CHAPTER THREE
The Union Inaugural Address[1]

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In June 2003, at the Thessaloniki Council in Greece, the European Union approved a major document entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, which represents the first draft of a genuine security strategy for the Union, the final version of which was endorsed in December 2003. The timing of this paper largely explains its content. After the transatlantic divisions over Iraq and the exclusion of the Union itself from the crisis, some EU actors were keen to repair the damage with the United States. This document could be seen as a first attempt to bridge the gap with Washington by acknowledging the common threats faced by both sides, especially international terrorism, where, despite the crisis over Iraq, transatlantic cooperation was excellent. Stressing agreement was thus a clear priority.

A strategy document is always a tentative exercise by nature. It is more about visions than strategic interests, more about attitude than policies. This is even truer for an organization of 25 independent states. The wording was indeed crucial. It is no coincidence that general formulae and ambiguous concepts are used in the document. Behind every such concept lies a difficult negotiating process. For example, the concept of 'pre-emptive' engagement was replaced by 'preventive' engagement, because the original wording was deemed too controversial for some member states. Likewise, some countries underlined the continued salience of the old Bosnia-type security risks while others were keen to stress the new emerging

threats of terrorism and WMD proliferation. As far as the instruments were concerned, there was an intense debate between a 'hawkish' approach to world problems and a softer view of the exercise of European power. These debates were for the most part healthy and fruitful. They helped to enhance the consciousness among European leaders and officials that in order to fulfil its international responsibilities, the EU cannot reduce itself to its civilian component, however important this may be. Moreover, the lessons of the Iraqi crisis were quickly learned. The deep internal divisions were a painful reminiscence of the European paralysis in the Bosnian conflicts where the nascent CFSP failed to deliver on its early promises.[2] Barely six months after the Iraqi war, which by European standards is a very short amount of time, the Union has agreed on a broad security strategy.

This document is thus historic. For the first time, the Union has begun to think strategically. The process of European integration has resulted in a 'post-modern' system in which a genuine democratic peace has been built, an institutional order progressively constructed and an increasingly 'amalgamated security community' has emerged.[3] This endeavour was mainly an inward-looking development that is still under way with the new draft constitution that is currently being scrutinised after the failed Intergovernmental Conference of December 2003. But besides this internal dimension and purpose, in this document the European Union is addressing its external dimension in a comprehensive manner. The reasons behind this awakening are twofold: since the Iraqi crisis, a recognition that, divided, the Union is powerless; and before the official entry of ten new members, an acknowledgement that, with 450 million people, the Union cannot turn its back on the world around it.

2. On the European impotence, Gow James, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, Columbia University Press, 1997; Guicherd Catherine, 'L'Heure de l'Europe: Premières leçons du conflit yougoslave', *Cahiers du Crest*, Mars 1993; Gordon Philip H., 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy', *International Security*, Winter 1997/98, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 74-100.
3. The term was first coined by Deutsch, Karl, 'Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement', *Foreign Policy Analysis Series*, Princeton University, September 1953, no. 2, pp. 1-25. It was subsequently developed in Deutsch, Karl et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the light of Historical Experience*, Princeton University Press, 1957.

A NEW AMERICA, A NEW EUROPE

The recurrent privilege of the United States was that the tragedy of power politics was for the most part a remote reality that existed only in foreign and remote places, and was rarely an emergency lived from inside. With the fall of the Twin Towers, America rediscovered a real and dangerous world. September 11th was clearly a historical moment, a period of 'tectonic shifts', as US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has put it, similar to the rise of the Soviet challenge at the end of the 1940s. President Bush, like President Truman, proceeded to a global analysis of the threat, but unlike his predecessor, Bush favoured a unilateralist approach in tackling the new challenge of international terrorism. This unilateralism, which derived from absolute confidence about U.S. supremacy in the world, was one of the key reasons behind the transatlantic divisions caused by the Iraqi crisis. The unilateral tone and the global scope of the 'war on terror' led to diverging security perceptions and interests across the Atlantic. The gap between an increasingly revisionist USA and a generally status quo-oriented Europe took a dramatic turn in Iraq.[4] The pre-Iraq war period saw one of the deepest NATO crises since Suez. But the divide was not limited to transatlantic relations: it cut deeply across Europe at a moment when delegates from the EU member states were discussing a new draft constitution, whose aim was to bring more coherence to European affairs, including foreign policy.

