Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation, by Ronald J. Deibert

6. Hypermedia and the Modern to Postmodern World Order Transformation: Distributional Changes

In this chapter, I turn to an examination of the distributional changes that may be occurring today as a result of the emerging hypermedia environment. As outlined in the theoretical chapter, distributional changes are those that take place in the relative power of social forces as a result of a "fitness" between the interests of these social forces and the communications environment. In other words, social forces whose interests match the hypermedia environment will tend to flourish, while those whose interests do not will tend to be disadvantaged. The claim being made here is not that the change in the mode of communication to hypermedia generates these social forces, but rather that existing social forces will tend to flourish or wither depending on their relative "fitness" with the hypermedia environment. This difference is crucial because it directs analysis to present conditions, rather than to future worlds yet to unfold. Thus my goal here is to identify those social forces in the world today whose interests or "logics of organization" appear to fit the hypermedia environment, and those that do not. On this basis, then, projections about the likely distributional consequences of the hypermedia environment can be made.

As throughout this study, my focus is on the impact of these distributional changes on the architecture of world order--in this case, modern world order. The "paradigm" of modern world order is the practice of dividing political authority into territorially distinct, mutually exclusive sovereign nation-states--a mode of differentiation that first arose, as outlined in part 1, in early modern Europe and from there spread gradually through imitation and force to encompass the entire planet. I use the word "paradigm" deliberately in order to underscore that this mode of differentiating political authority has never been absolute, but has accommodated various infringements in practice and in principle throughout modernity. Like many other observers, however, I see developments occurring that indicate this paradigm is being fundamentally transformed--that modern world order, in the words of both Ruggie and Elkins, is "unbundling." ₁   My intention in this chapter is to trace those elements of the "unbundling" process that are linked to distributional changes related to the emerging hypermedia environment.

The chapter will proceed in the following way: First, I will explore the distributional changes occurring in international political economy--particularly, the way the hypermedia environment favors the transnationalization of production and the globalization of finance. Second, I will examine the way transnational social movements are flourishing in the nonterritorial spaces of hypermedia, leading to what has been called a "global civil society." Third, I will assess the relative "fitness" of alternative domestic security arrangements in the hypermedia environment, arguing that this environment complements liberal-republican political organizations, or what have been called "negarchies." Finally, I will conclude with some brief observations on the way these distributional changes may be helping to transform the architecture of modern world order.

Hypermedia Markets: The Transnationalization of Production and Finance

Transnational Production

Like other aspects of social organization, production in the modern world order has generally been organized within territorially distinct, mutually exclusive sovereign nation-states. In other words, the production of goods and services, and the organization of economics, has been primarily a "national" affair and has been undertaken in a "national" context. Because of the state survivalist mentalité into which state leaders were acculturated, economic production has been shaped and driven primarily by a desire for self-sufficiency and autonomy. ₂   As Thomson remarks, "historically, state control of the economy was not meant to be functional to society but to the state's war-making capabilities." ₃   If Waltz's notion of functionally undifferentiated "like" units never corresponded exactly to state practice, it was a fair representation of the ideal to which all states strove. ₄  

In practice, of course, states have varied enormously in the extent to which they have approximated this ideal. And as Marxists have pointed out, "national" economic production has never been completely de-linked from a world economic system characterized by a variety of dependencies between "core" and "peripheral" economies. ₅   But, in general, economic production has been organized, planned, measured, and thus overwhelmingly contained within discrete sovereign-territorial boundaries. The most apparent evidence of this is that the vast majority of economic transactions have been internal or domestic as opposed to international. ₆   Trade among states--which often reached proportionately high levels relative to Gross National Product (GNP) during times of stability--has been predominantly of the "arms-length" variety, with nationally produced goods and commodities being exchanged across state boundaries. ₇   Even if capitalist entrepreneurs had an interest in escaping the self-sufficiency paradigm that bounded production within sovereign-territorial spaces, the existing communications environment placed significant constraints on the degree to which production could become transnationally complex. As Kurtzman notes, "most of the world's economy [during the nineteenth century] remained as separate islands only tangentially linked by slowly moving steam- and sail-powered ships, trains, and (beginning in 1844) the telegraph." ₈  

Of course the situation described above refers to general structural characteristics, which in reality have never been static, but have constantly evolved in conjunction with changing technological and social conditions. One discernible evolutionary trend, beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and spurred on by successive developments in transportation and communications, has been a gradual rise in the density of transnational economic ties, including international trade. ₉   For example, in the 1835–1968 period (excluding 1920–1945) international trade rose on average by 55 percent each decade. ₁₀   As these ties have grown, so too have questions about the obvious contradiction between transnationalization and the bounded political organization of sovereign-territorial states. In Gilpin's words, a "dominant motif" among observers of international political economy in the latter twentieth century has been "the conflict between the evolving economic and technical interdependence of the globe and the continuing compartmentalization of the world political system composed of sovereign states " ₁₁   Prior to the emergence of hypermedia, these trends were centered predominantly on traditional "arms-length" national transactions, with rising figures composed mostly of changes in the volume of international trade. In the hypermedia environment, however, the transnationalization of trade and production has reached a qualitatively different level and represents not merely a change in the volume of cross-border transactions, but a fundamental change in the nature and organization of production itself. In other words, although the transnationalization process has deep antecedents, it has been qualitatively transformed in the new communications environment with the complex diffusion of production across national boundaries.

The starting point for understanding the "fitness" of transnational production in the hypermedia environment is the way this environment facilitates the strategic interests of businesses and corporations that have an incentive to cross political boundaries. Although "rational-actor" models are often properly criticized for their ahistoricism and cultural parochialism, one area where they approximate the motivations and interests of actors is with respect to capitalist organizations whose overriding motivation is the accumulation of profits and the reduction of costs. ₁₂   Of course, actual decisions of individual firms to "go global" depend on a variety of causal factors which may not be so easily squared with such a model, including institutional path-dependencies, leadership culture, internal power struggles, and national origins. ₁₃   Generally speaking, however, hypermedia create a conducive environment with strong incentives for those firms that operate transnationally. Moreover, as more firms buy into these incentives, the nature of market competition creates strong pressures on other firms to do likewise in order to survive. This creates a "cascading" effect, with the hypermedia environment favoring the success of those firms that decide to operate transnationally, which, in turn, motivates other firms to follow suit. The result, in Morgan's words, is that "telecommunications now constitutes part of the central nervous system of far-flung corporate empires, so much so that it is much more than a mere cost item." ₁₄  

The most obvious and forceful way in which the hypermedia environment favors the transnationalization of production is by providing a way to communicate vast amounts of voice, text, and image data instantaneously throughout the world. McKenzie and Lee note that "Now, by touching a few keys and for the cost of a telephone call, modern managers can, via satellites, send millions of bits of crucial information on design specifications, production costs, or schedules to virtually any point on the globe at almost the speed of light." ₁₅   In other words, hypermedia greatly enhance what Hepworth has called "multilocational flexibility" by reducing the prior constraints associated with the risks and costs of operating over large distances for individual firms. ₁₆   Corporations value multilocational flexibility primarily because it permits the possibility of crossing political boundaries to evade government regulations, or to search for cheap or specially skilled labor, low taxes, and other favorable regulatory climates. The reliance of firms on effective telecommunications for multilocational flexibility has meant that many have taken to leasing their own private networks--called "intranets" for secure and reliable communications. One example is the Ford Motor Company's private telecommunications network called "Fordnet," which is designed to secure better synergy among Ford's 20,000 designers and engineers located around the world. ₁₇   Another example is Rolls Royce's Tradanet system, developed by General Electric Information Services, which is used for purchase orders, acknowledgements, and delivery forecasts with suppliers around the world. ₁₈   This reliance on private-leased lines by corporations has been one of the primary factors behind the push for "deregulation" and the break-up of national monopoly cartels in telecommunications, described in the previous chapter. ₁₉  

One increasingly popular manifestation of multilocational flexibility is the segmentation of different components of the production chain of individual firms into multiple national locations, not only to neutralize swings in currency differentials among national economies, but also to take advantage of "niche" regulatory climates or labor pools around the world that favor specific processes (e.g., marketing, management, "back-room" data processing, and/or research and development). ₂₀   As Hepworth notes, "These enhanced economies of scale and scope, deriving from the sharing of information and specialized physical assets (computers and telecommunications facilities), provide the firm with opportunities for reducing the minimum efficient scale of branch operations (remote plants, sales offices, etc) and extending their degree of geographical dispersal." ₂₁   For example, United Technologies operates more than 120 manufacturing plants in 24 countries, with sales and service offices in 56 countries. Production of its Elevonic 411 elevator exemplifies the segmentation of the production chain: the French branch built the door systems; the Spanish division handled the small-geared components; the German subsidiary handled the electronics; the Japanese unit designed the special motor drives; and the United States/Connecticut group coordinated the systems integration. ₂₂   Perhaps the most common example of this transnational disaggregation is data-entry, "back-office" jobs--a phenomenon that has given rise to the term "global office." New York Life Insurance Company, for example, has its claims works done in Ireland, while American Airlines employs more than a thousand data entry employees in Barbados. ₂₃  

The hypermedia environment not only favors the transnationalization of production internal to individual firms, it also facilitates it among multiple firms. By making it easier to coordinate strategic alliances, joint ventures, and joint production arrangements among separate firms regardless of the geographical distance that separates them, the hypermedia environment provides a way for individual firms to spread out the risks and costs of research and development, and thus permits an entry into foreign markets that might otherwise be precluded by tariffs or other regulatory restrictions. Although examples of these types of collaborative arrangements existed prior to the hypermedia environment, they have flourished since its development, becoming a much more dominant feature of the global production landscape. ₂₄   According to James and Weidenbaum, "The pace at which cooperative strategic alliances between firms occur is accelerating, particularly in high-tech, high-growth industries, such as computers, semiconductors, telecommunications, electronics, chemicals, and industrial equipment." ₂₅   In the aerospace and automotive industries, "every major company has formed alliances with foreign competitors in an effort to spread the costs and risks of developing new products, as well as to ensure access to overseas markets." ₂₆   Through teleconferencing systems, faxes, and computer networks (in particular, electronic mail), transnational collaborative arrangements can be as closely coordinated as if they were in the same building. ₂₇   Today, it is not uncommon for design teams located thousands of miles from each other to work on the same design in real-time over computer networks. ₂₈  

These types of collaborative ventures have also transformed the nature of subcontracting and traditional supplier-client relationships, with suppliers being drawn more closely into the research and design of their clients' products. Inventories can be adjusted electronically in what has been referred to as "just-in-time" delivery of parts and products. ₂₉   Just-in-time interaction (also known as "zero stock systems") could not take place without the use of Electronic Data Interchange, or EDI, which maintains a constant electronic link between companies like Wal-Mart and one of its major suppliers, Procter & Gamble, or Dominos Pizza, which uses a computer network called "Domilink" to coordinate supplies among its 1,100 workers located at 28 North American sites. ₃₀   Such complex electronic links reduce the constraints of operating supplier-client relationships over large distances, as inventories can be constantly monitored from afar and deliveries adjusted for travel time depending on the product concerned. These electronic connections link companies from all parts of the production chain both domestically and internationally into a rapid-response/mutual adjustment system that often begins the moment the bar-code is scanned at the retail register when the product is purchased. ₃₁  

Examples and illustrations of these new complex transnational collaborative ventures abound. The computer maker Unisys is both a customer of, and supplier to, IBM and Honeywell in the United States, BASF, Philips, and Siemens in the European Community, and Fujitsu and Hitachi in Japan. "Together, these companies engage in joint ventures, coproduce, serve as sources for each other, share output, and compete." ₃₂   More than one-half of Corning Glass's revenues comes from joint ventures--two-thirds of which are with foreign companies, including Siemens in West Germany, Ciba-Geigy in Switzerland, Plessey in the United Kingdom, Samsung in South Korea, and Asahi Glass in Japan. ₃₃   In developing and producing its new 777 commercial jet airliner, Boeing entered into coproduction arrangements with companies from six different countries, including Alenia of Italy (for the outboard wing flaps); Aerospace Technologies of Australia (for the rudder); Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fuji of Japan (for the fuselage panels and doors, and the wing ribs); Korean Air (for the flap covers); Menasco Aerospace of Canada (for the landing gears); and General Electric of Britain (for the primary flight computers). ₃₄  

One of the most complex sectors for these types of coproduction/joint venture relationships is the automobile industry, where alliances among competing automobile manufacturers in different countries have deeply permeated the production of most vehicles. To take just two examples, General Motors owns 40 percent of Isuzu and 5 percent of Suzuki, and has joint ventures with Chrysler, Daewoo, and Toyota. The latter (Toyota) has an equity partnership with Daihatsu, and joint ventures with Chrysler and Volkswagen. ₃₅   Perhaps most significant for long-term world order changes has been the surge in transnational joint ventures and strategic alliances in the global defense industry. As late as 1985 there were no transnational strategic alliances among major national defense firms; by 1993 there were sixteen. Similarly, from 1981 to 1985 there was only one transnational joint venture; from 1991 to 1993 there were sixteen. ₃₆   Bitzinger notes that these trends represent not just a quantitative shift, but also a qualitative one as the process of collaboration is "becoming increasingly less ad hoc and more formal, integrative, and permanent." ₃₇   Although hypermedia do not generate these complex transnational processes, which stem from multiple incentives in each case, they do favor them significantly, offering firms a more hospitable communications environment in which to reap the benefits of "going global."

