

NOTES

Preface: Iraq and the Ordering of the Postcolonial World

1. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Politics* (London: MacMillan, 1995), p. 13.

2. See Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 29–38, 61.

3. See Hedley Bull, “The Revolt Against the West,” in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 220.

4. Quoted in Robert H. Jackson, “The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations,” in *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 124.

5. On the power of this norm for diplomatic practice, see Douglas Hurd Foreword to *Regime Change: It's Been Done Before*, ed. Roger Gough (London: policyexchange, 2003), p. 12.

6. Michael Mastanduno, “Models, Markets, and Power: Political Economy and the Asia-Pacific, 1989–1999,” *Review of International Studies* 26, No. 4 (October 2000): 499.

7. David Williams, “Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-States and the International Financial Institutions,” *Review of International Studies* 26, No. 4 (October 2000): 568.

8. See Robert H. Jackson, “The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization:” Jackson first made this argument in *Quasi-States*, originally published in 1990.

9. See Bruce W. Jentleson, *Coercive Prevention: Normative, Political, and Policy Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2000), p. 27. The fact that Jentleson was a foreign policy advisor to former Vice President Al Gore and the Gore-Lieberman presidential campaign shows that the intellectual heritage of the Bush doctrine in the United States is largely bipartisan.

10. Quoted by Nicholas Leman, “After Iraq: The Plan to Remake the Middle East,” *The New Yorker*, 17 February 2003.

11. See “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop,” *The New York Times*, 8 March 1992; Nicholas Leman, “The Next World Order: The Bush Administration May Have a Brand-New Doctrine of Power,” *The New*

Yorker, 1 March 2002; and "Front Line Special: The War Behind Closed Doors," <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/themes>.

12. Richard N. Haass (director, State Department Policy Planning Staff), "The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture: Remarks to Foreign Policy Association," New York, 22 April 2002.

13. See Leman, "The Next World Order."

14. Toby Dodge and Steven Simon, Introduction to *Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change* (London and Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 11.

15. See Bob Woodward's description of the National Security Council meeting on 12 September 2001 in *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 43, 48.

16. See "The President's State of the Union Address," the United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 29 January 2002.

17. See Robert S. Litwak, "The New Calculus of Preemption," *Survival* 44, no. 4 (winter 2002–2003); and *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>. This was made even more explicit in the President's 2003 State of the Union address: "Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation."

18. See remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy West Point, New York, 1 June 2002; *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, pp. 1, 2; Richard N. Haass, "The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture"; and G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2002): 52.

19. For a comparable view of the dangers facing the hegemon, see Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinklet, *The Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (Harmsworth: Penguin Books, 1997).

20. See Michael Hirsh, "Bush and the World," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2002): 24.

21. See, for example, Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, pp. 192, 229.

22. See, for example, Edward Rhodes, "The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda," *Survival* 45, no. 1 (spring 2003): 131–54.

23. For evidence of what might be hoped from this success, see David Frum, *The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush* (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 232.

1. *Understanding the Mandate in Iraq*

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24. President Discusses the Future of Iraq at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., 26 February 2003.

1. *Understanding the Mandate in Iraq*

1. John Glubb, reporting a conversation with the dying Fahad ibn Hadhdhal, Shaikh of the Amart division of the Anaizd, once "one of the most important Bedouin shaikhs in Arabia." In Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service* (London: Cassell, 1978), pp. 97–98.

2. In British society of the 1920s the ideology of rational individualism was clearly dominant. But this position of dominance existed in an uneasy relationship with older forms of ideational ordering, specifically a more collective conception of social structures associated with the landed aristocracy and previous epochs of economic organisation. See Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998), p. 18. For effects of this process on social perception see Martin J. Wiener, *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992). For its effects on the economics see P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914* (London: Longman, 1993).

3. Ideational constructions of social reality, from high social theory through political ideology to common sense, are dominated by the structure-agency dichotomy. This ideational dichotomy focuses on the causal weight to be given to individual agency and/or societal organization. The explanatory weight in dominant discourses placed on one to the exclusion of the other is dependent upon the construction of an organic ideology. This dichotomy runs through all modern European discourses, intellectual and popular. It would be present and influential in the common sense of colonial staff and its rationalization in colonial policy. See Roy Bhaskar, *Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy* (London: Verso, 1993), p. 74. W. H. Greenleaf, *The Ideological Heritage*, vol. 2 of *The British Political Tradition* (London: Methuen, 1983), p. 15, and Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, pp. 327–330.

4. Two competing conceptions of society spring from the structure-agency, society-individual dichotomy. The first would be centered on the explanatory unit of the sovereign rational individual. Based upon the idea of societal voluntarism, society is ultimately reducible to the sum of its parts, individuals. Facts are person-centric, limited to what the individual can know through sen-

sory perception. The second approach views society itself as the ultimate unit of analysis. Within this approach therefore, individuals are created within the social structure they are born into; they are brought together and conditioned by their interaction with society. This division is well represented by differing conceptions of Iraqi society amongst the staff during the Mandate. Arguments focusing on how the Iraqi population was to be ideationally and materially ordered centered on which unit of analysis, tribal society or the rational individual, best described Iraq. Crucially, the outcomes of such debates directly shaped the institutions of the Iraqi state and how they interacted with Iraqi society.

5. "Industrial production, which had been growing at an annual rate of about 4% in the period 1820 to 1840 and about 3% between 1840 and 1870, became more sluggish; between 1875 and 1894 it grew at just over 1.5% annually, far less than that of the country's chief rivals . . . in 1870 the United Kingdom still contained 32% of the world's manufacturing capacity, this was down to 15% by 1910; and while its share of world trade was 25% in 1870, by 1913 this had shrunk to 14%." Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865–1980* (London: Fontana, 1985), pp. 22–23.

6. See Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy*, p. 148; and Giovanni Arrighi, "The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism," in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, ed. Steven Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 175.

7. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Fontana, 1989), p. 363; and Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 20.

8. See Arrighi, "The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism," p. 180; and Geoffrey Barraclough, "From the European Balance of Power to the Age of World Politics: The Changing Environment of International Relations," in *An Introduction to Contemporary History*, by Geoffrey Barraclough (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990).

9. See E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978).

10. See for example John Stevenson, *History of Britain: British Society, 1914–1945* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984); A. J. P. Taylor, *English History, 1914–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Greenleaf, *The Ideological Heritage*.

11. See Kennedy, *The Realities behind Diplomacy*, p. 25.

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2. *The Mandate System, the End of Imperialism, and the Birth of the Iraqi State*

1. Gareth Stedman Jones, "The History of U.S. Imperialism," in *Ideology in Social Science: Readings in Critical Social Theory*, ed. Robin Blackburn (London: Fontana/Collins, 1979), pp. 227–28.

2. See Geoffrey Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p. 118.

3. See Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History*, p. 93. E. H. Carr is a partial exception to the general view that the international system of the period was fundamentally adrift; he was aware of the fundamental difference in international relations in the post-war era but did not focus on the specific outcomes. See Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Politics, Norms, and Peaceful Change," *The Review of International Studies* 24 (December 1998): 194, special edition: "The Eighty Years' Crisis, 1919–1999," ed. Tim Dunne, Michael Cox, and Ken Booth.

4. "[W]hen we turn our attention to President Wilson . . . we are struck first of all by his amateurishness, by the vagueness and incoherence of his ideas, and by his lack of contact with European or world affairs." Richard W. Van Alstyne, "Woodrow Wilson and the Idea of the Nation State," *International Affairs* 37, no. 3, p. 305.

5. Philip J. Baram, *The Department of State in the Middle East, 1919–1945* (State College, Penn.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), p. 4.

6. John A. DeNovo, "On the Sidelines: The United States and the Middle East Between the Wars, 1919–1939," in *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919–1939*, ed. Uriel Dann (New York: Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Holmes & Meier, 1988), pp. 230–33.

7. William Stivers, *Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918–1930* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 67–68.

8. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Politics, Norms and Peaceful Change," p. 204.

9. Paul Kennedy, *The Realities behind Diplomacy*, pp. 161, 211.

10. Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914–1921* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 481.

11. Even after the power of a hegemon that set up an international institution has declined, the institution itself can still function efficiently. See Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

12. See Cooper-Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs*, p. 481.

13. Cooper-Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs*, p. 477.
14. Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq, 1914–1932*, (London: Ithaca Press, published for the Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford University, 1976), p. 18.
15. T. E. Lawrence's letter to *The Times*, 22 July 1920, quoted in Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 61.
16. Public Records Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/5227, paper E6509.
17. See Stephen Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 122–126; and David E. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 22.
18. See A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 1, *1914–1917: A Personal and Historical Record* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 140, 261.
19. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 26.
20. See Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1993.
21. Major Sir Hubert Young, *The Independent Arab* (London: John Murray, 1933), p. 40. Young served in Basra with the expeditionary force.
22. See Sir Ronald Evelyn Wingate, "Mesopotamia and South-Eastern Arabia During and Just After the War," a talk given to the Middle East Centre, Oxford, on 2 March 1965, p. 8, Box 132/9/1, the Sudan Archive, University of Durham. Also see Philip Willard Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937), p. 81.
23. See Ireland, *Iraq*, pp. 148–49; and Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*, p. 119.
24. India Office Library (IOL), L/P&S/18 B281, "The Future of Mesopotamia," Note by Political Dept., India Office, on points for discussion with Sir Percy Cox, p. 1; also see Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 18; and Ireland, *Iraq*, p. 108.
25. See David Gilmour, *Curzon* (London: Papermac, 1994), p. 474.
26. A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 1, pp. 103, 110.
27. Quoted in Gilmour, *Curzon*, p. 485.
28. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 1, p. xi.
29. Gertrude Bell, *From Her Personal Papers*, vol. 2, *1914–1926*, ed. Elizabeth Burgoyne (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1961), p. 104. Also, "Throughout the country there is very little belief in an Arab Government. Basra frankly dislikes it, the tribesmen scoff at it." Copies of letters from Gertrude Bell to Sir Valentine Chirol, 1916–1923, 29 November 1920, Box 303/4/245, Sudan Archive, Durham University.

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30. See PRO, Colonial Office (CO) 730/34, p. 782; and Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 18 n. 35.

31. See Stivers, *Supremacy and Oil*, p. 42.

32. On the negative effect of Wilson's rhetoric in 1918 see Mejcher, *Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq, 1910–1928* (London: Ithaca Press, published for the Middle East Center St. Antony's College, Oxford University, 1976), p. 55.

33. Woodrow Wilson, "Address Delivered to the Senate, 22 Jan. 1917," in *Readings in World Politics*, vol. 2 (Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education, 1957), p. 113.

34. Colonel House, Wilson's chief troubleshooter in Europe, was charged by the President to set up an inquiry team to look into the potential problems facing America in the post-war world. G.L. Beer was a member of this committee. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 18 n. 35; and George Louis Beer, "The Future of Mesopotamia," written for the inquiry team, finished 1 Jan. 1918, in *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, with papers on Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Colonial Settlement*, edited with introduction, annexes and additional notes by Louis Herbert Gray (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1968), pp. 413–27.

35. Beer, "The Future of Mesopotamia," p. 424.

36. Beer, "The Future of Mesopotamia," p. 425.

37. Point three centered on the right to equality of trade conditions for all states. Point five stated, "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims if the government whose title is to be determined." Point twelve stated that non-Turkish nationalities in the Ottoman Empire "should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." Woodrow Wilson, "A Speech Before a Joint Session of Congress, 8 Jan. 1918," *Readings in World Politics*, vol. 2 (Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education, 1957), pp. 23–25.

38. Mark Sykes, "Our Position in Mesopotamia in Relation to the Spirit of the Age," FO 800/22, reproduced in full as appendix 1 in Mejcher, *Imperial Quest for Oil*.

39. IOL, L/P&S/18/B281, "Future of Mesopotamia," Note by the Political Dept., India Office, on points for discussion with Sir Percy Cox, 3 April 1918, p. 2. "The main new factors in the situation may be classified broadly under two heads, viz. : (i) the general trend of the war in Europe; and (ii) the general change in outlook in regard to questions of imperial policy which the war has brought about, and, in particular, the spread of the doctrine of 'self-determi-

nation' under the powerful advocacy of the President of the United States" (L/P&S/18/B281, p. 2). " 'Autonomy' and 'separate national conditions' do not seem compatible with annexation (as was contemplated by His Majesty's Government in the case of Basra) in any form; while it is not easy to reconcile them even with British suzerainty or a British Protectorate, unless the people concerned, or the local chiefs or leaders on their behalf, can be induced to accept our assistance and supervision of their own accord" (L/P&S/18/B281, p. 3).

40. IOL L/P&S/18 B284 Eastern Committee, *The Future of Mesopotamia*, E.C. 173, Note by Sir Percy Cox, p. 2.

41. See H. Duncan Hall, "The British Commonwealth and the Founding of the League Mandate System," in *Studies in International History: Essays Presented to W. Norton Medlicott, Stevenson Professor of International History in the University of London*, ed. K. Bourne and D.C. Watt (London: Longman, 1967), p. 346.

42. H. Duncan Hall, "The British Commonwealth and the Founding of the League Mandate System," p. 354; and H. Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies, and Trusteeship* (New York: Klaus Reprint Company, 1972), p. 352.

43. Thus the former German colonies that the countries of the British Empire delegation wanted to have annexed were allocated to them, placed in the C category and were in a very different situation to those in the Middle East. Independence was to come, but in the distant future. See Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies, and Trusteeship*, p. 93.

44. "The whole idea of the international supervision of dependent territories was revolutionary. The normal assumption was that European Powers had a natural right to rule 'natives.' " F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920–1946* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986), pp. 201–2.

45. Wilson quoted in Hall, "The British Commonwealth and the Founding of the League Mandate System," p. 354.

46. Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 14.

47. PRO, FO 371/5227, paper E6830. Also see telegram no. 344436/75/19, Office of the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 15 November 1919, P.8253/19, Dispatch from the Civil Commissioner, Mesopotamia, to Secretary of State for India, Sudan Archives, Durham, Box 303/1/67 and ST48/12 (2), Baghdad, 15 November 1919, from Wilson to the Secretary of State for India; accompanying note by G. Bell, "Syria in 1919," the British Library Official Publications.

48. See Cooper-Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs*, p. 279.

49. See IOL, L/P&S/18, B317, Mesopotamia: Future Constitution, letter from A. T. Wilson, Baghdad, 6 April 1919.

50. See A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 2, 1917–920: *A Personal and Historical Record* (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 99, 140, 240, 261 and PRO FO 371/5227, File 2719, E6509, 16 June 1920 and E6830, 21 June 1920, Inter-Dept.al Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs.

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51. PRO, FO 371/5227, File 2719, E6830, 21 June 1920, p. 54.

52. See Thomas Lyell, *The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia* (Cambridge: All-borough Publishing, 1991), p. 168.

53. In August of 1920 the draft instructions to be given to Cox as High Commissioner were placed before the cabinet in London. These stated that Faisal was to be king, with a government that "must be as completely Arab as possible. That is to say, that it must be composed, as far as, or as soon as, practicable, of Arab ministers for each Dept. of State, responsible to the Arab Ruler, each assisted by a British expert as Secretary, such experts to be considered employees of the Arab Government." Britain would be responsible for Foreign Affairs and would oversee finances as long as the Exchequer was wholly or partly financing the Iraqi state. IOL, L/P&S/18, B.347, Appointment of Sir Percy Cox as High Commissioner: Instructions of His Majesty's Government, Draft Instructions submitted to the cabinet, 5 August 1920.

