ANNEX

(A) 2005 World Summit Outcome

Final document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly

United Nations General Assembly
A/60/L.1
15 September 2005
(Excerpts)

Peacebuilding

97.   Emphasizing the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace, recognizing the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development, and recognizing the vital role of the United Nations in that regard, we decide to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body.

98.   The main purpose of the Peacebuilding Commission is to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. The Commission should focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development. In addition, it should provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery. The Commission should act in all matters on the basis of consensus of its members.

99.   The Peacebuilding Commission should make the outcome of its discussions and recommendations publicly available as United Nations documents to all relevant bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions. The Peacebuilding Commission should submit an annual report to the General Assembly.

100.   The Peacebuilding Commission should meet in various configurations. Country-specific meetings of the Commission, upon invitation of the Organizational Committee referred to in paragraph 101 below, should include as members, in addition to members of the Organizational Committee, representatives from:
    a.   The country under consideration;
    b.   Countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue, as well as relevant regional and subregional organizations;
    c.   The major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort;
    d.   The senior United Nations representative in the field and other relevant United Nations representatives;
    e.   Such regional and international financial institutions as may be relevant.

101.   The Peacebuilding Commission should have a standing Organizational Committee, responsible for developing its procedures and organizational matters, comprising:
    a.   Members of the Security Council, including permanent members;
    b.   Members of the Economic and Social Council, elected from regional groups, giving due consideration to those countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery;
    c.   Top providers of assessed contributions to the United Nations budgets and voluntary contributions to the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, including the standing Peacebuilding Fund, that are not among those selected in (a) or (b) above;
    d.   Top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions that are not among those selected in (a), (b) or (c) above.

102.   Representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors should be invited to participate in all meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission in a manner suitable to their governing arrangements, in addition to a representative of the Secretary-General.

103.   We request the Secretary-General to establish a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions and taking due account of existing instruments. The

objectives of the Peacebuilding Fund will include ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery.

104.   We also request the Secretary-General to establish, within the Secretariat and from within existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission. The office should draw on the best expertise available.

105.   The Peacebuilding Commission should begin its work no later than 31 December 2005.

(B) Statement by the President of the Security Council

United Nations Security Council
S/PRST/2005/30
12 July 2005

At the 5225th meeting of the Security Council, held on 12 July 2005, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The maintenance of international peace and security: the role of the Security Council in humanitarian crises: challenges, lessons learned and the way ahead", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council reaffirms the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and bears in mind its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The Security Council remains deeply concerned by the devastating humanitarian, political and economic consequences of armed conflicts; and stresses the overriding political and moral imperatives to prevent the outbreak and escalation of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises, and the benefits therein for peace and development and friendly relations among all States.

"The Security Council acknowledges the importance of helping to prevent future conflicts through addressing their root causes in a legitimate and fair manner.

"The Security Council reiterates the importance it attaches to the promotion and urgent restoration of justice and the rule of law in post-conflict societies and in promoting national reconciliation, democratic development, and human rights. The Council recognizes that ending impunity is important in peace agreements, and can contribute to efforts to come to terms with past abuses and to achieve national reconciliation to prevent future conflict. The Security Council recalls that it has repeatedly emphasized the responsibility of States to end impunity and bring to justice those responsible for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law.

"The Security Council further recognizes the increasing importance of civilian aspects of conflict management in addressing complex crisis situations and in preventing the recurrence of conflict and acknowledges the importance of civilian-military cooperation in crisis management. When approving a United Nations operation, the Council should take into account the essential role of military and civilian police in assisting the stabilization of crises situations and the maintenance of security. At the same time, the Council acknowledges that the Special Representative of the Secretary General assisted by civilian advisers could play a key coordination role in the provision of humanitarian assistance, the re-establishment of public order, the functioning of public institutions, as well as rehabilitation, reconstruction and peace building, which lead to long-term sustainable development.

