with what has happening in the outside world. . . . By the mid-1970s, they seriously thought that they'd already won the "cold war" and that they had every reason to anticipate a new redivision of the world.
>
> —Andrei Grachev, *Kremlevskaia khronika*

> We reformers dreamed of ending . . . the division between East and West, of halting the insanity of the arms race and ending the "Cold War."
>
> —Alexander Yakovlev, *Gor'kaia chasha*

For Soviet new thinking, the long rule of Leonid Brezhnev was a distinctly contradictory period. In part it was a time of great hopes, of the maturation and activization of reformist thought in foreign (and domestic) affairs, boosted by an extensive new thaw in East-West relations. But it was also the "era of stagnation," a time when the country's mounting problems were largely ignored. At home, urgently needed changes were rejected as socioeconomic ills grew increasingly critical. Abroad, an expansionist course eventually undermined détente and accelerated a perilous and ruinously expensive arms race.

As seen, for many the post-Khrushchev era began with anticipation of "more consistent pursuit of the 20th Congress line." The new leadership's first major initiative was a plan for economic reform, and even though conservatives soon went on the offensive, liberals fought back and, among other successes, helped defeat an effort to rehabilitate Stalin. Only the crushing of the Prague Spring

experiment in 1968 ended hopes for similar near-term liberalization of the Soviet system. Anti-Western rhetoric now grew, while official pronouncements even qualified Khrushchev's unequivocal rejection of nuclear war.

But just a few years later, a new détente blossomed. The centerpiece was arms control, particularly the 1972 SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and ABM treaties. These breakthroughs led to expanded Soviet-Western ties in many other areas, from trade agreements to new academic, cultural, and scientific exchanges. Symbolically, perhaps, the apogee of détente was a joint Apollo-Soyuz spaceflight in 1975. Substantively, the high point was reached with the Helsinki Accords of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that same year. With all these steps, the détente of the 1970s went considerably farther than had the earlier epoch of "peaceful coexistence."

But in other ways, Brezhnev's "thaw" was notably more limited than Khrushchev's. From the outset, ideological controls remained much tighter. The media and culture were never so openly bold or experimental as they had been a decade before. Outwardly, at least, the Party enforced stricter orthodoxy in intellectual life. Dissidence was harshly repressed and periodic conservative attacks kept reformist-Westernizing thought on the defensive. Instead, the Party tolerated or even encouraged a growing anti-Western, Russian national current. In an effort to counter new foreign influences, themes of "vigilance," militarization, and a virtual cult of the Great Patriotic War were assiduously fostered.

By the mid-to-late 1970s, even as Western military programs slowed, development of new Soviet nuclear and conventional forces accelerated. Simultaneously, emboldened by U.S. recognition of its superpower status and strategic parity, the Kremlin embarked on a new course of activism in the third world. Soviet leaders, encouraged by a glut of petrodollars while the West endured recession at home and the United States suffered a post-Vietnam hesitancy abroad, appeared convinced that the tide of history had indeed turned. But within a few years, their military-political assertiveness had soured détente. The high Brezhnev era ended as it had begun, with a foreign invasion; the 1979 dispatch of a "limited contingent" of troops to Afghanistan was the final nail in détente's coffin. Though Brezhnev would live for three more years, his near-com-

plete physical and mental incapacity made this a time of political paralysis. With no leadership worthy of the name, the country sputtered on autopilot.

The prevailing Western interpretation of Soviet foreign-policy thought during this period has been that most analysts in the USSR shared, and often encouraged, their leaders' confidence that "the correlation of forces" had shifted in Moscow's favor; global assertiveness would be tolerated by a declining West, it was believed, and only with the crises of the decade's end did Soviet analysts reconsider the lessons of détente. In fact, among the community of new thinkers, the experience of the 1970s was very different. For them, the main impact of détente was not to bolster an expansionist course, but rather to subject it to increasing criticism.

Already by the late 1960s, the social and natural sciences had been distinguished by a growing anti-isolationist, Western-oriented current. By the early-mid 1970s, building on this early progress and now propelled by extensive new foreign ties, liberal specialists from diverse fields called for a much broader rapprochement abroad (and extensive reforms at home). But their efforts went largely unheeded, and by decade's end simply saving the modest gains of détente prompted even bolder critiques. By this time, however, Brezhnev was almost completely infirm. Reformist pleas were ignored, reactionary voices grew ominously louder, and the Kremlin's "hegemonic, great-power" policies ultimately left a nearly bankrupt and absurdly militarized country in confrontation with most of the world.[1]

The Brezhnev Cohort: Old Thinking's Last Hostages

One of the most important insights into Brezhnev-era politics since the inception of glasnost is that ideology loomed much larger than was previously understood. Certainly the hubris of the Khrushchev years—faith in socialism's rapid ascendance over capitalism—was supplanted by a cynicism in which preservation of the Stalinist system at home, the empire abroad, and the powerful interests vested therein were central. But many accounts also stress the enduring influence of the hostile-isolationist outlook:

> For us, one factor always blocked the development of stable relations with the United States and the West as a whole—the primacy

> of an irreconcilable "ideological struggle" between the two sociopolitical systems. Any agreement, any attempt to improve our relations with the USA, would immediately run into this obstacle.[2]

In the Middle East, a senior diplomat recalled, fealty to its "historical mission" and "an orthodox and dogmatic mode of thinking" propelled the Kremlin toward superpower confrontation.[3] In Vietnam, wrote Anatoly Dobrynin, longtime ambassador to the United States, these beliefs prolonged war "to the detriment of our own basic interests."[4] And in Africa, the warnings of pro-détente advisers about the danger posed to East-West ties by intervention in regional conflicts were trumped by ideologues' arguments that "Angola was reminiscent of Spain in 1935, we couldn't just stand aside and ignore our [internationalist] duty."[5] Others recall their leaders' dogmatism in various specific episodes. For example, early in the Brezhnev era—more than a decade after Stalin's death opened the world to his successors—Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny visited Austria and, viewing the bounty of Viennese markets, remarked, "Look how well they set things up for my visit."[6] A decade later, celebrating an apparent socialist tide in the third world, General Secretary Brezhnev exclaimed, "See, even in the jungles they want to follow Lenin!"[7]

Such beliefs would seem comical were it not for their role in the tragedy of renewed confrontation and an accelerating arms race. And even the few instances cited among many such revelations since the inception of glasnost reveal the several ways in which the hostile-isolationist identity contributed to détente's demise. One was through ignorance of the West and belief in its abiding threat to the USSR. Another was enduring faith in the expansion and ultimate triumph of socialism. And a third, in many accounts the most salient, was an ideological insecurity or "complex of revolutionary inadequacy" that drove expansion abroad in an effort to bolster legitimacy at home—both in the eyes of the Soviet people and, more importantly, in the minds of the leaders themselves.[8]

Many of these "servitors of an archaic ideological cult" were not so much cynics as captives of the "myths, prejudices, and unrealized hopes" of the Lenin and, especially, Stalin epochs.[9] Fealty to dogmas served not only to rationalize their hold on power, but also to

justify their—and their country's—bitter experience. Critically, in each of its aspects noted above, old thinking was perpetuated by the systematic distortion of reality. An "ideocracy" reigned, an ideological system that operated on several levels and served multiple functions.[10] Information and assessments were overtly bent through the prism of dogma, while perceptions and beliefs were covertly molded by ideology's monopoly over the symbols, language, and terms of analysis—the broader discourse—of politics.[11] Exaggerations of socialism's prospects, and imperialism's threats, were consciously advanced to please bosses and further careers.[12] But many also subconsciously distorted facts in order to "reaffirm the centrality of their experience and to explain to their colleagues developments abroad within a common framework of reference."[13]

The persistence of the hostile-isolationist identity must also be seen in the context of the elite's path to power. While many analysts of Soviet politics emphasize the differences in the backgrounds of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev cohorts, the similarities were probably even more salient. Though one group was still maturing while the other launched careers—over the bitter years of 1918 to 1921—they drew similar lessons from the epoch of civil war, class war, and foreign intervention. Both were also profoundly shaped by World War II and, most important, they shared Stalin's pre- and postwar "hostile capitalist encirclement" as a central formative experience. *The ABC* was supplanted by the *Short Course*, but both cultivated fear and loathing of the West.

Moreover, both generations of elites—ill-educated, anti-intellectual, and xenophobic—belonged to successive waves of *vydvizhentsy* largely drawn from Russia's rural masses. As with Khrushchev, Brezhnev's first exposure to "a totally different world" was the humiliation and envy of a poor youth in a factory town run by French, Belgians, and Poles.

> It was as if they were a different breed of people—well-fed, well-groomed, and arrogant. An engineer dressed in a formal peak cap and coat with a velvet collar would never shake hands with a worker, and the worker approaching an engineer or foreman was obliged to take off his hat. We worker's children could only look at "the clean public" strolling to the sounds of a string orchestra from behind the railings of the town park.[14]

From the tensions of the late 1920s through the terror of the 1930s, and thence to wartime service as political-ideological officers, many Brezhnev-era elites needed little encouragement to embrace Stalin's cold war precepts.[15] In contrast to the Decembrist officers who returned from the post–Napoleonic War occupation of Paris imbued with reformist ideas, Brezhnev's reaction to the suggestion of his assignment to the French capital in 1945 was "I'll climb the Eiffel Tower and spit on all of Europe!"[16] Nor, despite the subsequent post-Stalin thaw, could these critical formative experiences be quickly overcome.