54. "Finance not merely the governing but the only factor in the eyes of the British public." H. W. Young to Shuckburgh, Baghdad 23 October 1921, CO 55863, Affairs in Iraq, CO 730/18, p. 504. Also see Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, pp. 47–8.

55. See CO 730/34, Note prepared by the Middle East Dept., Colonial Office, printed for the cabinet, Dec. 1922, Secret I.R.Q.3., p. 783.

56. See Sir Percy Cox, "Historical Summaries," in *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, by Gertrude Bell, vol. 2, selected and edited by Lady Bell (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1939), p. 541.

57. "Broadly speaking, the root principle is that official control as such should be exercised by no one but the High Commissioner. In order to enable him to decide at what points his intervention is necessary, he must be kept fully informed, at every stage, of action which the Iraq Government propose to take." Minute by H. W. Young, CO 16522, 7 April 1922, "The Finances of Iraq," CO 730/33, p. 309.

58. The Council of Ministers met for the first time on 2 November 1920. IOL, L/P&S/18/ B365, Establishment of Council of State for Iraq, no. S.D./170A, dated 30 November 1920, issued by P.Z. Cox, High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, to all officers of the Civil Administration in Mesopotamia, signed by C. C. Garbett, Secretary to the High Commissioner.

59. Longrigg, *Iraq*, p. 129. Under the British Civil Administration the country had been divided into fourteen divisions. The Council of Ministers divided the country into ten *liwas*, thirty-five *qadhas*, and eighty-five *nahiyahs* on December 12 1920. See Ireland, *Iraq*, pp. 294–96.

60. Indian National Archive, Baghdad High Commision Files (BHCF) BHCF File no. 23/2, Proceeding of Council of State, from November 1920 to April 1921, Draft Instructions for the Council of State, p. 4; and IOL L/P&S/18/ B365, Note on the proceedings of Cox since arriving in Basra, p. 4.

61. "The question of ultimate responsibility, as between the British and Arab Governments, is perturbing alike the king, the ministers and the public. At the meetings of the Council it is the subject of frequent informal discussions and the ministers, including Sasun Effendi, are all of opinion that an explicit definition of their powers and position cannot be delayed." Intelligence Report no. 26, Baghdad 1 December, 1921, BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 2, Intelligence Reports.

62. CO 730/16, CO 5618 10 NOV 21, British Staff in Iraq, extracts from Major Young's letter of the 23 October 1921 from Baghdad, p. 205.

63. See, for examples of this approach, BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 2, Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Report no. 25, Baghdad, 15 November 1921, Proceedings of the Council of Ministers, File no. 19/1, vol. 4 (4), Intelligence Report no. 14 Baghdad, 15 July 1922, Intelligence Report no. 23, Baghdad, 1 December 1922.

64. In 1920 there were 2,035 officials of the Government of India in Iraq, by 1923 this number had fallen to 1,270. In 1920 there were 364 British gazetted officers in Iraq, by 1923 there were 181. See Ireland, *Iraq*, p. 367.

65. In October 1921 H. W. Young described the role of the adviser thus, "it will be sufficient if the second-in-command of the Arab minister, whether you call him an Under-Secretary or Inspector-General or a Director, is an Englishman." CO 730/16, CO 5618 10 NOV 21, British Staff in Iraq, Extracts from Major Young's letter of the 23 Oct. 1921 from Baghdad, p. 205. L/P&S/18/, B365, Note on the proceedings of Cox since arriving in Basra, p. 4. CO 5618 10 NOV 21, British Staff in Iraq, Extracts from Major Young's letter of the 23 October 1921 from Baghdad, CO 730/16, p. 205.

66. The problem of having such an informal understanding between the adviser and the High Commissioner's staff was recognized by the Colonial Office in 1921 but not acted upon: "we know by experience that British officials appointed to posts in the service of a foreign Government rapidly lose their British political status and become more native than the native himself." CO 730/18, CO 63592 24 DEC 21, Affairs of Iraq, to Shuckburgh from Young, Baghdad, 8 December 1921, p. 595.

67. See IOL, L/P&S/18, B.347, Appointment of Sir Percy Cox as High Commissioner: Instructions of His Majesty's Government, Draft Instructions submitted to the cabinet 5 August 1920.

68. Terence Ranger argues that in colonial Africa the notion of kingship provided a structure of ideational and material order for Imperial rule. See "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 211. At the Cairo Conference in March 1921 T. E. Lawrence

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argued that the scattered and backward peoples of Iraq needed the unifying figure of a king. See Mejcher, *Imperial Quest for Oil*, p. 77.

69 For the role Faisal was to play in the Iraqi state see, Note on the Organic Law, CO 63592 24 DEC 21, Affairs of Iraq, CO 730/18, p. 609.

70. For Bell, Sassun Effendi summed up the situation well when he argued that “no local man would be acceptable as head of state because every other local man would be jealous of him”; Gertrude Bell, *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, vol. 2, p. 489. The naqib of Baghdad, Abd al-Rahman al-Gailani, was discounted because he was both too old and too closely associated with the Sunni population. Saiyid Talib, the naqib of Basra, was considered to be too closely associated with the regional interests of Basra, an area which had a long-expressed wish not to be included in an Iraqi state. He had also had a violent reputation under the Ottoman administration. He was unceremoniously bundled out of the country and sent into exile when his presence was seen as destabilizing. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, pp. 36–45.

71. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, pp. 44–46. For a wider discussion of this approach, with reference to Transjordan, see Toby Dodge, *An Arabian Prince: English Gentlemen and the Tribes East of the River Jordan. Abdullah and the Creation and Consolidation of the Transjordanian State*, (London: Centre of Near and Middle Eastern Studies Occasional paper 13, SOAS, 1993).

72. On 18 August 1921 the Interior Minister informed the Council of Ministers that 96 percent of those who voted in the referendum had voted for Faisal. Faisal became king on August 23. CO 730/4, CO 41616, Rulership of Iraq, Reports on conversations with Faisal regarding the difficult position in which he now finds himself & submits suggestions for a settlement, paraphrase telegram from the High Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 August, 1921, p. 256. Faisal went so far as to refuse to be crowned if this proviso was not removed. See Sir J. Richmond, “G. L. Bell as a Political Influence,” text of a talk given at the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, 16 May 1977, Box 639/8/1, The Sudan Collection, University of Durham, p. 18. Also Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 70.

73. CO 730/4, CO 41616, Rulership of Iraq, Reports on conversations with Faisal regarding the difficult position in which he now finds himself & submits suggestions for a settlement. paraphrase telegram from the High Commissioner to Secretary of State for Colonies, 17 August 1921, p. 256.

74. CO 730/4, CO 41616/21, paraphrase telegram from Secretary of State Colonies to High Commissioner, 20 August 1921, pp. 260–262.

75. Mr Churchill telegraphed to Sir P. Cox on the 20 April as follows: “The question which the king should now address himself to is the following. Does he desire us to quit Iraq forthwith?” “We could begin the evacuation immedi-

ately after the hot weather, and all British troops and civilians could be out of the country before the end of the Christian year. If this is the king's wish, he should say so, with the knowledge that the responsibility for what follows will rest with him." CO 730/34, CO 62086, cabinet committee on Iraq, p. 749.

76. "Six months ago we were paying his hotel bill in London, and now I am forced to read day after day 800-word messages on questions of his status and his relations with foreign powers." CO 730/16, 24 Nov. 1921, Note by Secretary of State, the Colonial Office, Downing Street, p. 387.

77. See Bell, *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, vol. 2, pp. 279, 285; BHCF File no. 19/1 vol. 4 (4); Intelligence Report no. 17, Baghdad, 1 September 1922 and CO 730/34, CO 36475 26 JUL 22, Pan-Arab Activities, p. 91.

78. BHCF File no. 19/1, vol. 4 (4), Intelligence Report no. 17, Baghdad, 1 September 1922, Notes on Public Opinion and Affairs in Baghdad and News from Provinces, pp. 4–5. Also see Cox, "Historical Summaries," in Bell, *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, vol. 2, p. 524.

79. BHCF File no. 19/1, vol. 4 (4), Intelligence Report no. 17, Baghdad, 1 September 1922, p. 5.

80. "I realise that the success or failure of Faisal as king of Iraq and of our policy involved therewith is a matter of much more than local import, and that collapse of project in pursuance of which we brought him here, besides being humiliating to us vis-à-vis France, would probably involve recasting of our Arabian policy as a whole." "I quite recognise that, having put up Faisal and Iraq having accepted him, it may not be possible for us or worth the candle to contemplate any change and that Faisal and Iraq must take their chance." Telegram from the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Secret and Personal, 24 August 1922, CO 730/34, pp. 263–264. Also see paraphrase telegram from Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Cox, 29 August 1922, CO 730/24, CO 43045 29 AUG 22, Political Situation, p. 209.

81. Telegram from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, no. 605, 26 August 1922, CO 730/34, p. 263.

82. See CO 44086, The Political Situation in Iraq, CO 730/24, p. 261.

83. CO 730/4, CO 41616; Rulership of Iraq; Reports on conversations with Faisal regarding the difficult position in which he now finds himself & submits suggestions for a settlement, p. 253. Sluglett suggests that this was apparent to Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, as early as the summer of 1920. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 42.

84. Paraphrased telegram, from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, no. 163, dated 27 February 1922, pp. 323–324.

85. See Cox, "Historical Summaries," pp. 522–523; paraphrased telegram from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, no.

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163, dated 27 February 1922; CO 730/20 (vol. 2), Iraq 1922, p. 323; Shuckburgh, CO 62086, cabinet committee on Iraq, further memorandum by the Middle East Dept., Colonial Office, 12 December 1922, CO 730/34, p. 798. Or, to quote Faisal's explanation, "the people have acquired a repugnance towards the term 'Mandate,' its terms, and interpretations, which is a result of what they have observed in the way of abuse by the [French] Mandatory of his Mandate and his employment of the authority vested in him under the said Mandate for the realisation of private aims and objectives." Translation of a letter from King Faisal to Sir Percy Cox, dated 23 February 1922, CO 1354 9 MAR 22, treaty With Faisal, CO 730/20 (vol. 2), Iraq 1922, pp. 319–320.

86. Paraphrase telegram from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 August 1921, CO 730/4, p. 254.

87. CO 62086, cabinet committee on Iraq, 12 December 1922, CO 730/34, p. 797.

88. See telegram no. 163, from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 27 February 1922, CO 730/20 (vol. 2), Iraq 1922, pp. 321–23.

89. A coffee-shop anecdote, expressing *al-Wadha' al-Shadh* [the perplexing predicament] of relations between Iraqi statesmen and the British advisers, reported by Gertrude Bell to her father, 16 February 1922, Bell's Letters, Newcastle Library.

90. See Gilmour, *Curzon*, p. 543.

91. See Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History*, p. 72; and A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power* (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 190.

92. See Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies*, p. 185 and A. J. P. Taylor, *English History, 1914–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 163.

93. Bonar Law's response to the Chanak Crisis in a letter to *The Times*, 7 October 1922, quoted in M. E. Yapp, *The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995* (London: Longman, 1996), p. 380.

94. Law quoted in Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy*, p. 267.

95. On the role of Iraq in the election campaign see Ireland, *Iraq*, p. 377; and Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1917* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981), pp. 77–78.

96. Bonar Law and Ormsby Gore reflecting in the House of Commons on Law's election statements, quoted in *The Times*, 21 February and 2 March 1923.

97. See *The Times*, 21 February 1923; and Ireland, *Iraq*, p. 377.

98. *The Times*, 21 February 1923.

99. Law's election manifesto promised: "The nation's first need is, in every walk of life, to get on with its own work, with the minimum of interference at

home and of disturbance abroad.” Quoted in A. J. P. Taylor, *English History*, p. 196. British taxes per head of population had risen six fold from 1914 to 1922. See Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies*, p. 184.

100. See Ireland, *Iraq*, p. 377.

101. Cox’s advice was deemed so important that it was printed and circulated to the whole of the cabinet. See I.R.Q. 30, Secret, copy no. 103, Reply to Questionnaire by Sir P. Cox, printed for the cabinet, February 1923, CO 6851 7 FEB 23, cabinet committee on Iraq, CO 730/53.

102. See CO 730/53, CO 6851 7 FEB 23, cabinet committee on Iraq; Slugglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 80; and Ernest Main, *Iraq From Mandate to Independence* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1935), p. 84.

103. *The Times*, 21 March 1923.

104. Secret, to the High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Duke of Devonshire, CO 19114 17 APR 23, Organic Law, CO 730/47, p. 430.

105. General instructions as to the manner the High Commissioner for Iraq discharges his duties, Iraq Confidential B, from Devonshire, the Secretary of State for Colonies, to Sir Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner for Iraq, Downing Street, 20 September 1923, Sudan Collection, University of Durham Library, Box 472/13/141, pp. 1–14.

106. For example, “The aim of our policy in Iraq is, after all, to leave the Iraq Government strong enough to hold its own and friendly to us and it would be an absurd anti-climax if we simultaneously weakened and antagonised that Government by insisting on its always tamely accepting our views.” “The first necessity of this situation was to convince the politically minded part of the Iraq people of the disinterested attitude of Great Britain and to disabuse them of the suspicion that she was aiming at the perpetual domination of Iraq. A suspicion which persisted in spite of the expressed reluctance of the newly elected Conservative Government of Great Britain to accept the Mandate for the country.” From Sir Henry Dobbs, the Residency, Baghdad, 10 January 1924, to Devonshire, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO 730/57, Iraq 1924, vol. 1, Dispatches (January–February), pp. 282–83 and 276–77. Also see CO 8563 23 FEB 25, CO 730/73, Iraq 1925, Dispatches (21 February–18 March).

107. See Secret from H. Dobbs, High Commissioner to the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 November 1923, CO 60034 10 DEC 23, cabinet crisis, CO 730/43, Iraq 1923, Dispatches (October–November).

108. From Sir Henry Dobbs, the Residency, Baghdad, to the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10 January 1924, CO 730/57, Iraq 1924, vol. 1, Dispatches (Janu–February), p. 282.

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109. See, for example, private letter from Dobbs to Shuckburgh, 7 February 1924, CO 8246 20 FEB 24, Relations between the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office on economic questions, CO 730/71, Iraq 1924, vol. 15, Individuals, p. 165.

110. See Minutes, no. c.f. 15656, Appointment of an additional Assistant Secretary to the High Commissioner, CO 730/107/67, Iraq 1926, and Minutes, C. 1845 29 SEP 1926, Meeting of the PMC, Nov. 1926, CO 730/95, Iraq 1926, vol. 4, Dispatches (August–September).

111. British Gazetted Officers in Iraq in 1923 numbered 181, by 1926 they numbered 148. British non-Gazetted Officers numbered 361 in 1923 but only 53 in 1926. Indian Officials numbered 1,270 in 1923 but only 250 in 1926. See Ireland, *Iraq*, p. 367. According to Dobbs, by December 1926 there were only 104 British officers holding senior appointments in Iraq and only 12 officers responsible for regional administration, compared to 473 and 91 in 1920. See Sir Henry Dobbs, oral statement on Iraq by the accredited representative, League of Nations Permanent Mandate Commission, tenth session, Provisional Minutes of the Seventh Meeting held on Monday, 8 November 1926, CO 730/96, Iraq 1926, vol. 5, Dispatches (October–December), p. 714.

