Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense 1997: Chapter I

Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense
A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense

U.S. Department of Defense

March 1997

I. Executive Summary

U.S. Responsibility Sharing Policy

A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (February 1996) identifies major threats to U.S. security, including existing and potential regional aggressors; the spread of weapons of mass destruction; ethnic, religious, and national rivalries; and terrorism, drug trafficking, and international organized crime. To meet these challenges, the Administration’s national security strategy establishes three principal security objectives: enhancing our security with military forces that are ready to fight and that maintain an effective forward presence; bolstering America’s economic revitalization; and promoting democracy. The Administration’s strategy for achieving these mutually supporting objectives is through U.S. world leadership and engagement, as well as through sharing collective security responsibilities.

To shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. and allied interests, and to promote U.S. security objectives tailored to different regions of the globe, we require a broad range of security arrangements worldwide. Our alliances, particularly NATO in Europe, our bilateral security relationships with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and our growing partnership with the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), are essential to the projection of American power and influence into areas where vital U.S. interests are at stake. These alliances reflect fundamental shared interests and embody close cooperation in both political and military affairs. They multiply our capability to achieve our international security objectives, undergird our global diplomacy, and protect vital economic interests. Our regional security arrangements enable the United States and our allies to provide the security and stability essential to democracy–building, peaceful political change, economic progress, the expansion of social justice, and the orderly resolution of international differences.

The cornerstone of effective alliance relationships is the fair and equitable sharing of mutual security responsibilities, and the proper balancing of costs and benefits. Accordingly, this is the basis of U.S. responsibility sharing policy. The Administration is pleased that in passing the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act, Congress accepts this policy and recognizes the breadth and depth of U.S.–allied relationships. This broader understanding acknowledges that each country’s contribution is a mix of political, military, and economic elements; that important forms of cooperation may not lend themselves to quantification; and that influencing and increasing allied efforts is a long–term endeavor heavily influenced by country–specific historical and geographical considerations, unique circumstances, and a diverse set of capabilities and limitations (especially economic realities). Congress further appreciates that the manner in which allies contribute is also defined by the very different multilateral (NATO Europe) and bilateral (East Asia–Pacific and Southwest Asia) frameworks within which those contributions are made.

The FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act urges U.S. allies to increase their efforts in one or more of the following areas:

Investment in defense, as represented by defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP);
Contributions to multinational military activities;
Cost sharing for stationed U.S. forces; and
Foreign assistance.

This Report evaluates allied efforts in each of these four areas. As such it presents both a snapshot of a broad range of current contributions and a baseline for assessing allied performance in the future.

Summary Assessment

Based on the most recent and reliable data available (1995–1996), Chart I–1 shows that virtually all our European and Pacific allies and Gulf partners meet at least one of the above responsibility sharing targets, and the majority meet two or more of them. National strengths are clearly evident, as are those areas of concern — such as intense pressure on defense budgets — where more clearly needs to be done. This chart also identifies which nations make contributions significantly in excess of their “fair share” (based on ability to contribute).

Chart I–1
Countries Achieving Congressional Targets and/or Making Above Average Contributions

(view full–size chart)

NATO. Most of our NATO allies, like the United States, continue to experience defense budget reductions. European host nation support remains essentially level and focused on indirect contributions. However, many of these nations provide substantial foreign assistance, with the contributions of all NATO allies but one exceeding those of the United States (relative to GDP). Most NATO nations also contribute substantially to and participate extensively in shared military roles, missions, and combined operations within and beyond NATO.
Pacific Allies. Japan maintains an enviable record of providing host nation support and foreign assistance, although its level of defense spending as a share of GDP remains at just 1 percent due to political, constitutional, and treaty constraints. The Republic of Korea also provides robust host nation support and maintains a substantial investment in defense (over 3 percent of GDP), but in light of its limited per capita GDP makes only very modest contributions to foreign assistance.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Each of the GCC nations has a per capita GDP below the average of all countries addressed in this Report, yet contributes a greater share of GDP to defense than the average, with the shares of Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates in the 10 to 15 percent range. The UAE and Saudi Arabia also make foreign assistance contributions commensurate with the United States (relative to GDP), while Kuwait’s foreign assistance relative to GDP leads all nations in this Report.

Limitations of Targets

The short–term “pass/fail” targets suggested by the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act do not permit a full appreciation of the substantial contributions made by U.S. allies.

For example, several nations shown on Chart I–1 as not meeting the Congressional target for defense spending as a share of GDP have nevertheless achieved significant real defense spending growth since 1990, including the Republic of Korea (24 percent), Japan (13 percent), Luxembourg (10 percent), and Portugal (6 percent). This during a period in which U.S. defense spending declined by 25 percent, and the average change for all allies combined fell by 17 percent. In addition, the Republic of Korea, France, and the United Kingdom are consistently among the top nations assessed in this Report in terms of defense spending as a share of GDP, and were right behind the United States in this measure for 1996.

Likewise, the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands are among the nations shown on Chart I–1 as not meeting the Congressional target for increased contributions to multinational military activities. Yet the United Kingdom provides the backbone of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), including deployable ARRC headquarters, two heavy combat divisions, an air mobile brigade contributed to one of the ARRC’s multi–national divisions, and substantial combat support. The U.K. also provides disproportionately high funding and personnel to UN peacekeeping operations relative to its ability to contribute (GDP and labor force), as does Norway. In fact, Norway’s contribution to UN operations, relative to ability to contribute, exceeds that of any other country represented in this Report by a wide margin. In addition, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands also contribute to UN operations at a level above or commensurate with their ability to do so.

Lastly, only Japan now meets the Congressional target to offset 75 percent of U.S. stationing costs by 2000. However, ROK, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Germany, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia all provide above average cost sharing relative to their ability to contribute.

Conclusion

This is a mixed, but we believe on balance, a positive picture and a solid base from which to work on further strengthening performance. Our posts and commands in the field and senior Washington officials have maintained a close and systematic dialogue with allied governments over the past year concerning responsibility sharing strengths and weaknesses. Communication and understanding have greatly improved and there is a growing awareness of the importance of these issues to the management and ultimate effectiveness of our alliances.

We will continue to engage the allies in this manner, focusing on the political and material importance, in very constrained circumstances, of due attention to defense budgets and host nation support, and further strengthening of foreign assistance and participation in both bilateral and multilateral efforts to enhance our collective security. This is an evolutionary effort, and we will continue to press for progress across the board. Finally, it is important — if we are to arrive at a balanced assessment of nations’ efforts — that we complement short–term pass/fail objectives with a review of longer–term trends, and that countries’ contributions are evaluated relative to their ability to contribute.