Chapter 5

Embedding DDR Programmes in Security Sector Reconstruction

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Introduction

When wars end, armed forces are generally downsized and armed groups disbanded, as signs that peace has come but also because of the costs of maintaining militaries. For the individuals concerned, this implies a major change in life. Beginning in the late 1980s, external actors began to take a keen interest in promoting post-conflict downsizing of forces and reintegration of individuals into civilian society as an instrument of post-conflict peacebuilding.[i] Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)[ii] has become the preferred shorthand term for packages of activities combining force downsizing and reintegration of former combatants into civil society, including a host of measures such as the collection of combatants in camps, their registration and discharge, generally in exchange for the surrender of weapons, and support for their start in civilian occupations. The latter can include transport to home locations, a series of cash payments, training and micro-credit schemes. While often organisationally separated, support for the reintegration of former combatants in society is nonetheless regularly included in the package, because it increases the likelihood of success of the programme, and, for the individual combatant, is the most important aspect. DDR has become part of the core repertoire of post-war donor reconstruction assistance and is rightly seen as a central element for the long-term peacebuilding process. What is often overlooked, however, is that DDR has security implications beyond the cessation of hostilities among warring parties and influences the conditions for security sector reconstruction and reform (SSR).

It will be argued here that a number of deficiencies, inconsistencies, contradictions, but predominantly losses of potential synergies mark the relationship between efforts at SSR and the policies and practices of DDR. More coordination between SSR on the one hand and DDR on the other hand would be cost-saving, beneficial for individuals concerned, and would enhance the functioning of armed and police forces. The main place for such coordination of efforts are joint military-civilian institutions of security sector governance. The argument is made here on the basis of a review of the relevant literature. Unfortunately, rather little thought has been given to the analysis of the links between SSR and DDR so far, and empirical evidence is scant.

Still, it seems that various factors are responsible for the unsatisfactory relationship between SSR and DDR, described in some depth below. One is conceptual differences. The purposes of SSR have been fairly clearly defined: the creation of effective, accountable forces and supporting structures to bring security to people. The goals of DDR programmes, on the other hand, are rather case-dependent, and range from simple downsizing and cost-cutting to a central role in peacebuilding. The wide range of objectives of DDR programmes reflects a broad spectrum of purpose in actual DDR programmes. The second discrepancy between DDR and SSR is notable in comparing the practice of DDR and SSR. Ironically, the conceptual contrast between DDR and SSR is turned upside-down when one looks at implementation. DDR consists of a set of fairly clear and standard procedures with some variety to cater to the particular case. Still, DDR programmes, of which there have by now been quite a large number in many countries, look rather similar all over the world. The prescribed programme for SSR on the other hand is vast,

and consists of many elements, including, in many cases, DDR. Practical applications of more than a few of these elements are, so far, few to note. A third important difference accounting for much of the tension between SSR and DDR are the main actors involved. SSR, within a framework of democratic security sector governance, is predominantly a process steered by domestic political actors, governmental and non-governmental, and specialists in public security institutions, although increasingly also including private actors.[iii] Development donors have also discovered SSR as a field of activity, but so far remain of secondary importance. DDR, on the other hand, involves a more limited set of actors. After the initial decisions on the extent and the character of downsizing has been made by political decisionmakers, the main actors of DDR are technical experts, generally military experts for the 'DD' and development experts, with a dominant influence of external development actors, for the 'R'. The overlap of actors in DDR and SSR is largest in peace support operations, where the security sector needs to be reconstructed or newly established. With the UN increasingly covering this task, its offices and organisations have taken on responsibilities for both SSR and DDR. Most of the available discussion on the links between SSR and DDR has accordingly been conducted within the larger debate on the integration and expansion of UN peace support operations.[iv]

The differences in concepts and practice, as well as on the level of primary actors, between SSR and DDR lead first and foremost to a delinking of what in fact are linked issues, as is argued below. Furthermore, this delinking can even lead to tensions between SSR and DDR. In both cases, the outcome is suboptimal for both policy arenas. SSR and DDR have many overlaps which are often unexploited, because of lack of coordination but also by choice of the main actors. The overlaps occur because SSR and DDR concern, in principle, the same organisations, in particular the military but also the police and other security forces, as well as overlapping groups of people. But the interests in SSR and DDR differ, which is reflected in the above mentioned range of objectives in DDR and practices in SSR.