The strategic reasons for waging a preventive war against Iraq seemed self-evident to the Bush administration. Disarmament, regime change and democracy in the Middle East were reinforcing arguments for the President. The case presented to the international community was, however, confusing. Generally, the United States tends to colour strategic necessities with an idealistic blend. In the case of Iraq, it

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4. The term 'revisionist' is not intended to be pejorative but simply depicts the relationship between a state actor and the international system. The term was first used by Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. power Politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946. For further developments of this notion, see Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration, *Essays in International Politics*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, pp. 81-102.

was the other way around. Washington shaded its main objective of regime change with strategic motives linked to disarmament and terrorism. Contrary to a basic realist analysis, the White House tended to attribute to Saddam Hussein malicious intentions first and hypothetical capabilities second. Reversing this order of priorities, most Europeans focused on Saddam's current capabilities, while disregarding past behaviour.[5] They were more or less ready to recognize the remote threat that a nuclear Iraq was likely to pose to the region in the future, but they did not support regime change by force, something that seemed too provocative a gesture to a country that had had nothing to do with September 11th. In other words, Saddam Hussein was indeed a confirmed liar but ultimately he was not a danger. Precisely because Iraq was a war of choice, not a conflict of necessity, and because military victory was preordained, the debate evolved rapidly from the particular case to general principles, from disarming Saddam to Washington's use of force, from the opportunity for a second UN resolution to the relevance of the UN itself, from a specific demand of assistance by Turkey to NATO's *raison d'être*.

This represented too great a challenge to the European Union. The Union's attitude was thus essentially reactive. If it had set out its own definition of a 'material breach' of Resolution 1441, specified the conditions under which force might be used and laid down a precise timetable for action, it would have been able to foresee events and to strengthen its position in Washington. Instead, EU foreign ministers decided to formally hand over the Iraqi affair to the UN, without addressing the strategic case at hand. In doing so, they in fact gave a free hand to the permanent European members of the UN Security Council, France and Great Britain, that is, the two countries with the most opposed views vis-à-vis the United States. Not very surprisingly, London and Paris decided to focus on the legitimacy of the UN, while ignoring the European framework. As a result, the EU became irrelevant.

5. Although governments were aligned differently, public opinion throughout Europe was largely opposed to the war.

This painful reality contrasted with the ambition expressed at the Convention for a larger role for the EU in foreign and security policies. The Convention, which began in 2002, was established to prepare for the consequences of the enlargement by the ten new countries that would become official members of the EU in May 2004. This 'big bang' would increase the diversity of the Union and complicate even further the already arcane decision-making process at the EU level. Building a consensus with 25 members could lead the Union into producing nothing but minimal, delayed measures, confusion and inaction. In foreign and security policy, the Convention envisaged several ways of avoiding these pitfalls. First is the possibility of 'structured' cooperation, whereby countries who wanted to deepen their own security relationships could to do so without waiting for agreement at 25. In other words, if Germany and France wanted to set up a joint capacity to plan and conduct military operations, they would be allowed to do so, even if other members declined to follow them.[6] The Convention's most visible innovation was the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, who would coordinate national positions and represent the Union abroad. This ambition of a more coherent and active Europe in foreign and security policies contrasted heavily with the display of division during the Iraq crisis. Nonetheless, this aspiration is widely supported by public opinion throughout Europe. A recent poll by Eurobarometer indicates that more than 75% of the European public supports the idea of a common army. The discrepancy between the weight of the Union in economic and financial affairs and its absence in world politics is a constant matter of regret for a majority of EU citizens. The Iraq crisis demonstrated the necessity of a common strategy for the Union.

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6. This is somewhat different from the Tervueren initiative between Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Germany of April 29th 2003, where the four countries declared their intention to set up just such joint capability even outside the Union framework. In their declaration, it is stated that 'Dans le souci d'améliorer les capacités de commandement et de contrôle disponibles tant pour l'Union européenne que pour l'OTAN, les quatre Ministres de la Défense entreprendront les démarches nécessaires en vue d'établir, pour l'année 2004 au plus tard, un quartier-général multinational déployable pour des opérations conjointes et qui serait basé sur des quartiers-généraux déployables existants'. This triggered fierce hostility in Washington and London. However, Prime Minister Tony Blair has basically agreed to an independent headquarter inside the ESDP infrastructure. The text is available at http://www.diplomatie.be/fr/press/homedetails.asp?TEXTID=6279

SOFT POWER PLUS

An inward-looking Europe thus ceased to be a possibility with America being engaged in a global agenda that had serious direct and indirect consequences for the Union. The opening premise of the document, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, is a basic recognition that '… the European Union is inevitably a global actor … Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.'[7] In short, the Union could not have postponed its strategic dimension any longer. It is not, of course, the first time that such a lesson has been drawn. The tragedy of Bosnia and the poor performance of EU capabilities in the Kosovo conflict led to the Saint-Malo agreement and the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999. This time, however, the ambition is much broader than just fixing crisis-management capabilities: the aim was to draft a comprehensive security strategy. Originally drafted by Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, the document has two significant characteristics.

First, it is a threat-driven document, a dimension never addressed as such by the Union. It identifies five major threats: international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. In this environment, the Union recognized that the traditional form of defence, the territorial line of Cold War practice, is a thing of the past. The first line of defence now lies abroad. If this analysis may sound familiar in comparison to the US National Security Strategy of September 2002, the message to Washington is in fact considerably nuanced. First, Europe is at peace, not war. Even though the possibility of an al-Qaeda attack against the territory of the Union is duly underlined, the document is not a call to arms or an appeal for homeland defence. Secondly, though the security threats may be similar, their management is not. In the Union's view, addressing these threats cannot be limited to military force: while not excluding it, the Union intends to take a broader approach, combining the political and the economic, the civil and the military. Regarding terrorism, there will be no effective solution that is not

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7. *European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better world*, Brussels, December 2003.

global. Regarding WMD proliferation, strengthening international regimes and progressive conditionality remain the best means of countering proliferation. Without excluding the use of force, the Union clearly rejects a strategy of preventive strike.[8] Lastly, while the Union recognises that 'failed' or failing states – not, be it noted, 'rogue states', a category that does not exist in EU terminology – are a major source of instability, it advocates as a remedy the extension of good governance rather than regime change. Thus a more diversified and comprehensive strategy has emerged from the EU's analysis of the post-9/11 environment. In brief, for the Union the world is indeed more dangerous, but also more complex.

Second, the strategy builds on the Union's *acquis* and identity in security policy. It is based on three pillars – extending the zone of security around Europe, strengthening the international order, and countering the threats mentioned above – and two key concepts: 'preventive engagement' and 'effective multilateralism'. The first of these concepts refers to the Union's approach to stability and nation-building. This is far more comprehensive than the military method favoured by Washington, since it includes police personnel – the Union has a reserve force of 5000 police who could be sent abroad – civil administration and civil protection officials, and civilian authorities and justice officers to strengthen the rule of law. This specific approach is now being extended to new neighbouring countries like Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. This in turn demands a new strategic partnership with Russia, which remains an indispensable actor in the region, as the Kosovo conflict showed. The European Commission President, Romano Prodi, has set out a vision of the EU offering its neighbours 'everything but institutions'. The aim is to promote the emergence of a 'ring of friends' across Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean,

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8. In a declaration agreed in May 2003, the Union set out its strategy regarding WMD proliferation: 'Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organizations (IAEA, OPCW, etc.) form the first line of defence. When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role'. See http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf

bound together by shared values, open markets and borders, and enhanced co-operation in areas such as research, transport, energy, conflict prevention and law enforcement.[9] This strategy of 'preventive engagement' encapsulates the European way of dealing with instability, which includes rapid troop deployments, humanitarian assistance, policing operations, enhancement of the rule of law and economic aid. Therein lies the Union's added value and a specific know-how, a dimension that is lacking in the US arsenal, where, as Condoleezza Rice once said, the 82nd Airborne are not supposed to help kids go to kindergarten. European troops, by contrast, do this. This US weakness is Europe's strength.

The second concept, 'effective multilateralism', captures the essence of the Union's ruled-based security culture. The security strategy stresses that 'the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority'. Having suffered more than any continent from attempts by one actor to dominate the others, from what used to be called universal monarchy and balance-of-power politics, secret diplomacy and the major wars that followed, the Union is keen to stress the core fundamental values of the UN charter, based on the sovereignty of its units and the legitimacy of collective action. Because the true meaning of international norms and rules lies in the definition of what is and what is not permissible in the international arena, the Union reaffirms that, as a matter of principle, the UN Security Council should remain the forum for legitimizing the use of force. But it also recognizes that rules need enforcement. 'We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken'. The 'effectiveness' element implies that, in emergency situations, immediate action is not always compatible with the formal application of international public law. The precedent set by Kosovo and the preventive war against Iraq represent the unwritten limits of what is allowed and what is not.

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9. See the Commission Communication of March 2003, *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours.*

Clearly, the Venusian image of a Kantian Europe has been modified towards a more realist conception of the Union's security interests.

Both concepts, 'preventive' engagement and 'effective' multilateralism, are by nature elusive notions that will only receive more precise definitions when concrete situations arise. They nonetheless represent a significant departure from a civilian-only Union: the use of force, albeit as a last resort, is deemed necessary in specific circumstances. This message, soft power plus, should be welcomed in Washington.

CLARIFICATIONS TO BE MADE

Drafting a common strategy raised numerous challenges: to reach an agreement sufficiently broad to include widely different strategic traditions, but precise enough to become a motor of international action; to maintain credibility in the eyes of the major international actors, above all the United States; and to address the new threats without renouncing the Union's particular *acquis* and identity. At that level, the Solana doctrine is a major success. Nonetheless several tensions run through the document.

The first tension is the precarious balance between realism and idealism. Of course, every foreign-policy initiative contains both dimensions, and there is always a false antagonism between these two poles. Nonetheless, for the Union, these two dimensions represent national sensitivities. The risk of disagreements and divisions inside the Union is real. For example, the deliberately vague notion of 'preventive' engagement carries a message of a more proactive Europe, but at the same time, it solemnly echoes UN principles. If humanitarian tasks are obvious examples of uncontroversial preventive actions, a UN *mandate* is not considered an obligation. There was no specific mandate for the intervention in Kosovo, but it was never-theless perceived as legitimate by a majority of EU members. As far as terrorism is concerned, it should be noted that some big European players have introduced the concept of 'pre-emption' in their doctrinal thinking and their official doctrine. So it seems odd that the wording 'pre-emption' was ultimately changed. Behind this

potential confusion lies the old debate about UN Article 51 over its range of application and the elusive notion of 'immediate danger'. As far as WMD are concerned, the new assertiveness of the Union regarding the Iranian nuclear programme is a good indicator of the progress achieved. The display of unity among the 'big three' differs sharply from their ongoing disagreements about Iraq. Yet it remains to be seen whether the agreement reached October 2003 will bear fruit.[10] In any case, theological discussions on the matter are useless and pragmatism will be the rule.

The second potential conflict revolves around the status of the Union as a global actor or regional power. For some European countries, especially the newer members, the new threats cannot replace the old ones. Internal instability, ethnic conflict, civil war, drug-trafficking and criminal networks seem real enough to them. These risks must remain a priority of the Union. But for others, the EU security agenda must address the new post-9/11 environment, especially WMD and international terrorism. There is a hierarchy of priorities that remains to be clarified. Behind this problem lies in fact a deeper uncertainty about the ultimate borders of the Union. The enlargement of the EU may have been a success, but it immediately raises the issue of whether there should be a fresh round of enlargement. Given the willingness to shape a more active neighbourhood policy, the scope of this strategy may seem far-reaching. Ukraine, the southern Caucasus and the Black Sea basin are now direct neighbours. This tension between the EU as a regional stabilizer and the EU as a global actor becomes apparent whenever Russia is mentioned. Moscow is seen as an essential partner for an effective policy in Moldova or Belarus; at the same time, Moscow's policy of cooperation with Iran could become a serious problem. In any case, this policy will require a serious security dialogue with Russia. Lastly, the paper remains silent about Turkey, while underlining the threat that a country like North Korea might represent to the Union. Given these

10. On this point, see de Bellaigue Christopher, 'Big Deal in Iran', *The New York Review of Books*, February 26, 2004, pp. 30-33.

shifting *lines*, the Union encounters difficulties in finding the right balance between its regional priorities and its global role.

The third tension concerns whether the Union is an actor or just a reference. With the enlargement, 75 million people who have lived under Communist domination are now joining the 'old' Europe. A security doctrine for 25 independent countries is indeed unique in the world. These countries have different, if not diverging, security cultures and heritages. Some members are still officially neutral, some barely have an army, while others have a nuclear deterrent and world influence. The sheer heterogeneity of the Union's members means that decisions in foreign policy will be extremely difficult to take. The Convention has proposed several ways of avoiding the pitfalls of indecision and inaction, including the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the possibility of 'structured cooperation' in defence matters. Nonetheless, the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy is essentially reaffirmed in the draft Treaty. In this respect, it is clear to everybody that agreement between London, Paris and Berlin is a pre-condition for any decision to be taken. In other words, the coordination of national interests is a prerequisite for the expression of a genuine European interest. The Strategy calls for the creation of a stronger EU diplomatic service. This could lead to fundamental changes in the formulation of the Union's foreign policy. An epistemic and diplomatic community could enhance the identification and pursuit of a truly European interest in world affairs more systematically. The voice of Europe is more often than not diluted in a multiplicity of national diplomatic solos that seem cacophonic if not inconsistent. This is particularly the case when the Union has to engage Washington. The coordination of the diplomatic services of EU members as well as the reinforcement of the EU representation in Washington would dramatically enhance the influence of Europe, provided of course that the US administration is also ready and willing to engage and to listen.

As far as actual operations are concerned, the Union relies on two specific methods. One is to implement the Berlin-plus agreement, which allows the Union to use NATO assets where the Alliance as such is not engaged. This was the case in Macedonia, where the Union took over NATO's Operation Allied Harmony on

March 31ˢᵗ 2003. This will also be the case when the Union takes over from NATO operations in Bosnia. The other is to rely on a 'lead' nation to provide the bulk of the assets required for an operation abroad and to coordinate the efforts of the other EU countries. This happened in the case of Operation Artemis in Africa in the summer of 2003. In both cases, however, the Union is more a reference than a genuine actor. The reason is simple: as such, the Union does not have the necessary capabilities on its own. In other words, there is no such a thing as a European force that could be deployed by the collective decision of the 25 foreign ministers. So far, the Union's foreign and security policy is nation-based. Since there is no rule of majority voting in the CFSP, and since defence relies in practice on a very few countries, the Union remains more of a reference than a genuine actor.

AMBITIONS TO BE MET

Sharing more *global* responsibilities, enhancing an *effective* multilateralism and adopting a policy of *preventive* engagement are ambitious goals that will remain unfulfilled unless the current gap between ends and means can be overcome. The security strategy demands a major improvement of the Union's capabilities. Paradoxically, the short-term impact of the document will not be felt in the international arena but in the internal landscape of the Union. Even though the Union is the world's largest provider of aid and contributes forty percent of the regular UN budget, foreign and security policy at the EU level currently has a budget of 35 million Euros, which is woefully insufficient. Most of the effort concerns defense. The new ambition of the Union has serious implications at the operational level. Current planning assumptions envisage a virtual maximum geographical radius for EU military crisis management of approximately 4,000 km from Brussels. With an enlarged Union, the potential radius for purely humanitarian operations stretches as far as 10,000 km from Brussels.[11] This has huge consequences in terms of the

11. These rough figures do not, however, constitute an official EU 'doctrine', nor are in any way binding politically.

projection and sustainability of forces. Several improvements must be addressed now in order to have an adequate defence tool ready in 2010.

The first urgency is to transform armed forces. This will entail first conversion from conscription to professional army, as well as adopting network-centric techniques of warfare that until now have been introduced only in Sweden and Britain, and partly in France. In any hostile environment, the risks of casualties remain too high. The Union must enhance modernization of its capabilities in order to fight according to criteria laid down by modern democracies. At a minimum, effective C4ISR, i.e. command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, is an absolute requirement. To achieve this goal, incentives must be put in place for member states that will not dramatically increase their defense budgets. To this end, a European fund could be envisaged to support the future Defence Agency. In the same vein, research and development activities must be better funded and coordinated. The rather sad story of the A400 M aircraft – nearly ten years to produce a very specific and not very demanding capability – should not be repeated. Common procurement and common programmes in developing and maintaining capabilities could lead to rapid benefits. In short, the Union has to spend its money better.

The second priority is deployability. The Union has nearly one-and-a-half million men under arms, and the member states spend around 160 billion Euros a year on defense. Yet the Union barely has any means to deploy these troops. According to defense experts, the Union has something like fifty brigades that could be deployed rapidly. If we apply the classic sustainability requirement, the Union should be able to deploy seventeen brigades. At Helsinki in December 1999, the Union defined its headline goal objectives. The aim was to put at the Union's disposal forces capable of carrying out all the Petersberg missions, including the most demanding, in operations up to army corps level, i.e. 50,000 to 60,000 troops. This target, framed according to the precedent set by the Bosnian conflict, was supposed to be met at the end of 2003. However, it was concluded last October that this target was now

out of reach and that a new and more flexible Headline Goal 2010 will be considered.[12] In any case, given the move to a far more ambitious security framework, this instrument of crisis-management which was formatted after the Bosnian experience, seems obsolete. Most importantly, severe shortfalls remain: strategic transport, air-to-air refueling, air-to-ground surveillance, all-weather strategic theater surveillance capabilities, combat search and rescue, electronic intelligence and precision-guided munitions. The European Capabilities Action Plan, launched in October 2001, recognized this necessity. The current NATO Response Force process is also supposed to help this transformation. The support it enjoys among Europeans demonstrates than this current revolution in warfare cannot be missed by Europeans, even if technology is a mean to provide more flexibility and effectiveness. Technology *per se* is not an end in itself. But budget constraints will continue to put severe limits over the necessary adaptation of European forces to its new strategic environment. In short, the Union effort must move from the quantitative to the qualitative.

Thirdly, improvements in planning are necessary. A permanent planning cell at Union level that will have a better understanding of forces at their disposal is unavoidable. This does not mean an anti-NATO Europe but forms part of what has been called 'constructive duplication'.[13] Moreover, since European operations do exist, they should be backed up by a common doctrine. Behind a European defense policy lies a fundamental question: will European countries be friends forever? If the answer is yes, then there should be no difficulty in implementing horizontal specialization among member states in which particular niche capabilities could become collective assets for the Union. The obvious reluctance to proceed along that road means that national security still remains paramount. Yet, one's real sovereignty consists of one's ability to act. If the current trend of

12. One of the most recent proposals in this respect is the idea of the battle-groups (1,500 troops) that was agreed at the meeting between the 'big three' in February 2004. This underlines the current focus on deployability and rapidity, one of the key successes of Operation Artemis.
13. See Schake Kori, *Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU Reliance on US Military Assets*, Centre for European Reform, London, January 2002.

defence budget cuts coupled with dominant national framework persists, very few countries in Europe would be able to act. Multinational integration, resources and capacity pooling, and role specialization are the only way to proceed, especially for the smaller states of the Union.

The security strategy recognizes that the privileges of the post-modern world are not shared elsewhere and that, to protect and to project stability, soft power may not be enough. This in turn requires a 'European revolution in military affairs'. The European security strategy opens the way to a more responsible Europe in security affairs. Yet, the Union is not a nation state. That is why the document is historic. If there is a precedent to it, it should be George Washington's Farewell Address of 1796. Then as now, the ultimate challenge was to foster unity among member states. George Washington's genius was to combine idealistic ambitions and power necessities. The challenge for Europe is similar: to develop a world role that combines European values and interests. But Europe lacks the geographical advantage of the young American republic, which, sheltered by the surrounding oceans, could adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality. The international environment will sooner rather than later demand that the EU's new ambition be met. The credibility of the Union is now at stake.