"The Security Council stresses the need to ensure adequate and timely financing for peacebuilding priorities at all stages of the peace process, and stresses the need for sustained financial investment in peacebuilding over the medium to longer-term period of recovery. It recognizes the importance of rapid initiation of peacebuilding activities to meet immediate needs and encourages the building of capabilities that can be incorporated rapidly.

"The Security Council takes note with interest of the important proposal by the Secretary General to establish a Peacebuilding Commission and shares the objective of improving United Nations capacity to coordinate with donors and troop contributors and to perform peacebuilding activities, in particular from the start of peacekeeping operations through stabilization, reconstruction and development. The Security Council recognizes the important role that this body could play to bridge the gap between maintenance of international peace and security and the work of humanitarian and economic development assistance.

"The Security Council acknowledges that in post conflict societies successful peacebuilding rests on the premise that protection of civilians, the promotion of the rule of law and transitional justice, disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants, security sector and democratic, economic and social reform are integrated elements and that national ownership plays an important role which should be supported by the international community, including the regional organizations.

"The Security Council emphasizes that security sector reform is an essential element of any stabilization process in post-conflict environments, underlines that it is inextricably linked with promotion of the rule of law, transitional justice, DDR and the protection of civilians, among others, and acknowledges the need for more adequate preparation, including mobilization of necessary planning resources, and more coherent approaches by the United Nations and the international community in addressing these issues.

"The Security Council acknowledges the need to give adequate attention to security sector reform in the future, drawing on best practices that have been developed in this area. The Security Council stresses also the need seriously to consider the promotion of the rule of law and transitional justice, the DDR process and security sector reform, their inter-linkage and the availability of adequate resources, when approving the necessary mandates for United Nations operations."

(C) Remarks to the Open Meeting of the Security Council on "Maintenance of International Peace and Security – The Role of the Security Council in Humanitarian Crises: Challenges; Lessons learned; the way ahead"

Statement by Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

United Nations Security Council
S/PV.5225
12 July 2005
(Excerpts)

Please allow me to begin with a word of thanks to the Greek presidency for convening this thematic debate and for inviting me to contribute to one aspect of it, namely, the challenges currently faced by United Nations peacekeeping operations in promoting the rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform in post-conflict situations. I would like to take this opportunity to focus in particular on the interlinkages among those three issues and on the need for more focused discussion of security-sector reform, which has received little attention in such forums in the past. The challenges in this area are indeed formidable. But, before delving into the details, I would like to make three general observations.

First, the good news: the total number of active armed conflicts in the world is actually in steady decline. In fact, the 28 or so countries of the world currently affected by some form of active armed conflict represent a 30-year low. The Security Council lies at the heart of that decline, particularly since the end of the cold war. The members of this body have seized opportunities to broker agreements to end civil wars and to send multidimensional peacekeeping operations to assist with their implementation. In several of those cases – Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Cambodia, for example – peace prevails, albeit amid other serious challenges facing those countries more than a decade after United Nations peacekeepers departed.

One hopes that 10 years from now the same will be said about Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. The Peacebuilding Commission proposed by the Secretary General, if created, could certainly help increase that likelihood by ensuring sustained and coordinated international attention in the post-peacekeeping phase.

Second, while there are enough examples to demonstrate that this is not mission impossible, there should be no illusions about how difficult and precarious the undertaking is. The tragedy of Srebrenica, to which the Secretary General just referred, still serves as a constant reminder ten years later of how an already dire situation can descend into conscience-shocking acts of savagery in a matter of days or hours. When we think that the worst is over, it is important to remember precisely at that point that the threat of mass killings, new waves of ethnic cleansing and/or the resumption of full-scale hostilities is likely still present in many peacekeeping contexts. Small missteps and the misreading of events can spell disaster, and they have.

Moreover, the jobs are getting increasingly difficult. Although no one associated with the operations in Mozambique or Cambodia would ever say that those were easy cases, they now appear to be so, relative to the scale, scope and complexity of the challenges United Nations peace operations currently face in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan, for example.