112. See Ireland, *Iraq*, p. 367.

113. To Shuckburgh from Young, Baghdad, 8 December 1921, CO 63592 24 DEC 21, Affairs of Iraq, CO 730/18, p. 595; and to Shuckburgh from Young, London, 20 February 1922, CO 6360 9 FEB 22, High Commission Staff, CO 730/19, vol. 1, Iraq 1922, p. 641.

114. Although his resignation was explained on health grounds, Slater's "attitude," taking the side of the Iraqi Government against both Dobbs and the Colonial Office in London was a strong contributing factor to his dismissal. See CO 55465 26 NOV 24, CO 730/71, Iraq 1924, vol. 15, Individuals, p. 302.

115. To Henry Dobbs from J. E. Shuckburgh, Private, NC/62556/23, Downing Street, 4 January 1924, CO 62556 21 DEC 23, Financial adviser to the Iraq Government, CO 730/44, Dispatches, December 1923, p. 322.

116. To Sir Henry Dobbs from S. H. Vernon, Baghdad, 21 September 1924, CO 59869 23 DEC 24, S.H. Slater, the late Financial Secretary to the Iraq Government, CO 730/71, Iraq 1924, vol. 15, Individuals, pp. 339–40.

117. Dobbs, quoted by Shuckburgh, to Dobbs from J. E. Shuckburgh, Private, NC/62556/23, Downing Street, 4 January 1924, CO 62556 21 DEC 23, Financial adviser to the Iraq Government, CO 730/44, Dispatches, December 1923, p. 312.

118. Personal note prepared by Sir Hugh Trenchard in regard to his views on the situation that has arisen in Iraq, in answer to a request by Sir Samuel

Wilson, no. 40104, part 1, Defence Forces Reorganisation, Iraq, CO 730/114/4, p. 39.

119. It was viewed with suspicion at the Colonial Office which complained that Henry Dobbs, as acting High Commissioner, had not kept it informed in enough detail about the issues surrounding the legislation. See Young's minute dated 6 April 1923, Administrative Inspector Regulations, CO 13465 16 MAR 23, CO 730/38, 1923, p. 298. Cox wrote to the Council expressing his concern "that the very important change in practice which was proposed should be put into effect in such manner as not to deprive the High Commissioner of the opportunity of watching the development of the administration and its bearing on the interests of H.M.G., with special regard to the employment of Imperial forces." BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. V (5), Internal Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Report no. 4, Baghdad, 14 Feb. 1923, p. 2.

120. See the Administrative Inspectorate Regulations, CO 13465 16 MAR 23, CO 730/38, 1923, p. 301. Both Cox and then Dobbs recognized that this effect was inherent in the legislation but by this time could not insist that this part of the legislation be dropped. See BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 5, Internal Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Report no. 4, Baghdad, 14 February 1923.

121. Confidential letter from P. Cox to Shuckburgh, 27 April 1923, CO 23128 9 MAY 23, Instructions for the High Commissioner, Iraq, CO 730/55, p. 48.

122. Confidential letter from P. Cox to Shuckburgh.

123. See Shuckburgh's Minute, CO 8563 23 FEB 25, CO 730/73, Iraq 1925, Dispatches (21 February–18 March).

124. For the growing power of the Permanent Mandate Commission see Northedge, *The League of Nations*, pp. 198–201.

125. See CO 730/169/7, 1931, no. 88379/1, part 1, Conditions Governing Termination of Mandatory Control, League of Nations, C.P.M. 1210 (1), Geneva, 26 June 1931, Permanent Mandates Commission, Twentieth Session, p. 2.

126. For a summary and the conclusions of the Commissions report, see CO 730/119/10, part I, 1927 Iraq, no. 40299, Admission of Iraq to League of Nations and Revision of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, pp. 166–70.

127. CO 730/119/10, part 1, 1927 Iraq, no. 40299, Admission of Iraq to League of Nations and Revision of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, pp. 167–68.

128. See Peter J. Beck, "A Tedious and Perilous Controversy": Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918–1926," *Middle East Studies* 17 (April 1981): 265.

129. CO 730/119/10, part 1, 1927 Iraq, no. 40299, Admission of Iraq to League of Nations and Revision of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, p. 169.

130. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 125.

131. See DO no. SO 448, from Sir Henry Dobbs, the Residency, Baghdad,

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24 February 1927, to Leopold Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO 730/119/10, part I, 1927, p. 180. Also see Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 130.

132. DO no. SO 448, from Sir Henry Dobbs, the Residency, Baghdad, 24 February 1927, to Leopold Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO 730/119/10, part I, 1927, pp. 187–88.

133. J. Hall, 26 June 1927, CO 730/119/10, part I, 1927 Iraq, no. 40299, Admission of Iraq to League of Nations and Revision of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, Minutes 1–35, p. 16.

134. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, pp. 156–67.

135. DO no. SO 1334, Secret and Personal, from Sir Henry Dobbs, The Residency, Baghdad, 14 June 1927, to Leopold Amery, Secretary for State for the Colonies, CO 730/114/4, 1927 Iraq, no. 40104, part I. Although he said this after a state dinner when he was drunk, it was one of a number of such statements Nuri made during 1927. See DO/2c/9, from E. L. Ellington, Headquarters Iraq Levies, Mosul, 15 June 1927 to Trenchard, CO 730/120/1, part 2, no. 40299, Admission of Iraq to League of Nations and Revision of Anglo-Iraq treaty, p. 3.

136. See DO no. RO 213, Immediate and Secret, from Bourdillion, the Residency, Baghdad, to King Faisal, 22 July 1927, CO 730/120/1, part 2, no. 40299, Admission of Iraq to League of Nations and Revision of Anglo-Iraq treaty.

137. “If we go in 1928, the State will fall to pieces.” Leo Amery describing the Iraqi state after a month’s visit in 1925. CO 730/82, CO 22162 15 MAY 25, The Situation in Iraq, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies dealing with his visit to Iraq, draft report, p. 17.

138. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 156.

139. Document no. 40299A, Revision of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, Middle East Dept., Colonial Office, September 28, CO 730/120/2, p. 3.

140. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dealing with his visit to Iraq, CO 22162 15 MAY 25, CO 730/82, Iraq 1925, vol. 11, Colonial Office (January–May), p. 18.

141. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 17 June 1927, Paper C.P. 182 (27), SECRET O.P. 182 (27) cabinet, Entry of Iraq into the League of Nations, CO 730/119/10, part I, 1927 Iraq, pp. 3–4.

142. See Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies*, pp. 298–99. Also A. J. P. Taylor, *English History, 1914–1945*, pp. 51, 264–71.

143. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 168.

144. Secret B, from Gilbert Clayton, the High Commission, the Residency, Baghdad, to Lord Passfield, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 July 1929, CO 730/148/8, 1929 Iraq, part I, pp. 145–59.

145. Draft Memorandum for the cabinet, Future Policy in Iraq, CO 730/148/8, 1929 Iraq, part 1, pp. 96–97.

146. See Wm. Roger Louis, *In the Name of God Go! Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of Churchill* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992).

147. Sir Henry Dobbs, in retirement, predicting the future of Iraq after the 1929 declaration in a letter to Shuckburgh at the Colonial Office, 28 December 1929, CO 730/150/12, 1929 Iraq, pp. 4–5.

148. See Taylor, *English History, 1914–1945*, p. 272.

149. Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy*, p. 243; and Taylor, *English History, 1914–1945*, pp. 272–98.

150. Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy*, p. 244.

151. Article 22 quoted by Henry Dobbs; CO 730/119/10, part 1, 1927 Iraq, no. 40299, Admission of Iraq to League of Nations and Revision of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, pp. 172–73. The terms for ending a Mandate were further codified by the PMC in January 1931, see CO 730/166/8, League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Twentieth Session, Annex 3. Conditions to be fulfilled before the Mandate Regime can be brought to an end in respect of a country, pp. 195–210. Also see Wilbur Laurent Williams, *The State Of Iraq: A Mandate Attains Independence, Foreign Policy Reports, Foreign Policy Association*, vol. 8, no. 16 (12 October 1932), p. 186.

152. CO 730/166/8, League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Twentieth Session, Annex 3. Conditions to be fulfilled before the Mandate Regime can be brought to an end in respect of a country, p. 196.

153. DO no. SO 448, Secret Draft, from Sir Henry Dobbs, Baghdad, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, 24 February 1927, CO 730/119/10, part 1, 1927 Iraq, no. 40299, Admission of Iraq to the League of Nations and Revision of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, 1927, p. 173.

154. Dobbs compares Iraq “to the Papal States between 1849 and 1870, with a French garrison maintained in Rome at the request of the sovereign Pope and somewhat similar to that of Haiti and Cuba, which are members of the League.” DO no. SO 448, Secret Draft, from Sir Henry Dobbs, p. 173.

155. Dobbs, DO no. SO 448, Secret Draft, pp. 174–75.

156. Colonial Office, *Special Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Progress of Iraq During the Period 1920–1931* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1931), pp. 10–11.

157. Sir Francis Humphrys's opening statement to the sixteenth meeting of the twentieth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, Provisional Minutes, Iraq: Examination of the Special Report for the period 1920–1931, CO 730/166/7, Iraq 1931, no. 88149, part 1, p. 38.

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158. See Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development*, p. 148 and Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 211.

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1. See for examples of this A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 1, 1914–1917: *A Personal and Historical Record* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 21; and Sir Ronald Evelyn Wingate, “Mesopotamia and South-Eastern Arabia during and just after the War,” a talk given to the Middle East Center, Oxford, 2 March 1965. Text in the Durham University Sudan Collection, Box 132/9/1–34, Sir Ronald Evelyn Wingate (1889–1978).

2. See Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Iraq 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social and Economic History* (Oxford: Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 85. Also see, Public Records Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 696/1, Iraq Administration Reports, 1917–1918, p. 11.

3. PRO, CO 730/121/1, no. 40311, Report on Iraq by Ahmed Fahmi, Accountant-General, Baghdad.

4. See Nick Hostettler, “The Asiatic Mode of Production.” Unpublished paper, Department of Political Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, April 1993, p. 3.

5. The debacles at Kut and Gallipoli saw the supposedly inferior Ottoman troops inflict stunning defeats on allied forces. The Gallipoli campaign in the Turkish Dardanelles, started as an ill-fated attempt to break the stalemate on the Western front by marching on Constantinople. After a 259-day siege, Commonwealth and British troops retreated with each side suffering a quarter of a million casualties in bloody trench warfare. At Kut al-Amara, a small village on the Tigris, British troops suffered a grueling 146-day siege, only surrendering to Ottoman forces when their rations had run out. See David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914–1922* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 128–66, 200–3.

6. See Bruce Westrate, *The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916–1920* (State College, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 11, 58, 140.

7. See Graham Dawson, “The Blond Bedouin: Lawrence of Arabia, Imperial Adventure and the Imagining of English-British Masculinity,” in *Manful Assertions, Masculinities in Britain since 1800*, ed. Michael Roper and John Tosh (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 123.

8. Bryan S. Turner, *Marx and the End of Orientalism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p. 166.

9. See Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p. 4.

10. For the role of such a construct in colonial India see Bernard S. Cohn, "Representing Authority in Victorian India," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Canto, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 166–167.

11. Public Records Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 696/1, vol. 1, Reports of Administration for 1918 of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories in Mesopotamia. Iraq Administration Reports, 1917–1918. Basra division. Administrative Reports for Basra Division for the year 1918, p. 240. This theme was more explicitly developed in Mosul in 1919, see CO696/2, Iraq Administration reports, 1919, Mosul Division Report by Lieutenant-Colonel L. S. Nalder, p. 13.

12. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925), and *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*.

13. For details of S. H. Longrigg's career see Indian National Archive Baghdad High Commission Files (BHCF) File no. 6/3/104 I, Ministry of Finance, Major S. H. Longrigg.

14. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, p. 321. We find a very similar attitude in A. T. Wilson's book, see 'Prologue' in *Loyalties Mesopotamia*, vol. 1.

15. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*.

16. For examples of the book's influence on policy see BHCF File no. 6/34/22, DO/9894, from Secretariat of the High Commissioner to Longrigg, 19 August 1926, pp. 74–5. Also Gertrude Bell had a copy of *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* in her small library when she died. See BHCF File no. 35/143-I, The Estate of the late Miss G.L. Bell, CBE, p. 201.

17. See Asli Cirakman, "The Prejudice of Montesquieu: Intellectual Roots of Modern Eurocentrism," paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association, 32nd Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 3–6 December, 1998 p. 20.

18. See Asli Cirakman, p. 20; and Albertine Jwaideh, "Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq," *St Antony's Papers* 16 (Oxford, 1963), p. 112.

19. Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850–1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 13.

20. See, for example, Selim Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998).

21. Lady Anne Blount, *Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates*, vol. 1 (London: Frank Cass, 1968) (first published in 1870), p. 109.

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22. Longrigg, *Iraq*, p. 35.
23. Longrigg, *Iraq*, p. 36.
24. Minute signed by Young, CO 13377, 20 March 1924; The murder of Taufiq el Kh'alidi, CO 730/71, vol. 15, Individuals, p. 139.
25. See the Sudan Archive, University of Durham, Box 472/13/127, letter from Sir Henry Dobbs, High Commissioner, to Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 December 1928, p. 4.
26. Glubb argued that Hameed Beg, the *qa'immaqam* of Ana, "was convinced that a European suit and a smattering of French placed him in a different world from the good people of Ana," John Glubb, *Arabian Adventures. Ten Years of Joyful Service* (London: Cassell, 1978), p. 73.
27. See Gokhan Cetinsaya, "Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908," (Ph.D. diss., University of Manchester, 1994), pp. 43–57; and Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 235.
28. Cetinsaya, "Ottoman Administration of Iraq," pp. 54–55. This role was not exclusive to the naqib of Baghdad. A similar position involving state society mediation and even Persian Gulf diplomacy was taken by the naqib of Basra in the 1880s and 1890s.
29. See Jwaideh, "Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq," p. 112.
30. Namik Pasha was removed from office in Baghdad in Oct. 1902. See Cetinsaya, "Ottoman Administration of Iraq," pp. 133–138.
31. Gertrude Bell, "The Basis of Government in Turkish Arabia," *Arab Bulletin* 24 (5 October 1916), p. 320.
32. Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, the man who wrote the judicial code for the nascent Iraqi state, in Gertrude Bell, *Mesopotamia: Review of Civil Administration*, EI3898, FO 371/5081, 1920, p. 96.
33. See C. A. Hooper, Note on the extent to which Ottoman Law is in force in Iraq, 40641, CO 730/125/16, 28 December 1927, p. 4.
34. A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 1, p. 68.
35. CO 730/35, CO 15296, 31 March 1922, the Organic Law, p. 339.
36. Minute from Bullard to Shuckburgh, on the Organic Law, CO 15296, CO 730/35, p. 400.
37. See Longrigg *Iraq*, pp. 166, 201.
38. Preliminary Note II, On Settlement of Rights in pump areas, BHCF File no. 6/34/65, opened January 1931. Subject: Report by Sir Ernest Dowson—on land settlement in Iraq and allied subjects—p. 6. For other examples see Gertrude Bell's letters, Newcastle Library, 9 November 1921, Trip to Kurdistan, Administration Report of Diwaniyah district, CO 696/1, Iraq Administration reports 1917–1918, vol. 1, Reports of Administration for 1918 of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories in Mesopotamia, p. 197.