A second way in which the transnationalization of production fits the hypermedia environment is by facilitating more flexible production keyed to the vagaries of local consumer tastes. As hypermedia provide knowledge-intensive/software-based production lines, rapid shifts in production output or major changes in advertisement campaigns are made more feasible than with the traditional mode of labor-intensive, mass-produced finished goods. Bartlett and Ghoshal note that:

recent developments in computer-aided design and manufacturing, robotics, and other advanced production techniques have made the concept of flexible manufacturing a reality. Companies that previously had to produce tens or hundreds of thousands of standardized products in a single plant to achieve minimum efficient scale now find they can distribute manufacturing among smaller national plants with little cost penalty. In this way they can respond to localized consumer preferences and national political constraints without compromising their economic efficiency. 38

This particular capability contradicts the widespread belief that globalization of production necessitates homogenization. ₃₉   To the contrary, in order to operate successfully, transnational corporations have to be willing to accommodate local conditions: a strategy captured by the former head of Sony Akio Morito's term "global localization," and a pervasive concept within the multinational business literature today. ₄₀   Ohmae notes how "Coca-Cola's success in Japan was due to the establishment of its route sales force, but also to its rapid introduction of products unique to Japan." ₄₁   Through computer-based, digital-designed and operated manufacturing and advertising systems, hypermedia permit the production of "niche" products that are tailored to suit local conditions. With computer-assisted consumer profiles and other market-surveillance mechanisms, firms can then maintain a constant watch over disparate localities around the globe, enabling diversified responses to local conditions, as well as rapid adjustments in advertising campaigns to influence parochial consumer tastes. ₄₂   Even McDonald's--a symbol of capitalist homogenization if there ever was one--regularly changes many of its product and advertising characteristics to match local consumer profiles. In Japan, for example, it changed the name of its mascot from Ronald McDonald to Donald McDonald and the pronunciation of its name to "Makudonaldo," both of which are easier to pronounce for Japanese speakers. ₄₃  

A third way in which the hypermedia environment favors the transnationalization process is by enabling small, locally based firms to reach a global audience. While globalization is generally associated with massive, multibillion dollar transnational enterprises, hypermedia increasingly allow small firms with niche products to reach a global market, and thus compete with industry giants in select areas. The best example of this phenomenon is the rapid commercialization of the Internet, where individuals or small firms with low initial investment can market products to a rapidly increasing, global Internet audience through the mere posting of web-site advertisements. ₄₄   Everything from floral arrangements to pizzas to computer software to legal consultation is now marketed on the Internet in what has been referred to as a kind of "cyberspace bazaar." ₄₅   Initially, security concerns among credit card companies limited the scope of Internet commercialization. However, innovative credit solutions have been made to sidestep these concerns ("Digicash" and "Cybercash are the two most prominent examples), ₄₆   while credit card companies have entered into research projects with computer security specialists to devise appropriate encryption technologies that will protect on-line use of credit card numbers through anonymity of commercial transactions. ₄₇   What might be called (in an inversion of Morito's phrase) "local globalization" could not take place on such a large scale without the low-cost, planetary reach afforded by hypermedia to the average individual-producer. As the Internet continues its exponential growth around the world, and as more private companies flock to the "net," the connection between a considerable portion of the production, marketing, and sale of goods and services will become detached from "place," existing only in the nonterritorial "space" of globally-linked computer networks.

The result of this functional convergence between the hypermedia environment and the transnationalization of production is a much more complex and crosscutting nonterritorial organization of production. Not only are new corporate structures emerging that are less hierarchical, more "web-like," but also firms all over the planet are now embedded in a global "networked" environment, composed of multiple, overlapping, and complex transnational production arrangements ranging from formal equity-sharing or coproduction arrangements to informal alliances and joint ventures. ₄₈   Although it is certainly true that we are nowhere near a completely "borderless" economy, and that there are few truly "placeless" corporations, ₄₉   the changes that have already occurred are significant and growing, suggesting important consequences for the architecture of political authority, as will be explained shortly.

A variety of factors indicate the extent of the changes that are occurring. For example, for advanced economies of the "triad" states--the United States, Japan, and European Community members--from a third to as much as one-half of the trade crossing their borders now consists of internal transfers within the same enterprise. ₅₀   It is estimated that 80–90 percent of all "transborder data flows" are generated by such intra-firm transactions. ₅₁   Another indication of the transnationalization of production is the rise in traded services--a particularly difficult feature to gauge accurately, though one that by most accounts is assuming more importance, especially with the commercialization of Internet. As Ruggie has noted, it is not entirely clear what is meant by "trade in services": "In merchandise trade, factors of production stand still and goods move across borders; in traded services, typically the factors of production do the moving while the good (service) stands still: it is produced for the consumer on the spot." ₅₂   A conservative estimate places service exports at about $700 billion per year worldwide, constituting about 25 to 30 percent of world trade. ₅₃   Another indication is the growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)--a reasonably accurate data source, though one that unfortunately excludes most nonequity relationships and activities, the very ones that are now assuming such great importance. ₅₄   Worldwide outflows of FDI have increased nearly 29 percent a year on average since 1983, three times the growth rate of world exports. ₅₅   A 1995 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) study found that the world's 40,000 transnational corporations and their 250,000 foreign affiliates now account for two-thirds of the world trade in goods and services. ₅₆   According to a more recent UNCTAD press release, total FDI flows into developed and developing countries surged by 40 per cent in 1995, to reach US$315 billion. ₅₇   The press release noted that "[t]he tempo of business globalization is accelerating at a dramatic pace. In response to technological and competitive pressures, companies from every developed country, as well as from an increasing number of developing countries, are becoming more active globally." ₅₈   Moreover, trends indicate that the sources of FDI are diversifying geographically to include not only the traditional postindustrialized countries, but also FDI from several of the newly industrializing countries. Within the postindustrialized countries themselves FDI has leveled considerably, with the U.S. ratio of outward/inward FDI moving from 11:1 in 1975 to 1:1 by the end of the 1980s. ₅₉  

To be sure, the geographical distribution of these transnationalization processes is unevenly spread around the world. ₆₀   As some of the figures above suggest, the global pattern of FDI activity is strongly concentrated in the triad regions (and within those countries most of it is still concentrated in the United States and the United Kingdom), with the share going to the developing countries remaining low--some 18 percent of the world total. ₆₁   And despite some exceptions where bargaining agreements feature high technology transfers, the overwhelming majority of the FDI heading to the South is still predominantly tapping into the low-wage, low-skilled labor market. ₆₂   These geographical inequalities are both a reflection and a reinforcement of global power disparities between North and South. But power differentials notwithstanding, there is no region in the world today that is not in some way tied into the globalized economy. With respect to challenges to the modern world order paradigm, these North-South disparities are less significant than the complex diffusion of production across political borders. Before outlining exactly what these changes portend for world order transformation, I will examine similar distributional changes occurring in global financial markets.

The Emergence of Global Finance

According to Stopford and Strange, the international financial structure is "the system by which in a market-based economy, credit is created, bought and sold and by which, therefore, the use of capital is determined." ₆₃   It is different from the international monetary structure--which refers to the "system that governs exchange rate parities"--although the two, of course, are related in important ways. As Stopford and Strange point out, the international financial structure has undergone dramatic changes in the last few decades, proceeding "away from nationally-centered credit systems toward a single system of integrated financial markets. [to] a global system, in which national markets, physically separate, function as if they were all in the same place." ₆₄   In other words, a primarily "state-based" system "with some transnational links" has evolved into a single global financial system--a system that today exerts significant autonomous structural pressure on the macroeconomic behavior of states. ₆₅   As will be shown below, although the emergence of global finance has had multiple causes and antecedents that predate the change in the mode of communication, it has been social forces in favor of global finance working symbiotically with hypermedia that brought about such a fundamental change in the nature of international financial markets: pressures in the direction of financial globalization created a demand for, and spurred on new developments in, communication technologies, while the latter, in turn, fuelled the globalization processes of the former. Without hypermedia, the global financial structure could not exist on so formidable scale as it does today. According to Hepworth, "At the heart of this market transformation are the new information and communication technologies, which have effectively removed the spatial and temporal constraints on twenty-four-hour global securities trading and created pressures for 'deregulation' in all countries across the world." ₆₆  

As many theorists of international political economy have pointed out, the movement of money and finances across borders is not a new phenomenon, but has developed in conjunction with modern industrial capitalism. ₆₇   However, as with production, finance has been predominantly a national affair under the modern world order paradigm, first with the development of networks of regional banks channelling local sources of capital into private industry, and later with their absorption into "national" markets, which were more spatially and organizationally centralized, but still territorially discrete. ₆₈   When it occurred, the movement of money across borders was closely associated with the financing of international trade, and was used only sporadically to channel capital into overseas investment. ₆₉   For example, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, massive capital accumulation (mostly in Great Britain) resulted in relatively large overseas investments in railroads, port facilities, and other infrastructural projects in the United States, Canada, and Australia. ₇₀   But these financial flows reduced significantly during and after World War I, and remained subsidiary to trade and government aid for some time thereafter. Right up until the 1950s and 1960s, "international finance served to lubricate trade flows and to finance the operations of transnational firms and governments in a relatively controlled system." ₇₁   The subsidiary role of finance to production throughout this period was a product of both technological constraints that limited the mobility of finance capital, as well as deliberate policy initiatives designed to keep finance the "servant" of production, as outlined, for example, by John Maynard Keynes at Bretton Woods. ₇₂   Generalizing across all states prior to the 1970s, the international financial structure was characterized by "a series of national financial systems linked by a few operators buying and selling credit transnationally, across national frontiers, and across the exchanges (i.e., from one national currency to another) and by a few national asset markets (e.g. stock exchanges) " ₇₃  

The rise of a globally integrated financial sector has had a multiplicity of mutually interacting and reinforcing causes, making it futile to suggest any one "prime mover." ₇₄   Although the hypermedia environment is considered by theorists, almost without exception, to be crucial to this process, it is virtually impossible to disentangle its impact from other factors. ₇₅   It may be useful for analytical purposes, then, to sketch briefly some of the nontechnological factors that contributed to the globalization of finance, and then afterward show the way hypermedia reinforced and augmented them.

One reason for the rise in the volume of international financial activity was the transnationalization of production outlined above. As mentioned earlier, the traditional role of international financial movements was to "grease" the wheels of international commerce; as trade increased over the twentieth century, and as production diffused across national boundaries, cross-border financial activities rose in step. Transnational banks in particular became more widespread in the 1960s and 1970s to service the demands of multinational corporations. They offered a substantial transaction-cost advantage over nationally based banks in the international wholesale market by being able to handle smoothly large transactions among banks, governments and large firms with cross-border operations. ₇₆  

Financial innovations were a second big impetus to the globalization of financial activities--especially the creation of the so-called "Eurodollar" market. The Eurodollar market originated in London, where the city's lax regulatory and high rate-of-return financial climate, coupled with its considerable stock of financial expertise and extensive network of banks and financial connections, began to draw investment away from the tight regulations and artificially low-interest rates of the United States. ₇₇   The growth in Eurodollars remained steady until the OPEC crisis of the early 1970s suddenly put billions of so-called "petrodollars" into the hands of oil-producing states, who then reinvested their money not in the United States, where regulatory interference was common and taxes were high, but in the Eurodollar market where they were "untaxed, anonymous, and profitable." ₇₈   The result was a sudden explosion in the volume of financial capital circulating around the globe--"a gigantic pool of quasi-stateless mobile capital, not subject to political authority or accountability." ₇₉  

A third source of the globalization of finance was regulatory changes in the advanced economies, particularly the liberalization of domestic capital controls. The deregulation and liberalization of financial markets can be traced back to the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, the closing of the "gold window," and the subsequent removal of controls over the flow of money across borders and a relaxation of interest-rate regulations. ₈₀   The change "redefined money," created "enormous arbitrage possibilities, and set the stage for the invention of a myriad of new financial products." ₈₁   Perhaps more importantly, it began the decoupling process by which speculative capital was divorced from its traditional, subservient role as the "grease" of the "real" economy of trade and production. ₈₂   International finance suddenly had become, in Strange's apt phrase, "casino capitalism." ₈₃   A reduction in regulations governing stockbroker commissions followed, and competition policies among banks and other financial institutions in turn led to more speculation and uncertainty. ₈₄   By the 1980s, under the direction of the Reagan/Thatcher neoliberal movement, deregulation swept through all sectors of the advanced economies, whipping into a frenzy the speculative flows of capital across borders. ₈₅  

None of these changes can be divorced from the development of the hypermedia environment, which was both a product of, and reinforcement to, the nontechnological factors outlined above. In fact, finance capital and communications technologies have had a mutually reinforcing, symbiotic relationship dating back to the telegraph, with each move toward globalization, in turn, spurring on the development of more cost-effective, speedy communications, which in turn has led to more globalization. Daniels, for example, has identified a three-stage process whereby each new innovation leading to the hypermedia environment was gradually incorporated into the routines of foreign exchange dealings, from the first large and expensive computers of the 1970s that handled back-office accounting procedures, to the on-line data services provided by organizations like Reuters and Telerate in the late 1970s, to the complex, digitally integrated hypermedia systems of today. ₈₆   The result is that global financial services have developed the most advanced hypermedia networks in the world, and are today at the forefront of computing and telecommunications innovations--a place traditionally occupied by military research and development. According to Harry Scarbrough:

Financial services is a highly information-intensive sector, and massive amounts are invested in the processing and manipulation of information. IT [information technology] investments in a major UK bank could easily exceed a billion pounds over a five-year period. The sector also has greater experience of using computer technology than any other industrial sector. Within every major financial services firm, large IT divisions or departments have evolved to guide and control technological development. 87