The enduring influence of Marxism-Leninism as the source of legitimacy and language of politics, together with an ingrained Stalinist outlook, produced in the Brezhnev leadership a deep distrust of the West and a lasting susceptibility to "revolutionary" appeals and expansionist policies. Notwithstanding his sometime reliance on a younger group of aide-speechwriters (which included Arbatov, Bovin, and other reform-minded specialists), Brezhnev himself remained psychologically dependent on—and far more comfortable with—his own generation of more dogmatic, orthodox advisers. They ensured that his

> declarations, proposals or formulations conformed to Marxism's "holy writ." This obviously troubled Brezhnev greatly when he became general secretary. He thought that to do something "un-Marxist" now was impermissible—the entire party, the whole world, was watching him. Leonid Ilyich was very weak in [matters of] theory and felt this keenly.[17]

These advisers included Boris Ponomarev, the conservative head of the International Department, and the dogmatic Ideology Secretary Mikhail Suslov, both Stalin-era "Red Professors."[18] But equally influential, especially early in Brezhnev's reign, were trusted associates who had built careers alongside their patron. Viktor Golikov was a "committed Stalinist" and self-styled "theoretician on all issues [including] ideology and foreign affairs."[19] Another old crony, who became the bête noire of Soviet liberalism, was Sergei Trapeznikov, an unrepentant Stalinist whom Brezhnev named to head the Central Committee department overseeing the Academy of Sciences.[20] For Trapeznikov, anti-intellectual campaigns were reenactments of "the real battle for socialism"—

Stalin's brutal collectivization—whose pain and glory were always with him in the form of a disfigurement inflicted by pitchfork-wielding peasants.[21] Mediocrities at best, these were the men whom Brezhnev regarded as "real experts in politics, economics, and Marxism."[22]

The USSR's situation in the late 1970s has been characterized as that of a not-atypical "overextended" power. But Soviet overextension was so severe—it is now evident that the military-imperial appetite consumed more than a quarter of the country's wealth—that neither international, power-centered analyses, nor domestic, interest-group models, offer adequate explanation.[23] And it was at that moment, when "retrenchment" was so long overdue, that the final, ruinous foreign adventure in Afghanistan was launched.

Documents reveal that the leadership was well aware of the international outcry that would follow an invasion, as well as of the danger of the military quagmire that soon resulted.[24] While the actual decision to intervene remains shrouded in mystery, evidence shows that old thinking again played a key role. This it did directly, through grossly inflated assessments of a Western threat.[25] It also operated indirectly, through the call of "internationalist duty" to support a revolutionary movement proclaiming its "socialist orientation."[26] As with Czechoslovakia a decade earlier, there was also the tendency in a crisis to fall back on a familiar, simplified, black-and-white interpretation of events. In their dotage, this tendency on the part of the Brezhnev gerontocracy was only heightened—as was reflected in Defense Minister Ustinov's bizarre suggestion that they should defend Afghan "socialism" by "arming the working class."[27]

Brezhnev and his colleagues were simultaneously the inheritors and hostages of a vast "command-administrative" system at home and an empire abroad, and their policies were largely driven by the goal of preserving that legacy. But they were also captives of another legacy, the hostile-isolationist outlook of a divided world and threatening capitalist West. It was the latter, as well as the former, that limited and eventually doomed the second post-Stalin détente. And it was their liberation from the latter that prepared a new generation of thinkers for a more decisive break with the Stalinist (and Leninist) heritage.

Intellectual Life Under Brezhnev: Public Conformism, Private Reformism

Paradoxically, the era of conservatism began with a small reformist victory. As already seen, attempts to raise Stalin back to his pedestal were fought off in efforts that involved the entire liberal intelligentsia, uniting Party intellectuals and senior academicians with writers, artists, and future dissidents.[28] But despite its symbolic significance, the thwarting of Stalin's full rehabilitation was a rearguard action at best, a small battle in a losing war against conservatism and reaction. The neo-Stalinists eventually triumphed on nearly all fronts—ending hopes of economic reform, aligning with resurgent Russian nationalism, and clamping down on intellectual freedom and openness.

The "highlights" of this period were grim. *Novy Mir* editor Alexander Tvardovsky, long under siege, was fired in 1970. Alexei Rumyantsev, who had provided a haven for many reformers fired in the first round of conservative attacks, was now defeated himself; his sociology institute was crushed in 1971–72, and he and his staff of prominent liberals were dismissed en masse. Similar purges swept other institutes. Tellingly, in 1973 the minister of defense, along with the minister of foreign affairs and the KGB director, were elevated to full Politburo status.

For Yuri Andropov, as KGB chief, his days of sponsoring creative young scholar-analysts were long past. He carried out his new charge—repressing dissidence—with a thoroughness that sent chills through the liberal intelligentsia. Meanwhile, the last of his 1960s consultant group now dispersed. Some, such as Alexander Bovin and Gennady Gerasimov, worked in journalism. Others, such as Fedor Burlatsky, Ivan Frolov, and Lev Delusin, moved between academic and scholar-publicist jobs. Georgy Arbatov and Oleg Bogomolov now headed their own research institutes.

Though most remaining idealistic hopes had been crushed, a different and ultimately more important kind of progress began in earnest. There now ensued much more serious study of the outside world—the slow but steady accumulation of knowledge and insight about foreign political, social, and economic life that went well beyond that of the thaw era. Over time, it became clear that efforts to quash reformism, by crushing the few arenas where it had blos-

somed and casting its exponents away, had failed. Like seeds scattered to the wind, reformist ideas germinated and grew wherever these liberal thinkers landed.

At the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), new director Nikolai Inozemtsev quickly shaped his staff into perhaps the leading critical think tank. Arbatov, whose USA Institute (renamed the USA-Canada Institute, or ISKAN, in 1974) was founded only in 1967, gathered a diverse group of analysts that included independent-minded officers on loan from the Soviet general staff. Bogomolov became director of the new Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System (IEMSS) after the drama of 1968 made it clear that Eastern Europe required more serious study. In 1969, the Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences (INION) was created and, under Delusin's brief directorship, began its vital work of disseminating Western scholarship as well as conducting its own research on such topics as social democracy. Novosibirsk and the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute (TsEMI) continued their development into centers of original socioeconomic thought. Even the Central Committee apparatus slowly changed; Shakhnazarov, Chernyaev, Yakovlev, Nikolai Shishlin, Vadim Zagladin, and other reform-minded analysts—the now-middle-aged "children of the 20th Congress"—were joined by a modest influx of younger liberals, "the children of détente."[29]

The steady growth of reformist, anti-isolationist thought was also aided by two other developments. The first was a sharp deterioration in relations with China, to the point of armed conflict; this forced a deeper rethinking of the two-camp outlook and, in some instances, also offered analysts an ostensibly socialist state that could be studied and criticized with direct relevance for the USSR. Second, and more important, was the rise of détente with the West; though accompanied by a tightening of ideological orthodoxy at home, détente provided specialists their broadest access to the West in 50 years.

The scope of this new opening swiftly dwarfed that of the thaw era. Academic exchanges, conferences, international science and policy fora, and diplomatic and cultural negotiations were soon a full order of magnitude greater than under Khrushchev. This interchange developed on other levels, too, as Western media and schol-

arship in the humanities as well as the natural and social sciences became widely available to Soviet analysts. Their influence grew evident as political science, economics, and international relations began debating foreign concepts with growing frequency and seriousness, while the boldest and most original new works moved rapidly toward broader integration with Western scholarship.

As in their studies, so, too, in their conclusions; the early-mid 1970s saw many calling not just for expanded intercourse with the West, but also for more radical changes that would move their country toward broader integration with the liberal international community. However, amid the prevailing orthodoxy, the reformist-integrationist views of many philosophers, economists, sociologists, scientists, and political analysts of all sorts were not always readily visible, especially from afar. Some could be found in specialized literature, others in classified or limited-circulation publications; and it is in these venues, including analyses for various state ministries or reports to the Central Committee, that some of the boldest reform proposals were seen.

This maturation and mobilization of new thinking early in the Brezhnev era could not have occurred without the foundation laid under Khrushchev. In nearly all its aspects—from the evolution of particular ideas and the impact of specific individuals, to the role of key institutes—détente-era new thinking was an organic outgrowth of thaw-era changes. By the late 1960s, the changes had already gone so far that, as noted earlier, a new hard line could not halt, and in some instances further stimulated, reformist thought. But neither could the progress of the 1970s have advanced as rapidly as it did without the new impetus of détente. As Arbatov noted, a "majority of our specialists" had yet to overcome "pervasive ideology . . . propaganda and fear." Speaking for himself he recalled that, when named to head the USA Institute,

> my knowledge was insufficiently deep. . . . I had never been to the United States. I had no contacts or acquaintances among Americans . . . [but] harder to acquire than acquaintances . . . was a feeling for the country, a partly rational, partly intuitive sense that we could only acquire through regular professional contact with a wide variety of specialists from the United States and with representatives from government and business.[30]

Thanks to such contacts, less than a decade later this situation was reversed. Victor Kremenyuk, one of Arbatov's ISKAN deputies, recalled that "it became easier for us to talk to Americans than to our own Central Committee."[31] Anatoly Dobrynin, the longtime Soviet ambassador to Washington, noted the "deep respect, even love" for the United States that developed among some specialists in the Foreign Ministry: "Often we felt more at home in Washington than in Moscow. After all, who could we talk to back there? Nobody really, except Arbatov and Primakov.[32]

The same held for those in fields from economics to nuclear physics. And as their country stagnated, the early new thinkers saw the way out in deeper rapprochement with the West. Some shed their Marxist ideals altogether, seeing the USSR's future in adoption of radical market reforms at home and embrace of the liberal order abroad. Others retained the hopes of the 20th congress, though now of more social-democratic than socialist orientation, with Khrushchev's confrontational coexistence replaced by a desire for broader cooperation. For both—whether they envisioned an eventual "convergence" of socioeconomic systems, or their country's evolution from one to the other—Leninist-Stalinist dogmas of a divided world and hostile West were supplanted by an increasingly "global" outlook.