39. See *The Times*, 22 July 1927, Imperial and Foreign News, "Irrigation in Iraq, Progress in recent years," by 'our own correspondent in Baghdad," and The Dujail Plain, Administrative Report, Samarra District, 1917, CO 696/1, Iraq Administration Reports 1917–1918, p. 9.

40. See Gertrude Bell, *Mesopotamia: Review of Civil Administration*, 1920, EI3898, FO 371/5081, p. 22.

41. Lt. Col. E.B. Howell, Revenue Secretary to the Civil Commissioner, "Land revenue demand: Turkish theory and practice," Administration Report on the working of the Revenue Dept. for the year 1919, CO 696/2, Iraq Administration Reports, 1919.

42. Sir Ernest Dowson (Formerly Surveyor-General of Egypt, and later successively Under-Secretary of State for Finance, then Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government), *Government of el Iraq: An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions with Proposals for the Initiation of Reform* (Letchworth, England: printed for the Iraqi Government by the Garden City Press, 1931); BHCF File no. 6/34/65. Subject: Report by Sir Ernest M. Dowson—on land settlement in Iraq and allied subjects—p. 20. Also see Thomas Lyell, *The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia* (Cambridge: Allborough Publishing, 1991), p. 164.

43. S. H. Longrigg, Inspector-General Revenue and Acting Director, Annual Report on the Operations of the Revenue Dept. for the Financial Year 1927–1928, CO 696/6, Iraq Administration Reports, 1925–1928, p. 4; and A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 1, p. 77.

44. Jwaideh, "Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq," p. 106.

45. Jwaideh, "Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq," p. 108.

46. Note by the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, 10 July 1926, BHCF File no. 6/34/22, heading Finance, sub-head Revenue. Subject: Mr S.H. Longrigg's note on Revenue Policy in Iraq, p. 2.

47. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, p. 306.

48. Note by the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, 10 July 1926, BHCF File no. 6/34/22, heading Finance, sub-head Revenue. Subject: Mr S. H. Longrigg's note on Revenue Policy in Iraq, p. 3.

49. Dobbs, Note by the High Commissioner, p. 15.

50. Dowson, *Government of el Iraq*.

51. S. H. Longrigg, Ministry of Finance, 25 June 1926, Note on Land and Revenue Policy, BHCF File no. 6/34/22, heading Finance, sub-head Revenue. Subject: Mr S. H. Longrigg's note on Revenue Policy in Iraq, p. 120.

52. Longrigg, *Iraq*, p. 37.

53. See Glubb, *The Changing Scenes of Life: An Autobiography* (London: Quartet Books, 1983), p. 75.

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54. Note by the High Commissioner on pump irrigation on the rivers of Iraq and connected questions, CO 730/95, Iraq 1926, vol. 4, Despatches (August–September), C. 16338, 23 August 1926, Pump Irrigation, p. 9.

55. Glubb, *The Changing Scenes of Life*, p. 77.

56. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, p. 307.

57. See Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 57.

58. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 231; and Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq,” p. 119.

59. See Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–1914: A Book of Readings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 166; Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq,” p. 119; and Cetinsaya, “Ottoman Administration of Iraq,” p. 31.

60. See Assistant Political Officer Mylles, IOL, L/P&S/10/621, p. 7; P6705, Notes on the Tribes and Shaikhs of Anah-Albu Kamal District, by Captain C.C. Mylles, APO, 1920. Ireland and Longrigg both describe ‘primitive communities’ still living untouched by civilised government and unable to visualise any alternative to their lives. Ireland, *Iraq*, p. 89; and Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, p. 289.

61. BHCF File no. 6/34/22, DO/8165, from R. S. M. Sturges, Secretariat to the High Commissioner, to S. H. Longrigg, Revenue Secretary, Ministry of Finance, 14 July 1926, p. 1. This perception also runs through pre-war travel writing on the Ottoman Empire, see Lady Anne Blunt, *Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates* (London: Frank Cass, 1968), vol. 1.

62. Gertrude Bell, *Mesopotamia: Review of Civil Administration*, 9 November 1920, FO 371/5081, E13898, p. 94. Also see A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 1, p. 77; and Lyell, *The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia*, p. 164.

63. Longrigg, *Iraq*, p. 25. For a similar attitude see also Administration Report of Suq-esh-Shuyukh and district for the year 1916–17, by H.P.P. Dickson, Assistant Political Officer, 9 May 1917, IOL, File no. 1736, L/P&S/10/618, p. 506.

64. BHCF File no. 6/34/22, DO/8165, from R. S. M. Sturges [for Henry Dobbs], Secretariat to the High Commissioner, to S. H. Longrigg, Revenue Secretary, Ministry of Finance, 14 July 1926, p. 56.

65. BHCF File no. 6/34/22, DO/8165, p. 5.

66. BHCF File no. 6/34/22, DO/8165, pp. 3–4.

67. See Cetinsaya, “Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908,” p. 198.

68. See Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq,” pp.

130–131; and Cetinsaya, “Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908,” pp. 198–206.

69. See for example Martin J. Wiener, *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992); Gerard J. Degroot, *Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War* (London: Longman, 1996); and Mark Girouard, *The Return of Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989).

70. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2 (New York: Vantage Books, 1990), pp. 221–22.

4. *Rural and Urban: The Divided Social Imagination of Late Colonialism*

1. Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 5.

2. Gertrude Bell, Preface to *The Desert and the Sown* (1907; reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1985).

3. Public Records Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 730/33, Letter, GHQ British Forces in Iraq, 27 March 1922, from Haldane, Head of British Forces, Iraq, to Winston Churchill.

4. Indian National Archive (INA), Baghdad High Commission Files (BHCF), File no. 19/1, vol. 4, Intelligence Report no. 22, Baghdad, 15 November 1922, paragraph 1097.

5. PRO, AIR 23/445, I/2106, part 8, Euphrates, Samawah to Fallujah, 1923, p 10. D/582 of 27 December 1923, to ‘I’ Branch Air Staff, from Special Service Officer (SSO) Nasiriyah.

6. CO 730/21, CO 21941 9 MAY 22, Situation in Iraq, from Cox to Shuckburgh, Baghdad 28 April 1922, p. 389.

7. CO 730/21, Cox, Situation in Iraq, p. 389. CO 730/24, CO 43361, from Cox, the Residency, Baghdad, 31 August 1922, p. 22.

8. CO 730/114/4, Secret and Personal, DO no. SO 1334, the Residency, Baghdad, 14 June 1927, from Dobbs to Amery, appendix 1, note dated 2 August 1923. The theme of sexual depravity found wider purchase in a report by the Adviser to the Ministry of Education who claimed that “fifteen hundred years ago Ammianus Marcellinas stated that the Arabs of both sexes were inordinately addicted to matrimonial pleasures’ and it is today, I believe, the unanimous opinion of every European connected with education in Iraq, that a very large part of the adult Moslem population has been permanently dulled, mentally and morally, by premature and excessive indulgence in various sexual vices which induce a general moral degradation. The Christians are less open to reproach in this respect but the very precau-

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tions which they take tend to produce a character lacking in strength and virility. The only remedy lies in some application of the English Public School and Boy Scout ideal." The results of such activity were seen "in the middle classes of the urban population of Iraq, where, after the age of puberty, an inveterate dignity allows to few the indulgence of more vigorous hobbies than tea drinking and gossip in public and in private certain unmentionable indoor sports. It is not from this soil that we can expect to grow such humble virtues as a sense of duty, self sacrifice and sober patriotism." See CO 730/14, to the High Commissioner from the Adviser to the Ministry of Education, "The Education Dept. in its Relations to the Mandate and the League of Nations," p. 103.

9. CO 730/120/1, part 2, Reference DO/2c/9, Headquarters Iraq Levies, Mosul, 15 June 1927, Very Secret, from E. L. Ellington to Trenchard.

10. CO 730/123/10, Secret, Note on the Political Situation to 27 September 1927, from C. J. Edmonds, p. 129.

11. BHCF, File no. 5/1/1, vol. 2, Correspondence with the Ministry of Education, 27 December 1929, Note on the Present State of Education in Iraq, C/165, from the Inspector General of Education, p. 44.

12. CO 730/22, Iraq Intelligence Report no. 10, dated 15 May 1922, paragraph 408, p. 148, by Major Yetts, Adviser to Mutasarrif of Nasiriyah.

13. CO 696/3, Iraq Administration Reports 1920–1921, Administrative Report of Kirkuk Division, 1 January 1920 to 31 December 1920, p. 7.

14. CO 730/59, Iraq 1924, Despatches (May), CO 27354 9 JUNE 1924, Intelligence Report, the Residency Baghdad, 29 May 1924, Intelligence Report no. 11, Iraq Internal Affairs, p. 434.

15. Haj, *The Making of Iraq*, p. 146; and Owen, "Class and Class Politics in Iraq Before 1958."

16. Foreign Office (FO) 371/5227, E8267, Copy of Sir H. Dobbs's memo on the Proposals of Sir E. Bonham-Carter's Committee, 14 July 1920, p. 2.

17. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), p. 322.

18. See, for example, Colonial Office, *Iraq: Report on Iraq Administration, April 1922–March 1923* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 19240; Colonial no. 4., p. 5; and CO 696/1, vol. 1, Reports of Administration for 1918 of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories in Mesopotamia, Shamiyah Division Annual Administration Report, 1 January to 31 Dec 1918, p. 67; Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 10.

19. Gertrude Bell, August 1920, *From Her Personal Papers, 1914–1926*, vol. 2, ed. Elizabeth Burgoyne (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1961), p. 157. Bell to

her father, 3 October 1920, the Letters of Gertrude Bell, Newcastle Library. This points to the development of an Orientalist view of Islam as having its roots in an analysis of Britain's own normative march to modernity. The perceived negative effect of the Shia *Mujtahids* on the development of a strong and modern state is comparable to Rome's resistance to the independence and development of the modern British state.

20. Gertrude Bell letter to her mother, 14 March 1920, Bell's Letters, Newcastle Library. Sudan Archives, Durham, Box 303/1/82, Mesopotamia Lecture by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, given after leaving Iraq, p. 5. AIR 23/382, I/130, Intelligence Reports on Internal Politics, Baghdad, 1930–1932, from Special Services Officer, Baghdad, to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters, Hinadi, I/Bd/39, 18 March 1931.

21. See CO 696/3, Iraq Administration Reports, 1920–1921, Administrative Report of the Muntafiq Division for the year 1920, p. 19. See BHCF File no. 19/1, vol. 4, Intelligence Report no. 17, 1 September 1922, p. 4; and BHCF File no. 19/1, vol. 5, Intelligence Report no. 9, 1 May 1923; and CO 730/57, vol. 1, CO 3273, 21 January 1924, Intelligence Report no. 1, p. 139. See BHCF File No. 7/44/2, Letter from the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, Mr. Edmonds, to the High Commissioner, 12 October 1931.

22. Bell, Letter to her father, 3 October 1920, Bell's Letters, Newcastle Library. But strategic reasons would have had a greater part to play in official calculations on the inclusion or otherwise of Mosul; see Robert Olson, "The Battle for Kurdistan: The Churchill-Cox Correspondence Regarding the Creation of the State of Iraq, 1921–1923," *The International Journal of Turkish Studies* (1993); and Robert Olson, "The Second Time Around: British Policy towards the Kurds (1921–1922)," *Die Welt des Islams* 27 (1987).

23. Longrigg, *Iraq*, 1900 to 1950, p. 10.

24. CO 696/1, vol. 1, Reports of Administration for 1918 of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories in Mesopotamia, Shamiyah Division Annual Administration Report, 1 January to 31 December 1918, p. 65. Also see AIR 23/382, I/130, Intelligence Reports on Internal Politics, Baghdad, 1930–1932, p. 26a.

25. See, for example, Martin J. Wiener, *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), p. 6.

26. See, for example, the discussion of Sir Thomas Munro's early career in India in Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 12–13; and P. J. Musgrave, "Social Power and Social Change in the United Provinces, 1860–1920," in *Economy and Society: Essays in Indian Economic and Social History*, ed. K. N. Chaudhuri and Clive J. Dewey (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 10.

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27. See V. G. Kiernan, *The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to the Outside World in the Imperial Age* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 55.

28. See Lord Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London: Frank Cass, 1965), p. 79.

29. See Tim Youngs, *Travellers in Africa: British Travelogues, 1850–1900* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), p. 89.

30. Henry Dobbs to L.C.E.S. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 December 1928, Box 427/13/127, Durham University Library, Sudan Collection, p. 4.

31. CO 730/40, CO 33280 4 JULY 1923, Local forces in Iraq, Minutes, by Meinertzhagen, 10 November 1923, p. 734.

32. CO 730/1, Iraq (Mesopotamia), vol. 1, Dispatch 9829, Mesopotamian Intelligence Report no. 4, 31 December 1920, Proceedings of the Council of Ministers.

33. Durham University Library, Sudan Archives, Box 303/1/67, P 8253/19, Dispatch from the Civil Commissioner, Mesopotamia, to Secretary of State for India, no. 344436/75/19, Office of the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 15 November 1919, p. 7.

34. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 35.

35. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 13. Batatu details this movement of people without drawing the wider analytical conclusion that tribal allegiances, although changed by modernity, can and do survive these transformative effects.

36. See Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*; Haj, *The Making of Iraq*, p. 146; and Owen, “Class and Class Politics in Iraq Before 1958,” p. 158.

37. See, for example, CO 730/14, p. 189, *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government on the Administration of Iraq for the Period April 1923–Dec. 1924* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925), Colonial no. 13, section 28; *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1925*, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926), Colonial no. 21, p. 138; CO 730/1, Iraq vol. 1, Despatch no. 9829; CO 730/40, CO 33280, 4 July 1923, letter from Dobbs to Devonshire, 20 June 1923, p. 739; CO 730/57, CO 3271, letter from Dobbs to Devonshire, 10 January 1924, to name but a few sources.

38. As described by an RAF Intelligence Officer in April 1924, quoted in Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 267.

39. J. B. Glubb, *The Changing Scenes of Life: An Autobiography* (London: Quartet Books, 1983), p. 71.

40. Gertrude Bell, Mesopotamia: Review of Civil Administration, November 1920, Foreign Office (FO) 371/5081, E13898, p. 150. See also BHCF, File no. 19/1, VI Internal, Intelligence Report no. 4, Baghdad, 21 February 1924; and Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*, p. 114.

41. India Office Library (IOL), L/P&S/18, B284, Note by Sir Percy Cox to the Eastern Committee, The Future of Mesopotamia, E.C. 173, 22 April 1918, p. 5. IOL, L/P&S/18, B317, enclosure no. 9, in a letter from A.T. Wilson on the future of Iraq, dated 6 April 1919, by R.E. Wingate, Political Officer, Najaf, p. 8.

42. *Great Britain, Report on the Administration of Iraq, April 1923–December 1924*, p. 214, quoted in Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 93; and BHCF, File no. 7/20/19, Ministry of Interior, Personalities of Diwaniyah Division, “Muhammad al Haji Hassan,” p. 2.

43. BHCF File no. 4/69I, Conscription Bill, no. SO/1715, from R. S. M Sturges, Political Secretary to the High Commissioner, to the Ministry of Defence, p. 2; and no. C/1670, from Cornwallis, Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, to the High Commissioner, 1 July 1926, p. 27.