The fitness between finances and hypermedia is not difficult to understand when one considers the important relationship between, as the old adage goes, "time and money." Consider that in the United States alone, on an average day, America's 14,000 banks transfer about $2.1 trillion over their local data networks to settle account balances. The cost to a bank of financing a deficit, even if it is only for overnight, translates into strong incentives to develop networks--both national and transnational--that are efficient and quick. ₈₈   The U.S.-based Bank of America, for example, carries out trades in more than 100 foreign currencies for a volume of $60 billion per day. ₈₉   One recent study revealed that a major investment in hypermedia systems gave one major U.S. bank a ten-second advantage over competitors--a powerful advantage that meant gains on the order of billions of dollars. ₉₀   The ultimate goal, according to banking technology experts, is "just-in-time" cash, or what has been called a "disappearing float"--a real-time clearance of balances that would be inconceivable without hypermedia. ₉₁  

The consequences of the "time is money" imperative for the financial sector has been an explosion of hypermedia applications, as new innovations in information technology saturate the industry--each new product and service providing yet more information with more speed, and more computing power than before, on a global scale. Stock exchanges now no longer require a physical trading floor as electronically linked exchanges operate globally in a 24-hour marketplace. Examples are numerous and increasing, and include such systems as the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) of London; the U.S.-based NASDAQ network; the electronic trading system Globex, developed jointly by Reuters and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange; the Computer Assisted Trading System (CATS) centered in Toronto, and many more. These larger systems are now joined by smaller, "private" trading "clubs," like Instinet, Posit, or Was, each of which allow trading to take place remotely from PCs or terminals located anywhere in the world at anytime. ₉₂  

Numerous World-Wide Web pages provide niche information on a myriad of financial services and investment information from around the world. ₉₃   Complex artificial-intelligence software systems are then developed by securities firms to handle vast, complex stock portfolios that react instantaneously to slight shifts in the market. ₉₄   On-line services, such as Reuters, Telerate, and Quotron in the United States, and Extel and Datastream in Europe, plus smaller, hand-held devices like Quotreks, compete with each other and with global television networks, like the Cable News Network (CNN)'s Financial Network, or Asian Business News, to provide the most up-to-date information on international trading activities. ₉₅   Financial institutions now invest heavily in transnational communications infrastructural projects in order to help facilitate global trading activity as a whole. ₉₆   Hepworth, for example, has documented how leading financial institutions, like Nomura Securities of Japan or Prudential-Bache Securities of the United States, are the driving force behind major telecommunications developments around the world, such as teleports and fiber-optic installations. ₉₇   Leased lines, "virtual private networks," intranets, or specialized electronic transfer services, like the Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (or SWIFT), then provide the ever-intensifying, real-time links among these institutions. ₉₈  

Like the tightening of a knot, each advanced application of hypermedia in the financial sector furthers and deepens the global integration of capital markets in a planetary web of complex speculative financial flows. In ways that are similar to the overlapping layers of transnational production, the players in the "casino capitalism" market represent a complex montage of both massive global enterprises and small entrepreneurs with a planetary reach afforded by hypermedia. The "big" players--financial institutions like Citicorp, Chase Manhattan, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, Barclays, National Westminster, Warburg, and Nomura--have offices around the world and dominate trading: typically, the top twenty institutions in a market account for between 40 and 60 percent of worldwide transactions. ₉₉   Because of the way the hypermedia environment links the globe into a 24-hour market, companies like Salomon Brothers Inc, which can trade up to $2 trillion U.S. in stocks, bonds, and commodities in a single year, are "always open, everywhere." ₁₀₀   As Daniels notes, "Telecommunications permits a London-based Eurobond dealer who starts work at 6:00 am to catch the end of trading on the Tokyo exchange, to trade all day in London and to catch four to five hours on the New York exchange. " ₁₀₁   Stocks, bonds, and other instruments of debt are continuously traded, bounding from exchange to exchange in response to slight shifts in the market--often without human intervention as computer programs handle portfolios for traders. In the words of Thrift and Leyshon, "we might conceive of the international financial system as an electronically networked, constantly circulating, nomadic 'state', operating 24 hours a day around the world." ₁₀₂  

The entire volume of capital speeding through hypermedia currents is thus truly staggering, and at times seems almost incomprehensibly large compared to more readily identifiable figures. Kurtzman offers the following startling comparison:

Every day, through the "lobe" in the neural network that is New York, more than $1.9 trillion electronically changes hands at nearly the speed of light. These dollars--and the cares, hopes, and fears they represent--appear as momentary flashes on a screen. Every three days a sum of money passes through the fiber-optic network underneath the pitted streets of New York equal to the total output for one year of all of America's companies and all of its workforce. And every two weeks the annual product of the world passes through the network of New York--trillions and trillions of ones and zeros representing all the toil, sweat, and guile from all of humanity's good-faith efforts and all of its terrible follies. 103

CS First Boston, a leading global bond trader based in New York, trades more money each year than the entire GNP of the United States. ₁₀₄   To give some indication of the way in which "casino capital" has been decoupled from the so-called "real" economy (which historically it has been assumed to follow), international trade now amounts to about $2 trillion per year. Today foreign exchange transactions alone--carried out over computers linked in near-real time--amount to about $1 trillion per day. ₁₀₅   As will be shown below, these volumes assume a special significance when they are considered in relation to state autonomy over macroeconomic policies.

In response to this massive, global 24-hour marketplace, new spaces and flows are arising, and centers and "hubs" have emerged, that may provide a glimpse of the evolving architecture of the postmodern world order. New York, London, Tokyo, Singapore, and Hong Kong, are among the large cities that are assuming more of an importance as "command centers" in the global "finanscape"--what an Economist survey referred to as "Capitals of capital." ₁₀₆   According to Thrift and Leyshon, these "ordering centers" arise because "the interdependent connectedness of disembedded electronic networks promotes dependence on just a few places like London, New York, and Tokyo, where representations can be mutually constructed, negotiated, accepted and acted upon." ₁₀₇   They act not so much as national cities as they do world cites--interfacial nodes in the global hypermedia environment.

Also assuming more importance are the many "offshore" microstates that "have been transformed by exploiting niches in the circuits of fictitious capital." ₁₀₈   The term "offshore" is especially significant: in Ruggie's words, it signifies the way in which emerging financial practices strain our current stock of concepts and ideas, "as though they existed in some ethereal space waiting to be reconceived by an economic equivalent of relativity theory." ₁₀₉   Likewise, Roberts notes that "these offshore financial centers are sites that dramatically evince the contrary and complex melding of offshore and onshore, of national and international, and of local and global." ₁₁₀   For example, because of its strategic location (the same as the New York financial markets) and its lax regulations, the tiny Cayman Islands "houses" 546 banks from all around the world, of which only 69 maintain any kind of physical presence on the islands. ₁₁₁  

The quintessential "offshore" market is the Eurodollar or Eurocurrency market, the history of which was outlined earlier. Martin calls the Eurocurrency market "stateless" money. ₁₁₂   The prefix "Euro," as Roberts points out, is a misleading vestige of an earlier time; today, the Eurocurrency market involves a dynamic new geography of flows "stretching from Panama to Switzerland and on to Singapore and beyond." ₁₁₃   Confusing matters even more is that regulations designed to offer more competitive financial environments have created extraterritorial "offshore" markets onshore, within state boundaries, such as those that exist in New York, California, and Japan. ₁₁₄   Developments such as these, where a "space of flows" seems to dominate and transcend a "space of places" in Castell's terms, strain our traditional ways-of-seeing the world that were constructed and reaffirmed under the modern world order paradigm. ₁₁₅   They signal not only an "unbundling" of our practices, but of our conceptual baggage as well. ₁₁₆  

Implications for the Architecture of Modern Political Authority

The distributional changes to global production and finance as outlined above are increasingly well-known among political economists and International Relations theorists. What is less agreed upon, however, is their significance for the modern system of political rule centered on the sovereign state. As many have noted, while flows of finances and commerce across borders have increased, this does not mean that states are no longer important actors. Neither does a loss of control or autonomy necessarily equal a diminution of political authority, as I argued in the introduction to this study. As I see it, however, these distributional changes have three significant implications for the architecture of modern political authority.

The first, alluded to above, is that by creating a much more complex, overlapping, and globally integrated system of production and finance, these changes present fundamental challenges to longstanding presuppositions about the nature and character of modern economic organization. Practices that have been taken for granted, such as a "national" economic system, or a "national industry," or "international" trade, are thrown into doubt as production disaggregates and diffuses across territorial boundaries. The distributional changes to production outlined earlier represent not just a quantitative increase in the volume of cross-border transactions, but a qualitative, fundamental change in the nature of production itself--one that cannot easily be reversed given the density and scope of transnational links within and among firms. As these arrangements permeate more and more aspects of economic activity in all sectors, it becomes increasingly difficult for any one state to define, in Robert Reich's words, "who is 'US'?" ₁₁₇  

Similarly, preconceptions about the "domestic" and the "international," about "inside" and "outside," are strained by the constant flows of capital through cyberspatial currents, by the creation of "offshore" markets, and by the emergence of an electronically linked, 24-hour global trading system. What once seemed the "natural" division of politicoeconomic organization into discrete territorial bundles has given way to a much more fluid and complex global economic system. ₁₁₈   Of course these ideational changes in and of themselves have no direct impact on the nature of political authority. But their significance should not be too lightly dismissed, particularly when considered in conjunction with the changes to social epistemology that will be outlined in the next chapter. Much like the significance of the medieval trade fairs to which Ruggie alludes, their impact, though largely intangible, may nonetheless be substantial in the way they inculcate new habits of mind and ways-of-seeing the world.

Second, and on a more concrete level, the transnationalization of production and finance is gradually undermining the effective power of state regulatory systems within individual geographical-political jurisdictions. ₁₁₉   As a number of theorists have observed, the sheer volume and speed of capital mobility creates a "structural" pressure that systematically circumscribes the macroeconomic policy options available to states--a power large enough to warrant, according to Webb, its inclusion as a "third-image" attribute of the international structure. ₁₂₀   The most compelling evidence is the increasing convergence among state economic policies around the world. Whether referred to as the "transmission belt" state ₁₂₁   or the "competition" state, ₁₂₂   states have increasingly defined themselves and their interests according to the pressures and values of global capitalism. Governments at all levels now engage in competitive deregulatory and reregulatory "locational tournaments" designed to attract global investment. ₁₂₃   Although institutional lags and cultural traditions mean that individual state policies differ to some extent, ₁₂₄   governments around the world increasingly have molded their policies according to the interests of global market forces. ₁₂₅   And each deregulatory wave only drives the process further, augmenting transborder capital mobility and creating demands for yet more accommodating policies. Consider the findings of a recent U.N. Conference on Trade and Development study. That study found that of about 375 substantial changes in direct investment laws and regulations between 1991 and 1994 that were undertaken in developed and developing countries alike, all but five were in the direction of liberalization. ₁₂₆   It is important to be clear that what is at stake here is something more than just a loss of control over flows; it is a deferment to global market forces on a scale that suggests political authority over macroeconomics may no longer reside solely within sovereign states.

The third implication of these distributional changes also bearing directly on the nature of political authority has been the creation and emergence of multiple and overlapping layers of authority designed to respond to and govern globalizing economic forces. Nearly all states now find themselves enmeshed in an ever-widening network of informal and formal international institutions, regimes, organizations, and regional trading blocs that have arisen in reaction to the transnationalization of production and finance as outlined above. ₁₂₇   Examples of these layers of global "governance" ₁₂₈   are numerous and increasing. They range from more informal bodies, like the Trilateral Commission or the "G-7" economic summits; ₁₂₉   to more formal bodies, such as the recently created World Trade Organization; to regional bodies and agreements, such as the European Commission, the North American Free Trade Agreement, or the Asia-Pacific Economic Council. ₁₃₀   In addition, there are the more specialized, functional bodies, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or the Bank for International Settlements. While it is true that states voluntarily entered into and created such regimes, these webs of global governance establish institutional precedents and routines that cannot easily be reversed.

Transnational Social Movements in the Hypermedia Environment

The second area where distributional changes are occurring that are serving to "unbundle" the modern world order paradigm is the rise of transnational social movements with multiple, overlapping, and often competing interests. These new movements represent the emergence of what Lipschutz has called a "global civil society": that is, transnationally organized political networks and interest groups largely autonomous from any one state's control. ₁₃₁   In ways that are similar to the transnationalization of production and finance outlined above, the rise of a global civil society presents fundamental challenges to the modern world order paradigm by diffusing a dense network of social and interest-group activities across territorial-political boundaries. Although hypermedia do not generate these new social movements, they do create a communications environment in which such activities flourish dramatically. As computer networks have grown, transnational social movements have exploded, forming complex nonterritorial based links that defy the organization of political authority in the modern world order.