Politics, Science, and Society: The Emergence of a Global Outlook

The orientation toward global concerns and "universal human" (*obshchechelovecheskie*) values that replaced a class-based worldview as the cornerstone of new thinking, while usually seen as a phenomenon of the mid-to-late 1980s, in fact preceded perestroika by more than a decade. Its rise was difficult to perceive from afar, in part due to the Aesopian or "subterranean" nature of much original intellectual life under Brezhnev. But Western understanding of these changes was also hampered by approaches that, focusing on separate fields (for example, economics, sociology, history) or specific policy areas (security, trade, the third world), could not appreciate the totality of an emerging global critique that was visible only in the links *across* these fields and issue areas.

This "dispersion" was a stagnation-era necessity, for it also concealed the new thinking's breadth from ideological watchdogs quick to crush any more frontal attack (such as Sakharov's) on their dogma. But it simultaneously contributed much to new thinking's strength, informally uniting diverse individuals and ideas in an increasingly coherent critique of the hostile-isolationist identity. Sociologists and political scientists discussed literary-cultural affairs. Economists, philosophers, and historians debated issues of science and ethics. And analysts of modern China or the third world looked back to earlier historical and economic trends. In some cases, the same individuals performed pathbreaking work in various fields; in others, leading thinkers were former classmates or colleagues at academic institutes and journals. It was these personal ties and this intellectual cross-fertilization that, together with détente's exposure to foreign life, powerfully abetted the rise of a global outlook during the era of stagnation.

The rebirth of genuine political and sociological inquiry over the first post-Stalin decade was described in the preceding chapter. Over the post-Prague decade, even greater strides were taken toward less ideological, less class-bound analysis of domestic and foreign affairs. Fedor Burlatsky and Georgy Shakhnazarov, who pioneered the establishment of Soviet political science in the mid 1960s, continued to lead with studies that pushed the frontiers of their infant field much further. In his 1970 book *Lenin, the State, and Politics* Burlatsky confronted the gap between socialist ideals and Soviet reality by borrowing Western concepts of the "political system" or "regime" as distinct from formal institutions. He cited the example of Hungary, where social and economic changes since 1956 were significant notwithstanding unaltered Party-state structures. The changes were viewed positively, of course, and his praise of Hungarian reforms suggested a model for the USSR.[33] Shakhnazarov, in his 1972 *Socialist Democracy*, cautiously called attention to an absence of real democracy and stressed the need for greater freedom of information.[34] Anatoly Butenko, in *The Theory and Practice of Building Socialism*, held that a lack of democracy, together with oversized, overcentralized industry, was to blame for Soviet and East European socioeconomic woes.[35]

While Burlatsky and Shakhnazarov were well versed in foreign literature, others benefited from a proliferation of Russian-language

reviews of Western scholarship. Continuing a practice begun in the early 1960s, an overall critical orientation permitted such works to pass the censors while conveying much about Western theory as well as the reality of Western political life.[36] Venyamin Chirkin, another of Burlatsky's collaborators, noted that "the polemic with bourgeois conceptions" helped to stimulate "the formation of a new branch of knowledge."[37] Beyond politics and the state, another now-invigorated branch of knowledge was the study of modern society. "As a result of participating in international conferences and having access to Western literature," Soviet sociology drew closer to foreign scholarship in both its methods and conclusions.[38] Broad professional and personal ties to the West prompted a fresh look at Soviet society and appreciation of the problems common to both socialism and capitalism. They also encouraged a search for solutions that drew on others' experience. This was seen in the works of such pioneers as Boris Grushin, Yuri Levada, Igor Kon, Vladimir Yadov, and Andrei Zdravomyslov, on such issues as labor, youth, sex, values, and even public opinion on domestic and foreign affairs.[39]

This "rapprochement" between conceptions of socialist and capitalist society, and a new understanding of Western life, necessarily influenced views of international relations. Political systems that creatively studied and sought solutions to their domestic ills—many of which plagued Soviet society too—appeared less a threat and more a source of ideas for Soviet reform.[40] Moreover, as the global character of modern social processes was understood, class-based, conflict-centered views of international relations receded even further.[41] And as Soviet thinkers looked to the future, they found orthodox models increasingly barren, and foreign thought increasingly useful.[42] Debates over "limits to growth," "postindustrial society," and other issues raised by Western "futurology" now figured prominently in their writings.[43] Though often still couched in the jargon of capitalism's crisis and socialism's superiority, the new thinkers rapidly embraced global concerns, interdependence, and even ideas of "convergence."

In this, an important pioneer was a domestic, not foreign, thinker—Andrei Sakharov. As Burlatsky recalled, "I'd never read anything like it from a Soviet author. It was a real manifesto of liberalism, free thought, a totally new and unique perspective on . . . the contemporary world."[44] The "manifesto" was Sakharov's 1968

samizdat memorandum *Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*. Burlatsky credits it in the conception of his own bold 1970 proposal on "Planning Universal Peace."[45] Almost every significant new thinker has similar memories of the impact of Sakharov's pathbreaking discussion of nuclear dangers, the environment, overpopulation, and human rights.[46]

Yet a year before Sakharov's essay, overpopulation had been addressed by Gennady Gerasimov. His 1967 tract, *Will the World Become Too Crowded?*, drew on Western authors such as Kenneth Boulding and Bernard Brodie to place this issue on the Soviet agenda. Gerasimov faulted Soviet writers who held that overpopulation threatened only "bourgeois" societies, chided those who found sinister meaning in the term *birth control,* and implicitly criticized Stalinist policies by denouncing those of fascist Germany and South Africa for encouraging high birth rates under a "supremacist" ideology.[47] His 1968 article "For the Sake of a Woman's Health" contrasted the availability of contraception in the West with the single choice—abortion—facing most Soviet women.[48]

One of the pioneers of Soviet environmentalism was Grigory Khozin, a military-aviation writer who, at Arbatov's invitation, joined the USA Institute in 1969 as a space-policy specialist.[49] His *In Defense of the Planet*, though critical of the West, was probably the first open, full-scale analytical work to raise serious (albeit indirect) questions about Soviet policy.[50] He later described how research on the U.S. space program drew his attention to congressional and public oversight of science, including environmental issues:

> I saw the same technical-legal system that managed space research now turn to the environment. Ecology became a big issue, it was "small is beautiful," and that was impressive in contrast with the "gigantomania" that prevailed here. . . . You had this incredible scientific-industrial machine that now came under the Environmental Protection Agency, the Clean Air Act, the Wildlife Fund, and so on. . . . There wasn't—and couldn't have been—anything like that here.[51]

Like many others—from Zamoshkin, a leader in objective study of the West, to Artsimovich, the pioneer of Soviet scientists' involvement in arms control—Khozin was influenced by diverse new

Western ties.[52] These ranged from study of such works as those by the Club of Rome to personal meetings with U.S. scholars.[53]

One global thinker, whose outlook was formed well before the détente-era opening that was so crucial to younger specialists, was Peter Kapitsa. A physicist of world renown, Kapitsa spent the pre-war years at Cambridge University and later suffered for his principled refusal to lend his talents to nuclear weapons. Kapitsa merits comparison with Sakharov as a scientific-intellectual figure of great authority and global orientation. But in contrast to Sakharov's early strong devotion—and later harsh opposition—to the Soviet regime, Kapitsa's career was one of consistent efforts to effect reforms from within the system.[54]

Even under Stalin, Kapitsa fought for scientific integrity. In the 1960s and 1970s, he continually pressed the authorities on issues such as the environment, arms control, censorship, and international scholarly cooperation.[55] Kapitsa's years abroad were central in the formation of his outlook, as were his diverse Western contacts, his knowledge of foreign languages, and his concern over social and cultural issues. Kapitsa's iconoclasm brought more harassment in the post-Stalin years, and his views came to wider attention only via his participation in a series of debates in the early 1970s.[56] These were the roundtable discussions of global problems published in the journal *Voprosy Filosofii* (Philosophical Issues).

Ivan Frolov—another veteran of the Prague journal *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* and a colleague of Arbatov, Burlatsky, Gerasimov, et al. in Andropov's consultant group of the early 1960s—became editor of *Voprosy Filosofii* in 1968.[57] Under his stewardship, which lasted until 1977, the journal went far beyond the usual range of Soviet philosophical concerns. But Frolov's greatest success was the 1972–73 debates that prominently featured Kapitsa in airing pressing international issues.[58]

Kapitsa's contributions to the roundtable on "Man and His Habitat" startled many. He stressed the "global nature" of economic, social, and ecological problems, ridiculed those who saw separate "socialist" and "bourgeois" approaches to them, and argued that they could be solved only by "the combined efforts of all humanity." While acknowledging the Kremlin's stated commitment to halting the pollution of Lake Baikal, Kapitsa also cited the U.S. program to restore the Great Lakes. And he blasted militarism,

stressing the inadmissibility of any nuclear exchange and noting in amazement that "to this day you find people who think that if you take cover in a shelter filtered against radioactive fallout, then you'll survive."[59]

Kapitsa's frankness emboldened other roundtable participants. Khozin endorsed the U.S. idea of an international environmental center, arguing that, since the world was a "communal apartment," ecological problems demanded "the united efforts of all states."[60] IMEMO analyst A. E. Medunin criticized Soviet environmental "backwardness" and also injected an economic concern; noting the West's emphasis on clean technologies, he argued that "in 5–7 years, only those . . . technologies that cause minimal pollution will be competitive on foreign markets."[61] Cyberneticist Axel Berg took issues of technological progress a step further, praising Western programs for computer development and lamenting the attitude of "Bolsheviks . . . who think that to use [foreign models] plays into the hands of counterrevolution."[62]