This chapter looks at how SSR has been linked to DDR and vice versa, focusing on post-conflict situations, the most dramatic theatres for downsizing and reintegration measures, and changes in security sector institutions. Often in civil wars, DDR is part of the peace negotiation package. The need to reduce the costs of armed forces also provides powerful pressure for downsizing in all cases where wars have come to an end. Still, some DDR programmes have occurred several years after the end of fighting. The main reasons for this delayed downsizing of armed forces are the reluctance of former warring parties to agree to major force reductions soon after the conflict, and the time it takes to organise international financial support for reintegration measures. As time goes by, DDR, even if occurring in post-conflict situations, becomes more similar to downsizing in countries motivated primarily by financial considerations or the wish to modernise their forces.

Special emphasis is given throughout this chapter to security sector governance concerns. The proper place to link the approaches to SSR and DDR are security sector governance institutions. In order to be able to provide guidance to both SSR and DDR, these institutions need to include stakeholders in both SSR and DDR. The concluding section offers suggestions for improving the relation between SSR and DDR through better security governance, discussing both opportunities but also limitations of such an approach.

DDR in Post-Conflict Settings

While the combination of post-war demobilisation and support to ex-combatants is nothing new, it had not been a noticeable feature of post-war situations in developing countries until the late 1980s, when international development donors as well as peacekeepers became interested in supporting such programmes. The first United Nations peacekeeping operation to undertake

disarmament and demobilisation was the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), which was deployed in 1989.

The primary motivation for DDR programmes in post-conflict situations has been and continues to be a contribution to peacebuilding. In the words of the Brahimi Report of August 2000 on the reform of peacekeeping, DDR is a 'key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence'. It is called 'an area in which peacebuilding makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order'.[v] In a report by the UN Secretary General on The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, published in 2000, it is said: 'In the civil conflicts of the post-cold war era, a process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration has repeatedly proved to be vital to stabilising a post-conflict situation; to reducing the likelihood of renewed violence, either because of relapse into war or outbreaks of banditry; and to facilitating a society's transition from conflict to normalcy and development.'[vi] Development donors argue similarly. The World Bank, for instance, starts the internet presentation of its activities on DDR with the following observations: 'The prospects for stabilisation and recovery in conflict-affected countries largely depend on the success of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process.'[vii]

The argumentation in these and other official documents on DDR is based on a narrow perception of post-conflict security. Security is primarily seen as an issue of making peace between the former warring parties. If one side wins, it is seen as natural that the soldiers of the losing side will be demobilised. In addition, the winning party should also be able to reduce the number of its combatants. If there is no winner on the battlefield, but there is the political will to stop fighting, the future of security institutions, particularly the various forces which have fought the war, needs to be negotiated.

Putting peace first is good policy in post-conflict situations. However, the legitimate priority of satisfying the security concerns of former foes is not the only security consideration that should inform decisionmaking even early in a post-war situation. Parties which have fought in a war will not be the only relevant groups of people in need of improvements in security. The marginalisation of other groups in post-war situations at the expense of those involved in war-fighting, and thus peace-making, has been a major problem in a number of post-war situations, in some cases, such as Sudan after 2004, directly leading to renewed conflict. Moreover, in most post-conflict situations, the protection of people's lives and rights is generally at a very low level. The monopoly of force often needs to be reestablished and security provision improved. This is an interest beyond the immediate one for peace. Unfortunately, in many countries, the ending of immediate fighting has not led to a rapid improvement of physical security of people – for some cases, such as El Salvador in the mid-1990s, it is even claimed that individual physical security declined after the end of the war.[viii]

In addition to its contribution to peace, the effects of DDR on post-war security, including efforts at security sector reconstruction and reform, are therefore of interest. Two issues stand out. The first is familiar in the DDR literature and concerns the 'demand' for security, or put differently, the insecurity in a post-conflict situation. The other is often overlooked, including in the documents quoted above; and is about the way in which DDR programmes themselves are shaping the 'supply' of security, or put differently, the operation of security sector institutions.