To some extent, there have always been social movements throughout modernity whose interests transcend political boundaries. A good example, outlined by Nadelmann, is the nineteenth-century anti-slavery campaign initiated by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. ₁₃₂   Founded in 1839, the Society lobbied to abolish slavery around the world, calling international conventions and mass meetings and circulating petitions and propaganda to elites in foreign countries. It prompted the creation of similarly dedicated movements in France, the United States, Brazil, and elsewhere, and helped build a global prohibition regime against the slave trade. ₁₃₃   Religious organizations--like the Quakers, or in more recent decades, Christian and Islamic fundamentalists--also typically have framed their movements' aspirations and interests in universalist terms, beyond the boundaries of modern sovereign states. However, both the constraints of the existing communications environment, coupled with an overriding belief in the legitimacy of sovereign nonintervention, limited the scope of such transnational social movements to a few exceptional cases. ₁₃₄  

The growth in density of transnational social forces occurred during the twentieth century, arising mostly out of the industrialized Western states where a "pluralization" space was opened up by the expansion of an educated middle class motivated by broad liberal-democratic principles of human rights and social activism, and strategically placed to fill a vacuum left by the "crisis" and retreat of the national-welfare state. ₁₃₅   These movements continued to grow, and by the 1980s they were becoming a common feature of the world political landscape (though one that was generally overlooked by traditional International Relations theorists). For example, human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) alone increased from 38 in 1950, to 72 in 1960, to 103 in 1970, to 138 in 1980, to 275 by 1990. ₁₃₆   The Union of International Associations now recognizes some 14,500 international NGOs. ₁₃₇   Their visibility in a wide variety of international forums and conventions, and their growing influence on both international and domestic policy, make them hard to ignore. ₁₃₈   As an illustration of the growing importance of some of these groups, NGOs provided $8.3 billion in aid to developing countries in 1992--13 percent of development assistance worldwide. ₁₃₉  

The movements that together make up this emerging global civil society are not homogenous in their orientation or organization, but rather consist of a multiplicity of "heteronomous" networks of political associations. ₁₄₀   The causes around which these movements are formed are equally varied. Examples are numerous and include groups in issue-areas such as the environment (e.g. Greenpeace or Earth First!), human rights (e.g. Amnesty International), indigenous peoples' networks, gay and lesbian movements, and women's rights associations. As Spiro notes, "Environmentalists, human rights advocates, women, children, animal rights advocates, consumers, the disabled, gays, and indigenous peoples have all gone international." ₁₄₁  

The majority of these transnational social movements do not operate through the traditional lobbying procedures and political channels of participation as defined by state structures. ₁₄₂   Most of them cannot be characterized as political parties campaigning for government office. Indeed, their very importance as a challenge to the modern world order paradigm lies in their willingness to sidestep traditional political structures and sovereign boundaries "to address international problems, and to reflect a global sensitivity." ₁₄₃   They are "decentered, local actors, that cross the reified boundaries of space as though they were not there," ₁₄₄   seeking to organize activities, and educate and motivate populations directly. The rise in the visibility and density of these transnational social movements cannot be divorced from the communications technologies that have empowered them. ₁₄₅   As Spiro notes, "this explosion in nongovernmental activity reflects the dramatically heightened permeability of national borders and improvements in communications that have allowed territorially dispersed individuals to develop common agendas and objectives at the international level." ₁₄₆  

Although telephones and faxes have long been staples for international coordination, it has been computer networks--and in particular the Internet--that have vastly transformed the scope and potential of these transnational movements. In fact, transnational environmental groups were among the first to realize the potential of the early computer networks as facilitators of their organization. EcoNet, for example, was formed in 1982--long before the popularity of the Internet--and now spans over 70 countries. Rittner describes the types of activities that take place over EcoNet:

Hundreds of environmentally concerned organizations and individuals use EcoNet in a variety of ways. EcoNet members arrange local, regional, national, and international conferences. Environmental groups regularly post alerts requesting letter-writing campaigns and information. Environmental organizations post electronic newsletters for downloading or reading online. Other organizations download posted articles for their own newsletters. Grant information is available online, and you can read press and news releases. An online version of the National Wildlife Federation's Conservation Directory lists virtually every environmental organization in North America. Frequent news contributors include the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the center for Conservation Biology at Stanford, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Greenpeace. 147

Today, EcoNet is only one part of a vast web of networks operating through the Internet and linked together under the broad umbrella called the Association for Progressive Communications (APC). The APC is a nonprofit consortium of 16 international member networks serving approximately 40,000 individuals and NGOs in 133 countries. ₁₄₈   According to Sallin, it is "the most extensive global computer networking system dedicated to social and environmental issues." ₁₄₉   The member networks comprising the APC include Alternex (Brazil); GreenNet (England); Nicaro (Nicaragua); NordNet (Sweden); Pegasus (Australia); Web (Canada); Comlink (Germany); GlasNet (Russia); Equanex (Ecuador); Chasque (Uruguay); SangoNet (South Africa); Wamani (Argentina); GLUK (Ukraine); Histria (Slovenia); and LaNeta (Mexico). ₁₅₀   One of the larger members of the APC network is the U.S.-based Institute for Global Communications (IGC), which itself is an umbrella organization encompassing a wide variety of social and environmental movements, subdivided into five main specialty networks: EcoNet, PeaceNet, ConflictNet, WomensNet, and LaborNet. ₁₅₁   Together, these linked networks share enormous databases containing everything from government department phone numbers and addresses to scientific studies to calenders of events to various government regulations and accords, all hyper-linked and searchable by keyword. More than eighty "alternative" news and information services are available through the APC, including the Third World InterPress Service, the UN information service, and Greenpeace News. ₁₅₂   Members engage in electronic conferences, communicate directly through electronic mail, and distribute information, including urgent human rights or environmental violations. Underlining the increasing importance of these activist networks to global governance, the APC was the primary provider of telecommunications for NGOs and UN delegates to the UN-sponsored 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the 1994 World Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, and the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing, among others. ₁₅₃   Almost every environmental, human rights, or issue-oriented NGO is now either affiliated with, or can be accessed through, the APC network.

Of course, not included in the formal APC network are the many informal transnational social movements linked through Internet bulletin boards, newsgroups, and mailing lists. For example, Asian democracy activists (and any other potential interested party, for that matter) exchange information through computer mailing lists such as BurmaNet (strider@igc.apc.org); China News Digest (cnd-info@cnd.org); Vietnam (viet-net-info@ media.mit.edu); or Indonesia-L (apakabar@clark.net). Separate USENET newsgroups typically centered on human rights issues can be found in such areas as soc.culture.burma, soc-culture.saudi-arabia, or soc.culture.china. Countless other "private" exchanges take place through regular electronic mail, and in similar discussion groups on private computer networks like Compuserve, Prodigy, and America On-Line.

Perhaps most significantly, World Wide Web home pages have provided an important mode of global publication and dissemination of information for both formal and informal transnational social movements. Thousands of niche political movements from across the political spectrum and from all points of the planet have built a presence of the web. Through this presence, these movements can distribute alternative sources of news and information, maintain a repository of data related to their particular niche interest, or provide an informal hyperlinked gateway to other complementary movements. For example, one World Wide Web site, called WebActive, lists more than 1200 web pages of "activist" groups, ranging from Abolition 2000 (an anti-nuclear activist group based in Oakland, California) to the British-based League Against Cruel Sports to the Tibet Online Resource Gathering. ₁₅₄  

Although computer networks form the vital backbone of transnational social movement communications, their day-to-day activities are complemented by other components of the hypermedia environment as well. For example, Greenpeace (which has more than forty offices in thirty countries) has its own satellite communications link, called "Greenlink," which connects its ships and offices. ₁₅₅   According to one senior official, "Greenlink" is indispensable: "Without it, we could not possibly coordinate the actions we do." ₁₅₆  

Desktop publishing capabilities provide these movements with more effective (and affective) means of distributing pamphlets and newsletters on a grassroots level. In this way, local nodes in global movements can tailor their strategies and messages to match local conditions. Some elements of global civil society rely on the properties of particular components of the hypermedia environment more than others. Consider the use of fax machines and hand-held video cameras by dissident groups to publicize their activities abroad. While the most often cited example is the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing, where radical students were able to reach a global audience through fax machines, these technologies have long been staples in the "Urgent Action" strategies of human rights organizations like Amnesty International, which rely on speedy transmissions to publicize human rights violations to various national and regional centers. ₁₅₇  

Of course, not all of these transnational social forces are working with the same goals in mind, and not all can be said to be working to the betterment of the human condition: such technologies have also facilitated the rise of transborder criminal activities, including pornographic distribution systems, terrorist activities, and the money-laundering schemes of organized crime. ₁₅₈   The neo-Nazi movement has been a quite effective exploiter of hypermedia. It has gained a considerable following among younger generations in the United States, Canada, and Europe through the use of computer networks, faxes, video cassettes and other electronic forms of communication. The April 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City focused media attention on the use of computer networks by transnational terrorist organizations and militia movements. The commander of the Michigan Militia, Norman Olson, called the Internet "absolutely vital" to his cause. ₁₅₉   In a search that lasted less than 30 seconds, I was able to acquire from a web-site in Geneva, Switzerland a detailed "Terrorist Handbook" that provides information on the ingredients for and assembling of explosive devices. At the same site, I was also able to acquire a large, detailed document detailing how to go about making an atomic bomb, should I ever wish to do so.

Less important (for the purposes of this study) than the values of these social movements, however, is the extent to which their interests are defined and their actions organized largely without respect to sovereign-territorial boundaries. As Thiele comments, "transnational social movements scramble the distinction between national and international politics that grounds the Westphalian system." ₁₆₀   By moving around and through political boundaries to influence populations, they not only undermine the connection between sovereignty and a territorially defined populace over which the sovereign authority has ultimate jurisdiction, but also challenge the idea central to the modern world order paradigm that the international states system is the legitimate arena where politics across borders takes place. ₁₆₁   This is especially the case with respect to those movements that lobby to enforce the global institutionalization of norms and principles relating to universal human rights--a direct challenge to sovereignty. As Sikkink argues, "human rights policies and practices are contributing to a gradual, significant, and probably irreversible transformation of sovereignty in the modern world"--a shift that "cannot be explained without taking into account the role of transnational nonstate actors." ₁₆₂   The monopoly claims of territorial states over legitimate authority, in other words, are increasingly challenged by global civil society networks that buttress their actions on wider, universalist aspirations. ₁₆₃  

But the question naturally arises: Given the disparate nature of these groups' activities and values, exactly how much political authority and influence can we realistically ascribe to them? Clearly, these movements together do not have the same aggregate structural power as do the global market forces described in the previous section. Most importantly, they lack a common commitment to a shared system of values so important in translating the micro-decisions of individual capitalists into a large-scale structural effect on states. There are likely to be few occasions, for example, when networks of Muslims, gays, neo-Nazis, environmentalists, feminists, and anti-nuclear activists converge in their responses to a single public policy issue. ₁₆₄   However, while they lack the structural power of global market forces, many of them do increasingly have what might be called (borrowing from Michael Mann) "interstitial" power - that is, legitimate influence on the borders and in the margins, over specific issue-areas. ₁₆₅   Certainly the work of Sikkink mentioned above suggests this is the case in the human rights arena, as does Wapner's with respect to the influence of transnational environmental activists on mass ecological sensibilities, multinational corporate behavior, and local empowerment. ₁₆₆   From the perspective of this analysis, we should expect this type of interstitial power among global civil society networks to continue to grow. The aggregate influence of these networks, then, lies not so much in their "structural" effect on individual state policies as in their collective unbundling of authority on the margins, in their "interstitial" influence over disparate public policy issues and mass attitudes.

As with global market forces, however, it is important to be clear that the flourishing of these movements, and the growth of their interstitial power, does not necessarily mean a direct challenge to "the state" per se. Such an "either/or" formulation misses much of the complex inter-relationships between states and transnational social movements. For example, many (though not all) of these movements work alongside states, with active state consent and financial support. And given their typically narrow concerns around particular issue-areas, it is conceptually misguided to judge these movements in terms of whether or not they can substitute for states altogether. None have such grand ambitions. ₁₆₇   Rather, it is in their sheer density and complexity, operating within the "global nonterritorial region" of computer networks, that these movements together present a fundamental challenge to the modern world order paradigm. In other words, the importance of these movements lies not in their potential substitutability for the state, but rather in their collective "unbundling" and "de-territorializing" of political authority and processes of political participation. ₁₆₈  

The Nature of Security in the Hypermedia Environment

The remainder of this chapter examines the nature of security arrangements in the new communications environment. It is important to be clear about the level of analysis at which this examination is directed. Among International Relations theorists, "security" issues are traditionally discussed and examined in an "international" context. Theories of international security generally assume a basic structure--they take for granted the division of political authority into sovereign states, and they theorize about the security relations among those states. From this perspective, the nature of individual domestic security arrangements is an unproblematic "given" that can be assumed away for the purposes of theorizing. However, when structural changes are occurring in the very architecture of world order, a deeper, more fundamental level of analysis is required--one that problematizes what is normally taken for granted.

Consequently, my focus in this section is on the relative "fitness" of alternative "domestic" security arrangements in the new communications environment. ₁₆₉   For heuristic purposes, I will compare two "ideal-type" security arrangements, each of which may be treated as alternative "species" in a changing environment, and each of which represent two fundamentally antithetical modes of organizing security and politics in the world today. Borrowing from Daniel Deudney, I call these two "ideal-type" security arrangements, real-states and negarchies respectively. ₁₇₀   The former--real-states--are characterized by a number of interrelated features, including: a monopoly of violence and coercive capabilities and its concentration in the hands of a distinct organization; a hierarchical form of political organization, in which authority flows downward from a single center and information is tightly controlled and regulated; and a policy orientation toward economic, political, and cultural closure from the outside world--an orientation that arises from the value accorded to self-sufficiency and autonomy. Negarchies, on the other hand, are those security arrangements "in which devices such as balance, separation and mixture serve to limit, check and constrain power, particularly violent and concentrated power." ₁₇₁   Their central ordering principle is "the rule of the negative," in which authority is dispersed and decentralized among multiple power centers, and the free flow of information is encouraged. ₁₇₂   Their policy orientation is toward economic, political, and cultural openness and integration with the outside world.