With this, the debate touched on central issues of economic growth that were directly addressed in another roundtable on "The Interrelation of the Natural and Social Sciences." Nikolai Dubinin, director of the Institute of Genetics, saw a danger of pollution-induced genetic mutations and argued that Soviet technology's harmful impact on the environment resulted from "a 'ministerial' approach to exploiting natural resources." A system emphasizing quantity over quality lacked "a value-centered approach" to progress.[63] Nikolai Fedorenko, director of TsEMI and a champion of computer-mathematical models to aid planning, now stressed the limitations of his own field. Positive long-term development had social as well as economic aspects: "We can tell how many power stations there will be," but regarding culture and lifestyle "there are many questions that [central planning] cannot answer."[64]

Berg continued this critique by noting that Soviet science neglected methods "accepted and practiced throughout the world." Though one remedy for producers' ignorance of consumers' needs was better sociological research and polling, Berg also hinted that this was no substitute for direct market input.[65] Leonid Kantorovich—though he, too, could not quite say so explicitly—made the same point by questioning the dogma that the role of the market in determining prices disappears in a socialist economy. A

pioneer of models to improve planning, Kantorovich nevertheless echoed Fedorenko in noting the limits of central administration. He lamented the budget distortions caused by arbitrary pricing and argued that "correct technological and production decisions, and a proper balance of productive forces, depend on correct prices."[66]

Frolov also published anti-materialist, non-Marxist views, ostensibly pure philosophical arguments that were in fact linked to the same issues of society and world civilization. In a roundtable on "Science, Ethics, and Humanism," Frolov's sometime coauthor Merab Mamardashvili wrote that science "was not just a sum of knowledge, but a constant expansion of the means for man's understanding of the world and himself in it. . . . Knowledge exists in science only as something that constantly produces a different knowledge and is in permanent transition."[67] Yuri Zamoshkin echoed this heretical, metaphysical conception of science, arguing against a "pragmatic, overly narrow . . . expedient" view that led to "administrative" approaches to issues of science and society. In fact, simply posing the question of scientific ethics implied a false separation: "The problem of science's value orientation is above all the problem of the value orientation of society."[68] In the context of so much discussion of the ills of Soviet science, Zamoshkin thus suggested that the underlying problem was a sickness in the "value orientation" of Soviet society.

Conservatism, Nationalism, and the Debate Over Russia in World Civilization

For their daring, Frolov and his staff were subjected to fierce conservative attack.[69] And though he hung on as editor of *Voprosy Filosofii* for several more years, Frolov's fate was foreshadowed by that of the early liberal tribune, *Novy Mir*, and its editor Alexander Tvardovsky.[70] By the mid 1970s, the journal's latitude had been sharply curtailed, whereas others of increasingly chauvinistic, anti-Western orientation flourished. Everywhere reaction triumphed over reformism.

In 1971, Vasily Ukraintsev became director of the Institute of Philosophy. "The bastard quickly put his house in order," one observer recalled, "clamping down on original thought and driving out outstanding scholars such as [Alexander] Zinoviev."[71] In 1972,

an even more devastating purge struck the Institute of Concrete Social Research; director Rumyantsev and some 140 staffers, including Burlatsky, Karpinsky, Levada, and Zamoshkin, were fired in one stroke.[72] Rumyantsev was replaced by Mikhail Rutkeyevich, a pseudo scholar known by liberals as "the bulldozer" for his approach to critical thought.[73] There now ensued "a wholesale crackdown on the Moscow intelligentsia managed by that 'little Zhdanov' Yagodkin."[74] The crackdown struck even liberals formerly protected by their positions on the Central Committee staff. Shakhnazarov was disciplined, even though his published works were more cautious than those of his fellow political-science traveler Burlatsky.[75] Alexander Bovin, one of the last of Andropov's original consultant group still in the apparat, was fired in 1972.[76] A year later, after openly criticizing resurgent Russian nationalism, Alexander Yakovlev was dismissed from his post in the Propaganda Department and sent on a ten-year diplomatic exile to Canada.[77]

Many other new thinkers now endured a kind of internal exile, shuttling between various institutes and journals. Burlatsky was one such "intellectual gypsy," changing jobs five times over the early Brezhnev years. After the 1972 pogrom of Rumyantsev's sociology institute, he spent two years at the Institute of State and Law before joining his frequent collaborator Alexander Galkin and other beleaguered liberals at the Institute of Social Sciences to ride out the remainder of the Brezhnev era.[78]

Reflecting on this difficult period, IMEMO analyst Viktor Sheinis noted that "notwithstanding how minor were the departures from established ideological canons," it was amazing

> how quickly repression ensued, how rapidly fortifications and prison cells were rebuilt on "the front of ideological struggle." . . . The Central Committee's science department, headed by S. Trapeznikov, energetically . . . crushed research groups that had taken the first steps toward rebirth of real social studies. . . . "Ideological diversion" came back into the political lexicon, an invention of Stalin's that revived the medieval concept of the devil seducing man into sin.[79]

Of course, despite important parallels, the differences between this "ideological struggle" and Stalin's were great. Prisons were infre-

quently used and security could be had for the price of outward conformity. Echoes of the past were often heard, as in a new treatise by the old xenophobe Mark Mitin. But this time he "received no help from shouting mobs that filled the galleries of academic halls [under Stalin]."[80]

The harshest sanctions were reserved for open dissidents and human-rights campaigners. Private criticism was generally tolerated, but even the smallest hint of public or organized dissent was swiftly punished. Loss of travel privileges was a frequent sanction whose victims included such persistent critics as the economist Shatalin and philosopher Mamardashvili. Others ranged from Alexander Pumpyansky, a *Komsomolskaia Pravda* correspondent (and glasnost-era editor of the liberal weekly *Novoe Vremya*), for "blackening Soviet reality" by writing about U.S. millionaires, to Alexander Lebed (Gorbachev's last ambassador to Czechoslovakia), for characterizing that same reality as "an experiment."[81] In 1975, historian Gefter was forced into retirement. That same year, the KGB brought a more serious case against scholar-publicists Len Karpinsky, Otto Latsis, and Igor Klyamkin. The three, guilty of sharing private writings that found their way into a draft samizdat almanac, endured reprimands, expulsion from the Party, or loss of employment.[82] Just a few years earlier, allies within the apparat had often intervened to mitigate such cases (for example, Alexander Yakovlev in the 1967 Burlatsky-Karpinsky affair).[83] But by the mid 1970s, such "Party liberals" were either gone or under heavy pressure themselves.[84]

By such tactics, the regime sought to isolate the boldest critical thinkers from others who sympathized. The former would be punished and the latter co-opted through job security and privileges, a tactic that effectively squelched any wider stirrings among the broadly conservative ranks of the professional-educated class.[85] Those unwilling to break openly with the system had few choices. Some gave up and withdrew in cynicism. Others wrote "for the drawer" or made quiet efforts to effect change from inside. They protected friends, published in Aesopian language, and expressed themselves more openly only in limited-circulation journals and classified studies. Still others retreated to "the provinces" to escape the scrutiny of Moscow. Liberal economists and sociologists sought refuge in Novosibirsk, for example, while philosophers and histori-

ans found greater freedom in regional centers such as Tartu, Tbilisi, and Kiev.[86]

But even in Moscow, notwithstanding the hard-liners' offensive, some latitude remained for reformist-integrationist thought. This was so because, in searching for a post-Khrushchev identity and direction for the country, the Brezhnev leadership found itself trapped between Scylla and Charybdis. Officially, the now-embarrassing 1961 Party Program was supplanted by a declaration of "developed socialism," the supposed attainment of a qualitatively new stage in the march toward Communism.[87] But the very enunciation of a new formation only opened the door to critical analysis of its actual characteristics. Moreover, the evident hollowness of the new model and steady worsening of socioeconomic ills encouraged another ideological competitor—Russian nationalism—that rekindled the reformers' challenge to reaction in new venues, even as it was extinguished in old ones.

As previously noted, new thinking was not the only growing thaw-era intellectual current: there was also a Russian national or "neo-Slavophile" current. Initially less prominent than "neo-Westernism," it had a potential (if not actual) elite following that was much larger.[88] Like their nineteenth-century predecessors, these competing currents had common roots in dissatisfaction with the reigning "autocracy." For example, both neo-Westernism and neo-Slavophilism were stimulated by the exposure of Stalinism's rural catastrophe. But while the former saw solutions in market incentives and structures, the latter's prescription was the opposite. The neo-Slavophiles emphasized the *cultural* tragedy of collectivization, the destruction of traditional, religious, communal life. Both were shocked by poverty, alcoholism, family breakdown, and ecological despoilation. But while the neo-Westernizers looked forward to a "modernizing" technological and social transformation of rural life, the neo-Slavophiles sought a return to a "premodern" past.

