

ANNEX 5.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS



NATO Parliamentary Assembly

Spring Session - Sofia, Bulgaria May 2002

Forty-eighth Annual Session – Istanbul, Turkey, November 2002

AV 249

SA (02) 15

Original: English

International Secretariat

<http://www.nato-pa.int>

November 2002

Table of Contents

Declaration (Sofia)

315 NATO Enlargement.....190

Resolutions

316 Kaliningrad.....194

317 NATO Structural Reform and ESDP.....197

318 Iraq200

319 Terrorist Financing.....202

320 Strengthening the Transatlantic Security Partnership.....205

321 Terrorism with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons.....210

Declaration (Istanbul)

322 NATO Transformation.....213

DECLARATION 315
on
NATO ENLARGEMENT*

2. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly, meeting in plenary sitting in Sofia on Tuesday 28 May, confirms that NATO's purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Therefore,

The Assembly,

2. *Recalling* that under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, "the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to the Treaty";

3. *Recalling* its strong support for NATO enlargement expressed during its sessions in Vilnius and Ottawa;

4. *Stressing* that enlargement has a dominant political rationale through the projection of security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. It emphasizes the benefits to be gained in the light of changing circumstances from broadening the Alliance so that NATO can act as a forum for political consultations among democratic nations as well as for co-operation in and co-ordination of military and security activities;

5. *Stressing* that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose a significant threat to NATO countries, enlargement is part of a broader policy to build an alliance that ensures security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance is open to tolerant, democratic societies, embracing values that terrorism seeks to destroy. At the same time, enlargement promotes military and security efforts to combat threats to stability;

6. *Emphasising* that the military dimension of the Alliance remains an indispensable component of NATO's new role through the provision of the appropriate capabilities and a framework for military co-operation, co-ordination and interoperability;

*Presented by Peter Viggers (United Kingdom), Chairman of the Political Committee, at the request of Rafael Estrella, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, amended and adopted at the plenary sitting during the Spring Session in Sofia, Bulgaria, in May 2002.

7. *Agreeing* that a broad and regionally balanced enlargement of NATO is an essential part of the transformation of the Alliance;
8. *Recognising* and *appreciating* the efforts made by all aspirant countries towards NATO membership and *expressing* gratitude to these countries for the solidarity shown and for their contribution to the fight against terrorism and NATO efforts following 11 September;
9. *Noting* that Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have proved their progress towards NATO membership through successful programmes of reform at home and their contributions to NATO operations in the Balkans;
11. *Stressing* to aspirant countries the importance of maintaining their current efforts aimed at meeting the criteria for membership outlined in NATO's 1995 study on enlargement, upon which the Council will decide in Prague; and *reminding* each invited country that if it should falter in its commitment to reform, the member parliaments of the Assembly may decide to delay or even reject ratification of the treaty protocol needed for that country to join the Alliance;
11. CALLS UPON Alliance Heads of State and Government at their next Summit in Prague, on 21 and 22 November:
- a. to invite to commence accession talks those aspirant countries assessed to be ready for Alliance membership and whose accession is judged to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;
 - b. to continue the "open door" policy after the Prague Summit, and in particular to assist aspirant countries on their way towards NATO membership;
 - e. to accelerate and intensify co-operation and partnership programmes with aspirant countries and to continue and strengthen the Membership Action Plan in order to assist them in meeting NATO's requirements for eventual entry into NATO;
 - f. to indicate an approximate timeframe for the consideration of these candidate countries, if there is no deterioration in their respective progress in meeting the NATO criteria for membership;

e. to declare that the NATO Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, which are willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe;

12. CALLS UPON the constituent parliaments of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to give their consent to and/or campaign for ratification of the necessary treaty protocols;

13. BELIEVES that a substantially enlarged NATO, together with the adoption of other fundamental changes and improvements, will ensure the future relevance of the North Atlantic Alliance with Article 5 as its essential part.

DECLARATION 316

on

KALININGRAD*

The Assembly,

1. *Acknowledging* that peace and security are important to NATO and therefore *encouraging* agreements that establish good relations between the European Union and Russia;
2. *Recognising* the unique situation of Russia's Kaliningrad region;
3. *Understanding* the importance Russia attaches in particular to the movement of Russian citizens between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia after EU enlargement;
4. *Taking due account of* the EU's safety and security concerns about its frontiers, and of its insistence that the future transit of persons to and from Kaliningrad *Oblast* be in line with the Schengen *acquis*;
5. *Recalling* that co-operation on Kaliningrad forms part of the broader EU-Russia Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, which will become even more important for both the EU and Russia after EU enlargement;
6. *Insisting* on the necessity to strike a balance between national interests and international constraints and to work out a solution on the transit to and from Kaliningrad which should not prevent or in any way delay full participation of the new EU Member States in the Schengen regime;

* Presented by the Committee on Civil Dimension of Security.