Of course, actual domestic security arrangements vary in terms of the extent to which they approximate these images or ideal-types. Among existing or recent domestic security arrangements, the states of the former communist bloc and Islamic authoritarian regimes most approximate the real-state. Present-day liberal democracies, on the other hand, most approximate negarchical security arrangements. Of these two ideal-types, real-states are clearly most consistent with the modern world order paradigm. Indeed, to the extent real-states are "favored" in the emerging hypermedia environment (an argument that carries considerable weight with some, as will be shown below), then many of the observations raised earlier in this chapter about fundamental transformation become problematic. Negarchies, on the other hand, while technically not inconsistent with modern world order, would be more amenable to fundamental transformation given their openness to and accommodation of transnational forces, integration, and multiple layers of authority. The question to be explored in the remainder of this chapter, then, is the following: Between these two types of security arrangements, which will likely be favored in the hypermedia environment? To answer this question, I explore a number of security-related dimensions of the hypermedia environment each of which I contend has a functional bias toward negarchies and away from real-states.

Hypermedia and the Real-state: An Electronic Panopticon?

Upon first consideration, it may seem that the properties of hypermedia functionally complement real-states, enabling 1984-like "Big Brother" sur veillance by centralized authorities of subject populations. ₁₇₃   Indeed, among a number of theorists studying electronic surveillance, the arguments raised in support of such a thesis appear to be quite strong. This argument often takes as its basis the image of the electronic Panopticon--originally an eighteenth-century architectural plan for a prison devised by Jeremy Bentham, and later employed by Michel Foucault as a general theory of modern surveillance. ₁₇₄   At the heart of the Panopticon was a system of surveillance whereby through a carefully contrived system of lighting, prisoners would be unable to discern when they were being watched, and control was thus maintained by the constant sense that prisoners were being monitored by unseen eyes. ₁₇₅   Foucault argued that this model of surveillance was not confined to prisons, but had deep metaphysical roots in modern societies as a whole. Though Foucault himself never raised the issue of an electronic Panopticon, many Foucauldian-inspired theorists have attempted to do so, extending the idea of a Panopticon to contemporary state surveillance. The image that is put forth is of a cyberspatial, Weberian "iron cage" in which hypermedia-empowered state bureaucracies penetrate into the most private corners of citizen life.

The evidence gathered in support of these arguments is considerable, detailing the way the manipulation of information through computer databases and the use of electronic monitoring devices facilitate greater state control in such areas as policing, internal revenue, and other far-reaching facets of bureaucratic administration. ₁₇₆   For example, Gary Marx has analyzed the way American undercover police surveillance has been boosted by hypermedia technologies to such an extent that the United States is approaching a "maximum security society." ₁₇₇   Similar observations are made by Stanley Cohen with respect to electronic tagging devices that monitor "freed" criminal offenders. ₁₇₈   Going further, Diana Gordon argues that state computer databases and computer matching techniques have become so sophisticated and penetrating that, while criminals are more easily tracked, "we are all enclosed in an electronic Panopticon." ₁₇₉  

Indeed, the extent to which cross-matching and exchange of personal data has become much easier for government bureaucracies of all sorts in the hypermedia environment is hard to deny, as David Flaherty, Oscar Gandy, and others attest. ₁₈₀   Perhaps the clearest illustration is the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the United States, used primarily to track money laundering activities. ₁₈₁   FinCEN monitors large financial transactions, and through powerful artificial intelligence computer programs, compares such transactions with government, private, and foreign computer databases, and then with "profiles" of typical financial criminal activities. Through this process, results are obtained that "flag" certain transactions as potentially criminal. Similar systems have been set up in other countries, who now share data with each other and with Interpol. ₁₈₂   While there can be little doubt that the hypermedia environment enhances bureaucratic surveillance along the lines outlined above, do such trends favor the real-state? Do they signal the rise of an electronic Big Brother?

As a number of critics have pointed out, the most serious flaw in these analyses is their tendency to put forth a distorted image of contemporary surveillance that ignores other countervailing pressures and trends that suggest real-states are actually disadvantaged in the hypermedia environment. As Lyon aptly put it, "surveillance theory is dominated by models and metaphors deriving from the modern era" and "Cartesian obsessions with 'gaze.' ₁₈₃  " All forms of surveillance are collapsed into a single privileged center. The "state" becomes the equivalent of the guard in the panoptic tower, which according to Foucault, has the power of "permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisible." ₁₈₄   While from one perspective this does indeed appear to be the case insofar as government departments have been able to exploit hypermedia technologies to improve forms of bureaucratic surveillance, from other perspectives it appears to be merely a misapplied metaphor.

First, while governments are able to track and monitor individuals with greater ease in the hypermedia environment, they are less able to control the flow of information, or at least prevent individuals from having access to certain types of information. As Neuman explains, "The special character of the new media is that they can as easily be extended horizontally (among individuals and groups) as vertically (in the more traditional connection between the centralized authorities and the mass populace)." ₁₈₅   The new technologies of hypermedia communications are smaller, more mobile, more amorphous, and thus less easy to track and contain. Consider mobile personal digital assistants--small pocket-sized devices that now allow wireless two-way communication of digital information through credit-card sized modems. ₁₈₆   As these devices are linked into LEO satellites, such as those of the planned Iridium system, it will be nearly impossible for authorities to prevent communications from going in and out of their country. Perhaps the best example is portable satellite dishes--now as small as 18 inches in diameter--that provide links to satellite broadcasts for even the remotest of regions. Even though Iran has banned satellite dishes (which sell in the black market for as little as $400) an estimated 200,000 homes still receive television programs by satellite. ₁₈₇   In Colombia, when the government ordered its 300,000 dish owners to register, only 100 complied. ₁₈₈   In China, even though private ownership of satellite dishes was banned in 1990, it was reported in early 1994 that about 11 million households owned dishes, with around 30 million people being able to receive Rupert Murdoch's Star TV either through direct satellite reception or by cable relay. ₁₈₉   Elsewhere in Asia, where states have long maintained strict government controls over national broadcasting and in some cases, like Singapore and Malaysia, have banned satellite dishes altogether, many are now realizing the futility of their policies and reversing course. As Lee and Wang point out, the loss of advertising revenues and audiences from state-run television to illicit satellite broadcasts has forced regulatory changes to allow more competition in Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, and South Korea. ₁₉₀   In India, the state-run Doordashan channel took similar measures, offering five new channels to independent producers after facing competition from Star TV. ₁₉₁  

These control problems are only further exacerbated by changes in the economic sphere as outlined earlier in the chapter. As structural pressures are put on real-states to conform to liberal economic policies and allow the penetration of foreign investment from transnational corporations, it becomes increasingly difficult for these states to keep a "firewall" between information intended purely for economic reasons and other broader forms of social and political communication. This is especially the case as more transnational commerce takes place over the seamless webs of computer networks. Digital information is moved through these networks by a system called "packet-switching," which breaks transmissions down into a series of units and sends them along independent channels to the transmission destination. ₁₉₂   Even if a state chose to monitor such transmissions it would be an incredibly costly and difficult task, especially as encryption technologies and remailing systems allow virtual anonymity and security of communications. ₁₉₃   Real-states that hope to attract foreign investment must grapple with the risks of providing a globally networked communications environment on the one hand, while sifting out any politically sensitive information on the other. Such a strategy can be maintained in the short run, but both the technological constraints and economic costs of doing so are high. These contradictory forces are likely to be most pronounced in the coming decades in such states as Singapore, where liberalizing measures have been made in the economic sphere, and where a sophisticated information technology environment has been promoted by the state to attract investment (the "intelligent island"), while centralized control over information is vigorously maintained. ₁₉₄  

These types of control constraints associated with the properties of the hypermedia environment may help to shed new light on the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. ₁₉₅   As the central government attempted to break-up or "restructure" the economic command system and adopt modern computing and communication technologies in several advanced industrial sectors, they invariably lost centralized control over other forms of communication as well. The turning point came during the August 1991 coup attempt, when central authorities found they could no longer contain the spread of information both within and beyond their borders. Shane comments that by the time of the coup, "Fax machines and photocopiers, video recorders and personal computers outside the government were no longer exotica but a sprawling, living nervous system that linked the Russian political opposition, the republican independence movement, and the burgeoning private sector." ₁₉₆   Messages from Boris Yeltsin and others circulated through Compuserve, the "GlasNet" system, and through discussion groups on the Internet. ₁₉₇   Soviet reporters filed their stories over local lines to a cultural institute in Estonia, which had a computer link with PeaceNet in Sweden; that link forwarded the messages to six other computer networks around the world. ₁₉₈   Within the Soviet Union, airwaves were saturated with opposition viewpoints, and thousands of Muscovites were able to receive CNN television images intended for the microwave relay that served the Kremlin, the Foreign Ministry, and some hotels. When Yeltsin climbed on the tank to defy the coup, "His image went to thousands of Muscovites via CNN, his words to more thousands via photocopied leaflets and the White House radio station, prompting thousands more to join the protest." ₁₉₉  

A second reason to be wary of the "panoptic" metaphor is that in focusing only on the enhanced surveillance capacity of the state, it overlooks the way transparency in general has been raised in the hypermedia environment to such an extent that states themselves are caught in a surveillance web. In other words, rather than a single "gaze," the hypermedia environment has dispersed and decentralized the centers of surveillance to a much wider domain. Evidence of this dispersal can be found in the many forms of private surveillance emerging, ranging all the way from large-scale, commercial data-gathering enterprises, to security cameras in local shops, malls, and banks, to tiny hand-held video cameras. The latter are selling at a rate of 2.5 million per year in what has been referred to as the "democratization of surveillance." ₂₀₀   The Rodney King beating of March 1991 illustrated the potential power of these private camcorders as they filter into the hands of many more people. The beating was inadvertently captured by George Halliday's Sony minicam. Halliday sent his tape to a local television station, which then forwarded the tape to CNN. Within a day, the tape had been broadcast to a global audience. ₂₀₁   So prevalent are these mini-sites of surveillance, that news organizations now actually encourage, and sometimes rely on "amateur videos" to capture news items. ₂₀₂  

This dispersal of centers of surveillance has meant that there are many more "eyes" watching multiple, intersecting sites--many of which converge on states themselves. Today, governments and politicians find themselves under an intense scrutiny by an ever-expanding "pool of watchers" both "internal" and "external" to the state itself. Not only do these include the proliferating global news organizations, like CNN or the BBC, but also local television stations, investigative journalists, and talk television and radio shows, all of which are growing exponentially with the increase in distributional systems. Adding to these dispersed centers of surveillance are the burgeoning transnational social movements described earlier in this chapter, many of which now operate and thrive in the nonterritorial regions of computer networks. In Spiro's words, these nongovernmental organizations monitor "compliance as a sort of new world police force." ₂₀₃   Alarm bells rung by watchdog groups like Amnesty International now spread rapidly through hypermedia currents, putting into global focus state behavior that deviates from widely accepted norms. ₂₀₄   Additionally, the two-way, interactive nature of hypermedia has increased the potential not only for direct citizen feedback and participation in political processes, but also for the monitoring of government actions through databases, computer network discussion groups, and World-Wide Web home page modes of dissemination. One glance at some of the USENET groups indicates a wide variety of unmediated discussions on such topics as alt.politics.clinton, talk.politics.medicine, soc.rights.human, or alt.politics.datahighway. ₂₀₅   The combined effect of all of these dispersed centers of surveillance, as one Economist survey put it, is that instead of "Big Brother watching you," "Big Brother is you, watching." ₂₀₆  

The Emergence of Planetary Surveillance

One component of this dispersed surveillance web likely to have a significant influence on the nature of macro-security in the postmodern world order is the rise of planetary surveillance from space. The first space-based reconnaissance systems were an outgrowth of U.S. and Soviet military research and development in the 1950s. ₂₀₇   Although reconnaissance has always been an important ingredient of military operations, it was not until after World War II, with developments in optics, electronics, and ballistic missile technology, that serious consideration could be given to the idea of a space-based reconnaissance platform. By 1960, both the United States and the Soviet Union had operational satellite reconnaissance systems taking photographs of military installations on the earth below. The development fundamentally altered the scope of geopolitical strategy: the entire planet itself had now become the focus of constant superpower military surveillance. ₂₀₈  

The systems were highly guarded secrets--among the most sensitive of all military operations. Beginning in the 1970s, however, other nonmilitary organizations began to emerge that also shared an interest in planetary surveillance. Environmental and commercial satellite reconnaissance systems--such as the American LANDSAT and the French SPOT systems--were launched to provide data for environment researchers, urban planners, and other commercial interests. However, as long as the Cold War persisted, political barriers stood in the way of the dissemination of sophisticated technologies, and as a consequence the use of these systems remained limited. ₂₀₉   For many years while most of the world's familiarity with satellite reconnaissance was confined to the meteorological images displayed on nightly weather forecasts, the superpowers maintained a monopoly on a vastly superior technology.

