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Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense
A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
March 1998
I. Executive Summary
U.S. Responsibility Sharing Policy
A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997) identifies a diverse set of threats to U.S. security, including regional or state–centered threats (such as regional aggressors, unstable nations, internal conflicts, or failed states); transnational threats (including terrorism, illegal drugs, illicit arms trafficking, and organized crime); and threats from weapons of mass destruction (from existing arsenals and from the proliferation of advanced technologies).
To meet these challenges, the Administration’s national security strategy stresses the need for integrated approaches, specifically to shape the international environment to prevent or deter threats, to maintain the ability to respond across the full spectrum of potential crises, up to and including major theater war, and to prepare now to meet future uncertainties. A central aim of the Administration’s strategy to defeat these transnational threats is to strengthen and adapt our security relationships with key nations around the world—including sharing collective security responsibilities with allies and other friendly nations.
To promote U.S. security objectives tailored to different regions of the globe we require a broad range of security arrangements. Our alliances, particularly our security commitments in NATO, our bilateral relationships with Japan and the Republic of Korea, and our growing partnership with the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), are essential to the projection of American power and influence into areas where vital U.S. interests are at stake. These relationships reflect fundamental shared interests and embody close cooperation in both political and military affairs. They enhance our ability to achieve our international security objectives and protect vital economic interests. Our regional security arrangements enable the United States and our allies to provide the security and stability essential to democracy–building, economic progress, and the orderly resolution of international differences.
The cornerstone of effective alliance relationships is the fair and equitable sharing of mutual security responsibilities, and the proper balancing of costs and benefits. This, in turn, is the basis of U.S. responsibility sharing policy. The Administration is pleased that Congress accepts this policy and recognizes the breadth and depth of U.S.–allied relationships. This broader understanding, reflected in the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act, acknowledges that each country’s contribution is a mix of political, military, and economic elements, and that influencing and increasing allied efforts is a long–term endeavor heavily influenced by specific historical and geographical circumstances (including economic realities). The manner in which allies contribute to shared security objectives is also defined by the very different multilateral (NATO) and bilateral (East Asia–Pacific and Southwest Asia) frameworks within which those contributions are made.
This section includes an assessment of country contributions under the terms specified in the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act, as well as a more comprehensive evaluation consistent with previous reports.
Assessment Stipulated in the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act
The FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act urges U.S. allies to increase their efforts in one or more of the following areas:
Contributions to multinational military activities;
Cost sharing for stationed U.S. forces; and
Foreign assistance.
Chart I–1 presents an overview assessment of contributions made in each of these categories by our NATO and Pacific allies and our security partners in the Gulf. The assessment is based on the most recent, complete, and reliable data available: through 1997 for defense spending and multinational military activities, through 1996 for cost sharing and foreign assistance. The chart shows that all of the countries addressed in this Report meet at least one of the Congressional responsibility sharing targets listed above, and the majority meet two or more of them. National strengths are clearly evident, as are those areas of concern—such as continued pressure on defense budgets—where more clearly needs to be done.
Pacific Allies. Japan maintains an enviable record of providing host nation support and foreign assistance, although its level of defense spending as a share of GDP remains at just 1 percent due to political constraints. The Republic of Korea also provides host nation support and maintains a substantial investment in defense (over 3 percent of GDP), but in light of its limited per capita GDP makes only very modest contributions to foreign assistance.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Each of the GCC nations has a per capita GDP below the average of all countries addressed in this Report, yet spends an above–average share of GDP on defense, with the shares of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait in the 10 to 15 percent range. Kuwait’s foreign assistance relative to GDP leads all nations in this Report.
Comprehensive Assessment of Contributions
The targets embodied in the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act are a sound basis upon which to assess country efforts, although the Department believes that a thorough evaluation requires a somewhat expanded approach. Because nations’ efforts are subject to short–term volatility, and due to large differences in the economies, demographics, and standard of living among the nations included in this Report, year–to–year comparisons of absolute levels of effort can be highly misleading. Thus, the Department has long maintained that—in contrast to the short–term,“pass/fail” perspective of the Congressional targets—assessments should acknowledge trends in country contributions, and be based on a country’s ability to contribute.
Moreover, in addition to the four categories identified in the Authorization Act, previous assessments by the Department have also addressed military personnel and standing forces as key measures of a country’s contribution to shared security objectives. Finally, although an assessment of U.S. efforts is not specified in the Authorization Act, the Department believes such an assessment should be included in this Report for completeness and balance.
This more comprehensive evaluation yields an assessment similar to that resulting from the approach mandated in the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act. That is, when countries’ efforts are analyzed with respect to their ability to contribute, each nation in the Report makes substantial contributions in at least one (and the majority in at least two) of the four Congressional categories.
As summarized in Chart I–2, however, several key differences emerge relative to the results in Chart I–1.
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Countries Making Substantial Contributions Based on Ability to Contribute |
Countries Making Substantial Contributions Based on Ability to Contribute (Cont.) |
Likewise, while Belgium and Qatar failed to meet the Congressional objective of increasing their contributions in 1997 in the category of multinational military activities, their level of effort is nonetheless substantial in view of their ability to contribute. Conversely, although Germany and Japan did register increases—and thus meet the Congressional target—Japan’s share of contributions remains substantially below its share of ability to contribute, and Germany’s effort is roughly commensurate with its means.
Japan is the only nation that meets the Congressional target for cost sharing, yet relative to ability to contribute, Kuwait’s bilateral cost sharing contributions to the United States lead all countries in this Report. Qatar, Oman, and Luxembourg also contribute shares of host nation support significantly above their respective share of GDP. (The Republic of Korea is excluded from this list due to measurement problems surrounding estimates of ROK’s indirect cost sharing contributions for 1996, and is expected to rejoin this ranking once full cost sharing estimates for 1997 are compiled later this spring.)
Almost every nation in this Report meets the Congressional target for foreign assistance, aided by unavoidable anomalies in year–to–year reporting, or by the relatively low ranking of the United States which is used as a benchmark for evaluating allies. When efforts are assessed based on ability to contribute, however, aid provided by countries such as Saudi Arabia, Italy, and Portugal is average, and is below average in the case of Spain, Japan, Greece, and the Republic of Korea—though each of these countries meet the Congressional target, as shown in Chart I–1.
Finally, the more comprehensive approach assesses nations’ performance in the additional areas of military personnel and standing forces (ground, naval, and air). Although not addressed by the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act, these categories are important to the shared security objectives of deterrence and self–defense, and have been evaluated by the Department in previous reports. Chart I–2 shows that most nations make substantial contributions in relation to their ability to contribute in at least one of these categories. Most notably, Greece, Turkey, Bahrain, and Oman register substantial contributions in all four areas, while Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates achieve this distinction in three categories. In contrast, six nations (Canada, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, and Japan) fail to contribute substantially more than their relative share of GDP or labor force in any of these areas.
As stated in previous reports on this topic, the Department believes country efforts present a mixed but generally positive picture in terms of shouldering responsibility for shared security objectives.
The United States continues to maintain a close and systematic dialogue with allied governments at all levels concerning responsibility sharing strengths and weaknesses, and this in turn has contributed to an increased awareness of our concerns in allied capitals. We will persist in engaging allies in this manner, focusing on the need for increased attention to defense budgets and host nation support, and further strengthening of foreign assistance and participation in both bilateral and multilateral efforts to enhance our collective security. This is an evolutionary effort, and we will continue to press for progress across the board.
Finally, the Department continues to urge—in the interests of achieving a balanced assessment of nations’ efforts—that short–term pass/fail objectives be supplemented with a review of longer–term trends based on countries’ ability to contribute.
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