The philosophy underlying this goal—a general belief in the uniqueness of Russian civilization, that Russia was not properly destined to follow the Western path—was what united many otherwise diverse nationalists. Some were official writers or scholars, while others belonged to unofficial groups and circulated works in samizdat.[89] Some emphasized Orthodox Christianity; others grew

openly and aggressively neo-Stalinist. Some saw the West's main threat to be in its bourgeois values; others feared its military might. Some wanted to expand Russia's role as a global-imperial power; others sought its retreat into the isolation of a separate cultural and social world.[90]

Like their nineteenth-century predecessors, many neo-Slavophiles indulged in romanticism (as did some enthusiastic but naïve neo-Westernizers). Theirs was mostly a sincere protest against social and cultural decline, though the past they recalled was a much-idealized one. Moreover, their "program" was long on ideology and short on specifics (unlike that of the neo-Westernizers).[91] But a more serious problem was neo-Slavophilism's relationship to Stalinism. Though it was Stalin who had destroyed their idealized pastoral harmony, it was also Stalin who swept away the hated European, cosmopolitan aspects of Bolshevism and promoted Russian nationalism.[92] So in this respect—and certainly in their dislike of the West and Brezhnev's flirtation with it through détente—even benign neo-Slavophilism found itself uncomfortably close to something far more malignant.[93]

The nineteenth-century parallel is also useful in viewing the evolution of neo-Slavophilism. Just as its predecessor's early inclusive, universal, humanitarian ideals degenerated into the exclusive, chauvinistic, xenophobic hostility of Pan-Slavism, so would neo-Slavophilism follow a similar path.[94] Some of its own early supporters would migrate toward increasingly virulent (or just increasingly open) anti-Semitic, anti-Western attitudes. The movement would also be influenced by its attraction of adherents whose outlook contained few of the positive, and many of the negative, aspects of Russian nationalism. The latter included some defiantly reactionary, neo-Stalinist members of Soviet officialdom.[95]

Therein lay the dilemma that nationalism presented. The declaration of "developed socialism" had *not* been inspirational.[96] Some openly described its "essence" as including "Oblomov-like laziness . . . money-grubbing greed . . . drunken debauchery [and] religious fanaticism."[97] With such a hollow ideology, the temptation was strong to embrace nationalism as an alternative source of support. This temptation was all the greater because such attitudes were deeply ingrained in the Brezhnev generation. Russian nationalism was integral to the hostile-isolationist identity so persistent among

those schooled in Stalin's chauvinist 1930s, in genuine wartime patriotism, and in the extreme Russocentrism of the postwar years. But openly embracing reactionary nationalism was highly problematic because it directly contradicted the regime's internationalist basis of legitimacy.[98] Yakovlev's attack on "Great-Russian chauvinism" was particularly awkward for emphasizing that such ideas were absolutely anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist.[99]

Thus official ambivalence permitted both neo-Slavophiles and neo-Westernizers some latitude as the two engaged in a debate about the past that was transparently aimed at the country's present identity and future direction. Alexander Yanov argued that the nineteenth-century Slavophiles failed because they rejected European democracy and humanism for a utopian myth of Russia's cultural uniqueness.[100] The neo-Slavophiles answered that it was their critics whose model was idealized and unrealistic: "Was not the Westernizers' idea of transplanting European ways onto Russian soil a utopian one?"[101] Yanov invoked authorities such as Pokrovsky and even Lenin to brand the nineteenth-century Slavophiles "kvas-bottle patriots" and "apologists for [the messianic idea of] a Third Rome." The early Westernizers, by contrast, "had imbibed 50 years of European thought from Goethe to Georges Sand, from Kant to Fourier."[102]

Though this particular exchange was soon halted, the larger debate went on. Neo-Slavophilism continued to enjoy official tolerance and unofficial support, while the neo-Westernizers fought back in samizdat,[103] private lectures,[104] and—cautiously—in the open literature as well. Through the latter can be seen how a historical debate expanded to draw in specialists from other fields in an indirect but broader indictment of the old thinking.[105] For some, the Marxist-humanist critique was again the starting point. In *Novy Mir*, Grigory Vodolazov recalled Gramsci's view that "a revolution is not necessarily proletariat and Communist, even if a wave of popular revolt has placed in power men who call themselves communists."[106] In modernizing a backward country, the tendency exists "to render the problem very simply. All 'subtleties' are eliminated . . . from the complication of transition stages . . . the solution to the problem is laid out in straight lines [leading to] barbed wire . . . prisons, concentration camps."[107] In part, Vodolazov was responding to a call for broader reassessment of Soviet historiography than that

which had initially followed Stalin's death. This call had come in a symposium, edited by Gefter, that amounted to a "manifesto of legal Marxism."[108] This symposium, and a later one on "multi-structurality," raised basic questions of historical development—from the origins of European nations to the rise of socialism.[109] As the *Short Course's* crude but still-prevalent model of progression through Marx's five "formations" was challenged, discussion inevitably led back to "the accursed question" of Russia's path between East and West.[110] Gefter, like Vodolazov, was not addressing Soviet history per se, but his argument's relevance to the Stalin and post-Stalin periods was clear: "It is an historical paradox that one-sided, accelerated growth of a new formation 'takes it back' again and again to where it started."[111]

Views similar to Vodolazov's and Gefter's, on the danger of premature revolution and "accelerated" development, resonated far beyond the domain of historians. Area experts now used their subjects as a "mirror" for the USSR.[112] For example, Vladimir Lukin analyzed China to argue the perils of totalitarian ideology in transforming a backward "peasant-statocratic" society.[113] By the 1970s, as ties with China worsened and those with the third world grew, these socialist or "socialist oriented" states provided grist for an indirect debate about the USSR. And beyond bureaucratism, elite corruption, and economic failure, analysts also found suggestive parallels to Soviet foreign policy.[114] Yuri Ostrovityanov and Antonina Sterbalova cited Engels's injunction against labeling as socialist the "crying anachronism" of a system marked by "chauvinism . . . national isolationism, and the resurgence of old despotic methods."[115] Sheinis, viewing "revolutionary" elites of the third world, criticized their "foreign-policy strivings which are not related to real social needs," but lead instead to "arms build-up and militarization that ruin the national economy."[116]

These arguments about developmental paths were also tied to another aspect of debate about Russia and the West. The view of Gefter's 1969 symposium as a manifesto of "legal Marxism" appropriately linked it to the political-philosophical debates of early-twentieth-century Russia, in particular to Berdyaev and the *Vekhi* writers (whose views on Europe and Russia were now widely read).[117] These earlier authors—liberals, former Marxists, or Marxists of Menshevik, social-democratic leanings—had criticized

the radical intelligentsia for their ignorance of Western values and institutions, and for not understanding Russia's need for further economic, social, and cultural development along the European path before there was any possibility of building socialism.[118] Lyudmila Nikitich of the Institute of Social Sciences recalled:

> I read *Vekhi*, Berdyaev and the others in our *spetskhran*. It was all there. Berdyaev's story of the Russian who goes to France and finds that "there's no freedom" because nothing changes and there's no struggle underway, *that* was the naivete and the impatience of our radicals. By 1918 [Semyon] Frank already foresaw everything that would happen to us later. . . . Berdyaev's culture and spirituality was such a contrast to Lenin, who rejected Kantian ethics and the individual, and for whom the only morality was whatever advanced communism, as he said at the Komsomol Congress. . . . For me, Berdyaev was superior even to Gramsci as an inspirational thinker, and you know that my field is Italian Marxism![119]

By the mid 1970s, many understood that under Stalin the country had not only suffered an unfortunate "distortion" in building socialism, but that his attempted leap forward had instead thrown it back onto a primitive, "Asiatic-despotic" developmental path. Others questioned "utopian leaps" more generally and so suggested (intentionally or otherwise) that the wrong turn had been made even earlier, with Russia's break from Europe in 1917.[120] In either case, the remedy was a return to Western civilization. As Tsipko argued, building a humanistic socialist society required "assimilation of all the achievements of civilization and culture."[121] This was the theme that linked the anti-utopian philosophers with historians such as Gefter, political analysts such as Burlatsky, and third world experts such as Sheinis. From diverse perspectives, they all arrived at one conclusion: that Russia must return to the mainstream of world civilization.

Sheinis wrote that all nations were advancing, by various paths, "toward the formation of one international community, the basic features and main values of which . . . cannot be anything but universal."[122] Mamardashvili argued that "the main task before social thinkers . . . is reuniting our motherland with its European destiny . . . our minds still tend toward the old images of encirclement, of 'enemies.' . . . [But] it must be remembered that Russia is indivisi-

bly part of European civilization."[123] Gefter put it thus in a 1977 samizdat essay:

> The past forty years have brought gigantic changes to all human endeavors. The strengthening of the West through fundamental economic changes and the [postwar] revival of "bourgeois democracy," the self-collapse of colonial empires and the rise of the third world, the explosion of science . . . all this and more . . . raises the question of the identity, the oneness of humanity. Planetary shifts, calamities, and fears all knock at our door. Khrushchev . . . cracked the door open. But the "thaw" bogged down largely because we hung on to the anachronism of our exclusive, universalistic path [which led directly to] the Berlin Wall and the Caribbean crisis. . . . The centuries and millennia of civilization's variety, of its arrhythmia, take on new meaning: they are drawing us toward one universal human norm [*obshchechelovecheskaia norma*].[124]

Autarky Versus Integration: Economic Thought at Home and Abroad

Implicitly, underlying much of the early "global" thinking described above were economic concerns. Whether focused on science and the environment, China and the third world, or Russia's historical development, all were greatly influenced by the manifest failures of the Soviet system. By now economists well understood these failures, of course, and two strong reform currents emerged in the 1970s. One, aided by vast new experience studying Western models, was to marketize the economy. The other was to join the world economy, to end autarky and integrate with the "international division of labor." As in other fields, the two currents were intimately connected in their conception, in the politics and personalities of their elaboration, and in their broad implications for policy.

The need for serious economic change was already understood in the years of the thaw, for the ills of the Stalinist system—from apathetic workers to shortages, bottlenecks, and stifling bureaucracy—had been well aired in the media and specialized literature. But it is a mistake to see a straight line between the reformist thought of the early 1960s and the late 1970s, for there were critical differences, too. The thaw saw many bold diagnoses but fewer concrete reme-

dies—mainly general ideas of "market socialism." Many early reformers were "political" economists, weak in quantitative analysis and guided instead by an NEP legacy that was increasingly irrelevant to a modern industrial economy. Moreover, their outlook was largely domestic, their only foreign models being the chimera of self-management and the inspirational but often impractical theories of Lange, Sik, and Brus.