Failed Reintegration as a Source of Insecurity

There is general agreement in the DDR literature that reintegration success has direct effects on post-war security. First, there is the immediate effect of satisfying fighting factions and their members, who often see themselves as entitled to some benefits. Lack of satisfaction with reintegration can lead to internal unrest, such as in Nicaragua in the mid-1990s, and Zimbabwe in the late 1990s. However, a more frequent effect of low levels of integration of former combatants into the regular economy is an increase in criminal activity. The danger of former combatants

using their skills as 'violence entrepreneurs' is frequently mentioned in DDR discourse: 'reintegration – or the lack thereof – will affect levels of crime and instability in the longer run.'[ix] Additionally, there can be international security effects. In the West African case, there are reports that soldiers demobilised, but not reintegrated, in Liberia were easy prey for warlords who wanted to attract fighters for the war in Côte d'Ivoire.[x] To the extent that unsuccessful reintegration contributes to high rates of criminality, it also adds to the demand for police, courts and prisons. Another repercussion is that former combatants have, in several cases, such as Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, organised politically and extracted additional funds from the government, with the argument that they had not been sufficiently rewarded.

For most former combatants, the main aspect of civilian integration is to find gainful employment or some other way to earn an income. Obviously, this is primarily an economic issue. In many countries, domestic economic actors and external donors are primarily called upon to support former combatants to find a place in civilian society. But defence and military planners also exert some influence over the forms and costs of civilian economic reintegration by deciding on numbers and types of positions to be cut. Military organisations can also help make the step from military to civilian life easier by providing combatants with qualifications which are useful in civilian life.[xi]

Observers of recent DDR processes agree that reintegration is the most difficult part of programmes, but also the least likely to be adequately funded. Comparatively large amounts of money are often programmed for reintegration support, but even when these sums can be found, they may not suffice. In addition, funds for reintegration of former combatants usually come from development assistance budgets in donor countries which often means they are slow to flow. As a result, many of the recent DDR processes have seen serious underfunding of the reintegration component. A recent example is the Liberian case, where the number of people to be reintegrated is much higher than initially planned and budgeted for, and where resources are slow in coming into the country. In early March 2005, the total number of formally demobilised combatants stood at 101,495, including 22,370 women, 8,523 boys and 2,440 girls, while the number of ex-combatants in reintegration projects was only 25,591. Projects for a further 44,502 ex-combatants were in the pipeline but many of these projects had yet to commence owing to a lack of funding.[xii]

While most recent DDR processes have occurred fairly quickly after the end of conflict, in some cases downsizing occurred only after some years, either because of security concerns or out of consideration for the people earning an income in armed forces.[xiii] In such cases, the task of preparing soldiers for civilian life is often picked up by armed forces. There are three arguments in favour of involvement by defence and military institutions in preparing combatants for reintegration. The first is that in many cases it is simply more practical, if implementation of measures which facilitate the integration of former armed forces personnel occurs within the armed forces. People are already registered, their qualification profiles and deficiencies known etc. Measures can be spread over a longer period, with counselling and training accumulating towards the end of military careers. The second reason is the effect on job satisfaction when soldiers know that their institution is preparing its members for a later civilian life. The final, and most important, reason is that unsuccessful reintegration can have major security implications. Security sector organisations are thus doing themselves a favour by helping soldiers to prepare for civilian life.

SSR Parameter Setting through DDR Programmes

While the effects of DDR programmes on security, which can only briefly be summarised here, are accepted in the DDR literature, there is much less recognition of the way in which DDR programmes influence security sector reconstruction and reform. DDR is often seen as a rather technical process, while in fact, it often is, in addition, a highly political one.[xiv] In particular, decisionmaking on the overall numbers of combatants to be demobilised as well as on who will

be kept on in security forces and who will be demobilised set important parameters for security sector reconstruction and reform. In official documents on DDR, such as the ones quoted above, these decision are seen as outside of the realm of DDR programmes, coming out of the negotiations of the warring parties, from the winning side or whomever is running the show. While such an approach may be acceptable for DDR implementers, it is inappropriate for organisations involved in DDR policy-making, planning and funding. However, many organisations, including the UN DPKO and the World Bank, have a hard time acknowledging this link between DDR and SSR.

Somewhat unrealistically, it seems to be implied in such documents that warring parties will make the right decisions about numbers, and retain only those forces necessary for future security maintenance and shed the rest. Obviously, however, warring parties and their leaders have additional interests in decisionmaking on numbers. They want to reward their fighters and protect their interests, as well as not give up power positions in the future political process, which will partly be based on the satisfaction of former fighters and their families with the DDR process. The logical result of this interest is that larger numbers of people are kept in armed forces than would be necessary for the maintenance of post-war security. One good example of this is Bosnia. The force numbers agreed in the wake of the Dayton Peace agreement are ridiculously high, considering that security in the country was to be provided by international peacekeepers. The leaders of the warring parties convinced the international community to accept these numbers as a confidence-building measure, but obviously this also provided them with a means to reward former combatants. There have been successive rounds of downsizing after the Dayton agreement, but this was largely on the insistence of external donors who funded a large part of the oversized forces.

Contrary to the impression given in many official documents, however, the international community has much influence on decisionmaking over numbers. The main leverage of the international community is money. In most conflict situations, substantial portions of the costs of domestic security forces, such as the military and police, have to be covered by bilateral donors. These obviously have an interest in reducing such costs as much as possible, offsetting to some extent the interests of warring parties to keep large numbers of troops.

Another factor shaping the framework for SSR are decisions on major personnel parameters of demobilisation. Decisions on who to demobilise and who to keep in the armed forces is, judging by official documents, largely a decision of the warring parties. There are some exceptions. The international community is very concerned about child recruitment and will therefore insist on demobilisation of all underage persons within armed groups. Similarly, the international community is concerned that special care is taken of some groups, such as female combatants, the handicapped, and people with trauma. But beyond that, the generally accepted starting point of DDR processes is that those agreeing on the terms of a peace agreement should decide. While it seems wise to leave decisions on the integration of forces, whom to keep on and whom not and so on, with the former warring parties from the point of view of peacebuilding, it is problematic from the point of view of creating and maintaining efficient and democratically controlled security institutions.

Predictably, leaders of warring parties will decide to keep those persons who are most loyal and most able, to whom they are most indebted and who will be troublesome if they feel ill-treated by their leaders. They will want to get rid of troublemakers, sick people and the handicapped. Long-serving soldiers and officers will more likely choose to stay in the armed forces than young recruits, because they will have higher merits and also would find it more difficult to reintegrate into civilian life. The likely result of decisionmaking on personnel parameters of demobilisation are first, a more efficient, and second, a more loyal, force after demobilisation.

It should be obvious from the above that DDR programmes are also defence reform projects where the decisions on who to demobilise and who to keep on are made by leaders of

warring parties. However, they are generally defence reform projects from above, in the interests of leaders of former fighting groups, and with little discussion about them. One good example of this was the DDR process in Sierra Leone in the early 2000s. Prior to the peace negotiations, a force of 5,000 soldiers was recommended in a study by ECOMOG. In the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 it was agreed that the ex-combatants of the three major fighting forces 'who wish to be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria' (Article VII). After a lengthy DDR process, during which more than 72,000 persons were formally demobilised, the Sierra Leone armed forces have a strength of 14,500 solders.[xv]

The international community has been somewhat slow to grasp these realities. In early DDR programmes they were ignored. In the Ugandan demobilisation programme of the early 1990s, for instance, many of the demobilised were HIV-infected, had disabilities, or were otherwise unfit for military service. It can well be argued that the international community, by subsidising the reintegration of these former soldiers, inadvertently paid for an increase in the efficiency of the Ugandan armed forces (but also for the spreading of HIV in the countryside where former soldiers settled after demobilisation). As it turned out, the Ugandan government later increased personnel numbers again, justifying this with the volatile situation in the Eastern DRC. In retrospect, the international development community had thus helped the Ugandan armed forces to modernise.

DDR programmes also have an influence on SSR by adding to the supply of people with certain types of skills. Former soldiers generally have at least some qualifications such as working in very regulated environments but also in dangerous situations, or the application of physical violence and weapons handling, that raise their competitiveness for positions in other parts of the security sector. When former combatants or regular soldiers look for civilian occupations, jobs in the security sector are one interesting alternative. However, the experience with employing former military personnel in police forces has been mixed. Two major cases of failure are Haiti and El Salvador.[xvi] The main reasons for failure were insufficient screening of applicants for police service and insufficient training of police recruits. This resulted in police forces more familiar with military than with police methods of dealing with problems and with large numbers of members involved in earlier war crimes. In both cases, police forces largely recruited from among former combatants had to be dissolved and new recruitment drives started. Qualifications needed by members of police forces are only partially consistent with military qualifications. Dependent on the type and organisation of police force, independence, knowledge of the law and communication skills are of overriding importance. These are generally not the skills learned in armed forces. Planning for soldiers to become police officers needs to be carefully done. The interest of a professional police force should be primary, with recruitment of former soldiers following this lead. Again, communication among those planning DDR and those planning police reconstruction and reform is central, and is best done within institutions of security sector governance.

Another part of the security sector often absorbing former combatants and ex-soldiers are private military and security companies. The private security industry has become an important, though still deficient, field of security sector governance.[xvii] The role of former armed forces personnel has not received special attention so far, although there would be some options, such as requiring former members of national armed forces to register prior to working for foreign military companies.

Linking DDR with SSR in Post-Conflict Settings

Peace agreements differ widely with respect to the scope of future security arrangements contained in their texts. In general, the focus is justifiably on the avoidance of the recurrence of fighting among the peace-making parties. One such example is the Dayton agreement with its

provisions on arms reduction and confidence-building measures. Other agreements have, however, had additional provisions, for instance on the recruitment, composition and objectives of police forces, or on elements of the rule of law, such as the division of responsibilities within federalist systems.

Still, it is safe to say that the provision of physical security of individuals from crime and violence has been of lesser concern to peace-makers, including when deciding on DDR programmes. Ways in which such links could have been made are, for instance, decisions on the composition of the security sector, the objectives of the various forces etc. Demobilisation could be used in these circumstances as an instrument to shape the conditions for the provision of security to individuals, that is human security, in post-conflict societies.

Obviously the main reason for this prevailing deficit is that priorities are generally on immediate post-crisis stabilisation. Issues related to the rule of law, to police reform, the sustainable size of forces, etc., have often been seen as later priorities, to be tackled after the immediate tasks of stabilisation have been achieved, and thus outside of the realm of DDR. In addition, DDR policy-makers and implementers are justifiably concerned with an overload of the DDR agenda. It is already a tough job to implement programmes of the desired scale and quality.

Still, it would be foolish to ignore the important links between DDR and SSR. This is clearly seen in the importance of reintegration success on criminality, but not yet as clear for DDR as influencing security sector reconstruction and reform. It is a good sign that views are changing, in post-conflict countries, among development donors, and in the international community at large. Security issues, including the build-up and democratic control over domestic security forces, are increasingly seen as integrated with the overall reconstruction effort. The traditional separation between civilian and military elements in reconstruction is slowly giving way to better coordination and cooperation. However, this is a slow and tortuous process, full of sensitivities among actors involved and contradictory outcomes.

To sum up, decisionmaking on DDR in peace agreements or early on in post-war situations is related to some elements central for SSR, particularly the size and composition of forces, but also the funding needs of security sectors, and the roles and objectives of the various institutions of the security sector. These decisions are generally made in negotiations among former warring partners and with major players in the international community, including those willing to fund post-war security sectors. They therefore tend to be shaped by the interests of the leaders of warring groups and major international actors. Main concerns are post-war stabilisation, but also costs and protection of the interests of the leader of former warring groups and their combatants, while physical security of people and SSR issues were, at least in the past, only rarely of importance.

Lessons from Post-Conflict DDR

If the above argument holds, DDR designs should not only follow the logic of preventing the recurrence of armed conflict but also more broadly take account of the effects of DDR programmes on post-war human security, including the way in which parameters are set for SSR. What would this mean in practice? DDR practitioners, academics, representatives of international organisations and particularly development donors have increasingly found decisionmaking over DDR, as described above, deficient. Several ways to address this have been suggested, and will be discussed below, namely to put SSR first, to broaden the scope of security sector governance and to better coordinate SSR and DDR planning on the ground.

Security Sector Reform First?

Obviously, it would be more logical to have a broad security assessment and an SSR planning process first – involving a wide spectrum of actors concerned with and affected by security provision – and DDR as one of the instruments of SSR. In an ideal situation, future threat analysis, development of a strategic policy framework, specific plans for security institutions, etc., should precede decisions about the level of personnel security forces should have, and how many soldiers and who should be demobilised and offered reintegration support.

Such planning, however, is generally out of the question in immediate post-war situations. Peacebuilding, including promoting trust among former warring parties, the reduction of the costs of armed formations, and giving former combatants a new, civilian perspective, are the priorities, and rightly so. Still, at least some SSR concerns should be included in peace negotiations and in immediate post-war situations. In particular, decisions taken should not be set in stone. Flexibility is also advocated in a recent practical field and classroom guide on DDR.[xviii] It also seems to be the path taken by an expert group within the Stockholm Initiative on DDR.[xix]

In cases where the international community has a strong and direct stake in post-conflict situations, international organisations seem to have the potential to implement joint DDR and SSR strategies. In post-2003 Liberia, for instance, the UN is central for both SSR and DDR efforts, though it can be questioned to which extent these efforts are really joint. The tools are available. A recent report on the advances in reforming peacekeeping by the UN Secretary General contains the following:

