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Intellectuals and the World: From the Secret Speech to the Prague Spring

> The "generation of 1966" consisted of "establishment" people. Instead of half-scholars, it included doctors of science; instead of poets who had never published a single line, it included longtime members of the Union of Soviet Writers; instead of "persons with no specific occupation" it included old Bolsheviks, officers, actors and artists. For many of them, the years 1953–56 had also been decisive. But they still had hopes for improvement, and it was not until the unmistakable regression toward Stalinization in 1965–66 that their inner dissent was strengthened and their protest provoked.
>
> —Andrei Amalrik, *Notes of a Revolutionary*

> I suffered terribly over Prague. I condemned it in my soul, to my friends, and told my little schoolgirl daughter "Remember this—a great country has covered itself with shame and won't be forgiven."
>
> —Anatoly Chernyaev, *Shest' let s Gorbachevym*

The era of post-Stalin reforms is usually seen as strictly tied to, and bounded by, the years of the Khrushchev leadership beginning soon after Stalin's death in 1953 and ending with Khrushchev's removal in 1964. But in terms of the new thinking's rise—the transformation of beliefs and identity among a particular intellectual elite—the most important changes began in earnest only with Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956, and they continued well beyond his fall—until the new Brezhnev leadership moved strongly against reform after strangling the Prague Spring in 1968.

Notwithstanding some early steps, Khrushchev's main reform efforts began with his assault on Stalin, and on a conservative-Stalinist majority in the leadership, at the 20th congress. The

Stalinists fought back and nearly ousted Khrushchev in the affair of the "Anti-Party Group" of 1957. Narrowly victorious, Khrushchev pushed ahead. By the 22nd congress, in 1961, he brought an even bolder de-Stalinization campaign into the open. This time there were many anti-Stalin speeches, not just one, and they were public, not secret. Stalin's body was pointedly removed from the Lenin mausoleum, and there now followed in literature and the media an honest, searching critique of Stalinism and its legacies.

Though never without contradictions and reversals, this was also the period of Khrushchev's most important reform efforts in three areas: cultural-intellectual life, administration and the economy, and international affairs. Experimentation, diversity, and a general liberalizing trend dominated. In foreign policy, particularly after the Berlin and Cuban crises of 1961–62, Khrushchev embarked much more resolutely on the path of peaceful coexistence that he had proclaimed six years earlier. Critically, in all three areas, reforms were *not* undone immediately after Khrushchev's fall from power in October 1964. Conservative forces were emboldened, but in important ways the thaw epoch continued, and many of Khrushchev's changes would not come under serious assault until after the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. This was particularly true of the intellectual revival so vital in the inception of new thinking.

The preceding chapter viewed the main outlines of the USSR's initial opening to its own past and present, and to the world. There were broad changes in society and culture, new freedoms and diversity in intellectual life that began a reconnection with foreign thought and practice, and institutional changes that established regular interchange with the West and new centers for the specialized study of international politics and economics. By the end of Khrushchev's rule, these changes had already gone far toward the revival of an active, critical-thinking intelligentsia.

This chapter focuses more closely on intellectual life in the three fields noted above—culture and history, economics and society, and international relations—to trace the roots of new thinking mainly from the changes following the 20th congress in 1956 through the onset of a sharp conservative turn after 1968. It will show how growing scholarly-analytic freedoms at home and expanding ties abroad rapidly eroded hostile-isolationist beliefs. In all three fields, a push to reintegrate with the international community was strong. In the

humanities and social sciences, foreign experience became a critical reference point. For specialists in economics and foreign policy, Western models grew increasingly influential.

It has been argued that these various currents dominated a new intelligentsia. It is also important to understand that their diverse proponents were not simply motivated by related concerns, or engaged in parallel pursuits, but in a critical sense *were united in one common pursuit*. This was so, first, because their seemingly disparate professional priorities—international or domestic affairs, social, economic, or cultural policy—were inextricably linked. Just as the fundamental problem of a centralized-militarized system confronted reformers in both foreign and economic affairs, so did the revival of Soviet literature and philosophy necessitate similar rethinking of ties to foreign cultures. The reformist intellectuals examined here are often referred to as "Children of the 20th Congress," but rarely is it understood how the logic of their inquiries, not just their shared anti-Stalinism, indeed made them a member of similar intellectual fraternity. Moreover, they were also joined by personal and professional bonds; the educational and career links among reformist historians and economists, philosophers and physicists, policy analysts and Party apparatchiks, were strong. And it was these personal-professional ties, together with their shared beliefs, that fostered a distinct social identity and fortified the "neo-Westernizers" in the difficult years after 1968.

Intellectuals Against Isolationism: Culture, Philosophy, and History

The post-Stalin protest against isolationism came swiftly in the field of literature and culture. Led by the flagship reformist journal, *Novy Mir*, prominent authors and critics attacked the overweening "Soviet nationalism" and Russian chauvinism that had rendered cultural life self-congratulatory, barren, and ritualistic. Konstantin Simonov, *Novy Mir* editor from 1954 to 1956, criticized both the suppression of non-Russian cultures within the USSR as well as the country's broader isolation from foreign cultures.[1] Simonov published a number of European authors, and his successor, Alexander Tvardovsky, furthered the opening to Western thought.[2] Ilya Ehrenburg's 1958 article "Rereading Chekhov" recalled the shame

of the Dreyfus affair (over its anti-Semitism and scapegoating of others for one's own failures) in a veiled defense of Pasternak and a broad attack on the Stalinist system.[3] Ehrenburg deplored the system's legacy of "ferocious and absurd censorship . . . extreme anti-semitism and national chauvinism."[4] In memoirs serialized over 1960–62, he appraised Western culture. "I am prepared," he wrote, "to render homage not only to Shakespeare and Cervantes, but to Picasso, Chaplin and Hemingway, and I do not feel that this degrades me. Unending talk about one's superiority is [a sign of] an inferiority complex."[5]

Essayist Yefim Dorosh also faulted Stalin's cultural iron curtain and argued that "nations, like people, cannot live in isolation, and the more boldly a nation draws from outside, the healthier it will be."[6] Beyond such principled critiques, other works challenged hostile-isolationist beliefs more directly by portraying the West in a new, positive light. Viktor Nekrasov's 1958 "First Acquaintance," the diary of a trip to France and Italy, offered complex, sympathetic portraits. Further, Nekrasov not only revealed that most progressive Europeans deplored Soviet actions in Hungary, but also allowed that he, too, found the official justifications unconvincing.[7] Ehrenburg's influential memoirs gave an even more detailed picture of European life, drawn from his extensive travels. His portrayal of cultural and social diversity, praise for artists and writers vilified in Moscow, and admiration for European intellectuals were widely read and discussed.[8] Ehrenburg also offered some harsh comparisons; even Spain, though poor, was "a very great country, it has succeeded in preserving its youthful ardor despite all of the efforts of inquisitors and parasites . . . in this country live people, real, live people."[9] The contrast with Russia, whose people had been bled by parasites and had the life squeezed out of them by the grand inquisitor Stalin, was clear.

The best-known writers of the thaw era dealt primarily with Stalin's domestic legacies; for example, Vladimir Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* attacked the arbitrary bureaucratic system that suppressed initiative and destroyed creativity.[10] But the most sensational such theme—the gulag and the millions who had labored and perished in the camps, as depicted in Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*—also raised the issue of Stalinism's domestic-foreign nexus. The question was devastatingly simple, as

already noted: If so many had been wrongly condemned for involvement in nonexistent capitalist plots, then what *was* the truth about capitalism's "threat" to socialism? Other works raised questions about the country's ties to the West through history and culture; the heresy of Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*, for example, lay in its sympathetic portrayal of the old "European" intelligentsia whose traditions were destroyed in the revolution and civil war. Yevgeny Yevtushenko's 1961 poem *Babi Yar*, an attack on the policy that hid the mainly Jewish identity of those massacred at the Ukrainian site, was also an implicit criticism of the chauvinism that sought to isolate the fate of Soviet Jews and other persecuted peoples from the broader European tragedy of fascism and anti-Semitism.[11]