In order to be better prepared for the unexpected, the High-level Panel and the Secretary General have recommended the creation of a strategic reserve capacity, ready to be called upon on short notice to reinforce a mission facing an unforeseen crisis. One of the highest priorities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the coming year is to work with Member States to define the concept of operations of the strategic reserve.

Third, however robust United Nations peacekeeping operations military capabilities might be, they alone cannot ensure security in post-conflict environments absent the right political strategy and the political will of the relevant national and international actors. As a result of either international or internal pressure – or both – the main protagonists to the conflict must be ready to make the painful political and personal compromises necessary to maintain peace. They must transform themselves into leaders or give way to others able and willing to do the things required in order to engender the trust of former enemies, bring a war-torn society together around a common agenda and steer the delicate balance between promoting national reconciliation and unity, on the one hand, and accountability for war crimes and grave abuses of human rights on the other.

Those exceptionally trying demands require exceptional individuals to step forward. No amount of international assistance in the areas of the rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform can substitute for effective national leadership. If the basis for political compromise at the national and international level is wanting, in all likelihood a United Nations peacekeeping operation will be fighting an uphill battle, to put it mildly, to maintain a secure environment.

I have offered those three observations up front to stress that the right political context is often a necessary precondition for achieving a secure environment in a post-conflict setting. But while it may be a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition. Much more work is actually required in the field of national institution-building. Indeed, a country emerging from conflict cannot hope to consolidate peace, develop sustainable institutions or achieve economic prosperity if its citizens are too fearful to walk freely in the streets or lack access to social and legal services or political processes. Nor can a State rebuild itself and avoid a relapse into conflict if its population is threatened by police, armed forces or intelligence units that are not held accountable and are unprofessional, poorly resourced and poorly disciplined, untrained in international standards or lacking in effective management and oversight structures. And although stabilization in the immediate aftermath of conflict is a critical aspect of security, longer-term efforts addressing the entire range of security actors and judicial and law enforcement institutions are just as critical, if not more so.

In short, if peace is to be lasting, the short-, medium- and long-term security and justice needs of both the State and its population must be addressed equally. On those fronts, there are several areas that deserve further study and potential improvement.

First, our efforts in the security and justice sectors have tended to be driven by peace agreements, which address those issues in the context of ending a conflict. As during the conflict, parties to the agreement are often driven by their own personal agendas, and those do not always reflect all the elements that are crucial for sustainable peace. Peace agreements articulate in some detail the incorporation of militia forces into a new police force or army, the apportionment of senior-level appointments among warring factions and the harmonization of ranks.

However, those elements, while important, do not lay a strong basis for the consolidation of State and human security in the post-conflict setting. Insufficient attention is accorded to a comprehensive national security review process to identify the threats, whether internal or external, to State and human security and the development of a security architecture that is responsive to identified threats. As a result, both the international community and the host countries are ill prepared to tackle critical challenges such as corruption, cross-border narcotics and arms and human trafficking. Peace-agreement-driven approaches have in some instances even led the international community to support the reform of State institutions that had lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. It is therefore not surprising that those same countries have had a high propensity for relapsing into conflict.

Secondly, as in many other areas of peacebuilding, international efforts related to the security and the justice sectors are often disjointed. First, the United Nations bilateral donors and other actors at times pursue their own objectives without buying into a single agreed-upon framework or approach, and, due to competition for donor funds, the various actors are often not forthcoming about the projects that they are planning, which leads to uneven or duplicative assistance.

Thirdly, within the United Nations there is no agreement on a single system-wide approach on these issues. In some cases, we have specific operational capacities in one part of the system, whereas the corresponding capacity to support management, oversight and accountability mechanisms may be nonexistent or lie in a different part of the United Nations system. In other key areas, such as defence reform or some aspects of the justice sector, capacity is altogether lacking. That has led to an absence of strategic coherence among the various links in the chain of activities.

Fourthly, international approaches in support of security sector reform in post-conflict countries often apply foreign models and standards, which may be politically unpalatable or, practically speaking, unsuitable or unrealistic in the light of the realities on the ground.