7. WELCOMES the decisions of the European Union-Russia Summit in Brussels of 11 November 2002 on the transit between Kaliningrad *Oblast* and the rest of the territory of Russia, including those regarding the elimination of concerns of both parties about the future transit of people and cargo between Kaliningrad *Oblast* and other regions of Russia and the stepping up of their co-operation to accelerate the socio-economic development of the whole *Oblast* in general;

8. CALLS UPON the European Union:

- a. to speed up accession talks with EU candidate countries on joining the Schengen area as soon as possible;
- b. to pursue with its offer to assist in implementing the package on movement of people, including with additional costs and the opening of additional consulates in Kaliningrad;
- c. to discuss without delay the measures which Russia is putting in place to strengthen the rule of law, to intensify the fight against organised crime and ensure effective border security;
- d. to enhance practical co-operation on border management, as an essential instrument in tackling trans-border crime and illegal immigration and in preventing the free movement of criminal and terrorist elements;
- e. to forge a long-term, concerted and comprehensive strategy with Russia for the economic and infrastructural development of Kaliningrad, with accompanying measures in tackling social, health and environmental problems;

9. CALLS UPON the Russian authorities:

- a. *to implement without delay the arrangements agreed upon at the EU-Russia Summit on 11 November 2002 in accordance with all parties concerned;*
- b. *to show a sustained commitment to investing in securing Russia's borders, to reducing criminal activity in Kaliningrad Oblast and making headway with law-enforcement, legal, social and economic reforms;*

- c. to start without delay negotiations on the signing of readmission agreements with the EU, Lithuania and Poland as well as on the ratification of border agreements between Russia and all three Baltic States;
- d. *to inform Kaliningraders and the rest of the Russian population about the EU's package on movement of people to and from the enclave, in an open and co-operative manner.*

DECLARATION 317
on
NATO STRUCTURAL REFORM AND ESDP*

The Assembly,

1. *Declaring* that allied countries remain committed to defend one another against all threats to our security from any hostile governments or non-state actors;
2. *Finding* that terrorism constitutes a grave threat to the security of the Alliance today, which requires a comprehensive approach involving all means at our disposal;
3. *Recalling* that the NATO Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in response to the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States;
4. *Observing* that while military personnel from many allied countries contributed to *Operation Enduring Freedom*, NATO as an institution played a limited role;
5. *Recognising* that NATO must reform its structures in order to be able to command missions outside of the Euro-Atlantic region if so directed by its member governments;
6. *Aware* of discussions to transform the NATO command structure to create a streamlined organisation that would be capable of deploying headquarters and forces wherever they are needed to combat threats to the security of the Alliance;
7. *Commending* work on NATO's force structure review, which is developing a set of high-readiness headquarters able to command out-of-area operations at the corps level;
8. *Pointing out* that more deployable forces are needed for such missions;
9. *Supporting* the new capabilities initiative agreed by NATO Defence Ministers that will focus on a small number of capabilities essential to the full range of Alliance missions;

*Presented by the Defence and Security Committee.

10. *Reasserting* our determination to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and to support the building and strengthening of the European Security and Defence Policy in such a way that it will add to the strength of the Alliance;
11. *Remembering* that the European Union's Helsinki Headline Goal calls for the EU to develop by 2003 the ability to deploy a corps-sized rapid reaction force, with appropriate air and naval assets, to enhance the credibility of common foreign policy objectives and, if necessary, to manage crises when NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged;
12. *Recognising* the progress made to conclude the Berlin Plus agreements between NATO and the EU to ensure access by the EU to NATO assets and capabilities;
13. *Disappointed* that ongoing disagreements obstruct the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreements between NATO and the EU despite all progress already achieved, stopping the EU's ability to conduct crisis management operations;
14. *Supporting* efforts to overcome the current impasse concerning permanent arrangements between NATO and the EU;
15. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to make the fight against terrorism and against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction a central mission of the Alliance;
 - b. to reform NATO structures to enable the Alliance to carry out this mission;
 - c. to ensure that the new command structure enables NATO to deploy headquarters wherever the Alliance needs to perform its missions;
 - d. to develop national armed forces that can be deployed and sustained wherever they are needed to combat threats to the security of the Alliance;
 - e. to fulfil their NATO Force Goals, and to make these goals transparent so that parliaments and publics can monitor compliance;

- f. to work out appropriate arrangements with the European Union to enable it in the spirit of genuine partnership to draw on NATO assets and capabilities for its Rapid Reaction Force whenever NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged;
 - g. to work to ensure coherence between the proposed NATO Response Force and the EU Rapid Reaction Force and to ensure complementarity of NATO and EU capability initiatives;
16. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance that are also members of the European Union to fulfil the Helsinki Headline Goal by the 2003 target date.