44. CO 730/5, CO 489631, Mesopotamian Intelligence Report, no. 20, 1 September 1921, p. 125.

45. See Bell's Letters, Newcastle Library; to her father, 16 February 1922.

46. Summed up by the Special Services Officer, Baghdad, I/Bd/39, 19 May 1931, PRO, AIR 23/282, p. 32a. See Glubb, *Changing Scenes of Life*, p. 81.

47. CO 730/5, CO 50265 10 OCT. 1921, Report of Divisional Adviser, Dulaim, 15 August to 31 August, p. 245.

48. BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 4, Intelligence Report no. 16, Baghdad, 15 August 1922.

49. BHCF, File no. 6/34/55, heading Finance, sub-head Revenue, DO/816, from the Secretariat to the High Commissioner, to S. H. Longrigg, 14 July 1926, p. 57.

50. Sir Ronald Evelyn Wingate, “Mesopotamia and South-Eastern Arabia During and Just After the War,” a talk given to the Middle East Centre, Oxford, 2 March 1965. Text in the Durham University Sudan Collection, Box 132/9/1–34, Sir Ronald Evelyn Wingate (1889–1978). He entered the Indian Civil Service in 1912 and served in Mesopotamia from 1917 to 1919.

51. Sudipta Kaviraj, “On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, and Hegemony,” in *Contesting Colonial Hegemony, State and Society in Africa and India*, ed. Dagmar Engles and Shula Marxs (London: British Academic Press, 1994), p. 43.

52. Timothy Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991), p. x.

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53. Owen, "Class and Class Politics in Iraq Before 1958," p. 158.

54. A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 1, 1914–1917: *A Personal and Historical Record* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 21.

55. See Longrigg, *Iraq 1900 to 1950*, p. 85. Also see CO 696/1, Iraq Administration Reports, 1917–1918, p. 11.

56. Both Owen, "Class and Class Politics in Iraq Before 1958," and Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics*, mention British attempts to carry out a census but Ahmed Fahmi, the Accountant-General of Iraq in 1927, states "it is quite impossible to give the exact census of the inhabitants who live within the rice area, as no general census has as yet been carried out in the country." CO 730 /12 /1, no. 40311, Report on Iraq by Ahmed Fahmi.

57. Longrigg states that "no civilised country" is without a cadastral survey: BHCF File no. 6/34/22. Subject: Mr S. H. Longrigg's note on Revenue Policy in Iraq, p. 16.

58. CO 696/1, Iraq Administration Reports 1917–1918, Administrative Report, Samarra District, 191, p. 10.

59. For example, Secret, Office of Special Services Officer (SSO), Basra, 23 January 1926, Visit to Amara, "I proceeded by River to Amara on 15 Jan., arriving on the 17th, visiting many of the Shaikhs on the way up to obtain corrections for the tribal lists, which are now being copied out and will be forwarded when completed". AIR 23/101, 1/5/3, part 1, Intelligence Report, Lower Tigris, from October 1924 to September 1926, p. 22.

60. See for examples of these lists BHCF, File no. 24/44, Gazette and Publications, Mesopotamian Tribal Lists.

61. Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*, p. 8; and A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 2, 1917–1920: *A Personal and Historical Record* (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 78.

62. P 8253/19, Dispatch from the Civil Commissioner, Mesopotamia, to the Secretary of State for India, 15 November 1919, Box 3030/1/67, Durham University Library. CO 730/95, Iraq 1926, vol. 4, Despatches August to September, Secret, from Dobbs to Amery, September 1926.

63. IOL, L/P&S/10/619, p. 304, Land Revenue Report on Kirkuk, Baghdad, 12 March 1919, sub-heading the British Administrative System.

64. See, for example, CO 696/1, Iraqi Administration Reports, 1917–1918, p. 10.

65. Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*, p. 23.

66. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 2, p. 71.

67. For a wonderful example of this see John Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service* (London: Cassell, 1978), p. 97.

68. Air 23/447, I/2106, part 10, Euphrates-Samawah to Fallujah, 1924, Con-

siderations of the Abdul Wahid Land Case, by the Special Services Officer Hillah [Glubb], 19 July 1924, pp. 76–77.

69. IOL, L/P&S /1/621, P6705, Notes on the Tribes and Shaikhs of Anah-Albu Kamal District, by Captain C.C. Mylles, Assistant Political Officer (APO), 1920, p. 7. See also Administrative Report by Major C.F. MacPherson, Political Officer, Hillah District, 1917, CO 696/1, Iraq Administration Reports, 1917–1918, p. 106. Also see Glubb, *Arabian Adventures*, p. 65.

70. See, for example, CO 696/1, Iraq Administration Reports, 1917–1918, p. 119, Hillah Division, Review of District Administration Reports, 1 January to 31 Dece 1918.

71. D. G. Hogarth, *Arab Bulletin: Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, 1916–1919*, with introduction by Dr Robin Bidwell (Archive Editions, 1986), no. 32, 26 November 1916, vol. 1, p. 489.

72. Dispatch no. 10/223, the Office of the High Commissioner, Baghdad, 1 July 1920. Further correspondence on the future of Baghdad, note by Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs, C.S.I, C.I.E, I.C.S, Proposals for a Constitution on Mesopotamia, The British Library.

73. Gertrude Bell, Mesopotamia: Review of Civil Administration, November 1920, Foreign Office (FO) 371/5081, E13898, pp. 150, 197.

74. IOL, L/P&S/10/761, P. 2581, Memo no. 7442, dated 5 December 1920, from the Political Officer, Nasiriyah Division.

75. PRO, CO 696/4, Iraq Administration Reports, 1921–1922, Report by His Majesty's High Commissioner on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Iraq for the period from October 1, 1920 to 31 March 1922, Administrative report on the Muntafiq Division for the year 1921, written by A. H. Ditchburn, Divisional Adviser, Muntafiq Division, Nasiriyah, p. 4.

76. PRO AIR 23/18, part 1, from December 1924 to June 1925, Memorandum on the Relations between Hamud as Suwait and Lizzam aba Dhrahi of the Dhafir, signed by Glubb and date stamped by Air Staff Intelligence 20 April 1925.

77. See Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 240. For further examples see BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, heading Finance. Subject: Mr. S. H. Longrigg's note on Revenue Policy in Iraq. Note by the High Commissioner, 10 July 1926, pp. 43–44.

78. See, for example, Bell's letter to Sir Valentine Chirol, 29 January 1918, Box 303/4/189, Durham University, Sudan Archive.

79. For a more detailed account of his continual rebellion see Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*.

80. PRO CO 730/163/6, 1931, Iraq no. 88069, part II, Shaikh Mahmud, Report by the Air Officer Commanding Iraq on the operations in Southern Kurdistan against Shaikh Mahmud from October 1930–May 1931, Note by Captain V. Holt on Shaikh Mahmud, pp. 44–77.

5. *Using the Shaikhs: The Rational Imposition of a Romantic Figure*

1. See Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'athists, and Free Officers* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 77, 99, 110.

2. Indian National Archive (INA), Baghdad High Commission Files (BHCF), File no. 6/34/22, Finance, sub-head revenue. Subject: Mr S. H. Longrigg's note on Revenue Policy in Iraq, Note by the High Commissioner, 10 July 1926, p. 33.

3. BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 6, Intelligence Report no. 23, 1 December 1923, p. 6.

4. BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 6, Intelligence Report no. 23, 1 December 1923, p. 6.

5. See Sudipta Kaviraj, "On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony," in *Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in Africa and India*, ed. Dagmar Engles and Shula Marxs (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 21–32.

6. BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 5, Intelligence Report no. 12, 7 June 1923, p.1.

7. Public Records Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/5072, p. 75.

8. BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 5, Intelligence Report no. 11, Baghdad 1 June 1923, p. 4. Also see PRO, Air Ministry Files (AIR) 23/546, dated 4 June 1923, Operations in Basrah, Amarah and Nasiriyah, part 2.

9. See India Office Library (IOL), L/P&S/18 B. 342, Mesopotamian Constitution, Memorandum by Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, on the proposals of the Bonham-Carter Committee, 26 May 1920, p. 3. Here Dobbs is intimating that these residue of tribes are an unimportant minority, not representative of the wider social order.

10. BHCF, File no. 7/22/15I, heading Ministry of Interior, sub-head Dulaim Liwa. Subject: Shaikh Ali al Sulaiman, Chief of the Dulaim tribes, DO no. 203, from: L. M. Yetts, Office of the Divisional Adviser to Cornwallis, 30 January 1922, pp. 11–12.

11. From L. M. Yetts, Office of the Divisional Adviser, to Cornwallis, 30 January 1922, pp. 11–12.

12. BHCF, File no. 7/22/15I, heading Ministry of Interior, sub-head Dulaim Liwa. Subject: Shaikh Ali al Sulaiman, Chief of the Dulaim tribes, extract from Revenue Report of the Administrative Inspector Dulaim Division for the period 27 August to 13th November 1924, pp. 89–90.

13. BHCF, File no. 7/22/15I, heading Ministry of Interior, sub-head Dulaim Liwa. Subject: Shaikh Ali al Sulaiman, Chief of the Dulaim tribes, no. C/2779,

to Secretary to the High Commissioner, from Adviser to Interior, Cornwallis, 9 December 1924, p. 92.

14. BHCF, File no. 7/22/15I, heading Ministry of Interior, sub-head Dulaim Liwa. Subject: Shaikh Ali al Sulaiman, Chief of the Dulaim tribes, from H. Dobbs to Cornwallis, Adviser, Interior, 17 October 1925, pp. 103–5.

15. See BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 5, Intelligence Report no. 9, 1 May 1923, p. 2.

16. BHCF, File no. 7/22/15I, heading Ministry of Interior, sub-head Dulaim Liwa. Subject: Shaikh Ali al Sulaiman, Chief of the Dulaim tribes, DO no. C/3079, from Cornwallis, to Dobbs, 21 October 1925, pp. 108–109.

17. Sir Percy Cox, quoted in Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq, 1914–1932* (London: Ithaca Press, published for the Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford University, 1976), p. 42.

18. The Bonham-Carter Committee which drew up proposals for the constitution of Iraq also included E. B. Howell, Revenue Secretary; H. F. M. Tyler, Political Officer Hillah; F. C. C. Balfour, Military Governor and Political Officer for Baghdad; and R. W. Bullard, Deputy Revenue Secretary. See British Library, S.T. 48/12 (1), no. S/138, Office of the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 30 April 1920, IOL, L/P&S/18, B.342, Mesopotamian Constitution, PRO FO 371/5227, E8267, pp. 193–197.

19. Official Publications Library, British Library, 48/12 (1), no. S/138, Office of the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 30 April, Reference Committee on proposals for a constitution for Iraq, Appendix C. Method of election to Legislative Assembly, p. 10.

20. He was then Foreign Minister to the Government of India, having left Iraq after his first term of service there. See IOL L/P&S/18, B. 342, Mesopotamian Constitution, Memorandum by Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs, 26 May 1920.

21. IOL, L/P&S/10/759, P. 7367, 1920, Note on Proposals for the Electoral Law for Mesopotamia, written by E. L. Norton, I.C.S, Secretary to the Committee of ex-Turkish Deputies on Electoral Law, 20 August 1920.

22. IOL, L/P&S/10/759, Minute Paper, P. 7366, Mesopotamia, Proposals for an Electoral Law, written by R. Marrs, 12 November 1920.

23. See PRO, CO 730/1, Mesopotamian Intelligence Report no. 4, 31 December 1920, Proceedings of the Council of Ministers; also Stephen Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), p. 128; and Gertrude Bell, *From Her Personal Papers*, vol. 2, 1914–1926, ed. Elizabeth Burgoyne (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1961), p. 190.

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24. See Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 95; and Mohammad Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941* (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 27. The registering of a large numbers of tribesmen as primary voters in the run up to the elections for the 1924 Consultative Assembly meant that the British were happy to see the provision of 20 percent of the seats for tribal shaikhs set aside thereafter; see CO 730/61, p. 187 and CO 730/76, p. 198.

25. Longrigg's term, used in *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*, p. 150.

26. PRO CO 730/22, Iraq Intelligence Report no. 10, 15 May 1922, p. 147.

27. Gertrude Bell, *From Her Personal Papers*, vol. 2, p. 302, November 1 1922.

28. Mamdani sees similar divisions in African colonialism as having been consciously created or exacerbated whereas both with the case of Lugard in Africa and the Mandate official in Iraq, policy was driven by far more subconsciously structured perceptions than consciously enacted agency. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 23. Also see Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 24; and Roger Owen, "Class and Class Politics in Iraq before 1958: The 'Colonial and Post-Colonial State,' " in *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited*, ed. Robert A. Fernea and Wm. Roger Louis (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991).

29. See PRO CO 730/74, CO 15898. Also see Philip Willard Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937), p. 85; and A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 2, 1917–1920: *A Personal and Historical Record* (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 85.

30. See A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, vol. 1, p. 68; and *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1927* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), p. 122.

31. See IOL, L/P&S/10/618, File no. 1854, 1918, Tribal Disputes Regulation, p. 461.

32. Gertrude Bell, writing in *The Arab Bulletin: Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, 1916–1919* (Slough: Archive Editions, 1986), no. 24, 5 October 1916, p. 318. Also see PRO, CO 696/1, Iraq Administration Reports, 1917–1918, Administration Report, Amarah Division, 1918, p. 253.

33. CO 730/168/8, no. 88271/31 Iraq, J. B. Glubb, An Annual Report on the Administration of the Shamiya Desert & the Defence of the Iraq Frontiers lying therein 1 May 1929–15 May 1930, part 3, Administration of the TCCD. Regulations.

34. CO 730/103, Iraq, 1926, Individuals, (A–D), no. 1301, from the Resi-

dency, Baghdad, 18 October 1923 to E. M. Drower, Esqr., C.B.E. Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, Baghdad, Proposed Amendments to the Tribal Disputes Law, p. 284.

35. PRO CO 730/96, Iraq 1926, vol. 5, Despatches (October–December), League of Nations, C.P.M./10 Session/P.V.8, Permanent Mandates Commission, Tenth session, Provisional Minutes, Eighth Meeting, held Monday, 8 November 1926, p. 735.

36. Bell further develops this example by comparing Iraq with Britain: “In our own history, from the Moot Court through Magna Charta, to the Imperial Parliament was the work of centuries, yet the first contained the germ of all that came after. The tribes of the Iraq have advanced but little beyond the Moot Court, and should the shaping of their destinies become our care in the future, we shall be wise to eschew any experiments tending to rush them into highly specialised institutions a policy which could commend itself only to those who are never wearied by words that signify nothing.” *The Arab Bulletin* 24, p. 322.

37. CO 730/103, Iraq 1926, vol. 12, Individuals (A–D), no. 1301, from the Residency, Baghdad, 18 October 1923, to E. M. Drower, Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, Baghdad, p. 280.

38. BHCF File no. 8/4, vol. 1, DOSO no. 2140, 28 September 1924, Dobbs to Pulley (Interior); quoted in Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 242.

39. See PRO CO 696/1 and 2; and David E. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 168, for an explanation of this policy and its problems.