And finally, existing approaches tend to be more applicable to developing countries than to post-conflict countries, as those approaches involve lengthy processes that are not tailored to situations where the road map for political and institutional change is often set out in a negotiated and time-limited peace agreement.

In seeking to address those challenges, the international community might reconsider whether it is always realistic to seek to rebuild, reform or restructure a country's defence, police, courts and penal system while

simultaneously seeking to re-establish security, keep the political process on track, facilitate the return of displaced populations, conduct elections and restore basic services.

In some cases, it may be appropriate to start early on complex tasks such as rebuilding courts and training police so that we do not miss the window of opportunity for action. Otherwise, violent, corrupt and inept approaches may become entrenched, and we may later have little or no opportunity to have a significant impact. In other cases, however, we may need to re-examine the sequence of activities so that the peacekeeping operation focuses on stabilization while a proper assessment of threats and needs is conducted and appropriate international, regional and local partners are identified to rebuild the security infrastructure and institutions in a sustainable fashion. We need to think these questions through carefully so as to ensure that we spend our efforts and resources on viable processes and institutions that can be sustained beyond the brief lifespan of a peacekeeping operation.

For the United Nations system, another key to better delivery is to continue to strive to carry out our mandates in as integrated a manner as possible. We have recognized that strong synergies and links exist between the development and security agendas, but we must make greater strides in integrating our development partners at the initial stages of planning for peacekeeping operations. That would ensure that our joint efforts are guided by a coherent, long-term strategy, and would allow smooth handovers to national and development partners once the peacekeeping mandate is over. We must ensure that we involve not only technical experts, but also civilians and others with a big-picture perspective, in our strategic and operational planning and activities.

At the same time, we must seek the greater integration of capacities within the United Nations system, which would require the assignment of clear responsibility for specific activities; the development of repositories of best practices, including diverse models of reforming the security sector; and effective coordination that brings together United Nations, bilateral and other efforts, including with respect to resource mobilization.

Equally, we must differentiate between areas where the United Nations system has, or should further develop, the capacity to carry out operational tasks and deliver programmes, and other areas where we could most usefully engage knowledgeably with host countries and bilateral and multilateral partners that have the requisite experience or capacity. As such, our role would be to advocate for assistance from those with something to offer and to ensure that what is promised and delivered responds to the actual needs of the host country. One key area that deserves examination is defence reform, where the United Nations currently has limited capacity.

As we reflect on how the United Nations might better contribute to the justice and security sectors in post-conflict environments, we might build on our recent experience in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), which also involves multi-actor, multidimensional activities that stretch beyond the lifespan of a peacekeeping mission.

In April 2004, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations initiated an inter-agency process that brought together 14 United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes to jointly develop a set of policies, guidelines and procedures called the integrated DDR standards. Although that is a United Nations process, we also tapped into the rich experience of the beneficiaries of DDR programmes, Member States, non-governmental organizations and the World Bank. In one year, the inter-agency working group has developed a comprehensive set of 30 DDR models that cover the full spectrum from strategic to tactical-level issues. We have consulted the drafts widely, tested them in an inter-agency simulation exercise, piloted them in our Haiti and Sudan peacekeeping missions and made significant improvements in the way that DDR programmes are funded. We expect to publish the first edition of the standards, which will lay out the agreed United Nations approach for DDR, this fall. That substantive guidance on DDR will be available to all those who need it in the international community. In addition, the inter-agency working group on DDR is developing a Web-based United Nations resource centre and a joint training strategy for DDR practitioners.

On the basis of this agreed United Nations approach to DDR, we are now well placed to streamline our activities, maximize our effectiveness and minimize unnecessary duplication at Headquarters and in the field. It may be worth exploring whether United Nations efforts in the justice and security sectors might benefit from a similar comprehensive approach. Of course, that would require expertise and resources which the United Nations does not currently have.