Once the Cold War effectively ended, however, these political barriers dissolved. Satellite reconnaissance systems began to proliferate beyond the U.S./Soviet monopoly. Some of this proliferation has been in the form of national and regional military developments, such as the Western European Union's Helios satellite, the Indian IRS-series, or the Israeli Offeq-series of satellites. ₂₁₀   Other systems have proliferated as a result of a relaxation of superpower secrecy policies. Private companies in the United States, for example, have entered into agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Spain, and South Korea for the development of high-resolution reconnaissance satellites. ₂₁₁   Also significant has been the sharing of data by the United States and Russia with multilateral arms control organizations. Specifically, highly sophisticated U.S. imagery has been used by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its inspections and surveillance of Iraq and North Korea, while both U-2 aerial and satellite reconnaissance imagery were used during the United Nations Security Council Observer Mission in Iraq. ₂₁₂   Proposals to integrate formally satellite reconnaissance systems into the operations of multilateral arms control operations have been made in recent years. ₂₁₃   Even more significant has been the commercialization of U.S. and Russian imagery. (See figure 3.) Today, anyone with $3000 can purchase high-resolution Russian imagery of virtually any spot on the planet. ₂₁₄   Citing the Russian competition, U.S. corporations lobbied successfully to undo U.S. national-security restrictions against the dissemination of high-resolution imagery. ₂₁₅   Over the next few years, several U.S.-based private firms will begin sales of high-resolution images of any point of the earth to anyone who has the money to pay for them. ₂₁₆  

Perhaps the most important long-term trend, however, is the growth of environmentally dedicated satellite reconnaissance systems. ₂₁₇   Although there are a variety of national programs (e.g., the Canadian SPAR-satellite, the Indian IRS, and the Japanese JERS), the most significant are the multinational programs currently in development which entail large-scale, globally organized earth-observation activities. By far the most ambitious of these is the planned Earth Observing System (EOS)--a multiyear $8 billion NASA-directed initiative to study the earth's biosphere. ₂₁₈   EOS will entail two orbiting space platforms plus a series of LEO satellites that will continually monitor the entire surface of the planet in a variety of spectral modes. The imagery and data produced by the EOS, and other similar systems, will be distributed widely to researchers and organizations around the world. What makes these systems so significant is that they likely will remain permanent features of global environmental governance well into the future. As one environmental researcher put it, "electronic and optical technologies of every kind will underpin what will ultimately be a vast orbiting and terrestrial infrastructure for monitoring and modelling the global climate and environment." ₂₁₉  

While each of these systems may be oriented to specific missions, their most important long-term effect may lie in their unintended contribution to world order transformation. Today, the entire planet is under constant surveillance from a wide variety of national, regional, and multilateral organizations. Widely dispersed military, environmental, and commercial satellites now wrap the earth in a continuously orbiting web. Under this increasingly transparent environment, few large-scale activities will escape the notice of others around the world. The preconditions for surprise that in the past often led to security-dilemma situations are thus drastically reduced. ₂₂₀   Moreover, existing real-states are placed in spotlight from which they cannot hide, as evidenced by the present surveillance grid imposed on Iraq and North Korea. Such an environment clearly favors those security arrangements, like negarchies, that are open to the outside world while disadvantaging those, like real-states, that are premised on closure. While satellite reconnaissance systems may have originally been deployed by national military organizations, in the long run they may have the unanticipated effect of displacing the focus of security from an international to an intraplanetary level. In conjunction with the other properties of the hypermedia environment described earlier in this section, planetary surveillance will place considerable technological and political constraints on the viability of real-states.

In this chapter, I sketched out several distributional consequences that are occurring as a result of the hypermedia environment. Of these, the most important are the flourishing of complex transnational production arrangements and global financial markets, which together are creating an increasingly intense web of constraints on the macroeconomic and general public policies available to individual states. It is important to emphasize that these social forces represent more than just an qualitative increase in the amount of flows across borders. They represent an emerging political authority with a right to set the "rules of the game"--a right that is evidenced by the way states around the world have increasingly adopted almost en masse policies of deregulation, trade liberalization, and privatization; the way public policy arguments are increasingly framed in terms of the logic of the market; and by the deferment among state elites to credit and bond rating agencies--to "private makers of global public policy." ₂₂₁  

A third distributional change that I examined in this chapter was the rise of "global civil society networks"--environmental, peace, labor, and feminist activists, among others. Although these heteronomous groups lack a shared set of common values and thus are unable to wield the same type of structural power as global market forces, they are able to influence politics and values "interstitially," through the margins and on the borders, working within and across states. In their sheer density and complexity across a wide spectrum of issue-areas, and in their willingness to bypass traditional state structures to influence and motivate populations directly, they challenge the architecture of political authority in the modern world. Lastly, I argued that the widely dispersed, mutual surveillance properties of the hypermedia environment place considerable constraints on the viability of real-state security arrangements. Combined with the global market forces described above, the properties of the hypermedia environment favor those domestic security arrangements that are premised on decentralization, integration, and openness with the outside world. On this basis, we should expect trends toward the adoption of broadly liberal-republican, or "negarchical," state-security structures to continue.

Taken together, what consequences do these distributional changes have for world order? First, they challenge longstanding preconceptions about the nature of economic, social, and political organization that undergirded the modern world order paradigm. As many of these activities now take place through the nonterritorial regions of computer networks, they undermine taken-for-granted preconceptions about the "natural" order of political authority--the subordination of economics to politics, the principle of sovereign nonintervention, and the spatial boundedness of communities. In many respects, a "space of flows" is coming to dominate and transcend a "space of places" as the defining characteristic of postmodern world order.

A second discernible transformation is the emergence of multiple and overlapping layers of political authority. This is evidenced by both the ever-increasing webs of global governance in the economic sphere, as well as the rise of a global civil society composed of heteronomous networks of transnational social movements. The result is that any one sovereign state now finds itself enmeshed in a vast network of political arrangements, ranging from formal international organizations to informal governing bodies to nongovernmental organizations. These new layers of political authority establish deep institutional precedents both "above" and "below" states that cannot easily be reversed.

Amidst these wider changes, the purpose and forms of states themselves are being transformed. Although it would be conceptually misguided to portray these transformations as the "withering away" of the state (a topic I will discuss at some length in the concluding chapter), the state, as Spiro aptly put it, is "not what it used to be." ₂₂₂   Perhaps the best way to characterize this transformation is that states are evolving from "container" to "transmission-belt" organizations designed to facilitate flows of information and capital, transnational social movements, and multiple and overlapping layers of authority. ₂₂₃   While there is enough cultural and historical diversity among states to ensure a variety of separate trajectories within this process, nearly all states have taken similar liberalizing measures in response primarily to the structural pressures of global market forces. These economic pressures are, in turn, complemented by changes in the security sphere, as the general increase in transparency and a dispersal of the centers of surveillance creates a communications environment in which real-states are significantly disadvantaged while negarchies flourish. While these distributional changes are restructuring the architecture of political authority, the changes to social epistemology explored in the next chapter will provide the crucial "metaphysical" underpinnings for an emerging postmodern world order.

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Note 1: See Ruggie, "Territoriality"; and Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty. Back.

Note 2: See especially Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973), Part Three: National Power; and Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It." Back.

Note 3: Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations," p. 221. Back.

Note 4: Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Back.

Note 5: See Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vols. 1-3; Baran, The Political Economy of Growth; and Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment. Back.

Note 6: Part of this is related to the "nature" of capital throughout the modern world order period, which has primarily been fixed and/or concentrated within specific geographic regions making it more "captive" to state regulations and taxes. See chapter 2, "From Captive Capital to Quicksilver Capital," in Richard B. McKenzie and Dwight R. Lee, Quicksilver Capital: How the Rapid Movement of Wealth Has Changed the World (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 17-34. Back.

Note 7: See Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment," Review of International Studies 15 (1989): 183-198. Back.

Note 8: Joel Kurtzman, The Death of Money: How the Electronic Economy has Destabilized the World's Markets and Created Financial Chaos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), p. 207. Back.

Note 9: For a historical overview of these longterm processes, see Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple." Back.

Note 10: See Ibid., p. 81. Back.

Note 11: Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 11. Back.

Note 12: For criticism of "rationalactor" models along these lines, see Ulrich Witt, Explaining Process and Change: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992). Back.

Note 13: Peter Dicken, "The Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography--GlobalLocal Tensions: Firms and States in the Global SpaceEconomy," Economic Geography (1994), p. 111; For a more detailed treatment, see Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1982). Back.

Note 14: Kevin Morgan, "Digital Highways: the New Telecommunications Era," Geoforum 23, no. 3 (1992): 319. Back.

Note 15: McKenzie and Lee, Quicksilver Capital, p. 11. Back.

Note 16: Mark Hepworth, Geography of the Information Economy (London: Belhaven Press, 1989), p. 94. Back.

Note 17: See Morgan, "Digital Highways," p. 326; See also, Paul Taylor, "First the Internet: Now the Intranet Phenomenon," Financial Times (April 3, 1996) for many more examples of Intranets in business. Back.

Note 18: See "Rolls Royce Introduces Electronic Commercie Solutions," Electronic Information Commerce Resource News (May 1996), online at: http://www.yearx.co.uk/ec/zzapr96.htm#rolls. Back.

Note 19: Zacher, Governing Global Networks; Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power"; and Cowhey, "The International Telecommunications Regime." Back.

Note 20: Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), p. 8. Back.

Note 21: Hepworth, Geography of the Information Economy, p. 94; See also, Peter Dicken, Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity, 2nd ed. (New York: Paul Chapman, 1992), figure 7.1 for a breakdown of the "production chain." Back.

Note 22: Harvey S. James, Jr. and Murray Weidenbaum, When Businesses Cross International Boundaries: Strategic Alliances and Their Alternatives (London: Praeger, 1993), p. 49; See also, Amy Borrus, "The Stateless Corporations," Business Week (May 14, 1990): 101. Back.

Note 23: McKenzie and Lee, Quicksilver Capital, pp. 51-52; Ruggie, "Territoriality," p. 141; See also Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanaugh, "Creating a level playing field," Technology Review (MayJune 1994), pp. 46-54, who give a number of examples of transnational "backroom" processing centers. Back.

Note 24: For an excellent, comprehensive overview, see James and Weidenbaum, When Businesses Cross International Borders. Back.

Note 25: Ibid., p. 63. Back.

Note 26: Ibid. Back.

Note 27: See Paul Taylor, "As Costs Fall, Corporate Interest Rises Rapidly, " Financial Times (April 3, 1996) for an overview of the falling costs and rising popularity of videoconferencing among large global multinational corporations. Back.

Note 28: See Lee Sproull and Sara Kiesler, "Computers, Networks, and Work," Scientific American (September 1991): 116-123. Back.

Note 29: For a discussion of "justintime" production, see Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, pp. 147-173; and Richard Meegan, "A Crisis of Mass Production," in John Allen and Doreen Massey, eds., The Economy in Question (London: Sage Publications, 1988), pp. 136-183. Back.

Note 30: For discussion, see Thomas A. Stewart, "Boom Time on the New Frontier," Fortune (Autumn 1993); For "Domilink," see Peter H. Lewis, "Trying to Find Gold with the Internet," New York Times (January 3, 1995); See also Robin Mansell, "European Telecommunication, Multinational Enterprises, and the Implication of 'Globalization,' " International Journal of Political Economy Back.

Note 31: See Thomas W. Malone and John F. Rockart, "Computers, Networks and the Corporation," Scientific American (September 1991): 128-136 for a discussion of supplierclient coordination, especially for the role of scanned bar codes. Back.

Note 32: James and Weidenbaum, When Businesses Cross Borders, p. 67. Back.

Note 33: Ibid. Back.

Note 34: Ibid., p. 77. Back.

Note 35: Ibid., p. 85. Back.

Note 36: Richard A. Bitzinger, "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge," International Security 19, no. 4, Fall (1994): 182. Back.

Note 37: Ibid., p. 188; See also Molina, The Social Basis of the Microelectronics Revolution, pp. 107-132. Back.

Note 38: Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1989), p. 9. Back.

Note 39: For a representative position, see Benjamin Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld," The Atlantic 269, no. 3 (March 1992). Back.

Note 40: For examples, see Bartlett and Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders; C. K. Prahalad, and Y. Doz, The Multinational Mission: Balancing Local Demands and Global Vision (New York: The Free Press, 1987); and Samuel Humes, Managing the Multinational: Confronting the GlobalLocal Dilemma (New York: PrenticeHall, 1993). Back.

Note 41: See Ohmae, Borderless World, p. 9. Back.

Note 42: On consumer surveillance in postindustrial societies, see Oscar Gandy, The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), especially chapter 4. Back.

Note 43: James and Weidenbaum, When Businesses Cross Borders, pp. 41-42. Back.

Note 44: See Peter H. Lewis, "Trying to Find Gold with the Internet," New York Times (January 3, 1995); and Peter H. Lewis, "Companies Rush to Set up Shop in Cyberspace," New York Times (November 2, 1994). Back.

Note 45: See Adam Bryant, "Am I Bid Six? Click to Bid Six," New York Times (May 13, 1996) for the reference to the "cyberspace bazaar." Back.

Note 46: See Peter H. Lewis, "Attention Internet Shoppers: ECash is Here," New York Times (October 19, 1994); "Bank OKs Internet Payment," Associated PressClarinet (May 8, 1995). Back.

Note 47: Personal Interview, Herbert I. Phillips, Jr., VicePresident, Strategic Solutions, Royal Bank of Canada, January 12, 1995; See also, John Markoff, "A Credit Card for OnLine Sprees," New York Times (October 15, 1994); Lawrence M. Fisher, "Microsoft and Visa in Software Deal," New York Times (November 9, 1994); Saul Hansell, "Mastercard to Develop OnLine Standard," New York Times (January 10, 1995); Kelley Holland and Amy Cortese, "The Future of Money," Business Week (June 12, 1995); and Larry Donovan, "Software to Make Signatures Secure Could Prove Boom," The Globe and Mail (November 14, 1995). Back.

Note 48: The most exhaustive survey is found in James and Weidenbaum, When Businesses Cross International Borders. Back.

Note 49: For criticism along these lines, see Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, "The Problem of 'Globalization': International Economic Relations, National Economic Management, and the Formation of Trading Blocs," Economy and Society 21, no. 4 (November 1992). Back.

Note 50: James and Weidenbaum, When Businesses Cross International Borders, p. 3; See also United Nations, World Investment Report, 1994, p. 143. Back.

Note 51: Hepworth, Geography of the Information Economy, p. 95. Back.

Note 52: Ruggie, "Territoriality," p. 142; See also, John Gerard Ruggie, "Unraveling Trade: Institutional Change and the World Economy," (Paper Prepared for the Roundtable on Fair Trade, Harmonization, Level Playing Fields and the World Trading System: Economic, Political, and International Legal Questions for the 1990s, Columbia University, January 10, 1992). Back.