DECLARATION 318

on IRAQ*

The Assembly,

1. *Recalling* that after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq agreed to United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which requires Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes. In addition, Resolution 687 also requires Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of its programme to develop or acquire ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km. In accordance with that resolution, Iraq undertook unconditionally not to develop weapons of mass destruction or prohibited ballistic missiles thereafter. On numerous occasions since 1991, the UN Security Council has reaffirmed Resolution 687, most recently in Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 8 November 2002;
2. *Remembering* that Iraqi non-compliance with Resolution 687 led UN weapons inspectors to leave Iraq in 1998, ending international efforts to monitor its compliance with UN resolutions;
3. *Citing* evidence presented by the government of the United Kingdom and by non-governmental organisations that demonstrates that Iraq has continued to develop weapons of mass destruction and prohibited ballistic missiles, despite UN resolutions;
4. *Declaring* that the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest security threat today to the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and many other countries around the world;
5. *Asserting* that Iraq's failure to comply with its international obligations to destroy or dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programme and prohibited ballistic missile programme, its record of using weapons of mass destruction, its record of using force against

*Presented by the Defence and Security Committee.

neighbouring states, and its support for international terrorism require a strong diplomatic and, if necessary, military response by the international community;

6. *Noting* the acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 by the Iraqi authorities;
7. URGES the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to act together to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which requires that UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq;
 - b. to work through the United Nations to ensure Iraqi compliance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions in order to secure the dismantlement of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme and prohibited ballistic missile programme;
 - c. to ensure that UN weapons inspectors have immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites, records, officials and other persons within Iraq in order to determine whether Iraq is in compliance with UN resolutions;
 - d. to declare that failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and co-operate fully in the implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations, and that Iraq will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;
 - e. to prepare, if Iraq does not comply with UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq, for the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq following any possible use of force, particularly to ensure that any Iraqi government respects the principles of representative government and rule of law.

DECLARATION 319
on
TERRORIST FINANCING*

The Assembly,

1. *Conscious* that terrorism represents a threat to global security, economic well-being and democratic development;
2. *Concerned* about the direct and indirect burdens terrorism imposes on Western economies including higher insurance premiums, the need to defend enterprises and make critical economic infrastructure more robust;
3. *Recognising* that governments and central banks played a critical role in limiting the macro-economic impact of the 11 September 2001 attacks;
4. *Aware* that increased government spending associated with the broad response to the threat has the potential to generate costly economic distortions if not properly managed;
5. *Noting* that the private sector has been and will remain a key player in helping our societies manage the cost of terrorism in an efficient and comprehensive manner;
6. *Acknowledging* both the advantages and the increased vulnerabilities associated with our societies' ever-mounting reliance on highly complex and integrated communications, energy, water, food, and information networks;
7. *Applauding* the steps taken by international organisations and governments to promote greater financial transparency and to counter money laundering as laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 1373; yet,
8. *Troubled* that terrorist organizations are nonetheless still positioned to exploit the vulnerabilities within the international financial system and are continuing to funnel financial resources to terrorist cells;

*Presented by the Economics and Security Committee.

9. *Noting* that international terrorism is closely linked to international organized crime and increasingly funds acts of violence through drug smuggling, fraud, illegal gem sales, and human trafficking;
10. *Welcoming* the recognition on the part of many Western governments that development assistance can be one tool in fighting the conditions that make terrorism possible;
11. *Supporting* the commitments in the Monterrey Consensus on financing for development on the need to improve the volume and effectiveness of development assistance;
12. *Lamenting* the West's failure to open up certain commercial markets to developing countries, a policy which would bring greater levels of prosperity to many unstable and impoverished regions of the world;
13. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to focus on uprooting and destroying the financial networks of terrorism by better co-ordinating efforts to eradicate money laundering and illicit fund transfers, strengthening national and international regulations and harmonizing relevant aspects of financial legislation;
 - b. to use the power of intervention judiciously in order to ensure that liberal financial and commercial markets will continue to flourish and provide a foundation for broader social welfare;
 - c. to encourage both the public and private sectors to review continuously the vulnerability of crucial economic infrastructure to acts of terrorism and, where necessary, develop more robust systems better able to resist attack;
 - d. to encourage international banks to adopt strong "know your customer" rules and to monitor carefully the activities of their subsidiaries;
 - e. to blacklist and sanction countries and institutions which do not comply with international money laundering standards;
 - f. to demand stricter controls for non-standard traditional banking and financial structures, religious charities and other organisations which have either facilitated terrorist fund transfers or directly underwritten terrorist activities;
 - g. to press ahead in the development of alternative energy sources and the promotion of energy conservation in order to reduce Western energy dependencies on unstable regions of the world;

- h. to implement further increases in aid to less developed countries as well as greater access to Western markets to promote global economic development and stability;
- i. to develop a comprehensive security concept that includes access to education and health care and the alleviation of poverty through national foreign aid programmes for developing countries;
- j. to implement the standards and guidelines of relevant international financial "watchdogs" like the Financial Action Task Force and Interpol to combat illegal financial activities, to encourage those "watchdogs" to improve the exchange of information among them, and to encourage NATO to track the efforts of international "watchdogs" so that the Alliance is positioned to make accurate assessments of terrorist capabilities and threats.

DECLARATION 320
on
STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY PARTNERSHIP*

The Assembly,

1. *Declaring* that close transatlantic policy co-operation and co-ordination has been pivotal in securing peace, prosperity and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO remains indispensable to achieve this goal;
2. *Anticipating and welcoming* the intention to invite seven states to join the Alliance as a major contribution to the transformation of NATO and the strengthening of stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area;
3. *Recognising* the substantial efforts and reforms as well as their contributions to peace and stability in South-East Europe of the three other applicants: Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia **;
4. *Reaffirming* that the Alliance is open to any democratic European country that is willing and able to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;
5. *Considering* that the promotion of the Alliance's common values is one of the driving forces behind NATO's co-operation with its partner countries;
6. *Stressing* the critical importance of co-operation with Russia in the fight against terrorism and in maintaining security in the Euro-Atlantic area and *commending* the establishment of the NATO Russia Council on 28 May 2002 at the Rome Summit;
7. *Asserting* that NATO needs to tackle the threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at the Prague Summit;

*Presented by the Political Committee

**Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

8. *Recalling* that one of NATO's primary contributions in the fight against terrorism lies in assisting in the formation and maintaining the cohesion of a broad coalition, apart from military contributions, including the resolution of regional conflicts, the defence of forces and populations against attacks by NBC weapons and the co-ordinated use of intelligence;
9. *Stating* that in the context of the fight against terrorism, strengthening co-operation between the US, Canada, the European Union and other NATO Allies on internal security issues is needed, in particular between the police and judicial prosecution in order to effectively deal with terrorist networks as well as their overlap with organised crime and the illegal trade in drugs, human beings and arms;
10. *Reflecting* that cutting-off terrorist financing and that a common legal framework for dealing with international terrorism calls for stronger co-operation with the United Nations and international financial institutions on the basis of the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which creates a solid legal basis for effective counteraction against international terrorism;
11. *Emphasising* that international diplomacy can contribute significantly to preventing proliferation of WMD, and that strengthening arms control, particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as arms export control regimes, should be a priority of all NATO member countries;
12. *Praising* the G8 for making a substantial and long-term financial contribution to the "Global Partnership" programme for the former Soviet Union, and in particular Russia, as a means of encouraging effective implementation of international safety, security and verification standards for fissile materials;
13. *Reaffirming* that NATO's core tasks remain relevant and critical to the security of the Alliance:
 - a. Collective defence: the commitment to collective defence and the integrated force structure have prevented a re-nationalisation of defence policies among member countries, and play an important role in dealing with applicants and other partners;

- b. Partnerships: NATO has developed a broad network of relations with partner countries, - including Russia and Ukraine - as well as international organisations, making it a key factor in co-operation on international security;
 - c. Crisis management: over the last decade NATO has become one of the most important actors in international crisis management, the resolution of regional conflicts and peace missions;
 - d. To take steps that would allow the use of NATO's Integrated Air Defence System where the threat of imminent terrorist attacks is directed against civil targets used for NATO purposes, upon the request of the country concerned;
14. *Recognising* that collective defence is the core of the Alliance and that sufficient military assets remain absolutely essential, but that non-military tools, including diplomacy, economic and financial assistance can play an important part in defending security and projecting stability beyond NATO's borders;
15. *Reminding* that a strengthening of the European pillar and a successful implementation of the EU Headline Goal are key factors in strengthening NATO's military capabilities;
16. *Declaring* that all Member States of the Alliance remain committed to bringing long-term peace, stability and prosperity to South-East Europe;
17. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to invite Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to start accession talks and to keep supporting them and the other aspirants in their efforts to meet NATO standards within the context of the Membership Action Plan (MAP);
 - b. to reiterate the commitment to NATO's open door policy after invitations to new members have been extended and to continue to recognise and support the efforts Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** are undertaking towards meeting NATO standards within the context of MAP;

- c. to continue interaction with Russia in practical co-operation and carrying out joint projects and operations in order to build mutual trust, establish interoperability, and subsequently, broaden the agenda of the NATO-Russia Council;
- d. to intensify and expand the existing partnerships of the Alliance, in particular the Distinctive Partnership with Ukraine in the form of the Action Plan, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Partnership for Peace as well as co-operation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC);
- e. to seek closer co-operation between NATO and the OSCE, and - where appropriate - the Council of Europe, in preventing internal instability as well as promoting democratic governance and the rule of law;
- f. to strengthen co-operation between the States party to the Convention on the International Criminal Court and non-party States in dealing with crimes against humanity, new crimes and genocide;
- g. to strengthen NATO's role as the primary forum for consultations among the US, Canada and their European partners for addressing crucial security issues;
- h. to strengthen and support existing arms control regimes as well as develop new mechanisms and provide financing for regimes to prevent the proliferation of WMD, for effective monitoring, for implementation and for the sanctioning of non-compliance;
- i. to discuss as a matter of urgency whether - and if so, under which conditions - pre-emptive action might be a complement to the strategy of deterrence and containment, and compliant with international law;
- j. to consider making maximum use of NATO's integrated structures in leading ISAF in Afghanistan;
- k. to seek closer co-operation between NATO and the European Union, especially in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and the international fight against terrorism;
- l. to overcome any remaining reservations and contribute constructively to the establishment of permanent arrangements for co-operation between NATO and the EU;

- m. to ensure the continuation of a peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** beyond 15 December 2002 either as a NATO- or a EU-led mission;
- n. to consider the adaptation of the mandate of operation Task Force Fox (TFF) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** according to the request of the new Macedonian Government to include monitoring of the border.

RESOLUTION 321
on
TERRORISM WITH CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL
AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS*

The Assembly,

1. *Persuaded* that the events of 11 September 2001 have confirmed the existence of a kind of terrorism driven by religious motivations or other ideological objectives, which strives to inflict mass casualties on their enemies;
2. *Recognising* that these terrorist groups have a variety of financing, information resources, weapons and illicit material at their disposal;
3. *Extremely concerned* that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda are actively engaged in efforts to acquire chemical, biological, and radiological weapons for use in terrorist attacks;
4. *Conscious* that the anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001 signalled that we have entered a new, dangerous era in biological weapons terrorism;
5. *Convinced* that fast advances in science and technology - notably in biotechnology - as well as their rapid diffusion in a globally networked world, are creating new vulnerabilities;
6. *Concerned* that terrorists, taking advantage of the poor security conditions at some sites, might illegally acquire chemical and biological agents, nuclear material or other weapons technologies stemming from programmes of the former Soviet Union;
7. *Persuaded* that effective measures to deter and defend against terrorism using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, as well as cyber attacks, should be accomplished through a co-ordinated, multilateral effort to the extent practicable;
8. *Convinced* that to maximise effectiveness in reducing the scope of the threat, the international response firstly requires an integrated transatlantic approach, particularly in the

* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee.

areas of law enforcement, intelligence sharing, norm building, defence/preparedness, lessons learned analysis, research and development;

9. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to make all non-military attempts at resolving, moderating and containing conflicts that would reduce the danger of anyone wanting to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons;
- b. to advance a global legal and moral proscription on the possession and use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons; and eventually establish an international agreement to make the possession and use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons a crime against humanity;
- c. to reinforce the system of nuclear safeguards established by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to continue work on ratification by all countries of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
- d. to encourage the Governments of Russia and the United States to work co-operatively to assure the security of their arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons; refrain from expanding their existing arsenals, work towards an agreement regarding future reductions of such weapons; and work together to discourage or prevent the acquisition of such weapons by other nations;
- e. to widen the membership of the Biological Weapons Convention and strengthen its obligations, possibly including mechanisms for compliance and verification;
- f. to include in the work of the NATO-Russia Council the question of the former Soviet Union's biological weapons programme, with a view to dismantling completely any remaining facilities and preventing them from falling into the hands of terrorist groups or countries;
- g. to strengthen the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by maintaining the principle of independent, transparent and sound management, and increasing emphasis on verification of non-compliance, which should include the use of challenge inspections;
- h. to control the transfer of classified information that could be used for chemical and biological weapons and to restrict access to genetic information on dangerous pathogens while remaining sensitive to legitimate scientific, medical, or other research that could potentially be used on weapons of mass destruction;
- i. to take concerted national actions to tighten bio-security regulations and consistently increase physical protection of highly lethal biological agents;

- j. to reinforce all international (multilateral and bilateral) initiatives to assist Russia to destroy, dismantle and secure nuclear weapons in accordance with arms control agreements ratified with the United States; and to assist partner countries to secure nuclear material and facilities stemming from programmes of the former Soviet Union;
- k. to amend the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and expand it to cover civil nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport and nuclear facilities;
- l. to intensify international police co-operation to properly address the threat of illegal nuclear trafficking;
- m. to be prepared to take, within the boundaries of international law, police operations or multilateral military actions against preparations for all varieties of mass casualty terrorist acts;
- n. to create a continuously updated database of terrorist groups and incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons;
- o. to enhance the capabilities of the World Health Organisation to monitor global infectious disease trends and unusual outbreaks;
- p. to enhance the Alliance's defences against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks, including better training, improved protective equipment, and the development and procurement of mobile air sensors for early warning;
- q. to devise nationally integrated responses to terrorist attacks, which include public information strategies and the preparation and training of first responders and medical staff in recognising and responding to unfamiliar agents and adapting to new medical conditions;
- r. to develop arrangements for swift and effective international assistance to complement and support national defensive and treatment capacities.

DECLARATION 322
on
NATO TRANSFORMATION*

1. *NATO's Founding Purpose*

1.1. NATO was created to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means; its core role is the commitment to collective defence in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As the embodiment of the transatlantic relationship, NATO has provided the foundation for the peace and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. NATO's success has been due to the consistent unity of purpose of its members bound together by common values and principles. The mechanisms for consultation, co-operation and co-ordination of policy, for the harmonisation of defence and operational plans, and the development of common habits and working practices have made NATO the unique organisation it remains today.

2. *The Need for Alliance Adaptation*

2.1. Since 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the challenges to the collective security of Alliance members have changed profoundly. NATO has responded by adopting new roles and missions, namely the projection of stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area through a policy of partnership and co-operation with former adversaries, the incorporation of new members and the deployment of armed forces for peace support operations outside its formal boundaries. As a result of the changes in the security environment and the assumption of new missions, the Alliance updated its Strategic Concept in 1999 and set in train profound changes to its command and force structures.

2.2. As we move into the twenty-first century, NATO must again adapt to new threats to our collective security. The purpose of the Alliance remains the safeguarding of the security of its members. This will continue to require the projection of stability and security, the participation in crisis response operations in the Euro-Atlantic area, and the maintenance of adequate

*Presented by Rafael Estrella (Spain), President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, on behalf of the Standing Committee, amended and adopted during the plenary sitting of the 48th Annual Session in Istanbul on Tuesday 19 November 2002.

levels and types of armed forces necessary to fulfil the wide spectrum of NATO's commitments.

2.3. However, NATO's approach to collective security must now take account of, and respond to, the new threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the atrocities of 11 September 2001 and subsequent developments have shown, these new threats know no boundaries and cover a wide spectrum of activities, military and non-military.

2.4. NATO has already demonstrated political and military solidarity with the invocation of Article 5. Members and partners have also contributed to the operations in Afghanistan. The Alliance must build upon this co-operation in future operations and as a contribution to world peace and stability.

2.5. Terrorism and the proliferation of WMD together pose a qualitatively new threat to our societies. Dealing with them will require action on a wide range of fronts: military, political, economic, social, financial, technological and judicial. NATO provides a unique forum for co-ordination and co-operation in several of these areas. It is essential that NATO identify and accord priority to those areas where it has a comparative advantage and where it can assume a leading role. It should also identify those areas where it needs to co-operate and co-ordinate with other organisations, especially the European Union which possesses unique instruments in the field of justice and home affairs. Maintaining a proper balance between freedom and security will be a major challenge for our societies.

2.6. The emergence of these new threats will have consequences for the roles, missions and capabilities of NATO's armed forces. NATO members' forces must therefore be capable of taking action wherever the security of the members is threatened, upon the basis of the United Nations Charter. The declared willingness to undertake such actions will strengthen the deterrent element of Alliance strategy by making clear that there is no safe haven for those who would threaten our societies or for those who would harbour such people. The need for Alliance action, based upon unequivocal evidence should be decided on a case-by-case basis by the North Atlantic Council and, as always, will be based on consensus. Where NATO as a whole is not engaged then Allies willing to take action should be able to make use of NATO assets, procedures and practices.

2.7. While guidance in the 1999 Strategic Concept remains relevant and continues to provide an appropriate basis for Alliance policies, greater priority must now be accorded to defence against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.

2.8. We believe that NATO remains uniquely equipped to play a primary role in the new security environment and in dealing with the most immediate challenges. However, harnessing the Alliance's full potential will require substantial adjustments to capabilities and structures. This includes the internal structures within NATO itself. The profound changes required are urgent.