We are fortunate that our multidimensional peacekeeping operations generally have solid mandates to support justice- and security-related programmes on the ground, even if we often experience shortfalls in staffing and funding. A greater focus by the Security Council on the specific DDR, rule-of-law and security related needs in particular settings would provide us with even stronger and more precise mandates that would better address the needs of post-conflict countries. In the meantime, the United Nations system must continue to work on rationalizing its approaches, integrating its resources and capacities and delivering a single and comprehensive United Nations response for the Governments and populations that we are called upon to assist. That would also enable the United Nations system to maintain the level of political attention that is needed and to draw upon donor funding in a coordinated manner. The reform or formation of national security and justice sectors requires long-term commitment. A single United Nations approach is surely the best way to ensure the coherence and sustainability of these efforts well after the peacekeepers have left the country.

(D) Concept Paper for the July 12th Security Council Thematic Debate on "Maintenance of International Peace and Security. The Role of the Security Council in Humanitarian Crises: Challenges; Lessons Learned; the Way Ahead"

Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations
7 July 2005

1. The 1990s witnessed a series of violent humanitarian crises that caused death and immense suffering to millions of people around the world (Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia).

The UN made many efforts to improve its system and respond effectively to these challenges. The Security Council (SC) became the principle organ for organizing the international efforts in crises management and peacebuilding.

The number of UN peacekeeping operations increased considerably and became multifunctional as they have a broader mandate than ending hostilities. Their mission is a combination of military and civilian tasks with the aim to build long lasting peace in conflict torn societies and to prevent further outbreaks of violence or its escalation. This is because in most cases a country coming out of conflict has a very big chance to relapse into conflict within the first five (5) years. The reasons behind this are worthy of investigation in order to better understand which elements promote lasting peace and which either inhibit it or are simply ignored.

A greater involvement of regional organizations to meet the rising demands became soon an urgent need and many regional organizations enhanced their capacities in these areas. The United Nations themselves had to make some institutional reforms to deal with the new realities.

2. The proposed thematic debate can focus on recent SC efforts to break the conflict cycle in conflict affected societies and prevent them from relapsing to such crises.

SC Resolutions on East Timor, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Liberia, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, among others, as well as peace agreements and peacekeeping (PK) mandates, contain elements for long term peace and stability.

In recent years, the SC has recognized that the prevention of a return to conflict often hinges on the extent to which three key pillars of post-conflict security are adequately addressed, namely: The promotion of the Rule of Law; Security sector reform; and the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (and repatriation if applicable) of ex-combatants. Yet, the approach being taken in these three areas varies considerably in many places where UN operations have been established in the past 5-6 years.

- The Rule of Law: The promotion of democracy and good governance in conflict affected countries could open political space and help alleviate many of the ethnic tensions. Promotion of human rights, constitution-making, transitional justice mechanisms, legal and penal reform are important rule of law aspects in post conflict environment.

Transitional societies must be supported in their efforts to reform their institutions in order to establish a more human, just and democratic order. In this respect, the breaking of impunity through prosecution, trial and punishment as well as the exclusion of perpetrators of human rights crimes from the newly reconstituted institutions are essential elements for creating long lasting peace. To these ones should also add the ultimate objective of achieving reconciliation within those societies.

- Security Sector Reform: Military, Training of police forces.

It has been recognized that security in post conflict environment is crucial for peacemaking and peace implementation. However, security sector reform is one area that has not been focused on; its linkages to the other two areas, the

requirement to work with bilateral partners on reform, and the continuum in which security sector reform should take place i.e. from the outset of peacekeeping work through to the development phase. Discussion could focus on the "best practices", "lessons-learned" and inherent challenges in this area which the Security Council should take cognizance when mandating future UN and related peacekeeping operations.

Discussion could also address the restructuring of security institutions such as the military and police. Police operations and activities should provide legal protection to individuals (accountability). Civilian oversight in order to secure democratic control and (police) accountability is also important component of such reforms.

- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR):

DDR are crucial components of peace agreement. There are many actors involved in DDR programs (national authorities, UN agencies, International Financial Institutions etc.). However, national ownership of the process is very important (see Mozambique).