By the mid 1960s, the literary avant-garde was dominated by Yevtushenko and other young writers such as Andrei Voznesensky, Bella Akhmadulina, and Vasily Aksenov. Though also focused mainly on domestic themes, they stood in sharp contrast to a generation of Stalinist literary figures by virtue of their increasingly Western orientation. Some admired and consciously emulated Proust, Joyce, and T. S. Eliot.[12] Others found inspiration not only in the newly permitted works of pre-Stalin Russian masters—Bulgakov, Gumilev, Tsvetaeva, and Mandelstam—but also in Kafka, Brecht, Hemingway, and other now-widely read Western authors. Culturally, the country was "making an exit from Asia, attaching itself to Europe."[13]

Despite this movement's youth, the role played by some notable older-generation figures in fostering the country's opening must also be stressed. Unlike a majority of their contemporaries, these few stood out by virtue of experience that set them apart from most Stalin-era intellectuals, tying them instead to an earlier epoch or rendering them particularly critical of the Stalinist outlook. Simonov, the first thaw-era *Novy Mir* editor, was a poet-essayist whose patriotic wartime writings won Stalin's favor. Later, on visits to Europe and the United States, Simonov was deeply struck by the contrast between life at home and abroad. With new eyes, he critically viewed the onset of cold war and the campaign against "kowtowing" before the West, contrasting legitimate national pride with "superficial patriotism, kvas-bottle patriotism . . . self-glorification and the rejection of all things foreign simply because they are for-

eign."[14] Simonov was especially pained by Stalin's imperial treatment of Yugoslavia; he had formed close ties with Partisan leaders and greatly admired Yugoslavia and its people.[15]

Tvardovsky, Simonov's successor at *Novy Mir*, was another formerly orthodox writer who had gained fame through his wartime works. The turning point in his outlook came with the revelation of Stalin's crimes. While sponsoring many reformist works, his passion was the gulag theme and his main battles with the old guard were over Solzhenitsyn and other "camp writers."[16] Although focused on the terror, dogmas about the world abroad that justified repressions at home did not escape Tvardovsky's scrutiny. In 1963, Vasily Terkin, the famed soldier of Tvardovsky's wartime verse, passed on to "the other world" in a poem that ridiculed militant isolationism and suggested that the socialist paradise was really closer to hell:

> You couldn't be expected to know: there's this world where we are
> And then there's the other, the bourgeois one, of course.
> Each has its walls beneath a common ceiling:
> Two such worlds, two systems, and the border under lock and key.
>
> . . .
>
> But wait: Even in the stillness beyond the grave
> Do labor and capital exist? And the struggle too, and all the rest?
>
> . . .
>
> That's a big subject. Here's the chief thing to remember:
> In this place beyond the grave, our world is the best and most advanced.
>
> . . .
>
> In the first place, the discipline there is weak compared with ours.
> The picture is: Over here—a marching column, over there —a mob.[17]

Ehrenburg, like Simonov and Tvardovsky, was a conformist writer for most of the Stalin era. His later (re)emergence as a leading critic

of cultural isolation stemmed from his extensive European experience—that of a self-described intellectual "formed in pre-revolutionary times."[18]

Closely tied to the cultural thaw was a revival of philosophy, and here, too, a critical role was played by a few old-intelligentsia exemplars. Even before the 20th congress sanctioned fresh scholarly approaches, a postwar generation was encouraged by prominent elders such as Valentin Asmus, Bonifatsy Kedrov, and Konstantin Bakradze. Specializing respectively in formal logic, philosophy of science, and the history of philosophy, all were born around the turn of the century and schooled in a rich, prerevolutionary tradition. They were Marxists, but also nondogmatic thinkers who rejected the crude schemas of the *Short Course* and instilled in students the critical faculties that would ultimately lead many to non- and anti-Marxist views. Thus the rejuvenation of philosophy was "powerfully abetted by the survival of a group of older scholars . . . a link to an earlier tradition of Russian work . . . reaching back into the nineteenth century.[19]

This rejuvenation was already in evidence at MGU even before the events of 1956. Motivated by such teachers as Asmus, I. S. Narsky, and Teodor Oizerman—in whose lectures and seminars the discussion went far beyond what was then publishable—students sought answers "by going back to the real Marx."[20] Others were impressed by earlier, non-Marxist Russian thought.[21] "Courses on contemporary bourgeois philosophy became extremely popular with all students," particularly as access to original texts expanded around the time of the 20th congress.[22] There ensued a "revolt of the young" among the new generation of philosophers.[23] Students of logic, including future luminaries Evald Ilyenkov, Alexander Zinoviev, Boris Grushin, and Merab Mamardashvili, extended their criticism beyond the *Short Course*'s "barren" dialectics to fault the limitations of both Lenin's and Marx's systems of knowledge.[24] Students of the history of Russian philosophy, notably Yuri Karyakin and Yevgeny Plimak, "openly criticized their professors . . . for falsifying historical facts, for crudely lumping together the views of Russian revolutionary democrats as Marxism, and for their sterile, tongue-tied lectures."[25]

Many suffered for their boldness, especially in the backlash that followed the rebellion in Hungary. Some, such as Zinoviev, retreated into safer niches such as mathematical logic and continued at the university. Others, including Ilyenkov, found refuge at the Institute of

Philosophy under the old liberal Kedrov. Still others turned to sociology (Grushin), history and literature (Karyakin), or quietly continued their philosophy in scholarly-publicistic jobs (Mamardashvili). In these pursuits, they were aided by influential party liberals such as Alexei Rumyantsev.[26] Support for the victims of the university "pogrom" also came in the form of protests from prominent foreign Communists, among them Palmiro Togliatti and Todor Pavlov.[27]

This intercession from abroad on behalf of Moscow's bold student-philosophers highlights an important foreign link in the post-Stalin revival of philosophy. It was no coincidence that Togliatti spoke up for the new generation of Soviet philosophers, for it was the same tradition of European Marxism that encouraged both political de-Stalinization among European Communist parties and philosophical de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union. Especially after 1956, many Soviet intellectuals were particularly taken by the writings of Antonio Gramsci, Georg Lukacs, Herbert Marcuse, Robert Garaudy, Robert Havemann, Ernst Bloch, and others. For a time, the views of these writers dominated many private discussions of political, cultural, and social issues. Though still not widely published, such works became familiar to many. Students pored over scarce copies of Lukacs and debated the arguments of reformist Hungarian intellectuals, especially during and after 1956.[28] The literary intelligentsia shared scarce foreign journals and limited-circulation translations to discuss Lukacs, Gramsci, and Marcuse on matters of culture and society.[29] Specialists studied the significance of these early "Euro-Communist" critiques, drawing on the new opportunity to do research abroad as well as access to once-closed *spetskhran* library collections.[30]

The excitement these works elicited in Moscow is not hard to understand. At a time when reformism dominated the political agenda, and interest in the early, "humanistic" Marx ran high, these European critics pointed the way toward "socialism with a human face." Moreover, their writings were directly relevant to the fate of Bolshevism. Gramsci's warnings of the Party's becoming a "Byzantine-Bonapartist authority," with Marxism degenerating into "crude materialism," resonated loudly, as did the concern of Lukacs and Marcuse for the fate of democracy and culture under "proletarian" dictatorship.[31] The European Marxists also challenged specific Stalinist policies. Lukacs's prewar arguments for

broad anti-fascist cooperation in Europe were published in 1956. Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*, in which he equated Russian national Bolshevism with "social fascism," were also widely read by Soviet intellectuals. As one recalled, "Gramsci laid bare the imperial-chauvinistic essence of Stalin's foreign policy."[32] Moreover, the Italians now argued that such attitudes lived on; defending German Communist Havemann from attacks over his criticism of ideological intrusions on science, *L'Unita* warned that "the habit of describing as enemies of the people and agents of imperialism all comrades who dissent is a characteristic of Stalin."[33]

But even more important than particular criticisms of the hostile-isolationist posture was that, through the European Left, new Soviet intellectuals were returning to an old Russian tradition of broad engagement with Western social and political thought. In one recollection,

> It was the steady awakening of our intelligentsia to 20th century philosophy and a renewed link to world civilization and modern Western ideas. Ilyenkov came at it through Marx, Feuerbach, Kant and Hegel. For others the path was through Gramsci and Lukacs. . . . I was always closer to sociology, to Freud, Heidegger . . . Sartre and Camus.[34]

By the mid 1960s, many Soviet intellectuals were well-versed in the leading currents of contemporary Western thought.[35] Their sources included foreign books newly published in Russian translation and an increasingly diverse East European scholarship, particularly Polish and Yugoslav, which itself drew heavily on Western thought.[36] Specialists enjoyed ever-broader access to Western books and journals in their libraries and research institutes; others became familiar with such works through scores of ostensibly critical review articles in Soviet journals.[37]