2.9. We are aware that threats and challenges the Alliance faces require continuous modernisation of the Member States' armed forces. Therefore, defence expenditures must be effective and well directed; research in the field of defence should be co-ordinated with particular emphasis on balanced exchanges of technology between the United States and the other Members of the Alliance. There is a need to consider an increase in defence budgets.

3. *Enlargement*

3.1. The enlargement of NATO is central to the transformation of the Alliance. The admission of new members to the Alliance will strengthen NATO, increase the security and stability of Europe and provide a further impulse for reform and reorganisation. At its Session in Sofia in May 2002, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly called for a broad and regionally balanced enlargement and recognised that Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have proved their progress towards NATO membership through successful programmes of reform at home and their contributions to NATO operations in the Balkans.

3.2. Therefore, on the understanding that the reform processes in these countries will be vigorously pursued, the Assembly recommends that invitations be issued to these seven countries at the Prague Summit; and further calls upon NATO national parliaments to ensure the smooth passage of ratification. The Assembly's Standing Committee is ready to include in its work the representatives of the new member countries as soon as the protocols of accession have been signed.

3.3. Each of the applicant countries is now making a distinctive contribution to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic region. The Assembly urges all applicants to continue their

efforts in implementing their Membership Action Plans (MAPs) as outlined in the Reykjavik communiqué.

3.4. The open door policy must continue. Those countries not invited to join the Alliance at the Prague Summit are expected to join in the future. NATO should consider the issue of enlargement no later than 2007. Assistance in the context of MAPs should be increased.

4. *The Revision of NATO's Roles and Missions*

4.1. In the struggle against terrorism, NATO is the most effective organisation for the use of military forces, for the sharing of appropriate intelligence, for defence against WMD, and for the protection of both military forces and civilian populations against biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological attacks.

4.2. NATO should now endorse defence against the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and particularly the threat of biological, chemical or radiological agents, as a priority for the Allies.

4.3. This priority must be acknowledged in NATO's Strategic Concept and in the military concept for defence against terrorism which is currently under development. It should acquire appropriate prominence in guiding the development of Alliance capabilities. In this context, defence against WMD should be given priority at all levels: arms control, counter-proliferation and disarmament, and the appropriate military capabilities. NATO's Civil Emergency Planning aimed at the protection of civil society should also be given an enhanced role.

4.4. This new mission should not detract from NATO's current role of extending the zone of stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO's enlargement and Europe's stability are of paramount relevance in the face of the new challenges. NATO must continue to be collectively involved in crisis response operations and remain actively engaged with transition countries, particularly in helping partners implement and consolidate defence reforms.

5. *Reform of NATO's Military Structures*

5.1. NATO's existing structures should be further improved to facilitate force projection.

5.2. NATO's integrated command structure should be subject to further reform so that it can support and sustain such campaigns or new missions in the future. The ongoing review of the existing command structure should result in the development of flexible and highly deployable headquarters, ready to move at short notice and with the ability to deal with major regional crises. This review should also take account of the latest and future enlargement of the Alliance.

5.3. The Alliance must encourage the development of multinational, rapidly deployable response forces, as well as the means to transport and sustain them.

5.4. A particular emphasis should be placed on the further development of special forces.

5.5. Noting the problems of recent years in deploying forces in the Balkans, nations must increase substantially the proportion of combat and support forces that are available for deployment in NATO-led missions.

5.6. The Alliance must encourage a degree of role specialisation where countries focus on their particular strengths and existing and planned investments.

5.7. As NATO Defence Ministers recommended at their meeting on 6 June 2002, the Defence Capabilities Initiative must now focus on a small number of high priority goals essential to the full range of Alliance missions including the defence against terrorism. This new initiative should be based on firm national commitments with specific target dates.

5.8. These national commitments should be made transparent for parliamentary monitoring and oversight.

5.9. Priority should be given to projects that maximise multi-nationality and which have the potential to become common NATO assets.

5.10. Every effort should be made to ensure that the NATO and EU capabilities initiatives are mutually reinforcing and thoroughly harmonised through permanent co-ordination mechanisms and procedures in a spirit of openness.

5.11. In view of the potential threat of chemical and biological weapons, priority must be given to the development of the capabilities needed to defend NATO forces and populations against terrorism, WMD and their delivery systems, and other unconventional threats.

5.12. The measures should include the creation of an NBC Event Response Team to be immediately available in the case of an attack and the sharing of technical and material resources in order to assess and mitigate the effects on both military forces and civilians of an NBC attack.

5.13. Priority should be also given to the prevention and countering of cyber-terrorism.

5.14. NATO must redouble its efforts to reduce the fragmentation of defence procurement efforts through the pooling of military capabilities, co-operative acquisition of equipment and common funding. It should reduce to a minimum the obstacles for the sharing of technology.