> The major strategic challenge in the year ahead for our approach to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is the need to develop workable arrangements for United Nations system-wide coordination of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration policy and strategy development. That would also provide opportunities for other entities, including the Bretton Woods institutions, Member States and NGOs, to contribute to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration planning and implementation processes. Recent experience in post-conflict societies has demonstrated that sustainable peace cannot be built in the absence of the rule of law and United Nations peacekeeping operations continue to expend efforts and resources on restoration of the rule of law.[xx]

The World Bank, which has been a major actor in reintegration, has used several instruments to prevent its funding from inadvertently being used for force modernisation. In the Ugandan case, for instance, the international donor community set a limit on military expenditures. The Ugandan government was told, beginning in the late 1990s, that it would lose development assistance if the share of military spending in the gross national product would rise above 2 percent. Spending caps, however, have proven to be highly problematic. In Uganda it has, for instance, led to 'creative budgeting' and a decrease in transparency in military expenditures.

The World Bank now seems to favour commitments for SSR from governments receiving DDR funding. One example is the Multi-Donor Recovery Program (MDRP), the largest post-conflict DDR programme currently running, planning the demobilisation of 455,300 ex-combatants in the African Great Lakes area. The World Bank, which leads the MDRP, has on its website lists of 'What the MDRP Is' and 'What the MDRP Is Not'. First among the former is: 'An initiative aimed at improving stability and socio-economic development in the greater Great Lakes region of Africa'. Among the latter is 'A security sector reform program'.[xxi] If that is so, how has the World Bank arrived at the numbers of ex-combatants to be demobilised, and, in consequence, to be kept in armed forces of countries in the African Great Lake area? In a paper from the MDRP program discussing these issues it is said that '[i]n order to be eligible for funding under the MDRP, the Governments concerned are expected to submit a letter of demobilisation policy that should expand on links with security sector reform, including plans for

future military size and budget, military unification and restructuring where relevant'.[xxii] In the demobilisation programme for Angola, the ADRP, the World Bank has attached a number of conditions on funding, including 'further clarity concerning the Government's plans for the security sector' and 'a net reduction in the size of the FAA (Armed Forces of Angola)'. It required the government to prepare and sign a letter of demobilisation policy outlining government commitments, including 'to the regional peace process, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform and fiscal impact of demobilisation'.[xxiii] These are beginnings in a process of greater integration of SSR and DDR programmes, but not more. For the MDRP, for instance, follow-up to letters by governments stating their SSR intentions has been very limited: 'However, once such letters are submitted, there have been very few, if any, formal or informal exchanges between partners on the subject of SSR.'[xxiv] With no follow-up it is not clear what value such arrangements have in reality. They are commitments made in certain situations. Circumstances can easily change. Moreover, it is not clear from the World Bank documents whether there are any requirements on the process of deciding on these commitments. In addition, SSR policies drawn up by governments, without consultation of stakeholders, and no democratic decisionmaking process, are not passing the basic test of security sector governance.[xxv]

Broadening the Scope of Security Sector Governance

Another and potentially complementary approach to bringing SSR thinking into decisions on DDR is to widen the circle of decisionmakers, and include a broader set of stakeholders in the provision of security. The broadening of participation in peace negotiations has been argued for from several angles. Most prominent is the inclusion of women, which has been endorsed by the UN Security Council in SCR 1325, but good arguments have been made for broad, and representative, inclusion of stakeholders in peace negotiations and post-war situations. This is obviously also true for decisions about the scope and structure of DDR programmes.

Such representation comes close to the emphasis in the literature on SSR in democratic control and governance. Of course, even very representative decisionmaking bodies may not come up with the right solutions with respect to DDR and SSR, but the likelihood that decisions are not made in the interests of particular groups of powerful leaders is lowered.

In a nutshell, the way forward in making the links between DDR and SSR stronger in post-conflict situations is security sector governance, and at least some international actors now seem to promote this approach. Obviously, neither full-blown security sector reform planning, nor a set-up of balanced security sector governance institutions is realistic in post-war situations. But what is realistic is to include a broad range of stakeholders in peace negotiations and immediate post-war decision making and to bring SSR issues to bear, including in decisions on DDR.[xxvi]

Removing Obstacles to Better Coordination

The argument for better coordination and decisionmaking in security sector governance institutions is rather straightforward. Still, limited information available both about post-conflict situations as well as major downsizing in the wake of streamlining and modernisation of armed forces indicates that it is often lacking. If so, what are the reasons?