By contrast, the new cohort who studied and began their careers in the 1960s were a different breed. Trained in a more sophisticated world of mathematical models and rigorous empirical analysis, they were steeped in Western theory (and Western critiques of the Soviet economy).[125] Their foreign models were Samuelson, Keynes, and Friedman.[126] It is not entirely incorrect to group the younger generation of reformist economists together with its elders in the broad category of "market socialists," as is often done. But now the emphasis was increasingly on *market* at the expense of *socialist*.

Thus the greatest difference was the extent to which the younger economists were oriented toward the West. Having imbibed neoclassical theory early, many followed advances in macroeconomic and econometric analysis. Given computers to improve planning, they soon found its limitations and used their new tools to examine market alternatives instead. Eastern Europe remained a testing ground, but interest in such "socialist" models as Yugoslav self-management was supplanted by study of such "capitalist" innovations as those in Hungarian agriculture.[127] Still, their gaze remained fixed on the West and its success in encouraging growth, managing business cycles, and stimulating scientific innovation. Reformist institutes became "breeding grounds for marketeers and anti-Marxists."[128] While their works retained a socialist veneer, their ideas were increasingly based on purely economic criteria. Nikolai Shmelev later described this outlook as "everything that is economically efficient is moral."[129] And it was the "immoral" capitalist world where economic efficiency and popular well-being were greatest.

By the mid 1970s, this new cohort was well represented not only in the main establishments of economic research—Novosibirsk, TsEMI, and the Institute of Economics—but also at leading institutes of foreign-policy studies such as IMEMO, ISKAN, and

IEMSS. How did they see their system's performance during the high Brezhnev era? Judging primarily by the open writings of the latter institutes—those most closely scrutinized in the West—it appears they held a quite favorable view. Soviet economic woes were not ignored but, viewed in the relative context of the broader "global correlation of forces," optimism seemed high.[130] For example, an ISKAN study saw the fall of the Bretton Woods order as sharply worsening Western difficulties.[131] A major IMEMO study, while noting Western scientific prowess, argued that this could not mitigate capitalism's contradictions. On the contrary, it increased domestic social strains and also heightened inter-imperialist rivalries.[132] Ideologues naturally emphasized "a qualitative shift in the general crisis of capitalism," but it appeared that many liberal analysts, too, were bullish on Soviet prospects vis-à-vis the West. The consensus at IMEMO seemed to be that "capitalism had entered a new and more troubled phase of its development."[133]

But elsewhere, institute directors Inozemtsev, Arbatov, and Bogomolov were considerably less optimistic. In other writings they emphasized the gathering "scientific-technological revolution," stressed Soviet weakness, and argued for drawing on Western experience to keep pace.[134] Far from simply following the official détente policy of cautiously expanding certain East-West ties, the directors were echoing research by their own staffs, and those of other institutes, that painted a far gloomier picture of the Soviet economy and the global balance of economic forces. And in many classified or limited-circulation studies, these problems, and the necessary remedies, were laid out in much starker terms.[135]

For example, in contrast to limits on honest data in the open literature, specialized publications reported alarming statistics on a Soviet lag in everything from living standards to technology.[136] Some of them detailed problems in scientific, social, and environmental aspects of development, or stressed capitalism's success in these areas.[137] Others argued that solutions lay not just in expanded exchanges or purchases of Western goods, but in broad adoption of Western methods.[138] By the mid 1970s, official recognition of the fact that a global "scientific-technological revolution" was indeed under way permitted a certain latitude for concerns about its success in the USSR (and, beyond the economy, its impact on society, the environment, and military security). But the mainstream literature

was still dominated by optimistic views of this revolution's contribution to "developed socialism" at home and Soviet power abroad.[139] In the open press, reformers could only hint that technological change posed challenges that—without far-reaching reform—the Soviet economy could not possibly surmount. In private, they fairly trumpeted a warning.[140]

In 1972, Shatalin initiated a high-level study group that reported on *Scientific-Technological Progress and its Socio-Economic Impact Through the Year 1990*. Their farsighted study was ignored.[141] Shortly thereafter, Kosygin invited top experts—including Aganbegyan, Fedorenko, Arbatov, Inozemtsev, and Bogomolov—to discuss the economy. But when anyone argued the need for substantial change, Kosygin attacked them viciously.[142] In 1973, with a decision to hold a Central Committee plenum on scientific-technological issues, many of the same experts were tapped to draft a report. Again they called for substantial reforms, again they were ignored, and the idea for a plenum simply "sank like a stone."[143]

Whereas the USSR's international technological lag was uppermost in some reformers' early détente-era appeals to the leadership, others stressed domestic concerns even more emphatically. Again, this is seen in specialized literature, where analysts could go beyond such cautious arguments as Kantorovich's on the problem of irrational prices in *Voprosy Filosofii*. For example, Shatalin hit hard on the price issue and on the sensitive question of incentives and pay differentials.[144] His TsEMI colleague Nikolai Petrakov and IEMSS analyst Nikolai Shmelev both advocated financial and decision-making autonomy for production enterprises.[145] Others promoted Hungary's market-cooperative experiments or even a revamping of Lenin's original cooperative ideas.[146] Novosibirsk director Aganbegyan warned of severe socioeconomic ills in various national regions.[147] And in 1975, TsEMI director Fedorenko presented an in-depth, classified report on Soviet economic problems and prospects so stark that it left his listeners stunned.[148]

Taken together, these analyses shouted of a looming crisis. While the general need for market reforms had been long understood—and many ideas for change in one or another sector were now advanced—probably no critique was so bold and no proposals so sweeping as those of Shmelev. Already in 1970, he was advocating that enterprises operate on a self-financing, cost-accounting

(*khozraschet*) basis. With détente, he joined the strong supporters of East-West trade.

Shmelev's arguments were unique in several important respects. First, he did not limit them to economic gains but offered a theoretical justification as well; for socialism "there have not been, and are not now, any objective developmental factors that require autarky."[149] Second, he refuted warnings of sinister capitalist motives; the West sought trade for the same reason that the USSR should, namely "the advantages of the international division of labor [i.e. classical gains from trade] which are the foundation of our deep, mutual interest."[150] Third, the sort of trade Shmelev envisioned was not simply access to Western markets or the purchase of specific technologies, but a means to transform completely the domestic system. This it would do by opening the economy to foreign contacts and competition, essentially forcing it to adopt decentralizing measures and market practices across the board.

Shmelev's proposals toward this end were concrete. First, foreign trade must not be a state monopoly. Rather, "spontaneous" ties should be fostered "by giving production enterprises and firms the right of direct access to the foreign market."[151] Second, joint ventures and broad foreign investment should be encouraged.[152] Third, steps must be taken toward internal and ultimately external currency convertibility.[153] This would mean transition to world market prices, to be bolstered by a further step: membership in international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT.[154] Taken together, the implications of Shmelev's ideas were clear; the end of state control over prices, exchange rates, and international ties would make most central planning impossible, while forcing newly independent enterprises to learn from and compete with foreign producers.

At least officially, the Soviet leadership was all for expanding trade and contacts with the West. In 1973, Brezhnev stated, "We have no plans for autarky [but instead seek] growth of broad cooperation with the outside world."[155] But others stressed trade's limits, warned of Western economic and ideological manipulation, and argued that the country must remain "an independent economic unit."[156] Of course, the leadership knew exactly where Shmelev was pointing and had no intention of taking even his first step toward

"internationalization" of the Soviet economy. As one high-level Party declaration argued,

> The state monopoly on foreign trade is the best way to meet the needs of a planned, socialist economy [without which] it is impossible to preserve socialism's economic independence, operate a planned economy, and preserve state and national interests. . . . We maintain a high state of vigilance against abuse of economic cooperation by class enemies.[157]

By the time of this statement, 1977, hopes for an East-West trade boom had already been dashed, in part due to a U.S. congressional amendment tying favorable trade status to human rights, as well as by the pall cast over East-West relations by Soviet activism in the third world. But as Shmelev saw it, the real problem was a Soviet decision not to take advantage of détente's opportunities to assist in economic reform, but to use them instead as a stopgap measure to avoid it. As he had warned as early as 1975,

> The USSR lags behind the other CEMA states and even some developing countries in the use of promising international economic cooperation. . . . The biggest growth so far [has been in] grain imports made possible by Western credits. So now we have a trade deficit with the West. In 1973–74 another factor emerged [namely] a rise in world prices of raw materials and oil which led to a sharp rise in our hard currency earnings. . . . However, this situation is temporary and is not likely to last beyond the 1980s.[158]

Just as the appeals of Inozemtsev, Arbatov, and others for urgent measures to redress the country's growing technological lag fell on deaf ears—at least among the senior leadership—so, too, did Shmelev's warnings about using the glut of oil money to avoid change. The country enjoyed an illusory prosperity that blinded the aging Politburo and even emboldened it to launch the foreign adventures that helped bury détente. And this, in turn, aided reactionary tendencies with predictable results for reformist thinkers. Economists who persisted in offering unwanted advice were subject to the same sanctions suffered by outspoken intellectuals in other fields.[159]

Still, the new thinkers did not give up. On the contrary, in the specialized literature they pushed reformist proposals harder than ever. IEMSS continued to hold up East European success in attract-

ing foreign investment as a model for the USSR.[160] Vladimir Tikhonov, who had promoted the revival of NEP-style cooperatives, now called for "fundamental changes" in agriculture.[161] IMEMO admired the Common Market's environmental programs and held out the United States and Japan as models for technological growth.[162] And ISKAN produced scores of laudatory studies of the U.S. economy, on topics from automation and civilian uses of space technology to housing construction and scrap-metal recycling.[163]

Toward decade's end, hopes for reform were probably lower than even at its troubled beginning. Still, the stagnation era saw great changes in thinking about the USSR's economic place in the world. A highly professional cohort of specialists had matured, and their experience studying the West made the desire to join it very strong. Their vision of the Soviet future was generally that of a social-democratic type welfare state and full participant in the "international division of labor."[164] The salience of capitalist-socialist differences faded and Western "threats" were simply no longer an issue. Informed by neoclassical precepts of mutual gains from trade, the USSR's overriding interest in fully joining the global economy was simply a given.