40. See *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government on the Administration of Iraq for the period April 1923–December 1924* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925), p. 59; and CO 730/6, CO 52858 24 OCT 21, Administration of Justice in the Tribal Areas, Confidential Memorandum no. S. 679, July 1921, from the Judicial Adviser, Baghdad, to the High Commissioner, Baghdad, p. 148. Also see CO 730/74, Iraq 1925, Despatches, March 30–April 1925, CO 15898, Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations.

41. Tribal Disputes Regulations, Appendix, pp. 144–156, Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (Revised), Iraq Occupied Territories. Definitions in *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1925* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926).

42. See CO 730/168/8, no. 88271/31, Iraq, J. B. Glubb, An Annual Report on the Administration of the Shamiya Desert & the Defence of the Iraq Frontiers lying therein 1 May 1929–15 May 1930, part 3, Administration of the TCCD Regulations and BHCF File no. 7/32/57. Subject: Proposed Conven-

tion between Syria and Iraq for the regulation of the affairs of nomadic tribes, to the Acting High Commissioner, Beyrout, pp. 64—63a.

43. See Intelligence Report no. 1, 1 January 1922, BHCF, File 19/1, vol. 2, Internal Intelligence Reports, p. 4; and BHCF, File no. 7/22/151, heading Ministry of Interior, sub-head Dulaim Liwa. Subject: Shaikh Ali al Sulaiman, Chief of the Dulaim tribes, from H. Dobbs to Cornwallis, Adviser, Interior, 17 October 1925, p. 105.

44. CO 696/2, Iraq Administration Reports, 1919, Mesopotamian Judicial Dept., Report on the Administration of Justice for the Year 1919, p. 6; and CO 730/6, Memorandum no. A. 12/1571, 12 April 1921, from the Judicial Adviser to the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, Baghdad, p. 154.

45. CO 730/6, pp. 154—155.

46. CO 730/6, p. 153.

47. CO 730/103, Iraq 1926, vol. 12, Individuals (A–D), p. 286, copy, DO no. S/142, Ministry of Justice, Baghdad, 21 October 1923, to Sir Henry Dobbs from E. M. Drower.

48. E. M. Drower, Ministry of Justice, Baghdad, p. 287.

49. *Al Sha'ab*, no. 6, 17 April 1924, CO 730/59, Iraq, Despatches (May), CO 22547 12 MAY 1924, Intelligence Reports, no. 9, Baghdad, 1 May 1924, Press Supplement.

50. *Al Iraq*, no. 1198, 18 April 1924, CO 730/59.

51. 'Ali Mahmud Al Mahami writing in *Al Istiqlal*, no. 491, 9 November 1924, CO 730/63, Iraq 1924 Despatches (November–December), CO 55054 24 NOV 24, Intelligence Reports, no. 23, Baghdad, 13th November 1924, press supplement, p. 165.

52. See CO 730/6, p. 151.

53. CO 730/103, Iraq 1926, vol. 12, Individuals (A–D), pp. 263—88.

54. CO 730/103, Iraq 1926, vol. 1, Individuals (A–D), Confidential, the Residency, Baghdad, 9 June 1926, DO no. SO 1177, from Dobbs to Cornwallis, p. 277.

55. BHCF, File no. 6/34/65. Subject: Report by Sir Ernest Dowson—on land settlement in Iraq and allied subjects, p. 20.

56. This view springs from the same philosophical heritage as James Mills's conception of India; that the progress of any country can be judged by the level of encouragement of rational thought and individual action. For similar examples see Shamiyah Division, Annual Administration Report, 1 January–31 December 1918, vol. 1, Reports of Administration for 1918 of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories in Mesopotamia, CO 696/1, Iraq Administration Reports 1917–1918, p. 72. Also Administration Report of the Suq al Shuyukh for the year 1921, by G.C. Kitching, Assistant Divisional Adviser, CO 696/4 Iraq Administration Reports 1921–1922, p. 56.

57. See, for example, J. B. Glubb, *The Story of the Arab Legion* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948), p. 8; and Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service* (London: Cassell, 1978), p. 65. That the tribal system was killed by the effects of modernity, the advance of “civilization” and urbanization was the dominant view. See, for example, *Iraq: Report on Iraq Administration, October 1920–March 1921* (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1922), p. 19; and IOL, L/PS/10/619, File no. P433, 2 December 1918, The Future of the Tribal System by the Assistant Political Officer, Hillah, p. 526.

58. Glubb, *Arabian Adventures*, p. 65.

59. Diary entry for April 1923, quoted in Glubb, *Arabian Adventures*, p. 73.

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1. A. T. Wilson speaking about land policy in 1918; see his *Loyalties, Mesopotamia, vol. II, 1917–1920: A Personal and Historical Record* (London: Oxford University Press, June 1931), pp. 76–77.

2. For a more detailed discussion of this, see chapter 3.

3. See A. T. Wilson, speaking of Dobbs’s role in organizing revenue, finance, and education in 1915 and 1916 in *Loyalties, Mesopotamia, vol. I, 1914–1917: A Personal and Historical Record* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 70–72.

4. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 22.

5. For the transformative effects of “military Keynesianism,” see Michael Mann, *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, vol. 1 of *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 146–55. For the application of this concept to Trans-Jordan under the Mandates, see Vartan Amadouny, “Infrastructural Development under the British Mandate,” in *Village, Steppe, and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan*, ed. Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 129–31.

6. See Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, p. 4; and Sudipta Kaviraj, “On the Construction of Colonial Power, Structure, Discourse, Hegemony,” in *Contesting Colonial Hegemony, State, and Society in Africa and India*, ed. Dagmar Engles and Shula Marx (London: British Academic Press, 1994), p. 21.

7. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, pp. 2–3.

8. See Kaviraj, “On the Construction of Colonial Power,” p. 32.

9. See Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, p. 80.

10. See Anislie T. Embree, “Landholding in India and British Institutions,” in Eric Frykenberg, ed., *Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 37–39.

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11. See Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, p. 83; also pp. 33–49, 80–82.
12. See Saree Makdisi, *Romantic Imperialism: Universal Empire and the Culture of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 15; and P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914* (London: Longman, 1993), p. 84.
13. See Jan P. Nederveen Pieterse, *Empire and Emancipation: Power and Liberation on a World Scale* (London: Pluto Press, 1990), pp. 30–31.
14. See Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 139.
15. See Nicholas B. Dirks, “From Little King to Landlord: Colonial Discourse and Colonial Rule,” in Nicholas B. Dirks, ed., *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 177.
16. See Michael Richard Fischbach, “State, Society, and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan), 1850–1950,” 2 vols., Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1992, pp. 244–245; and Matthew H. Edney, *Mapping Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–1843* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 334.
17. See Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, p. 6.
18. See Kaviraj, “On the Construction of Colonial Power,” p. 29.
19. See, for example, Fischbach, “State, Society, and Land in ‘Ajlun,” p. 246–47; and Dirks, “From Little King to Landlord,” pp. 176–84.
20. See Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, p. 36.
21. See Nader Saiedi, *The Birth of Social Theory: Social Thought in the Enlightenment and Romanticism* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1993); and Charles Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, Philosophical Papers 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 160.
22. See chapter 2.
23. See E. Hilton Young and R. V. Vernon, *Iraq: Report of the Financial Mission Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Enquire Into the Financial Position and Prospects of the Government of Iraq* (Baghdad, 1925). The aim of dramatically raising taxes was never realized. In 1911 under the Ottoman Empire, taxes from land accounted for 42 percent of national income. By 1933 this had actually fallen to 14 percent. See Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq, 1914–1932* (London: Ithaca Press, for the Middle East Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford University, 1976), p. 232.
24. See, for example, Gertrude Bell, 14 February 1920, *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, vol. 2 (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1939), p. 468. In 1926 the settlement of land tenure was listed as the second most important policy aim after the creation of an effective army. See Intelligence Report no. 10,

Baghdad, 29 April 1926, Baghdad High Commission Files, Indian National Archives, New Delhi (BHCF), File no. 19/1, vol. 10, p. 4. Also see *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1928* London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1929), p. 47.

25. "There is at the moment in this Ministry no recorded agreement on any matter of Land or Revenue policy at all: no authoritative reply can be given to any question on such matters of fact: and it must be admitted (as I have pointed out to the Adviser) that we seem to be rather further from, than nearer to, a considered policy than we were in 1919." DO 3317, Ministry of Finance, 30 June 1926, to R. S. M. Sturges, Political Secretary to the High Commissioner, from Longrigg, BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, heading Finance, subhead Revenue. Subject: Mr. S.H. Longrigg's note on Revenue Policy in Iraq. Also see Ernest Dowson, Preliminary Note 5, BHCF, File no. 6/34/65. Subject: Report by Sir Ernest Dowson on land settlement in Iraq and allied subjects, p. 52. Samira Haj, *The Making of Iraq, 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 28–32.

26. See Albertine Jwaideh, "Aspects of Land Tenure and Social Change in Lower Iraq During Late Ottoman Times," in *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, ed. Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), pp. 349–50.

27. Report of the subcommittee appointed under paragraph 17 of the Minutes of 21 March 1917, 27 March 1917, Mesopotamian Administration Committee, India Office Library (IOL), L/P&S/18/B254. This was reconfirmed in 1926. Mr. S. H. Longrigg's Note on Revenue Policy in Iraq, BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, p. 7. Also see Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 239. Added to this desire to perpetuate the status quo was an international legal requirement. The Turkish legal code had to be used until a state of war had officially ceased. This did not happen until the signing of the treaty of Lausanne, 23 July 1923. For the effects of this on revenue policy see Bertram Thomas, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), p. 80.

28. See Ahmed Fahmi, Accountant-General, Baghdad, Public Records Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 730/121/1, no. 40311, Report on Iraq.

29. See E. Hilton Young and R. V. Vernon, *Iraq: Report of the Financial Mission*, p. 14.

30. Ahmed Fahmi, Accountant-General, Report on Iraq, p. 10.

31. The British government began to consult Sir Ernest Dowson in 1926 as the debate about Iraqi land became urgent. However, until they employed him, Colonial Office officials appeared content to let Dobbs and Longrigg develop a policy for land tenure; this was despite their being well aware of the long-

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running dispute the two men had had over the matter. See J. Hall's minute, 28 August 1926, and H. W. Young's minute to Shuckburgh, 4 October 1926, C. 15136, 2 August 1926, Revenue Notes, CO 730/94, Iraq 1926, vol. 3, Dispatches.

32. A note by the High Commissioner on pump irrigation on the rivers of Iraq and connected questions, C. 16338, 23 August 1926, CO 730/95, Iraq 1926, vol. 4, Dispatches (August–September), pp. 1–2.

33. A note by the High Commissioner on pump irrigation on the rivers of Iraq and connected questions.

34. BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, heading Finance, subheading Revenue. Subject: Mr. S. H. Longrigg's Note on Revenue Policy in Iraq, Note by the High Commissioner, 10 July 1926, p. 33.

35. See the conclusion of chapter 3 for a more complete exposition of this argument.

36. See L/P&S/10/618, no. 74, 19769, 20 Sept. 1918, Revenue Notes on Qizil Rabat, Kadhimain, Diwaniyah, Musaiyib, Samawah, Shamiyah and Ramadi, by C. C. Garbett, First Revenue Officer, p. 125.

37. L/P&S/10/618, no. 74, 19769, p. 125.

38. *Iraq: Report on Iraq Administration, April 1922–March 1923* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), pp. 67–68. The ideational and material centrality of the Amarah shaikhs as representative of tribal society for the British administrators remained to the end of the Mandate in 1932. See Secret from Flight-Lieutenant Howes, Special Services Officer Basra, to Air Staff Intelligence, Air HQ, Hinaidi, 17 March 1932, PRO Air Ministry File (Air) 23/102 1/5/3, part 2, p. 5.

39. See Haj, *The Making of Iraq*, p. 29.

40. See extract from summary of outstanding events in the Dulaim Liwa for the year 1931, Intelligence Reports Upper Euphrates from 1927 to 1932, AIR 23/119, 1/5/6, part 7, p. 64a.

41. See extract from Revenue Report of the Administrative Inspector Dulaim Division for the period 27 August to 13 November 1924, BHCF, File no. 7/22/15I, p. 89.

42. See Extract from Revenue Report of the Administrative Inspector Dulaim Division, p. 67.

43. See Notes on Provincial Affairs, Mesopotamian Intelligence Report no. 5, 15 January 1921, CO 730/1, vol. 1, p. 94.

44. See Notes on Provincial Affairs, Intelligence Report no. 24, Baghdad, 1 November 1921, BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. II, Internal Intelligence Reports, p. 5.

45. See BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 5, Internal Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Report no. 4, 14 February 1923, p. 8.

46. See Thomas, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, pp. 76–77.

47. See Revenue Notes on Qizil Rabat, Kadhimain, Diwaniyah, Musaiyib, Samawah, Shamiyah, Ramadi, by C. C. Garbett, First Revenue Officer, Administration report of Suq-esh-Shuyukh and District, 1916–17, for Suq tribal affairs and the situation generally, L/P&S/10/618, no. 74, 19769, 20 September 1918, p. 506.

48. CO 696/2, Iraq Administration Reports 1919, Administration Report of the Muntafiq Division for the year ending 31 December 1919, by Captain A. H. Ditchburn, Officiating Political Officer, Muntafiq Division, Nasiriyah, p. 3.

49. See chapter 3.

50. See BHCF File no. 19/1, vol. 5, Internal Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Report no. 4, 14 February 1923, p. 7; and a report on the Accountant-General's tour in Shamiyah, printed at the Government Press, 1926, CO 730/121/1, no. 40311, p. 25.

51. BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 4, Intelligence Report no. 16, Baghdad the 15 August 1922, p. 10.

52. Rauf Kubaisias was appointed as *Mutasarrif* in November 1921. In August 1922 it was reported that he had travelled to Muntafiq with a personal injunction from the king to "bring the shaikhs to heel. Upon his arrival he immediately surrendered to the extremists." See Intelligence Report no. 16, Baghdad, 15 August 1922, p. 10.

53. See Notes on Provincial Affairs, Iraq Intelligence Report no. 2, 15 Jan. 1923, CO 730/38, p. 120.

54. See CO 730/23, CO 43319 30 August 22, Activities of the tribes of Nasiriyah District, CO 528, from Percy Cox, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, London 17 August 1922, p. 699; and BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 4, Intelligence Report no. 16, Baghdad, 15 August 1922, p. 10.

55. See appendix A, Sa'dun history and activities leading up to the present state of affairs between the landlord and tenant, 1/Bd/39, secret from the office of the Special Service Officer Baghdad to Air Staff Intelligence, Air 23/105, I/5/4, part 3, Lower Euphrates, p. 7f.

56. See, for example, Intelligence Report no. 2, 15 January 1923, CO 730/38; and appendix A 1/Bd/39, Air 23/105 I/5/4, part 3, p. 7f.

57. Administration report from the Amarah Division for the year 1920–1921, written by the Official Adviser, 'Amarah Division, to the Revenue Secretary, Baghdad, 11 November 1920, CO 969/3, Iraq Administration Reports 1920–21, p. 25.

58. Administration report from the Amarah Division for 1920–21, p. 26.

59. See Secret no. D/2(a), from the Office of Special Service Officer, Baghdad to Air Staff Intelligence, October 26 1924, AIR 23/113, I/5/6, part 1, Upper Euphrates from October 1924 until March 1925.

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60. Extract from Revenue Report of the Administrative Inspector Dulaim Division 27 August to 13 November 1924, BHCF, File no. 7/22/15I, p. 90.