Greatly influenced by the writings of Erich Fromm, Jean-Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers, and Teilhard de Chardin, as well as the early Marx, young Soviet philosophers turned their attention away from sterile fields such as historical materialism and dialectics and toward sensitive topics such as consciousness, alienation, and the individual. New "existential" and "pragmatic" trends, inspired by Sartre, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey, emerged.[38] Still, such themes remained highly sensitive, and while some significant works were

published toward the end of the thaw, the boldest ideas were restricted to lectures, seminars, and conferences.[39]

Other branches of philosophical-cultural studies also joined in the assault on old thinking. The Tartu Semiotics School, pioneered by Yuri Lotman in the 1960s, offered a critique of the Manichaean worldview and contributed much to the creation of "a common cultural space between Russian and the West."[40] Meanwhile, a common "scientific space" was the goal of some philosophers of science who, viewing the wreckage that a militant, class approach had wrought in fields such as genetics and cybernetics, revived earlier debates over the intrusion of ideology.[41] More than just scientific integrity, the principle at issue was the essential unity of all scholarly inquiry—bourgeois or socialist—and thus even esoteric arguments over dialectics were directly relevant to the assualt on intellectual isolation.[42]

Perhaps even more significant for intellectuals' rethinking of isolation, and their attitude toward the core question of Russia's place in the world, was the de-Stalinization of historical studies. Philosophy played a role here, too—raising basic questions about the Marxist historical process.[43] This, together with the airing of long-hidden truths and the broader opening to the world, encouraged many historians to respond boldly to Mikhail Gefter's call for a "perestroika" of Soviet historiography. Gefter noted approvingly the growing breadth of Western scholarship and urged his colleagues to work toward creation of a "worldwide historical canvas."[44] While the revival of historical studies included diverse trends, a central theme united most: the shedding of exclusivist, national-chauvinist dogmas and the revival of the "Westernizing" tradition.

In 1962, a conference of historians erupted in an "academic rebellion." The Stalinists were confronted by an "alliance between the younger generation of historians and . . . veterans from the pre-Stalin period."[45] Some questioned Stalinist views of tsarist history, namely Russian colonialism's supposedly "progressive" role and the denigration of the non-Russians' struggle for independence. This new anti-imperial, anti-chauvinist current was accompanied by renewed interest in the still-banned works of the once-preeminent Marxist historian Mikhail Pokrovsky. Moreover, its controversial implications for views of the state-building process—both tsarist

and Soviet—were obvious as a dispute was already under way over the rehabilitation of Ukrainian Communists condemned as "nationalist-deviationist" by Stalin.[46]

In 1964, under Gefter, a section on methodology was created at the Institute of History. For several years, during which time the institute's Party committee was dominated by anti-Stalinists and supported by influential liberals such as Rumyantsev in the Academy of Sciences, Gefter's section mounted a strong challenge to the "Whiggish" historical schemas of the *Short Course*.[47] Motivated in part by the failure of anti-colonial movements to hasten capitalism's downfall, Gefter's seminars drew in not only historians but also philosophers, ethnographers, and economists—Soviet *and* Western—to reconsider fundamental issues of the world-historical process. Directly or indirectly, they raised questions concerning everything from the "inevitability" of 1917 and 1929 to the correctness of Khrushchev's policy toward the third world.[48]

Other historians turned to a more distant past for lessons relevant to the present. Karyakin and Plimak, a decade after being forced out of MGU's Philosophy Department, published a study of Radishchev, the eighteenth-century critic of autocracy. Drawing on foreign as well as domestic sources, they disputed the view that Radishchev's ideas were of purely Russian origin by illustrating the impact on his thought of Western liberalism and the Enlightenment.[49] Less fortunate was Andrei Amalrik, whose thesis about Norman influence on ninth-century Russia was rejected for contradicting dogmas of Russian uniqueness.[50] More successful was Natan Eidelman, who now began his influential work on the autocracy and its challengers—from the Decembrists in the early nineteenth century to liberals in the early twentieth—to explore the sources of change and the role of Russia's European ties.[51] The "Aesopian" message of such works—emphasizing reform of the autocratic system and the importance of Western models—was not lost on Eidelman's many readers.[52]

A third historiographical current confronted Stalin's foreign policy head on. Joining the samizdat memoirs of Yevgeny Gnedin were the published ones of another "old-school" diplomat, Ivan Maisky, that openly faulted Stalin's paranoid suspicions for delays in forming alliances with the West at the outset of World War II.[53] Even more controversial was Alexander Nekrich's 1965 book *June*

22, 1941, which not only detailed Stalin's responsibility for the USSR's unpreparedness and huge losses, but also cast Western policies in a more favorable light.[54] Nekrich noted that in 1940 and 1941, before the Nazi invasion of Russia, the United States and Britain offered aid, alliance, and warnings of impending attack. Stalin's "spy mania," belief in Western "intrigue," and "special suspicion" of Anglo-American intentions meant such offers languished. Instead, as Nekrich repeatedly stressed, the USSR continued supplying Hitler with critical raw materials and foodstuffs, even as Germany ravaged the continent and bombarded England.[55]

Nekrich too answered Gefter's appeal for integration with foreign studies by drawing extensively on Western works. And while postwar foreign policy was not explicitly addressed, a positive appraisal of Allied prewar actions implicitly challenged the official line—that the hostilities of the cold war derived solely from "Anglo-American imperialism." Nekrich's revisionism touched even archvillain Churchill, who was seen addressing Parliament just hours after the Nazi attack, giving a strongly pro-Russia speech and promising aid, even as Stalin was immobilized by shock and most Soviet people still knew nothing of the invasion.[56]

Economy, Society, and Isolation: Early Critiques of the Stalinist System

In contrast to the assault on cultural-academic isolation that was launched and sustained by the intelligentsia, often at odds with Party conservatives, the critique of economic isolation and other aspects of the centralized-command system was inspired by the Party itself. Not surprisingly, change here appeared far more urgent to the leadership as it faced the need to invigorate the economy and move the country out of the rut of Stalinist stagnation.

Though economic difficulties were known to all, at Stalin's death few even in the top leadership fully grasped the depth of the continuing rural tragedy. Stalin's legacies included a divided country in which the cities lived by benefit of horribly unequal terms of exchange with the countryside. Moreover, as seen, much of the urban population was ignorant of real conditions in the village due to restrictions on internal travel and communications, harsh sanctions against criticism, and incessant propaganda images of rural

prosperity.[57] Stalin's successors were soon apprised of the true state of affairs. The revival of oligarchic rule eased the rigid compartmentalization of information and the shroud of lies was stripped away. Khrushchev, with his early experience in Ukraine, where collectivization's toll had been particularly high, was more sensitive to the state of agriculture than most of his Politburo (Presidium) colleagues who had worked mainly in industry.[58] And even though official statistics continued to exaggerate economic progress by individual sectors, the overall picture was clear enough; more than 20 years after collectivization, production in many areas was still below NEP levels, or even those of prerevolutionary times.

In September 1953, a Central Committee plenum publicly criticized the "appalling" state of agriculture. Some modest but positive steps followed; rural incomes rose as farm prices were raised, taxes lowered, and private plots revived. The plenum's long-term impact was even greater, its critical line prompting bold new writings that pilloried the Stalinist system and laid bare its legacies—backwardness, stifled initiative, and widespread rural poverty.[59]

At this early stage, economic debate was dominated by the exposés of novelists and journalists. A more analytical critique still lay in the future; economics, like all social sciences, was just beginning to recover from the long Stalinist nightmare in which critical study had been replaced by lies, commands, and exhortations.[60] Also, many economists succumbed to the enthusiasm of the mid 1950s, the belief that, by simply stripping away Stalinist abuses, the economy could be induced to make a great leap forward. The apparent success of the Virgin Lands campaign, the reported surge in growth rates, and pride in technological feats such as Sputnik seduced intellectuals no less than society at large. Many were caught up in Khrushchev's euphoria for overtaking America, and the illusory nature of early gains would become fully clear only toward the end of the decade. Such enthusiasm, as noted above, led to steps that would bring unintended consequences. Mikoyan's address at the 20th congress criticizing the primitive state of Soviet scholarship rejuvenated economic studies too. The leadership's desire to improve policy-relevant studies, coupled with confidence in the essential soundness of the system, engendered a new openness that soon transformed Soviet economics radically.

This openness came first to study of the domestic economy. Specialists set upon much new information—voluminous census data, information on investment and resources, and detailed statistics on industrial and labor productivity.[61] Moreover, Khrushchev's faith in the superiority of the Soviet system facilitated an opening to foreign studies; although he was motivated less by desire to adopt capitalist methods than by hubris that sought to challenge and defeat rival bourgeois theories, much Western literature become available to Soviet analysts in the thaw era.[62]

Equally important was the broader context of economic discourse raised by the challenge to the West. Not just by opening the country to foreign thought and practice, but by explicitly raising the United States as the marker by which progress would be measured, Khrushchev set a new frame of reference for younger economists. And their gaze would turn increasingly Westward.[63]

> In one sense, just as important as the opening of the country was that Khrushchev set the goal of catching up with the West. . . . He was focused on our radiant future, but specialists now turned more attention to the other side, our current backwardness. . . . We looked at how others were solving problems that we couldn't, and we focused on the West in a way that we would not have done if [Khrushchev] hadn't made it our reference point.[64]

With these changes in both the conduct and content of inquiry, Soviet economic science developed rapidly in the mid-to-late 1950s. Many postwar, post-Stalin graduates now began advancing in the field. With experience and an outlook that differed sharply from their Stalin-era seniors, they would form an entirely new generation of economists. An examination of their rise points up several important factors.

As in other fields, one of these factors was the influence of a few scholars of pre-Stalin vintage, economists schooled in the diversity of NEP traditions, or even those of the prerevolutionary era. Tatyana Zaslavskaya recalled that her mentor was Vladimir Vezhner, an advocate of reforming the collective farms' economic and social structures. Attacked in Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Vezhner was one of those who provided a "human bridge" between the 1920s and the 1950s–60s.[65] Abel Aganbegyan described similarly the impact of two other Stalin-era survivors: Vasily

Nemchinov, a veteran of the old *zemstvo* statistical offices that performed a vital research function in Russia's pre-1917 capitalist development; and Viktor Novozhilov, "a man of the Russian intelligentsia in the best sense of that word."[66]

> [Novozhilov] had a broad cultural outlook, knew several languages, and was well versed in contemporary world literature on economics. . . . He was an original thinker who was accused of being a non-Marxist, a cosmopolitan, of borrowing his ideas from bourgeois science. . . . He suffered for this: he was deprived of his professorship and . . . could only get hourly-paid work.[67]

Another pioneer was Leonid Kantorovich, a 1920s graduate of Leningrad University whose seminal work on modeling was published only in 1959, some 20 years after it was written.[68] Of all the Stalin-era survivors, his impact on the new generation was the greatest and his genius in mathematical economics was recognized by a Nobel Prize. Even some who had not survived still influenced debate through their work—for example, Alexander Chayanov, and his *The Theory of Peasant Cooperatives*, an NEP-era treatise on the noncoercive development of collective farming. While none of these older scholars openly advocated a market system, they sought changes that would reintroduce certain of its aspects, such as rational prices, profit-and-loss accounting, and producer independence. Moreover, all were notable for their intellectual honesty, scholarly accuracy, and originality. These were qualities that would eventually lead their students, through study and experience, toward efforts to reintegrate with world economic theory and practice.

Another early formative experience shared by many of the post-Stalin economists was a harsh collision with Soviet reality. Zaslavskaya, for example, recalled her first rural fieldwork, on the condition of collective farms in Soviet Kirghizia, in the mid 1950s:

> I was looking through the books and saw . . . a mistake, that pay per work-day was figured in fractions of a kopeck. "No, that's correct," the director said. "But how can they live on that? It only adds up to a few rubles a year!" "Oh that's not so important, they're still the nomadic tribesmen that they've always been. Each of them has a herd [of goats] up in the mountains somewhere, and every now and then they disappear to tend them." I had absolutely no idea . . . the situation was positively feudal.[69]

Meanwhile Aganbegyan, working in the Council of Ministers' Committee on Labor, encountered "astonishing" data: "Even after industrialization more than half our workers . . . were employed as manual laborers. Our published [statistics] distorted the picture."[70] In 1957, Zaslavskaya and a colleague ran up against the limits of the new openness. Assigned to compare U.S.-Soviet labor performance, they found that the former was some five times more productive than the latter. This brought a harsh reprimand when it turned out that Khrushchev himself would only permit the admission of a threefold difference.[71]

A third key factor in the development of post-Stalin economic thought was the haven provided by new institutes that "brought together all the best younger economists."[72] Most influential were the Novosibirsk Institute of Economics and Industrial Organization, set up in 1961, and the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute (TsEMI), founded in 1963.[73] The Novosibirsk Institute, particularly under director Aganbegyan, was a key center of reformist economic and socioeconomic research, the cradle of such pioneering sociologists as Zaslavskaya, Vladimir Shubkin, and Vladimir Shlapentokh.[74] TsEMI, though dedicated to technical modeling and planning studies, soon became a school of Western-oriented economic research, "the breeding ground of marketeers, of anti-Marxists, the Austrian school. . . . We were students of Kantorovich, Nemchinov . . . Pareto, Leontiev . . . Keynes, Koopmans, Hayek, Marshall. . . ."[75]

By the end of the 1950s, the economy entered a sharp downturn as the half-measures of the first post-Stalin years failed to address systemic ills. The superficial success of grandiose projects such as the Virgin Lands, and pride in achievements such as Sputnik, could no longer hide the danger signs of falling productivity and growth rates. Armed now with extensive data, analysis, and relevant experience—from earlier Russian and Soviet practice, from ongoing East European experiments, and from Western market models—Soviet economists advanced several critiques that all pointed toward a need for serious reform.

The first of these critiques was an attempt to improve planning. Proceeding from analysis of persistent bottlenecks, shortages, and hoarding, it was recognized that the antiquated system in which thousands of bureaucrats juggled millions of supply, production, and resource-allocation decisions simply could not manage a mod-

ern economy. "Optimal planing" sought to improve central administration. A minimum goal was the use of computers to perform better and faster the numerous calculations still done exclusively by hand, while a broader objective was the employment of forecasting techniques and mathematical models that would enable the system to be more efficient, dynamic, and adaptable.

Decades earlier, Soviet economists had done pioneering work in this field. Most prominent was Kantorovich, whose early studies either were not understood or were rejected as "bourgeois deviations." Such charges were motivated by optimal planning's echo of the Austrian school's "maximum efficiency" credo, and from the models' reliance on some semblance of rational prices that clashed with the Marxist labor theory of value.[76] Ironically, it was the opening to foreign studies that revived Soviet mathematical economics as "news of [such] work by American scientists filtered through to the USSR."[77]

The impact of "optimal planning" on the development of Soviet economic thought was a mixed blessing. For a time, it fostered illusions that the centrally planned system could be induced to operate efficiently. But it also stimulated analyses that eventually led back to the market; reliance on rational prices was only a first such step. Moreover, exposure to Western literature revealed not only the possibilities of planning, but also its limits. Finally, the field's early promise to "improve the system without changing anything," together with its complexity and inaccessibility to most ideologues (much like the Tartu semioticians' analysis of Stalinist culture), afforded it a sanctuary that permitted more radical critiques to develop in relative safety.[78] And these critiques were uniformly pro-market.[79]

Still, the main impetus for market reforms was simply that Soviet economic woes contrasted ever more sharply with Western success. The United States refused to follow its predicted decline but instead, particularly with the Keynsian policies of the early 1960s, surged ahead strongly. Also impressive were the vigorous postwar recoveries of capitalist Japan and West Germany. Perhaps most immediately relevant to Soviet experience were the successes of new market reforms in socialist Hungary and Yugoslavia.[80]

Reform ideas proliferated widely. Yuri Chernichenko advocated decentralization of agriculture and development of a rural market, while Grigory Khanin studied the market's role under socialism.[81]

In 1965, *Pravda* editor Rumyantsev published Yevsei Liberman's calls for decentralization and enterprise autonomy.[82] Probably the era's best-known reformist economic manifesto—Gennady Lisichkin's *Plan and Market*—was published in 1966.[83] Otto Latsis, another prominent perestroika-era reformer, recalled that by the early 1960s "the urgent necessity of market reforms [was agreed by] all serious economists."[84]

Beyond the optimal planning and market critiques, a third important current that emerged from thaw-era studies of socioeconomic issues was sociology. As a science devoted to the study of social groups, their interrelations and problems, sociology posed an automatic challenge to Marxism-Leninism's class-based approach to society. Though Soviet sociology had flowered in the early 1920s, its inherently critical stance toward the new regime was regarded by Lenin with suspicion and increasing hostility. Under Stalin, this "bourgeois" field was simply banned.

As with economics, sociology's revival had both domestic and foreign origins. The domestic spur came as young scholars studied firsthand the economics of agricultural (and, later, industrial) life and soon encountered severe social problems and divisions whose existence had long been denied and largely hidden from scholarly scrutiny.[85] Impetus from abroad came as the opening of scholarship gave access to important foreign literature—both Western and that of the more liberal East European countries—in a field that lacked theoretical and empirical foundations.[86]

Though denied an independent place in higher education, sociology gained several institutional bases in the thaw era.[87] Even before the Novosibirsk Institute was created in 1961, a Sociological Association had been founded in 1958, and such centers as the Public Opinion Research Institute at the newspaper *Komsomolskaia Pravda* and the Laboratory for Concrete Social Research at Leningrad University also emerged. Since sociology pointed toward broad socioeconomic liberalization, it was strongly supported by reformist intellectuals in other fields, such as philosophers Zinoviev and Kedrov and economists Kantorovich, Aganbegyan, and Shatalin.[88] The Institute for Concrete Social Research, whose first director was Rumyantsev, was established in 1968. During its brief heyday, it was home to a remarkable collection of original thinkers,

including Levada, Lisichkin, Zamoshkin, Davydov, Burlatsky, Karpinsky, and Igor Kon.[89]

Sociology too contributed to new thinking about Russia and the West, first via research that exploded myths about Soviet society and its uniqueness, exposing social problems and divisions no less serious than under capitalism.[90] Sociology also brought many specialists better understanding of Western realities, further eroding stereotyped views of class-torn, crime-plagued societies.[91] And increasingly, via ostensibly denunciatory analyses of Western society and bourgeois scholarship, it spread these insights among specialists and the broader reading public.[92]

By the mid 1960s, the evident failures of Khrushchev's economic policies, following a decade of relative scholarly freedom and openness, encouraged the coalescence of a strong "Westernizing" socioeconomic critique. Slow growth and agricultural stagnation were clearly chronic woes, and the beginning of large-scale grain imports sharply highlighted the system's inferiority vis-à-vis the capitalist West. These problems provided a strong impetus to market reformers. A vivid example was a 1965 closed-session report by Novosibirsk director Aganbegyan that circulated in specialist, and soon samizdat, circles. Judging the state of the economy "extremely disturbing," he broke taboos by noting falling growth, inflation and unemployment, as well as a decline in real living standards.[93] The fault lay in Stalinist methods, and solutions were to be found in enterprise autonomy, rational prices, and other marketizing steps. Not only did Aganbegyan measure socialist progress by the capitalist yardstick; because official data were "a lie," Soviet economists relied on the capitalists' data about their own economy. While the Soviet Central Statistical Administration distorted facts, "the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency . . . gave an absolutely accurate assessment of the Soviet economy."[94]

Aganbegyan also lamented the underdeveloped state of Soviet foreign trade.[95] That reforms must include broad participation in the "international division of labor" was now recognized by most serious specialists.[96] As recalled by Nikolai Shmelev,

> It was impossible to study the international economy seriously without concluding that our country must become a real participant in it. . . . We discussed ways of expanding our foreign trade,

> we envied East European and especially Yugoslav experience . . . and we even studied ways to move toward convertibility of the ruble.[97]

Growing economic woes and near-unanimity among serious specialists convinced some in the post-Khrushchev leadership that changes were necessary. As modest as they were, however, the "Kosygin reforms" of 1965–66 were doomed by half-hearted implementation and bureaucratic resistance. Still, the late thaw period is less notable for what did not change than for what did—the outlook of leading social scientists. Just a decade earlier, many had believed in the essential soundness of the Soviet system, its prospects for outpacing capitalism, and the inevitability of the world's division into separate camps. Now such beliefs were fading, as was the underlying hostile-isolationist precept of a permanent Western threat. Aganbegyan broached the latter indirectly but boldly—contradicting official claims—in noting that, with an economy only half as large, Soviet military spending was roughly equal to that of the United States. Moreover, of 100 million workers nationwide, an astonishing 30 to 40 million were employed in defense industries.[98] Others put the matter even more bluntly; Vladimir Shkredov's 1967 *Economics and Law* argued that "a new stage has been reached in which the social system and . . . the state no longer face external dangers . . . there are no excuses therefore for delaying the indispensable rethinking and reorganizing of the system."[99]

Isolation, Integration, and International Relations

This repudiation of Stalinism's core tenet was obviously central to the reappraisal of international relations. Thus, in a critical sense, the preceding discussions of revived cultural-historical and socioeconomic thought have already sketched the broader foundation of new thinking. This section will focus more narrowly on the evolving views of the *mezhdunarodniki*, those policy analysts, journalists, scholars, and others particularly concerned with foreign affairs. Although many of their ideas about war, peace, and international change have been closely studied, their evolution in the context of an emergent reformist intelligentsia has not.[100] Yet it was from the same intellectual milieu that new foreign-affairs thought arose;

future *mezhdunarodniki* partook of the same university discussions and institute seminars, read the same works and debated the same questions of history and culture, and pondered the same links between domestic and international problems. Thus it is only as an integral part of the broader "Westernizing" intellectual current that the rise of new thinking about foreign affairs can be fully understood.

Here, too, the impact of a few veterans of pre-Stalin experience was great. Arbatov and Burlatsky were among those shaped by work in the mid-to-late 1950s under Otto Kuusinen, drafting *The Essentials of Marxism-Leninism*, a textbook meant to replace such Stalin-era works as the *Short Course*.[101] While luminaries, including the philosopher Asmus, also consulted on the project, none so influenced the younger participants as Kuusinen himself. He was a Finn by nationality and veteran of early social-democratic politics, and his original views cleared minds "dirtied and dulled" by Stalinist dogmas:

> Kuusinen was a live exemplar of the . . . distant traditions of the European workers' movement, of early "left" social democracy and mature Leninism, of the best [pre-Stalin] period of the Comintern. . . . Highly cultured, he also . . . wrote poetry, composed music . . . and surveyed literature.[102]

Many important revisions to dogmas about the West came from young specialists affiliated with Kuusinen (and later, with the consultant group of Kuusinen's political ally Andropov), with Rumyantsev at *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* in Prague, and on the new staff at IMEMO, the resurrection of Varga's old institute. Arbatov, echoing the postwar views of Varga, called attention to the masses' "vital interest" in international affairs and the moderating impact of public opinion on Western foreign policies.[103] Eduard Arab-Olgy, who joined Arbatov in Prague, published a "global roundtable" on overpopulation.[104] *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* certainly featured much orthodoxy, but it also published a whole host of heretofore heretical perspectives. These included the diverse views of West European Marxists, on issues from integration and the Common Market to the benefits of a multiparty electoral system.[105] Another young "Praguer," Alexander Galkin, questioned the stereotype of Wall Street militarism and, at one of Gefter's history seminars, dismissed the dogma of inevitable revolution in cap-

italist countries by noting that "the Western proletariat has more to lose than its chains."[106]

Galkin and other *mezhdunarodniki*, including Anatoly Chernyaev and Yuri Krasin, were increasingly drawn to social-democratic critiques.[107] Some even managed to attended such elite foreign gatherings as the 1966 Stockholm Socialist International; others were struck by the writings of Willy Brandt and Olof Palme.[108] Another young analyst, Vladimir Lukin, wrote a dissertation on Asian social democracy that warned against hopes for revolution in the third world, noting that regional leaders criticized Soviet foreign policy and rejected the Soviet model for its "cruelty" and "lack of humanism."[109] Chernyaev echoed this caution at a Moscow conference on the world revolutionary movement and also suggested that, far from finished, European social democracy had more than a little to teach the USSR.[110]

Increasingly, these and other specialists called for reintegration with foreign scholarship and creation of a true Soviet political-science discipline.[111] In the field of international-relations theory—aided by broad exposure to Western literature—such integration was already well under way. Translations became widely available to Soviet specialists, including the works of Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, and Thomas Schelling.[112] As in other fields, the impact of Western thought was strong.[113] New ideas were also spread through objective, often positive, reviews; Gennady Gerasimov introduced Soviet readers to the work of Schelling and others on game theory, while Yuri Krasin assessed bipolarity via John Herz's *International Politics in the Atomic Age*.[114] Some turned to balance-of-power theory and a more "realist" view of international relations.[115] Proceeding from the nuclear stalemate and Europe's division into blocs, Soviet writings increasingly equated the United States and the USSR as leaders of similar state systems.[116] Globally a balance held, the historian-*mezhdunarodnik* Karyakin argued, and it was one that neither could nor should upset.[117] Perhaps the most influential Western realist was Hans Morgenthau, author of *Politics Among Nations*, the subject of a widely read though unpublished study by Alexei Obukhev.[118] A young Foreign Ministry staffer, Obukhev had earlier spent a year at the University of Chicago in the early 1960s and studied under Morgenthau.

> I studied conceptual works by American authors who wrote on theoretical aspects of foreign policy. In other words, I was doing what Americans call "political science." Today we regard it as a well-established discipline but back then that was something new to us. Speaking about Soviet authors . . . I haven't yet found anything comparable, say, to *Politics Among Nations* by Hans Morgenthau.[119]

Mention of the youthful experiences of Foreign Ministry staffers such as Obukhev highlights another segment of the new Soviet *mezhdunarodniki*: the diplomats. In the 1930s, as seen, the diplomatic corps was purged with particular ruthlessness. As a specialized profession whose stock in trade was knowledge of the outside world, Stalin decimated the first Bolshevik generation of broadly educated, Europe-oriented diplomats. Andrei Gromyko, who succeeded Molotov as foreign minister in 1955, fit the typical profile of the successor generation: a young economist-propagandist trained in agronomy, plucked from an academic career for a crash course in Stalinist diplomacy. His wartime appointment to one of the most important positions in the entire diplomatic service—first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Washington—was Gromyko's first posting abroad and also his first time ever outside Soviet borders.[120]

In contrast, the post-Stalin generation of Soviet diplomats stood out by virtue of their better training, greater worldliness, and broader outlook as products of the general thaw-era opening to the West. The Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), which was created late in the war and became the chief school for diplomats, also underwent important changes in the postwar and post-Stalin years. Foreign students, mainly from the new "people's democracies," were now admitted. Over 1954–58, separate departments for study of the West and training in foreign trade were established, followed by an international-law department in 1968.[121] Access to foreign media and scholarly literature was eased, and advanced students now did original research on previously restricted topics such as arms control.[122]

Simultaneously, diplomatic work abroad was radically transformed over the post-Stalin years. Change here came first with the easing of fears over personal security and the relaxation of xenophobic ideological strictures. As recalled by Georgy Kornienko, who would later rise to first deputy foreign minister,

> with Stalin's death, the fear that pervaded diplomatic work went away . . . and with it the highly dogmatic outlook that possessed even those who dealt intimately with the West. . . . The demand to fit everything into extreme ideological formulas now eased [and] we saw the world with new eyes. . . . This began to be reflected in reports and analyses.[123]

These changes, combined with the broader thaw-era activization of Soviet foreign relations, transformed the experience of a new generation of diplomats. Foreign contacts expanded qualitatively as well as quantitatively. No longer confined to fear-ridden embassy compounds, diplomats engaged in a broad new range of political, trade, and cultural duties. Those in East Berlin, for example, became acquainted with survivors of the old German Social Democratic Party. Learning of their heroic struggles with Nazism—and their fate under the Gestapo-NKVD collaboration that followed the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939—they were struck by the contrast between the "more democratic" traditions of German social democracy and the dogmatic, Moscow-trained Communists promoted by Stalin.[124] And many younger diplomats cringed at the "imperial" behavior of Soviet ambassadors as the practice of naming unqualified Party officials to top foreign posts continued and caused increasing friction with the diplomatic corps' growing professionalization from below.[125]

Boris Ilyichev, a young diplomat posted to Indonesia in the mid 1960s, recalled Ambassador Nikolai Mikhailov, a "hidebound party functionary" who rose swiftly under Stalin before his "exile" to diplomacy. Reflecting the Party leadership's enthusiasm for expanding Soviet influence in the developing world, Mikhailov crudely attempted to cultivate the Indonesian Communist Party toward Moscow's line: "His entire approach to the fraternal party's leadership strongly smacked of Comintern directives. 'Every time we meet,' [Indonesian Communist] chairman Adit told me in Moscow one day, 'he teaches me the ABC of Marxism-Leninism.' "[126]
Ilyichev also recalled 1965 as "The beginning of my political awakening and the refutation . . . of dogmas made out to be Marxist-Leninist ideals." The crushing of the Indonesian Communist Party in the coup of that year little impressed senior Soviet officials, who still "held the legacy of the Comintern sacred. . . . As for us junior

Party officials, we sensed that something historically inevitable . . . was taking place."

> My view . . . was strongly influenced by a brilliant paper which Anatoly Chernyaev delivered to a theoretical seminar in the ID [International Department of the Central Committee]. . . . By the standards of the time, the paper was a bold political analysis of the situation in fraternal parties. It warned against what befell us years later.[127]

The experience of those who served in the West was even more eye-opening. In London, diplomats pursued a broad range of activities that kept them in frequent contact with not only all manner of political, business, and cultural figures, but also Russian emigrés—from the sisters of Boris Pasternak to the "White" anti-Bolshevik emigré great-great grandson of tsarist Admiral Nakhimov. Moreover, as one diplomat wrote,

> We in London (like our colleagues in other foreign capitals, I suppose) had a rare opportunity to read samizdat and emigre publications . . . hardly anybody withstood the temptation of tasting the forbidden fruit. [I myself collected] an entire library . . . the Bible, the Koran, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, Okujava, Daniel, Sinyavsky, Alliluyeva, and much else.[128]

Another diplomat recalled, "Sooner or later, those who worked in the West for any length of time all came to the conclusion that our system was just no good [*ne deesposobnaia*]. But we weren't able to do anything [to improve relations with the West]."[129]

Beyond such general trends in the experience of Soviet diplomats, a change of particular importance came with the inception of arms control. It has already been seen how the shift from propagandistic calls for "general and complete disarmament" to serious negotiations required the easing of controls on information and the studying of Western theory and policy. Higher standards of knowledge and professionalism were needed for training a new corps of less ideological, more businesslike "Americanists." Equally influential was the experience gained in extensive bilateral and multilateral talks. A strong current favoring arms control emerged among midlevel ministry officials. Georgy Kornienko recalled the situation in the mid 1960s when the United States first proposed limiting strategic defenses:

> Our leaders really couldn't understand these issues. . . . When the subject was first broached, the initiative came from bureaucrats . . . in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, those who worked on the United States and studied disarmament issues; and though they weren't technical experts, they'd read American publications and understood these concepts, so they started to think.[130]

Disarmament concerns were also uppermost for a third group of *mezhdunarodniki*: scientists. Among the earliest critics of ideology's intrusion on scholarship, scientists also led in calling for integration with foreign cultural and economic life.[131] Prominent were senior figures, such as Tamm and Kapitsa, whose outlook was shaped by experience abroad before Stalin's forced isolation. Another was Lev Artsimovich, schooled under NEP, a pioneer in plasma physics who also pioneered the revival of international scientific ties.[132] Their "cosmopolitan" views influenced a younger generation—whose best-known representative was Sakharov—that matured during the war.[133] But it was the opening to the West that had the greatest impact. The anti-nuclear activism of Linus Pauling and Robert Oppenheimer, for example, made a great impression on Sakharov's thinking.[134] Yevgeny Velikhov and Roald Sagdeyev, of a still-younger cohort, in turn credited not only the influence of such exemplars as Artsimovich and Sakharov in the evolution of their ideas, but also the broad foreign interchange that came with the thaw.[135]

Leading scientists, along with many others, were struck by what they saw in "closed" screenings of such satirical or apocalyptic films as *On the Beach* and *Doctor Strangelove*.[136] Their new exposure to a broad range of Western views—together with their professional expertise on nuclear-technical issues—led many to a rethinking of international confrontation, especially when the Soviet leadership entered serious arms talks.[137] Attention swiftly turned from building bombs to the possibilities of their reduction or elimination. Some, such as Sakharov, had privately studied such issues as the effects of atmospheric nuclear testing, while others were now formally charged with exploring strategic problems as technical advisers to the new negotiations.[138] Moreover, thanks to the thaw, scientists also participated in new international fora dedicated to issues of peace and security: Pugwash and Dartmouth conferences, UN-sponsored meetings (and, later, those of the United Nations

Association of the USA), the Soviet-American Disarmament Study groups, and several others.[139]

Such exchanges went far in breaking down stereotypes and forging common understanding.[140] They were also instrumental in spreading Western strategic concepts.[141] Significantly, the first Soviet analyst to embrace openly the logic of limiting strategic defenses was a *political* scientist. Gennady Gerasimov, drawing on U.S. critiques of defensive systems, presented in 1965 the logic that, seven years later, would be enshrined in perhaps the most important arms-control agreement of the nuclear age—the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty.[142] In 1967, when the United States first formally proposed such limitations—which the USSR initially rejected—Artsimovich contradicted his government's position in an address to the Pugwash conference of that year in Sweden.[143] Sakharov's searching 1968 samizdat memorandum, *Reflections on Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom,* also called for limiting ABM systems as part of a broader plea for sweeping domestic reforms and international cooperation.[144]

Soviet Intellectuals and the Prague Spring

By the mid-to-late 1960s, the various reformist critiques outlined above were coalescing into a single coherent and vigorous intellectual current. The priorities of writers and artists were not identical to those of economists and sociologists, just as the immediate concerns of philosophers and historians differed from those of scientists and policy analysts. But all sought similar liberalization in economic, social, and political life. Moreover, most were united by an increasingly Western orientation in foreign policy—and a "Westernizer" social identity at home—that saw their country's future in expanding Khrushchev's early steps toward broad integration with foreign economic, scientific, and cultural life.

> Analyzing [East European] reforms . . . we concluded that many of them could be . . . adopted in our country. We studied the rapid integration of Western Europe, deeply envious of the Common Market and its contrast with the slow, bureaucratic functioning of CEMA [the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance]. We thought about acquiring . . . modern technology and joining in the

> greatest achievements of world culture. In other words, we dreamed of reforming Russia.[145]

For this new intelligentsia, "the children of the 20th congress," Stalinist beliefs about a "hostile capitalist encirclement" had long since disappeared, and even Leninist tenets on the irreconcilability of capitalism and socialism were broadly questioned.[146] Sakharov raised these issues openly in his 1968 *Reflections* memorandum. "The division of mankind threatens it with disaster," he began, and "in the face of these perils, any action increasing the division of mankind, any preaching of the incompatibility of world ideologies and nations is madness and a crime."[147] Sakharov saw salvation in a steady "convergence" of the socialist and capitalist systems.[148]

To be sure, many reformist intellectuals retained a broadly Marxist outlook. But theirs was less the Marx of class struggle and revolution and more the Marx of broader humanistic interests and concern for mankind's alienation. It was a Marxism that led back to a European tradition of social-democratic reformism. And, given the Stalinist legacy, it led to a search for "socialism with a human face," to reforms of an arbitrary, militarized, hypercentralized system that would unleash society's potential for economic vitality, cultural diversity, and international harmony. For most liberals, these goals were embodied in the model of the Prague Spring.

With the hindsight of August 1968, the Brezhnev regime's intolerance of substantial reforms anywhere in its socialist camp suggests that the end of the thaw began with Khrushchev's removal in October 1964. But the perception then was very different. Khrushchev's fall was greeted by many with optimism; his cultural intolerance had grown oppressive, for example, and his "harebrained schemes" were seen as the main impediment to economic reform.[149] Although conservatives were emboldened by the change at the top, the view of most liberals at the time was that a fight was now under way for "Brezhnev's soul," and that the outcome was not at all preordained. Accordingly, they boldly joined the struggle.

The conservative resurgence was first felt incrementally, in actions such as the expulsion from the Party of outspoken liberals such as Karyakin.[150] Hard-line voices grew louder, from dogmatic ideologists to military writers who largely ignored Khrushchev's coexistence-and-disarmament priorities in a renewed emphasis on

international class struggle and the winnability of nuclear war.[151] Sergei Trapeznikov, a rigid neo-Stalinist, became Brezhnev's adviser for academic-scientific affairs. In 1965, as Rumyantsev was forced from *Pravda*, Trapeznikov declared the 1930s "one of the most brilliant periods" in Soviet history;[152] also sacked were reformist *Pravda* writers Lisichkin, Chernichenko, and Yegor Yakovlev.[153]

The liberals responded vigorously. Tvardovsky fought and won many battles with *Novy Mir*'s censors and, as seen, important reformist works in all fields were published in the years 1965 to 1968. Announcement of the "Kosygin reforms" in 1965 raised hopes, as did a 1966 address in which Brezhnev criticized those who would limit the social sciences to a purely "propagandistic" role.[154] When conservatives began pushing for Stalin's rehabilitation, many prominent scientists, writers, and other intellectuals protested directly to Brezhnev.[155] The 1966 trial for "anti-Soviet slander" of writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel prompted other protests.[156] Another diverse group—including Rumyantsev, Maisky, Central Committee staffer Chernyaev, and military historian Col. Vyacheslav Dashichev—supported Nekrich at various stages of the battle over his controversial *June 22, 1941*.[157] In 1967, Burlatsky and Karpinsky published another strong appeal for cultural-intellectual freedom.[158]

However ominous the signs of a neo-Stalinist resurgence, the hopes of Soviet liberals rose even further with the inception of the Czechoslovak reforms. As an intelligentsia-led movement, presided over by the Communist Party in a "fraternal" country historically friendly to Russia, the Prague Spring's impact on Soviet intellectuals was enormous. It was an experiment that united the many political, economic, and social reforms that they sought for the USSR, a concrete model for further de-Stalinization.

> The political and economic system [they] were trying to transform had been created as the mirror image of ours. Therefore, Czechoslovakia's experience [was] transferable to our country. My best-case scenario went something like this: After reforms, Czechoslovakia's workers would be given incentives . . . factory managers would . . . see value in innovation, writers would be allowed to publish. As labor, management and the intelligentsia united, economic indicators would shoot up. Impressed by the Czech economic miracle, Soviet leaders would attempt similar reforms.[159]

Interest in East European reforms had been strong since the late 1950s, as already noted. By the mid 1960s, the writings of Yugoslav, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak reformers were known to their Soviet counterparts. Prominent were the works of Janos Kornai and Ota Sik, the latter becoming the chief economic theorist of the Prague Spring. In 1967 and 1968, the professional and personal links between Soviet and Czech reformers grew even stronger.[160] Moreover, Soviet interest went far beyond narrow specialists' circles. Solzhenitsyn's "Open Letter" to the 1967 Congress of Czechoslovak Writers was "one of the brightest and hottest sparks" for Soviet reformism.[161] The Prague Spring was also central in stimulating Sakharov's *Reflections*.[162] In general, liberal intellectuals were transfixed by the experiment under way in Prague.[163]

The reformers followed events through the Soviet press, in the interested and often sympathetic coverage of *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma*, and through Czech articles in official Russian translations. As the Soviet media turned hostile, foreign radio broadcasts were monitored. Other interested Russians turned to Czechoslovak sources; some already knew Czech while others now learned it, translating news from the "fraternal" papers *Literarni Listy* and *Rude Pravo* for themselves and colleagues.[164] Writings on Czechoslovakia became the most popular samizdat items, a notable example being the Czechoslovak Communist Party's *Action Program*.[165] Analysis of East European reformism had figured prominently in the samizdat journal *Politicheskii Dnevnik* (Political Diary) since the mid 1960s; in 1968, Czechoslovakia completely dominated the bulletin.

"Prague became the Mecca of the Soviet opposition,"[166] literally as well as figuratively. Leading the way were staffers of *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma*. "Those on the scene were naturally most excited . . . but even those of us who had worked in Prague somewhat earlier were caught up in events. . . . We all had Czech friends and contacts, we couldn't help our enthusiasm."[167] With censorship tightening, Soviet "Praguers" such as Vladimir Lukin also provided a vital personal link for interested Muscovites.

> Pavel Litvinov and I recalled an . . . episode from early 1968. I returned to Moscow from Prague on business and met with a friend, P. Yakir, who asked me to report on events in Czechoslovakia. We agreed to meet at his apartment. . . . I cau-

> tioned that only our friends should be present [but] when I arrived, literally all of dissident Moscow was there in his home. I couldn't back out, and there ensued a lecture with questions and answers . . . that was followed by a [typical] Moscow "kitchen" discussion.[168]

In short, "the entire Moscow liberal intelligentsia was preoccupied with the Prague Spring." Many were skeptical of the Kremlin's tolerance, but most were hopeful and all were uplifted. "In the early summer of 1968, there were few anti-socialists among the Moscow intelligentsia . . . we believed again."[169]

Given such hopes, the crushing of the Prague Spring in late August was a painful blow, a powerful "cognitive punch" toward further rethinking of domestic and international politics. One emotion appears in nearly every intellectual's recollection of the time: "Burning shame, shame for the policy of our country"; "The shame of our complicity . . . our servility"; "Such deep shame . . . that I had to turn away upon meeting Czech friends and colleagues"; "The shameful . . . suicide of socialism." All were "ashamed of being part of a barbarian country that had clubbed its enlightened neighbor."[170]

This view of the Prague Spring's demise—the brutal invasion of a progressive neighbor—dominated Soviet liberals' assessments of their government's action. Over the twelve thaw years since the crushing of the Hungarian revolt, their outlook had changed considerably. The justification that was widely though passively accepted in 1956—blaming Western instigation and a NATO threat to the socialist camp—was broadly rejected in 1968.[171] Instead it was seen as an act of pure imperialism, and some went so far as to place events in a particular historical context.

Solzhenitsyn, drawing a parallel to tsarist Russia's crushing of a Polish rebellion in 1863, argued that the country needed "a new Herzen"—that was to say, a Russian patriot willing to denounce Soviet imperialism.[172] Bard Alexander Galich, in his *St. Petersburg Romance*, allegorically raised the legacy of the Decembrists, the officer-noblemen who, in search of reforms, rose up against the autocracy in 1825.[173] His refrain—"Dare you come to the square, when that hour strikes?"—took on special meaning when a demonstration was indeed staged on Red Square four days later.[174] Among the pro-

testers' banners was one that read "For your freedom and ours," a slogan that hailed from the Poles' nineteenth-century fight for independence from the tsarist empire and now challenged twentieth-century Russians to reject imperialism.[175]

Though only seven protesters answered the challenge to "come to the square" literally, many protested in other ways. Lukin, the young "Praguer," whose meeting with prominent dissidents was described above, openly criticized the invasion and was promptly sent home to Moscow.[176] *Izvestiia* correspondents Vladlen Krivosheyev and Boris Orlov not only refused to report the Kremlin's version of events, but actually tried to communicate their dissent both in the media and directly to the Soviet leadership, for which they, too, were punished.[177] Central Committee staffer Alexander Bovin, who had been so bold as to warn his Czech friends of an imminent invasion at the July meeting of Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders, also protested directly to Brezhnev.[178] And poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko, in a telegram to Brezhnev, called the invasion "a tragic mistake" that "detracts from our prestige in the eyes of the world and our own."[179]

Protests took other forms as well. Tvardovsky, for example, refused orders for the Party committee at *Novy Mir* to pass a resolution endorsing the invasion.[180] Such statements were orchestrated in Party organizations throughout the country, from farms and factories to academic institutes. Gefter walked out of the room at the Institute of History when the vote was called, an act of defiance that would further cripple his career.[181] Yegor Yakovlev, then the editor of *Zhurnalist*, provocatively published the liberal Czech press law and was promptly fired.[182] Central Committee staffer Shakhnazarov refused to join the "brigade" set up to provide publicistic support for the invasion, and he, too, was punished.[183]

Bovin and Shakhnazarov were not the only young apparatchiks who shared in the "deep dismay" that enveloped liberal opinion.[184] Throughout the Central Committee's International Department and other sections of the apparat, as well as in the new foreign-affairs institutes and elsewhere, were many who had together caught the "virus" of the Prague Spring, hopes of democratizing, modernizing, and further opening Soviet society.[185] And these dozens of the elite "Party intelligentsia" joined the hundreds of other

reformist writers, scholars, and scientists (and thousands of other critical thinkers) in sympathy with the goals of thoroughgoing domestic and international change. Importantly, this sympathy did not evaporate with the shock of August 1968. While the ensuing crackdown on reformist activity forced upon many a stark choice—conformism or nonconformism, even dissidence—many who chose the former retained their ideals and made quiet but valuable contributions from within the system.

Arbatov "rescued" Lukin and gave him a home at his new USA Institute, as he had recently done for Boris Nikiforov, a legal scholar persecuted for refusing to serve on the puppet jury that condemned Sinyavsky and Daniel.[186] Shatalin, expelled from the Party for a highly critical report on the economy, was "saved" by Academy of Sciences president Mstislav Keldysh.[187] Alexander Yakovlev, then a midlevel official in the Ideology Department of the Central Committee and later Gorbachev's main perestroika ally, helped soften the blow to Karpinsky and Burlatsky after their article in defense of intellectual freedom angered powerful conservatives.[188] The pair soon landed at the new Institute of Concrete Social Research, along with other fired reformers such as Levada and Lisichkin, through the efforts of the still-influential but weakened Rumyantsev. The former *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* and *Pravda* editor also aided such "semidissidents" as Karyakin and Gefter by employing them informally as researchers and speechwriters.[189]

Rumyantsev, now a vice president of the Academy of Sciences, was aided in establishing the new institute by his former Prague assistant Anatoly Chernyaev, who had become an analyst in the Central Committee's International Department.[190] In 1969, Chernyaev also helped create the Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences (INION) and facilitated the appointment of Lev Delusin, his erstwhile Prague colleague, as director. Another veteran of the Burlatsky-Arbatov Central Committee consultant group under Andropov, Delusin in turn hired such liberal staffers as the fired *Izvestiia* correspondent Boris Orlov, and the budding dissident Ludmilla Alexeyeva, before being forced out himself just a year later.[191] Other such instances, of small steps in defense of embattled reformers and reformism, were numerous.[192]

■

The suppression of the Prague Spring and the subsequent crackdown on liberal intellectuals engendered a wide range of responses. A very few protested openly, and a great many did nothing, but between these extremes there was a variety of milder protests and subtler forms of opposition, from less-public criticism to the defense of colleagues and friends who had risked their positions and privileges. Such quiet resistance naturally attracted less attention. But it was equally noteworthy for its demonstration of the broad acceptance among post-Stalin intellectuals, both within and without the Party apparatus, of the reformist, integrationist, "Westernizing" beliefs that were the core of new thinking.

Certainly for many, the end of the Prague Spring was also the end of hopes for liberalizing change, a deep disillusion that led to conformism and cynical careerism. But others drew the opposite conclusion: that the Prague Spring had shown that reforms *were* possible, but only under an enlightened leader that many "awaited as if for the coming of the Messiah."[193] For these intellectuals, the Prague Spring acquired a kind of mythological status that, while sustaining, was also not unproblematic. Cut off before it had a chance to succeed, the Czech perestroika was also denied the opportunity to fail. Soviet liberals viewing the arrested Czech and Soviet reforms did not see the contradictions, inconsistencies, and often utopian aspects of their own hopes.[194] Their naïveté—if only leaders had the will, then reforms would "work without a hitch"—would be a severe handicap to a later leader's search for "socialism with a human face."[195]

But the reverse of illusion was inspiration, and here the legacy of the Prague Spring and the Russian thaw was undeniably positive. Like a latter-day NEP, they offered concrete models for future reformers. Writing in the gloom of post–Prague Spring reaction, the journalist and former Komsomol official Karpinsky optimistically foresaw the following:

> Our tanks in Prague were, if you will, an anachronism, an "inadequate" weapon. They "fired" at ideas. With no hope of hitting the target. . . . With a fist to the jaw of thinking society, they thought they had knocked out and "captured" its thinking processes. [But these] new times are percolating into the apparatus and forming a

layer of party intellectuals . . . an arm of the intelligentsia, its "parliamentary fraction" within the administrative structure. This fraction will inevitably grow, constituting a hidden opposition. [One day it will triumph and then we will] take consolation in the fact that our cause had not perished, that it had "awakened" new layers within the Party intelligentsia who would repeat the attempt with more success.[196]