6. *Relations with the European Union*

6.1. NATO and the European Union are evolving from their respective origins and goals towards a common strategic endeavour in European security and stability. This provides a compelling rationale for the closest possible interaction and collaboration between both organisations in all areas, particularly the struggle against terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, the Petersberg missions and all crisis response operations.

6.2. The “Berlin Plus” formula should be implemented to allow the effective use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations when NATO itself is not involved.

6.3. The EU and NATO must work closely together on the improvement of capabilities.

6.4. Timely and effective consultation and co-operation should be ensured by the establishment of permanent representation in each others’ headquarters.

6.5. In view of the need for a comprehensive response to international terrorism, the closest possible co-ordination and harmonization with the European Union will be essential.

6.6. NATO and the EU should consider and pursue all areas of potential co-operation and co-ordination in crisis management and the fight against terrorism.

6.7. The plans and resources of NATO and the EU in the area of civil emergency planning should be fully co-ordinated to avoid duplication and ensure maximum efficiency.

6.8. Consultation and co-operation between NATO and EU members' internal security agencies in the areas of counter-terrorism and the proliferation of WMD should be intensified and improved.

7. Alliance Engagement

7.1. The engagement in the Balkans of forces from Alliance and other contributing nations under NATO co-ordination has been a crucial factor in restoring peace and security to the region. Significant positive results have been attained, but the situation remains volatile.

7.2. Therefore the Alliance commitment to peace support operations in the Balkans must be sustained in conjunction with the European Union.

8. NATO and Russia

8.1. The deepening of NATO's relationship with Russia and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council provide a solid basis for meeting Euro-Atlantic security challenges while safeguarding NATO's cohesion and freedom of action.

8.2. NATO must increase its efforts to convey to all sectors of Russian society the role that NATO plays and the co-operative nature of the partnership between NATO and Russia.

8.3. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly will work to that same end by continuing to strengthen its relationship with the Russian Federal Assembly through a new NATO PA-Russian Federal Assembly Standing Committee.

9. NATO and Ukraine

9.1. The Assembly welcomes Ukraine's contribution to NATO missions in the Balkans and to the struggle against terrorism.

9.2. The Assembly supports the deepening and broadening of the relationship between NATO and Ukraine to bring it to a qualitatively new level.

9.3. Ukraine must redouble its efforts in the field of defence reform and must ensure that its defence exports are conducted within appropriate national and international regulatory frameworks.

10. Partnership and Co-operation

10.1. NATO has a key role to play in assisting countries in transition through programmes of partnership and co-operation, particularly in implementing much needed defence reforms. This role will become even more important after the enlargement decision in Prague to avoid the emergence of grey areas of instability and insecurity.

10.2. Particular attention and encouragement should be given to endeavours for regional co-operation and to those countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia seeking closer relations with NATO.

10.3. All partners must be involved in the struggle against terrorism and a Partnership plan should be formulated to provide appropriate guidance for the development of contributions and capabilities in that specific area.

10.4. The Alliance's transformation should include a deepening of the Mediterranean Dialogue in order to strengthen mutual understanding and promote peace and stability in that region. NATO should develop a Partnership for Mediterranean Dialogue with countries that seek a closer relationship with the Alliance.

10.5. Encouragement should be given to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in their efforts to implement reforms and to take steps towards a full range of positive relationships with NATO.

11. NATO's Internal Structure

11.1. NATO enlargement and the adoption of new roles and missions will affect the internal functioning of the Alliance. NATO's internal structures should be further streamlined. NATO's Secretary General should be given a mandate to overhaul the internal organisation, under the

guidance of the North Atlantic Council, with the aim of streamlining and reducing the number of committees and ensuring that resources are devoted to supporting the revised political and military priorities.

11.2. Every effort must be made to maximise the speed and effectiveness of the NATO decision-making process while preserving the consensus-building principle.

11.3. The work of NATO on science and environment should be directed specifically towards supporting projects that are relevant to current security challenges.

12. NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

12.1. NATO should work more closely with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in developing partnership programmes, strengthening and broadening the transatlantic relationship, and ensuring that NATO's roles and missions are better appreciated and understood by the populations in the Euro-Atlantic region, through greater transparency and openness. To this end, the Alliance must continue, and if possible increase, its efforts in public information and outreach policies.

12.2. Carrying through the changes needed to sustain NATO's relevance will require the engagement and active support of public opinion throughout the Alliance. Members of Parliament have a key role in reflecting public concerns and in providing the necessary resources. Public support must be sustained through full transparency, accountability and effective parliamentary oversight.

12.3. As the collective parliamentary voice of the Alliance, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly plays a central role in making Alliance policies more transparent and accountable.