Currently one can only speculate on an answer. One possible reason is that interests of both military and civilian actors in pursuing their priorities are often too strong to allow for better coordination, which may come at the cost of the pursuit of partial interests. Another possible reason is that the importance of coordination of SSR and DDR is too small to lead to the establishment of proper bodies for coordination. A third possible reason is that security sector governance institutions are often lacking or weak, so that it would be unrealistic to expect them to take on the role of coordinating DDR and SSR processes.

As mentioned above, the facts about the links between SSR and DDR, and the lack of coordination between the two processes are not well established and are partially speculative. DDR practitioners are often overwhelmed by the various demands on DDR programmes and warn of overloading DDR programmes. However, increasingly, it is argued that the political nature of DDR programmes cannot be ignored and their broad security implications beyond immediate peacebuilding have to be considered, including on post-war human security. Still, rather little research has so far been done on the security conditions and security implications of DDR. Most of the limited research on DDR focuses on practical matters, or on effects on peacebuilding.[xxvii] Research on its implications for individual security, particularly crime rates and crime prevention, is scarce, despite the often made assumptions about the effects of failed reintegration on crime. SSR is even less well researched, partly because of the novelty of this concept, which remains contentious in both its content and usefulness. More research would therefore seem important before more definitive answers can be given as to how important the lack of coordination between SSR and DDR actually is, how the interests of various types of actors in such coordination can be overcome and what kind of security sector governance institutions are best suited to deal with these problems.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The main arguments made in this chapter were that: (1) there are several important links between SSR and DDR; (2) these can be detrimental to both the success of SSR and DDR but also be used to improve, through better coordination, the success of both SSR and DDR; and (3) institutions of security sector governance are the best place for such coordination.

The most important link is that between DDR and SSR in post-conflict situations. DDR influences the conditions for SSR both on the supply side – by setting initial force sizes and selection between who is to be demobilised and who not – and on the demand side – by affecting the security situation, particularly with respect to crime and the likelihood of resurgence of armed conflict. In theory, it would be preferable to let an SSR process precede DDR. However, this often is not possible because of the pressing need to downsize armed forces, as an element in peacebuilding as well as for financial reasons. In addition, there are often clashes of interest, particularly between national military decisionmakers, who want to prioritise SSR and see DDR as a kind 'mopping up' of those parts of the former military sector not seen as needed for the new military, and some civilian actors, often including external development donors, who want to prioritise demilitarisation. These actors tend to see the modernisation of armed forces as counter to the objectives of DDR processes. In such a constellation of interests, institutions of security sector governance, which bring these various interests together in a deliberative process that ends with democratic decisionmaking, are of great importance. Currently, there generally is a lack of such security sector governance institutions, sometimes leading to misunderstandings about the objectives and practical implementation of DDR and SSR processes.

Lack of policy coordination in post-war reconstruction is not specific to SSR and DDR, but a rather general phenomenon. Efforts at better integration can therefore benefit from general progress in the area of policy coordination, which is currently a subject of much debate in the development donor community.[xxviii] Based on the above discussion three recommendations seem to be of particular importance for improving coordination.

The first recommendation is to raise awareness of the effects of the design and implementation of DDR programmes on the provision of security beyond the immediate interest of satisfying the demands of parties to a peace agreement. Some of the links are broadly accepted, such as the one between reintegration success and post-war criminality. Others, however, are often overlooked, particularly the ways in which decisions on DDR programmes set parameters for security sector reconstruction and reform. Part of this awareness-raising effort needs to be

more research into the links between DDR and SSR. Recent studies on human security in local settings seem to provide a particularly useful avenue for such research.[xxix]

The second recommendation is to broaden decisionmaking on DDR in view of the recognition of the effects of DDR beyond immediate post-war confidence-building. This should occur within the framework of a general expansion of decisionmaking on security issues in post-war situations. There is no reason to create specific governance institutions to deal with the links between DDR and wider security considerations. Rather it would seem possible that this first be done in the forum where peace is negotiated, to be followed later on by more permanent institutions that allow the relevant stakeholders voice and influence.

A third recommendation is for the international community to broaden its perspective on DDR. There are major institutional obstacles already in the current situation, with design and implementation of DDR programmes generally marked by a multitude of actors with differing interests and mandates. Current efforts to achieve greater consistency, such as the Stockholm Initiative, as well as 'learning by doing', for instance in the MDRP programme, are welcome improvements. However, more policy discussion, as well as the coordination of implementation, will need to be done to better address the full complexity of DDR programmes, including their effect on security sector reform.

Notes

i   A good summary of standard practice is: Gleichmann, C., Odenwald, M., Wilkinson A., *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. A Practical Field and Classroom Guide* (GTZ: Frankfurt, 2004). A critical assessment can be found in Knight, M., Özerdem, A., 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 41, no. 4 (2004), pp. 499-516.

ii Acronyms with more Rs are also in use, with the letter standing for activities such as reinsertion, repatriation or resettlement. All of these R-terms are problematic in many cases, where combatants have no area or work to go back to, or choose not to.

iii See for instance Ball, N., Bouta, T., Van de Goor, L., *Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework*, (Clingendael/Netherlands Institute of International Relations: The Hague, 2003).

iv See for example Eide, E., Kaspersen, A., Kent, R., von Hippel, K., *Report on Integrated Missions. Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group (United Nations: New York, May 2005).

v   United Nations, *Report of the Panel on Peacekeeping Operations*, UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000), para 42.

vi United Nations, *The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, Report of the Secretary General, UN doc. S/2000/101 (2000).

vii See URL <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/Themes>.

viii   Cruz, J. M., Trigueros, A., González, F., *El crimen violento en El Salvador: Factores sociales y económicos asociados*, report prepared for the World Bank project on violence in Latin America (Washington, DC, 2000).

ix Kaspersen, A., Eide, E., Hansen, A., *International Policing and the Rule of Law in Transitions from War to Peace*, working papers from NUPI's UN Programme (Oslo, 2003).

x   Paes, W-C., 'The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping* vol. 12, no. 2, (2005), pp. 253-261.

xi The same questions of training and education, certification of qualifications, housing, personal attitudes etc. are relevant for soldiers with time-limited contracts of medium length. In armed forces where many soldiers serve on medium-term contracts, measures which ease the later reintegration into civilian life are often found. This is generally different in armies where most longer-serving soldiers are lifetime professionals, as was the case in the former socialist countries.

xii United Nations Security Council, *Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN doc. S/2005/177 (17 March 2005).

xiii   See the list of DDR programs collected in Ball, N., Hendricksen, D., *Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,* Phase 1 Report to Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Stockholm, May 16, 2005).

xiv See Pouligny, B., *The Politics and Antipolitics of Contemporary DDR Programmes* (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationals, Science Po/CNRS; Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale; Programme d'Etudes Stratégieques et de la Sécurité International: Paris and Geneva, 2004).

xv See Gbla, O., 'Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone', *International Peacekeeping* (forthcoming).

xvi Call, C. T., 'War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America'. *Comparative Politics* vol. 35, no. 1 (October), pp. 1-20.

xvii Singer, P. W., *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 2003); Wulf, H., *Die Internationalisierung und Privatisierung von Krieg und Frieden* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2005); Holmquist, C., *Private Security Companies. The Case for Regulation*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 9 (SIPRI: Stockholm, January 2005).

xviii See Gleichmann et al, *op. cit.*

xix See the first interim report from Working Group 1 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, URL <www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/03/52/81/51fbd940.pdf>.

xx United Nations, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, Report of the Secretary General, UN doc. A/58/694 (26 January 2004).

xxi See URL <www.mdrp.org>.

xxii Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, *Linkages between Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Security Sector Reform*, position paper, (Washington, DC, October 2003).

xxiii World Bank, *Technical Annex for a Proposed Grant of SDR 24 million (US$ 33 million equivalent) to the Republic of Angola for an Angola emergency demobilization and reintegration project*, report no. T7580-ANG (World Bank: Washington, DC, 7 March 2003).

xxiv See World Bank, *op. cit.*

xxv See Ball, N., Bouta, T., Van de Goor, L., *op. cit.*

xxvi See also the discussions in: International Peace Academy, *Challenges in Peacekeeping: Past Present and Future* (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and International Peace Academy: New York, 20 October 2002).

xxvii See for example Kingma, K. (ed.), *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts* (Macmillan Publishers: Basingstoke, 2000); Gleichmann, C., et al, *op. cit.*

xxviii See for example United Nations Development Group and World Bank, *An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices. Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States* (Washington, DC, January 2005).

xxix See Burgess, P., Owen, T. (eds.), 'Special Issue on Human Security', *Security Dialogue* vol. 35, no. 4 (2004); Debiel, T., Werthes, S., 'Human Security–Vom politischen Leitbild zum integralen Baustein eines neuen Sicherheitskonzepts?', *Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F)* vol. 23, no. 1 (2005), pp. 7-14.