DDR programs should be included in peace agreements and be part of an overall recovery strategy that encompasses economic development, security sector reform, the integration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and justice and reconciliation.

The reintegration of ex-combatants in the civilian life should be given special attention as they pose serious threat to peace and security. There is an ongoing debate as to whether ex-combatants should be prioritized over refugees and internally displaced persons (Sierra Leone).

3. Lessons learned: Assessment on the effectiveness of the above measures and need to reinforce them in the future.

Although, the above mentioned three pillars are contained in the majority of the SC resolutions, with different degree of emphasis depending on the specific country situation, their implementation is not always successful. The mandate and the strength of the peacekeeping mission, the follow up of the SC and the full cooperation by the respective government are important elements for an effective process.

Likewise, lasting peace is not exclusively dependant on SC initiatives, but on a variety of other factors such as: the actual involvement of regional organizations, the quality of the peace agreements, the history and the nature of the conflict, the involvement of regional organizations or the neighboring countries in the peace process, the support by international and local actors and the consistency in the flow of donor aid (concerns regarding cases in which the flow is initially good – yet the absorbing capacity of the conflict area may be poor – but then tends to be minimized over time, or in South Sudan, where the infrastructure is inadequate to welcome returning IDPs).

4. The way ahead:

- The importance of further strengthening the above three pillars in achieving long lasting peace.

- Has the Security Council given adequate attention to security sector reform, or to the inter-linkages between rule of law, DDR, and security sector reform? If so, in which cases? If not, how might it do so better in future?

- Is a more active engagement of the Security Council required in war affected zones for the early prevention of conflicts or further outbreaks?

- The role of international and local actors in implementing the above pillars.

(E) Conflict Prevention and Peace Building: What Counts as ODA?

OECD
3 March 2005

A secure environment is fundamental to long-term growth, sustainable development and poverty reduction in developing countries. The work of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), including its document Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice in 2004 and the results of a recent Senior Level

Forum in Fragile States co-sponsored with EC, UNDP and the World Bank, emphasises that OECD countries need to apply whole-of-government approaches that respond to the needs of partner countries and their populations.

Within such an approach, resources come from a variety of government budgets, notably those for defence, diplomacy and development. It is therefore important to have clarity on what activities should qualify as development spending internationally. This is determined by the DAC, which is responsible for the definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) – a measure of donor flows that are for 'the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries'. The directives that cover what can be reported as ODA exclude the supply or financing of military equipment or services and use of military personnel to control civil disobedience. These exclusions remain. In an 18-month process, culminating in the DAC High Level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies on 3 March 2005, the DAC has been examining the existing references in the directives to expenditure relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding to see if they can be clarified, in particular explicitly to cover improved civilian control over the security system, civilian peacebuilding, child soldiers, and small arms.

In its review, the DAC was guided by the need to preserve the credibility and integrity of ODA statistics and the understanding that only certain specific activities in the areas of security and development will be ODA eligible or will come from ODA/aid budgets. Consensus has been reached on technical co-operation and civilian support for six items:

1. **Management of security expenditure** through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure.
2. **Enhancing civil society's role in the security system** to help ensure that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance.
3. Supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of **child soldiers**.
4. **Security system reform** to improve democratic governance and civilian control.
5. **Civilian** activities for **peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution**.
6. Controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of **small arms and light weapons**.

The Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies also discussed two other items - training the military in non-military matters, such as human rights, and extending the coverage of peacekeeping activities. (For the latter, and only in specific circumstances, incremental costs of the deployment of military personnel from DAC member countries are reportable as ODA.) While everyone accepted that effective support in these areas helps to promote peace and security, many did not consider that training the military in non-military matters, such as human rights, and extending the coverage of peacekeeping activities were an appropriate use of ODA budgets. They also noted that, unlike the six items agreed on which expenditures are relatively modest, these items currently involve large sums, mostly from defence budgets. It was agreed, however, to assess members' positions on these two issues again in 2007.