Note 53: See William J. Drake and Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: 'Trade in Services' and the Uruguay Round," International Organization 46 (Winter 1992): 37. Back.

Note 54: This is a point Dicken makes in "The Roepke Lecture," p. 109. Back.

Note 55: James and Weidenbaum, When Businesses Cross International Borders, p. 52; These flows tailed off slightly in the first two years of the 1990s due to worldwide recession, but have recently begun to pick up pace again. UN, World Investment Report, 1994, p. 17. Back.

Note 56: Globalization and Liberalization: Development in the Face of Two Powerful Currents (UNCTAD Report TD/366/Rev.1, December 1995). By extension, then, only onethird of the world trade in goods in services is still accounted for by traditional "armslength" transactions. Back.

Note 57: UNCTAD Press Release, 13 September 1996. Back.

Note 58: Ibid. Back.

Note 59: Dicken, "The Roepke Lectures," pp. 109-110. Back.

Note 60: On "geographic inequalities" in general, see Andrew Gillespie and Kevin Robbins, "Geographical Inequalities: The Spatial Bias of the New Com Back.

Note 61: Dicken, "The Roepke Lectures," p. 110; See also, Hirst and Thompson, "The Problem of 'Globalization'," pp. 368-369. Back.

Note 62: See Barnet and Cavanaugh, "Creating a Level Playing Field." Back.

Note 63: John M. Stopford and Susan Strange (with John S. Henley), Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 40. Back.

Note 64: Ibid., pp. 40-41. Back.

Note 65: Ibid., p. 41. Back.

Note 66: Mark Hepworth, "Information Technology and the Global Restructuring of Capital Markets," in Stanley D. Brunn and Thomas R. Leinbach, eds., Collapsing Space and Time: Geographic Aspects of Communications and Information (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 132. Back.

Note 67: See Charles Kindleberger, International Capital Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Fred Hirsch, Money International (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967). Back.

Note 68: This evolutionary trend is adapted from Ron Martin, "Stateless Monies, Global Financial Integration and National Economic Autonomy: the End of Geography?" in Stuart Corbridge, Nigel Thrift, and Ron Martin, eds., Money, Power and Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 255. Back.

Note 69: Ibid., p. 255. Back.

Note 70: Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, pp. 308-309. Back.

Note 71: Stephen Gill, "Economic Globalization and the Internationalization of Authority: Limits and Contradictions," Geoforum 23, no. 3 (1992): 273. Back.

Note 72: Ibid.; See also, Eric Helleiner, "From Bretton Woods to Global Finance: A World Turned Upside Down," in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, eds., Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994), pp. 163-165; and Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994). Back.

Note 73: Susan Strange, "Finance, Information, and Power," Review of International Studies 16 (1990): 260. Back.

Note 74: David M. Andrews, "Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Towards a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations," International Studies Quarterly 38 (1994): 198. Back.

Note 75: Bryant writes that "The technological nonpolicy factors were so powerful, I believe, that they would have caused a progressive internationalization of financial activity even without changes in government separation fences and the inducement of differing regulatory, tax, and supervisory systems. But I also conjecture that governmentpolicy changes were important enough to have Back.

Note 76: John Langdale, "Electronic Funds Transfer and the Internationalisation of the Banking and Finance Industry," Geoforum 16, no. 1 (1985): 2. Back.

Note 77: Geoffrey Ingham, "States and Markets in the Production of World Money: Sterling and the Dollar," in Corbridge et al., Money, Power, and Space, p. 45. Back.

Note 78: Susan Strange, "From Bretton Woods to the Casino Economy," in Corbridge et el., Money, Power, and Space, p. 58; See also Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). Back.

Note 79: Gill, "Economic Globalization," p. 274. Back.

Note 80: See Richard O'Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (London: Pinter, 1992), p. 18; See also, Kurtzman, The Death of Money, p. 51. Back.

Note 81: Kurtzman, The Death of Money, p. 51. Back.

Note 82: Ibid. Back.

Note 83: Strange, Casino Capitalism. Back.

Note 84: For a useful, short summary, see Strange, "From Bretton Woods to the Casino Economy," pp. 58-59. Back.

Note 85: For a "Gramscian" view of the hegemony of the neoliberal movement, see especially Stephen Gill and David Law, Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989): 475-499; and Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Back.

Note 86: P. W. Daniels, "Internationalization, telecommunications, and metropolitan development: the role of producer services," in Stanley D. Brunn and Thomas R. Leinbach, eds., Collapsing Space and Time: Geographic Aspects of communications and information (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 160; See also Kurtzman, The Death of Money, pp. 44-46 for an overview of the history of Reuters in the financial sector. Back.

Note 87: Harry Scarbrough, "Introduction," in Harry Scarbrough, ed., The IT Challenge: IT and Strategy in Financial Services (New York: Prentice Hall, 1992), pp. 1-2. Back.

Note 88: See Kurtzman, The Death of Money, pp. 170-171; Personal interview, Herbert I. Phillipps, VicePresident, Strategic Solutions, Royal Bank of Canada. Back.

Note 88:  See Kurtzman, The Death of Money, pp. 170-171; Personal interview, Herbert I. Phillipps, VicePresident, Strategic Solutions, Royal Bank of Canada. Back.

Note 89:  See Black, "A Sobering Look at Cyberspace." Black cites the following website as the source for this information: http://www.bankamerica.com/batoday/bacfacts.html. Back.

Note 90:  As cited in O'Brien, Global Financial Integration, p. 9. Back.

Note 91:  Personal Interview, Herbert I. Phillips, VicePresident, Strategic Solutions, Royal Bank of Canada, January 13, 1995. Back.

Note 92:  Hepworth, Geography of the Information Economy, pp. 171-172; On Globex, see "The Screen Is the future, Master," The Economist (October 24, 1992): 85-86; See also, Hepworth, "Information Technology and the Global Restructuring of Capital Markets," pp. 138-139; On "private" trading "clubs" and other electronic stock markets, see Kurtzman, The Death of Money, pp. 36-37. Back.

Note 93:  See Andrew Allentuck, "Financial Services That Delight, Amaze," The Globe and Mail (November 14, 1995). Back.

Note 94:  Nigel Thrift and Andrew Leyshon, "A phantom state? The detraditionalization of money, the international financial system and international financial centres," Political Geography 13, no. 4, July (1994): 309; See also, Maurice Estabrooks, Programmed Capitalism: A ComputerMediated Global Society (London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988); and Robert X. Cringely, "Fast Money: How Computers Are Used for Trading Securities," Forbes (April 11, 1994). Back.

Note 95:  Mark Hepworth, "Information Technology and the Global Restructuring of Capital Markets," in Brunn and Leinbach, Collapsing Space and Time, pp. 137-138; On "Quotreks," see Kurtzman, The Death of Money, p. 112. Back.

Note 96:  Every year for more than a decade the 300 or so major firms of Wall Street have invested between them about $3.4 billion U.S. in hypermedia--a figure that typically accounts for about 20% of their total outlays. See Kurtzman, The Death of Money, p. 26. Back.

Note 97:  Hepworth, Geography of the Information Economy, pp. 174-175. Back.

Note 98:  For an overview of SWIFT, see Langdale, "Electronic Funds Transfers"; and Black, "A Sobering Look at Cyberspace," particularly part two. Back.

Note 99:  Martin, "The End of Geography?," p. 261. Back.

Note 100: Kurtzman, The Death of Money, p. 109. Back.

Note 101: Daniels, "Internationalization," p. 163. Back.

Note 102: Thrift and Leyshon, "A Phantom State?," p. 311. Back.

Note 103: Kurtzman, The Death of Money, p. 17. Back.

Note 104: Ibid., p. 77. Back.

Note 105: Ruggie, "Territoriality," p. 141. Back.

Note 106: See "Financial Centres: A Survey," The Economist (June 27, 1992); See also, Nigel Thrift, "On the Social and Cultural Determinants of International Financial Centres: the case of the city of London," in Corbridge, et el., Money, Power and Space, pp. 327-355; Ronald L Mitchelson and James O. Wheeler, "The Flow of Information in a Global Economy: The Role of the American Urban System in 1990," Annals of the American Geographer 84, no. 1 (1994): 87, 91, 98; and Castells, The Informational City. The term "finanscape" is Back.

Note 107: Thrift and Leyshon, "A phantom state?," p. 312. Back.

Note 108: Susan Roberts, "Fictitious Capital, Fictitious Spaces: the Geography of Offshore Financial Flows," in Corbridge et al., Money, Power and Space, p. 92. Back.

Note 109: Ruggie, "Territoriality," p. 141. Back.

Note 110: Roberts, "Fictitious Capital, Fictitious Spaces," p. 92. Back.

Note 111: Ibid., p. 92. Back.

Note 112: Martin, "The End of Geography?," p. 259. Back.

Note 113: Roberts, "Fictitious Capital, Fictitious Spaces," p. 94. Back.

Note 114: Ibid., p. 100. Back.

Note 115: Castells, The Informational City. Back.

Note 116: Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty. Back.

Note 117: Robert Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Knopf, 1991). Back.

Note 118: Three outstanding discussions of the way new practices present anomalies to the modern world order paradigm are Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty; Ruggie, "Territoriality"; and Walker, Inside/Outside. Back.

Note 119: Andrew Leyshon, "The Transformation of Regulatory Order: Regulating the Global Economy and Environment," Geoforum 23, no. 3 (1992): 251; Gill and Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital"; J. Goodman and L. Pauly, "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," World Politics 46 (1993): 50-82; Michael Webb, "International Economic Structures, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies," International Organization 45 (1991): 309-342; Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968); and Andrews, "Capital Mobility and State Autonomy." Back.

Note 120: Webb, "International Economic Structures"; See also, Andrews, "Capital Mobility and State Autonomy," for a comprehensive overview. Back.

Note 121: Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). Back.

Note 122: Philip Cerny, "The Deregulation and Reregulation of Financial Markets in a More Open World," in Philip Cerny, ed., Finance and World Politics: Markets, Regimes, and States in the PostHegemonic Era (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1993). Back.

Note 123: "Locational Tournaments" is a term I borrow from Lynn K. Mytelka's talk at the Information Technologies and International Relations symposium, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, January 13, 1995. Back.

Note 124: See Goodman and Pauly, "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls," for a fairly extensive survey. Back.

Note 125: For an interesting account of the role of credit rating agencies as "private makers of global public policy," see Timothy J. Sinclair, "Economic and Financial Analysis Considered as Knowledge Dynamics of Global Governance," (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 1995); and Timothy J. Sinclair, "Between State and Market: Hegemony and Institutions of Collective Action Under Conditions of International Capital Mobility," Policy Sciences, 27 (1994): 447-466. For pressures on the developing countries in this respect, see Thomas J. Biersteker, "The 'Triumph' of Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World: Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in the International Economic Order," in Rosenau and Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government, pp. 102-131. Back.

Note 126: Drew Fagan, "Transnationals fuelling global integration," Globe and Mail, (December 15, 1995). Back.

Note 127: See Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple," pp. 65-67. For "regimes," see Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). For "institutions," see Keohane, "International Institutions." Back.

Note 128: For an overview of "global governance" as used here, see James N. Rosenau, "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics," in Rosenau and Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government, pp. 1-29. Back.

Note 129: Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission; Gill, "Economic Globalization"; and Gill and Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital." Back.

Note 130: Emphasizing their nonexclusive economic orientation, Dicken aptly calls these regional economic zones, "mesolevels" of regulation. See Peter Dicken, "International Production in a Volatile Regulatory Environment: the Influence of National Regulatory Policies on the Spatial Strategies of Transnational Corporations," Geoforum 23, no. 2 (1992): 304. Back.

Note 131: Ronnie Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21, no. 3 (1992): 398-420. Back.

Note 132: Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society," International Organization, 44 (Autumn 1990): 495. Back.

Note 133: Ibid. Back.

Note 134: On the principle of sovereign nonintervention, see Jackson, Quasistates. Back.

Note 135: An excellent historical overview is provided by Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics," pp. 400-414. Back.

Note 136: Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled IssueNetworks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," International Organization, 47 (Summer 1993): 418. Back.

Note 137: Peter J. Spiro, "New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International DecisionMaking Institutions," The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1994): 47. Back.

Note 138: See Paul Wapner, "Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics," World Politics 47, no. 3 (April 1995): 311-340 for a good overview of the growing importance of these movements and of the way they have exploited the hypermedia environment to further their interests. Back.

Note 139: Spiro, "New Global Communities," p. 49. See also Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions," Third World Quarterly (Vol. 16, No. 3, 1995): 365. Gordenker and Weiss note that about 25% of U.S. assistance is channelled through NGOs, and that Vice President Gore committed to increase this figure to 50% by the end of the century. Back.

Note 140: The term "heteronomous" is taken from Lipschutz, which, as he says, "implies that these networks are differentiated from each other in terms of specialisations: there is not a single network, but many, each fulfilling a different function." Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics," p. 391. Back.

Note 141: Spiro, "New Global Communities," p. 45. Back.

Note 142: See Leslie Paul Thiele, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: Social Movements and Global Politics," Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance 18, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 281. Back.

Note 143: Ibid., p. 280. Back.

Note 144: Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics," p. 390. Back.

Note 145: Although Lipschutz is correct in pointing out that information technologies did not "cause" or generate these movements, in going out of his way to point this out he grossly underestimates the extent to which hypermedia is deeply bound up with the rise of global civil society, as any brief glance at the Internet alone will reveal. See Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics," pp. 411-412. Back.

Note 146: Spiro, "New Global Communities," p. 47. Back.