International Relations and the West: Coexistence, Cooperation, and Conciliation

This section focuses on the *mezhdunarodniki*, the most specialized students and practitioners of international relations: area experts, policy analysts, technical advisers, diplomats, and others directly concerned with foreign affairs. While the preceding sections have shown the broad conceptual underpinnings of new thinking on international relations—and also explored some of the main issues and individuals involved—they have not examined closely the most pressing East-West problems. In the 1970s, the most critical of these was probably nuclear arms control.

For new thinkers, the first post-thaw years were distressing in their retreat from Khrushchev's near-categorical rejection of "survivable" nuclear war. This was indirectly seen in such statements as Brezhnev's that "in combat against any aggressor, the Soviet Union will achieve victory," and directly in military pronouncements that

even from the ashes of nuclear war, socialism would arise triumphant with capitalism defeated forever.[165] Briefly silenced, the resumption of U.S.-Soviet arms talks emboldened liberals such as Burlatsky with his heretical claim that peace was "an absolute value," higher than class and other interests.[166] With the success of the 1972 SALT and ABM treaties, others joined in. Bovin rejected the formula that war could be a rational continuation of policy; he argued that "further growth of nuclear arsenals loses . . . meaning and decreases rather than increases security."[167] Arbatov echoed this; he warned hawks (on both sides) that striving for superiority would only prompt "efforts to build up power by the opposing side—in other words, unrestrained military rivalry and armed conflict."[168] To those who still emphasized capitalism's aggressive designs, Burlatsky answered that Western democracy "virtually precluded" resort to nuclear war.[169]

Such views enjoyed a brief prominence during the early-to-mid 1970s—though more militaristic voices were hardly silenced—because détente's heyday was the time of greatest influence on Brezhnev of such reformist advisers as Arbatov, Inozemtsev, and Bovin (and because Brezhnev the "realist" temporarily eclipsed Brezhnev the "ideologue").[170] But behind such public statements, détente and arms control brought far more radical changes to the outlook of many experts than was visible from afar. This they did by utterly transforming their conditions of study and work—through exposure to vast new sources of data, to foreign theoretical and policy studies, and through broad new ties with their Western counterparts. The impact of such changes in other fields has been seen, but for many *mezhdunarodniki* it came somewhat later. Arbatov explains this via his own experience, with the example that as late as 1968 even he, director of the new USA Institute, still had not a single American acquaintance because "given the restrictions of the times . . . I didn't even have the right to initiate such contacts."[171]

Arms control, addressing as it did the holy of holies—the country's nuclear forces—was an area of highest secrecy. Earlier negotiations (such as on the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty) brought in some scientists and other civilian advisers, to enlightening effect. But beyond the military, detailed knowledge of strategic capabilities remained extremely limited and there existed nothing even remotely like an independent analytical center. Still, as seen earlier, some

scholar-publicists and Foreign Ministry staffers familiar with Western strategic thought played a vital role in urging the leadership to begin talks on nuclear limitations as the Soviet buildup attained strategic parity (on top of conventional superiority) with the United States and NATO. Even so, the Politburo was still not fully committed to concluding a treaty, and Stalin's legacy weighed heavily on Soviet participants as the first SALT talks began in 1969. "When Brezhnev saw us off [to Helsinki] he really didn't have anything of substance to say on the issues but mainly spoke about how we should behave ourselves: 'You watch your step there, don't forget that the Lubyanka [KGB headquarters and prison] isn't far away.' "[172]

As talks progressed, this cloud hanging over Soviet negotiators largely passed and the "psychological climate . . . changed a great deal."[173] But they soon collided with other Stalinist legacies that encouraged deeper rethinking of their Western counterparts and the political systems that they represented. One such legacy was paranoid secretiveness, which led to such embarrassing episodes as the following:

> Once my American colleague at the UN disarmament commission, where at [our own] initiative the discussion concerned cuts in naval forces, asked me to specify the size of the Soviet fleet. I had no data on this. He showed me a list of Soviet warships . . . in an American publication and asked me to confirm it. That I could not do. He then said that under such circumstances he would not even discuss the matter, let alone enter into negotiations.[174]

Soviet diplomats felt humiliation at their dependence on open Western sources, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) or the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), for data on their own country's forces.[175] They also envied the broad initiative permitted their U.S. counterparts: "[A Soviet] negotiator, even a very high-ranking one, could not know whether a 'bargaining position' even existed or whether there was another position to fall back on; he simply lacked the data required for [such a] judgment."[176] Gradually, mutual respect and trust were built, "not only during negotiating sessions but also [in] conversations at home, intervals, or 'walks in the woods.' "[177] Moreover, understanding grew that "our enduring supersecrecy and spy mania" was not only a problem for arms control—as an

obstacle to agreement on treaty verification provisions—but symptomatic of a much deeper malady of the Soviet system.[178]

During détente, experts in European and, especially, American affairs emerged as a special corps among Soviet diplomats. The latter worked in the ministry's U.S.A. section in Moscow or studied in "Dobrynin's School," the Soviet embassy in Washington.[179] Arms negotiators were a particular elite; others worked on broader political, economic, and cultural ties.[180] Many *zapadniki* ("Westernizers," a telling self-appellation) developed a high regard for the United States and a deep commitment to furthering détente.[181] As Alexander Bessmyrtnykh recalled, "We developed great admiration for the West, for the United States . . . respect for the country, its strengths, its people. I can't say that it was all 'new thinking,' we were what you call realists, but strongly dedicated to arms control and to improving Soviet-American relations."[182]

Détente similarly affected another segment of the *mezhdunarodniki*—Soviet scientists—who were now increasingly drawn in to East-West relations and arms control. Some knew the issues from work in weapons design or as advisers to the negotiations. Others took part in Pugwash meetings, UN committees on disarmament and nuclear energy, or other international fora on global security issues. An even larger group participated in scores of new foreign exchanges in fields from nuclear physics to medicine.[183] Natural scientists had long been prominent among politically active Soviet intellectuals.[184] Due in part to the critical, nonideological nature of their work as well as the tradition of exemplars from Kapitsa to Artsimovich, their détente-era experiences only heightened awareness of the folly of isolation and "raised the consciousness of Soviet scientists about their role in their own society and the world."[185]

In this consciousness-raising, Sakharov's influence was particularly important. Notwithstanding his growing official ostracism, détente only increased the resonance of his early arguments on coexistence and human rights. For some, such as Sagdeyev, the latter was as important as the former as understanding grew that scientific integrity was inseparable from broader intellectual and individual liberties.[186] Others found Sakharov's views on East-West relations particularly persuasive; Goldansky, who shared a hospital room with him for several days in 1973, recalled "endless hours" of debate over for-

eign policy.[187] But for Goldansky and many others, a breakthrough only came with participation in the Pugwash movement:

> I first went to the meeting in Munich in 1977, then Bulgaria in 1978 and Mexico in 1979. It was highly impressive . . . the foreign participants had such command of the scientific and political issues. I learned about non-proliferation, testing and other matters . . . it broadened my horizons in every way.[188]

Sagdeyev, who first attended a Pugwash meeting at Artsimovich's invitation in 1970, described his involvement as having "played a central role in my thinking." But he also noted that, over the decade of détente, Pugwash was gradually "displaced" by new exchanges that drew in many more Soviet participants.[189] Boris Raushenbakh, a pioneer of Soviet rocketry (and a camp survivor) described his work on the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz joint spaceflight as important to his evolving views on U.S.-Soviet cooperation.[190] Cardiologist Yevgeny Chazov wrote of the "mutual sympathy and individual friendships" that arose among U.S. and Soviet physicians.[191] Perhaps the most influential perestroika-era Soviet scientist was Yevgeny Velikhov, who (in addition to insights on global security gained from weapons-design work) credited his broad détente-era experience with international exchanges on fusion and other physics problems. "I had many foreign colleagues and friends . . . and so realized very early that we live in one world. You know, I probably had more American contacts than anybody else here except Arbatov."[192]

The benefits of détente were equally great for the core group of *mezhdunarodniki*—the scholar-publicists of international-relations and foreign policy. The 1970s saw a huge increase in the information and contacts available to Soviet analysts. INION, founded only in 1969, was soon distributing hundreds of reviews, summaries, and translations of Western foreign-policy studies.[193] Subscriptions to foreign journals soared, and institute libraries quickly filled with specialized Western literature. Access was also eased to Western media and to restricted "White TASS" reportage.[194] For the hundreds of young analysts who joined ISKAN, IMEMO, and other institutes in the 1970s, the hypersecrecy (and consequent ignorance) of an earlier generation was largely unknown.[195]

Military-related information remained under tighter control, but civilian analysts relied on the same SIPRI and IISS data books

that Soviet negotiators used.[196] Moreover, among closed institute publications there now appeared many dispassionate, detailed analyses of defense issues. Some reviewed U.S. missile programs or naval doctrine.[197] Others examined NATO nuclear cooperation or issues of defense-economic conversion.[198] All drew overwhelmingly on Western sources or simply presented Western views, the latter ranging from a State Department study on the global effects of nuclear war to lectures on threat assessment and defense planning by Pentagon advisor Alain Enthoven.[199]

This rapid growth in military studies was abetted by ties to scientific-diplomatic expertise. Senior *institutchiki* took part in Pugwash and other international fora alongside scientists and military officers.[200] Military and diplomatic officials were increasingly frequent visitors to ISKAN.[201] In 1978, IMEMO became the coordinating institution for the U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee on International Issues that united scientists with policy analysts under the two countries' academies of science.[202] From being nonexistent just a few years earlier, strategic studies became central to both institutes' work; ISKAN's Military Department grew with the addition of reform-minded officers on loan from the general staff, and IMEMO's military research section (whose very existence was still concealed as the "Department of Technical-Economic Research") managed to combine contract work for the Defense Ministry with the hiring of "semi-dissident" officer-analysts.[203]

It was not long before this growth in access and expertise was reflected in critical analyses.[204] Vitaly Shlykov, a retired officer working at IMEMO, questioned dogmas about NATO forces and the rationale for such massive, expensive Soviet armies.[205] Study of NATO economics showed an alliance divided by business squabbles and unable to agree even on weapons standardization.[206] Shlykov also questioned projections of the West's mobilization potential that were central to assessments of a conventional-arms threat to the East: "Once I examined NATO plans and resources, I saw that our assumptions were ridiculously exaggerated and that our own capabilities were ten times greater."[207] Meanwhile, his colleague Alexei Arbatov (the son of ISKAN director Georgy Arbatov) reviewed the U.S. nuclear threat; analyzing the U.S. *Trident* and B-1 programs, he downplayed Moscow's view of them as first-strike weapons, while acknowledging the U.S. position that

they were meant to counter the huge Soviet land-based missile force.[208] ISKAN analyst Yevgeny Kutovoi, examining Western views of the Soviet military buildup, warned that "any steps capable of upsetting the existing balance . . . could have very serious consequences."[209]

Regional studies, too, grew bolder. Viewing the recent Sino-American rapprochement, ISKAN analyst Vladimir Lukin questioned the official anti-Chinese (and anti-American) line; while faulting Mao for "splitting" socialist unity and blocking Soviet influence, the USSR itself was actually more to blame. Improved Sino-American relations had "an objective foundation" in Soviet behavior; the United States had "reconsidered the Chinese military threat" because Peking was "no longer . . . inclined to send troops beyond its borders." The United States, too, had greatly reduced its military presence in Asia, as Lukin detailed, while Soviet deployments in the region, particularly opposite China, had only grown.[210] Asia was also the subject of an even bolder proposal by IMEMO analyst (and retired army colonel) Viktor Girshfeld.[211]

> The Soviet Union can even undertake unilateral arms and troop reductions without danger of upsetting the balance. On the contrary, this will lead to similar reductions [by the United States and NATO]. . . . And to normalize our relations with China, these [cuts] could be up to one-half of our conventional and two-thirds of our strategic forces.[212]

Analysts also rethought dogmas about Europe. Boris Orlov, the former *Izvestiia* correspondent rescued by Delusin and Chernyaev, published several original works on social democracy.[213] Their subjects ranged from the politics of Willy Brandt to the phenomenon of neofascism; he admired the former and judged the latter a fringe phenomenon that was decidedly not part of a broader "revanchist" threat, as officially depicted.[214] Another who cautiously reappraised the Federal Republic of Germany and its foreign policy was IMEMO analyst Daniil Proektor.[215] Such works reflected a broader rethinking of Western Europe and the progress of its integration. Over the mid-to-late 1970s, IMEMO produced many studies viewing European political and economic union in an increasingly favorable, even glowing light.[216]

To the Summit and Back: The Peaks and Valleys of Détente

Europe was the setting of détente's other main diplomatic breakthrough—the CSCE. It was also the locus of an internal debate that, as with the ongoing struggle over arms control, pitted old thinkers against new thinkers in a battle that concerned domestic as much as international affairs, and whose near-term significance for foreign policy was matched by its long-term implications for the cause of reform and the country's overall path of development.

While the idea of a pan-European agreement went back decades, it rose to the top of the Soviet diplomatic agenda only in the early 1970s. This was due in large part to the efforts of midlevel diplomats-*zapadniki* concerned to broaden the momentum of détente—principally Lev Mendelevich and Anatoly Kovalev—and was also enthusiastically supported by new thinkers in the apparat, academia, and journalism.[217] Just the first round in an envisioned permanent (to date, ongoing) process of negotiation, the Helsinki agreement of 1975 was, for the leading states of the two blocs, a compromise; the East sought formal recognition of Europe's postwar borders, while the West sought to open those same borders to the freer flow of individuals, information, and ideas.

Brezhnev, concerned primarily with the former (and also with his chances for the Nobel Peace Prize), signed the Final Act "without really reading it through."[218] Other Politburo members looked at it closely and did not like what they saw. The CSCE became "a highly contested topic inside the country, the subject of an acute ideological and political struggle."[219] Suslov, in particular, detected "a threat to the steel and concrete dogmata of the communist ideals." He subsequently "blacklisted" Kovalev, who had worked most assiduously for Moscow's acceptance of Helsinki's human-rights provisions.[220]

Yet it was precisely those provisions that encouraged many new thinkers. In the CSCE, they saw, rather than simply de jure confirmation of a de facto geopolitical reality, a new impetus for détente that would extend beyond superpower summitry to encourage domestic reforms, a gradual liberalization of the Communist system, and humanization of Soviet society. At home, some worked to incorporate Helsinki's humanitarian strictures into Soviet domestic

law.[221] Others went even further, edging close to Sakharov and the dissidents' concerns in seeking greater protection of human rights or broader openness and steps toward real democratization of political life.[222] In short, Helsinki provided an enormous boost to liberals' hopes of forging a meaningful Soviet "Westpolitik."[223]

Thus, by the mid 1970s, reformist thought had gone far beyond mere revival of "peaceful coexistence" to the broad theoretical conception of—and numerous concrete proposals toward—deeper integration with the West. But while thinking rapidly advanced, practice stagnated or retreated. Socioeconomic problems at home, and throughout the bloc, worsened as reform opportunities were squandered. Abroad, détente's diplomatic gains seemed to encourage not conciliation but expansionism. Trade talks floundered, human-rights disputes grew, and an aging Politburo seemed to draw all the wrong lessons from the experience of the early-to-mid 1970s. And so what appeared so promising in 1975 was clearly unraveling only a year or two later. In response, leading new thinkers turned to even more active measures to save détente.

Even as their influence on an increasingly skeptical and infirm Brezhnev waned while that of militaristic-nationalistic forces grew, reformist advisers such as Arbatov and Inozemtsev struggled to revive and advance the arms-control process.[224] Others appealed for a reversal of provocative steps, such as the decision to deploy a new generation of missiles targeted on Europe or to construct a massive new radar in violation of the ABM Treaty.[225] In these efforts they failed, but Soviet scientists did successfully block an even more dangerous (and expensive) military initiative—that of a vast strategic defense system akin to the later U.S. "Star Wars" program.[226]

The signing of the SALT II Treaty in 1979 brought a ray of hope, and Soviet liberals again spoke out publicly in strong support of arms control. Beyond criticism of the still-prevalent formula that war "was simply a continuation of policy by other means," the domestic need for deep arms cuts was now stressed.[227] Central Committee aide Shakhnazarov, IMEMO analysts Oleg Bykov and Rachik Faramazian, and IEMSS analyst Boris Gorizontov noted weapons production's environmental harm, the need to convert military industry to civilian needs, and even compared the arms race to "eating one's own skin to ward off starvation."[228] Elsewhere, IMEMO director Inozemtsev renewed his calls, in public writings

and even stronger, private appeals to the leadership, for integration with the global economy.[229] ISKAN echoed this in a continuing flow of laudatory studies of the U.S. economy; simultaneously, in a report to the Central Committee, director Arbatov returned to arms control and the confrontation heightened by Moscow's military buildup. Renewed superpower tensions could be eased only by greater Soviet openness and an "authoritative, public explanation of our positions." The problem was that

> extreme secrecy leads to deadlock in relations with the USA [and permits] their military-industrial complex to take the arms race to yet another level while weakening the position of those [American] forces in favor of lowering the level of military confrontation and defense outlays. A lack of clarity and openness regarding the intentions of one side always fuels suspicion and fear, encourages worst-case scenarios, and complicates the chances for agreement.[230]

Meanwhile, IEMSS analyst Dashichev tied détente to Eastern Europe. In a strongly implied criticism of the USSR's increasingly confrontational course with the West, and its efforts to enforce such a policy throughout the bloc, Dashichev stressed Eastern Europe's "special need for good relations" with Western neighbors.[231] Unlike the autarkic USSR, "easing international tensions is vital" for states like Poland and Hungary, due to economic and geographic realities. Despite Poland's foreign-debt crisis, Dashichev argued "the necessity of widening cooperation in the international division of labor," assessed East-West economic ties as "on the whole, positive," and even suggested that East European experience could help "draw the USSR into" such exchange.[232] In general, "the independence and initiative" of smaller socialist states could moderate tensions [i.e., Soviet intransigence]."[233] IEMSS director Bogomolov sent up a report warning that, without radical reforms, Eastern Europe—and, by implication, the USSR—was "doomed to economic and social degradation and crisis." Integration must be

> an organic process (i.e., free movement of people, ideas and capital across borders) . . . the internationalization process, which Lenin considered the most critical indicator and precondition of mankind's progress, has stopped. The main reason for this is that ruthless centralization inevitably leads to withdrawal and isolation, autarky. . . . And monopoly, as Lenin taught, always leads to rot.[234]

■

A Russian proverb tells that "a fish rots from the head," and this was certainly true of Soviet politics at the beginning of the 1980s. Despite the emergence of a reformist intellectual elite—many of whose members now vigorously promoted a sharp "Westernizing" turn in the country's course—an aging leadership was unable to accept even minor changes. The rapid decay in domestic and international life was directly tied to a growing decrepitude at the top. Politically and ideologically opposed to change even in the best of times, the Brezhnev cohort was increasingly paralyzed by a literal physical rot. Reformist efforts now went far beyond even those at the height of the thaw era. But the new thinkers would endure another five years of rejection until arrival of a leader willing and able to put their ideas into practice.