61. See Intelligence Report no. 12, 15 October 1925, CO 730/79, p. 3.

62. No. C/1771, from Cornwallis to the Political Secretary to the High Commissioner, 4 July 1926, BHCF, File no. 7/18/36, p. 147.

63. See BHCF, File no. 7/22/15I, p. 86.

64. No. M.I./2567, 24 February 1926, from Cornwallis, the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, to the Administrative Inspector Ramadi, Memorandum, BHCF, File no. 7/22/15I.

65. See Intelligence Report no. 20, 1 October 1925, CO 730/78, vol. 7, Dispatches (September), CO 46166 13 OCT 25, Intelligence Reports, p. 693.

66. Intelligence Report no. 20, CO 730/78, p. 693.

67. S. H. Longrigg, Note on Land and Revenue Policy, 25 June 1926, BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, p. 14.

68. Longrigg, Note on Land and Revenue Policy, p. 13.

69. See Do/8165, from the Secretariat of the High Commissioner for Iraq, 14 July 1926, pp. 55–59; and Do/9894, from the Secretariat of the High Commissioner, 19 August 1926, pp. 74–76, BHCF, File no. 6/34/22.

70. Captain A. H. Ditchburn, Officiating Political Officer, Muntafiq Division, Nasiriyah, Administration Report of the Muntafiq Division for the year ending 31 December 1919, CO 696/2, Iraq Administration Reports, 1919, p. 4.

71. Administration Report of the 'Amarah Division, CO 696/2, Iraq Administration Reports, 1919, p. 26.

72. See Ahmed Fahmi, Accountant-General, Report on Iraq, p. 26.

73. See Revenue derived from properties, no. I/n/25, Nasiriyah, 19 March, 1927, Air Staff, AIR 23/105, I/5/4, part 3, lower Euphrates, January 1927 to November 1927.

74. Colonial administrators in India at the peak of utilitarian influence drew similar conclusions. See Clive Dewey, *Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service* (London: Hambledon Press, 1993), p. 16.

75. AIR 23/119, 1/5/6, part 7, Intelligence Reports, upper Euphrates, from 1927 to 1932, p. 68a.

76. See Philip Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937), p. 149.

77. See, for example, IOL L/P&S/10/618, A. L. Gordon Walker, Revenue Officer, Basrah, 31 May 1918, p. 122.

78. Bernard S. Cohn, "Representing Authority in India," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 166.

79. Charles Townsend, "Civilisation and Frightfulness in Air Control in the Middle East Between the Wars," in *Warfare Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor*, ed. Chris Wrigley (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p. 143.

80. Dobbs served on the North West Frontier as Judicial Commissioner and was from 1909 to 1911 Revenue and Judicial Commissioner, Baluchistan. Humphrys was personal assistant to Chief Commissioner, North Western Frontier Province in April 1905. See CO 730/148/9, no. 68444, part 2, p. 105; and CO 730/149/9, no. 68509.

81. See Thomas Henry Thornton, *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier. A Memoir, with Selections from His Correspondence and Official Writings* (London: John Murray, 1895).

82. "I am a fervent admirer of the Sandeman policy . . . in Iraq . . . I introduced the same system for the management of the tribes": Dobbs commenting on Colonel C. E. Bruce's lecture, "The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems of Today," both reproduced in *The Journal of Royal Central Asian Society* 19 (1932): 45–67. For the wider influence of Sandeman in the Middle East see, Riccardo Bocco and Tariq Tell, "Pax Britannica in the Steppe: British Policy and the Transjordanian Bedouin, 1923–39," in *Village, Steppe, and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan*, ed. Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell (London: British Academic Press, 1994), p. 241.

83. For example, PRO, CO 730/103, Iraq 1926, vol. 12, Individuals (A–D), C. 12513, Tribal Disputes Regulation, p. 280, no. 1301, from Dobbs, 18 October 1923, to E. M. Drower, Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, Baghdad. Also see Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, p. 242.

84. Thornton, *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman*, p. 304.

85. Philip Woodruff, *The Guardians*, vol. 2 of *The Men Who Ruled India* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954), p. 146.

86. Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1991), p. 36.

87. See T. E. Lawrence, *Observer*, 8 August 1920, quoted in Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia, vol. II*, p. 110.

88. Earl of Cromer, *Political and Literary Essays, 1908–1913* (London: Macmillan, 1913), p. 50.

89. Cromer, *Political and Literary Essays*, p. 254.

90. BHCF, File no. 6/34/65. Subject: Report by Sir Ernest Dowson—on land settlement in Iraq and allied subjects, to His Excellency the High Commissioner, Baghdad, from Ernest Dowson, p. 128–29.

91. See Fischbach, *State, Society, and Land in 'Ajlun*, p. 257.

92. BHCF, File no. 6/34/65, Reply to Longrigg's Note on Land and Revenue Policy, H. Dobbs, 10 July 1926, pp. 38, 42.

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93. BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, note by H. Dobbs, 10 July 1926, p. 36.
94. C. 16338, 23 August 1926, note by the High Commissioner on pump irrigation on the rivers of Iraq and connected questions, CO 730/95, Iraq, 1926, vol. 4, Dispatches (August–September), p. 22.
95. BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, H. Dobbs, 10 July 1926, pp. 43–44.
96. BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, DO 3826, from Longrigg to Sturges, Secretary to the High Commissioner, 22 July 1926, p. 2.
97. S. H. Longrigg, Annual Report on the operations of the Revenue Dept. for the financial year 1927–1928, 1 July 1928, Iraq Administration Reports, 1925–26 to 1927–28, CO 696/6, p. 5.
98. Provisional Note on Land Reform, no. 4, 27 February 1931, BHCF, File no. 6/34/4 II, Alienation of Government Land, p. 4.
99. Note by Dobbs, the High Commissioner, on pump irrigation on the rivers of Iraq and connected questions, C. 16338, 23 August 1926, CO 730/95, Iraq 1926, vol. 4, Dispatches (August–September), p. 9.
100. Letter to the Prime Minister, Abdul Munshin Beg al Sa'dun, from B. H. Bourdillon, Secretariat to the High Commissioner, DO no. P.O. 215, 27 August 1925, BHCF, File no. 8/10/7-I.
101. See Letter to Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, from Sir Henry Dobbs, Baghdad, 4 December 1928, Box 472/13/127, Durham University Library.
102. See telegram no. C.O./1375, from Dobbs, to Amery, 22 October 1926, CO 730/96, Iraq 1926, vol. 5, Dispatches (October–December), p. 345.
103. See BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, Note by the High Commissioner, H. Dobbs, 10 July 1926, p. 41.
104. BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, p. 38.
105. BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, p. 45 also see pp. 40 and 44.
106. To the High Commissioner, from Ernest Dowson, BHCF, File no. 6/34/65, pp. 119–128.
107. Dowson, BHCF, File no. 6/34/65, p. 19; and Dowson, *Government of el Iraq: An Inquiry Into Land Tenure and Related Questions with Proposals for the Initiation of Reform* (Letchworth, U.K.: Garden City Press Limited, 1931), p. 26.
108. Dowson, *Government of el Iraq*, p. 26. Jwaideh argues that Dowson's understanding was based on a historical fallacy, that tribal rights were allotted a status inferior to Ottoman law. See her "Aspects of Land Tenure and Social Change in Lower Iraq during Late Ottoman Times," p. 335.
109. Dowson, *Government of el Iraq*, p. 20.
110. Longrigg, 25 June 1926, BHCF, File no. 6/34/22, pp. 11–16.
111. Longrigg, Note on Land and Revenue Policy, pp. 5, 14.

112. Longrigg, Note on Land and Revenue Policy, p. 14.

113. Longrigg, Note on Land and Revenue Policy, pp. 14–15.

114. For the “fluidity in the meaning and the contestation over the title ‘shaykh’ among the tribes of southern Iraq,” before the arrival of the British, see Haj, *The Making of Iraq*, p. 3.

7. *The Imposition of Order: Social Perception and The “Despotic” Power of Airplanes*

1. Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, summing up the situation in Iraq after returning from a month-long tour of inspection in 1925. Public Records Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 730/82, Iraq 1925, vol. 2, p. 12.

2. A tribesman speaking to G. A. Moore, the Special Services Officer (SSO), Hillah *Liwa*, 7 January 1924, PRO, Air Ministry Files (AIR) 23/445, I/2106, part 8, p. 50.

3. See John Gallagher, “The Decline, Revival, and Fall of the British Empire,” in *The Decline, Revival, and Fall of the British Empire: The Ford Lectures and Other Essays*, ed. Anil Seal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 94. Also see Keith Jeffery, *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918–1922* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

4. Antony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, vol. 2 of *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 10.

5. See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 137.

6. See Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,” in *States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology*, ed. Michael Mann (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p. 4.

7. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 7.

8. See Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” pp. 5–7.

9. Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” p. 5.

10. See Sir Philip Sasson (Under-Secretary of State for Air), Anniversary Lecture, “Air Power in the Middle East,” *Journal of the Royal Asian Society* 20 (1933): 399. Also see Michael Howard, “The Military Factor in the European Expansion,” in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

11. See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 9.

12. See John Darwin, *Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War, 1918–1922* (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 205.

13. See Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influ-*

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ences on British External Policy, 1865–1980 (London: Fontana, 1985), p. 226; and Gallagher, "The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire," p. 95.

14. See Darwin, *Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East*, p. 168.

15. Quoted in Gallagher, "The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire," p. 96.

16. See Darwin, *Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East*, p. 30.

17. See John Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service* (London: Cassell, 1978), pp. 28–29.

18. See David E. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp. 22, 123.

19. See Darwin, *Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East*, pp. 197–202.

20. See Jafana L. Cox, "A Splendid Training Ground: The Importance to the Royal Air Force of its Role in Iraq, 1919–1932," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 8, no. 2 (January 1985): 161.

21. For descriptions of the Cairo Conference see Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control*, p. 25; William Stivers, *Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918–1930* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 76–78; and Mohammad A. Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941* (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 78.

22. Churchill summed up these conclusions thus: "I wish to make it perfectly clear that I have from the outset contemplated holding Mesopotamia not by sheer force, but by the acquiescence of the people of Mesopotamia as a whole in a Government and Ruler whom they have freely accepted, and who will be supported by the Air Force, and by British organised levies, and by four Imperial battalions. At a later stage I contemplate still further reductions, and look forward eventually to the country being in the condition of an Independent Native State friendly to Great Britain, favourable to her commercial interests, and costing hardly any burden upon the Exchequer." Quoted in Stivers, *Supremacy and Oil*, p. 78.

23. Note prepared by the Middle East Dept., Colonial Office, by the instruction of the Committee to implement the skeleton statement; circulated as I.R.Q.2, Secret I.R.Q.3, cabinet Committee on Iraq, December 1922, CO 730/34, CO 61243 11 December 1922, p. 778.

24. See Dobbs's letter of appointment, 20 September 1923, University of Durham Library, Sudan Collection, Box 472/13/141, p. 4.

25. Situation in Iraq, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies dealing with his visit to Iraq, CO 730/82, Iraq 1925, vol. 2, p. 12.

26. See Omissi, *AirPower and Colonial Control*, p. 37.

27. These were the officers, about 300 in all, who had deserted the Ottoman

army to fight with the Hashemites during the Arab Revolt. See Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and its Communists, Ba' thists, and Free Officers* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 319.

28. Ja'far and Nuri personified the Hashemite circle around Faisal. They were both of urban middle- or lower-class origin (one the son of a brigadier the other the son of an auditor), linked to each other by marriage and alienated from the tribal, religious, merchant, and landowning elites who saw them as upstart adventurers. See Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, pp. 115–17, 319–33.

29. See Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 333.

30. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 321.

31. For examples of this drive for military expansion at other times during the mandate period see: Defence of Iraq, CO 19004 27 APR 25, Memorandum of discussions, CO 730/74, p. 5; and CO 16563 11 APR 25, Re-organisation of Iraq Army, CO 730/90, p. 6.

32. See Proceedings of the Council of Ministers, Intelligence Report no. 14, 1 July 1921, CO 730/3, p. 294.

33. See Proceedings of the Council of Ministers, Intelligence Report no. 14, 1 July 1921, CO 730/3, p. 295.

34. See BHCF File no. 19/1, vol. 3, Internal Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Report no. 7, Baghdad, 1 April 1922, p. 5.

35. The High Commissioner's Secret Intelligence Report no. 13, dated 1 July 1922, CO 730/32, pp. 670–71.

36. See Notes of conversation with the Prime Minister and King Faisal on 2 April 1925, CO 730/82, Iraq 1925, vol. 11.

37. View of Ja'far Pasha al Askari regarding the formation of an Army for the Arab State, signed by him, 12 November 1920, AIR 23/439, p. 17.

38. See view of Ja'far Pasha al Askari, and also notes from a conversation with Ja'far Pasha, Confidential GSOI, initialled W.J.B, AIR 23/439.

39. See no. 58047, Defence Forces Re-organisation, Personal letter from Nuri Said, Minister of Defence, to Henry Dobbs, dated 27 October 1928, CO 730/128/1, p. 5.

40. Secret paraphrase telegram no. 423, from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 August 1928, CO 730/134/12, p. 65.

41. Dobbs, when faced with complaints about the inefficiency of the Iraqi army, complained that "the Iraq Government has persisted in the face of the most discouraging changes of policy on the part of the British Government in

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pressing for the rapid expansion, better training and better equipment for the Iraq Army. They have been ordered to cut it down; the best of their British officers have been taken away; their Training College has been abolished; there have been inordinate delays in the provision of material by the Crown Agents; they have not received the inspection and attention from British officers which they had hoped to receive." Confidential memorandum by the High Commissioner reviewing the policy of HMG as to the progress made by the army and difficulties encountered by it, 1 April 1925, CO 730/82, vol. 11, pp. 12–13.

42. See Intelligence Report no. 10, Baghdad, 29 April 1926, BHCF File no. 19/1, vol. 10, Internal Intelligence Reports, p. 4.

43. See C.18358, 28 September 1926, the organisation of the Defence Forces, secret, from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 September 1926, CO 730/95, pp. 5–6.

44. Even this plan would stretch Iraqi government finances to the limit. See personal and secret letter to Leopold Amery from Henry Dobbs, 23 June 1926, CO 730/103, p. 304.

45. See for example V. G. Kiernan, *The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to the Outside World in the Imperial Age* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp. 55–56.

46. See *Iraq: Report on Iraq Administration, April 1922–March 1923* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1924), p. 112; and secret letter from Dobbs to Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20 June 1923, CO 33280 4 JUL 23, Local forces in Iraq, CO 730/40, pp. 742–43.

47. The military college was opened as early as 1921 but then closed as part of the financially motivated cutbacks on the growth of the military. It opened again in 1924. See Mark Heller, "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920–1958: The British influence," *Armed Forces and Society* 4, no. 1 (November 1977): 83–84. See Regulations for the Admission of Tribal Cadets into the Iraq Royal Military College in September 1929, no. C.R.I.A./423 (A) 2, 34/2, Iraq Army H.Q., 23 June 1929, BHCF File no. 4/75 I, p. 13.

48. See Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics*, p. 78; *Iraq: Report on Iraq Administration, April 1922–March 1923*, p. 112; *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1925* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926), p. 105; and *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1928* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1929), p. 110.

49. Memorandum of Discussion between the High Commissioner, the Air Officer Commanding and General Daly, 23 June 1926, BHCF File no. 4/69I, Conscription Bill.

50. No. SO/510, from the Secretariat of the High Commissioner, 10 July 1926, BHCF File no. 4/69I, Conscription Bill, p. 45.

51. See Secret, C. 17572 14 SEP 1926, Conscription for Iraq, from Henry Dobbs, to Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 September 1926, CO 730/95.

52. See no. C/1670, from Cornwallis, to Henry Dobbs, 1 July 1926, p. 26; and no. C/2341 8/3 from Cornwallis to Dobbs, 22 August 1926, p. 64, BHCF File no. 4/69I, Conscription Bill.

53. See no. SO/1715, from the Secretariat of the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Ministry of Defence, 13 July 1925; BHCF File no. 4/69I, Conscription Bill, p. 2.

54. For a justification of this policy see, secret letter from Sir Henry Dobbs, to Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 December 1928, University of Durham Library, Sudan Collection, Box no. 427/13/127, pp. 11–12.

55. See secret from the Secretariat of the High Commissioner to Air HQ, Baghdad, 26 May 1923, CO 730/40, p. 748.

56. See paraphrase telegram from Sir Percy Cox, High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 December 1923, CO 730/44, p. 36.

57. See telegram from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State, 10 January 1924, CO 730/57, p. 153; Organisation of the Defence Forces, Secret, from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Baghdad, 16 September 1926, CO 730/95, p. 2; and C. 19845 22 OCT 1926, Training of Iraqi Air Officers, CO 730/95, p. 253; Formation of Iraqi Air Force, C. 15845 14 AUG 1926, CO 730/103, p. 298.

58. Charles Townsend, " 'Civilisation' and 'Frightfulness' in Air Control in the Middle East between the Wars," in *Warfare, Diplomacy, and Politics: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor*, ed. Chris Wrigley (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p. 143.

59. See Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control*, p. 18.

60. See Townsend, " 'Civilisation' and 'Frightfulness,' " p. 144.

61. See Memorandum by the Air Staff on the effects likely to be produced by intensive aerial bombing of semi-civilised people, CO 58212 22 NOV 21, CO 730/18, pp. 39, 40, 96. Interestingly the deployment of another and widely reviled technology, gas, was defended in exactly the same way during the First World War. See Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 10.

62. BHCF, File no. 26/2/65, vol. 1, Confidential, Air Staff Memorandum no. 14. Some Points on the Administration of Air Control in Underdeveloped Countries, 1 September 1929, p. 98.

63. See Statement by Air Marshal Sir J. M. Salmond of his views on the

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principles governing the use of air power in Iraq, CO 62797 29 DEC 23, CO 730/46, p. 209; and BHCF, File no. 26/2/65, vol. 1, Confidential, Air Staff Memorandum no. 14, p. 98.

64. See Statement by J. M. Salmond, CO 730/46, pp. 209–10.

65. Confidential, Air Staff Memorandum no. 14, Notes by the Air Staff on the regulation of air control in undeveloped countries, BHCF File no. 26/2/65, vol. 1, p. 98.

66. See A. T. Wilson, cited in Note on use of air force in Mesopotamia in its political aspects and as to its utility actual & potential in support of the civil government of the country, CO 730/13, p. 449; and Report by Sir A. Haldane, C. in C. Mesopotamia E.F. on the work of the RAF in O/184/106, d/25.11.20, CO 58212 22 NOV 21, CO 730/18, p. 401.

67. See CO 730/18, p. 32.

68. On the Power of the Air Force and the Application of this Power to Hold and Police Mesopotamia, Air Staff, March 1920, IOL, L/P&S/10/762, p. 2.

69. *Iraq: Report on Iraq Administration, April 1922–March 1923*, p. 66.

70. *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government on the Administration of Iraq for the Period April 1923–December 1924* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925), p. 27.

71. Statement by Air Marshal Sir J. M. Salmond, CO 62797 29 DEC 23, CO 730/46, p. 209.

72. See Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control*, p. 38.

73. See for example, note on the use and effect of aircraft during the Rania disturbances, 14 to 22 August 1921, by Major H.A. Goldsmith, P. 2036/7/4, CO 58013 22 NOV 21, CO 730/7, p. 120; and Intelligence Report no. 19, 15 August 1921, BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 2, Internal Intelligence Reports, p. 10.

74. See, for example, "Air raids on recalcitrant tribes," a paraphrase telegram from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 December 1922, CO 61179 11 DEC 22, CO 730/26, p. 414. He lists nine operations along the Euphrates. In every case a shaiikh was explicitly targeted, bombed and told to supply guarantees of future good behavior.

75. Quoted in Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq, 1914–1932* (London: Ithaca Press, for the Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford University, 1976), p. 262.

76. Jafana Cox, "A Splendid Training Ground," p. 167.

77. Glubb, *Arabian Adventures*, p. 106.

78. Report on a second reconnaissance of the Beni Huchaim area, D/ 495, 18 November 1923, to 'I Branch Air Staff, Air 23/443, part 6, I/2106, Euphrates Samawah to Fallujah (Beni Huchaim Operations) 1923, p. 14.

79. See statement by Air Marshal Sir J. M. Salmond of his views upon the

principles governing the use of air power in Iraq, CO 62797 29 DEC 23, CO 730/46, p. 207.

80. See Memorandum from the Ministry of Interior to the Secretary to the High Commissioner, 3 October 1923, AIR/505/B, part 1, operations against the Beni Huchaim tribe, Samawah district, AIR 23/548, p. 414; and Report on the possibilities of operations on the Beni Huchaim, by Special Service Officer, Nasiriyah, AIR 23/443, part 6, I/2106, p. 1.

81. See AIR 23/548, p. 415.

82. See Glubb, *Arabian Adventures*, p. 107.

83. See telegram from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, no. 67, 2 February 1924, AIR 23/549.

84. See letter from L. N. Reed, Administrative Inspector Diwaniyah Liwa, to the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, 12 October 1923, AIR 23/548, p. 417.

85. See telegram from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, no. 67, reviewing the reasons for the operation, 2 February 1924, AIR 23/549.

86. AIR/505/B/23, letter from Sir J. M. Salmond, to the Secretary Air Ministry, 12 December 1923, AIR 23/548, p. 41.

87. Letter from Sir J. M. Salmond, AIR/505/B/23, p. 41.

88. The tax demand was placed at the bottom of the list because of British press and parliamentary disquiet about bombing tribes into paying tax. See secret memorandum no. C/2667, from K. Cornwallis, the Ministry of Interior, to the Administrative Inspector, Diwaniyah, 19 November 1923, p. 403.

89. See Secret no. 20, from Reed, Administrative Inspector, Diwaniyah, to the Ministry of Interior, 3 December 1923, AIR 23/444, I/2106, part 8, p. 9; and BHCF File no. 19/1, vol. 6, Internal, Intelligence Report no. 24, 15 December 1923, p. 4.

90. CO 5682 5 FEB 24, telegram from the High Commissioner describing the operation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 February 1924, CO 730/57, p. 570.

91. Report of the bombing from the Special Services Officer, Hillah, 7 December 1923, AIR 23/443, part 6, I/2106.

92. Report on operations against the Barkat and Sufran, 30 November to 1 December 1923, from the Special Services Officer (SSO), Hillah, AIR 23/443, part 6, I/2106, p. 122.

93. See estimated casualties inflicted on Barkat and Sufran, Air 23/443, p. 128. The Iraqi police estimated a higher toll on human life as did Internal Intelligence Report no. 25, 27 December 1923, which was the official record of the Mandate authorities, BHCF, File no. 19/1, vol. 6, Internal.

94. Glubb, *Arabian Adventures*, p. 119.

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95. See report on operations against the Barkat and Sufran, Air 23/443, part 6, I/2106, p. 124. The fear induced by airplanes was prolonged by the refusal of flights to tribesmen so that they would not know that the planes did not communicate with each other or that visibility from them was not as great as those on the ground believed.

96. Seventy shaikhs and headmen of the Beni Huchaim tribes were assembled on December 10 to meet the minister and his adviser. It was arranged for a flight of Snipe airplanes to fly over the tent as the meeting began. It had the desired effect of imposing a sombre atmosphere: "The shaikhs thought their last moment had come." Gertrude Bell, *From Her Personal Papers*, vol. 2, 1914–1926, ed. Elizabeth Burgoyne (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1961), p. 322; also see AIR 23/445, p. 15; and AIR 23/548, pp. 48, 65–66.

97. See telegram no. C/21, from G. N. Moore, SSO Diwaniyah, to Air Staff Intelligence AHQ, 21 December 1923, AIR 23/444, p. 113.

98. See telegram C/2, from SSO Hillah, to Air Staff Intelligence HQ, 2 January 1924, AIR 23/445, p. 33.

99. See report on operations against the Barkat and Sufran 30 November and 1 December 1923, from SSO, Hillah, AIR 23/443, p. 119.

100. The distinction between the shaikh and "his" tribespeople began to be made in explanations of why the rifle fine had not been paid. But it was never explicitly investigated. The dynamic of the supposedly consensual relationship between the two was never raised as a subject.

101. See AIR/505/B, part 2, second operation against Beni Huchaim tribe, Samawah, AIR 23/549, p. 43.

102. See report on the operations against the Barkat and Sufran, second phase, AIR 23/445, I/2106, part 8, pp. 16–18.

103. Air Commodore Chief Staff Officer, note for file Air/505/B, 21 December 1923, AIR 23/548, p. 214.

104. Or, if the bedouin section of each tribe was excluded, one rifle to every five cultivators. AIR 23/445, p. 19.

105. Report on operations against the Barkat and Sufran, from the SSO, Hillah, 7 December 1923, AIR 23/443, part 6, p. 124.

106. See Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control*, p. 37.

107. See Ministry of Interior, Baghdad, 12 October 1931, to the High Commissioner, copy of a further note by Edmonds, the Adviser, Ministry of Interior, 12 October 1931, C/3/32, BHCF, File no. 7/44/2, p. 18.

108. See CO 730/174 /11, no. 96393, part 1, Activities of Shaikh Ahmad of Barazan.

109. Omissi's investigation of colonial air power in India and Aden clearly indicates a comparative perception of society being deployed. Shaikhs or other

tribal leaders were made to take collective responsibility for their tribes. See Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control*, pp. 166–67.

110. Quoted in Cox, "A Splendid Training Ground," p. 171.

Conclusion: Iraq's Past And Possible Iraqi Futures

1. Speech by retired Marine General Antony Zinni, head of the U.S. Central Command from 1997 to 2000, the Middle East Institute, Washington D.C., October 10th 2002.

2. Of the fifty-four peace-keeping operations the United Nations has mounted since its formation, 80 percent have started since 1989. See *America's Record on Nation Building*, RAND, forthcoming.

3. The two definitive reports on intervention, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," UN document A/55/305 S/2000/809, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, and "The Responsibility to Protect," Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, IDRC, 2001, between them take many hundreds of pages to say how intervention and reform should be carried out with greater technocratic efficiency but do not go into any detail about how institutions can be built, reformed, or gain acceptance amongst the population.

4. See Steve Heder "Cambodia, 1990–98: The Regime Didn't Change," in *Regime Change, It's Been Done Before*, ed. Roger Gough (London: policyexchange, 2003).

5. See Charles Tripp, "After Saddam," *Survival* 44, no. 4 (winter 2002–2003): 26; and "What Lurks in the Shadows?" *The Times Higher*, 18 October 2002, p. 17.

6. See Isam al Khafaji, "A Few Days After: State and Society in a post-Saddam Iraq," in *Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change*, ed. Toby Dodge and Steven Simon (London and Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 2003).

7. See Isam al-Khafaji, "The Myth of Iraqi Exceptionalism," *Middle East Policy* no. 4 (October 2000): 65.

8. Frederick D. Barton and Bathsheba Crocker, "Winning the Peace in Iraq," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (spring 2003): 10.

9. A visit to any government institution during this decade was a sobering event. In the middle of May 2001, I secured an interview with a provincial governor in the south of the country. On entering the building I had to step over a pool of raw sewage to reach his office door. Clearly the power of the state was no residing in this building.

10. See Toby Dodge, "Cake Walk, Coup, or Urban Warfare: The Battle for Iraq," in *Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change*, ed. Toby Dodge and Steven Simon (London and Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 2003); and Amatzia Baram, "Building Towards Crisis: Saddam Husayn's Strategy for Survival," Policy Paper No. 47, The Washington Institute for Near East policy, 1998, pp. 7–31.

11. See Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and Its Communists, Bathists, and Free Officers* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 22; and Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq, 1914–1932* (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), p. 239.

12. Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2000, pp. 205–6.

13. Faleh A. Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968–1998," in *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*, ed. Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod (London: Saqi, 2003), pp. 69–101.

14. See Amatzia Baram, "Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies, 1991–99," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 29 (1997): 1–31.

15. "British government sources admitted yesterday that there had been a general expectation' on both sides of the Atlantic that 'the Iraqi people would revolt against Saddam as they had in 1991' or at least that there might be a coup 'with in the higher echelons' of the regime." See R. Beeston and T. Baldwin, "Washington Hawks Under Fire for Ignoring Advice," *The Times*, 28 March 2003, p. 5.

16. "It is not too late for the Iraq military to act with honor and protect your country." George W. Bush's address to the American People, 17 March 2003.

17. "When Makiya and two other Iraqis were invited to the Oval Office in January [2003], he told President Bush that invading American troops would be greeted with 'sweets and flowers.' " See George Packer, "Kanan Makiya, Dreaming of Democracy," *New York Times Magazine*, 2 March 2003. Some Middle East experts were also prone to over confident analysis, see Fouad Ajami, "Iraq and the Thief of Baghdad," *New York Times*, 19 May 2002. Ajami's prediction that Baghdadis would greet U.S. troops with joy was quoted by Vice President Cheney in a speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd convention, 26 August 2002.

18. See Elizabeth Drew, "The Neocons in Power," *The New York Review of Books* 50, No. 10 (12 June 2003).

19. Stephen Fidler and Guy Dinmore, "Debating How to Put Iraq Back Together Again," *Financial Times*, 22 March 2003, p. 9.
20. See Kanan Makiya's War Diary, New Republic Online, 18 April 2003.
21. Jonathan Steele in Baghdad, "Delegates Agree New Talks on Government," *The Guardian*, 29 April 2003.
22. Unedited Transcript, "The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq," Conference, American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., 3 October 2002.
23. See Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence, General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economics, Business and Agricultural Affairs, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2:35, pm, Thursday May 22, 2003.
24. See Susan B. Glasser, Basra, "Sheik's Appointment by British Triggers Protests and Accusations," *Washington Post*, 11 April 2003.
25. Quoted in Robyn Dixon, "A Dust-Up in Basra's Leadership Vacuum," *Los Angeles Times*, 18 April 2003.
26. See Donald Macintyre in Amarah, "British Hope Colonial Past Can Inspire Law And Order," *The Independent*, 24 April 2003; and Glen Owen in al-Amarah, "British Law Is Template for New Legal System," *The Times*, 24 April 2003.
27. See Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).
28. See Peter Slevin, "Iraqi Town Becomes Test for Reconstruction," *Washington Post*, 23 April 2003.
29. For a further expansion of this argument, see "Iraq after Saddam: The Quagmire of Political Reconstruction," *IISS Strategic Comment* 8, no. 4 (May 2002).