Note 147: Don Rittner, Ecolinking: Everyone's Guide to Online Environmental Information (Berkeley: Peachpit Press, 1992), p. 178. I discovered this quotation in W. T. Stanbury and Ilan B. Vertinsky, "Assessing the Impact of New Information Technologies on Interest Group Behaviour and Policy Making," (Revised draft: January 1995. To be published in Bell Canada Papers III on Economic and Public Policy), pp. 33-34. Back.

Note 148: Susanne Sallin, The Association for Progressive Communications: A Cooperative Effort to Meet the Information Needs of NonGovernmental Organizations (A Case Study Prepared for the HarvardCIESIN Project on Global Environmental Change Information Policy, February 14, 1994). The APC can be reached via the Internet at http://www.apc.org/ Back.

Note 149: Ibid., p. 1. Back.

Note 150: For a detailed overview of each of these member networks, see Ibid. Back.

Note 151: The IGC can be reached via the Internet at http://www.igc.apc.org/ Back.

Note 152: Peter White, "The World is Wired," San Francisco Guardian (December 1992); and Sallin, The Association for Progressive Communications. Back.

Note 153: See http://www.apc.org/un.html for information about the relationship between the APC and the UN. The APC is a NGO with Consultative Status (Category 1) with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Back.

Note 154: WebActive can be found at http://www.webactive.com/. Back.

Note 155: See Stanbury and Vertinsky, "Assessing the Impact of New Information Technologies," p. 34; See also, William T. Stanbury, "New Information Technologies and Transnational Interest Groups," (Paper prepared for delivery at the "Information Technologies and International Relations," symposium, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, January 13, 1995). Back.

Note 156: As cited in Stanbury and Vertinsky, "Assessing the Impact of New Information Technologies," p. 34; See also Wapner, "Politics Beyond the State." Back.

Note 157: A good balanced overview of the role of information technologies in "democratic uprisings" is Adam Jones, "Wired World: Communications Technology, Governance and the Democratic Uprising," in Edward A. Comor, The Global Political Economy of Communication: Hegemony, Telecommunication and the Information Economy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 145-164. Back.

Note 158: Personal Interview with Staff Sergeant Peter German, Vancouver Commercial Crime Division, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, January 13, 1995; For a very detailed overview, see Bruce Zagaris and Scott B. MacDonald, "Money Laundering, Financial Fraud, and Technology: The Perils of an Instantaneous Economy," George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 26 (1992): 61-107. Back.

Note 159: Jared Sandberg, "Militia Groups Meet, Recruit in Cyberspace," Wall Street Journal (April 26, 1995). Back.

Note 160: Thiele, "Making Democracy Safe for the World," p. 278. Back.

Note 161: This point is made by Lipschutz in "Reconstructing World Politics," p. 392. Back.

Note 162: Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled IssueNetworks," p. 411. Back.

Note 163: See Richard Falk, "Challenges of a Changing Global Order," Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace Studies 24, no. 4, (November 1992). Back.

Note 164: Although formal alliances and coalitions of NGOs are becoming more common. For discussion, see Gordenker and Weiss, "Pluralizing Global Governance," p. 367. Back.

Note 165: Mann, Sources of Social Power, pp. 15-19. Back.

Note 166: Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled IssueNetworks"; and Wapner, "Politics Beyond the State." Back.

Note 167: This is not to say that such groups might not contribute to the "delegitimization" of states. Quite the contrary. There are many cases where NGOs fill public service functions traditionally associated with states functions such as public health and education, for example. In doing so, they might help empower local communities at the expense of national identities and statebuilding projects. As Wapner puts it, while such groups "may see themselves working outside the domain of the state and focusing on civil society per se, their actions in fact have a broader impact and interfere with state policies." Wapner, "Politics Beyond the State," p. 335. See also Gordenker and Weiss, "Pluralizing Global Governance," p. 370 for examples of NGOs filling traditional state functions, such as the education system in the north of Sri Lanka and the operations of 35,000 schools in Bangladesh. Back.

Note 168: "Global, nonterritorial region" is taken from John Gerard Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time and Method," in Czempiel and Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges, p. 31. Back.

Note 169: I deliberately set off the word "domestic" in quotation marks to underscore the extent to which the term may be somewhat anachronistic given that it presupposes a basic division between "domestic" and "international" that is essential to the modern world order paradigm--the very paradigm that I am problematizing. However, as will be shown below, one of the very reasons for the "fitness" of the security arrangement I propose is precisely its accommodative capacity to global forces and multiple layers of political authority. Back.

Note 170: See Deudney, Pax Atomica; and Deudney, "Binding Powers, Bound States." Realstate is pronounced re ahl. Back.

Note 171: Deudney, " ''Binding Powers, Bound States," p. 10. Back.

Note 172: Ibid., p. 11. Back.

Note 173: George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Signet Books, 1949). Back.

Note 174: See Foucault, Discipline and Punish. Back.

Note 175: Good overviews can be found in David Lyon, "An Electronic Panopticon? A Sociological Critique of Surveillance Theory," The Sociological Review 41 (1993): 655-660; and Gandy, The Panoptic Sort: and David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), especially chapter four. Back.

Note 176: The following section draws on Lyon's informative overview, in "An Electronic Panopticon?" pp. 661-662. See also, Stephen Gill, "The Global Panopticon? The Neoliberal State, Economic Life, and Democratic Surveillance," Alternatives 2 (1995), pp. 1-49 for a similar discussion. Back.

Note 177: Gary Marx, Undercover Police Surveillance in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Back.

Note 178: Stanley Cohen, Visions of Social Control (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985). Back.

Note 179: Diana Gordon, "The Electronic Panopticon: A CaseStudy of the Development of the National Crime Records System," Politics and Society 15 (1986): 387. Back.

Note 180: See David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Gandy, The Panoptic Sort; Oscar H. Gandy, "The Surveillance Society: Information Technology and Bureaucratic Social Control," Journal of Communication 39, no. 3 (1989): 61-76. Back.

Note 181: For a detailed over of FinCEN, see Steven A. Bercu, "Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police Technology?" Jurimetrics Journal, 34 (Summer 1994): 383-449. Back.

Note 182: Personal Interview, Staff Sergeant Peter German, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Vancouver Commercial Crime Division, January 13, 1995. Back.

Note 183: Lyon, The Electronic Eye, pp. 218-219. Back.

Note 184: Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 217. Back.

Note 185: Neuman, The Future of the Mass Audience, p. 13. Back.

Note 186: See "End of the Line," p. 6. Back.

Note 187: "Iran Prohibits Satellite Dishes To Bar U.S. TV," New York Times (December 27, 1994). Back.

Note 188: "Feeling for the Future," p. 17. Back.

Note 189: Paul S. N. Lee and Georgette Wang, "Satellite TV in Asia: Forming a new ecology," Telecommunications Policy 19, no. 2 (1995): 140-141; See also William Shawcross, "Reaching for the Sky," New Statesman and Society (March 24, 1995): 12-14. Back.

Note 190: Lee and Wang, "Satellite TV in Asia," pp. 141-143. Back.

Note 191: Ibid. Back.

Note 192: See Drake, "Territoriality and Intangibility," pp. 270-272. Back.

Note 193: See Peter H. Lewis, "Computer Jokes and Threats Ignite Debate on Anonymity," New York Times (December 31, 1994). Computer systems known as "anonymous" remailers receive messages from around the world, strip them of their identity, and then send them off to their destination. They are an estimated 20 to 25 publicly accessible anonymous remailers around the world. As Lewis notes, "The ability to send anonymous and untraceable messages can also shield political and religious dissidents, whistleblowers and human rights advocates from possible reprisals." In the United States, attempts have been made to counter the spread of encryption technologies through regulation, in particular through a device known as the "clipper chip," which would allow central authorities surveillance access to particular electronic technologies that had the clipper chip installed. For an overview, see Steven Back.

Note 194: Subscribers to Teleview, Singapore's computer network, must agree not to use it "for sending to any person, any message which is offensive on moral, religious, communal or political grounds." "Feeling for the Future," p. 16; Victor Keegan notes the following with respect to Singapore: "One irony is that the information revolution that Singapore is pioneering may become the Trojan Horse that upsets the political and cultural repression of the regime. How can a society that still bans satellite dishes and many foreign journals continue to do so when the global information highway will give its citizens instantaneous access to multimedia newspapers all over the world, not to speak of pornography?" Victor Keegan, "Who's in Charge Here," The Guardian (December 12, 1994). Back.

Note 195: See Gaddis, "Tectonics, History and the End of the Cold War"; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3, 1990/1991): 14-15. For analyses that astutely predicted such a downfall from a communications perspective, see Wilson Dizard, "Mikhail Gorbachev's Computer Challenge," Washington Quarterly 9, no. 2, Spring 1986); and Walter R. Roberts and Harold E. Engle, "The Global Information Revolution and the Communist World," The Washington Quarterly 9, no. 2, Spring 1986). Back.

Note 196: Scott Shane, Dismantling Utopia: How information ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994), p. 262. Back.

Note 197: Lyon, The Electronic Eye, p. 87. Back.

Note 198: White, "The World is Wired." Back.

Note 199: Shane, Dismantling Utopia, p. 266. Back.

Note 200: Berko, "Surveying the Surveilled," p. 72. Back.

Note 201: Ibid., p. 73. Back.

Note 202: CNN has set up a hot line to solicit amateur videos, paying $150, a mug and tshirt for each spot. See Ibid., p. 71. While watching the news coverage of a man firing bullets into the White House earlier this year, I noticed that three separate amateur videos captured the melee. Back.

Note 203: Spiro, "New Global Communities," p. 45. Back.

Note 204: Amnesty International, for example, regularly distributes videos of human rights abuse over the WorldWide Web. See, for example, the capture of human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia at http://www.oneworld.org/amnesty/press;llawards/news.html. Back.

Note 205: See Peter H. Lewis, "Exploring New Soapboxes for Political Animals," New York Times (January 10, 1995); and Robert Wright, "Hyper Democracy," Time (January 23, 1995): 41-46. Back.

Note 206: "Feeling for the Future," p. 17. The Economist attributes this quote to Mark Crispin Miller. For a similar critique of the Panoptic metaphor along lines similar to my own, see Martin Hewson, "Surveillance and the Global Political Economy," in Comor, ed., The Global Political Economy of Communication, pp. 61-80. Back.

Note 207: For comprehensive historical overviews, see William S. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Berkeley Books, 1986); and Jeffrey T. Richelson, America's Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper and Row, 1990). Back.

Note 208: An outstanding and innovative historical analysis of the rise of planetary geopolitics is provided by Daniel Deudney, Whole Earth Security: A Geopolitics of Peace (Worldwatch Paper 55, July 1983). Back.

Note 209: I discuss the interplay between environmental and military satellite reconnaissance systems in "Out of Focus: U.S. Military Satellites and Environmental Rescue," in Deudney and Matthew, eds., Contested Grounds. Back.

Note 210: For an overview, see Pericles Gasparini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies (Geneva: UNIDIR Publications, 1992); Jeffrey T. Richelson, "The Future of Space Reconnaissance," Scientific American (January 1991); Giovanni de Briganti, "WEU's Satellite System May Fly in 2000," Defense News (February 1-7, 1993). Back.

Note 211: William J. Broad, "A U.S. Spy Satellite May be Sold Abroad," New York Times (November 17, 1992); Dan Charles, "Governments Queue Up to Buy U.S. Spy Satellite," New Scientist (December 1992). Back.

Note 212: A.V. Banner and A.G. McMullen, "Commercial Satellite Imagery for UNSCOM," in Steven Mataija and J. Marshall Beier, eds., Multilateral Verification and the PostGulf War Environment: Learning from the UNSCOM Experience (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1992); Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," Jane's Intelligence Review (September 1991), p. 408; and Nayan Chanda, "Atomic Shock Waves," Far Eastern Economic Review (March 25, 1993). Back.

Note 213: United Nations, "The Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency," (Report of the SecretaryGeneral, Department of Disarmament Affairs, 1983); Walter Dorn, "Peacekeeping Satelites," Peace Research Reviews 10 (1987); Bhupendra Jasani, "ISMA--will it ever happen?" Space Policy (February 1992); and F. R. Cleminson, "Paxsat and progress in arms control," Space Policy (May 1988). Back.

Note 214: "Russian Spysat Data Creates Buying Spree," Military Space (October 19, 1992): 6; and William J. Broad, "Russia is now selling spy photos from space," New York Times (October 4, 1992). Back.

Note 215: Tim Weiner, "CIA considers Allowing Sale of Spy Technology," New York Times (November 13, 1993); Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Lockheed Wants Austra Back.

Note 216: For an overview of these firms, see Vipin Gupta, "New Satellite Images for Sale," International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 94125. Back.

Note 217: For overviews, see Deibert, "Out of Focus"; and Karen T. Litfin, "Watching the Earth: An Inquiry into Global Environmental Monitoring," (Paper delivered at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1-4, 1994). Back.

Note 218: Gary Taubes, "Earth Scientists Look NASA's Gift Horse in the Mouth," Science (February 1993); and James Asker, "NASA Reveals Scaled Back Plan for Six EOS Spacecraft," Aviation Week and Space Technology (March 1992). Back.

Note 219: Glenn Zorpette, "Sensing Climate Change," IEEE Spectrum (July 1993), p. 20. Back.

Note 220: John Lewis Gaddis makes this point with reference to the Cold War. See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security 10, Spring (1986): 123. Back.

Note 221: Sinclair, "Between State and Market." Back.

Note 222: Spiro, "New Global Communities," p. 46. Back.

Note 223: Peter J. Taylor, "The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern WorldSystem," Progress in Human Geography 18, no. 2 (1994): 151-162. Back.

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Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation