

## Chapter 12

# Shaping the Security Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

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### **Introduction**

The consequences of not learning from the international community's experience in post-conflict peacebuilding are well illustrated by the number of states where armed conflict has reignited despite such intervention. More positively, set beside the major challenges of building sustainable peace in states emerging from conflict, there are significant opportunities – which could be more effectively exploited – as a result of the major mobilisation of international commitment in post-conflict peacebuilding. This volume has considered, from the perspective of security governance, the range of issues and actors that shape the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda. It has identified key challenges, highlighted good (and bad) practice and has attempted to clarify linkages among elements of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda. The key – mainly UN – documents included in the annex to this volume are evidence of a growing international consensus on the need for better coordination, cooperation and integration of efforts by a wide variety of actors. Indeed, the creation of a UN Peacebuilding Commission, supported by a Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund, demonstrate the commitment of the international community to tackle this issue jointly – although there are a number of questions concerning the operational effectiveness of this new structure.

Effective peacebuilding must be underpinned by long-term commitments by external actors that are grounded in legitimacy and reflect the realities of specific post-conflict contexts. The contributions to this volume indicate that there is a need for more effective coordination and cooperation among the various elements of the international community's response at different levels of policy and programming. Applying a security

governance approach, it is argued, provides a useful means to deconstruct the complex, multi-layered architecture of actors and mechanisms interacting in related, yet disconnected, security and development fields. Intuitively, mechanisms addressing all the issues discussed in this volume will contribute to achieving overall goals of peace and stability. However, only by understanding these linkages in conceptual and practical terms will it be possible to integrate efforts more systematically and foster synergies among various stakeholders at the strategic level and in the field.

This concluding chapter begins by highlighting some of the key points drawn from the contributions to this volume. It then assesses some of the cross-cutting issues that link them and the lessons that can be derived from this analysis. Finally – an important point that emerges from this volume – it is suggested that security sector reform (SSR) within a framework of democratic security sector governance offers opportunities to integrate other security-related aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding, which could make an important contribution to broader planning and priority-setting.

### **Key Points**

In analysing the emerging security governance agenda in post-conflict peacebuilding, a number of issues have been discussed in this volume under three overarching themes – security sector reform and governance; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; and rule of law and transitional justice.

#### *Security Sector Reform and Governance*

Bryden and Hänggi (Chapter 2) note that SSR is a new and still contested concept, but one that has increasing support among a range of stakeholders involved in post-conflict peacebuilding. A key element of the SSR concept is that it goes beyond state-centric approaches, particularly important given that post-conflict contexts are defined by weak or non-existent state structures. The governance dimension is central to the SSR concept – supporting the ‘effectiveness’ of security sector actors without reference to the governance thereof does not constitute SSR. From a governance perspective, the concept addresses key post-conflict actors such as peacekeeping forces and transitional administrations, non-statutory civil society groups and armed non-state actors. This is important, as Holmqvist (Chapter 3) points out, because in practice armed non-state actors tend to be

ignored or underemphasised in peacebuilding efforts on the ground as well as in the normative and legal frameworks that should underpin peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, Caparini (Chapter 4) notes that the role of civil society in post-conflict peacebuilding has been emphasised more in policy documents than in actual practice.

The privatisation and internationalisation of the provision of post-conflict security greatly complicates opportunities for SSR. A central challenge of security sector reconstruction lies in the fact that it is externally induced, funded and supported, creating an inherent tension between local ownership and external assistance. Linked to this is the danger of imposing external models that do not reflect local realities and needs. Also, external actors may provide security and governance while potentially ignoring the necessity of building local capacities to assume these roles. Donor support for civil society building can have similarly counterproductive outcomes, creating a dependency culture of civil society actors depending on donor support which can, in effect, sever the linkages with communities in favour of external funding, agendas and priorities. With regard to the plethora of Western NGOs as well as commercial companies that are involved in peacebuilding efforts, there is a similar danger of staff with limited appreciation of the local context perpetuating inappropriate, externally-driven approaches.

In the case of private security companies (PSCs), the absence of effective regulatory frameworks poses significant problems for establishing the legitimacy for international actions, as well as for encouraging ownership by local authorities. PSCs have been highly involved in the security sector reconstruction of a number of states, notably in the retraining of police, military and intelligence services. However, accountability deficits, a presence that may fuel grievances of locals, and approaches that replace rather than foster local capacity undermine the legitimacy of external interventions – there is obviously a need for greater regulation.<sup>1</sup>

### *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*

The end of hostilities offers a time-limited opportunity to address the physical legacies of conflict. Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) is one logical consequence of the end of hostilities and is recognised as a core element of post-conflict peacebuilding. However, as Brzoska (Chapter 5) points out, the goals for DDR are case dependent, ranging from simple downsizing or cost-cutting to full-blown peacebuilding. It is therefore an activity that, while clear in terms of its practical steps, is less well-defined

in terms of policy. Child soldiers represent a particular subset of this issue that has specific implications for post-conflict peacebuilding, although as Singer (Chapter 6) points out, very few DDR programmes have specific elements targeting this category of former combatants.

Failure to reintegrate former combatants can be directly linked to increased criminality and a return to violence. In this regard, children have particular reintegration needs if they are to be removed from the conflict cycle and given real prospects for the future. Brzoska's (Chapter 5) observation that the reintegration dimension is the least funded element of DDR by the international community is therefore worrisome. However it is arguably the most challenging element of DDR, requiring the greatest commitment in terms of resources and effort. It is also the most obviously cross-disciplinary element of the process, linking the more immediate requirements of disarmament and demobilisation to the long-term imperatives of economic and social welfare. According to Brzoska this complexity is not reflected by commensurately diverse platforms among external actors with a stake in DDR. Ebo's (Chapter 7) example of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) providing disarmament and demobilisation support through peacekeeping funding but having to delay reintegration programmes as a result of the need to seek voluntary funding for this element of the process is telling.

The threat of landmines and the presence of small arms and light weapons (SALW) contributes to insecurity and undermines reconstruction and development efforts. They offer two related if qualitatively different challenges to post-conflict peacebuilding. Efforts to address SALW and landmines have in common the need to address their impact rather than numbers of weapons per se. However, Ebo (Chapter 7) points out that anti-SALW measures tend to focus on supply side issues, ignoring the governance deficit – which he identifies as the root cause of SALW proliferation at the national level. Similarly, Bryden (Chapter 8) characterises mine action as a governance challenge with the goal to return responsibility to legitimate and effective national actors.

Apart from the disarmament dimension of these issues, addressing SALW and landmines potentially offers significant confidence-building benefits at the national and community levels. Moreover, Bryden notes that mine action is both an early entry point for the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding and an enabling activity for other peacebuilding efforts, although this is an underexplored area and its potential to contribute to peacebuilding is not fully understood.

The benefits of addressing the human and material legacies of war are to an extent dissipated by a lack of coordination between policy actors and disconnects among different elements of the international response. Slowly disbursed and short-term funding precludes long-term programmatic approaches and undermines work on the ground. Moreover, policy gaps among multi- and bilateral stakeholders reflect a lack of integrated approaches across related issue areas.

### *Rule of Law and Transitional Justice*

Restoring the rule of law and guaranteeing the protection of individuals and communities is a vital precondition of post-conflict peacebuilding and is consequently essential for the development of new national authorities that have the trust of their citizens. It requires comprehensive strategies that address root causes of conflict and are underpinned by legitimacy and accountability. The mechanisms of transitional justice represent a way of addressing these root causes in ways that deal with the past by healing wounds from the previous conflict that would otherwise fester. Trafficking in human beings, though not post-conflict specific, inhibits transitions from war to sustainable peace and is clear evidence of a breakdown in the rule of law. Establishing and protecting the rule of law is therefore a vital security governance issue, which must be founded on effective national executive, legal and judicial institutions. It requires comprehensive strategies that promote accountability, justice, as well as the application of relevant legal and normative frameworks, in particular international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRL).

International transitional administrations – as in East Timor and Kosovo – have been created to provide such governance frameworks where national actors are unable to provide for the rule of law and legal structures have been destroyed or neglected. The externally imposed nature of these arrangements means that respect for IHL and HRL, and the equitable provision of justice by these actors, is key to promoting these values in the territories they oversee in order to provide a suitable environment for an eventual handover of ownership to national responsibility.

As Vité (Chapter 9) notes, transitional administrations therefore have a dual responsibility to apply the rule of law to their own conduct and to their administrative functions if the same approaches are to be preserved in the transition of ownership to national actors. In the same way, as van Zyl (Chapter 10) points out, support by the international community for the pursuit of justice through prosecutions, truth commissions, provision of

reparations, reforming institutions and promoting reconciliation requires a sensitive balancing of the imperatives of peace, security and justice. The trade in human beings is driven by and supports organised criminal networks, challenges the authority of the state, and undermines security actors and political authorities corrupted by involvement in this trade. The preponderance of trafficking in human beings, Ghebali (Chapter 11) emphasises, is therefore a clear indicator of defective security sector governance.

In the context of post-conflict peacebuilding, all these dimensions of the rule of law are security governance challenges to be addressed by effective security actors within a framework of democratic oversight and control.

### **Cross-Cutting Issues**

A number of issues have emerged through analysing the different topics in this volume which are common to achieving the broader objectives of post-conflict peacebuilding: framing conditions; external involvement; local ownership; and sequencing. These are discussed below in order to better understand the linkages and potential opportunities for developing synergies. Underlying this analysis is the need to better understand those factors that provide genuine opportunities to build capacity in state and local actors in post-conflict contexts as a precondition for sustainable peace and security. Although the principles of ‘capacity building’ are ubiquitous in policy statements, implementation of these principles is much patchier, raising serious questions for both external and national actors. For this reason, particular emphasis is placed on the intertwined themes of external involvement and local ownership.

#### *Framing Conditions*

Knowledge of the specific context for post-conflict peacebuilding is essential for targeted and effective interventions. Beyond the general conditions that apply to all post-conflict contexts, a number of specific security, political and socio-economic framing conditions are particularly relevant. These dimensions are interwoven and deeply ingrained; while they must be taken into account, they can only be influenced to a certain extent by external actors.

In security terms, the duration of a conflict, the level of violence, factionalism, and ethnic or religious dimensions all shape opportunities for post-conflict peacebuilding. In this respect, Ebo (Chapter 7) emphasises the antagonistic effect of ethnic cleavages in Liberia, endemic corruption and the minimal economic prospects in addressing such cleavages. Van Zyl (Chapter 10) stresses the particular importance of reconciliation when there is an identity dimension to the conflict such as religion, race or ethnicity. The cross-border security dimensions of conflict are particularly important with soldiers and arms flowing to and from different conflict zones. Holmqvist (Chapter 3) describes a pattern of conflict migration where armed non-state actors in West Africa are supported by neighbouring countries and re-recruited across borders. In the case of Guinea, ex-fighters were subsequently recruited after going through a DDR process in Liberia.

The nature and extent of political development prior to the conflict and how that was reflected in the pre-conflict security sector will shape expectations and possibilities for the post-conflict political dispensation. Weak states, characterised by corruption and clientism, that do not provide security or democratic governance enable armed non-state actors and are mistrusted by their citizens. A repressed civil society will therefore generally lack capacity and any culture of monitoring leaders will be absent. As Holmqvist (Chapter 3) notes, local populations' perceptions of state security forces, or feelings of impunity more broadly, impact on their willingness to support or join armed groups. An understanding of these underlying reasons for the existence and longevity of such groups are essential in order to devise effective strategies to address them.

The available social and economic capital is a strong factor in influencing the potential for post-conflict peacebuilding. This is particularly clear in the context of DDR where the absence of jobs and economic opportunities encourages criminality, creates 'violence entrepreneurs' who have little option but to fall back on skills gained during conflict and generates a vicious circle where the resultant sense of fear encourages people to retain weapons. Similarly, Ghebali (Chapter 11) cites impoverishment, social exclusion and discrimination as the main factors pushing women in South Eastern Europe towards prostitution and the dangers of trafficking. Singer (Chapter 6) concurs that orphans, street children and refugees are particularly at risk of child soldier recruitment. Health issues can also be an important framing condition. As Brzoska (Chapter 5) points out, many demobilised Ugandan soldiers in the early 1990s were HIV-positive, leading to a spread of the disease in the countryside following their demobilisation. Finally, cultural values and perception may also have a strong role to play

with Ghebali (Chapter 11) arguing that human trafficking in South Eastern Europe is propped up by a general cultural attitude that denigrates the role of women in society.

### *External Involvement*

A key cross-cutting issue in post-conflict peacebuilding is the very nature of external involvement and the means by which the international community can assist national and local actors in very different post-conflict contexts. On one level, the effectiveness of external involvement depends on the ability and willingness of local actors to absorb and engage with the influx of assistance. The pre-conflict history of external involvement plays an important role in this context as acceptance of foreign involvement builds on its perceived legitimacy on the ground. The UN with its non-partisan mandate is best placed to be accepted as a legitimate international aide in post-conflict reconstruction. It is in a similar vein that Holmqvist (Chapter 3) wishes the UN to carefully nurture its image as a non-partisan and neutral actor. On another level, the nature of external involvement is an issue of coordination (and sometimes competition) between stakeholders with very different objectives, approaches and cultures, but it is also an issue of cooperation in ensuring that different mechanisms and activities are logically sequenced and genuinely reflect the needs of conflict-affected societies. Directly linked to this is the challenge of building capacity and infusing a sense of ownership among national and local actors. The UN has a central role in this context. This results in a dual requirement of ensuring coordination within the UN system, as well as with the array of international and regional organisations, international financial institutions, bilateral donors, NGOs and representatives of affected countries in setting policy and implementing programmes.

Effective interventions can only be achieved if there is adequate coordination at the level of strategic policy setting. The role of the UN in governing mine action described by Bryden (Chapter 8) – including responsibility for policy, coordination, norms and standards setting and implementation – casts in relief the difficulties of juggling internal coordination, bilateral donors and a host of other actors. In Kosovo, two intergovernmental organisations – the UN and NATO – contribute to peacebuilding under separate legal frameworks. The situation is further complicated by the application of national law to individuals from each of the nations providing support to these operations. Administrative bottlenecks and policy disagreements between peacekeeping forces, transitional



authorities and agencies with narrower mandates are the equivalent found in field operations and could be alleviated by better coordinating mechanisms at the strategic level.

Peace ‘building’ has a long-term horizon which is not necessarily reflected in the agenda setting or financial planning of donors. Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, reflecting on the international community’s peacebuilding efforts to date, suggests that ‘the failure to follow through ... is the most depressingly familiar reason for the recurrence of avoidable conflict’.<sup>2</sup> Resource mobilisation is a key factor but resources will be (and have been) wasted without priorities based on the local context which provide support to national authorities. Slow disbursement of donor funds is a recurring theme described in specific terms in the DDR programme in Liberia (Chapter 5) and the mine action programme in Kosovo (Chapter 8).

Ensuring that commitments are effectively implemented requires professional staff with a range of expertise to facilitate a multidisciplinary approach. In a number of post-conflict peacebuilding activities such as SSR (Chapter 2), DDR (Chapter 5), and mine action (Chapter 8), an over-reliance on military or former military personnel has not tended to encourage appreciation of the socio-economic or capacity building dimensions of these issues. Experience from the development world can be particularly useful in building capacity with national actors. Relevant experience from organisations such as the ICRC – for example in reaching out to non-state armed groups – and certain NGOs, who can have a strong appreciation of local contexts is therefore essential. Caparini (Chapter 4) notes the potential benefits of donor approaches that emphasise community driven reconstruction (CDR) where local involvement in decision-making is as important as the results of the project themselves.

Broad political or military powers and a sound resource base will not be sufficient without taking account of the deeply engrained and distinct framing conditions which apply in each post-conflict context. Interventions need to be tailored to local realities and grounded in legitimacy – as evident by the differing experiences of SSR in Iraq and East Timor (Chapter 2). Similarly, Caparini (Chapter 4) describes an interventionist approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina, characterised as a ‘quasi-protectorate’, that has seen decision making by the High Representative blocking the development of democratic practice among elected officials. Vité (Chapter 9) points out that broad immunity from prosecution for UNMIK and KFOR personnel, covering both criminal and civil matters, is tantamount to a government granting immunity to itself. This undermines nascent judicial structures in

the province because it is seen to set the transitional administration above the law demonstrating a lack of equity and due process. Similarly, Holmqvist (Chapter 3) uses the case of Iraq where contractors have been granted immunity from local prosecution as an example of a host state's inability to influence such actors on its territory.

The support by the international community for civil society shares the same dangers that cover external interventions more broadly: local and national actors will meet donor requirements before the needs of their own constituencies. They are also vulnerable to changes in levels of donor funding which has implications for both capacity and credibility. Finally, Caparini (Chapter 4) notes that the favouring of a select civil society 'elite' by the international community risks moving attention away from issues of broader participation. This raises the larger issue of capacity building among local actors in post-conflict peacebuilding. Although individual successes in areas such as mine action, DDR and SALW are noted, these localised examples cannot disguise the fact that this has not been conducted effectively by the international community. This is directly linked to expertise gaps and a lack of appreciation of different contexts. Holmqvist notes (Chapter 3) that the increasing use of PSCs in a range of peacebuilding activities risks jeopardising this legitimacy given the accountability deficits which surround the use of these organisations. In particular, the use of PSCs, while providing custom solutions for external actors across a range of services, tend to replace rather than enhance local capacities, lack knowledge of local contexts and, in the absence of regulatory frameworks, their conduct is not bound by international or national legal regimes. This is paralleled, as in Iraq, in the use of multi-national companies for a range of reconstruction activities which lack transparency and accountability and tend not to consult or employ local actors in a way that build capacity.<sup>3</sup>

### *Local Ownership*

The legacies of conflict include weak or illegitimate governance institutions, a lack of political space, and security actors that have been skewed to regime interests rather than those of the state and its citizens. This context frames the openings for building local capacity in post-conflict peacebuilding. There is an inherent tension between the need to build local capacity and the reality that in post-conflict contexts the provision of both security and governance is, at least initially, in the hands of external actors. Such tensions can be exacerbated, as described by Holmqvist (Chapter 3), if responsibility for security is outsourced to private security companies which fill an evident

security deficit but rarely reflect local needs and are not bound by individual legal accountability.

It is widely recognised that civil society has a key role in SSR and post-conflict peacebuilding more broadly through promoting dialogue and reconciliation as well as holding national and international actors accountable. The media can play a particularly important role in raising awareness – such as on human trafficking – monitoring government decisions and applying pressure. The UN in particular has recognised the need to reach out to civil society by linking representatives into formal dialogues, consultations and decision-making processes. However, there is a concern that such participation does not genuinely influence decision-making processes or truly open up the political space for these actors. Referring to the ethnic divisions that remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina and have been enshrined in the Dayton Agreement,<sup>4</sup> Caparini (Chapter 4) underlines that building civil society capacity is not an alternative to addressing these underlying issues but must be conducted in parallel to broader political reform.

Establishing sustainable national authorities and supporting domestic constituencies is a precondition for moving from immediate post-conflict to longer-term development priorities. Vité (Chapter 9) notes that the use of international judges and prosecutors may be a short term answer to a lack of capacity but they often lack knowledge of local legal systems and risk to create a ‘permanent umbrella’ that does not favour capacity building in the local judiciary. The alternative is perpetuating the ‘de facto multilateralist states’ found in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also important to be clear about the kinds of national capacity that need to be built. Building governance capacity in security organisations and oversight bodies must be done in parallel to broader political and socio-economic development with societal as well as institutional repositioning essential to restore faith in reconstituted national authorities. In this respect, participative approaches involving a range of civil society actors are imperative. More broadly, van Zyl (Chapter 10) notes that public attention focussed through trials, truth commissions and public hearings offers mechanisms to catalyse public debate and give the public a voice in addressing the recent past. According to Holmqvist (Chapter 3), a precondition for reinstating a state monopoly on the use of force is increased dialogue between the state and armed groups. It is also important that capacity building efforts are not directed solely at the national level but are felt at the community level.

However, it should not be assumed that reconstituted national authorities will make the right choices. Brzoska (Chapter 5) notes that

decisions about force numbers agreed between former warring parties are frequently based on the need to provide patronage and protect interests. These interests, albeit by national actors, are imposed 'from above,' lack broader participation and favour leaders rather than their citizens. They therefore do not pass a basic test of security sector governance. Van Zyl (Chapter 10) contrasts the truth commissions established in South Africa and East Timor which were structured around local consultation and debate with the ambivalent approach of the Cambodian government to the 'Khmer Rouge tribunal'.

Similarly, Bryden (Chapter 8) describes the 'Samaritans Dilemma', that donors' contributions to mine action can actually deter self-help by national authorities. The case for developing effective oversight mechanisms in parallel to improving 'effectiveness' is therefore uncontested in order to address issues of corruption and clientism. In this regard, van Zyl (Chapter 10) concludes that vetting procedures, an important dimension of transitional justice, can be a highly effective tool in removing rights abusers from office. There is a need to engage more fully regional and sub-regional actors who are often influential and have an intimate understanding of local contexts. This is particularly important because of the regional dynamics of conflicts and the cross-border nature of such challenges as arms and human trafficking. In West Africa, the creation of the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOFF) and the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), with the support of ECOWAS, offers innovative ways to bring peacebuilding stakeholders closer. The growing regional involvement of new EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe is proving a valuable means of transferring knowledge and experience to countries with similar legacies and antecedents.

### *Sequencing*

Sequencing of post-conflict peacebuilding activities in an 'ideal' post-conflict peacebuilding model should interweave national level policy development, and constitutional and legal reform within a framework of local capacity building. This requires an integration of different peacebuilding activities to avoid examples such as in Liberia where police reform was not backed up by investment in corrections authorities or in Sri Lanka where roads were cleared of landmines for refugee return but the settlements at the other end remain uncleared, resulting in casualties.

In practice, there can be significant grey areas between conflict, emergency and post-conflict phases. Sequencing therefore involves the need

to balance reform and reconstruction with the overall requirement to preserve peace. Van Zyl (Chapter 10) notes that links between transitional justice and broader post-conflict peacebuilding need to be better understood given the very clear link between war-induced grievances and a return to war in post-conflict countries.

The importance of peace agreements in facilitating post-conflict peacebuilding is widely acknowledged. That such agreements are not a *deus ex machina* is self-evident. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledges this in his May 2005 explanatory note on the Peacebuilding Commission: 'several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements – for instance in Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994'.<sup>5</sup>

However, such agreements represent a commitment by new national authorities and consequently provide certain opportunities. Information is a key resource and Bryden (Chapter 8) demonstrates the value of enshrining obligations to provide relevant data on the location and use of landmines in peace agreements for the effectiveness of mine action. Peace Agreements may also be used to acknowledge issues that might otherwise remain hidden. Singer (Chapter 6) highlights the Lomé Accord which ended the conflict in Sierra Leone was the first such document to recognise the existence of child soldiers as a specific category of combatants, offering hope that their particular needs will be addressed.

Links between DDR and the broader post-conflict peacebuilding agenda should be considered in a more explicit fashion by international actors involved in DDR. Brzoska (Chapter 5) points out that the compartmentalisation of these related issues is unfortunate because decisions on numbers of combatants to be demobilised will have a significant impact on the parameters for security sector reconstruction. Later priorities such as the composition and numbers of security forces could therefore be addressed at the outset of DDR activities.

A key issue of sequencing concerns the question of when to hand over responsibility to local actors. There are no fixed answers to this question but experiences such as the handover of mine action responsibilities in Kosovo in 2001 (Chapter 8), which then returned to the UN Special Representative less than three years later, caution against handing over responsibilities for political reasons or in the absence of adequate local capacity. This highlights a temptation to hand over responsibility for political reasons which must be avoided. Similar challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan must be based, within an appropriate legal framework, on the governance capacities of national

authorities to assume these roles or the international community will be obliged to return and finish the job.

Finally, Brzoska (Chapter 5) makes the point that the leverage of the international community could be better used to influence former warring parties in peace agreements and other decisionmaking frameworks. In this respect, the influence of the international community, as a provider of security and through the disbursement of funds, should not be underestimated.

### **Integrating Role of SSR**

The SSR concept bridges security policy, peace and democracy promotion and development assistance. This cross-sectoral character is useful because it links different activities across the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda. By virtue of its emphasis on governance rather than government, it reaches out to actors beyond the state such as non-statutory civil society organisations and armed non-state actors, encompassing both security and democratic deficits. This holistic perspective integrates partial reforms of security sector actors such as the military, police or intelligence services with the requirements of democratic governance. As Bryden and Hänggi (Chapter 2) note, it therefore spans a wide array of activities from political dialogue, policy and legal advice, training programmes to technical and financial assistance.

SSR must deal with the broader categories of activities in post-conflict peacebuilding. If not necessarily applicable in development or transitional contexts, issues such as DDR (Chapter 5), transitional justice (Chapter 10) and human trafficking (Chapter 11) are component parts of security sector reconstruction. Applying principles of security governance to these broader areas provides a means to assess performance through the broader peacebuilding agenda. Brzoska (Chapter 5) argues that the institutions of security sector governance offer an opportunity to develop synergies between DDR and SSR – both concern the same sets of actors, and broader SSR concerns could be integrated in peace negotiations and other decisions relating to DDR.

Although detailed integration of these concerns may be unrealistic in complex post-conflict contexts, some problematic outcomes could be avoided, such as using former soldiers in police forces which Brzoska points out in certain cases – such as Haiti and El Salvador – saw candidates with inappropriate skills sets or a history of war crimes adding to insecurity. Van

Zyl (Chapter 10) makes the point that transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions and vetting processes could make a much greater contribution to SSR. Specifically, this would inform: identifying institutions that need reform; providing specific proposals for such reform; and identifying and removing inappropriate post holders such as individuals with a history of war crimes. The institutional reform dimension is particularly important for military, police and intelligence agencies in SSR processes. He emphasises that the failure of police reform in Haiti cannot be attributed to individuals but to wider problems of governance, composition and mandate. Similarly, Bryden (Chapter 8) argues that the absence of any convincing examples where ownership of, and responsibility for, mine action has been handed back to national actors is in large part a result of governance deficits in the security sector and particularly its executive and legislative oversight functions.

Armed non-state actors (Chapter 3) may control land and therefore possibilities for aid delivery or the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. A governance perspective must therefore take account of non-state armed actors who remain outside of international legal frameworks and are frequently unrecognised by national authorities even though they may de facto control significant territories. These actors need to be addressed in DDR efforts (Chapters 5 and 6), specifically their conspicuous use of small arms (Chapter 7) and landmines (Chapter 8). Moreover, organised criminal networks, such as those involved in human trafficking (Chapter 11), represent a direct challenge to democratic security sector governance through fostering corruption and undermining political institutions.

In sum, SSR in post-conflict settings – security sector *reconstruction* – provides a frame of reference for all these concerns.

## **Conclusion**

This volume highlights an emerging security governance agenda which offers important opportunities to link, sequence and optimise the various elements of post-conflict peacebuilding. It has sought to analyse good (and bad) practice and to identify relevant policy guidance. A number of recommendations have emerged specific to individual issue areas. But, taken collectively, the fundamental message of these contributions calls for integrated, holistic and long-term approaches to interventions in post-conflict states. Indeed, in the face of very grave challenges, the positive message that emerges from analysis of these issues is that there is a great deal to be

learned across different issue areas in terms of good practice and cross-fertilisation of expertise which can be used to further overall peacebuilding goals. The decision to create the UN Peacebuilding Commission recognises this challenge and offers a potentially valuable mechanism to integrate different actors and approaches. However, the success of improved coordination will be measured on the ground where success is difficult to quantify and failure is all too evident.

### Notes

- 1 See: Caparini, M. Schreier F. 'Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies'; *DCAF Occasional Paper* No. 6 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, 2004)..
- 2 Evans, G., 'A Make or Break Year for the UN : Reforming the 60 Year Old', Second Sean Lester Lecture (Dublin City University: Dublin, 24 June 2005), available at URL <[www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3256&l=1](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3256&l=1)>.
- 3 See: Singer P.W., 'The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What Have We Learned and Where to Next?', *DCAF Policy Paper* (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, 2004).
- 4 See: Caparini, M., 'Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilization: The Case of the Western Balkans', Bryden, A., Hänggi, H. (eds.), *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector* (Lit: Münster, 2004), pp.151-155
- 5 United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2 (23 May 2005), p.1.